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Leaking deserialization protection on Externalizables #15346

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kwart opened this issue Jul 23, 2019 · 3 comments · Fixed by #15358
Closed

Leaking deserialization protection on Externalizables #15346

kwart opened this issue Jul 23, 2019 · 3 comments · Fixed by #15358
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@kwart
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kwart commented Jul 23, 2019

The deserialization filter doesn't properly protect against vulnerable Externalizable classes. The filtering has to be extended.

The issue was discovered by @Mak-Sym and reported on Hazelcast google group - https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/hazelcast/B_RAv7gTVPU.

@kwart kwart added this to the 3.12.2 milestone Jul 23, 2019
@kwart kwart self-assigned this Jul 23, 2019
@kwart kwart added the Source: Community PR or issue was opened by a community user label Jul 23, 2019
kwart added a commit to kwart/hazelcast that referenced this issue Jul 23, 2019
kwart added a commit to kwart/hazelcast that referenced this issue Jul 23, 2019
kwart added a commit to kwart/hazelcast that referenced this issue Jul 23, 2019
kwart added a commit to kwart/hazelcast that referenced this issue Jul 23, 2019
kwart added a commit that referenced this issue Jul 24, 2019
…ck in Map index (#15358)

* [#15346] Fix deserialization filtering for Externalizables and Deadlock in Map index

* Fix ambiguous toArray() in Java 11
kwart added a commit that referenced this issue Jul 24, 2019
…nd Deadlock in Map index (#15359)

* [#15346] Fix deserialization filtering for Externalizables and Deadlock in Map index
@andrewfinnell
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Would it be possible for someone to describe specifically how an attacker might use this vulnerability? From what I am reading it sounds like an attacker would need to send a malformed Join request that tricks Hazelcast into deserializing a rogue class that is on the classpath of the service accepting the join request. Is that accurate?

@mmedenjak
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@kwart can you provide an answer for the question or confirm it?

@kwart
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kwart commented Jan 31, 2022

Would it be possible for someone to describe specifically how an attacker might use this vulnerability? From what I am reading it sounds like an attacker would need to send a malformed Join request that tricks Hazelcast into deserializing a rogue class that is on the classpath of the service accepting the join request. Is that accurate?

We don't publish details on attack vectors. Sorry.

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