Does this kernel support the Intel® Media Server Studio 2017 R3? #1

pauldotknopf · 2018-02-28T20:13:03Z

https://software.intel.com/en-us/forums/intel-media-sdk/topic/740685

I know they recommend using the 4.4 kernel with the patches they provided, but I am wondering if the same gpu libraries should work with the patches currently present in this repo.

commit 1ff5325 upstream. Avoid circular locking dependency by calling to uobj_alloc_commit() outside of xrcd_tree_mutex lock. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syzkaller401056/269 is trying to acquire lock: (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000006c12d2cd>] uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 but task is already holding lock: (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 rdma_alloc_commit_uobject+0x22c/0x600 ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0x61a/0xdd0 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b -> #0 (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock); lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex); lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock); lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syzkaller401056/269: #0: (&file->cleanup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c9f0c252>] ib_uverbs_close+0xac/0x570 #1: (&ucontext->cleanup_rwsem){++++}, at: [<00000000b6994d49>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730 #2: (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller401056 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xde/0x164 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0 print_circular_bug.isra.24+0x35e/0x396 ? print_circular_bug_header+0x12e/0x12e ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b validate_chain.isra.28+0x25d1/0x40c0 ? check_usage+0xb70/0xb70 ? graph_lock+0x160/0x160 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280 ? __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630 __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630 lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 ? __mutex_lock+0x828/0x1720 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730 ? __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0x1630 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200 ? uverbs_close_fd+0x1c0/0x1c0 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520 ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x220/0x220 ? exit_notify+0x9f0/0x9f0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670 ? time_hardirqs_off+0x27/0x490 ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x6c/0x460 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b RIP: 0033:0x431ce9 Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Fixes: fd3c790 ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema") Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f027e0b upstream. The adis_probe_trigger() creates a new IIO trigger and requests an interrupt associated with the trigger. The interrupt uses the generic iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll() function as its interrupt handler. Currently the driver initializes some fields of the trigger structure after the interrupt has been requested. But an interrupt can fire as soon as it has been requested. This opens up a race condition. iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll() will access the trigger data structure and dereference the ops field. If the ops field is not yet initialized this will result in a NULL pointer deref. It is not expected that the device generates an interrupt at this point, so typically this issue did not surface unless e.g. due to a hardware misconfiguration (wrong interrupt number, wrong polarity, etc.). But some newer devices from the ADIS family start to generate periodic interrupts in their power-on reset configuration and unfortunately the interrupt can not be masked in the device. This makes the race condition much more visible and the following crash has been observed occasionally when booting a system using the ADIS16460. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008 pgd = c0004000 [00000008] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.0-04126-gf9739f0-dirty #257 Hardware name: Xilinx Zynq Platform task: ef04f640 task.stack: ef050000 PC is at iio_trigger_notify_done+0x30/0x68 LR is at iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll+0x18/0x20 pc : [<c042d868>] lr : [<c042d924>] psr: 60000193 sp : ef051bb8 ip : 00000000 fp : ef106400 r10: c081d80a r9 : ef3bfa00 r8 : 00000087 r7 : ef051bec r6 : 00000000 r5 : ef3bfa00 r4 : ee92ab00 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : ee97e400 Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 18c5387d Table: 0000404a DAC: 00000051 Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xef050210) [<c042d868>] (iio_trigger_notify_done) from [<c0065b10>] (__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x118) [<c0065b10>] (__handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c0065bbc>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c/0x58) [<c0065bbc>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c0065c30>] (handle_irq_event+0x38/0x5c) [<c0065c30>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c0068e28>] (handle_level_irq+0xa4/0x130) [<c0068e28>] (handle_level_irq) from [<c0064e74>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) [<c0064e74>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c021ab7c>] (zynq_gpio_irqhandler+0xb8/0x13c) [<c021ab7c>] (zynq_gpio_irqhandler) from [<c0064e74>] (generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x34) [<c0064e74>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c0065370>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x5c/0xb4) [<c0065370>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c000940c>] (gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x8c) [<c000940c>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0013e8c>] (__irq_svc+0x6c/0xa8) To fix this make sure that the trigger is fully initialized before requesting the interrupt. Fixes: ccd2b52 ("staging:iio: Add common ADIS library") Reported-by: Robin Getz <Robin.Getz@analog.com> Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7ba7166 upstream. It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b8ff180 upstream. During eviction, the driver may free more than one hole in the drm_mm due to the side-effects in evicting the scanned nodes. However, drm_mm_scan_color_evict() expects that the scan result is the first available hole (in the mru freed hole_stack list): kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mm.c:844! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: i915 snd_hda_codec_analog snd_hda_codec_generic coretemp snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core lpc_ich snd_pcm e1000e mei_me prime_numbers mei CPU: 1 PID: 1490 Comm: gem_userptr_bli Tainted: G U 4.16.0-rc1-g740f57c54ecf-kasan_6+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 755 /0PU052, BIOS A08 02/19/2008 RIP: 0010:drm_mm_scan_color_evict+0x2b8/0x3d0 RSP: 0018:ffff880057a573f8 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: ffff8800611f5980 RBX: ffff880057a575d0 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 00000000029d5000 RSI: 1ffff1000af4aec1 RDI: ffff8800611f5a10 RBP: ffff88005ab884d0 R08: ffff880057a57600 R09: 000000000afff000 R10: 1ffff1000b5710b5 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: 1ffff1000af4ae82 R13: ffff8800611f59b0 R14: ffff8800611f5980 R15: ffff880057a57608 FS: 00007f2de0c2e8c0(0000) GS:ffff88006ac40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2ddde1e000 CR3: 00000000609b2000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ? drm_mm_scan_remove_block+0x330/0x330 ? drm_mm_scan_remove_block+0x151/0x330 i915_gem_evict_something+0x711/0xbd0 [i915] ? igt_evict_contexts+0x50/0x50 [i915] ? nop_clear_range+0x10/0x10 [i915] ? igt_evict_something+0x90/0x90 [i915] ? i915_gem_gtt_reserve+0x1a1/0x320 [i915] i915_gem_gtt_insert+0x237/0x400 [i915] __i915_vma_do_pin+0xc25/0x1a20 [i915] eb_lookup_vmas+0x1c63/0x3790 [i915] ? i915_gem_check_execbuffer+0x250/0x250 [i915] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x33f/0x590 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x7d/0xf0 i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x86a/0x2ff0 [i915] ? __kmalloc+0x132/0x340 ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x10f/0x760 [i915] ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0x12e/0x1c0 ? drm_ioctl+0x662/0x980 ? eb_relocate_slow+0xa90/0xa90 [i915] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x10f/0x760 [i915] ? __might_fault+0xea/0x1a0 i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x3cc/0x760 [i915] ? i915_gem_execbuffer_ioctl+0xba0/0xba0 [i915] ? lock_acquire+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? i915_gem_execbuffer_ioctl+0xba0/0xba0 [i915] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x12e/0x1c0 drm_ioctl+0x662/0x980 ? i915_gem_execbuffer_ioctl+0xba0/0xba0 [i915] ? drm_getstats+0x20/0x20 ? debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x2a6/0x8c0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x170/0xe70 ? ioctl_preallocate+0x170/0x170 ? task_work_run+0xbe/0x160 ? lock_acquire+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x33f/0x590 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2f/0x50 SyS_ioctl+0x36/0x70 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xe70/0xe70 do_syscall_64+0x18c/0x5d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b RIP: 0033:0x7f2ddf13b587 RSP: 002b:00007fff15c4f9d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2ddf13b587 RDX: 00007fff15c4fa20 RSI: 0000000040406469 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff15c4fa20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f2ddf3fe120 R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000040406469 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007fff15c4fa20 R15: 00000000000000c7 Code: 00 00 00 4a c7 44 22 08 00 00 00 00 42 c7 44 22 10 00 00 00 00 48 81 c4 b8 00 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 0f 0b 0f 0b <0f> 0b 31 c0 eb c0 4c 89 ef e8 9a 09 41 ff e9 1e fe ff ff 4c 89 RIP: drm_mm_scan_color_evict+0x2b8/0x3d0 RSP: ffff880057a573f8 We can trivially relax this assumption by searching the hole_stack for the scan result and warn instead if the driver called us without any result. Fixes: 3fa489d ("drm: Apply tight eviction scanning to color_adjust") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+ Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180219113543.8010-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 642a843 ] Calling tipc_mon_delete() before the monitor has been created will oops. This can happen in tipc_enable_bearer() error path if tipc_disc_create() fails. [ 48.589074] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001008 [ 48.590266] IP: tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] [ 48.591223] PGD 1e60c5067 P4D 1e60c5067 PUD 1eb0cf067 PMD 0 [ 48.592230] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN [ 48.595610] CPU: 5 PID: 1199 Comm: tipc Tainted: G B 4.15.0-rc4-pc64-dirty #5 [ 48.597176] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014 [ 48.598489] RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] [ 48.599347] RSP: 0018:ffff8801d827f668 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 48.600705] RAX: ffff8801ee813f00 RBX: 0000000000000204 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 48.602183] RDX: 1ffffffff1de6a75 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297 [ 48.604373] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff1dd1533 [ 48.605607] R10: ffffffff8eafbb05 R11: fffffbfff1dd1534 R12: 0000000000000050 [ 48.607082] R13: dead000000000200 R14: ffffffff8e73f310 R15: 0000000000001020 [ 48.608228] FS: 00007fc686484800(0000) GS:ffff8801f5540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 48.610189] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 48.611459] CR2: 0000000000001008 CR3: 00000001dda70002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 48.612759] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 48.613831] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 48.615038] Call Trace: [ 48.615635] tipc_enable_bearer+0x415/0x5e0 [tipc] [ 48.620623] tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x1ab/0x200 [tipc] [ 48.625118] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x36b/0x570 [ 48.631233] genl_rcv_msg+0x5a/0xa0 [ 48.631867] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1cc/0x220 [ 48.636373] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 48.637306] netlink_unicast+0x29c/0x350 [ 48.639664] netlink_sendmsg+0x439/0x590 [ 48.642014] SYSC_sendto+0x199/0x250 [ 48.649912] do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 48.650651] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 48.651843] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6859848e3 [ 48.652539] RSP: 002b:00007ffd25dff938 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 48.654003] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd25dff990 RCX: 00007fc6859848e3 [ 48.655303] RDX: 0000000000000054 RSI: 00007ffd25dff990 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 48.656512] RBP: 00007ffd25dff980 R08: 00007fc685c35fc0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 48.657697] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000d13010 [ 48.658840] R13: 00007ffd25e009c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 48.662972] RIP: tipc_mon_delete+0xea/0x270 [tipc] RSP: ffff8801d827f668 [ 48.664073] CR2: 0000000000001008 [ 48.664576] ---[ end trace e811818d54d5ce88 ]--- Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 0b76aae ] This patch adds check so that driver does not disable already disabled device. [ 44.637743] advantechwdt: Unexpected close, not stopping watchdog! [ 44.997548] input: ImExPS/2 Generic Explorer Mouse as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input6 [ 45.013419] e1000 0000:00:03.0: disabling already-disabled device [ 45.013447] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 45.014868] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 71 at drivers/pci/pci.c:1641 pci_disable_device+0xa1/0x105: pci_disable_device at drivers/pci/pci.c:1640 [ 45.016171] CPU: 1 PID: 71 Comm: rcu_perf_shutdo Not tainted 4.14.0-01330-g3c07399 #1 [ 45.017197] task: ffff88011bee9e40 task.stack: ffffc90000860000 [ 45.017987] RIP: 0010:pci_disable_device+0xa1/0x105: pci_disable_device at drivers/pci/pci.c:1640 [ 45.018603] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000863e30 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 45.019282] RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: ffff88013a230008 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 45.020182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000203 [ 45.021084] RBP: ffff88013a3f31e8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 45.021986] R10: ffffffff827ec29c R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 45.022946] R13: ffff88013a230008 R14: ffff880117802b20 R15: ffffc90000863e8f [ 45.023842] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 45.024863] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 45.025583] CR2: ffffc900006d4000 CR3: 000000000220f000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [ 45.026478] Call Trace: [ 45.026811] __e1000_shutdown+0x1d4/0x1e2: __e1000_shutdown at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:5162 [ 45.027344] ? rcu_perf_cleanup+0x2a1/0x2a1: rcu_perf_shutdown at kernel/rcu/rcuperf.c:627 [ 45.027883] e1000_shutdown+0x14/0x3a: e1000_shutdown at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:5235 [ 45.028351] device_shutdown+0x110/0x1aa: device_shutdown at drivers/base/core.c:2807 [ 45.028858] kernel_power_off+0x31/0x64: kernel_power_off at kernel/reboot.c:260 [ 45.029343] rcu_perf_shutdown+0x9b/0xa7: rcu_perf_shutdown at kernel/rcu/rcuperf.c:637 [ 45.029852] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xa2/0xa2: autoremove_wake_function at kernel/sched/wait.c:376 [ 45.030414] kthread+0x126/0x12e: kthread at kernel/kthread.c:233 [ 45.030834] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x8e/0x8e: kthread at kernel/kthread.c:190 [ 45.031399] ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30: ret_from_fork at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:443 [ 45.031883] ? kernel_init+0xa/0xf5: kernel_init at init/main.c:997 [ 45.032325] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30: ret_from_fork at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:443 [ 45.032777] Code: 00 48 85 ed 75 07 48 8b ab a8 00 00 00 48 8d bb 98 00 00 00 e8 aa d1 11 00 48 89 ea 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 d8 e4 0b 82 e8 55 7d da ff <0f> ff b9 01 00 00 00 31 d2 be 01 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 f0 b1 61 82 [ 45.035222] ---[ end trace c257137b1b1976ef ]--- [ 45.037838] ACPI: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5 Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@oracle.com> Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e2d5915 ] The hotplug code uses its own workqueue to handle IRQ requests (pseries_hp_wq), however that workqueue is initialized after init_ras_IRQ(). That can lead to a kernel panic if any hotplug interrupts fire after init_ras_IRQ() but before pseries_hp_wq is initialised. eg: UDP-Lite hash table entries: 2048 (order: 0, 65536 bytes) NET: Registered protocol family 1 Unpacking initramfs... (qemu) object_add memory-backend-ram,id=mem1,size=10G (qemu) device_add pc-dimm,id=dimm1,memdev=mem1 Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xf94d03007c421378 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000012d744 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-ziviani+ #26 task: (ptrval) task.stack: (ptrval) NIP: c00000000012d744 LR: c00000000012d744 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: (ptrval) TRAP: 0380 Not tainted (4.15.0-rc2-ziviani+) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28088042 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c00000000012d3c4 SOFTE: 0 ... NIP [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 LR [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 Call Trace: [c0000000fffefb90] [c00000000012d744] __queue_work+0xd4/0x5c0 (unreliable) [c0000000fffefc70] [c00000000012dce4] queue_work_on+0xb4/0xf0 This commit makes the RAS IRQ registration explicitly dependent on the creation of the pseries_hp_wq. Reported-by: Min Deng <mdeng@redhat.com> Reported-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Jose Ricardo Ziviani <joserz@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f23a535 upstream. The ib_write_umad() is protected by taking the umad file mutex. However, it accesses file->port->ib_dev -- which is protected only by the port's mutex (field file_mutex). The ib_umad_remove_one() calls ib_umad_kill_port() which sets port->ib_dev to NULL under the port mutex (NOT the file mutex). It then sets the mad agent to "dead" under the umad file mutex. This is a race condition -- because there is a window where port->ib_dev is NULL, while the agent is not "dead". As a result, we saw stack traces like: [16490.678059] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b0 [16490.678246] IP: ib_umad_write+0x29c/0xa3a [ib_umad] [16490.678333] PGD 0 P4D 0 [16490.678404] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [16490.678466] Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) ib_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx4_en(OE) ptp pps_core mlx4_ib(OE-) ib_core(OE) mlx4_core(OE) mlx_compat (OE) memtrack(OE) devlink mst_pciconf(OE) mst_pci(OE) netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache cfg80211 rfkill esp6_offload esp6 esp4_offload esp4 sunrpc kvm_intel kvm ppdev parport_pc irqbypass parport joydev i2c_piix4 virtio_balloon cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm e1000 serio_raw virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio ata_generic pata_acpi qemu_fw_cfg [last unloaded: mlxfw] [16490.679202] CPU: 4 PID: 3115 Comm: sminfo Tainted: G OE 4.14.13-300.fc27.x86_64 #1 [16490.679339] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu2 04/01/2014 [16490.679477] task: ffff9cf753890000 task.stack: ffffaf70c26b0000 [16490.679571] RIP: 0010:ib_umad_write+0x29c/0xa3a [ib_umad] [16490.679664] RSP: 0018:ffffaf70c26b3d90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [16490.679747] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: ffff9cf75610fd80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [16490.679856] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffdf2bfd714 RDI: ffff9cf6bb2a9c00 In the above trace, ib_umad_write is trying to dereference the NULL file->port->ib_dev pointer. Fix this by using the agent's device pointer (the device field in struct ib_mad_agent) -- which IS protected by the umad file mutex. Fixes: 44c5848 ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types") Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ff26cc1 upstream. If we can't get inode lock immediately in the function ocfs2_inode_lock_with_page() when reading a page, we should not return directly here, since this will lead to a softlockup problem when the kernel is configured with CONFIG_PREEMPT is not set. The method is to get a blocking lock and immediately unlock before returning, this can avoid CPU resource waste due to lots of retries, and benefits fairness in getting lock among multiple nodes, increase efficiency in case modifying the same file frequently from multiple nodes. The softlockup crash (when set /proc/sys/kernel/softlockup_panic to 1) looks like: Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks CPU: 0 PID: 885 Comm: multi_mmap Tainted: G L 4.12.14-6.1-default #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x5c/0x82 panic+0xd5/0x21e watchdog_timer_fn+0x208/0x210 __hrtimer_run_queues+0xcc/0x200 hrtimer_interrupt+0xa6/0x1f0 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x34/0x50 apic_timer_interrupt+0x96/0xa0 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:unlock_page+0x17/0x30 RSP: 0000:ffffaf154080bc88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: dead000000000100 RBX: fffff21e009f5300 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: dead0000000000ff RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: fffff21e009f5300 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffaf154080bb00 R10: ffffaf154080bc30 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff993749a39518 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffff21e009f5300 R15: fffff21e009f5300 ocfs2_inode_lock_with_page+0x25/0x30 [ocfs2] ocfs2_readpage+0x41/0x2d0 [ocfs2] filemap_fault+0x12b/0x5c0 ocfs2_fault+0x29/0xb0 [ocfs2] __do_fault+0x1a/0xa0 __handle_mm_fault+0xbe8/0x1090 handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1f0 __do_page_fault+0x235/0x4b0 trace_do_page_fault+0x3c/0x110 async_page_fault+0x28/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa75ded638e RSP: 002b:00007ffd6657db18 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 000055c7662fb700 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 000055c7662fb700 RDX: 0000000000001770 RSI: 00007fa75e909000 RDI: 000055c7662fb700 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000000000e R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000483 R11: 00007fa75ded61b0 R12: 00007fa75e90a770 R13: 000000000000000e R14: 0000000000001770 R15: 0000000000000000 About performance improvement, we can see the testing time is reduced, and CPU utilization decreases, the detailed data is as follows. I ran multi_mmap test case in ocfs2-test package in a three nodes cluster. Before applying this patch: PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND 2754 ocfs2te+ 20 0 170248 6980 4856 D 80.73 0.341 0:18.71 multi_mmap 1505 root rt 0 222236 123060 97224 S 2.658 6.015 0:01.44 corosync 5 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 1.329 0.000 0:00.19 kworker/u8:0 95 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 1.329 0.000 0:00.25 kworker/u8:1 2728 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 0.997 0.000 0:00.24 jbd2/sda1-33 2721 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 0.664 0.000 0:00.07 ocfs2dc-3C8CFD4 2750 ocfs2te+ 20 0 142976 4652 3532 S 0.664 0.227 0:00.28 mpirun ocfs2test@tb-node2:~>multiple_run.sh -i ens3 -k ~/linux-4.4.21-69.tar.gz -o ~/ocfs2mullog -C hacluster -s pcmk -n tb-node2,tb-node1,tb-node3 -d /dev/sda1 -b 4096 -c 32768 -t multi_mmap /mnt/shared Tests with "-b 4096 -C 32768" Thu Dec 28 14:44:52 CST 2017 multi_mmap..................................................Passed. Runtime 783 seconds. After apply this patch: PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND 2508 ocfs2te+ 20 0 170248 6804 4680 R 54.00 0.333 0:55.37 multi_mmap 155 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 2.667 0.000 0:01.20 kworker/u8:3 95 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 2.000 0.000 0:01.58 kworker/u8:1 2504 ocfs2te+ 20 0 142976 4604 3480 R 1.667 0.225 0:01.65 mpirun 5 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 1.000 0.000 0:01.36 kworker/u8:0 2482 root 20 0 0 0 0 S 1.000 0.000 0:00.86 jbd2/sda1-33 299 root 0 -20 0 0 0 S 0.333 0.000 0:00.13 kworker/2:1H 335 root 0 -20 0 0 0 S 0.333 0.000 0:00.17 kworker/1:1H 535 root 20 0 12140 7268 1456 S 0.333 0.355 0:00.34 haveged 1282 root rt 0 222284 123108 97224 S 0.333 6.017 0:01.33 corosync ocfs2test@tb-node2:~>multiple_run.sh -i ens3 -k ~/linux-4.4.21-69.tar.gz -o ~/ocfs2mullog -C hacluster -s pcmk -n tb-node2,tb-node1,tb-node3 -d /dev/sda1 -b 4096 -c 32768 -t multi_mmap /mnt/shared Tests with "-b 4096 -C 32768" Thu Dec 28 15:04:12 CST 2017 multi_mmap..................................................Passed. Runtime 487 seconds. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514447305-30814-1-git-send-email-ghe@suse.com Fixes: 1cce4df ("ocfs2: do not lock/unlock() inode DLM lock") Signed-off-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Acked-by: alex chen <alex.chen@huawei.com> Acked-by: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…iled. commit bb422a7 upstream. Syzbot caught an oops at unregister_shrinker() because combination of commit 1d3d443 ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") and fault injection made register_shrinker() fail and the caller of register_shrinker() did not check for failure. ---------- [ 554.881422] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. [ 554.881422] name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 [ 554.881438] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82 [ 554.881443] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ 554.881445] Call Trace: [ 554.881459] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 [ 554.881474] ? arch_local_irq_restore+0x53/0x53 [ 554.881486] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 [ 554.881507] should_fail+0x8c0/0xa40 [ 554.881522] ? fault_create_debugfs_attr+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 554.881537] ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20 [ 554.881546] ? find_next_zero_bit+0x2c/0x40 [ 554.881560] ? ida_get_new_above+0x421/0x9d0 [ 554.881577] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 [ 554.881594] ? __lock_is_held+0xb6/0x140 [ 554.881628] ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320 [ 554.881634] ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990 [ 554.881649] ? find_held_lock+0x35/0x1d0 [ 554.881672] should_failslab+0xec/0x120 [ 554.881684] __kmalloc+0x63/0x760 [ 554.881692] ? lock_downgrade+0x990/0x990 [ 554.881712] ? register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0 [ 554.881721] ? trace_event_raw_event_module_request+0x320/0x320 [ 554.881737] register_shrinker+0x10e/0x2d0 [ 554.881747] ? prepare_kswapd_sleep+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 554.881755] ? _down_write_nest_lock+0x120/0x120 [ 554.881765] ? memcpy+0x45/0x50 [ 554.881785] sget_userns+0xbcd/0xe20 (...snipped...) [ 554.898693] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 554.898724] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 554.898732] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN [ 554.898737] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 554.898741] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 554.898743] Modules linked in: [ 554.898752] CPU: 1 PID: 13231 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8+ #82 [ 554.898755] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ 554.898760] task: ffff8801d1dbe5c0 task.stack: ffff8801c9e38000 [ 554.898772] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x7e/0x150 [ 554.898775] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c9e3f108 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 554.898780] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 554.898784] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801c53c6f98 RDI: ffff8801c53c6fa0 [ 554.898788] RBP: ffff8801c9e3f120 R08: 1ffff100393c7d55 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 554.898791] R10: ffff8801c9e3ef70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 554.898795] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff100393c7e45 R15: ffff8801c53c6f98 [ 554.898800] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 554.898804] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 554.898807] CR2: 00000000dbc23000 CR3: 00000001c7269000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [ 554.898813] DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 554.898816] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 [ 554.898818] Call Trace: [ 554.898828] unregister_shrinker+0x79/0x300 [ 554.898837] ? perf_trace_mm_vmscan_writepage+0x750/0x750 [ 554.898844] ? down_write+0x87/0x120 [ 554.898851] ? deactivate_super+0x139/0x1b0 [ 554.898857] ? down_read+0x150/0x150 [ 554.898864] ? check_same_owner+0x320/0x320 [ 554.898875] deactivate_locked_super+0x64/0xd0 [ 554.898883] deactivate_super+0x141/0x1b0 ---------- Since allowing register_shrinker() callers to call unregister_shrinker() when register_shrinker() failed can simplify error recovery path, this patch makes unregister_shrinker() no-op when register_shrinker() failed. Also, reset shrinker->nr_deferred in case unregister_shrinker() was by error called twice. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Aliaksei Karaliou <akaraliou.dev@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Glauber Costa <glauber@scylladb.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d0e312f upstream. The RDMA netlink core code checks validity of messages by ensuring that type and operand are in range. It works well for almost all clients except NLDEV, which has cb_table less than number of operands. Request to access such operand will trigger the following kernel panic. This patch updates all places where cb_table is declared for the consistency, but only NLDEV is actually need it. general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 522 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 task: ffff8800657799c0 task.stack: ffff8800695d000 RIP: 0010:rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0x13a/0x4c0 RSP: 0018:ffff8800695d7838 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff1000d2baf0b RCX: 00000000704ff4d7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81ddb03c RDI: 00000003827fa6bc RBP: ffff8800695d7900 R08: ffffffff82ec0578 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8800695d7900 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000001c R13: ffff880069d31e00 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff880069d357c0 FS: 00007fee6acb8700(0000) GS:ffff88006ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000201a9000 CR3: 0000000059766000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? rdma_nl_multicast+0x80/0x80 rdma_nl_rcv+0x36b/0x4d0 ? ibnl_put_attr+0xc0/0xc0 netlink_unicast+0x4bd/0x6d0 ? netlink_sendskb+0x50/0x50 ? drop_futex_key_refs.isra.4+0x68/0xb0 netlink_sendmsg+0x9ab/0xbd0 ? nlmsg_notify+0x140/0x140 ? wake_up_q+0xa1/0xf0 ? drop_futex_key_refs.isra.4+0x68/0xb0 sock_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0 sock_write_iter+0x228/0x3c0 ? sock_sendmsg+0xd0/0xd0 ? do_futex+0x3e5/0xb20 ? iov_iter_init+0xaf/0x1d0 __vfs_write+0x46e/0x640 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190 ? __vfs_read+0x620/0x620 ? __fget+0x23a/0x390 ? rw_verify_area+0xca/0x290 vfs_write+0x192/0x490 SyS_write+0xde/0x1c0 ? SyS_read+0x1c0/0x1c0 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xad RIP: 0033:0x7fee6a74a219 RSP: 002b:00007fee6acb7d58 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000638000 RCX: 00007fee6a74a219 RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000000020141000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: ffff8800695d7f98 R13: 0000000020141000 R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 00000000ffffffff Code: d6 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 66 41 81 e4 ff 03 44 8d 72 ff 4a 8d 3c b5 c0 a6 7f 82 44 89 b5 4c ff ff ff 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <0f> b6 0c 01 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 c8 7c 08 84 c9 0f 85 RIP: rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0x13a/0x4c0 RSP: ffff8800695d7838 ---[ end trace ba085d123959c8ec ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: b4c598a ("RDMA/netlink: Implement nldev device dumpit calback") Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

commit 3f34cfa upstream. Syzbot reported several deadlocks in the netfilter area caused by rtnl lock and socket lock being acquired with a different order on different code paths, leading to backtraces like the following one: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.15.0-rc9+ #212 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syzkaller041579/3682 is trying to acquire lock: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline] (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}, at: [<000000008775e4dd>] do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167 but task is already holding lock: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 register_netdevice_notifier+0xad/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1607 tee_tg_check+0x1a0/0x280 net/netfilter/xt_TEE.c:106 xt_check_target+0x22c/0x7d0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:845 check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:538 [inline] find_check_entry.isra.7+0x935/0xcf0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:580 translate_table+0xf52/0x1690 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:749 do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1165 [inline] do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x370/0x5f0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1691 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ipv6_setsockopt+0x115/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:928 udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0 -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3914 lock_sock_nested+0xc2/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2780 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1463 [inline] do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x3c5/0x39d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:167 ipv6_setsockopt+0xd7/0x150 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922 udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2978 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syzkaller041579/3682: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000004342eaa9>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 The problem, as Florian noted, is that nf_setsockopt() is always called with the socket held, even if the lock itself is required only for very tight scopes and only for some operation. This patch addresses the issues moving the lock_sock() call only where really needed, namely in ipv*_getorigdst(), so that nf_setsockopt() does not need anymore to acquire both locks. Fixes: 22265a5 ("netfilter: xt_TEE: resolve oif using netdevice notifiers") Reported-by: syzbot+a4c2dc980ac1af699b36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6ab4051 ] Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads. As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap memory disclosure or oopses. This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf module can be autoloaded. Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627 CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1 [...] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x85 print_address_description+0x6a/0x260 kasan_report+0x254/0x370 ? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf] [...] Allocated by task 4627: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables] [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048 The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0) [...] ================================================================== Fixes: e6f30c7 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 87a81dc upstream. Performing the hash of an empty file leads to a kernel Oops [ 44.504600] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x0000000c [ 44.512819] Faulting instruction address: 0xc02d2be8 [ 44.524088] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 44.529171] BE PREEMPT CMPC885 [ 44.532232] CPU: 0 PID: 491 Comm: md5sum Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-00211-g3a968610b6ea #81 [ 44.540814] NIP: c02d2be8 LR: c02d2984 CTR: 00000000 [ 44.545812] REGS: c6813c90 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.15.0-rc8-00211-g3a968610b6ea) [ 44.554223] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 48222822 XER: 20000000 [ 44.560855] DAR: 0000000c DSISR: c0000000 [ 44.560855] GPR00: c02d28fc c6813d40 c6828000 c646fa40 00000001 00000001 00000001 00000000 [ 44.560855] GPR08: 0000004c 00000000 c000bfcc 00000000 28222822 100280d4 00000000 10020008 [ 44.560855] GPR16: 00000000 00000020 00000000 00000000 10024008 00000000 c646f9f0 c6179a10 [ 44.560855] GPR24: 00000000 00000001 c62f0018 c6179a10 00000000 c6367a30 c62f0000 c646f9c0 [ 44.598542] NIP [c02d2be8] ahash_process_req+0x448/0x700 [ 44.603751] LR [c02d2984] ahash_process_req+0x1e4/0x700 [ 44.608868] Call Trace: [ 44.611329] [c6813d40] [c02d28fc] ahash_process_req+0x15c/0x700 (unreliable) [ 44.618302] [c6813d90] [c02060c4] hash_recvmsg+0x11c/0x210 [ 44.623716] [c6813db0] [c0331354] ___sys_recvmsg+0x98/0x138 [ 44.629226] [c6813eb0] [c03332c0] __sys_recvmsg+0x40/0x84 [ 44.634562] [c6813f10] [c03336c0] SyS_socketcall+0xb8/0x1d4 [ 44.640073] [c6813f40] [c000d1ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38 [ 44.645530] Instruction dump: [ 44.648465] 38c00001 7f63db78 4e800421 7c791b78 54690ffe 0f090000 80ff0190 2f870000 [ 44.656122] 40befe50 2f990001 409e0210 813f01bc <8129000c> b39e003a 7d29c214 913e003c This patch fixes that Oops by checking if src is NULL. Fixes: 6a1e8d1 ("crypto: talitos - making mapping helpers more generic") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b9c97c6 upstream. If m88d3103 chip ID is not recognized, the device is not initialized. However, it returns from probe without any error, causing this OOPS: [ 7.689289] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 7.689297] pgd = 7b0bd7a7 [ 7.689302] [00000000] *pgd=00000000 [ 7.689318] Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [#1] SMP ARM [ 7.689322] Modules linked in: dvb_usb_dvbsky(+) m88ds3103 dvb_usb_v2 dvb_core videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core crc32_arm_ce videodev media [ 7.689358] CPU: 3 PID: 197 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.15.0-mcc+ #23 [ 7.689361] Hardware name: BCM2835 [ 7.689367] PC is at 0x0 [ 7.689382] LR is at m88ds3103_attach+0x194/0x1d0 [m88ds3103] [ 7.689386] pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<bf0ae1ec>] psr: 60000013 [ 7.689391] sp : ed8e5c20 ip : ed8c1e00 fp : ed8945c0 [ 7.689395] r10: ed894000 r9 : ed894378 r8 : eda736c0 [ 7.689400] r7 : ed894070 r6 : ed8e5c44 r5 : bf0bb040 r4 : eda77600 [ 7.689405] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : eda77600 [ 7.689412] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 7.689417] Control: 10c5383d Table: 2d8e806a DAC: 00000051 [ 7.689423] Process systemd-udevd (pid: 197, stack limit = 0xe9dbfb63) [ 7.689428] Stack: (0xed8e5c20 to 0xed8e6000) [ 7.689439] 5c20: ed853a80 eda73640 ed894000 ed8942c0 ed853a80 bf0b9e98 ed894070 bf0b9f10 [ 7.689449] 5c40: 00000000 00000000 bf08c17c c08dfc50 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689459] 5c60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689468] 5c80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689479] 5ca0: 00000000 00000000 ed8945c0 ed8942c0 ed894000 ed894830 bf0b9e98 00000000 [ 7.689490] 5cc0: ed894378 bf0a3cb4 bf0bc3b0 0000533b ed920540 00000000 00000034 bf0a6434 [ 7.689500] 5ce0: ee952070 ed826600 bf0a7038 bf0a2dd8 00000001 bf0a6768 bf0a2f90 ed8943c0 [ 7.689511] 5d00: 00000000 c08eca68 ed826620 ed826620 00000000 ee952070 bf0bc034 ee952000 [ 7.689521] 5d20: ed826600 bf0bb080 ffffffed c0aa9e9c c0aa9dac ed826620 c16edf6c c168c2c8 [ 7.689531] 5d40: c16edf70 00000000 bf0bc034 0000000d 00000000 c08e268c bf0bb080 ed826600 [ 7.689541] 5d60: bf0bc034 ed826654 ed826620 bf0bc034 c164c8bc 00000000 00000001 00000000 [ 7.689553] 5d80: 00000028 c08e2948 00000000 bf0bc034 c08e2848 c08e0778 ee9f0a58 ed88bab4 [ 7.689563] 5da0: bf0bc034 ed90ba80 c168c1f0 c08e1934 bf0bb3bc c17045ac bf0bc034 c164c8bc [ 7.689574] 5dc0: bf0bc034 bf0bb3bc ed91f564 c08e34ec bf0bc000 c164c8bc bf0bc034 c0aa8dc4 [ 7.689584] 5de0: ffffe000 00000000 bf0bf000 ed91f600 ed91f564 c03021e4 00000001 00000000 [ 7.689595] 5e00: c166e040 8040003f ed853a80 bf0bc448 00000000 c1678174 ed853a80 f0f22000 [ 7.689605] 5e20: f0f21fff 8040003f 014000c0 ed91e700 ed91e700 c16d8e68 00000001 ed91e6c0 [ 7.689615] 5e40: bf0bc400 00000001 bf0bc400 ed91f564 00000001 00000000 00000028 c03c9a24 [ 7.689625] 5e60: 00000001 c03c8c94 ed8e5f50 ed8e5f50 00000001 bf0bc400 ed91f540 c03c8cb0 [ 7.689637] 5e80: bf0bc40c 00007fff bf0bc400 c03c60b0 00000000 bf0bc448 00000028 c0e09684 [ 7.689647] 5ea0: 00000002 bf0bc530 c1234bf8 bf0bc5dc bf0bc514 c10ebbe8 ffffe000 bf000000 [ 7.689657] 5ec0: 00011538 00000000 ed8e5f48 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689666] 5ee0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689676] 5f00: 00000000 00000000 7fffffff 00000000 00000013 b6e55a18 0000017b c0309104 [ 7.689686] 5f20: ed8e4000 00000000 00510af0 c03c9430 7fffffff 00000000 00000003 00000000 [ 7.689697] 5f40: 00000000 f0f0f000 00011538 00000000 f0f107b0 f0f0f000 00011538 f0f1fdb8 [ 7.689707] 5f60: f0f1fbe8 f0f1b974 00004000 000041e0 bf0bc3d0 00000001 00000000 000024c4 [ 7.689717] 5f80: 0000002d 0000002e 00000019 00000000 00000010 00000000 16894000 00000000 [ 7.689727] 5fa0: 00000000 c0308f20 16894000 00000000 00000013 b6e55a18 00000000 b6e5652c [ 7.689737] 5fc0: 16894000 00000000 00000000 0000017b 00020000 00508110 00000000 00510af0 [ 7.689748] 5fe0: bef68948 bef68938 b6e4d3d0 b6d32590 60000010 00000013 00000000 00000000 [ 7.689790] [<bf0ae1ec>] (m88ds3103_attach [m88ds3103]) from [<bf0b9f10>] (dvbsky_s960c_attach+0x78/0x280 [dvb_usb_dvbsky]) [ 7.689821] [<bf0b9f10>] (dvbsky_s960c_attach [dvb_usb_dvbsky]) from [<bf0a3cb4>] (dvb_usbv2_probe+0xa3c/0x1024 [dvb_usb_v2]) [ 7.689849] [<bf0a3cb4>] (dvb_usbv2_probe [dvb_usb_v2]) from [<c0aa9e9c>] (usb_probe_interface+0xf0/0x2a8) [ 7.689869] [<c0aa9e9c>] (usb_probe_interface) from [<c08e268c>] (driver_probe_device+0x2f8/0x4b4) [ 7.689881] [<c08e268c>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c08e2948>] (__driver_attach+0x100/0x11c) [ 7.689895] [<c08e2948>] (__driver_attach) from [<c08e0778>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x4c/0x9c) [ 7.689909] [<c08e0778>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c08e1934>] (bus_add_driver+0x1c0/0x264) [ 7.689919] [<c08e1934>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c08e34ec>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf4) [ 7.689931] [<c08e34ec>] (driver_register) from [<c0aa8dc4>] (usb_register_driver+0x70/0x134) [ 7.689946] [<c0aa8dc4>] (usb_register_driver) from [<c03021e4>] (do_one_initcall+0x44/0x168) [ 7.689963] [<c03021e4>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c03c9a24>] (do_init_module+0x64/0x1f4) [ 7.689979] [<c03c9a24>] (do_init_module) from [<c03c8cb0>] (load_module+0x20a0/0x25c8) [ 7.689993] [<c03c8cb0>] (load_module) from [<c03c9430>] (SyS_finit_module+0xb4/0xec) [ 7.690007] [<c03c9430>] (SyS_finit_module) from [<c0308f20>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 7.690018] Code: bad PC value This may happen on normal circumstances, if, for some reason, the demod hangs and start returning an invalid chip ID: [ 10.394395] m88ds3103 3-0068: Unknown device. Chip_id=00 So, change the logic to cause probe to fail with -ENODEV, preventing the OOPS. Detected while testing DVB MMAP patches on Raspberry Pi 3 with DVBSky S960CI. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b28676b upstream. Reported by syzkaller: pte_list_remove: ffff9714eb1f8078 0->BUG ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:1157! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP RIP: 0010:pte_list_remove+0x11b/0x120 [kvm] Call Trace: drop_spte+0x83/0xb0 [kvm] mmu_page_zap_pte+0xcc/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x81/0x4a0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages+0x159/0x220 [kvm] kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all+0xe/0x10 [kvm] kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x6c/0xa0 [kvm] ? kvm_mmu_notifier_release+0x5/0xa0 [kvm] __mmu_notifier_release+0x79/0x110 ? __mmu_notifier_release+0x5/0x110 exit_mmap+0x15a/0x170 ? do_exit+0x281/0xcb0 mmput+0x66/0x160 do_exit+0x2c9/0xcb0 ? __context_tracking_exit.part.5+0x4a/0x150 do_group_exit+0x50/0xd0 SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 The reason is that when creates new memslot, there is no guarantee for new memslot not overlap with private memslots. This can be triggered by the following program: #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <setjmp.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> long r[16]; int main() { void *p = valloc(0x4000); r[2] = open("/dev/kvm", 0); r[3] = ioctl(r[2], KVM_CREATE_VM, 0x0ul); uint64_t addr = 0xf000; ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR, &addr); r[6] = ioctl(r[3], KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0x0ul); ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR, 0x0ul); ioctl(r[6], KVM_RUN, 0); ioctl(r[6], KVM_RUN, 0); struct kvm_userspace_memory_region mr = { .slot = 0, .flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, .guest_phys_addr = 0xf000, .memory_size = 0x4000, .userspace_addr = (uintptr_t) p }; ioctl(r[3], KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &mr); return 0; } This patch fixes the bug by not adding a new memslot even if it overlaps with private memslots. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>

commit 0b2e990 upstream. The initial reset of the local APIC is performed before the VMCS has been created, but it tries to do a vmwrite: vmwrite error: reg 810 value 4a00 (err 18944) CPU: 54 PID: 38652 Comm: qemu-kvm Tainted: G W I 4.16.0-0.rc2.git0.1.fc28.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CW/S2600CW, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0003.090520141303 09/05/2014 Call Trace: vmx_set_rvi [kvm_intel] vmx_hwapic_irr_update [kvm_intel] kvm_lapic_reset [kvm] kvm_create_lapic [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_init [kvm] kvm_vcpu_init [kvm] vmx_create_vcpu [kvm_intel] kvm_vm_ioctl [kvm] Move it later, after the VMCS has been created. Fixes: 4191db2 ("KVM: x86: Update APICv on APIC reset") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ upstream commit 6c5f610 ] Commit 9a3efb6 ("bpf: fix memory leak in lpm_trie map_free callback function") fixed a memory leak and removed unnecessary locks in map_free callback function. Unfortrunately, it introduced a lockdep warning. When lockdep checking is turned on, running tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_lpm_map will have: [ 98.294321] ============================= [ 98.294807] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 98.295359] 4.16.0-rc2+ #193 Not tainted [ 98.295907] ----------------------------- [ 98.296486] /home/yhs/work/bpf/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:572 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 98.297657] [ 98.297657] other info that might help us debug this: [ 98.297657] [ 98.298663] [ 98.298663] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 98.299536] 2 locks held by kworker/2:1/54: [ 98.300152] #0: ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: [<00000000196bc1f0>] process_one_work+0x157/0x5c0 [ 98.301381] #1: ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: [<00000000196bc1f0>] process_one_work+0x157/0x5c0 Since actual trie tree removal happens only after no other accesses to the tree are possible, replacing rcu_dereference_protected(*slot, lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock)) with rcu_dereference_protected(*slot, 1) fixed the issue. Fixes: 9a3efb6 ("bpf: fix memory leak in lpm_trie map_free callback function") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ upstream commit 16338a9 ] I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccd ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb5599 ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ upstream commit ca36960 ] The requirements around atomic_add() / atomic64_add() resp. their JIT implementations differ across architectures. E.g. while x86_64 seems just fine with BPF's xadd on unaligned memory, on arm64 it triggers via interpreter but also JIT the following crash: [ 830.864985] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8097d7ed6703 [...] [ 830.916161] Internal error: Oops: 96000021 [#1] SMP [ 830.984755] CPU: 37 PID: 2788 Comm: test_verifier Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #8 [ 830.991790] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.29 07/17/2017 [ 830.998998] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 831.003793] pc : __ll_sc_atomic_add+0x4/0x18 [ 831.008055] lr : ___bpf_prog_run+0x1198/0x1588 [ 831.012485] sp : ffff00001ccabc20 [ 831.015786] x29: ffff00001ccabc20 x28: ffff8017d56a0f00 [ 831.021087] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 831.026387] x25: 000000c168d9db98 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 831.031686] x23: ffff000008203878 x22: ffff000009488000 [ 831.036986] x21: ffff000008b14e28 x20: ffff00001ccabcb0 [ 831.042286] x19: ffff0000097b5080 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 831.047585] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 831.052885] x15: 0000ffffaeca8000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 831.058184] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 831.063484] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 831.068783] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 831.074083] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000580d428000000 [ 831.079383] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 831.084682] x3 : ffff00001ccabcb0 x2 : 0000000000000001 [ 831.089982] x1 : ffff8097d7ed6703 x0 : 0000000000000001 [ 831.095282] Process test_verifier (pid: 2788, stack limit = 0x0000000018370044) [ 831.102577] Call trace: [ 831.105012] __ll_sc_atomic_add+0x4/0x18 [ 831.108923] __bpf_prog_run32+0x4c/0x70 [ 831.112748] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 831.116224] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xb4/0x120 [ 831.120567] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 831.123873] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 831.127437] Code: 97fffe97 17ffffec 00000000 f9800031 (885f7c31) Reason for this is because memory is required to be aligned. In case of BPF, we always enforce alignment in terms of stack access, but not when accessing map values or packet data when the underlying arch (e.g. arm64) has CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS set. xadd on packet data that is local to us anyway is just wrong, so forbid this case entirely. The only place where xadd makes sense in fact are map values; xadd on stack is wrong as well, but it's been around for much longer. Specifically enforce strict alignment in case of xadd, so that we handle this case generically and avoid such crashes in the first place. Fixes: 17a5267 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1041401 upstream. syzbot reported that xt_LED may try to use the ledinternal->timer without previously initializing it: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:958! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1826 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #306 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline] RIP: 0010:mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d24fe9f8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801d25246c0 RBX: ffff8801aec6cb50 RCX: ffffffff816052c6 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffbd14b RDI: ffff8801aec6cb68 RBP: ffff8801d24fec98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1ffff1003a49fd6c R10: ffff8801d24feb28 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8801d24fec70 R14: 00000000fffbd14b R15: ffff8801af608f90 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000206d6fd0 CR3: 0000000006a22001 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: led_tg+0x1db/0x2e0 net/netfilter/xt_LED.c:75 ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365 ip6table_raw_hook+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_raw.c:42 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook.constprop.27+0x3f6/0x830 include/linux/netfilter.h:243 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0xa51/0x1370 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491 ndisc_send_ns+0x38a/0x870 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633 addrconf_dad_work+0xb9e/0x1320 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4008 process_one_work+0xbbf/0x1af0 kernel/workqueue.c:2113 worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2247 kthread+0x33c/0x400 kernel/kthread.c:238 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:429 Code: 85 2a 0b 00 00 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 75 9f 4c 8b bd 60 fd ff ff e8 bb 57 10 00 65 ff 0d 94 9a a1 7e e9 d9 fc ff ff e8 aa 57 10 00 <0f> 0b e8 a3 57 10 00 e9 14 fb ff ff e8 99 57 10 00 4c 89 bd 70 RIP: __mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline] RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8 RIP: mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102 RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8 ---[ end trace f661ab06f5dd8b3d ]--- The ledinternal struct can be shared between several different xt_LED targets, but the related timer is currently initialized only if the first target requires it. Fix it by unconditionally initializing the timer struct. v1 -> v2: call del_timer_sync() unconditionally, too. Fixes: 268cb38 ("netfilter: x_tables: add LED trigger target") Reported-by: syzbot+10c98dc5725c6c8fc7fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit db57ccf upstream. syzbot reported a division by 0 bug in the netfilter nat code: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4168 Comm: syzkaller034710 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #309 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88 RSP: 0018:ffff8801b2466778 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000f153 RBX: ffff8801b2466dd8 RCX: ffff8801b2466c7c RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801b2466c58 RDI: ffff8801db5293ac RBP: ffff8801b24667d8 R08: ffff8801b8ba6dc0 R09: ffffffff88af5900 R10: ffff8801b24666f0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000002990f153 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801b2466c7c FS: 00000000017e3880(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000208fdfe4 CR3: 00000001b5340002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: dccp_unique_tuple+0x40/0x50 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_dccp.c:30 get_unique_tuple+0xc28/0x1c10 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:362 nf_nat_setup_info+0x1c2/0xe00 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:406 nf_nat_redirect_ipv6+0x306/0x730 net/netfilter/nf_nat_redirect.c:124 redirect_tg6+0x7f/0xb0 net/netfilter/xt_REDIRECT.c:34 ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365 ip6table_nat_do_chain+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:41 nf_nat_ipv6_fn+0x594/0xa80 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:302 nf_nat_ipv6_local_fn+0x33/0x5d0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:407 ip6table_nat_local_fn+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:69 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x10ec/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:277 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 dccp_transmit_skb+0x9ac/0x10f0 net/dccp/output.c:142 dccp_connect+0x369/0x670 net/dccp/output.c:564 dccp_v6_connect+0xe17/0x1bf0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:946 __inet_stream_connect+0x2d4/0xf00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:620 inet_stream_connect+0x58/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:684 SYSC_connect+0x213/0x4a0 net/socket.c:1639 SyS_connect+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:1620 do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b RIP: 0033:0x441c69 RSP: 002b:00007ffe50cc0be8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 0000000000441c69 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00000000208fdfe4 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000538 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000403590 R13: 0000000000403620 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 48 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 46 02 00 00 48 8b 45 c8 44 0f b7 20 e8 88 97 04 fd 31 d2 41 0f b7 c4 4c 89 f9 <41> f7 f6 48 c1 e9 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 0f b6 0c 01 RIP: nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88 RSP: ffff8801b2466778 The problem is that currently we don't have any check on the configured port range. A port range == -1 triggers the bug, while other negative values may require a very long time to complete the following loop. This commit addresses the issue swapping the two ends on negative ranges. The check is performed in nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple() since the nft nat loads the port values from nft registers at runtime. v1 -> v2: use the correct 'Fixes' tag v2 -> v3: update commit message, drop unneeded READ_ONCE() Fixes: 5b1158e ("[NETFILTER]: Add NAT support for nf_conntrack") Reported-by: syzbot+8012e198bd037f4871e5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a5dcb73 upstream. when sock_create_kern(..., a) returns an error, 'a' might not be a valid pointer, so it shouldn't be dereferenced to read a->sk->sk_sndbuf and and a->sk->sk_rcvbuf; not doing that caused the following crash: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4254 Comm: syzkaller919713 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #18 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:smc_create+0x14e/0x300 net/smc/af_smc.c:1410 RSP: 0018:ffff8801b06afbc8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801b63457c0 RCX: ffffffff85a3e746 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: ffff8801b06afbf0 R08: 00000000000007c0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8801b6345c08 R14: 00000000ffffffe9 R15: ffffffff8695ced0 FS: 0000000001afb880(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000040 CR3: 00000001b0721004 CR4: 00000000001606f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __sock_create+0x4d4/0x850 net/socket.c:1285 sock_create net/socket.c:1325 [inline] SYSC_socketpair net/socket.c:1409 [inline] SyS_socketpair+0x1c0/0x6f0 net/socket.c:1366 do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b RIP: 0033:0x4404b9 RSP: 002b:00007fff44ab6908 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000035 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004404b9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 000000000000002b RBP: 00007fff44ab6910 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 00007fff44003031 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 b3 01 00 00 4c 8b a3 48 04 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 82 01 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 20 48 b8 00 00 00 00 RIP: smc_create+0x14e/0x300 net/smc/af_smc.c:1410 RSP: ffff8801b06afbc8 Fixes: cd6851f smc: remote memory buffers (RMBs) Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+aa0227369be2dcc26ebe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d64d6c5 upstream. This patch fixes regression added by commit d745952 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Add multiple queue pair functionality."). When driver is not able to get reqeusted IRQs from the system, driver will attempt tp clean up memory before failing hardware probe. During this cleanup, driver assigns NULL value to the pointer which has not been allocated by driver yet. This results in a NULL pointer access. Log file will show following message and stack trace qla2xxx [0000:a3:00.1]-00c7:21: MSI-X: Failed to enable support, giving up -- 32/-1. qla2xxx [0000:a3:00.1]-0037:21: Falling back-to MSI mode --1. qla2xxx [0000:a3:00.1]-003a:21: Failed to reserve interrupt 821 already in use. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffffc010c4b6>] qla2x00_probe_one+0x18b6/0x2730 [qla2xxx] PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Fixes: d745952 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Add multiple queue pair functionality."). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10 Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3efc31f upstream. During error test case where switch port status is toggled from enable to disable, following stack trace is seen which indicates recursion trying to send terminate exchange. This regression was introduced by commit 82de802 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Preparation for Target MQ.") BUG: stack guard page was hit at ffffb96488383ff8 (stack is ffffb96488384000..ffffb96488387fff) BUG: stack guard page was hit at ffffb964886c3ff8 (stack is ffffb964886c4000..ffffb964886c7fff) kernel stack overflow (double-fault): 0000 [#1] SMP qlt_term_ctio_exchange+0x9c/0xb0 [qla2xxx] qlt_term_ctio_exchange+0x9c/0xb0 [qla2xxx] qlt_term_ctio_exchange+0x9c/0xb0 [qla2xxx] qlt_term_ctio_exchange+0x9c/0xb0 [qla2xxx] qlt_term_ctio_exchange+0x9c/0xb0 [qla2xxx] Fixes: 82de802 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Preparation for Target MQ.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.10 Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit cb88a05 upstream. Corsair Strafe RGB keyboard does not respond to usb control messages sometimes and hence generates timeouts. Commit de3af5b ("usb: quirks: add delay init quirk for Corsair Strafe RGB keyboard") tried to fix those timeouts by adding USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT. Unfortunately, even with this quirk timeouts of usb_control_msg() can still be seen, but with a lower frequency (approx. 1 out of 15): [ 29.103520] usb 1-8: string descriptor 0 read error: -110 [ 34.363097] usb 1-8: can't set config #1, error -110 Adding further delays to different locations where usb control messages are issued just moves the timeouts to other locations, e.g.: [ 35.400533] usbhid 1-8:1.0: can't add hid device: -110 [ 35.401014] usbhid: probe of 1-8:1.0 failed with error -110 The only way to reliably avoid those issues is having a pause after each usb control message. In approx. 200 boot cycles no more timeouts were seen. Addionaly, keep USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT as it turned out to be necessary to have the delay in hub_port_connect() after hub_port_init(). The overall boot time seems not to be influenced by these additional delays, even on fast machines and lightweight distributions. Fixes: de3af5b ("usb: quirks: add delay init quirk for Corsair Strafe RGB keyboard") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <danilokrummrich@dk-develop.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2fe2582 ] The rcutorture test suite occasionally provokes a splat due to invoking rt_mutex_lock() which needs to boost the priority of a task currently sitting on a runqueue that belongs to an offline CPU: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 12 at /home/paulmck/public_git/linux-rcu/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c:128 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x37/0x40 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: rcub/7 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff9ed3de5f8cc0 task.stack: ffffbbf80012c000 RIP: 0010:native_smp_send_reschedule+0x37/0x40 RSP: 0018:ffffbbf80012fd10 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 000000000000002f RBX: ffff9ed3dd9cb300 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000080000004 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffffbbf80012fd10 R08: 000000000009da7a R09: 0000000000007b9d R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffbb57c2cd R12: 000000000000000d R13: ffff9ed3de5f8cc0 R14: 0000000000000061 R15: ffff9ed3ded59200 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ed3dea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000080686f0 CR3: 000000001b9e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: resched_curr+0x61/0xd0 switched_to_rt+0x8f/0xa0 rt_mutex_setprio+0x25c/0x410 task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+0x1b3/0x1f0 rt_mutex_slowlock+0xa9/0x1e0 rt_mutex_lock+0x29/0x30 rcu_boost_kthread+0x127/0x3c0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? rcu_report_unblock_qs_rnp+0x90/0x90 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Code: f0 00 0f 92 c0 84 c0 74 14 48 8b 05 34 74 c5 00 be fd 00 00 00 ff 90 a0 00 00 00 5d c3 89 fe 48 c7 c7 a0 c6 fc b9 e8 d5 b5 06 00 <0f> ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 a2 d1 13 02 85 c0 75 38 55 48 But the target task's priority has already been adjusted, so the only purpose of switched_to_rt() invoking resched_curr() is to wake up the CPU running some task that needs to be preempted by the boosted task. But the CPU is offline, which presumably means that the task must be migrated to some other CPU, and that this other CPU will undertake any needed preemption at the time of migration. Because the runqueue lock is held when resched_curr() is invoked, we know that the boosted task cannot go anywhere, so it is not necessary to invoke resched_curr() in this particular case. This commit therefore makes switched_to_rt() refrain from invoking resched_curr() when the target CPU is offline. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a0982df ] The rcutorture test suite occasionally provokes a splat due to invoking resched_cpu() on an offline CPU: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8 at /home/paulmck/public_git/linux-rcu/arch/x86/kernel/smp.c:128 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x37/0x40 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 8 Comm: rcu_preempt Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff902ede9daf00 task.stack: ffff96c50010c000 RIP: 0010:native_smp_send_reschedule+0x37/0x40 RSP: 0018:ffff96c50010fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010096 RAX: 000000000000002e RBX: ffff902edaab4680 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000080000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff96c50010fdb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000299f36ae R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff9de64240 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffffff9de64240 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff902edfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f7d4c642 CR3: 000000001e0e2000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: resched_curr+0x8f/0x1c0 resched_cpu+0x2c/0x40 rcu_implicit_dynticks_qs+0x152/0x220 force_qs_rnp+0x147/0x1d0 ? sync_rcu_exp_select_cpus+0x450/0x450 rcu_gp_kthread+0x5a9/0x950 kthread+0x142/0x180 ? force_qs_rnp+0x1d0/0x1d0 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x40 Code: 14 01 0f 92 c0 84 c0 74 14 48 8b 05 14 4f f4 00 be fd 00 00 00 ff 90 a0 00 00 00 5d c3 89 fe 48 c7 c7 38 89 ca 9d e8 e5 56 08 00 <0f> ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 52 9e 37 02 85 c0 75 38 55 48 ---[ end trace 26df9e5df4bba4ac ]--- This splat cannot be generated by expedited grace periods because they always invoke resched_cpu() on the current CPU, which is good because expedited grace periods require that resched_cpu() unconditionally succeed. However, other parts of RCU can tolerate resched_cpu() acting as a no-op, at least as long as it doesn't happen too often. This commit therefore makes resched_cpu() invoke resched_curr() only if the CPU is either online or is the current CPU. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…ntext | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:914 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 255, name: kworker/u257:6 | 5 locks held by kworker/u257:6/255: | #0: ("events_unbound"){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8108edf1>] process_one_work+0x171/0x5e0 | #1: ((&entry->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8108edf1>] process_one_work+0x171/0x5e0 | #2: (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa000faa3>] __scsi_add_device+0xa3/0x130 [scsi_mod] | #3: (&set->tag_list_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff812f09fa>] blk_mq_init_queue+0x96a/0xa50 | #4: (rcu_read_lock_sched){......}, at: [<ffffffff8132887d>] percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm+0x1d/0x120 | Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff812eff76>] blk_mq_freeze_queue_start+0x56/0x70 | | CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: kworker/u257:6 Not tainted 3.18.7-rt0+ #1 | Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn | 0000000000000003 ffff8800bc29f998 ffffffff815b3a12 0000000000000000 | 0000000000000000 ffff8800bc29f9b8 ffffffff8109aa16 ffff8800bc29fa28 | ffff8800bc5d1bc8 ffff8800bc29f9e8 ffffffff815b8dd4 ffff880000000000 | Call Trace: | [<ffffffff815b3a12>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c | [<ffffffff8109aa16>] __might_sleep+0x116/0x190 | [<ffffffff815b8dd4>] rt_spin_lock+0x24/0x60 | [<ffffffff810b6089>] __wake_up+0x29/0x60 | [<ffffffff812ee06e>] blk_mq_usage_counter_release+0x1e/0x20 | [<ffffffff81328966>] percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm+0x106/0x120 | [<ffffffff812eff76>] blk_mq_freeze_queue_start+0x56/0x70 | [<ffffffff812f0000>] blk_mq_update_tag_set_depth+0x40/0xd0 | [<ffffffff812f0a1c>] blk_mq_init_queue+0x98c/0xa50 | [<ffffffffa000dcf0>] scsi_mq_alloc_queue+0x20/0x60 [scsi_mod] | [<ffffffffa000ea35>] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x2f5/0x370 [scsi_mod] | [<ffffffffa000f494>] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x9e4/0xdd0 [scsi_mod] | [<ffffffffa000fb26>] __scsi_add_device+0x126/0x130 [scsi_mod] | [<ffffffffa013033f>] ata_scsi_scan_host+0xaf/0x200 [libata] | [<ffffffffa012b5b6>] async_port_probe+0x46/0x60 [libata] | [<ffffffff810978fb>] async_run_entry_fn+0x3b/0xf0 | [<ffffffff8108ee81>] process_one_work+0x201/0x5e0 percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm() invokes blk_mq_usage_counter_release() in a rcu-sched region. swait based wake queue can't be used due to wake_up_all() usage and disabled interrupts in !RT configs (as reported by Corey Minyard). The wq_has_sleeper() check has been suggested by Peter Zijlstra. Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

commit 9ef0f88 upstream. Just when I had decided that flush_cache_range() was always called with a valid context, Helge reported two cases where the "BUG_ON(!vma->vm_mm->context);" was hit on the phantom buildd: kernel BUG at /mnt/sdb6/linux/linux-4.15.4/arch/parisc/kernel/cache.c:587! CPU: 1 PID: 3254 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G D 4.15.0-1-parisc64-smp #1 Debian 4.15.4-1+b1 Workqueue: events free_ioctx IAOQ[0]: flush_cache_range+0x164/0x168 IAOQ[1]: flush_cache_page+0x0/0x1c8 RP(r2): unmap_page_range+0xae8/0xb88 Backtrace: [<00000000404a6980>] unmap_page_range+0xae8/0xb88 [<00000000404a6ae0>] unmap_single_vma+0xc0/0x188 [<00000000404a6cdc>] zap_page_range_single+0x134/0x1f8 [<00000000404a702c>] unmap_mapping_range+0x1cc/0x208 [<0000000040461518>] truncate_pagecache+0x98/0x108 [<0000000040461624>] truncate_setsize+0x9c/0xb8 [<00000000405d7f30>] put_aio_ring_file+0x80/0x100 [<00000000405d803c>] aio_free_ring+0x8c/0x290 [<00000000405d82c0>] free_ioctx+0x80/0x180 [<0000000040284e6c>] process_one_work+0x21c/0x668 [<00000000402854c4>] worker_thread+0x20c/0x778 [<0000000040291d44>] kthread+0x2d4/0x2e0 [<0000000040204020>] end_fault_vector+0x20/0xc0 This indicates that we need to handle the no context case in flush_cache_range() as we do in flush_cache_mm(). In thinking about this, I realized that we don't need to flush the TLB when there is no context. So, I added context checks to the large flush cases in flush_cache_mm() and flush_cache_range(). The large flush case occurs frequently in flush_cache_mm() and the change should improve fork performance. The v2 version of this change removes the BUG_ON from flush_cache_page() by skipping the TLB flush when there is no context. I also added code to flush the TLB in flush_cache_mm() and flush_cache_range() when we have a context that's not current. Now all three routines handle TLB flushes in a similar manner. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a5b862c6a221459d54e494e88965b48dcfa6cc44 upstream. l2cap_le_flowctl_init() can cause both div-by-zero and an integer overflow since hdev->le_mtu may not fall in the valid range. Move MTU from hci_dev to hci_conn to validate MTU and stop the connection process earlier if MTU is invalid. Also, add a missing validation in read_buffer_size() and make it return an error value if the validation fails. Now hci_conn_add() returns ERR_PTR() as it can fail due to the both a kzalloc failure and invalid MTU value. divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G W 6.9.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work RIP: 0010:l2cap_le_flowctl_init+0x19e/0x3f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:547 Code: e8 17 17 0c 00 66 41 89 9f 84 00 00 00 bf 01 00 00 00 41 b8 02 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 4c 89 e2 89 d9 e8 27 17 0c 00 44 89 f0 31 d2 <66> f7 f3 89 c3 ff c3 4d 8d b7 88 00 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 RSP: 0018:ffff88810bc0f858 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000002a0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88810bc0f7c0 RDI: ffffc90002dcb66f RBP: ffff88810bc0f880 R08: aa69db2dda70ff01 R09: 0000ffaaaaaaaaaa R10: 0084000000ffaaaa R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810d65a084 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000000002a0 R15: ffff88810d65a000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000103268003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> l2cap_le_connect_req net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4902 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5420 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5486 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe59d/0x11710 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6809 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x544/0x10a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3939 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x5e5/0xb20 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4176 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x90f/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x926/0xe70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2e3/0x380 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x5c/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 6ed58ec ("Bluetooth: Use LE buffers for LE traffic") Suggested-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit c214ed2a4dda35b308b0b28eed804d7ae66401f9 ] The session resources are used by FW and driver when session is offloaded, once session is uploaded these resources are not used. The lock is not required as these fields won't be used any longer. The offload and upload calls are sequential, hence lock is not required. This will suppress following BUG_ON(): [ 449.843143] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 449.848302] kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2727! [ 449.853072] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 449.858712] CPU: 5 PID: 1996 Comm: kworker/u24:2 Not tainted 5.14.0-118.el9.x86_64 #1 Rebooting. [ 449.867454] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.3.4 11/08/2016 [ 449.876966] Workqueue: fc_rport_eq fc_rport_work [libfc] [ 449.882910] RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x2e/0x30 [ 449.887098] Code: 00 65 8b 05 14 a2 f0 4a a9 00 ff ff 00 75 1b 55 48 89 fd e8 34 36 79 00 48 85 ed 74 0b 48 89 ef 31 f6 5d e9 14 fc ff ff 5d c3 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 49 89 ce 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 41 [ 449.908054] RSP: 0018:ffffb83d878b3d68 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 449.913887] RAX: 0000000080000201 RBX: ffff8f4355133550 RCX: 000000000d400005 [ 449.921843] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: ffffb83da53f5000 [ 449.929808] RBP: ffff8f4ac6675800 R08: ffffb83d878b3d30 R09: 00000000000efbdf [ 449.937774] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff8f434573e000 R12: 0000000000001000 [ 449.945736] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffffb83da53f5000 R15: ffff8f43d4ea3ae0 [ 449.953701] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f529fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 449.962732] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 449.969138] CR2: 00007f8cf993e150 CR3: 0000000efbe10003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 449.977102] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 449.985065] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 449.993028] Call Trace: [ 449.995756] __iommu_dma_free+0x96/0x100 [ 450.000139] bnx2fc_free_session_resc+0x67/0x240 [bnx2fc] [ 450.006171] bnx2fc_upload_session+0xce/0x100 [bnx2fc] [ 450.011910] bnx2fc_rport_event_handler+0x9f/0x240 [bnx2fc] [ 450.018136] fc_rport_work+0x103/0x5b0 [libfc] [ 450.023103] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0 [ 450.027581] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 [ 450.031669] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370 [ 450.036143] kthread+0x149/0x170 [ 450.039744] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 [ 450.044411] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 450.048404] Modules linked in: vfat msdos fat xfs nfs_layout_nfsv41_files rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver dm_service_time qedf qed crc8 bnx2fc libfcoe libfc scsi_transport_fc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp dcdbas rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore mei_me pcspkr mei ipmi_ssif lpc_ich ipmi_si fuse zram ext4 mbcache jbd2 loop nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs irdma ice sd_mod t10_pi sg ib_uverbs ib_core 8021q garp mrp stp llc mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt mxm_wmi fb_sys_fops cec crct10dif_pclmul ahci crc32_pclmul bnx2x drm ghash_clmulni_intel libahci rfkill i40e libata megaraid_sas mdio wmi sunrpc lrw dm_crypt dm_round_robin dm_multipath dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_zero dm_mod linear raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_intel raid1 raid0 iscsi_ibft squashfs be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 tls [ 450.048497] libcxgbi libcxgb qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi edd ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler [ 450.159753] ---[ end trace 712de2c57c64abc8 ]--- Reported-by: Guangwu Zhang <guazhang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Saurav Kashyap <skashyap@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315071427.31842-1-skashyap@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit e5f4e68eed85fa8495d78cd966eecc2b27bb9e53 ] When using --Summary mode, added MSRs in raw mode always print zeros. Print the actual register contents. Example, with patch: note the added column: --add msr0x64f,u32,package,raw,REASON Where: 0x64F is MSR_CORE_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS Busy% Bzy_MHz PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt REASON 0.00 4800 35 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 0.00 4801 34 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 80.08 4531 66 108.17 107.52 0x08000000 98.69 4530 66 133.21 132.54 0x08000000 99.28 4505 66 128.26 127.60 0x0c000400 99.65 4486 68 124.91 124.25 0x0c000400 99.63 4483 68 124.90 124.25 0x0c000400 79.34 4481 41 99.80 99.13 0x0c000000 0.00 4801 41 1.40 0.73 0x0c000000 Where, for the test processor (i5-10600K): PKG Limit #1: 125.000 Watts, 8.000000 sec MSR bit 26 = log; bit 10 = status PKG Limit #2: 136.000 Watts, 0.002441 sec MSR bit 27 = log; bit 11 = status Example, without patch: Busy% Bzy_MHz PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt REASON 0.01 4800 35 1.43 0.77 0x00000000 0.00 4801 35 1.39 0.73 0x00000000 83.49 4531 66 112.71 112.06 0x00000000 98.69 4530 68 133.35 132.69 0x00000000 99.31 4500 67 127.96 127.30 0x00000000 99.63 4483 69 124.91 124.25 0x00000000 99.61 4481 69 124.90 124.25 0x00000000 99.61 4481 71 124.92 124.25 0x00000000 59.35 4479 42 75.03 74.37 0x00000000 0.00 4800 42 1.39 0.73 0x00000000 0.00 4801 42 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 c000000 [lenb: simplified patch to apply only to package scope] Signed-off-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f2db7230f73a80dbb179deab78f88a7947f0ab7e ] Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique() with nice analysis. Since commit ec94c26 ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock. Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique() for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt. If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free somewhere else. To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0 RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0 R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84 R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0 FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110 tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190 __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0 __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0 ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10 tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530 __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0 inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80 RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0 R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0 </TASK> Fixes: ec94c26 ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for timewait hashdance") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/37a477a6-d39e-486b-9577-3463f655a6b7@allelesecurity.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501213145.62261-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit adf0398cee86643b8eacde95f17d073d022f782c ] There is a race condition between l2cap_chan_timeout() and l2cap_chan_del(). When we use l2cap_chan_del() to delete the channel, the chan->conn will be set to null. But the conn could be dereferenced again in the mutex_lock() of l2cap_chan_timeout(). As a result the null pointer dereference bug will happen. The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below: [ 472.074580] ================================================================== [ 472.075284] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000158 by task kworker/0:0/7 [ 472.075308] [ 472.075308] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.075308] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.075308] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.075308] Call Trace: [ 472.075308] <TASK> [ 472.075308] dump_stack_lvl+0x137/0x1a0 [ 472.075308] print_report+0x101/0x250 [ 472.075308] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x77/0x160 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_report+0x139/0x170 [ 472.075308] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] kasan_check_range+0x2c3/0x2e0 [ 472.075308] mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.075308] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.075308] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.075308] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.075308] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.075308] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.075308] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.075308] </TASK> [ 472.075308] ================================================================== [ 472.094860] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 472.096136] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 472.096136] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 472.096136] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 472.096136] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 472.096136] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G B 6.9.0-rc5-00356-g78c0094a146b #36 [ 472.096136] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu4 [ 472.096136] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.096136] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.096136] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.096136] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.096136] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.096136] Call Trace: [ 472.096136] <TASK> [ 472.096136] ? __die_body+0x8d/0xe0 [ 472.096136] ? page_fault_oops+0x6b8/0x9a0 [ 472.096136] ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x20c/0x2a0 [ 472.096136] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1027/0x1340 [ 472.096136] ? _printk+0x7a/0xa0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x68/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? add_taint+0x42/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x1b0 [ 472.096136] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] ? mutex_lock+0x75/0xc0 [ 472.096136] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x181/0x300 [ 472.096136] process_one_work+0x5d2/0xe00 [ 472.096136] worker_thread+0xe1d/0x1660 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] kthread+0x2b7/0x350 [ 472.096136] ? pr_cont_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 472.096136] ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 [ 472.096136] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 472.096136] </TASK> [ 472.096136] Modules linked in: [ 472.096136] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 472.096136] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 472.096136] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x88/0xc0 [ 472.096136] Code: be 08 00 00 00 e8 f8 23 1f fd 4c 89 f7 be 08 00 00 00 e8 eb 23 1f fd 42 80 3c 23 00 74 08 48 88 [ 472.096136] RSP: 0018:ffff88800744fc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 472.096136] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11000e89f8f RCX: ffffffff8457c865 [ 472.096136] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88800744fc78 [ 472.096136] RBP: 0000000000000158 R08: ffff88800744fc7f R09: 1ffff11000e89f8f [ 472.132932] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1000e89f90 R12: dffffc0000000000 [ 472.132932] R13: 0000000000000158 R14: ffff88800744fc78 R15: ffff888007405a00 [ 472.132932] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 472.132932] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 472.132932] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 000000000da32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 472.132932] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 472.132932] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 472.132932] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Add a check to judge whether the conn is null in l2cap_chan_timeout() in order to mitigate the bug. Fixes: 3df91ea ("Bluetooth: Revert to mutexes from RCU list") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d101291b2681e5ab938554e3e323f7a7ee33e3aa ] syzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1], caused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use. Indeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline] RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267 Code: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760 RBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00 FS: 00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326 sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455 sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662 sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099 __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197 sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline] sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline] __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 5e5f3f0 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Convert ipv6_get_saddr() to ipv6_dev_get_saddr().") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507163145.835254-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 080cbb890286cd794f1ee788bbc5463e2deb7c2b upstream. Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…nix_gc(). commit 1971d13ffa84a551d29a81fdf5b5ec5be166ac83 upstream. syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 ] Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in smb2_parse_contexts(). This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from server: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 4a01067 P4D 4a01067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 1736 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:smb2_parse_contexts+0xa0/0x3a0 [cifs] Code: f8 10 75 13 48 b8 93 ad 25 50 9c b4 11 e7 49 39 06 0f 84 d2 00 00 00 8b 45 00 85 c0 74 61 41 29 c5 48 01 c5 41 83 fd 0f 76 55 <0f> b7 7d 04 0f b7 45 06 4c 8d 74 3d 00 66 83 f8 04 75 bc ba 04 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc900007939e0 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: ffffc90000793c78 RBX: ffff8880180cc000 RCX: ffffc90000793c90 RDX: ffffc90000793cc0 RSI: ffff8880178d8cc0 RDI: ffff8880180cc000 RBP: ffff8881178d8cbf R08: ffffc90000793c22 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8880180cc000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000793c22 FS: 00007f873753cbc0(0000) GS:ffff88806bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff8881178d8cc3 CR3: 00000000181ca000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x181/0x480 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? exc_page_fault+0x1b6/0x1c0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? smb2_parse_contexts+0xa0/0x3a0 [cifs] SMB2_open+0x38d/0x5f0 [cifs] ? smb2_is_path_accessible+0x138/0x260 [cifs] smb2_is_path_accessible+0x138/0x260 [cifs] cifs_is_path_remote+0x8d/0x230 [cifs] cifs_mount+0x7e/0x350 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x128/0x780 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0xd9/0x290 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x2c/0x100 ? capable+0x37/0x70 path_mount+0x2d7/0xb80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __x64_sys_mount+0x11a/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x47/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f8737657b1e Reported-by: Robert Morris <rtm@csail.mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> [Guru: Removed changes to cached_dir.c and checking return value of smb2_parse_contexts in smb2ops.c] Signed-off-by: Guruswamy Basavaiah <guruswamy.basavaiah@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e6f57c6881916df39db7d95981a8ad2b9c3458d6 upstream. Unfortunately the commit `fd8958efe877` introduced another error causing the `descs` array to overflow. This reults in further crashes easily reproducible by `sendmsg` system call. [ 1080.836473] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x400300015528b00a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1080.869326] RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_build_ib_tx_headers.constprop.0+0xe1/0x2b0 [hfi1] -- [ 1080.974535] Call Trace: [ 1080.976990] <TASK> [ 1081.021929] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_common+0x7a/0x2e0 [hfi1] [ 1081.027364] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_list+0x62/0x270 [hfi1] [ 1081.032633] hfi1_ipoib_send+0x112/0x300 [hfi1] [ 1081.042001] ipoib_start_xmit+0x2a9/0x2d0 [ib_ipoib] [ 1081.046978] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc4/0x210 -- [ 1081.148347] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0 crash> ipoib_txreq 0xffff9cfeba229f00 struct ipoib_txreq { txreq = { list = { next = 0xffff9cfeba229f00, prev = 0xffff9cfeba229f00 }, descp = 0xffff9cfeba229f40, coalesce_buf = 0x0, wait = 0xffff9cfea4e69a48, complete = 0xffffffffc0fe0760 <hfi1_ipoib_sdma_complete>, packet_len = 0x46d, tlen = 0x0, num_desc = 0x0, desc_limit = 0x6, next_descq_idx = 0x45c, coalesce_idx = 0x0, flags = 0x0, descs = {{ qw = {0x8024000120dffb00, 0x4} # SDMA_DESC0_FIRST_DESC_FLAG (bit 63) }, { qw = { 0x3800014231b108, 0x4} }, { qw = { 0x310000e4ee0fcf0, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x3000012e9f8000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x59000dfb9d0000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x78000e02e40000, 0x8} }} }, sdma_hdr = 0x400300015528b000, <<< invalid pointer in the tx request structure sdma_status = 0x0, SDMA_DESC0_LAST_DESC_FLAG (bit 62) complete = 0x0, priv = 0x0, txq = 0xffff9cfea4e69880, skb = 0xffff9d099809f400 } If an SDMA send consists of exactly 6 descriptors and requires dword padding (in the 7th descriptor), the sdma_txreq descriptor array is not properly expanded and the packet will overflow into the container structure. This results in a panic when the send completion runs. The exact panic varies depending on what elements of the container structure get corrupted. The fix is to use the correct expression in _pad_sdma_tx_descs() to test the need to expand the descriptor array. With this patch the crashes are no longer reproducible and the machine is stable. Fixes: fd8958e ("IB/hfi1: Fix sdma.h tx->num_descs off-by-one errors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mats Kronberg <kronberg@nsc.liu.se> Tested-by: Mats Kronberg <kronberg@nsc.liu.se> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201081009.1109442-1-neelx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 136cfaca22567a03bbb3bf53a43d8cb5748b80ec upstream. The gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered before registering the generic netlink family. Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 PID: 5826 Comm: gtp Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-std-def-alt1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp] Code: c6 89 c6 e8 64 e9 86 df 58 45 85 f6 0f 85 4e 04 00 00 e8 c5 ee 86 df 48 8b 54 24 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 de 05 00 00 48 8b 44 24 18 4c 8b 30 4c 39 f0 74 RSP: 0018:ffff888014107220 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88800fcda588 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f1be4eb05c0(0000) GS:ffff88806ce80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1be4e766cf CR3: 000000000c33e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x90/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x50/0xd0 ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp] ? __alloc_skb+0x1dd/0x350 ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10 genl_dumpit+0x11d/0x230 netlink_dump+0x5b9/0xce0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x253/0x430 ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x40 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xa0 ? genl_start+0x675/0x970 __netlink_dump_start+0x6fc/0x9f0 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x1bb/0x2d0 ? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? genl_op_from_small+0x2a/0x440 ? cap_capable+0x1d0/0x240 ? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10 ? security_capable+0x9d/0xe0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org> Fixes: 459aa66 ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214162733.34214-1-kovalev@altlinux.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 85a6a1aff08ec9f5b929d345d066e2830e8818e5 ] The 'TAG 66 Packet Format' description is missing the cipher code and checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result, the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the buffer. Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet will always fit in the buffer. This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181 CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70 print_report+0xc5/0x610 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 kasan_report+0xc2/0x110 ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 __asan_store1+0x62/0x80 ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0 ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540 ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d] ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0 ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550 ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10 ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190 ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150 ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0 path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30 ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330 do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67 Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67 RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040 </TASK> Allocated by task 181: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0 __kmalloc+0x66/0x160 ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0 ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550 ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150 ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0 path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0 do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290 do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160 __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: dddfa46 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management") Signed-off-by: Brian Kubisiak <brian@kubisiak.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5j2q56p6qkhezva6b2yuqfrsurmvrrqtxxzrnp3wqu7xrz22i7@hoecdztoplbl Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c6854e5a267c28300ff045480b5a7ee7f6f1d913 ] Add a check to make sure that the requested xattr node size is no larger than the eraseblock minus the cleanmarker. Unlike the usual inode nodes, the xattr nodes aren't split into parts and spread across multiple eraseblocks, which means that a xattr node must not occupy more than one eraseblock. If the requested xattr value is too large, the xattr node can spill onto the next eraseblock, overwriting the nodes and causing errors such as: jffs2: argh. node added in wrong place at 0x0000b050(2) jffs2: nextblock 0x0000a000, expected at 0000b00c jffs2: error: (823) do_verify_xattr_datum: node CRC failed at 0x01e050, read=0xfc892c93, calc=0x000000 jffs2: notice: (823) jffs2_get_inode_nodes: Node header CRC failed at 0x01e00c. {848f,2fc4,0fef511f,59a3d171} jffs2: Node at 0x0000000c with length 0x00001044 would run over the end of the erase block jffs2: Perhaps the file system was created with the wrong erase size? jffs2: jffs2_scan_eraseblock(): Magic bitmask 0x1985 not found at 0x00000010: 0x1044 instead This breaks the filesystem and can lead to KASAN crashes such as: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802c31e914 by task repro/830 CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120 print_report+0xc4/0x620 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x308/0x5b0 kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0 ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0 ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0 jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0 jffs2_flash_direct_writev+0xa8/0xd0 jffs2_flash_writev+0x9c9/0xef0 ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc4/0x160 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x140 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [...] Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: aa98d7c ("[JFFS2][XATTR] XATTR support on JFFS2 (version. 5)") Signed-off-by: Ilya Denisyev <dev@elkcl.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240412155357.237803-1-dev@elkcl.ru Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f0e729af2eb6bee9eb58c4df1087f14ebaefe26b ] Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will trigger following softlockup: kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976] CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30 Call Trace: <TASK> md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0 raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10] md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020 md_thread+0xa7/0x170 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 And the detailed process is as follows: md_do_sync j = mddev->resync_min while (j < max_sectors) sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &skipped) if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &sync_blocks)) // md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0 return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe; // sectors = 0; j += sectors; // j never change Root cause is that commit 301867b ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") return early from md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks. Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from md_bitmap_get_counter"(), as it used to be. Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the case that bitmap size doesn't match array size still need to be fixed. Fixes: 301867b ("md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter") Reported-and-tested-by: Nigel Croxon <ncroxon@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/71ba5272-ab07-43ba-8232-d2da642acb4e@redhat.com/ Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422065824.2516-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 3c5d0dce8ce0a2781ac306b9ad1492b005ecbab5 ] Fix the calculation of the utrd pointer. This patch addresses the following Coverity complaint: CID 1538170: (#1 of 1): Extra sizeof expression (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) suspicious_pointer_arithmetic: Adding sq_head_slot * 32UL /* sizeof (struct utp_transfer_req_desc) */ to pointer hwq->sqe_base_addr of type struct utp_transfer_req_desc * is suspicious because adding an integral value to this pointer automatically scales that value by the size, 32 bytes, of the pointed-to type, struct utp_transfer_req_desc. Most likely, the multiplication by sizeof (struct utp_transfer_req_desc) in this expression is extraneous and should be eliminated. Cc: Bao D. Nguyen <quic_nguyenb@quicinc.com> Cc: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com> Cc: Can Guo <quic_cang@quicinc.com> Fixes: 8d72903 ("scsi: ufs: mcq: Add supporting functions for MCQ abort") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240410000751.1047758-1-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 3d6586008f7b638f91f3332602592caa8b00b559 ] Patch series "mm: follow_pte() improvements and acrn follow_pte() fixes". Patch #1 fixes a bunch of issues I spotted in the acrn driver. It compiles, that's all I know. I'll appreciate some review and testing from acrn folks. Patch #2+#3 improve follow_pte(), passing a VMA instead of the MM, adding more sanity checks, and improving the documentation. Gave it a quick test on x86-64 using VM_PAT that ends up using follow_pte(). This patch (of 3): We currently miss handling various cases, resulting in a dangerous follow_pte() (previously follow_pfn()) usage. (1) We're not checking PTE write permissions. Maybe we should simply always require pte_write() like we do for pin_user_pages_fast(FOLL_WRITE)? Hard to tell, so let's check for ACRN_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE for now. (2) We're not rejecting refcounted pages. As we are not using MMU notifiers, messing with refcounted pages is dangerous and can result in use-after-free. Let's make sure to reject them. (3) We are only looking at the first PTE of a bigger range. We only lookup a single PTE, but memmap->len may span a larger area. Let's loop over all involved PTEs and make sure the PFN range is actually contiguous. Reject everything else: it couldn't have worked either way, and rather made use access PFNs we shouldn't be accessing. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240410155527.474777-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240410155527.474777-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 8a6e85f ("virt: acrn: obtain pa from VMA with PFNMAP flag") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Fei Li <fei1.li@intel.com> Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Yonghua Huang <yonghua.huang@intel.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ] syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1] Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node) [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline] nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355 nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129: #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 88ce0106a1f603bf360cb397e8fe293f8298fabb ] The session has a header in it which contains a perf env with bpf_progs. The bpf_progs are accessed by the sideband thread and so the sideband thread must be stopped before the session is deleted, to avoid a use after free. This error was detected by AddressSanitizer in the following: ==2054673==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x61d000161e00 at pc 0x55769289de54 bp 0x7f9df36d4ab0 sp 0x7f9df36d4aa8 READ of size 8 at 0x61d000161e00 thread T1 #0 0x55769289de53 in __perf_env__insert_bpf_prog_info util/env.c:42 #1 0x55769289dbb1 in perf_env__insert_bpf_prog_info util/env.c:29 #2 0x557692bbae29 in perf_env__add_bpf_info util/bpf-event.c:483 #3 0x557692bbb01a in bpf_event__sb_cb util/bpf-event.c:512 #4 0x5576928b75f4 in perf_evlist__poll_thread util/sideband_evlist.c:68 #5 0x7f9df96a63eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #6 0x7f9df9726a4b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 0x61d000161e00 is located 384 bytes inside of 2136-byte region [0x61d000161c80,0x61d0001624d8) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f9dfa6d7288 in __interceptor_free libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:52 #1 0x557692978d50 in perf_session__delete util/session.c:319 #2 0x557692673959 in __cmd_record tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2884 #3 0x55769267a9f0 in cmd_record tools/perf/builtin-record.c:4259 #4 0x55769286710c in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:349 #5 0x557692867678 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:402 #6 0x557692867a40 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:446 #7 0x557692867fae in main tools/perf/perf.c:562 #8 0x7f9df96456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 Fixes: 657ee55 ("perf evlist: Introduce side band thread") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301074639.2260708-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 33e62cd7b4c281cd737c62e5d8c4f0e602a8c5c5 ] As reported by Yi Zhang in mailing list [1], kernel warning was catched during zbd/010 test as below: ./check zbd/010 zbd/010 (test gap zone support with F2FS) [failed] runtime ... 3.752s something found in dmesg: [ 4378.146781] run blktests zbd/010 at 2024-02-18 11:31:13 [ 4378.192349] null_blk: module loaded [ 4378.209860] null_blk: disk nullb0 created [ 4378.413285] scsi_debug:sdebug_driver_probe: scsi_debug: trim poll_queues to 0. poll_q/nr_hw = (0/1) [ 4378.422334] scsi host15: scsi_debug: version 0191 [20210520] dev_size_mb=1024, opts=0x0, submit_queues=1, statistics=0 [ 4378.434922] scsi 15:0:0:0: Direct-Access-ZBC Linux scsi_debug 0191 PQ: 0 ANSI: 7 [ 4378.443343] scsi 15:0:0:0: Power-on or device reset occurred [ 4378.449371] sd 15:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg5 type 20 [ 4378.449418] sd 15:0:0:0: [sdf] Host-managed zoned block device ... (See '/mnt/tests/gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/19168116/repository/archive.zip/storage/blktests/blk/blktests/results/nodev/zbd/010.dmesg' WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 44011 at fs/iomap/iter.c:51 CPU: 22 PID: 44011 Comm: fio Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #1 RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x32b/0x350 Call Trace: <TASK> __iomap_dio_rw+0x1df/0x830 f2fs_file_read_iter+0x156/0x3d0 [f2fs] aio_read+0x138/0x210 io_submit_one+0x188/0x8c0 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x8c/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x86/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Shinichiro Kawasaki helps to analyse this issue and proposes a potential fixing patch in [2]. Quoted from reply of Shinichiro Kawasaki: "I confirmed that the trigger commit is dbf8e63 as Yi reported. I took a look in the commit, but it looks fine to me. So I thought the cause is not in the commit diff. I found the WARN is printed when the f2fs is set up with multiple devices, and read requests are mapped to the very first block of the second device in the direct read path. In this case, f2fs_map_blocks() and f2fs_map_blocks_cached() modify map->m_pblk as the physical block address from each block device. It becomes zero when it is mapped to the first block of the device. However, f2fs_iomap_begin() assumes that map->m_pblk is the physical block address of the whole f2fs, across the all block devices. It compares map->m_pblk against NULL_ADDR == 0, then go into the unexpected branch and sets the invalid iomap->length. The WARN catches the invalid iomap->length. This WARN is printed even for non-zoned block devices, by following steps. - Create two (non-zoned) null_blk devices memory backed with 128MB size each: nullb0 and nullb1. # mkfs.f2fs /dev/nullb0 -c /dev/nullb1 # mount -t f2fs /dev/nullb0 "${mount_dir}" # dd if=/dev/zero of="${mount_dir}/test.dat" bs=1M count=192 # dd if="${mount_dir}/test.dat" of=/dev/null bs=1M count=192 iflag=direct ..." So, the root cause of this issue is: when multi-devices feature is on, f2fs_map_blocks() may return zero blkaddr in non-primary device, which is a verified valid block address, however, f2fs_iomap_begin() treats it as an invalid block address, and then it triggers the warning in iomap framework code. Finally, as discussed, we decide to use a more simple and direct way that checking (map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) condition instead of (map.m_pblk != NULL_ADDR) to fix this issue. Thanks a lot for the effort of Yi Zhang and Shinichiro Kawasaki on this issue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/CAHj4cs-kfojYC9i0G73PRkYzcxCTex=-vugRFeP40g_URGvnfQ@mail.gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/gngdj77k4picagsfdtiaa7gpgnup6fsgwzsltx6milmhegmjff@iax2n4wvrqye/ Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/CAHj4cs-kfojYC9i0G73PRkYzcxCTex=-vugRFeP40g_URGvnfQ@mail.gmail.com/ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com> Fixes: 1517c1a ("f2fs: implement iomap operations") Fixes: 8d3c1fa ("f2fs: don't rely on F2FS_MAP_* in f2fs_iomap_begin") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

… just one DSO [ Upstream commit d9180e23fbfa3875424d3a6b28b71b072862a52a ] 'perf bench internals inject-build-id' suffers from the following error when only one DSO is collected. # perf bench internals inject-build-id -v Collected 1 DSOs traps: internals-injec[2305] trap divide error ip:557566ba6394 sp:7ffd4de97fe0 error:0 in perf[557566b2a000+23d000] Build-id injection benchmark Iteration #1 Floating point exception This patch removes the unnecessary minus one from the divisor which also corrects the randomization range. Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Fixes: 0bf02a0 ("perf bench: Add build-id injection benchmark") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507065026.2652929-1-zhe.he@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 769e6a1e15bdbbaf2b0d2f37c24f2c53268bd21f ] ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated memory in hist_browser__run(). Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string. Committer notes: Further explanation from Ian Rogers: My command line using tui is: $ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report' I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan error (from the log file): ``` ==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address 0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180 65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10 READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0 #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461 #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251) #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9) #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60 #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266 #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288 #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206 #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458 #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412 #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527 #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613 #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661 #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671 #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141 #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805 #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374 #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516 #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350 #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403 #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447 #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561 #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId: 84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93) Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork ``` hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit. There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade anyway. Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev> Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn> Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 9841991a446c87f90f66f4b9fee6fe934c1336a2 ] Billy Jheng Bing-Jhong reported a race between __unix_gc() and queue_oob(). __unix_gc() tries to garbage-collect close()d inflight sockets, and then if the socket has MSG_OOB in unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb, GC will drop the reference and set NULL to it locklessly. However, the peer socket still can send MSG_OOB message and queue_oob() can update unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb concurrently, leading NULL pointer dereference. [0] To fix the issue, let's update unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb under the sk_receive_queue's lock and take it everywhere we touch oob_skb. Note that we defer kfree_skb() in manage_oob() to silence lockdep false-positive (See [1]). [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 8000000009f5e067 P4D 8000000009f5e067 PUD 9f5d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 50 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-00191-gd091e579b864 #110 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events delayed_fput RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2386 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2402 net/core/skbuff.c:3847) Code: 39 e3 74 3e 8b 43 10 48 89 ef 83 e8 01 89 43 10 49 8b 44 24 08 49 c7 44 24 08 00 00 00 00 49 8b 14 24 49 c7 04 24 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 e8 e7 c5 42 00 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c c3 cc cc RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bfd48 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880088f5ae8 RCX: 00000000361289f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: ffff8880088f5b00 RBP: ffff8880088f5b00 R08: 0000000000080000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8880056b6a00 R13: ffff8880088f5280 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8880088f5a80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000006314000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> unix_release_sock (net/unix/af_unix.c:654) unix_release (net/unix/af_unix.c:1050) __sock_release (net/socket.c:660) sock_close (net/socket.c:1423) __fput (fs/file_table.c:423) delayed_fput (fs/file_table.c:444 (discriminator 3)) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3259) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/a00d3993-c461-43f2-be6d-07259c98509a@rbox.co/ [1] Fixes: 1279f9d9dec2 ("af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.") Reported-by: Billy Jheng Bing-Jhong <billy@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240516134835.8332-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ffbf4fb9b5c12ff878a10ea17997147ea4ebea6f ] When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior entries in the table will be handled correctly. The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct are suitably aligned within arrays. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is: struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short line; // 2 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes } ... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment. When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is: struct bug_entry { signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes < implicit padding > // 2 bytes } ... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing padding, requiring 4-byte alginment. When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries. However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding bytes. For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries: for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug) if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug)) return bug; However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing bytes when calculating the number of entries: mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry); ... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry: sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6 sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8; sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0; Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does: for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug) if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug)) goto out; ... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug. This can be demonstrated with the following module: static int __init buginit(void) { WARN(1, "hello\n"); return 0; } static void __exit bugexit(void) { } module_init(buginit); module_exit(bugexit); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); ... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded: ------------[ cut here ]------------ hello Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: hello(O+) CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello] lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello] sp : ffff800080533ae0 x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0 x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720 x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312 x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8 x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000 x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0 Call trace: buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8 do_init_module+0x60/0x218 load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70 __do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0 __arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xd8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: d0ffffe0 910003fd 91000000 9400000b (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception Fix this by always aligning the end of a bug_entry to 4 bytes, which is correct regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE. Fixes: 9fb7410 ("arm64/BUG: Use BRK instruction for generic BUG traps") Signed-off-by: Yuanbin Xie <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1716212077-43826-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…oy_rcu() [ Upstream commit dc21c6cc3d6986d938efbf95de62473982c98dec ] syzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() : WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427: #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline] #1: ffff88801ca92958 (&inst->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712 nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline] nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397 nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline] instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline] rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471 handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 </IRQ> <TASK> Fixes: 9872bec ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink: use RCU for queue instances hash") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

… rules [ Upstream commit 16d66a4fa81da07bc4ed19f4e53b87263c2f8d38 ] rx_create no longer allocates a modify_hdr instance that needs to be cleaned up. The mlx5_modify_header_dealloc call will lead to a NULL pointer dereference. A leak in the rules also previously occurred since there are now two rules populated related to status. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 109907067 P4D 109907067 PUD 116890067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 484 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-rrameshbabu+ #254 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5_modify_header_dealloc+0xd/0x70 <snip> Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x60/0x70 ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15f/0x430 ? free_to_partial_list.constprop.0+0x79/0x150 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c9/0x5c0 ? exc_page_fault+0x63/0x110 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 ? mlx5_modify_header_dealloc+0xd/0x70 rx_create+0x374/0x590 rx_add_rule+0x3ad/0x500 ? rx_add_rule+0x3ad/0x500 ? mlx5_cmd_exec+0x2c/0x40 ? mlx5_create_ipsec_obj+0xd6/0x200 mlx5e_accel_ipsec_fs_add_rule+0x31/0xf0 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x426/0xc00 <snip> Fixes: 94af50c0a9bb ("net/mlx5e: Unify esw and normal IPsec status table creation/destruction") Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 21a673bddc8fd4873c370caf9ae70ffc6d47e8d3 ] syzbot reports: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] [..] RIP: 0010:nf_tproxy_laddr4+0xb7/0x340 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_tproxy_ipv4.c:62 Call Trace: nft_tproxy_eval_v4 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:56 [inline] nft_tproxy_eval+0xa9a/0x1a00 net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c:168 __in_dev_get_rcu() can return NULL, so check for this. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b94a6818504ea90d7661@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: cc6eb43 ("tproxy: use the interface primary IP address as a default value for --on-ip") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 3f858bbf04dbac934ac279aaee05d49eb9910051 upstream. There is an issue with ACPI overlay table removal specifically related to I2C multiplexers. Consider an ACPI SSDT Overlay that defines a PCA9548 I2C mux on an existing I2C bus. When this table is loaded we see the creation of a device for the overall PCA9548 chip and 8 further devices - one i2c_adapter each for the mux channels. These are all bound to their ACPI equivalents via an eventual invocation of acpi_bind_one(). When we unload the SSDT overlay we run into the problem. The ACPI devices are deleted as normal via acpi_device_del_work_fn() and the acpi_device_del_list. However, the following warning and stack trace is output as the deletion does not go smoothly: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernfs: can not remove 'physical_node', no directory WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1674 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u128:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #1 Hardware name: congatec AG conga-B7E3/conga-B7E3, BIOS 5.13 05/16/2023 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 Code: e4 00 48 89 ef e8 07 71 db ff 5b b8 fe ff ff ff 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 a7 55 e4 00 0f 0b eb a6 48 c7 c7 f0 38 0d 9d e8 97 0a d5 ff <0f> 0b eb dc 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffff9f864008fb28 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ef90a8d4940 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8f000e267d10 RSI: ffff8f000e25c780 RDI: ffff8f000e25c780 RBP: ffff8ef9186f9870 R08: 0000000000013ffb R09: 00000000ffffbfff R10: 00000000ffffbfff R11: ffff8f000e0a0000 R12: ffff9f864008fb50 R13: ffff8ef90c93dd60 R14: ffff8ef9010d0958 R15: ffff8ef9186f98c8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f000e240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f48f5253a08 CR3: 00000003cb82e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 ? __warn+0x7c/0x130 ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xb9/0xc0 acpi_unbind_one+0x108/0x180 device_del+0x18b/0x490 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f device_unregister+0xd/0x30 i2c_del_adapter.part.0+0x1bf/0x250 i2c_mux_del_adapters+0xa1/0xe0 i2c_device_remove+0x1e/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x19a/0x200 bus_remove_device+0xbf/0x100 device_del+0x157/0x490 ? __pfx_device_match_fwnode+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f device_unregister+0xd/0x30 i2c_acpi_notify+0x10f/0x140 notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xd0 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3a/0x60 acpi_device_del_work_fn+0x85/0x1d0 process_one_work+0x134/0x2f0 worker_thread+0x2f0/0x410 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe3/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ... repeated 7 more times, 1 for each channel of the mux ... The issue is that the binding of the ACPI devices to their peer I2C adapters is not correctly cleaned up. Digging deeper into the issue we see that the deletion order is such that the ACPI devices matching the mux channel i2c adapters are deleted first during the SSDT overlay removal. For each of the channels we see a call to i2c_acpi_notify() with ACPI_RECONFIG_DEVICE_REMOVE but, because these devices are not actually i2c_clients, nothing is done for them. Later on, after each of the mux channels has been dealt with, we come to delete the i2c_client representing the PCA9548 device. This is the call stack we see above, whereby the kernel cleans up the i2c_client including destruction of the mux and its channel adapters. At this point we do attempt to unbind from the ACPI peers but those peers no longer exist and so we hit the kernfs errors. The fix is to augment i2c_acpi_notify() to handle i2c_adapters. But, given that the life cycle of the adapters is linked to the i2c_client, instead of deleting the i2c_adapters during the i2c_acpi_notify(), we just trigger unbinding of the ACPI device from the adapter device, and allow the clean up of the adapter to continue in the way it always has. Signed-off-by: Hamish Martin <hamish.martin@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Fixes: 525e6fa ("i2c / ACPI: add support for ACPI reconfigure notifications") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d4f9d5a99a3fd1b1c691b7a1a6f8f3f25f4116c9 upstream. A system crash like this Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ... CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3 000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0 000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff 000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8 Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047 brc 8,0000014b75e7b68a 0000014b75e7b600: 18b2 lr %r11,%r2 #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a brc 15,0000014b75e7b616 >0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6 laog %r2,%r2,0(%r13) 0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001 lhi %r6,1 0000014b75e7b610: 187b lr %r7,%r11 0000014b75e7b612: 84960021 brxh %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654 0000014b75e7b616: 18e9 lr %r14,%r9 Call Trace: [<0000014b75e7b606>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8 ([<0000014b75e7b5dc>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8) [<0000014b75e7b758>] apmask_store+0x68/0x140 [<0000014b75679196>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8 [<0000014b75598524>] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448 [<0000014b7559894c>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100 [<0000014b7618a440>] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328 [<0000014b761a3558>] system_call+0x70/0x98 INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000014b75e7b636>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops occured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value (like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX. The fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The correct checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for the internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow. Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9d274c19a71b3a276949933859610721a453946b upstream. We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Does this kernel support the Intel® Media Server Studio 2017 R3? #1

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Does this kernel support the Intel® Media Server Studio 2017 R3? #1

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pauldotknopf commented Feb 28, 2018