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Author(s): John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell

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Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434¹

John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell
University of Chicago

We analyze the centralization of political parties and elite networks that underlay the birth of the Renaissance state in Florence. Class revolt and fiscal crisis were the ultimate causes of elite consolidation, but Medicean political control was produced by means of network disjunctures within the elite, which the Medici alone spanned. Cosimo de' Medici's multivocal identity as sphinx harnessed the power available in these network holes and resolved the contradiction between judge and boss inherent in all organizations. Methodologically, we argue that to understand state formation one must penetrate beneath the veneer of formal institutions, groups, and goals down to the relational substrata of peoples' actual lives. Ambiguity and heterogeneity, not planning and self-interest, are the raw materials of which powerful states and persons are constructed.

INTRODUCTION

Regardless of time or place, political centralization lies at the heart of state building. Less widely appreciated is the fact that the process of centralization is contradictory: its agents are forced to seek both reproduction and control. Centralization occurs, often abruptly, when founders emerge out of the soup of contending actors to establish (perhaps unintentionally) new rules for others' interaction. Reproduction ensues when rules induce roles, which induce interests, which induce strategic exchanges, which lock in patterns of collective action that depend on the

¹ Our colleague Paul McLean is a full joint participant in the larger project out of which this paper has been drawn. His help has been invaluable. We would also like to thank Wayne Baker, Ronald Breiger, Gene Brucker, Michael Cohen, Samuel Cohn, Walter Fontana, Mark Granovetter, the late David Greenstone, Wendy Griswold, the late David Herlihy, Alex Hicks, Ian Lustick, Charles Perrow, Tony Tam, Charles Tilly, and participants in the University of Chicago's Organizations and State-Building Workshop, the New School's "think and drink" seminar, and the Santa Fe Institute's Adaptive Organizations Conference for their many helpful comments. This article is dedicated to the memory of David Herlihy, whose quantitative research on Renaissance Florence made work like this possible.

rules.² Control is when others' locked-in interactions generate a flow of collective behavior that just happens to serve one's interests.

The contradiction, in state building or in any organization, is between judge and boss: founders cannot be both at once. Stable self-regulating maintenance of rules (i.e., legitimacy) hinges on contending actors' conviction that judges and rules are not motivated by self-interest (Elster 1983; Padgett 1986; Douglas 1986). At the same time, the nightmare of all founders is that their organizational creation will walk away from them. As Weber recognized long ago, in crisis (sooner or later inevitable), direct intervention in or overt domination of locked-in interactions is a sure sign of control's absence, not of its presence. Tactical tinkering to maintain fleeting control sucks in founders to locked-in role frames, thereby inducing attributions of self-interest and undermining their judicial perch above the fray.

This article analyzes one historical resolution of this state-building contradiction: the early 15th-century rise of Cosimo de' Medici in Renaissance Florence. We focus in particular on analyzing the structure and the sequential emergence of the marriage, economic, and patronage networks that constituted the Medicean political party, used by Cosimo in 1434 to take over the budding Florentine Renaissance state.

The historical case is exemplary in numerous ways. From a state centralization perspective, the period marks the abrupt transition from the late medieval pattern of fluid urban factionalism to the birth of a regionally consolidated Renaissance state (Baron 1966).³ Before the advent of the Medici, two centuries of late medieval Florentine politics could be characterized by a cyclic alternation between guild corporatism and warring urban feudal factions, as is implied by figure 1. Originally, the Medici partook of this ancient rhythm, which became puzzlingly muted thereby. After the rise of the Medici, the periodic explosion of the system, under the pressure of "new men" families surging from below, abruptly stopped, never to be renewed.⁴

² Feedback dependence is not necessarily of the form of everyone's obeying the rules. More common is when rules structure the patterned process of subverting themselves, thereby sustaining a mutual symbiosis between subversion and rules. See Padgett (1990) for an example in the domain of courts.

³ The oligarchic regime of Maso degli Albizzi and Niccolo da Uzzano (1382–1433) was significant in effecting this transition, as well as Cosimo's regime (1434–1464). The oligarchic regime spawned the formally democratic institutions that newly constituted "the consensual state" (Najemy 1982). Through political party networks, the Medicean regime learned how to use these institutions for purposes of control (Rubinstein 1966).

⁴ "New men" (*novi cives*) refers to families only "recently" admitted to legal participation in the state. See fig. 1.




FIG. 1.—New families admitted to the Signoria, 1282–1532 (Source: Najemy 1982, pp. 320–22).

The dynamic underlying Florentine state centralization, we shall show, was this: unsuccessful class revolt (1378–82) and fiscal catastrophe due to wars (1424–33) were the ultimate causes, but these shocks were transmitted through the ratchet mechanism of elite network transformation. A citywide oligarchy, cemented through marriage, first emerged from a quasi-feudal federation of patrician neighborhood hierarchies. The very process of oligarchic consolidation, however, also produced the agent of its own destruction: the Medici party. The Medici party was a heterogeneous mixture of contradictory interests and crosscutting networks. In stark contrast to this fact, contemporaries perceived the Medici categorically as “heroes of the new men.” The Medici’s contradictory agglomeration exhibited great cohesion and capacity for sustained collective action. But what the Medici stood for is unclear to this day.

On the surface, it seems obvious that Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464) did it all. Cosimo de’ Medici was multiply embedded in complicated and sprawling Florentine marriage, economic, and patronage elite networks. And he was riding herd on vast macropolitical and macroeconomic forces far beyond his control. Yet he founded a dynasty that dominated Florence for three centuries. He consolidated a Europe-wide banking network that helped induce both international trade and state making elsewhere (de Roover 1966). And he oversaw and sponsored the Florentine intellectual and artistic efflorescence that we now call “the Renaissance.”

Contemporaries deeply appreciated Cosimo’s power. Foreign princes after 1434 flocked to Cosimo’s private palazzo to work out international relations, much to the consternation of bypassed Florentine officials. Cosimo was legally enshrined on his death as the father of his country—no mean recognition from citizens as cynical and suspicious as the Florentines. Machiavelli ([1525] 1988), almost a full century later, still held Cosimo and his family in awe—attributing both all good and all evil in recent Florentine history to Cosimo’s deep and ruthless machinations.⁵

Yet the puzzle about Cosimo’s control is this: totally contrary to Machiavelli’s portrait in *The Prince* of effective leaders as decisive and goal oriented, eyewitness accounts describe Cosimo de’ Medici as an indecipherable sphinx (Brown 1961, p. 186). “Cosimo was anxious to remain in the background, hiding his great influence, and acting, when need arose, through a deputy. As a result, very little is known of the measures for which he was directly responsible” (Gutkind 1938, p. 124). Despite almost complete domination of the state, Cosimo never assumed lasting

⁵ This is not entirely surprising, since Niccolò Machiavelli enjoyed the freedom to write in the first place because he had been outmaneuvered into exile by his boyhood friends, the Medici. Only their memory of his childhood saved Machiavelli from summary execution, a fact that probably focused his gaze.

public office.⁶ And he hardly ever gave a public speech.⁷ Lest one conclude that this implies only savvy back-room dealing, extant accounts of private meetings with Cosimo emphasize the same odd passivity.⁸ After passionate pleas by supplicants for action of some sort, Cosimo typically would terminate a meeting graciously but icily, with little more commitment than “Yes my son, I shall look into that” (cf. Vespasiano 1963, pp. 223, 226).

Moreover, especially after 1434, all action by Cosimo (never explained or rationalized) appeared extraordinarily reactive in character. Everything was done in response to a flow of requests that, somehow or other, “just so happened” to serve Cosimo’s extremely multiple interests.

We use the term “robust action” to refer to Cosimo’s style of control. The key to understanding Cosimo’s sphinxlike character, and the judge/boss contradiction thereby, we argue, is multivocality—the fact that single actions can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously, the fact that single actions can be moves in many games at once, and the fact that public and private motivations cannot be parsed. Multivocal action leads to Rorschach blot identities, with all alters constructing their own distinctive attribution of the identity of ego. The “only” point of this, from the perspective of ego, is flexible opportunism—maintaining discretionary options across unforeseeable futures in the face of hostile attempts by others to narrow those options.

⁶ The only state offices Cosimo ever held were short-term: three two-month terms as Gonfalonier of Justice (Gutkind 1938, p. 123), a one-year stint as one of the Ufficiali del Banco in 1428 (Molho 1971, p. 218), and a few martial and Monte commissions.

⁷ We know of Cosimo’s reticence because Florentine verbatim documentation of Consulte e Pratiche (an informal “inner elite” advisory body) and other speeches is very extensive. Two rare exceptions were a 1446 debate about potential electoral reforms (Rubinstein 1966, p. 24) and a vigorous public debate with Neri Capponi in 1450 about whether Florence should realign from Venice to Milan (Gutkind 1938, p. 110).

⁸ Contemporaneous reports of Cosimo’s personal style are as follows: “He acted privately with the greatest discretion in order to safeguard himself, and whenever he sought to attain an object he contrived to let it appear that the matter had been set in motion by someone other than himself. . . . He replies were brief and sometimes obscure, so that they might be made to bear a double sense” (Vespasiano [ca. 1495] 1963, p. 223). “In 1432, just before his exile and triumphant return, a political opponent, Francesco Filefo, described in a letter how Cosimo, in contrast to his ‘open and lighthearted’ brother, Lorenzo, ‘is, I notice, despite appearing devoted to me, the kind of man who feigns and dissembles everything. He is so taciturn that he can scarcely be understood even by his intimates and servants in his family circle’” (Brown 1992, p. 106). “Said Neri di Gino [Capponi] to Cosimo: I would like for you to say things clearly to me, so that I can understand you. He replied: Learn my language!” (Poliziano [ca. 1478] 1985, p. 57). Cosimo’s speech, when it occurred, was often Delphic in form. “As Gutkind has suggested, in this situation Cosimo’s use of proverbs and fables served a useful political purpose—in delivering messages ‘in such a way that no one noticed,’ as Vespasiano put it” (Brown 1992, p. 106).

Crucial for maintaining discretion is *not* to pursue any specific goals. For in nasty strategic games, like Florence or like chess, positional play is the maneuvering of opponents into the forced clarification of their (but not your) tactical lines of action.⁹ Locked-in commitment to lines of action, and thence to goals, is the product not of individual choice but at least as much of others' successful "ecological control" over you (Padgett 1981). Victory, in Florence, in chess, or in *go* means locking in others, but not yourself, to goal-oriented sequences of strategic play that become predictable thereby.¹⁰

Robust action resolves the contradiction between judge and boss because at the center there are no unequivocal self-interests. Cosimo, after all, "merely" responded graciously to the flow of requests. Because requests had to flow to him, others, not Cosimo himself, struggled to infer and then to serve Cosimo's inscrutable interests. Control was diffused throughout the structure of others' self-fashionings.

Of course, robust action will not work for just anyone. For the flow of requests to be channeled, only some network structures will do. And for the resolution of judge and boss to be credible, coherent interests must remain opaque as far down as it is conceivable to peer.¹¹ Contra Machiavelli, even Cosimo himself did not set out with a grand design to take over the state: this assumption reads history backward. As this article will show, Cosimo's political party first emerged around him. Only later, during the Milan war, did Cosimo suddenly apprehend the political capacity of the social network machine that lay at his fingertips.

⁹ Our original inspiration for the robust action idea was the research of Eric Leifer (1991; this is a revised version of his 1985 Harvard University dissertation), who studied chess. While skill, not identity, was Leifer's main focus, he did point out that experts' moves in chess and in dyadic roles often are directed toward maintaining multiple lines of play, especially in balanced situations. Of course, one difference between Florence and chess is that the multiple networks of Florence constituted an entire linked ecology of games, each game layered on top of another. One single action, therefore, might be a move in multiple games simultaneously.

¹⁰ Harrison C. White (1992) argues along similar lines. John Holland was the one who informed us that locking in others but not yourself to clear lines of play is also the secret to victory in the Japanese game *go*.

¹¹ Of course, Cosimo had goals tied to specific roles—to make money as a banker, to increase family prestige through marriage, to maintain power as leader of Florence—but the points here are three: (1) goals are properties of roles, not of persons, (2) no overarching trade-off or utility function existed for Cosimo that could prioritize these possibly conflicting role-based goals, and (3) once he was in structural position, success in attaining these goals flowed to him without tactical intervention or even effort on his part. In Cosimo's special position, indeed, which role was in play at which time was not transparent. Therefore, whether Cosimo de' Medici was really a person, as conceived by modern liberalism, is undecidable by any means available to us, or to them (cf. Goffman 1974, pp. 293–300; Foucault 1975).

The bulk of this article is an archaeological dig for the structural preconditions of that learning and of that success.

These arguments will be developed in the following stages: after a brief summary of data, we will analyze first the attributional composition and then the social network structure of the Medici party, during the period 1427–34, as compared with those of their opponents, the “oligarchs.” After this cross-sectional anatomy, we will sketch the long-term historical dynamic—the emergence first of the marriage and second of the economic patronage halves of the Medici party as a function of ongoing transformations within the Florentine elite. At the end, we will show how contradictory networks induced both robust action in Cosimo and political legitimacy in the Medicean state.

DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION

This article is empirically possible because of the thorough and impressive work of many historians of Florence. In particular, we build on the work of Dale Kent, whose book, *The Rise of the Medici* (1978), in the tradition of Lewis Namier (1929), is an intimate prosopographical description of the network foundations both of the Medici party, or faction, and of the looser alliance system of their opponents.¹² From the detailed text of this account, we coded a core network data set, which consists of information on the following nine types of relations among early 15th-century Florentine elite families: (a) one type of kinship relation—intermarriage ties,¹³ (b) four types of economic relations—trading or business ties, joint ownerships or partnerships, bank employment, and real estate ties,¹⁴ (c) two types of “political” relations—patronage and per-

¹² Some may question whether the term “party” is apt for such an early time period. If presentist definitions, which include reference to mass electorates, are insisted on, then of course the Medici did not organize a party. But the Medicean organization was mobilized, in part, in order to influence the outcomes of popular elections (called “scrutinies”) for government office, albeit in a restricted electorate. This certainly fits dictionary meanings of the term.

¹³ At the valuable suggestion of Ronald Breiger, we took care in the second round of our coding to distinguish the family that provided the marrying male from the family that provided the marrying female. Hence, unlike the data provided to Breiger and Pattison (1986), the interfamily marriage relations analyzed here are asymmetric. Only marriages occurring in the time period 1394–1434 were coded. The modern reader may need reminding that all of the elite marriages recorded here were arranged by patriarchs (or their equivalents) in the two families. Intraelite marriages were conceived of partially in political alliance terms. Hence, there is little doubt that, in this time and place, marriage relations were interfamily, not interpersonal, relations.

¹⁴ Kent’s sources for all these different types of economic relations (except bank employment) were the 1427 and 1433 *catasti*, which are registers of tax reports. Trading and partnership data were symmetric, by definition, since information on directional-

sonal loans,¹⁵ and (d) two types of personal friendship relations—personal friends and *mallevadori*, or surety, ties.¹⁶ Social network ties were constituents of, as well as backdrops to, Florentine political party formation.

These network data, coded from Kent, were supplemented with attributional data coded from a variety of sources: (a) economic wealth was obtained from the computer tape of the 1427 *catasto*, coded and generously made available for public access by the late David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (1981);¹⁷ (b) “date of first Prior,” the Florentine measure of family social status, was obtained from Najemy (1982) and Kent (1975);¹⁸ (c) neighborhood residence, at both the ward (*gonfalone*) and the quarter levels, was obtained from Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber’s tape (1981) and from Kent (1975); and (d) 1403 tax assessments, for the richest 600 households in the city, were obtained from Martines (1963). In addition, for interpretative purposes, systematic data over time on factional memberships, bank employment, city finances, and rates of neighborhood exogamy were obtained from Brucker (1962, 1977), de Roover (1966), Molho (1971), and Cohn (1980), respectively.

All in all, the unusual richness of these data, from such a distant time, bear witness to the impressive creativity and industry both of the original

ity of trade and magnitude of partnership investment was not provided by Kent. Kent’s asymmetric bank employment data were coded mostly from de Roover (1966). Real estate ties were coded as symmetric when they referred to joint ownership of property, and as asymmetric when they referred to rental relations.

¹⁵ “Political” is in quotations here because the motivations underlying these relations may be complicated: a mixture of political aid, economic exchange, personal friendship, and unspecified “building up of credits.” Such mixtures of motives are typical of multifaceted patron-client relations.

¹⁶ Personal friends were coded conservatively as such only when Kent seemed to indicate, on the basis of surviving letters, that the relationship had no political content. This coding rule keeps “friendship” from being confounded by our dependent variable, membership in political faction. *Mallevadori* are friends who put up surety, or bond, to guarantee the good behavior of an exile. “Citizens who helped relatives or friends accused of political crimes were motivated by a strong sense of obligation, for they were risking not only money, but their reputations and status” (Brucker 1977, p. 29).

¹⁷ Household economic wealth was aggregated to the clan or “common last name” level of aggregation, to be consistent with other attributional data. Some small amount of error is inevitable in this procedure (Kent 1978, p. 119).

¹⁸ The Priorate (or city council), first created in 1282, was Florence’s governing body. This board was almost sacred in its ritual construction (Trexler 1980): membership, on a randomly rotating (within a select circle) two-month-term basis, was public confirmation of one’s family’s and one’s own highest status and honor, in peers’ eyes (Martines 1963). Hence, the date of first Prior measures how old and dignified one’s family was. Consciousness of their family’s date of entry into the elite, relative to other families’ dates of entry, was acute among Florentines.

Florentine scribes and of the modern historians who labor in the Florentine field.

Two matters are important to clarify at the outset, in order to frame the universe of this study—the definition of “family” and the definition of “elite.”

Operationally, “family” here means “people with a common last name.” Hence, it is more equivalent to clan than to household.¹⁹ This level of aggregation is forced on us by the nature of some of our data (particularly, date of first Prior and neighborhood).²⁰ However, F. W. Kent (1977) provides strong substantive justification for this coding. Relations between distant lineages in an elite clan were less solidary during the Renaissance than they had been in medieval *consorteria* times. But, contra Burckhardt (1860) and Goldthwaite (1968), the Renaissance in Florence was not an era of individualism. Relations among households in a clan were typically, although not universally, very strong (see also Brucker 1977, pp. 18–19). The turbulence of the times reinforced defensive cohesion (Brucker 1977, pp. 19–21; Kent and Kent 1981). And communal citizenship and office-holding regulations during the early 15th-century placed more emphasis on the unitary legal character of clans than before (Witt 1976, p. 262; Najemy 1982, chap. 8). In other words, while the clan level of data aggregation is indeed a data convenience, it was also a Florentine social reality.

The definition of “elite” is more complicated. The Florentine political elite (called the *reggimento*) was in no way identical to the Florentine economic elite, in part because of volatility in international markets. In our definition, which emphasizes political practice, we follow the lead of Kent (1975), who in turn follows the practice of Brucker (1977).

For us, a Florentine family is politically elite if it satisfies any of the following criteria: (a) it had two or more members who spoke in the Consulte e Pratiche three or more times between January 1429 and December 1434, (b) it had three or more members who qualified in 1433 for scrutiny, or election to the leading public offices in Florence,²¹ or (c) it was a magnate clan.²² Information on the former two criteria is contained

¹⁹ The median number of households in the 92 elite families studied here is nine. One household, in turn, may contain a number of politically active brothers, in addition to the patriarch father. (See Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber [1985] for more information on elite vs. nonelite household composition.)

²⁰ But also Kent and Brucker, following the practice of Florentine chroniclers, frequently report alliances and ties by family name only.

²¹ In particular, the so-called Tre Maggiori: the Signoria (or Priorate) and the Dodici and Sedici (auxiliary colleges to the Signoria).

²² Magnate clans were old, previously powerful and violent noble families that had misbehaved politically in the past. They and their offspring were punished by the

in Kent (1975); information on the last criterion (added because of the political importance of this legally excluded group) is contained in Becker (1965) and Lansing (1991). Since official Florentine political participation was comparatively broad, this liberal definition of the ruling elite contains more parvenu new men and upper middle classes than one might expect.

In all, 215 Florentine families (i.e., clans) satisfied one or more of these criteria. Attributes of these 215 families are analyzed in the following section. Kent's book (1978) contains information on at least one marriage or economic relation for 92 of these 215 families. These 92 families are the basis for the network analysis contained herein.

By intention, Kent's book is a comparative study of the Medici party and its oligarch opponents. Hence, the 92-family "sample" is skewed, relative to the 215-family elite "universe," toward active participation in factions and away from political neutrals.²³ We are not aware of any sample bias in Kent's selection of network data *among* partisans.²⁴

NETWORK STRUCTURE

Attributional Analyses of Florentine Partisanship

Let us begin our analysis in the traditional way: namely, let us ask, Who exactly were the Mediceans and their oligarch opponents? And what social interests did they represent? Four hypotheses (not necessarily mutually exclusive) have been presented in the literature, all built around a common assumption that politics fundamentally means a struggle between self-interested groups.

victorious *popolani* in 1293, and occasionally thereafter, by being excluded legally from high public office (Becker 1965; Lansing 1991). They were politically defanged, however, only in this formal sense.

²³ This fact means that it is difficult, with these data, to study factional participation—only factional membership, given participation, can be studied. As will be seen in the attributional analyses below, however, "factional participation" included virtually all of the economically and socially important families in Florence. Nonparticipation was more an issue for the politically active, but not factional, middle classes. We are currently working to expand our network data set with primary materials, in part in order to evaluate potential sample selection problems. Padgett has been coding original *Carte dell'Ancisa* marriage records in the Florentine archives, covering the *longue durée* period 1300–1500. Our colleague, Paul McLean, likewise has been coding original 1427 and 1433 *catasti* tax records in order to assemble a broader cross-section of economic relations in the Florentine elite. Analyses of these primary materials will be reported in future publications.

²⁴ In particular, residential distribution of marriage dyads (possibly relevant for bias in estimated exogamy rates, calculated below) is not seriously skewed. The slight overrepresentation of San Giovanni families if anything works against the Medici neighborhood exogamy finding reported below.

An older economic class hypothesis is that the oligarchs were rich, and the Mediceans were of the middling sort. Prominent recent exponents of the class perspective, albeit not explicitly applied to the Medici, include Martines (1963) and Cohn (1980). An important variant of the economic class hypothesis applies not to volume of wealth but to its change: the Mediceans were rising economic parvenus, while oligarchs were “old money,” generally on the decline.²⁵

Tables 1–4 present distributional data on these two economic class hypotheses for the entire 215-family universe of elite. Distributions of wealth and of change in wealth are tabulated for Medici partisan families, for oligarchic partisan families, and for neutral families. Party memberships were taken, here and throughout this paper, from the two lists published as appendices to Kent (1978).²⁶

Both economic class hypotheses are false. While both the Mediceans and the oligarchs were significantly more wealthy than the neutrals, the two parties’ wealth distributions were statistically identical to each other. Moreover, the elite was not split into partisan rich and neutral poor; both parties were extremely heterogeneous in their wealth composition. A similar story holds for change in wealth, as measured relative to a 1403 base. A Marxist class struggle this was not.

Correlated with but not identical to the economic class view is the social class (or prestige) argument: the oligarch party was recruited from older patricians, whereas the Mediceans were new men—defined not in terms of wealth, but rather in terms of the political age of their families. Brucker (1962, 1977) and Becker (1962) are the most prominent exponents of the view that broad stretches of Florentine history should be analyzed primarily as a conflict between old and new family political cohorts. Bolstering this interpretation is the fact that numerous contemporaries, such as (pseudo) Niccolo da Uzzano (Kent 1978, pp. 212–14) and the chronicler Cavalcanti, forcefully analyzed the conflict in class terms, without always distinguishing between economic and social versions.

As presented in tables 5 and 6, evidence for the social class hypothesis is mixed. The oligarchs were indeed more skewed toward patricians than were the Mediceans, but this was due to the relative absence of new men

²⁵ Logically, a third variant might be occupational in focus: the Mediceans were bankers, and the oligarchs rentiers. However, no one in the literature has, to our knowledge, seriously proffered this view, for the simple reason that Florentine economic elites are well-known to have been extremely multifaceted and nonspecialized in their money-making activities.

²⁶ Kent identified Medicean partisans primarily from private letters to and from the Medici. She identified oligarch partisans from lists of those exiled when the Medici took over.

TABLE 1
REGGIMENTO FAMILY DISTRIBUTIONS OF WEALTH IN 1427

Gross Wealth (1,000 florins)	No. of Oligarch Families	No. of Medicean Families	No. of Neutral Families	Total No. of Families	Proportion Partisan
More than 100	4	2	0	6	1.000
50-100	7	7	6	21	.714
10-50	16	23	44	86	.488
0-10	14	10	58	83	.301
Missing	0	0	18	19	.053
Total	41	42	126	215	.414

NOTE.—Median gross wealth (in florins) was, for oligarch families, 21,053; for Medicean families, 20,874; for neutral families, 9,052; for total families, 12,414. The source for the data in this table is Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1981). "Family" is operationally defined by common last name. Hence, the gross family wealth reported here is sums of the prededuction wealth of all households that shared last names in the 1427 *catasto*, according to Herlihy's computerized coding. Numbers do not add perfectly because of families whose partisan loyalties were split. When split families had a majority on one partisan side or the other, they were allocated to the majority side for purposes of the attributional analyses here. However, six families were tied, and excluded from all tabular breakdowns (but not from proportion partisan calculations).

TABLE 2
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL DIFFERENCE IN FAMILY WEALTH

	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic	One-tailed <i>P</i>
Mediceans vs. oligarchs1051	.632
Mediceans vs. neutrals3942	.000
Oligarchs vs. neutrals3202	.002

NOTE.—Here and in tables 4 and 6, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics were calculated on the basis of underlying continuous distributions, not on the basis of the summary tables 1, 3, and 5, in which the data have been made ordinal through cut points. Stricter one-tailed tests which use the chi-square approximation, not the more usual two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, are applied in tables 2, 4, and 6 since the literature implies the following expectations: Mediceans were on average less wealthy, more recently wealthy, and newer (in terms of first Prior) than oligarchs. See Blalock (1972, p. 264) for this one-tailed chi-square approximation procedure, which makes it harder to reject the hypothesis that parties are different. (I thank Ed Laumann for this suggestion.)

from the oligarch party, not to the absence of patricians from the Medicean side. Mediceans were not more new men than the oligarchs; they simply were more socially heterogeneous. Relative to political neutrals as a control group, the Mediceans were distinctly old-guard patrician in cast.

Finally, both Dale Kent herself (1978; Kent and Kent 1982) and F. W.

TABLE 3

REGGIMENTO FAMILY DISTRIBUTIONS OF RELATIVE WEALTH CHANGE, 1403-27

Estimated Change in Relative Wealth	No. of Oligarch Families	No. of Medicean Families	No. of Neutral Families	Total No. of Families	Proportion Partisan
More than 100%.....	2	7	7	17	.588
0% to 100%.....	15	11	19	46	.587
0% to -50%.....	8	7	17	34	.500
-50% to -100%....	4	8	17	29	.414
Missing.....	12	9	66	89	.258
Total.....	41	42	126	215	.414

NOTE.—Median tax in 1403 was 24 florins; median wealth in 1427 was 22,500 florins. The sources for the data in this table are Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1981) and Martines (1963). Since systematic data on wealth do not exist before the 1427 *catasto*, this table is based on the tax tables of 1403 *prestanza* (or forced loans) found in Martines (1963, pp. 353-65). These tables report tax data only on the 150 wealthiest households in each of the four quarters—that is, 600 households in all. Thus, the 1403 *prestanza* information used here is a truncated data set. *Prestanza* tax data of course are not comparable to gross wealth data, so both data sets were standardized by their medians before estimated change was calculated—that is, estimated change = [(1427 wealth/wealth median) - (1403 tax/tax median)]/(1403 tax/tax median). Because of this standardization, "estimated change" refers not to absolute change in florins, which is impossible to know, but rather to relative change, in ranked comparison to peers. Data in the above table (and associated medians) include only those families with nonmissing data in both 1403 and 1427. Missing data is a serious problem here because of the truncated nature of Martines's 1403 "wealthiest" data set.

TABLE 4

KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL DIFFERENCE IN (Estimated) RELATIVE WEALTH CHANGE

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic	One-tailed P
Mediceans vs. oligarchs1735	.395
Mediceans vs. neutrals1606	.333
Oligarchs vs. neutrals.....	.2954	.033

NOTE.—For an explanation of the statistics used, see table 2.

Kent (1977, 1987; Kent and Kent 1982), without directly disagreeing with either class view, distinctively emphasize the importance of neighborhood: The Medici party was rooted in the San Giovanni quarter, particularly the Medici's home ward of Lion d'oro, whereas their opponents were centered in the Santa Croce quarter.

Tables 7 and 8 show that there was no statistically significant difference between the two parties by neighborhood. This does not mean that

TABLE 5
REGGIMENTO FAMILY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIAL PRESTIGE

Date of First Prior	No. of Oligarch Families	No. of Medicean Families	No. of Neutral Families	Total No. of families	Proportion Partisan
1282-1299.....	24	19	26	72	.639
1300-1342.....	10	7	30	48	.375
1343-1377.....	5	9	31	45	.311
1378-1434.....	2	7	33	44	.250
Missing	0	0	6	6	.000
Total	41	42	126	215	.414

NOTE.—Median date of first Prior is, for oligarch families, 1289; for Medicean families, 1318.5; for neutral families, 1349; for total families, 1327. The source for the data in this table is Najemy (1982, 323-27). Except for the arbitrary date of 1300, the intervals in dates reported here are defined by major revolutions in the history of Florence: 1282, 1343, and 1378. Since large waves of new families were admitted to eligibility in the priorate during these revolutions, the historical periodization in table 5 corresponds to discrete political cohorts. Old magnates either have no date of first Prior, by virtue of never being legally eligible for this office, or have a misleadingly recent date of first Prior, if they were reinstated as *popolani* somewhere along the line. Therefore, most magnates were coded as having a date of 1284, essentially the oldest possible. There are 21 magnate families in this data set.

TABLE 6
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL DIFFERENCE IN SOCIAL PRESTIGE

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic	One-tailed <i>P</i>
Mediceans vs. oligarchs2968	.026
Mediceans vs. neutrals2619	.014
Oligarchs vs. neutrals.....	.4477	.000

NOTE.—For an explanation of the statistics used, see table 2.

geography was irrelevant: the two parties mirrored each other in geographical concentration, especially relative to neutrals. The Mediceans were indeed overrepresented in San Giovanni, but then again so were the oligarchs. San Giovanni was the most polarized of quarters; Santa Croce was a distant second.

The main theme that comes through these attributional analyses is similarity, not difference. With the important exception of the absence of new men from the oligarch side, the Mediceans and oligarchs were mirror images of each other. The elite as a whole appears to have fractured in two, with no underlying social group basis.

A deep historical enigma remains. Contrary to these heterogeneous

TABLE 7
REGGIMENTO FAMILY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENCE

Quarter of City	No. of Oligarch Families	No. of Medicane Families	No. of Neutral Families	Total No. of Families	Proportion Partisan
Santo Spirito	7	8	36	52	.308
Santa Croce	14	6	33	55	.400
Santa Maria Novella.....	9	7	29	46	.370
San Giovanni	11	21	27	61	.557
Missing.....	0	0	1	1	.000
Total.....	41	42	126	215	.414

NOTE.—The source for these data, both for the four quarters and for the 16 *gonfaloni* (or wards), is Kent (1975, pp. 624–32).

TABLE 8
CHI-SQUARE TESTS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL DIFFERENCE IN RESIDENCE

	ACROSS QUARTERS (<i>df</i> = 3)		ACROSS GONFALONI (<i>df</i> = 15)	
	χ^2	<i>P</i>	χ^2	<i>P</i>
Mediceans vs. oligarchs	6.629	.084	17.806	.273
Mediceans vs. neutrals	12.554	.006	29.567	.014
Oligarchs vs. neutrals.....	2.683	.443	19.660	.185

membership statistics, contemporaries had a perfectly clear, almost polemical, understanding of what was at stake. Virtually all recorded participants interpreted the partisan conflict in traditional economic and/or social class terms: the oligarchs were considered to be the conservative party of old, wealthy, and threatened patricians, and the Mediceans were considered to be the heroes of the economically rising new men (Brucker 1977; Kent 1978). This in spite of the fact that it does not objectively appear to be true.²⁷ A puzzling structural mismatch existed between clear cognitive typifications of social groups at the level of culture and extreme heterogeneity and overlap of social groups at the level of behavioral action.

This puzzle about mismatch between cognition and behavior remains

²⁷ Moreover, even if the difference were one of policy, not one of membership, fig. 1 shows clearly that the Medici did not in fact represent the interests of the new men once they assumed office.

to be solved, but even at this point we can conclude that tables 1–8 provide *prima facie* evidence against classical group theories of parties, of either the pluralist or the neo-Marxist varieties. These theories assume that parties represent coalitions of groups. But political “groups” in the sense of sets of attributionally similar individuals who solve collective action problems in order to coordinate action on common (latent) interests simply did not exist in Renaissance Florence. Indeed, as we shall show below, the more homogeneous the attributes, the less coherent the collective action. We do not argue thereby that social attributes and groups are irrelevant to party formation; merely that their role needs to be understood within a deeper relational context. There is no simple mapping of groups or spatial dimensions onto parties; social attributes and group interests are “merely” *cognitive* categories, which party mobilization, networks, and action crosscut.

Social Structure: Blockmodel Analysis

We now look more directly at this mobilization, through an analysis of our nine microstructural networks. Party organization was not reflective of any one of these networks, taken alone, but Kent has already demonstrated persuasively the fact that both parties were constructed from differing concatenations of preexisting social networks. We will return in subsequent sections to examine the consequences of these patterns of micromobilization for the aggregate social characteristics (or “interests”) that they organized.

The essential step in this task is to derive an overall relational picture of Florence’s social structure, within the 92-family ruling elite. For the purposes of this article, we define “social structure” to be marriage and economic networks, which we take to be “strong ties” in Granovetter’s (1973) sense.²⁸ Figure 2a presents, in graphical form, the result of our

²⁸ This distinction between “strong tie” marriage and economic networks and “weak tie” political and friendship networks was to some extent arrived at inductively. We were concerned from the beginning with excluding patronage and friendship networks from this particular analysis, because these might be too close to our dependent variable, political partisanship, to be considered legitimate independent predictors. Marriage and economic networks, on the other hand, are driven primarily by nonpartisan calculations. It goes against the whole thrust of our article to assert that these networks were independent of politics, but the first-order consideration in economic relations was making money, while the first-order consideration in marriage was hierarchical status. Furthermore, partisan politics operated on a higher-frequency temporal pulse than did the more glacially changing marriage and economic structures. Personal loans and *mallevadori* ties, however, were ambiguous in our minds. We ran the blockmodel analyses both including and excluding these networks and examined the robustness of the resulting partitions as well as the goodness of fit (see below). Includ-

analyses: an aggregate blockmodel image of the marriage and economic networks, obtained by methods described in Appendix A. Figure 2b presents the parallel blockmodel image of “weak tie” political and friendship networks, based on the family clusters generated by the analysis of marriage and economic data. Appendix B lists the cluster memberships of those families that are contained in the various structural blocks graphed in figures 2a and 2b, along with those families’ partisan affiliations and social attributes.

Methodological and goodness-of-fit issues are addressed in Appendix A. Suffice it to say here that the structuralist research style embedded in blockmodeling aggregates actors into structurally equivalent sets, or “blocks,” in accordance with their common *external* ties with outsiders, rather than in accordance with dense internal relations with each other (as in cliques). The sets of families observed in Appendix B, in other words, were clustered or “thrust together” by common third-party relations to outside families; the blocks need not (and usually do not) contain any ties within themselves.²⁹

Three graphical points need to be borne in mind in order to interpret the figures: (1) Family labels in figures 2a and 2b do not indicate solo families; they encode the most prominent family in that structurally equivalent block of families (App. B gives details). (2) An image line or “bond” in this global portrait corresponds to at least two underlying ties between families in the linked blocks, of the graphically indicated type. (3) The triangulated circle superimposed onto the blockmodel diagram contains the dependent variable, Medici party membership. The bulk of oligarchic partisans are contained in the rectangular set of intermarrying blocks, directly beneath the Medicean party.

The first thing to observe about figure 2a is that the capacity of marriage and economic blockmodels to predict political partisanship is remarkable, especially given the virtual attributional identity of the two parties. The partisanship of the Medici family itself is impossible to predict from social structure alone, since the Medici family was deeply tied to both sides. But given the Medici split from the lower set of blocks, prediction of Medicean followers is obvious: the enclosed circle of blocks

ing these two networks did not improve goodness of fit but did have the effect of breaking up the oligarch blocks into smaller “globules,” an indicator of ties that cut across rather than reinforce the existing system. Figure 2b illustrates this graphically: Personal loans and *mallevadori* ties were sent not only to structural intimates, but also to families far distant in the social structure. Perhaps these were the “bridges” to future structural change, as elite families attempted to reach to new partners, just as Granovetter’s weak tie image conveys.

²⁹ If they do, this is indicated in the figures by a circle around the block name.




FIG. 2a.—Marriage and economic blockmodel structure (92 elite families)

contains families that had systematic access to the rest of the elite only through the Medici.

More specifically, 93% of the families within the triangulated circle were mobilized actively into the Medici party. Fifty-nine percent of all other families, including neutrals, were organized actively into the oligarch party. Excluding neutrals, 82% of all other partisan families joined the oligarch side (see App. A, tables A1 and A2, for details). Even errors in partisanship prediction here are a bit overstated: in fact, we would predict families in the cross-pressured Guasconi and Albizzi blocks to be




FIG. 2b.—“Political” and friendship blockmodel structure (92 elite families)

split in their partisan loyalties, which for the most part they were. Truly, the microstructure of marriage and economics was central to the formation of parties in Florence.³⁰ Rather than parties being generated by social

³⁰ The lack of congruence between patronage (fig. 2b) and the rest of the social structure (fig. 2a) is worthy of note. A standard image is that patronage is the glue that binds parties together internally. Here, however, this is not particularly true. Elites did tax, job-hunting, court, and miscellaneous favors for other elites, almost regardless of partisanship, as much as they did favors for their client followers. Even though patronage was pervasive, in Renaissance Florence party was far more deeply embedded in marriage and economic relations than it was in patronage relations.

groups, we argue, both parties and social groups were induced conjointly by underlying networks.

We will return in a later section to a causal discussion of the exact temporal unfolding of this intimate connection between social networks and party membership. For now, however, we discuss only the consequences of this social structure for political control.

Contemporaries and historians have long known that the Medici party was far more cohesive and tightly centralized than was the looser and more cross-pressured oligarch faction. With the aid of figure 2a, it is easy to see why.

The Medici party was an extraordinarily centralized, and simple, “star” or “spoke” network system, with very few relations among Medici followers: the party consisted almost entirely of direct ties to the Medici family.³¹ One important consequence for central control was that Medici partisans were connected to other Medici partisans almost solely through the Medici themselves. In addition, Medici partisans were connected to the rest of the oligarchic elite only through the intermediation of the Medici family. Medici partisans in general possessed remarkably few intraelite network ties; compared to oligarchs, they were structurally impoverished.³² In such an impoverished network context, it is easy to understand how a solo dependence on a powerful family would loom very large indeed (Emerson 1962).

³¹ Graph centralization can be measured with the network betweenness statistic (C_B) of Freeman (1979, p. 230), usually interpreted as intensity of concentration of resource or information flows. Among Medicean families, marriage relations were concentrated at the level $C_B = .362$. Among oligarch partisans, marriage $C_B = .184$. On the economic front, $C_B = .429$ among Mediceans, compared to $C_B = .198$ among oligarchs. (Economic ties, including personal loans, were pooled for the latter calculations. Personal loans were included because otherwise the density of intra-Medicean ties was too low. All data were binarized and symmetrized for these calculations, as required by the Freeman measure.) We thank an *AJS* referee for the suggestion of calculating these statistics.

³² Statistics on two-step ties—the number of families that families tied to the Medici were tied to (by marriage or economic relations)—demonstrate this clearly, especially for the case of marriage. Within this 92-family data set, Medici marriage partners were married, on median, to only 2 other families. (According to blockmodel analysis, these two ties were structurally incoherent.) In contrast, the median number of marriage partners for two oligarch control groups (see below for description) were as follows: 6.5 for Santa Croce faction leader families and 4.5 for oligarchic superelite families. Data on “political” and friendship partners show the same pattern less dramatically: The median numbers of (marriage or economic) partners of Medici “political” or friendship partners were 2 and 3, respectively. This compares with the control groups’ partners: 5.5 and 6.5 for the Santa Croce leaders, and 4 and 4 for the superelite. For economic partners, on the other hand, there was little difference: 3.5 for the Medici’s partners versus 5 for Santa Croce partners, and only 3 for the partners of the superelite.

Conversely, the oligarch side was densely interconnected, especially through marriage. Dense structural interconnection, however, did not lead to cohesive collective action. The oligarchs were composed of too many status equals, each with plausible network claims to leadership. In dense networks in times of crisis, cacophony ensued, as each family conspired privately with other families to which they were tied about the proper course of action. Simultaneous and contradictory conversations redounded through ambigious private network channels, generating cross-pressure on each family instead of collective convergence.

A concrete behavioral example, the final “military” showdown between the two sides, will illustrate this point. On the morning of September 26, 1433, Rinaldo Albizzi, titular leader of the oligarchs, passed the word to his supporters to assemble their troops at a certain piazza in order forcibly to seize the city hall and the government (Kent 1978, pp. 332–34). At the appointed hour, only a portion of his supporters appeared. Each supporter looked around at, and no doubt consulted with, other supporters, and a stochastic threshold equilibrium ensued, in which repeated efforts by Rinaldo to assemble more troops (especially from Palla Strozzi) were offset by other supporters’ changing their mind and drifting away.

In contrast, while the oligarchs dithered, the Medici immediately and decisively mobilized their supporters to join the Priors in the embattled Palazzo Vecchio. The clarity of this coordinated response was astonishing, given the fact that Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were in Venice at the time.³³ As a result of this Medicean mobilization, no military engagement actually ensued, since it became clear to Albizzi supporters, if not to Rinaldo himself, that they had no chance. At this point, popular opinion swung massively behind the Medici, Cosimo was recalled from Venice in triumph, and Cosimo’s oligarchic enemies were exiled, this time for good.

Kent (1978, pp. 228–34) also gives examples, less dramatic than this, of the greater cohesion of the Medici side during 1427–28 electoral maneuvering.

Even granted this explanation of the greater cohesion of the Medici side, an equilibrium puzzle remains: How could such a centralized spoke system maintain itself? Florentine clientage systems historically had been notoriously fluid. And the oligarchs had a clear incentive to marry into or do business with Medici supporters, thereby inducing cross-pressure and sowing dissent. The Medici supporters would appear to have had

³³ Temporarily, the Medici brothers had been exiled. They were not, however, successfully cut off from secretly communicating with and issuing standing orders to their supporters.

an equally clear incentive to respond, in order to alleviate their extreme dependence. At the very least, one would assume Medicean supporters would want to interbreed among themselves, for defensive if no other purposes, for only then would they have the organizational capacity to resist Medici domination, should they ever choose to do so. Structural isolation among Medici partisans would seem to have been in the long-term self-interest only of the Medici.

This structural atomization puzzle is only deepened through closer inspection of figures 2a and 2b. Two large blocks of Medici supporters were connected to the Medici essentially through marriage alone. Other blocks of Medici supporters were connected to the Medici solely by economic or by personal loan relations. The Medici had strongly multiplex ties with the oligarch Guasconi block,³⁴ but, within their own party, the Medici did not marry those families with whom they engaged in economic relations, nor did they do business with those whom they married.³⁵

This is in sharp contrast to the greater multiplexity of relations on the oligarch side: core oligarch families, the superelite and the Santa Croce faction leaders (see below), married into 40% and 38%, respectively, of the clans with whom they did business.

Most sociologists' Durkheimian presumptions are that the more overlapping ties one has with another, the more closely and holistically bound the other is to you. Obligations from one sphere spill over into another. The Medici, however, apparently believed the opposite: to control followers politically, segregate one's social relations with them. On the whole, multiplex ties (across marriage and economics) were discouraged. Thus, structural isolation operated in two ways: the marriage and economic isolation of partisans from all others (including other partisans), and the segregation of types of ties with the Medici themselves.

Comparative Statics of Attributes with Networks

The beginnings of an understanding of stability can be gained from a reexamination of the social attributes listed in Appendix B. The large Guicciardini and Tornabuoni blocks, with whom the Medici were intermarried, were composed virtually entirely of patricians (i.e., date of first Prior before 1343) who also had substantial wealth. In sharp contrast, the Ginori, the Orlandini, and the Cocco-Donati blocks, to whom the Medici were connected through economic or personal loan ties, were

³⁴ The Medici bank was a primary source of these exceptional multiplex ties. Often such multiply tied exceptions did not politically support the Medici in the end—e.g., two prominent families in the Guasconi block: the Bardi and the Guasconi themselves.

³⁵ There was only one exception to this rule: the Tornabuoni.

composed almost entirely of new men (date of first Prior after 1343). The remaining Medicean blocks—the Davanzati, the dall’Antella, the Dietisalvi, and the Valori blocks—were for the most part patricians of only modest wealth. These blocks of families were connected to the Medici indirectly, via intermarriage with economically connected new men.

The hybrid social class character of the Mediceans, revealed in tables 5 and 6, has now been clarified: actually, the Medici party was an agglomeration of structurally disjoint patrician and new men components. Different social class interests were embodied in the Medici party; (social) class contradiction was quite real. Not only that, but within the party these elements were separately clustered by Medici ties and then kept rigidly segregated from each other, to be connected indirectly only through the Medici themselves.

Given this, there is no particular mystery about the low intermarriage rate among Mediceans: patrician and new men supporters despised each other. Status-conscious patricians (Medici included) usually would not dream of sullying their own honor by marrying into new men families; such would be a downward-mobility admission of status equality. Part of the distinctive Medicean party organization, in other words, was simply leveraged off and sustained by the ordinary cognitive classifications and social marriage rules of Florentine elites.

A close reexamination of Appendix B also reveals a second striking attributional cleavage between these Medicean social class segments, this time on the dimension of neighborhood. Almost none of the patricians in the Guicciardini and Tornabuoni blocks came from the San Giovanni quarter, where the Medici resided. The Medici, in other words, did not marry those with whom they lived.³⁶ However, 10 of the 14 families in the other Medici blocks—both new men and the indirectly tied patricians, married to new men—resided in San Giovanni. The Medici, in other words, did a great deal of business (plus personal loans) with those with whom they lived. In addition, they somehow induced local San Giovanni patrician supporters to marry into the families of their economic partners, rather than into their own.

Thus, the Medicean supporters were deeply cleaved on two attributional dimensions simultaneously—social class (i.e., prestige) and neighborhood. Not only did the various components despise each other; they did not run into each other much either. Only the Medici family itself linked the segments.

To give a more precise sense of the distinctiveness of this Medici agglomeration, we present table 9. The upper panels of the three parts

³⁶ Weissman (1982) makes vivid the dense piazza-oriented street life of Renaissance Florence, in which one constantly mingled with (or at least ran into) one’s neighbors.

TABLE 9

SOCIAL ATTRIBUTES AND PARTISANSHIP OF TIES: MEDICI VERSUS SUPERELITE VERSUS SANTA CROCE FACTION LEADERS

		SOCIAL PRESTIGE: DATE OF FIRST PRIOR							
		Medici			Superelite			Santa Croce Faction Leaders	
	Pre-1343	Post-1343	n	Pre-1343	Post-1343	n	Pre-1343	Post-1343	n
Allocation of types of ties:									
Marriage (M).....	.93	.07	28	.93	.07	58	.87	.13	30
Friendship (F + M)	1.00	.00	9	.87	.13	31	.79	.21	14
“Political” (L + P)62	.38	45	.86	.14	21	.69	.31	16
Economic (T + P + B + R)44	.56	27	.88	.12	16	.86	.14	21
Total69	.31	109	.90	.10	126	.81	.19	81
Political support consequences of ties:*									
Marriage (M).....	.71	1.0		.73	.31		.85	.37	
Friendship (F + M)76	..		.57	.00		.84	.00	
“Political” (L + P)58	.97		.42	.17		.82	.20	
Economic (T + P + B + R)55	.90		.81	..		.85	.50	
Total64	.94		.65	.25		.84	.27	
ECONOMIC CLASS: WEALTH (in 1,000 Florins)									
		Medici			Superelite			Santa Croce Faction Leaders	
	More than 25	0-25	n	More than 25	0-25	n	More than 25	0-25	n
Allocation of types of ties:									
Marriage (M).....	.82	.18	28	.79	.21	58	.83	.17	30
Friendship (F + M)89	.11	9	.81	.19	31	.86	.14	14

“Political” (L + P)51	.49	45	.71	.29	21	.94	.06	16
Economic (T + P + B + R)56	.44	27	.50	.50	16	.52	.48	21
Total63	.37	109	.75	.25	126	.78	.22	81
Political support consequences of ties:*									
Marriage (M)72	.80		.72	.64		.74	1.0	
Friendship (F + M)73	..		.54	.33		.61	..	
“Political” (L + P)67	.74		.47	.17		.60	..	
Economic (T + P + B + R)61	.92		.79	.81		.76	.85	
Total68	.78		.63	.54		.69	.92	

NEIGHBORHOOD: CITY QUARTER									
Medici					Superelite				
San	Outside	In	Outside	Quarter	n	Quarter	n	Quarter	n
Giovanni									
Allocation of types of ties:									
Marriage (M)14	.86	28	.36	.64	58	.33	.67	30
Friendship (F + M)33	.67	9	.29	.71	31	.36	.64	14
“Political” (L + P)40	.60	45	.48	.52	21	.50	.50	16
Economic (T + P + B + R)59	.41	27	.31	.69	16	.43	.57	21
Total38	.62	110	.36	.64	126	.39	.61	81
Political support consequences of ties:*									
Marriage (M)58	.76		.65	.73		.80	.77	
Friendship (F + M)78	.76		.33	.57		.70	.64	
“Political” (L + P)82	.62		.60	.18		.75	.50	
Economic (T + P + B + R)84	.60		.80	.80		.78	.82	
Total80	.68		.61	.62		.76	.72	

NOTE.—Superelite families are Peruzzi, Albizzi, Strozzi, and Gianfigliazzi. Santa Croce faction leaders of the oligarch side are Peruzzi, Ricasoli, and Castellani. Amount shown, except for *n*'s, are proportions.

* Political support consequences of ties = (no. of ties to fellow partisans)/(total no. of ties), with split families allocated proportionately. A tie to a neutral family is treated the same here as a tie to an enemy.

tabulate prestige, wealth, and neighborhood endogamy rates for the Medici and for two comparable oligarch reference groups: a set of superelite families—the Peruzzi, the Strozzi, the Albizzi, and the Gianfigliazzi—and a set of Santa Croce faction leaders—the Peruzzi, the Ricasoli, and the Castellani families. The lower panels of the three parts give the partisanship consequences of the network mobilization ties tabulated in the upper panels.

We begin by discussing the first control group, the superelite. Table 9, part A, on prestige, shows that the Peruzzi, Strozzi, Albizzi, and Gianfigliazzi families were patrician to the core. It mattered not what the type of network relation was—marriage, economic, “political,” or friendship; across the board, these families directed about 90% of their ties to fellow patricians. New men were snubbed in all spheres.

Table 9, part B, on wealth, tells a similar story, with one exception: the superelite did business with many less well off families. But this was just another sign of their exclusivity on prestige. Even though many patricians had fallen on hard times, the superelite stuck with them in their economic relations, rather than switch to wealthier new men.

Santa Croce factional leaders behaved little differently, except of course that their degree of social exclusivity was slightly less than that of the superelite, since their own status was slightly lower.

Compared to these reference groups, the Medici’s own network strategies were, as already argued, more differentiated. In marriage and friendship, the Medici were even more snobbish than the superelite, if that were possible. However, in the economic sphere, the Medici associated heavily with the new men, quite unlike their elite counterparts. “Political” ties (i.e., personal loans and patronage) were intermediate in social class endogamy; the Medici established such relations with both their economic and marriage partners. The Medici’s distinctiveness within the elite, in other words, was not that they represented new men; their distinctiveness was that they associated with them at all.

The political responsiveness of those new men with whom the Medici chose to associate was breathtaking: 90% and 96% of those new men tied to the Medici through economic or “political” relations became active Medici partisans. This rate of response was so overwhelming, indeed, that the fact that the Medici did not associate with more new men shows that party building was not the only thing on their minds. New men not explicitly mobilized through Medici ties showed no great enthusiasm for the Medici cause (see tables 5, 6).

Thus, we have an important insight into the reason for the strong contemporary image of the Medicean party affair as a social class struggle. It was not that the Medici did all that much actively to mobilize new men. It was that the oligarchs did so extraordinarily little. In as deeply

elitist a context as Florence, a mere pittance thrown the new men's way, even by such an archpatrician family as the Medici, could generate overwhelming response. Parvenu new men, anxious for inclusion but long barred from entry, were structurally available, awaiting mobilization, for reasons that had nothing to do with the Medici *per se*. The Medici opened the door just a crack, and for that they were polemically tarred by their enemies with the rhetorical brush of class traitor: the label "heroes of the new men" connoted contempt. *Cognitive classification of Medici group identity, both by contemporaries and by historians, was the product not of Medici action but of vitriolic oligarch polemics* (supported, no doubt, by wishful thinking among new men). Inscrutable Cosimo of course did nothing to deny it.

Table 9, part C, demonstrates statistically what we have already asserted about neighborhood. Both the superelite and the Santa Croce faction leaders were citywide in their networks, regardless of type of tie.³⁷ In contrast, the Medici's relations geographically were quite differentiated: only 14% of Medici marriages were within their home quarter, compared with 36% for the superelite. Yet 59% of Medici economic ties were within San Giovanni, compared with 31% for the superelite.

We now have a clear picture of the structure of the Medici party and of its roots in elite network strategies. The Medici party was an agglomeration of doubly disarticulated parts: structurally isolated new men living within San Giovanni, whom the Medici mobilized directly through economic relations, and structurally isolated patricians residing outside San Giovanni, whom the Medici mobilized directly through marriage. Conscious residential segregation, as well as "natural" social class segregation, were keys to the inhibition both of independent ties among followers and of multiplex ties with the Medici themselves. The result was an awesomely centralized patrimonial machine, capable of great discipline and "top down" control because the Medici themselves were the only bridge holding this contradictory agglomeration together.³⁸

³⁷ Perhaps an exception could be argued for the cases of loans and patronage.

³⁸ Our general position on the interrelation of social attributes and social networks can now be clarified. Obviously (contra some occasionally overstated polemics by network aficionados) we do not believe that social attributes are irrelevant: the particular way in which the Medici recombined social attributes through networks is the heart of the story here. What we object to is the arraying of attributes discretely as groups or spatially as grids—a procedure that presumes attributes to be behaviorally meaningful in a network vacuum. Of course, actors in the system, as well as researchers, do exactly these clustering procedures mentally when they analyze their own social structure; this is what "boundedly rational" cognitive classifications are all about. But there is a widely underappreciated gap between these macrocognitive (or "cultural") operations and microbehavioral "local action" taken by concrete individuals in very particular, heterogeneous, and often cross-pressured circumstances. Sim-

The specific micromechanisms that translated this network structure into Medici control were as follows:

1. Spoke structure induced common dependence of partisans on the Medici for access to the rest of the elite, and it forced any sensitive intraparty communication that required tie-enforced trust to be channeled through the Medici (cf. Molho 1979, p. 19).

2. Double segregation of attributes inhibited defensive counteralliance among mutually suspicious partisans: no “revolt of the colonels” was possible.³⁹

3. Interactionally, marrying geographically distant patricians, whom the Medici met casually only rarely, kept affine relations socially proper and formal—thereby inhibiting unwanted presumptions of familiarity and status equality. In contrast, doing business with new men inside the neighborhood engendered motivationally useful friendliness. The status gap between Medici and new men was so enormous that the Medici did not need to fear any slackening of their abject deference.

4. The attributional heterogeneity of the party made the Medici party a swing vote, potent beyond its numbers, in Florentine legislative politics. The reason, explained below, was the bitter class polarization that was reviving in Florence.

Thus, attributional heterogeneity and contradiction of group interests were not a problem for Medici party control. Quite the contrary, they were the keys to Medici control. For this result to be generally true, however, surrounding cognitive group identities (and animosities) must be intense. Stable monopoly of broker position is leveraged off this, and practical political organization becomes cognitively invisible (or at least murky) to the outside world precisely when it cuts across strong identities.

NETWORK DYNAMICS

The Dynamics of Party Formation: Patrician Marriage

We have insufficient space in this article to show how figure 2a emerged historically in detail, but in the next two sections we shall sketch the

plifying social reality into homogeneous subsets “with common interests” rips individuals out of their (often contradictory) multiple network contexts and obscures the very heterogeneity and complexity of which organizations like the Medici party are constructed.

³⁹ A “revolt of the colonels” requires more than just comparing dissatisfactions. Colonels have to have confidence that other colonels are not just stabbing them in the back. There has to be an organizational infrastructure, independent of the boss, through which they can coordinate. And there has to be something they are offering to each other that is better than their current state. Crosscutting Medici networks inhibited each of these preconditions.

driving dynamic: elite marriage and economic networks were reconfigured by working-class revolt and wartime fiscal crisis, respectively. Elite reconfiguration explains why oligarchs would not marry Medicean patriots.

Our core conclusion regarding party formation will be simple: Cosimo de' Medici did *not* design his centralized party, nor did he intend (until the very end) to take over the state. The network patterns of figure 2a were produced by oligarchs' earlier successful reassessments of their own control. The Medici party grew up around Cosimo and Lorenzo from raw network material unintentionally channeled to them by the oligarchs' previous smashing both of the wool workers known as *ciompi* (1378) and of the new men's challenge during the Milan and Lucca wars (1424–33). Only very late in the game, we shall argue, did the Medici adaptively learn of the political potential of the social network machine that lay at their fingertips. In almost Hegelian fashion, oligarchs crafted the networks of their own destruction.

Historical trends in neighborhood exogamy.—The first thing to appreciate in any dynamic analysis of Medicean marriage strategy is the fact, uncovered by Cohn (1980), that increasing rates of neighborhood exogamy were a historical trend in Florentine elite marriage behavior. The Medici were not tactical revolutionaries; they were simply the leading edge of an ongoing transformation in the network structure of the Florentine elite.

Table 10 presents a recalculated version of Cohn's neighborhood data, along with our own data for historical comparison. By coincidence, Cohn studied the mid-14th- and late 15th-century periods, which bracket the early 15th-century focus of this study. Since Cohn's primary focus was on changing marriage patterns within the lower classes, the volume of elite marriages is lower than that which was extracted from Kent.⁴⁰ Cohn's listing of his late 15th-century data permitted a further breakdown into "state marriages" and others—a concept that has no real meaning for the period before the Medici changed the republic into a *de facto* principality.⁴¹ It is reassuring, given different operational defini-

⁴⁰ For the lower classes, or *popolo minuto*, Cohn found a trend just the opposite of that of the elite: increasing rates of marriage *within* neighborhoods. Some portion, but not all, of this trend was due to growing immigrant ethnic enclaves, organized around the silk industry. Cohn argues forcefully that new administrative methods of lower-class control (containment within parishes) during the late 15th century inhibited cross-neighborhood contact and organization among workers. A recurrence of the Ciompi revolt became well-nigh impossible (cf. Molho 1979).

⁴¹ We label as "state marriages" those marriages registered by Lorenzo de' Medici's personal secretary. "The majority of these marriages were celebrated at the Medici palace and were witnessed by Lorenzo. In several instances Lorenzo even provided

TABLE 10
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN ELITE MARRIAGE

	No. within Parish	No. within Gonfalone	No. within Quarter	No. across Quarter	Total
I. Fourteenth-century elite marriages (1340–83)*	5 (20)	8.5 (34)	12 (48)	13 (52)	25
II. Early 15th-century elite marriages (1395–1434):†					
Patrician–patrician	16 (12)	37 (29)	92 (71)	129	
Patrician–new man	8 (27)	17 (57)	13 (43)	30	
New man–new man	1	1	1	2	
Total	25 (16)	55 (34)	106 (66)	161	
III. Late 15th-century elite marriages (1450–1530):‡					
State marriages:††					
Patrician–patrician	0 (0)	1 (8)	11 (92)	12	
Patrician–new man	1	1	1	2	
New man–new man	0	0	0	0	
Total	1 (7)	2 (14)	12 (86)	14	
Other elite marriages:					
Patrician–patrician	0 (0)	2 (29)	5 (71)	7	
Patrician–new man	1 (17)	4 (57)	3 (43)	7	
New man–new man	0 (0)	2 (40)	3 (60)	5	
Total	1 (5)	8 (42)	11 (58)	19	

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

* "Elite" is defined by family name plus a dowry of at least 400 florins. Data are from Cohn (1980, p. 52). To make the data comparable with others in this table, we report the number of marriages rather than Cohn's "number of marriage relations," which, for Cohn, equaled two times the number of marriages, i.e., one for each partner.

† "Elite" is defined by political participation (see text). Data are from this article. Except for "Total" in this category, entries refer to marriages between a patrician and a patrician within the political elite, to marriages between a patrician and a new man within the political elite, etc.

‡ "Elite" is defined by having passed scrutiny plus a dowry of at least 600 florins. Figures are from marriage data listed in Cohn (1980, pp. 54–56.) Due to the passage of time, "new men" is defined here as post-Ciompi (post-1383), rather than post-1343 as in the rest of this paper.

†† These are marriages notarized by Lorenzo de' Medici's personal secretary (see Cohn 1980, p. 53).

tions of the elite, that neighborhood endogamy/exogamy estimates are perfectly consistent between our two studies.

These aggregate statistics demonstrate what has already been asserted—that rates of elite marriage outside neighborhood quarter increased progressively over the course of the 14th and 15th centuries. Cohn’s elite marriage data are too scanty to disaggregate reliably by decade, but the combined data give the impression that the bulk of change occurred between 1383 and about 1420—namely, precisely at the time when the patrician elite reconsolidated its control after the disastrous (from their perspective) Ciompi revolution.

Cross-sectional estimates are also consistent: for both 15th-century periods, the higher the position in the elite hierarchy, the higher the rate of marriage outside neighborhood. Patricians married other patricians at higher exogamous rates than they married new men. And, most striking in spite of the low numbers, 92% of state marriages in the late 15th century were arranged across rather than within neighborhoods. In other words, what in the early 15th century was an innovative Medici strategy of partisan control, applicable only to their own marriages, later appears to have become official state policy, applicable to all their top supporters.

This trend is better interpreted from the perspective of its origin than from knowledge of its final result: patrician neighborhood clusters based on marriage gradually dissolved. The Peruzzi-Ricasoli-Castellani clique in Santa Croce, the Albizzi and Guadagni blocs in San Giovanni, and the Strozzi group in Santa Maria Novella indicate clearly that this process was hardly complete during our period (if indeed it ever was).⁴² But this “neighborhood solidarity” mode of elite organization, which linked patricians of different stature, was a residue of the past.

In particular, this mode historically descended from feudalism. Florentine neighborhoods originally (in the 1200s) were settled by immigration from contiguous regions of the surrounding rural countryside. Urbanizing feudal lords brought their hierarchical retinues with them, thereby creating self-sufficient neighborhood pockets with stronger ties to the rural homeland than to other parts of Florence (Weissman 1983, pp. 7–9). By the 15th century, “feudalism” is hardly an apt description of Florentine

the dowry. We find the state, in effect, taking an active role in the structuring of marriage relations, which were at the same time political alliances” (Cohn 1980, p. 53).

⁴² Given the vigor of F. W. Kent’s recent defense (1987) of the continuing importance of neighborhood in quattrocento Florence, a clarification is in order. We are not arguing that the importance of neighborhood for patricians declined, in some totalistic sense. In fact, we agree with Kent’s emphasis on neighborhood patronage (and, we would add, neighborhood economics). However, marriage was no longer the primary basis of elite consolidation within quarter.

neighborhoods, but hierarchical intraneighborhood marriage among patricians persisted.

As neighborhood marriage solidarity disintegrated roughly around the turn of the century, however, patricians may have been almost forced to reach outside the comfortable (and essentially defensive) shells of their own wards, parishes, and piazzas. Later, such marriage outreach would provide the organizational infrastructure to undergird the emergence of a self-consciously “city” elite, psychologically (though not materially) decoupled from its original neighborhood base.⁴³

The question therefore arises: What forces led to this widespread corrosion of elite neighborhood solidarity and to its replacement by elite neighborhood exogamy? The answer to this question will take us far toward understanding the historical roots of the Medici’s own innovative marriage strategy.

Political vulnerability among Medicean patricians.—The mid-14th-century, pre-Ciompi story is best told by Brucker (1962). Progressive waves of new men were economically thrust up by the internationalization of trade and finance. Without aristocratic sponsorship, such mercantile new men (hardly radicals in any event) were doomed to political ostracism and frustration. However, this upward thrust often coincided with intraelite factional cleavage. The Albizzi-Ricci factions were the most important such split in the mid-14th century, with the Ricci garnering more new men’s support. Intense politics ensued from 1343 to 1378 about who was to be eligible for election to the Signoria. The new men (with artisan support) took the tack of trying to label their opponents officially as lawless magnates, and the old guard countered by trying to get their opponents designated as traitorous antipapal Ghibellines.

Eventually, such aristocratic-mercantile feuding got out of hand, and the Ciompi rose up in alliance with the artisans to take over the state for two months in 1378. Through their major guilds, the merchants quickly realigned with artisans in minor guilds to reestablish control, but in 1382 this alliance in turn was overthrown by an embittered patrician elite (which included earlier cohorts of now old “new men” merchants). These “oligarchs” excluded the artisans and ruled Florence until the Medici took over in 1434.⁴⁴

⁴³ This extrapolation into psychology is not fanciful. Without much commentary, Cohn reports (1980, p. 37) that he had much trouble reconstructing the neighborhood residences of his late 15th-century families, because notaries of the time, who registered the marriage deeds, recorded these families only as *cives Florentinis* (citizens of Florence). In contrast, in the 14th century, residence down to the level of parish was routinely recorded, irrespective of status.

⁴⁴ In the field of Florentine studies, Brucker represents the highest quality of history written with groups as the primary agents. While I disagree with his group-based approach, I have nothing but the highest respect for his pathbreaking research.

For us, the clue in this account is to understand how first the Albizzi-Ricci factional feuds and then the searing revolt of the Ciompi placed strain on neighborhood solidarities. Could it be that intraelite factional struggles of the 14th century were so intense that, first following medieval patterns, they polarized each neighborhood into competing patrician clusters (cf. Barth 1959), but then, because of Ciompi escalation, they pulverized the losing patrician side into structural isolates, which the Medici much later exploited? If so, this would account in part for the increasing rate of neighborhood exogamy, as the winners and, even more, the losers had fewer compatible intraneighborhood marriage options to choose from. Assuming social class endogamy, Florentine patrician marriages would be forced outward because of neighborhood blockage, or structural “holes,” within.

We will test the plausibility of this account in pieces. One observable corollary of the hypothesis is that Medicean patrician support derived disproportionately from losers of earlier factional struggles. We have gathered evidence from secondary sources (*a*) about patrician family membership in the mid-14th century Albizzi and Ricci factions and (*b*) about patrician support for the 1378–82 Ciompi/artisan regime. We also have very limited information about the Alberti faction (a transformed descendant of the Ricci) of 1385–1400.

From the detailed text of Brucker (1962), we could identify 39 14th-century families from the Albizzi or Ricci factions that also appeared in Dale Kent’s (1978) list of 1434 partisans. The relationship between these two lists of partisans is shown in table 11. The evidence is much stronger for the historical continuity of the winning oligarchic side than it is for the losing “liberal” Ricci. The Medici did indeed gain some support from families of the old 14th-century Ricci faction, but this support is not a major factor in Medicean mobilization.⁴⁵

More convincing evidence of historical continuity dates from the 1378–82 period. Najemy (1982, p. 260) has published a list of families from “traditional inner elite” families that were members of the governing Signoria during the 1378–82 corporatist guild regime. This list of 15 “collaborator” patrician families is as follows: Alberti, Aldobrandini, Ardinghelli, del Bene, Corbinelli, Corsini, Davanzati, Medici, Pitti, Rinnuccini, Salimbeni, Salviati, Scali, Strozzi, and Vecchietti.

Six of these families were unequivocal Medici supporters in 1434. Moreover, the split Salviati family leaned strongly to the Medici side

⁴⁵ In hindsight, perhaps we should not have expected much from such a lengthy time-lagged effect. Not only did much transpire between the Ricci and the Medici, but the leaders of the Ricci and Alberti factions were not just ostracized; their participation, and even life, in the regime was completely obliterated.

TABLE 11
LEGACY OF MID-14TH CENTURY PARTISANSHIP

1360 PARTISAN FAMILIES*	1434 PARTISAN FAMILIES†		
	Medici	Split	Oligarch
Albizzi faction.....	4	3	12
Split loyalties	4	4	2
Ricci faction	5	2	3
Not mentioned in Brucker	44	3	34

* Brucker (1962).

† Kent (1978).

(Kent 1978, p. 55), and the technically neutral Corsini were in the process of joining the Medici when 1434 arrived (Kent 1978, p. 53). Only three collaborator families supported the oligarchs in 1434.⁴⁶

The Alberti faction of 1385–1400 was the last barrier of opposition to the revived patrician oligarchy (Brucker 1977, p. 75–102). However, apart from descriptions of the extremely wealthy Alberti themselves, who were papal bankers before the Medici replaced them as a result of the Alberti's 1393 exile (Holmes 1968; Foster 1985), almost no published information exists on the composition of this faction. We do know, however, that Acciaiuoli support for the Medici dated from the exile of Alberti supporter Donato Acciaiuoli (Brucker 1977, p. 97; Kent 1978, p. 59).⁴⁷ In addition, the close friends of Acciaiuoli who put up 20,000 florins as security for his exile included three Cavalcanti, Luigi Guicciardini, and Nicola di Vieri de' Medici (Brucker 1977, p. 29)—all later patrician supporters of the Medici.

In sum, while the evidence that historical continuity among Medicean patricians went back as far as the mid-14th century is very weak, the evidence for grounding our understanding of patrician support for the Medici in the events of the Ciompi revolution and its immediate aftermath is quite strong (albeit still only suggestive). Our data, merged with Cohn's, on neighborhood exogamy support the view that elite neighborhood solidarity dissolved in the decades following the Ciompi revolution;

⁴⁶ The Rinuccini and Salimbeni, along with the exiled del Bene and Scali, no longer figured prominently in Florentine politics.

⁴⁷ A close relationship between the Acciaiuoli and the Medici families, however, pre-dated this period. In the mid- to late 14th century, an important client of the banker Vieri di Cambio de' Medici was Bishop Angelo Acciaiuoli, who played a major role in Florentine politics while occupying the city's episcopal see (Brucker 1977, p. 10). A marriage around 1405 consolidated this family relationship.

the data on patrician factional continuity supports the further view that structural isolation among Medicean patricians dates from this period as well.

Oligarchic elite closure.—Establishing the existence of historical continuity, however important, is not the same thing as establishing the mechanism through which such continuity was created. *A priori*, there is no obvious reason that factional wounds could not have been gradually healed (perhaps under the goad of a massive external threat, like the Milanese war), that disaffected elites could not have been reabsorbed (under careful controls), or that the political system could not therefore have returned to its routinely tumultuous stochastic equilibrium. In reality, however, an irreversible “ratchet effect” appears to have occurred, which we need to explain.

In particular, we argue, elite marriage networks shifted permanently during the period from 1385 to about 1420 from a quasi-feudal pattern of parallel, intraneighborhood marriage hierarchies, which had incorporated most patrician families, toward a citywide elitist pattern of cross-neighborhood marriage cycles, which co-opted “politically correct” patrician families while structurally isolating patrician “class traitors” who had collaborated with the Ciompi and artisan guilds. The folding of a dense oligarchic core into itself (the rectangular set of blocks in fig. 2a) and the segregation of patrician Medici supporters from this core (the Guicciardini and Tornabuoni blocks in fig. 2a), in other words, were two sides of the same elite reconsolidation process.⁴⁸ The effect of this marriage transformation was to keep Ciompi-type challenges from ever arising again; no longer were there fluid elite factions to play off one another.

The process is illustrated graphically in figure 3. The solid lines give a stylized portrait of the quasi-feudal pattern of parallel neighborhood hierarchies before the Ciompi.⁴⁹ As mentioned above, this marriage pattern originally derived, centuries before, from rural lord-retinue hierarchies transplanted to local city neighborhoods. During the late medieval interim, however, neighborhood hierarchies were sustained by a logic of status: enshrouded within overtly symmetric political alliance marriages,

⁴⁸ The shift from neighborhood to citywide patrician elites is exemplified in fig. 2a by the contrast between, on the one hand, the old Santa Croce hierarchical organization of Peruzzi→Castellani→Pepi and, on the other hand, the newer self-encapsulating organization of Guasconi→Strozzi→Panciatichi→Albizzi→Guasconi (and similar cycles).

⁴⁹ This portrait may conflate prematurely the Albizzi-Ricci factional underpinnings with earlier Guelf-Ghibelline and Black-White Guelf marriage structures, but no data exist at present to trace medieval stages of transformation, if any. With the new *Carte dell'Ancisa* marriage information currently being processed, we will be able to investigate this further.




FIG. 3.—Mechanics of elite closure (1380–1420)

arranged by Florentine patriarchs,⁵⁰ was an implicit claim on the part of the family giving the dowried wife to be superior in status to the family receiving the dowried wife.⁵¹ The reasons for this were two: (a) culturally, in all ceremonial exchange or gift-giving systems, prestige accrues to the more (competitively) generous (Mauss [1925] 1967);⁵² (b) structurally, son-in-law relations often were the raw material for constructing political lieutenants (Kent 1978, p. 55).⁵³

⁵⁰ Needless to say, modern conceptions of romance are anachronistic in this deeply sexist context. Patrician fathers arranged marriages between sons around 35 years old and daughters in their teens (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985).

⁵¹ This combination of implicit domination enshrouded in a cultural veneer of friendship is typical of patron-client relations.

⁵² This also fits with the Catholic principle of plenitude, or grace—the ideological foundation for European nobility (Lovejoy 1936; Duby 1980).

⁵³ This potential could be actualized most easily in two circumstances: (a) when the son-in-law came from a small disorganized clan, in which therefore the potentially countervailing father of the son was weak, or (b) when the son-in-law was a “black sheep” for whatever reason. Examples of both cases can easily be found in the Medici party.

Because of intense status competition, wife-giving families could not take back daughters from their wife-receiving affines without thereby relinquishing their claim to superiority. *Gonfaloni* neighborhoods in particular were strongly bounded hothouses, in which frequencies of both interaction and status rivalry were high (Weissman 1982; Kent 1977). Add asymmetric marriage to bounded neighborhoods, and the result is the network pattern drawn in figure 3: hierarchical linear trees or “pecking orders.”⁵⁴

Medieval factions were driven by local neighborhood antagonisms at their root, even when they aggregated under broader pope-versus-emperor banners (Waley 1969, p. 203). This is shown in figure 3 by factional splits between rival lords within each neighborhood. The factions link up, in geographical checkerboard fashion, across neighborhoods (cf. Barth 1959).⁵⁵ The medieval dynamic at this point was that things eventually would explode, with top leaders of the losing side suffering exile, expropriation of wealth, and burning of homes. After a rocky period of probation, however, losing lieutenants and those lower down slowly would be reabsorbed back into the system through asymmetric marriage (since new local challengers in the old winning faction reached to them for support).

The Albizzi-Ricci feuds of the mid-14th century, we argue, were just this sort of traditional medieval factional affair, except for one catastrophic complication: The Ciompi working-class revolt threatened the elite in toto, which suddenly was confronted with mass exile. Ricci partisans and, even more, patrician sympathizers with the Ciompi (like the Medici) now were not just normal elite from a losing faction; they were class traitors in a very direct and deep sense. Resurgent oligarch consciousness was seared by the Ciompi event to a degree that it structured both polemics and virtually every domestic institutional reform for decades (Brucker 1977; Najemy 1982).

After the oligarchs' return to power in 1382, the reverberating consequences for intraelite marriage networks were profound.

1. Class traitor patrician sympathizers with the Ciompi were shunned in marriage by victorious oligarch families. This is the source of the

⁵⁴ Of course, top-level lords also had to get wives from somewhere. Inability to accept daughters from below, within their neighborhood, forced them to trade among themselves, across neighborhoods, but only at the very top. Some neighborhood bosses were prestigious enough to obtain wives from outside the city.

⁵⁵ That is, each local faction was surrounded by its enemies. The aggregation logic here is balance theory: “[neighboring] enemies of my [neighboring] enemies are my friends.”

structural barrier to marriage between the oligarchs and the Guicciardini and Tornabuoni Medicean blocks, observed in figure 2a. To see the dynamic of how this came to be, refer again to figure 3: (a) Ricci and Alberti families were effectively expunged from the diagram, the normal consequence of being leaders of losing medieval factions. (b) This left losing and now leaderless lieutenant families, such as the Medici, structurally isolated and cut off from their victorious neighbors. (c) Cross-pressured “swing-vote” families, such as the Rondinelli, who might be potential bridges for reintegrating the losers, were temporarily left hanging. But (d) marriage ostracism of patrician losers by victorious oligarchs was exceedingly intense and vengeful.

This last assertion is not mere hypothesis. When the Alberti males were finally banished in 1397, virtually no one would marry them (Foster 1985, p. 321). Before that, in 1394, the very prestigious moderate, Filippo Bastari, was sentenced to perpetual exile merely for trying to talk Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi into changing his mind about withdrawing from a marriage agreement with the Alberti. Gianfigliazzi had withdrawn from the Alberti agreement in the first place because of pressure he had received from Maso degli Albizzi (Brucker 1977, pp. 95–96).⁵⁶ This prominent example apparently was taken to heart, and routinized into marriage maxims, by the patrician rank and file desirous of advancement within the new regime.⁵⁷

2. Not only were Ciompi sympathizers shunned, however, but oligarchs themselves were restructured by their vengeful ostracism: cross-

⁵⁶ Such cross-family consultations about politically significant marriages involving only one of them may have been common. Kent (1978, p. 130) cites a much later 1431 case of Almanno Salviati’s consulting Averardo de’ Medici, his father-in-law, about the proposed marriage of Salviati’s daughter to a Frescobaldi. (Averardo apparently okayed the deal.)

⁵⁷ In the early 15th century, Giovanni Morelli wrote as follows in his memoirs, intended as posthumous instruction for his sons: “[When you decide to marry] think of this first of all: don’t demean yourself with an inferior person; try instead to improve your condition, though not to such an extent that she would want to be the husband and make you the wife. . . . Aside from being of old stock in the city, they should also be Guelfs who are honored by the Commune and who are free of all stains, such as those associated with treason. . . . In marriage, connect yourself with a Guelf family in government; it ought to be a powerful and trusted family, free of all scandal” (cited in Martines 1963, pp. 58–59). According to Martines, Morelli was particularly sensitive about this subject because he himself had made the mistake of marrying into the Alberti. “According to Morelli’s testimony, this marriage hurt his career in public life, undermined his contacts, and left him exposed, during a period of twenty years, to tax rates aimed at his ruin” (Martines 1963, p. 59; we thank Samuel Cohn for suggesting the relevance of Morelli’s memoirs).

neighborhood marriage cycles began to form.⁵⁸ A dense, citywide elite was created thereby, which transcended its earlier neighborhood base.⁵⁹

The short-term motivation for cross-neighborhood marriage cycles, we argue, was co-optation, especially of potentially bridging swing-vote families, such as the Rondinelli in figure 3. Oligarchs wanted the doors completely slammed in traitors' faces, without leaving open the traditional route for rehabilitation. And they certainly did not want to give patrician outcasts any network room to pluck away wavering supporters from themselves.

The complication was the status implications of intermarriage, mentioned above. "Big cheese" families could not reach down to, and accept daughters from, middling swing-vote patricians in the same neighborhood, without at the same time jeopardizing their own status positions in the local pecking order. But other prominent oligarch families, outside the neighborhood, could do so without disrupting either local neighborhood order. Given the decline in neighborhood intermarriage because of the ostracism, moreover, there was a demographic push to do just that. Cross-neighborhood co-optative daughter flows are illustrated as dotted lines in figure 3. Marriage cycles are the straightforward, even if unintended, result.

Since this co-optation process was occurring in all neighborhoods simultaneously (the consequence of the checkerboard pattern), the oligarchic elite as a whole closed in on itself: given the unexpected windfall of exogamous marriage into the truly elite, patricians of moderate position had fewer daughters available to send down. But this new cross-neighborhood elite was far more expansive and inclusive in status than had been the earlier medieval pattern of a federated alliance of neighborhood bosses: because of co-optation, the truly elite had fewer sons available to trade among themselves. The net result was the rectangular clique of oligarch blocks in figure 2a.

3. A final consequence was cross-neighborhood intermarriage among structurally isolated class traitor patricians. Given successful co-optation of swing votes into the reconsolidated elite and their own geographical scatter, outcast patricians were left with very few status-appropriate mar-

⁵⁸ From a network perspective, triadic cycles cause networks to fold into themselves, thereby creating clear "group" boundaries. Understanding how cyclic marriage triads formed, therefore, is the microbehavioral essence of understanding how the reconstituted patrician elite congealed.

⁵⁹ Civic humanism, a 1400–1430 ideology of citywide elites, arguably was built on top of this new elite marriage network foundation, even as it was catalyzed more proximately by 1390–1402 wars with Milan (Baron 1966).

riage options in their own neighborhoods. (We have argued, of course, that that was precisely the point.)

This left such patricians with two marriage options. (a) They could start to accept daughters from lower social groups. But this moved patricians down to the new men's status level, in other patricians' eyes.⁶⁰ (b) Alternatively, they could start to marry fellow isolates outside the neighborhood. This at least preserved their claim to status, even if it did nothing to restore power. For outcasts who wanted to remain patricians, this extranighborhood marriage game was the only game in town. Hence, even though exogamy rates were increasing for all, intrapatrician exogamy rates were higher among outcasts than among oligarchs: Oligarchs married both outside and inside the neighborhood.

In short, this is how we claim the outcast Medici discovered their "leading edge" and highly consequential marriage strategy. Near exclusive intermarriage with patricians outside their own neighborhood was a network strategy forced on the Medici by the resurgent oligarchs' successful blockage of Medici marriage with their San Giovanni patrician neighbors. The half of the Medici party that was based on marriage was "chosen" by the Medici family only in the sense of positional chess: oligarchs structurally induced their choice.

Thus, the oligarchic clique and the Medicean spoke marriage networks were not two separate party organizations, later to butt heads as autonomous units. They emerged in tandem, as a single network, each reflexively and asymmetrically structuring the other.⁶¹

Data on change in elite marriage strategy over time.—We still have not shown how the Medici themselves, alone among patrician outcasts, eventually came to marry into the oligarchy. But before we solve this final puzzle, let us present evidence in support of the above account.

We have attempted to date the 162 marriages in our data set, which span the period from about 1395 to 1434. Fifty-three of these marriages are precisely dated by Kent in her book. For 84 of the remaining 109 marriages, we have been able to estimate the decade of the marriage, usually through triangulating the known dates of relatives with genealogical information contained in Florentine names.⁶² Because of this estima-

⁶⁰ This is not to say that patricians never would do this—say, for money. But wealthy dowries from new men daughters were always implicitly purchased at the cost of lowered prestige. The dowry money was tainted, a sign of patricians on hard times.

⁶¹ Padgett (1990, p. 450) develops a similar "reflexive structuring through mutual contestation" argument in a totally different empirical context, that of professionalism and plea bargaining in U.S. criminal courts.

⁶² Florentine names usually include the father, and frequently the grandfather, in them—e.g., Cosimo di Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici. This is yet another indicator of the Florentine concern with patrilineage.

TABLE 12
ELITE MARRIAGES OVER TIME

Neighborhood by Estimated Date of Marriage	Overall	1395–1410	1411–20	1421–29	1430–34	No Date
Medici marriage strategies:						
San Giovanni.....	4 (.143)	0	0	3	0	1
Santo Spirito	10 (.357)	1	2	3	4	0
Santa Maria Novella	9 (.321)	2	4	2	0	1
Santa Croce.....	<u>5</u> (.179)	2	1	2	0	0
Total	28					
Peruzzi + Ricasoli + Castellani marriage strategies:						
San Giovanni.....	10 (.345)	2	3	1	3	1
Santo Spirito	5 (.172)	0	1	0	4	0
Santa Maria Novella	6 (.207)	3	1	1	1	0
Santa Croce.....	<u>8</u> (.276)	4	0	1	3	0
Total	29					
Strozzi + Gianfigliazzi marriage strategies:						
San Giovanni.....	11 (.344)	4	2	1	2	2
Santo Spirito	6 (.188)	2	0	0	3	1
Santa Maria Novella	9 (.281)	4	2	1	1	1
Santa Croce.....	<u>6</u> (.188)	3	1	0	2	0
Total	32					
Albizzi + Guadagni marriage strategies:						
San Giovanni.....	13 (.591)	2	5	5	0	1
Santo Spirito	4 (.182)	2	0	1	1	0
Santa Maria Novella	3 (.136)	3	0	0	0	0
Santa Croce.....	<u>2</u> (.091)	0	1	0	0	1
Total	22					

NOTE.—Values in parentheses are percentages of total.

tion procedure, table 12 contains measurement error, which will be reduced through ongoing archival work. For our purposes, however, these best estimates are sufficient to reveal broad trends in strategic behavior of the elite.

Table 12 presents, for the leading elite families in various quarters, the number of their marriages into families in all other quarters (including their own), broken down by decade. The Medici lived in the western portion of San Giovanni; the rival but intimately connected Albizzi and Guadagni lived in the eastern half. The Peruzzi, Ricasoli, and Castellani were leaders of Santa Croce, as already mentioned. And the Strozzi and

Gianfigliazzi were the most prominent families in Santa Maria Novella. No family in Santo Spirito had a volume of marriages high enough to warrant inclusion in this table.

If one looks first at the overall figures, what is most striking about these data is the fact that all of the most prestigious oligarch families intermarried at the highest rate with patrician families in San Giovanni—the Medici's own homeland. We have already established that the Medici themselves married at very low rates into their own neighborhood. We now have a better sense of why: they were surrounded by patrician enemies (Kent 1978, p. 170) whom the oligarchs already had successfully wired into themselves. The more detailed timing data also support this conclusion: the oligarchs were active in the 1395–1420 period in establishing marriage links with San Giovanni, during which time the Medici made not a single marriage (in our data set at least). Apparently, the oligarchs were quite aware of the potential for trouble from this quarter (also home to the Ricci) and took active steps to contain it at its source.

The case of the Rondinelli, mentioned above as a swing vote, illustrates the oligarchs' strategy more precisely. In the 1340s the Medici, the Rondinelli, and the della Stufa had formed a San Giovanni clique, apparently of the traditional sort (Kent 1978, p. 65). As late as the 1370s, the Rondinelli were active, along with a portion of the Medici, in the Ricci's San Giovanni faction (Brucker 1977, pp. 34, 125). Hence, the Rondinelli were prime candidates for neighborhood intermarriage with the Medici and for pariah status. However, an early wife-giving marriage with the Strozzi (themselves split between Albizzi and Ricci factions), followed by both types of marriage with the Guasconi (who themselves furnished an early wife to the Strozzi) apparently saved them from ostracism and turned them into avid oligarchs. In this manner, the Strozzi dissolved the Medici's local patrician clique.

In addition to such innovative cross-neighborhood raiding into the Medici's base by the Santa Maria Novella and the Santa Croce elites, the data reveal that the Medici's San Giovanni heartland was being squeezed in a traditional way. For reasons we do not know, from 1410 on, the old-line Albizzi and Guadagni retreated to an old-fashioned but successful neighborhood consolidation strategy. This retreat made them less integrated into the elite than one might suspect from their stature (cf. Kent 1978, p. 177). But it also made it harder for the Medici to rebuild their own local patrician base.

So far, the data are consistent with our expectations. In addition to this (albeit loose) confirmation, however, the data contain a surprise. The oligarchy worked so hard on controlling San Giovanni that they apparently overlooked the “older suburb” quarter of Santo Spirito (that

is, until the 1430s). Perhaps this was a simple and traditional oversight on their part, based on the slightly less prestigious character of this district; but we suspect that the overemphasis on San Giovanni, relative to Santo Spirito, was at least partly a conscious allocation of scarce marriage resources.⁶³

In any event, this oversight represented a clear “structural hole” within the oligarchic marriage network, which the data reveal the Medici to have exploited—at first gradually, but then with a vengeance, as they incrementally but clearly learned about the political potential in Santo Spirito: by the early 1430s, 100% of the Medici’s own marriages were directed to this quarter. Three of every four of these late Medici marriages were wife-receiving rather than wife-giving—an indication that the Medici by this point were not particularly picky about relative status claims. One of these wife-receiving marriages was with the Guicciardini, a family fairly well integrated into the elite, in order to reinforce an old marriage alliance under siege.⁶⁴ But all the others (with the Corbinelli, the Corsini, and the Ridolfi) fit the classic Medicean pattern of marriage to patrician structural isolates.

The oligarch families apparently were not fools, and so moved quite late to repair this breach in their own defenses. As was the oligarchs’ wont, all of these Santo Spirito marriages in the 1430s were to old-line families, already well integrated into the Florentine marriage network, albeit not at the highest levels. Thus, the late but intense mobilization of Santo Spirito patricians, by both sides, followed in microcosm the same pattern as that found in the global blockmodel—successful Medicean mobilization of structurally isolated patricians, and successful oligarchic co-optation of fairly well integrated patricians.

It may be of more general interest to pause here for an observation about the apparent microbehavioral decision processes revealed in these data. This sequence of structural holes, created in the first place by active elite attention focused elsewhere and then exploited gradually but surely by opponents, suggests more than anything that elite tactics evolve not as part of interacting sets of omniscient “grand strategies,” à la game

⁶³ Santo Spirito, located across the Arno river (on the “other side of the tracks”), originally was more like an old suburb than a part of the city’s geographical core (Weissman 1982, p. 6). It was the heart of the Ciompi wool workers’ district. This hardly implied that the quarter contained nothing but workers and new men—after all, many old magnate families resided there. But it does imply that the elite of this quarter were somewhat less densely integrated by marriage (though not economics) into themselves and into other neighborhood elites.

⁶⁴ The Peruzzi also arranged a marriage with the Guicciardini, in 1434, in an apparent effort to induce the Guicciardini to switch sides. The net effect of these offsetting moves was a Guicciardini family split in its partisan loyalties.

theory, but rather as a mutually adaptive learning process (Lave and March 1975).

Florentine families were extremely shrewd and opportunistic, but nonetheless they were always engaged in boundedly rational local action dictated by their own deep embedding through networks in localistic and highly idiosyncratic circumstances. Any complicated and endogenous marriage system presents each actor with narrow and changing opportunities, derived like vacancy chains (White 1970) from the actions and inactions of others in other arenas. Yet no one, not even Cosimo de' Medici, possessed the clear global overview of figure 2a. Everyone looked out at elite structure egocentrically from the vantage point of his or her own network location. This conclusion is not to doubt that families learned, and often shrewdly so, but to question the plausibility of historical explanations that place much weight on Machiavellian foresight and planning, especially in tumultuous times (cf. Skocpol 1979, pp. 14–18).

The Medici's own structurally anomalous position.—Finally, we need to explain: Given a global predisposition to form parties, why the Medici in particular as leaders of that party? After all, given the success of their opponents' control strategy against them, and especially given the depth of their involvement in previous discredited regimes,⁶⁵ the Medici emergence to take over the state in 1434 would seem, from the perspective of 1400, to be little short of miraculous.

One possible explanation might be the Medici bank, founded on ties with the pope. But this is not convincing. As a “cash cow” generator of personal wealth, which the Medici used both for personal patronage (Molho 1979) and for city loans (Molho 1971, p. 168), the role of the bank is clear. However, an identical economic position did not save the Alberti, who were the pope's primary bankers before their exile. And the Medici bank as an institution (not just as a generator of wealth) was useless for political mobilization: apart from the fact that not many fami-

⁶⁵ Salvistro di Alamanno de' Medici was the forceful, and somewhat demagogic, leader of the campaign against the Parte Guelfa that triggered the Ciompi revolution (Brucker 1962, chap. 8). For this role, and his subsequent leadership, he was the Ciompi's hero. On the very day of their street triumph, as patrician houses burned, the Ciompi “mob” knighted Salvistro for his services to the *popolo*. Other Medici followed in Salvistro's footsteps, through their heavy involvement with the Alberti faction. In 1397, shortly after the 1393 downfall of the Alberti, Bastardino de' Medici (along with Maso de' Ricci) was executed for attempting to assassinate Maso degli Albizzi and Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi and thereby to overthrow the regime (Brucker 1977, p. 100). In 1400, the Medici were involved in another such conspiracy and assassination attempt, with the result that the entire Medici family (along with the Alberti and Ricci) were excluded from holding public office for 20 years. Actions more anathema to the oligarch regime can hardly be imagined.

lies were involved, the bank was heavily infiltrated with oligarchic partners and employees (particularly the Bardi, but also the Guasconi and della Casa), later purged (de Roover 1966, p. 56).

A better answer, we believe, has to do with the Medici's own anomalous or structurally contradictory position in the patrician networks. They were the only major Florentine family to span the structural chasm created by elite closure and to participate simultaneously in the two disarticulated patrician worlds. (Refer to Medici links to the Guasconi and Albizzi blocks in figure 2a.) To understand this oddity, we need more information on the Medici's own, rather peculiar, family history.

Brucker's article (1957) on the 14th-century Medici makes it clear that the Medici were hardly a mercantile banking family throughout most of their history. On the whole, they were a rather violent and lawless bunch—*popolani* imitating magnates. Only Vieri di Cambio engaged in banking, and even then the Medici economic fortunes did not really begin to rise until Giovanni de' Medici used the remnants of Vieri's firm to capture the pope's business from the discredited Alberti (Holmes 1968). Perhaps in part because of his relative Salvestro's Ciompi exploits (see n. 65), Giovanni himself assiduously avoided politics throughout his lifetime (1360–1429) and tried to talk his sons, Cosimo and Lorenzo, into the same course (Machiavelli 1988, p. 161).

More particularly, Machiavelli describes (on the basis of earlier chronicles) two incidents that may account for how the Medici avoided utter, rather than just heavy, ostracism after 1382.

In 1393, immediately after the Alberti were finally banished by the Albizzi oligarchs, a crowd of guildsmen and *popolo minuto* ran to the house of Vieri di Cambio, who was left head of the Medici clan after the death of Salvestro in exile in 1388. According to Machiavelli (1988, pp. 139–140), this crowd implored Vieri in the name of Salvestro to lead a pro-Alberti revolt to topple the oligarchic regime. Vieri's kinsman Antonio also urged Vieri to commit the Medici to immediate revolt. However,

Going among them in the piazza and from there into the palace, he said before the Signoria that he could not in any mode regret having lived in such a manner that the people of Florence loved him, but that he regretted very much the judgment that had been made of him, which his past life did not deserve. . . . He therefore begged the Signoria that the ignorance of the multitude not be imputed to his sin because, as far as he was concerned, as soon as he could he had put himself in [the Signoria's] power. . . . After these words, Messer Veri returned to the piazza and joined his followers with those who had been led by Messer Rinaldo [Gianfigliazzi] and Messer Donato [Acciaiuoli]. . . . He begged [the mob] to put down their arms and obey the Signoria [which they did]. [Machiavelli 1988, p. 140]

Much later, in 1426, Giovanni de' Medici behaved in much the same way, although a change in who initiated the action reveals how far roles had altered in the interval. Rinaldo Albizzi came to Giovanni to ask him to join his faction of oligarchs in their efforts to disenfranchise new men (about which more below). He refused, saying that he opposed factions of any sort.

These things, so dealt with, were learned of outside and brought more reputation to Giovanni and hatred to the other citizens. But Giovanni sought to detach himself from this so as to give less spirit to those who might plan new things under the cover of his favor. . . . Many of those who followed his part were malcontent at this because they would have liked him to show himself more active in things. Among these was Almanno de' Medici [son of Salvestro], who was fierce by nature and did not cease inciting him for his coldness and for his mode of proceeding slowly, which, he said, was the cause of his enemies' dealing against him without respect. . . . Inspiring him also in the same way was his son Cosimo. Nonetheless, Giovanni . . . did not budge from his position. [Machiavelli 1988, p. 156]

In other words, throughout the decades following the Ciompi revolt, the leaders of the Medici clan tried hard to distance themselves from their more fractious relatives and to reestablish their family within the conservative oligarchic regime. Not only that, they went out of their way to keep the lid on trouble. As the Machiavelli accounts make clear (see also Martines 1963, p. 55), this docile political behavior did not expunge the pro-new-men image that the Medici name had in the popular mind. But, for their role in squelching discontent, the oligarchs apparently were begrudgingly grateful.

Even so, it was not until the 1420s that the oligarchs relented and began to co-opt the Medici through marriage cycles. Except for marriages with the Bardi, all of the marriages between the Medici and the oligarch blocks in figure 2a were recent.⁶⁶ This readmission of the Medici into elite circles was just what the cautious Giovanni had struggled for all his life. But what would have worked splendidly with the older generation of Vieri and Giovanni was too late for the fractious Young Turks Cosimo and Lorenzo di Giovanni and their cousin Averardo di Francesco. Events sketched in the next section led the die to be cast.

Thus, we lay at Vieri di Cambio's doorstep the explanation of the structurally anomalous position that the Medici house held in 15th-

⁶⁶ The early 1420s period of this co-optative marriage behavior is quite narrow, so the volume of evidence is not overwhelming. But what we have in mind here are the 1420s wife-giving marriages with Luca di Maso Albizzi (after the death of his father), with the Gianfigliazzi, and with the Barbadori—in other words, with the Albizzi block of figure 2a. In addition, there was a wife-receiving marriage with the Guasconi.

century patrician marriage networks. Giovanni followed up Vieri's abject plea with exemplary circumspection, but it was the defusion of popular rebellion by Vieri di Cambio, we argue, that saved the Medici name in oligarch eyes.⁶⁷

Even so, oligarchic acceptance of Giovanni de' Medici, however delimited, suspicious, and constrained, did not occur without a debate. "Niccolo da Uzzano did not fail to alert the other citizens [about the political inclusion of Giovanni di Bicci] by pointing out how dangerous it was to foster one who had such a reputation in the generality of people, and how easy it was to oppose disorders in their beginnings, but how difficult it was to remedy them when they were left alone to increase; and he recognized in Giovanni many parts superior to those of Messer Salvestro. Niccolo was not heeded by his peers because they were envious of his reputation and desired to have partners in defeating him" (Machiavelli 1988, p. 148).

The Dynamics of Party Formation: New Men Economic Ties

We shall now sketch, in exceedingly brief compass because of space limitations, the 1420s and 1430s Medici mobilization, through economic ties, of the second half of their party—the San Giovanni new men. In this reconstruction, we rely heavily on hard-earned data and interpretation in Molho (1971), Brucker (1977), and Kent (1978). The Milan and Lucca wars of 1424–33, we shall argue, were the short-term catalysts that galvanized San Giovanni new men into support and triggered, thereby, self-consciousness of the Medici as party. The argument in brief is as follows.⁶⁸

The Milan and Lucca wars triggered tax extraction of such magnitude that entire family patrimonies, both of patricians and of new men, were being destroyed. This set off a frantic scramble, among everyone, to escape ruinous tax assessment.

Taxes were levied administratively by neighborhood; thus, fiscal crisis revived the politics of neighborhood. Neighbors looked to neighbors to gain leverage on other neighbors who allocated assessments through rotating offices.

⁶⁷ Further evidence of this is the fact that only the descendants of Vieri were exempted from the oligarchs' blanket proscription of the Medici clan in 1433 (Kent 1978, p. 295).

⁶⁸ Readers interested in documentation of the claims herein can write the authors for an earlier draft of this paper. We have chosen to respond to page limitations by drastically shortening this section on new men, because the argument in this section is primarily a synthesis of secondary sources.

Administrative assessment procedures could more easily uncover fixed assets like real estate than liquid assets like cash and business investments. Patricians went on the legislative offensive to squeeze more offices and taxes out of mercantile new men.

New men responded initially by banding together in parish-based secret societies: the religious confraternities. While not class homogeneous, this corporate form was a first step toward organized class solidarity and resistance.

Oligarchs responded with vicious and successful repression. Abolition of confraternities left new men bereft of coordinated local neighborhood support from each other.

New men responded in the only way left: supplication of local neighborhood patrician patrons for help. But successful mobilization of patricians for class repression had locked in most oligarchs against responding to appeals from below. The enforcement mechanism behind this coordinated class rejection of new men was the dense marriage network analyzed above.

The Medici were the only exception: their structurally contradictory position within elite marriage networks gave Giovanni and Cosimo the truly discretionary choice of responding or not to pleas from San Giovanni new men. Giovanni de' Medici, late in his life, responded to Rinaldo Albizzi's explicit request to join him in repression in the manner described in the quotation from Machiavelli above. In the sharply polarized context of the time, the hotheaded Rinaldo probably took Giovanni's equivocal response as throwing down the Ciompi (or at least new men) gauntlet. Henceforth (after 1426), the Medici family was severed from budding oligarchic co-optation and was now afloat as a distinct political faction.

San Giovanni new men received patronage, through economic ties, from their neighbors the Medici, but other new men did not, from the Medici or any other source.⁶⁹

Therefore, we believe that the surge of supplication from San Giovanni new men during the Milan war is what triggered Medici self-consciousness of themselves as a political party (as opposed to just an outcast family struggling desperately to regain admittance to the club). Oligarchs funneled new men's support to them and then cut off any possibility of equivocating response. Certainly, the first evidence of intentional and coordinated Medici manipulation of elections dates from 1427, right after this period.

⁶⁹ Hence, the 1434 peak of newly admitted families is only one-fourth as large as the historical average. See fig. 1.

NETWORK IDENTITIES

Robust Action

With these analyses of Medicean party dynamics in hand, we are now in position to understand the structural preconditions for robust action. We can only assume that Cosimo learned sphinxlike behavior at his father Giovanni's knee, and then adapted that to revolutionary circumstances. The strategy certainly was not unknown in Florence (Weissman 1989). But robust action is not just a matter of behaving ambiguously. Others are too shrewd not to see through behavioral facades down to presumed self-interested motivations. To act credibly in a multivocal fashion, one's attributed interests must themselves be multivocal.

Within the Medici party itself, the structural underpinnings for contradictory attributions of "Medici self-interest" are clear. The Medici were heroes of the new men not just because they inherited the historical legacy of Salvestro d'Alamanno. They did sponsor a few San Giovanni families of new men, quite unlike their oligarch opponents. And, after Giovanni spurned Rinaldo Albizzi's class alliance request, oligarchs heaped the scornful opprobrium of that label on Medici heads in a polemical effort to whip up patrician fury. At the same time, the Medici's deep patrician roots were clear enough to those whom they married. One can easily imagine Medicean patrician supporters knowingly winking at each other on hearing the public charges of favoring the new men that swirled around their in-laws. Such patricians' hatred of the oligarchs ran deep, and "everyone knows that tactical alliances are sometimes necessary to reestablish an old regime." After all, it would not be the first or last time in Florentine history that the new men had been sold down the river.

Which attribution was true? Plausible evidence could be assembled for either view, but new men and patrician supporters of the Medici hardly ever had the opportunity to get together privately to compare contradictory notes. Even if they had, trust between them was so low that neither should have believed a word of the other. Robust action by the Medici was credible precisely because of the contradictory character of their base of support.

Descending to more micro levels does not help to clarify attributions. Everyone knew that the Medici wanted, as bankers, to make money; as families, to increase prestige; as neighborhood patrons, to amass power. But which of the goals (which really are roles) was in play when? Given fixed role frames, self-interests (and attributions) are clear, but in complicated chaos like the Milan and Lucca wars the games themselves are all up for grabs. Rational choice requires a common metric of utility for

footing, but revealed preferences (the basis for inferring trade-offs across goals/roles) only exist post hoc.

A Medicean goal of taking over the state can be inferred from the historical record, but only after their choice already had been narrowed to that or exile. Before that, the Medici appear to have been traditional incrementalists, trying only to worm their way back into oligarchs' good graces. Yet, at the level of sphinxlike style, it is not at all clear that Cosimo and Giovanni were any different. Both were shrewd and multivocal opportunists, pursuing openings whenever they presented themselves. Clear goals of self-interest, we conclude, are not really features of people; they are Florentine (and our) interpretations of varying structures of games.

Legitimacy

Besides multivocal placement in contemporary conflict, however, there was a second dimension to Medicean robust action. Not only has Cosimo been remembered in history as a Machiavellian deep thinker, but also at his death he was legally enshrined as *pater patriae*, father of his country, by his contemporaries (cf. Schwartz 1983). The very ambiguity of his placement in self-interest somehow became elevated, in the public mind, into the essence of public interest.

This transposition from hero of the new men to Solomonic sage, we believe, can be understood by returning to those Florentines who have remained on the margins of our account so far—the political neutrals. Cosimo never beat the oligarchs in pitched battle; he was recalled from Venetian exile in public triumph, as savior of the republic.⁷⁰

The key is the cognitive category “oligarch.” After all, when the oligarchs were firmly in control, they were not labeled “oligarchs”; they were republican “public citizens of the state.” Loss of legitimacy and Medici victory are what got them their pejorative tag. No longer public-spirited and selfless in attribution, they came to epitomize class self-interest in Florentine eyes.

How did this delegitimizing change in attribution come to pass? Our answer, basically, is positional chess. The Medici themselves never slung “oligarch” mud back into oligarch eyes. As mentioned in the introduction, Cosimo never said a clear word in his life. Instead, others—new men and eventually political neutrals—were the agents of active tactical slashing.

The sequence went like this: As already described, the fiscal crisis of

⁷⁰ The irony, of course, is that most historians regard Cosimo as the destroyer of republicanism (Rubinstein 1966).

the wars repolarized social classes and tempted oligarchs into a successful (in the short run) repression campaign. This campaign earned them their label in new men's eyes. However, as Kent (1978) makes clear, the oligarchs' attack was not just a rash tilt at windmills, based on lack of sophisticated foresight. Oligarchs' ability to control the legislative process (especially the colleges), and therefore to attain their goals peacefully, had been hindered recently by the network tentacles of the duplicitous Medici faction. Medicean latent appeal to new men and heterogenous control of some offices gave them swing-vote influence out of proportion to their numbers—even though legislatively all they did was block. In the context of vanishing patrician patrimonies, however, mere blockage was sufficient to force oligarchs onto the offensive. Either they purged the opposition or else all their wealth would be gone.

Cosimo, in contrast, behaved in his typically reactive fashion of only responding to requests. He funneled a sizable portion of the assets of his bank into funding the state's short-term debt, for which he was rewarded with brief public office—member of the Ufficiali del Banco, from November 1427 to December 1428.⁷¹ The monetary catch was this: as incentive to grant such emergency loans, the state offered above-average short-term returns. Thus, while his opponents faced financial catastrophe, Cosimo actually may have made money.⁷² More to the point here, once Florence survived, Cosimo de' Medici took on the appearance of financial savior of the city (Molho 1971).

Knowing this, once the Lucca war had ended, the oligarchs moved quickly to send Cosimo, Lorenzo, and other Medici and lieutenants into exile in Venice (and elsewhere). In anticipation of this very move, Cosimo had shifted much of his wealth out of the city, away from potential expropriation, and used it to cultivate Venetian support (de Roover 1966, p. 54; Kent 1978, pp. 304–8). Oligarchic legitimacy was now in deep trouble. They still did not have enough control to purge sufficiently the Signoria electoral bags,⁷³ so, when the lottery randomly produced too many Medicean officeholders (Kent 1978, p. 328), the oligarchy was forced to take desperate action. Rinaldo Albizzi sent out the word to

⁷¹ Even after Cosimo left this post, his supporters continued to dominate this financial nerve center (Molho 1971).

⁷² A number of oligarchs possessed as much, or almost as much, raw wealth as did Cosimo, but theirs often was not as liquid as his—a consequence of Cosimo's special ties to the pope.

⁷³ The Florentines had an elaborate electoral system that involved electing candidates to bags, one bag for every class of offices. Offices were filled every two months by randomly drawing names from the bags and checking these against various legal restrictions. The whole republican purpose of the system was to make it hard for any one faction to consolidate control. See Najemy (1982).

assemble the troops in order forcibly to seize the Signoria, with the stochastic turnout consequences described above. Political neutrals joined the cry for Medici return, and Cosimo became in public acclamation the political as well as financial savior of Florence.

War of course was the *sine qua non*, but note that at each step of the way Cosimo's careful positional maneuvering forced or enticed oligarchs into offensive lines of action, which connoted private self-interest. These were clear, irrevocable, and hence foreseeable. The reactive character of his robust and multivocal actions gained for Cosimo the revolutionary the legitimizing aureole of protector of the status quo. Party transmuted into state.

CONCLUSION

We shall not summarize the arguments in this paper, except for this: state centralization and the Renaissance emerged from the grinding of tumultuous historical events, as these were filtered through elite transformation. Cosimo did not create the Medici party, but he did shrewdly learn the rules of the networks around him. Rather than dissipate this power through forceful command, Cosimo retreated behind a shroud of multiple identities, impenetrable to this day. These credibly imparted multivocal meanings to all his reactive actions. Robust discretion, in the face of unpredictably hostile futures, and Solomonic legitimacy, above the self-interested fray, were the intended or unintended (who knows?) consequences.

We close on this methodological note: to understand state building, we have argued, one needs to penetrate beneath the veneer of formal institutions and apparently clear goals, down to the relational substratum of people's actual lives. Studying "social embeddedness," we claim, means not the denial of agency, or even groups, but rather an appreciation for the localized, ambiguous, and contradictory character of these lives. Heterogeneity of localized actions, networks, and identities explains both why aggregation is predictable only in hindsight and how political power is born.

APPENDIX A

Blockmodeling Methods

We adopt correlation as our operational measure of structural equivalence, just as in CONCOR (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976). A frequently used alternative measure, Euclidean distance (Burt 1976), gives weight to volume of ties as well as to pattern of ties (Faust and Romney

1985). In the current context, in which parties and class crosscut, this weighting unhelpfully differentiates elite from nonelite rather than one party from another. Unlike CONCOR, however, we prefer agglomerative to divisive clustering.⁷⁴

Thus, our method is to correlate columns of “stacked” matrices (and transposes), across all strong tie networks, and then to input the resulting correlation matrix into the standard Johnson’s complete-link clustering algorithm.⁷⁵ This produced the partition of families given in Appendix B. To get the structural portraits of figures 2a and 2b, blockmodel images of social bonds among clusters were generated by (a) aggregating each raw network matrix according to Appendix B’s clustering of families and then (b) defining and drawing a social “bond” whenever the number of raw network ties between clusters equaled or exceeded two.⁷⁶

Tables A1 and A2 address goodness-of-fit issues. There are two such issues: How well do the simplified blockmodels represent the more complex actual network data? How well does the blockmodel partition predict actual party memberships, as recorded in Kent? The first issue is assessed, in table A1, in two ways: (a) by the percentage of actual ties among families represented in figure 2’s image bonds among blocks and (b) by correlations between raw data matrices and block mean densities, based on the partitions in Appendix B (Noma and Smith 1985).

All correlations in tables A1 and A2 are significant at the $P < .001$ level, according to the QAP procedure of Baker and Hubert (1981).⁷⁷

⁷⁴ The reason is the two procedures’ differing treatments of structural isolates. We prefer to inhibit these “irrelevant” actors from contaminating our structural picture of relations within the core. (This does not mean that information on ties between central and isolated families is ignored in the discovery of the core. Such information already has been incorporated into the original correlation measure.)

⁷⁵ In addition to this computer output, we did one manual correction: we merged the Capponi/Busini block with the Strozzi solo block. This merger improved (marginally) goodness of fit. More important, Kent (1978, p. 184) makes a strong case for the structural equivalence of Strozzi and Capponi. In addition, it was clear (from comparing D. Kent [1978] to F. W. Kent [1977]) that we possessed only limited marriage and economic data on Capponi.

⁷⁶ Often, density percentages are used as cutoff criteria, instead of raw number of ties, as is the case here. The reason for our approach is that, with small block sizes, percentages are not robust: a single actual tie can mean as much as a 50% density.

⁷⁷ In the nonparametric QAP procedure (Baker and Hubert 1981), an empirical distribution of random correlations is generated by repeatedly permuting rows and columns of the raw data matrix and then correlating this with the fixed image matrix. In no case, out of about 1,000 trials, did any of our own simulated random correlations exceed .10. More formal parametric significance tests are rarely possible with network data, since the data grossly violate the “independent observations” assumptions of traditional tests.

TABLE A1
GOODNESS OF FIT OF BLOCKMODEL IMAGE TO RAW NETWORK DATA

TYPE OF RELATION	No. of Ties	OVERALL		MEDICI	
		Proportion of Ties in Image	Correlation with Block Means	No. of Ties	Proportion of Ties in Image
Marriage	161	.646	.492	28	.964
Trade	92	.674	.561	10	.800
Partnership	45	.556	.513	13	.846
Bank	13	.769	.415	10	.800
Real estate	<u>22</u>	<u>.091</u>	.378	<u>5</u>	<u>.400</u>
Subtotal*	333	.610		66	.848
Mallevadori	31	.194	.338	3	.000
Friendship	50	.360	.381	14	.714
Personal loan.....	89	.404	.408	25	.840
Patronage	<u>36</u>	<u>.222</u>	.389	<u>21</u>	<u>.381</u>
Subtotal*	206	.330		63	.619
Total	539	.503		129	.736

* The blockmodel partitions were derived from data on the first five of these relations only. Goodness-of-fit measures for the last four relations derive from the superposition of best-fitting partitions from the first five relations. All correlations are significant at the $P < .001$ level, according to the nonparametric QAP procedure (Baker and Hubert 1981), implemented in UCINET.

TABLE A2
GOODNESS OF FIT OF BLOCKMODEL PARTITIONS TO PARTY MEMBERSHIP

No. of Families	Medici Blocks	All Other Blocks	Elite Blocks	Nonelite Blocks
Mediceans.....	26	4	2	2
Split loyalty.....	2	10	6	4
Oligarchs.....	0	31	8	23
Neutrals	1	18	2	16
Proportion mobilized*966	.714	.889	.644
Proportion own party†.....	.958	.823	.737	.871

* % Mobilized measures relative recruitment of blocked families into any party; i.e., proportion mobilized = (no. of families - no. of neutral families)/(no. of families).

† % Own party measures relative partisanship of activists; i.e., proportion own party = (no. of families in own party)/(no. of families - no. of neutral families), with split families allocated proportionately.

Moreover, 50% of the total volume of ties,⁷⁸ 61% of marriage and economic ties (fig. 2a), and 33% of “political” and friendship ties (fig. 2b) are captured by the central tendencies in the blockmodel. Given that the blockmodel was derived from the strong tie marriage and economic relations alone, we were pleasantly surprised by the weak tie performance.

More particularly, it is clear that marriage and trading relationships are the primary driving forces behind this blockmodel portrait of the Florentine elite. In part, this is because of their high rates of inclusive success, but it is also due to the higher volume of data. Partnerships and especially bank employment relations were very important when they appeared, but they do not span much of the elite. Real estate relations essentially were irrelevant.

On the weak tie side, personal friendships and personal loans operated in large part within the framework of marriage and economic relations. *Mallevadori* and patronage relations, however, were not well predicted by marriage and economic ties.

The success with which the blockmodel predicts political partisanship, in the table A2, speaks for itself. Ninety-three percent of the families in the Medicean blocks were mobilized into the Medici party. Fifty-nine percent of the families in the non-Medicean blocks were mobilized into the oligarch party.

⁷⁸ Considering that this blockmodel has been disaggregated to an average of 2.7 families per block, and considering that the average overall density of the nine historical networks here is an extremely sparse 0.7%, this is excellent performance.

APPENDIX B

TABLE B1

BLOCK MEMBERSHIPS: CLUSTERING OF CORRELATIONS OF MARRIAGE, TRADE,
PARTNERSHIP, BANK, AND REAL ESTATE RELATIONS

<i>Reggimento</i> Family	Party*	Gross Wealth (Florins)	Date of First Prior	Neighborhood (<i>Gonfalone</i>)†
Medicean blocks:				
MEDICI:				
Medici.....	Medici (5)	199,672	1291	41
Carnesecchi.....	Medici	42,316	1297	42
Berlinghieri.....	Medici	6,117	1365	22
TORNABUONI:				
Tornabuoni/				
Torn aquinci	Medici	121,310	Magnate	34
Salviati.....	Split loyalties (1/1)	29,964	1297	24
Serristori.....	Medici	56,675	1392	23
Giugni.....	Medici (3)	41,086	1291	24
Pecori	Medici	17,244	1284	42
Corsini		16,387	1290	13
Vecchietti.....	Medici	17,212	Magnate	34
GUICCIARDINI:				
Acciaiuoli.....	Medici	28,200	1282	31
Guicciardini	Medici	60,060	1302	12
Ridolfi.....	Medici	46,196	1290	13
Pitti.....	Medici (2)	9,676	1283	12
Corbinelli.....	Medici	58,955	1286	12
GINORI:				
Ginori	Medici (3)	34,831	1344	41
Martelli	Medici (8)	7,502	1343	41
DIETISALVI:				
Dietisalvi	Medici (2)	3,943	1291	41
Ciai	Medici	22,331	1389	41
DALL'ANTELLA:				
dall'Antella	Split loyalties (1/2)	18,437	1282	21
Bartolini.....	Medici	19,477	1299	42
ORLANDINI:				
Orlandini.....	Medici	11,012	1420	42
Lapi	Medici	5,303	1394	44
DAVANZATI:				
Davanzati	Medici (2)	19,887	1320	32
COCCO-DONATI:				
Cocco-Donati.....	Medici (2)	2,580	1376	22
Arnolfi	Medici	4,160	1318	42
Pandolfini	Medici	30,520	1381	43
VALORI:				
Valori	Medici	15,213	1322	43
del Benino	Medici	22,629	1345	13
Non-Medicean blocks:				
ARDINGHELLI:				
Ardinghelli.....	Oligarch	57,596	1282	32
da Panzano	Split loyalties (1/1)	...	1312	22

TABLE B1 (*Continued*)

<i>Reggimento</i> Family	Party*	Gross Wealth (Florins)	Date of First Prior	Neighborhood (Gonfalone)†
DA UZZANO:				
da Uzzano.....		75,737	1363	11
Bucelli	Oligarch	20,394	1284	22
GUASCONI:				
Guasconi	Oligarch (3)	29,074	1314	41
Bardi	Split loyalties (3/5)	189,452	Magnate	11
Cavalcanti	Split loyalties (1/1)	50,122	Magnate	31
Pazzi.....	Medici	72,550	Magnate	43
RONDINELLI:				
Rondinelli	Oligarch	21,053	1296	41
Brancacci.....	Oligarch (4)	15,697	1317	14
Mancini.....		6,838	1284	22
ALDOBRANDINI:				
Aldobrandini	Oligarch	7,171	1307	34
Raugi.....	Oligarch	3,634	1304	21
PERUZZI:				
Peruzzi	Oligarch (8)	104,795	1283	23
Ricasoli	Oligarch (2)	36,178	Magnate	21
degli Agli		9,402	Magnate	42
CASTELLANI:				
Castellani.....	Oligarch (5)	61,696	1326	21
Spini.....	Oligarch	39,553	Magnate	32
Fagni		10,106	1295	23
PEPI:				
Pepi.....	Oligarch	2,865	1301	23
Doffi	Oligarch	12,700	1393	22
Morelli		27,535	1387	23
SCAMBRILLA:				
Scambrilla.....	Oligarch (2)	148	1387	21
Sertini.....		...	1376	34
BENIZZI:				
Benizzi	Oligarch (2)	9,672	1301	12
Manelli.....		16,421	Magnate	12
STROZZI:				
Strozzi.....	Oligarch (4)	296,250	1283	33
Capponi	Medici	54,027	1287	12
Busini		57,019	1345	23
RUCELLAI:				
Rucellai		54,968	1302	33
Baldovinetti	Oligarch (2)	9,831	1287	31
Sacchetti.....		29,092	1335	22
PANCIATICHI:				
Frescobaldi	Oligarch	28,898	Magnate	12
Panciatichi	Oligarch	151,542	Consular	42
Manovelli	Oligarch	13,438	1283	42
ALBIZZI:				
Albizzi	Split loyalties (1/2)	92,599	1282	43
Gianfigliazzi	Split loyalties (1/5)	47,853	Magnate	32
Barbadori	Split loyalties (1/2)	98,663	1295	12
Belfradelli	Oligarch (2)	9,014	1321	12
Bencivenni.....	Split loyalties (1/1)	1,811	1389	43

TABLE B1 (*Continued*)

<i>Reggimento</i> Family	Party*	Gross Wealth (Florins)	Date of First Prior	Neighborhood (Gonfalone)†
ALTOVITI:				
Altoviti.....	Oligarch (2)	42,357	1282	31
del Palagio		8,676	1328	43
Corsi.....	Split loyalties (1/3)	26,588	1354	23
DELLA CASA:				
della Casa.....	Split loyalties (1/1)	31,069	1393	42
Adimari.....		45,689	Magnate	44
Serragli		63,866	1325	14
SOLOSMEI:				
Solosmei	Oligarch (2)	5,757	1364	41
LAMBERTESCHI:				
Lamberteschi.....	Oligarch (2)	52,524	Consular	21
Baronci	Oligarch	12,251	1330	42
VELLUTI:				
Velluti.....	Split loyalties (1/1)	22,372	1283	12
Arrigucci	Oligarch	5,736	Magnate	42
BARONCELLI:				
Baroncelli		67,966	1287	21
Rossi.....	Oligarch	24,649	Magnate	44
GUADAGNI:				
Guadagni.....	Oligarch (5)	25,179	1289	43
BISCHERI:				
Bischeri.....	Oligarch	55,230	1309	44
Arrighi		23,499	1373	43
FIORAVANTI:				
Donati.....		26,099	Magnate	43
Scolari.....		12,074	Magnate	43
Fioravanti.....	Medici	19,501	1344	43
Miscellaneous				
(unblocked):				
Carducci.....	Medici (2)	28,909	1380	31
Fortini		30,645	1386	43
del Forese	Oligarch	4,220	1296	24
Bartoli	Oligarch	54,956	1345	32

* For Medici and oligarch parties, numbers in parentheses are numbers active, if more than one. For split loyalties, numbers in parentheses are, first, number of Mediceans and, second, number of oligarchs. Blank spaces indicate that there were no active partisans.

† For Santo Spirito quarter, 11 = Scala *gonfalone*, 12 = Nicchio *gonfalone*, 13 = Ferza *gonfalone*, 14 = Drago Verde *gonfalone*. For Santa Croce quarter, 21 = Carro *gonfalone*, 22 = Bue *gonfalone*, 23 = Lion Nero *gonfalone*, 24 = Ruote *gonfalone*. For Santa Maria Novella quarter, 31 = Vipera *gonfalone*, 32 = Unicorn *gonfalone*, 33 = Lion Rosso *gonfalone*, 34 = Lion Bianco *gonfalone*. For San Giovanni quarter, 41 = Lion d'oro *gonfalone*, 42 = Drago San Giovanni *gonfalone*, 43 = Chiavi *gonfalone*, 44 = Vaio *gonfalone*.

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