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Future deprecation notice
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=========================

We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in a near-future
release, specifically:

 * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
   is 768 bits)

This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for future releases.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms
by default in ssh:

 * Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants
   and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.

 * MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.

These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.

Changes since OpenSSH 7.1p2
===========================

This is primarily a bugfix release.

Security
--------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): remove unfinished and unused roaming code (was
   already forcibly disabled in OpenSSH 7.1p2).

 * ssh(1): eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to
   trusted forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY
   extension.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): increase the minimum modulus size supported for
   diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits.

 * sshd(8): pre-auth sandboxing is now enabled by default (previous
   releases enabled it for new installations via sshd_config).

New Features
------------

 * all: add support for RSA signatures using SHA-256/512 hash
   algorithms based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
   draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt.

 * ssh(1): Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to
   'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'.  When
   enabled, a private key that is used during authentication will be
   added to ssh-agent if it is running (with confirmation enabled if
   set to 'confirm').

 * sshd(8): add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that includes
   all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc.).
   Also add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g.
   "no-pty" -> "pty". This simplifies the task of setting up
   restricted keys and ensures they are maximally-restricted,
   regardless of any permissions we might implement in the future.

 * ssh(1): add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list
   certificates. bz#2436

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to change the key comment for all
   supported formats.

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting from standard input, e.g.
   "ssh-keygen -lf -"

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting multiple public keys in a
   file, e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" bz#1319

 * sshd(8): support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
   Foreground and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to
   override a global default. bz#2486

 * ssh-keygen(1): support multiple certificates (one per line) and
   reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"

 * ssh-keyscan(1): add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching
   certificates instead of plain keys.

 * ssh(1): better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in
   hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and
   remove the trailing '.' before matching ssh_config.

Bugfixes
--------

 * sftp(1): existing destination directories should not terminate
   recursive uploads (regression in openssh 6.8) bz#2528

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly send back SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
   replies to unexpected messages during key exchange. bz#2949

 * ssh(1): refuse attempts to set ConnectionAttempts=0, which does
   not make sense and would cause ssh to print an uninitialised stack
   variable. bz#2500

 * ssh(1): fix errors when attempting to connect to scoped IPv6
   addresses with hostname canonicalisation enabled.

 * sshd_config(5): list a couple more options usable in Match blocks.
   bz#2489

 * sshd(8): fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block.

 * ssh(1): expand tilde characters in filenames passed to -i options
   before checking whether or not the identity file exists. Avoids
   confusion for cases where shell doesn't expand (e.g. "-i ~/file"
   vs. "-i~/file"). bz#2481

 * ssh(1): do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match
   exec" in a config file, which could cause some commands to fail
   in certain environments. bz#2471

 * ssh-keyscan(1): fix output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line
   when host hashing or a non standard port is in use bz#2479

 * sshd(8): skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when
   ChrootDirectory is active. bz#2485

 * ssh(1): include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump.

 * sshd(8): avoid changing TunnelForwarding device flags if they are
   already what is needed; makes it possible to use tun/tap
   networking as non-root user if device permissions and interface
   flags are pre-established

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): RekeyLimits could be exceeded by one packet.
   bz#2521

 * ssh(1): fix multiplexing master failure to notice client exit.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present
   empty key IDs. bz#1773

 * sshd(8): avoid printf of NULL argument. bz#2535

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): allow RekeyLimits larger than 4GB. bz#2521

 * ssh-keygen(1): sshd(8): fix several bugs in (unused) KRL signature
   support.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connections with peers that use the key
   exchange guess feature of the protocol. bz#2515

 * sshd(8): include remote port number in log messages. bz#2503

 * ssh(1): don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without
   SSHv1 support. bz#2505

 * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): fix incorrect error messages during key
   loading and signing errors. bz#2507

 * ssh-keygen(1): don't leave empty temporary files when performing
   known_hosts file edits when known_hosts doesn't exist.

 * sshd(8): correct packet format for tcpip-forward replies for
   requests that don't allocate a port bz#2509

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix possible hang on closed output. bz#2469

 * ssh(1): expand %i in ControlPath to UID. bz#2449

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix return type of openssh_RSA_verify. bz#2460

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix some option parsing memory leaks. bz#2182

 * ssh(1): add a some debug output before DNS resolution; it's a
   place where ssh could previously silently stall in cases of
   unresponsive DNS servers. bz#2433

 * ssh(1): remove spurious newline in visual hostkey. bz#2686

 * ssh(1): fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+...

 * ssh(1): fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+...

Documentation
-------------

 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): update default algorithm lists to
   match current reality. bz#2527

 * ssh(1): mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert query options.
   bz#2455

 * sshd_config(8): more clearly describe what AuthorizedKeysFile=none
   does.

 * ssh_config(5): better document ExitOnForwardFailure. bz#2444

 * sshd(5): mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups in manual.
   bz#2302

 * sshd_config(5): better description for MaxSessions option.
   bz#2531

Portability
-----------

 * ssh(1), sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1), sshd(8): Support Illumos/
   Solaris fine-grained privileges. Including a pre-auth privsep
   sandbox and several pledge() emulations. bz#2511

 * Renovate redhat/openssh.spec, removing deprecated options and
   syntax.

 * configure: allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl

 * sshd(8): fix multiple authentication using S/Key. bz#2502

 * sshd(8): read back from libcrypto RAND_* before dropping
   privileges.  Avoids sandboxing violations with BoringSSL.

 * Fix name collision with system-provided glob(3) functions.
   bz#2463

 * Adapt Makefile to use ssh-keygen -A when generating host keys.
   bz#2459

 * configure: correct default value for --with-ssh1 bz#2457

 * configure: better detection of _res symbol bz#2259

 * support getrandom() syscall on Linux
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christos committed Mar 11, 2016
1 parent 8b584ed commit f1738f2
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Showing 98 changed files with 2,580 additions and 1,635 deletions.
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.13 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.14 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
if (!authctxt->valid)
return -1;

if (authctxt->as == 0)
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");

if (numresponses != 1)
Expand Down
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.20 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.21 2016/01/27 06:44:58 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
*
* $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $
* From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved.
Expand Down
111 changes: 65 additions & 46 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth-options.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.68 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.70 2015/12/10 17:08:40 mmcc Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -72,18 +72,44 @@ auth_clear_options(void)
free(ce->s);
free(ce);
}
if (forced_command) {
free(forced_command);
forced_command = NULL;
}
if (authorized_principals) {
free(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = NULL;
}
free(forced_command);
forced_command = NULL;
free(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = NULL;
forced_tun_device = -1;
channel_clear_permitted_opens();
}

/*
* Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
* 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
* if negated option matches.
* If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
* point to the first character after the option and, if 'msg' is not NULL
* then a message based on it added via auth_debug_add().
*/
static int
match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg)
{
size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
char *opts = *optsp;
int negate = 0;

if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
opts += 3;
negate = 1;
}
if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
*optsp = opts + opt_len;
if (msg != NULL) {
auth_debug_add("%s %s.", msg,
negate ? "disabled" : "enabled");
}
return negate ? 0 : 1;
}
return -1;
}

/*
* return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
* side effect: sets key option flags
Expand All @@ -92,7 +118,7 @@ int
auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
{
const char *cp;
int i;
int i, r;

/* reset options */
auth_clear_options();
Expand All @@ -101,52 +127,48 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
return 1;

while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
cp = "cert-authority";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
key_is_cert_authority = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
if ((r = match_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
key_is_cert_authority = r;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "no-port-forwarding";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled.");
if ((r = match_flag("restrict", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
auth_debug_add("Key is restricted.");
no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_pty_flag = 1;
no_user_rc = 1;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "no-agent-forwarding";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled.");
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
if ((r = match_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts,
"Port forwarding")) != -1) {
no_port_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "no-X11-forwarding";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled.");
no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
if ((r = match_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts,
"Agent forwarding")) != -1) {
no_agent_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "no-pty";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled.");
no_pty_flag = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
if ((r = match_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts,
"X11 forwarding")) != -1) {
no_x11_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "no-user-rc";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled.");
no_user_rc = 1;
opts += strlen(cp);
if ((r = match_flag("pty", 1, &opts,
"PTY allocation")) != -1) {
no_pty_flag = r != 1;
goto next_option;
}
if ((r = match_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts,
"User rc execution")) != -1) {
no_user_rc = r != 1;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "command=\"";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
opts += strlen(cp);
if (forced_command != NULL)
free(forced_command);
free(forced_command);
forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
i = 0;
while (*opts) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -176,8 +198,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
cp = "principals=\"";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
opts += strlen(cp);
if (authorized_principals != NULL)
free(authorized_principals);
free(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
i = 0;
while (*opts) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -563,8 +584,7 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
free(*cert_forced_command);
*cert_forced_command = NULL;
}
if (name != NULL)
free(name);
free(name);
sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(c);
return ret;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -608,8 +628,7 @@ auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
/* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */
if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
if (forced_command != NULL)
free(forced_command);
free(forced_command);
forced_command = cert_forced_command;
}
return 0;
Expand Down
6 changes: 2 additions & 4 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.86 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */

/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -157,8 +157,6 @@ int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);

int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
Expand All @@ -185,7 +183,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);

/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
Expand Down
36 changes: 22 additions & 14 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.55 2016/01/27 00:53:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -76,19 +76,19 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *userstyle;
char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int have_sig, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;

if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
return 0;
}
have_sig = packet_get_char();
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
/* no explicit pkalg given */
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
buffer_init(&b);
Expand All @@ -103,18 +103,18 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
pkalg);
logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
Expand All @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
goto done;
Expand All @@ -135,6 +136,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
}

if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
__func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
packet_check_eom();
buffer_init(&b);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -180,7 +183,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
buffer_free(&b);
free(sig);
} else {
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
__func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
packet_check_eom();

/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
Expand All @@ -203,11 +207,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (authenticated != 1)
auth_clear_options();
done:
debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(fp);
return authenticated;
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -793,8 +798,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
free(fp);
continue;
}
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
"signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
key_type(found), fp, file);
free(fp);
found_key = 1;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -872,8 +878,10 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
goto out;

verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
"%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
ret = 1;

Expand Down
20 changes: 17 additions & 3 deletions crypto/external/bsd/openssh/dist/authfd.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.98 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.100 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -424,11 +424,24 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
}
#endif

/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
static u_int
agent_encode_alg(struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
{
if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
}
return 0;
}

/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
int
ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *blob = NULL, type;
Expand All @@ -447,12 +460,13 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg) != 0))
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
Expand Down
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