-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 106
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
[SECURITY][CVE-2019-10248] Releases are built/executed/released in the context of insecure/untrusted code #1434
Comments
Signed-off-by: vlvanchin <vanchinathan.lokanathan@bosch-si.com>
Signed-off-by: vlvanchin <vanchinathan.lokanathan@bosch-si.com>
Signed-off-by: vlvanchin <vanchinathan.lokanathan@bosch-si.com>
Were previous releases re-built to ensure there wasn't compromise or should a CVE number be requested? |
Hi @JLLeitschuh |
I'm pretty busy. Here is a similar CVE for Eclipse Hawkbit eclipse/hawkbit#812 (comment) |
@aedelmann Do you want me to file for the CVE number? CC: @waynebeaton |
Hi @JLLeitschuh |
@aedelmann Can you let me know what released version this was first fixed in? |
Hi @JLLeitschuh |
@aedelmann I don't think I can submit the CVE request. The eclipse foundation is a CNA. Please request a CVE from @waynebeaton using the eclipse bug tracker. Here's an example for Hawkbit. |
@JLLeitschuh Ok, will try to do that next week. |
Hi @JLLeitschuh |
Just to link to the CVE for reference: |
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
The build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.
This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 Base Score of 8.1/10
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
This isn't just theoretical
POC code has existed since 2014 to maliciously compromise a JAR file inflight.
See:
MITM Attacks Increasingly Common
See:
Source Locations
vorto/pom.xml
Lines 105 to 114 in a48e4c2
Original Report
https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=544852
This was originally responsibly disclosed privately, but I was asked to make it public by @waynebeaton.
Public Disclosure
Option 1: File for a CVE
A project maintainer for this project should probably file for a CVE number to inform the public about this vulnerability in the build for this project. The goal is to inform the public that there was a potential for published build artifacts to have been maliciously compromised in earlier releases.
If a maintainer on this project works for or is associated with a CNA, please have them file it with them:
cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html
Otherwise, an open source CVE should be filed for here:
iwantacve.org
Option 2: Manually validate the release artifacts
If this project's build is fully reproducible. An alternative to filing for a CVE is to go back and build the earlier releases (with the HTTPS patch applied) to confirm the artifacts were not tampered when they were built. This can be done by comparing the hashes of the artifacts built locally with the ones published. If the hashes of all previous artifacts match those that are published, you can safely assume that the releases were not tampered with.
Again, this assumes that the build if fully reproducible and will require significantly more work.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: