dwc2: g_serial doesn't enumerate when builtin #3
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This issue might be a timing issue. In the past there has been problems with to much debug messages: |
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The following patch works as a workaround (not intend as proper solution): https://gist.github.com/lategoodbye/5e842f22c1f5a94fde24b466569a7d10 |
lategoodbye
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Realtek RTL8723BS and RTL8723DS are SDIO wifi chips with an embedded Bluetooth controller which connects to the host via UART. The H5 protocol is used for communication between host and device. The Realtek "rtl8723bs_bt" and "rtl8723ds_bt" userspace Bluetooth UART initialization tools (rtk_hciattach) use the following sequence: 1) send H5 sync pattern (already supported by hci_h5) 2) get LMP version (already supported by btrtl) 3) get ROM version (already supported by btrtl) 4) load the firmware and config for the current chipset (already supported by btrtl) 5) read UART settings from the config blob (already supported by btrtl) 6) send UART settings via a vendor command to the device (which changes the baudrate of the device and enables or disables flow control depending on the config) 7) change the baudrate and flow control settings on the host 8) send the firmware and config blob to the device (already supported by btrtl) This uses the serdev library as well as the existing btrtl driver to initialize the Bluetooth functionality, which consists of: - identifying the device and loading the corresponding firmware and config blobs (steps #2, #3 and #4) - configuring the baudrate and flow control (steps #6 and #7) - uploading the firmware to the device (step #8) Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
lategoodbye
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Currently we can crash perf record when running in pipe mode, like:
$ perf record ls | perf report
# To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options.
#
perf: Segmentation fault
Error:
The - file has no samples!
The callstack of the crash is:
0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name
3513 ev = event_update_event__new(len + 1, PERF_EVENT_UPDATE__NAME, evsel->id[0]);
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0000000000515242 in perf_event__synthesize_event_update_name
#1 0x00000000005158a4 in perf_event__synthesize_extra_attr
#2 0x0000000000443347 in record__synthesize
#3 0x00000000004438e3 in __cmd_record
#4 0x000000000044514e in cmd_record
#5 0x00000000004cbc95 in run_builtin
#6 0x00000000004cbf02 in handle_internal_command
#7 0x00000000004cc054 in run_argv
#8 0x00000000004cc422 in main
The reason of the crash is that the evsel does not have ids array
allocated and the pipe's synthesize code tries to access it.
We don't force evsel ids allocation when we have single event, because
it's not needed. However we need it when we are in pipe mode even for
single event as a key for evsel update event.
Fixing this by forcing evsel ids allocation event for single event, when
we are in pipe mode.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180302161354.30192-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
lategoodbye
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If load ip6_vti module and create a network namespace when set fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net to 1, then exit the namespace will cause following crash: [ 6601.677036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 [ 6601.679057] PGD 8000000425eca067 P4D 8000000425eca067 PUD 424292067 PMD 0 [ 6601.680483] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 6601.681223] CPU: 7 PID: 93 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 4.18.0+ #3 [ 6601.683153] Hardware name: Fedora Project OpenStack Nova, BIOS seabios-1.7.5-11.el7 04/01/2014 [ 6601.684919] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 6601.685742] RIP: 0010:vti6_exit_batch_net+0x87/0xd0 [ip6_vti] [ 6601.686932] Code: 7b 08 48 89 e6 e8 b9 ea d3 dd 48 8b 1b 48 85 db 75 ec 48 83 c5 08 48 81 fd 00 01 00 00 75 d5 49 8b 84 24 08 01 00 00 48 89 e6 <48> 8b 78 08 e8 90 ea d3 dd 49 8b 45 28 49 39 c6 4c 8d 68 d8 75 a1 [ 6601.690735] RSP: 0018:ffffa897c2737de0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6601.691846] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dead000000000200 [ 6601.693324] RDX: 0000000000000015 RSI: ffffa897c2737de0 RDI: ffffffff9f2ea9e0 [ 6601.694824] RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6601.696314] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8dc323c07e00 [ 6601.697812] R13: ffff8dc324a63100 R14: ffffa897c2737e30 R15: ffffa897c2737e30 [ 6601.699345] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dc33fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6601.701068] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6601.702282] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000424966002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 6601.703791] Call Trace: [ 6601.704329] cleanup_net+0x1b4/0x2c0 [ 6601.705268] process_one_work+0x16c/0x370 [ 6601.706145] worker_thread+0x49/0x3e0 [ 6601.706942] kthread+0xf8/0x130 [ 6601.707626] ? rescuer_thread+0x340/0x340 [ 6601.708476] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 6601.709266] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Reproduce: modprobe ip6_vti echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net unshare -n exit This because ip6n->tnls_wc[0] point to fallback device in default, but in non-default namespace, ip6n->tnls_wc[0] will be NULL, so add the NULL check comparatively. Fixes: e2948e5 ("ip6_vti: fix creating fallback tunnel device for vti6") Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
lategoodbye
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This patch fixes the race between netvsc_probe() and rndis_set_subchannel(), which can cause a deadlock. These are the related 3 paths which show the deadlock: path #1: Workqueue: hv_vmbus_con vmbus_onmessage_work [hv_vmbus] Call Trace: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock __device_attach bus_probe_device device_add vmbus_device_register vmbus_onoffer vmbus_onmessage_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #2: schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock netvsc_probe vmbus_probe really_probe __driver_attach bus_for_each_dev driver_attach_async async_run_entry_fn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork path #3: Workqueue: events netvsc_subchan_work [hv_netvsc] Call Trace: schedule rndis_set_subchannel netvsc_subchan_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork Before path #1 finishes, path #2 can start to run, because just before the "bus_probe_device(dev);" in device_add() in path #1, there is a line "object_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);", so systemd-udevd can immediately try to load hv_netvsc and hence path #2 can start to run. Next, path #2 offloads the subchannal's initialization to a workqueue, i.e. path #3, so we can end up in a deadlock situation like this: Path #2 gets the device lock, and is trying to get the rtnl lock; Path #3 gets the rtnl lock and is waiting for all the subchannel messages to be processed; Path #1 is trying to get the device lock, but since #2 is not releasing the device lock, path #1 has to sleep; since the VMBus messages are processed one by one, this means the sub-channel messages can't be procedded, so #3 has to sleep with the rtnl lock held, and finally #2 has to sleep... Now all the 3 paths are sleeping and we hit the deadlock. With the patch, we can make sure #2 gets both the device lock and the rtnl lock together, gets its job done, and releases the locks, so #1 and #3 will not be blocked for ever. Fixes: 8195b13 ("hv_netvsc: fix deadlock on hotplug") Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
lategoodbye
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…equests Currently, nouveau uses the generic drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed() function provided by DRM as it's output_poll_changed callback. Unfortunately however, this function doesn't grab runtime PM references early enough and even if it did-we can't block waiting for the device to resume in output_poll_changed() since it's very likely that we'll need to grab the fb_helper lock at some point during the runtime resume process. This currently results in deadlocking like so: [ 246.669625] INFO: task kworker/4:0:37 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.673398] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.675271] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.676527] kworker/4:0 D 0 37 2 0x80000000 [ 246.677580] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.678704] Call Trace: [ 246.679753] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.680916] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.681924] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x20 [ 246.683023] __mutex_lock+0x569/0x9a0 [ 246.684035] ? kobject_uevent_env+0x117/0x7b0 [ 246.685132] ? drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.686179] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 246.687278] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 246.688307] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.689420] drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed+0x23/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.690462] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2a/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.691570] output_poll_execute+0x198/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.692611] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.693725] worker_thread+0x214/0x3a0 [ 246.694756] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.695856] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.696888] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.697998] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.699034] INFO: task kworker/0:1:60 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.700153] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.701182] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.702278] kworker/0:1 D 0 60 2 0x80000000 [ 246.703293] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 246.704393] Call Trace: [ 246.705403] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.706439] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.707393] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.708375] schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590 [ 246.709289] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80 [ 246.710208] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 246.711222] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.712134] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190 [ 246.713094] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 246.713964] wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190 [ 246.714895] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 246.715727] ? get_work_pool+0x90/0x90 [ 246.716649] flush_work+0x1c9/0x280 [ 246.717483] ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 246.718442] __cancel_work_timer+0x146/0x1d0 [ 246.719247] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 246.720043] drm_kms_helper_poll_disable+0x1f/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.721123] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x3d/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 246.721897] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x190 [ 246.722825] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.723737] __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0 [ 246.724721] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.725607] rpm_callback+0x24/0x80 [ 246.726553] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 246.727376] rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0 [ 246.728185] pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0 [ 246.728938] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.729796] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 246.730614] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.731395] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.732202] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.732878] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.733768] INFO: task kworker/4:2:422 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 246.734587] Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5Lyude-Test+ #2 [ 246.735393] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.736113] kworker/4:2 D 0 422 2 0x80000080 [ 246.736789] Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.737665] Call Trace: [ 246.738490] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 246.739250] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 246.739908] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 246.740750] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 246.741541] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 246.742370] nv50_disp_atomic_commit+0x31/0x210 [nouveau] [ 246.743124] drm_atomic_commit+0x4a/0x50 [drm] [ 246.743775] restore_fbdev_mode_atomic+0x1c8/0x240 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.744603] restore_fbdev_mode+0x31/0x140 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.745373] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x54/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.746220] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2d/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.746884] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x96/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.747675] drm_fb_helper_output_poll_changed+0x23/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.748544] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2a/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.749439] nv50_mstm_hotplug+0x15/0x20 [nouveau] [ 246.750111] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x177/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.750764] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0xa8/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.751602] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x51/0x90 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.752314] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 246.752979] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 246.753838] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 246.754619] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 246.755386] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 246.756162] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 246.756847] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 246.758261] 3 locks held by kworker/4:0/37: [ 246.759016] #0: 00000000f8df4d2d ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.759856] #1: 00000000e6065461 ((work_completion)(&(&dev->mode_config.output_poll_work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.760670] #2: 00000000cb66735f (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.28+0x20/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.761516] 2 locks held by kworker/0:1/60: [ 246.762274] #0: 00000000fff6be0f ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.762982] #1: 000000005ab44fb4 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.763890] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64: [ 246.764664] #0: 000000008cb8b5c3 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185 [ 246.765588] 5 locks held by kworker/4:2/422: [ 246.766440] #0: 00000000232f0959 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.767390] #1: 00000000bb59b134 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 246.768154] #2: 00000000cb66735f (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x4c/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.768966] #3: 000000004c8f0b6b (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: restore_fbdev_mode_atomic+0x4b/0x240 [drm_kms_helper] [ 246.769921] #4: 000000004c34a296 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8a/0x1b0 [drm] [ 246.770839] 1 lock held by dmesg/1038: [ 246.771739] 2 locks held by zsh/1172: [ 246.772650] #0: 00000000836d0438 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 [ 246.773680] #1: 000000001f4f4d48 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870 [ 246.775522] ============================================= After trying dozens of different solutions, I found one very simple one that should also have the benefit of preventing us from having to fight locking for the rest of our lives. So, we work around these deadlocks by deferring all fbcon hotplug events that happen after the runtime suspend process starts until after the device is resumed again. Changes since v7: - Fixup commit message - Daniel Vetter Changes since v6: - Remove unused nouveau_fbcon_hotplugged_in_suspend() - Ilia Changes since v5: - Come up with the (hopefully final) solution for solving this dumb problem, one that is a lot less likely to cause issues with locking in the future. This should work around all deadlock conditions with fbcon brought up thus far. Changes since v4: - Add nouveau_fbcon_hotplugged_in_suspend() to workaround deadlock condition that Lukas described - Just move all of this out of drm_fb_helper. It seems that other DRM drivers have already figured out other workarounds for this. If other drivers do end up needing this in the future, we can just move this back into drm_fb_helper again. Changes since v3: - Actually check if fb_helper is NULL in both new helpers - Actually check drm_fbdev_emulation in both new helpers - Don't fire off a fb_helper hotplug unconditionally; only do it if the following conditions are true (as otherwise, calling this in the wrong spot will cause Bad Things to happen): - fb_helper hotplug handling was actually inhibited previously - fb_helper actually has a delayed hotplug pending - fb_helper is actually bound - fb_helper is actually initialized - Add __must_check to drm_fb_helper_suspend_hotplug(). There's no situation where a driver would actually want to use this without checking the return value, so enforce that - Rewrite and clarify the documentation for both helpers. - Make sure to return true in the drm_fb_helper_suspend_hotplug() stub that's provided in drm_fb_helper.h when CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION isn't enabled - Actually grab the toplevel fb_helper lock in drm_fb_helper_resume_hotplug(), since it's possible other activity (such as a hotplug) could be going on at the same time the driver calls drm_fb_helper_resume_hotplug(). We need this to check whether or not drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event() needs to be called anyway Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
lategoodbye
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When we disable hotplugging on the GPU, we need to be able to synchronize with each connector's hotplug interrupt handler before the interrupt is finally disabled. This can be a problem however, since nouveau_connector_detect() currently grabs a runtime power reference when handling connector probing. This will deadlock the runtime suspend handler like so: [ 861.480896] INFO: task kworker/0:2:61 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.483290] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.485158] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.486332] kworker/0:2 D 0 61 2 0x80000000 [ 861.487044] Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau] [ 861.487737] Call Trace: [ 861.488394] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.489070] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.489744] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.490392] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.491068] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.491753] nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x22/0x60 [nouveau] [ 861.492416] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.493068] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.493722] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.494342] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.494991] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.495648] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.496304] INFO: task kworker/6:2:320 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.496968] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.497654] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.498341] kworker/6:2 D 0 320 2 0x80000080 [ 861.499045] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 861.499739] Call Trace: [ 861.500428] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.501134] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.501851] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.502564] schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590 [ 861.503284] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80 [ 861.503988] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40 [ 861.504710] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.505417] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190 [ 861.506136] ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190 [ 861.506845] wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190 [ 861.507555] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 861.508268] flush_work+0x1c9/0x280 [ 861.508990] ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 861.509735] nvif_notify_put+0xb1/0xc0 [nouveau] [ 861.510482] nouveau_display_fini+0xbd/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.511241] nouveau_display_suspend+0x67/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.511969] nouveau_do_suspend+0x5e/0x2d0 [nouveau] [ 861.512715] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x47/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.513435] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x180 [ 861.514165] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.514897] __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0 [ 861.515618] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.516313] rpm_callback+0x24/0x80 [ 861.517027] ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70 [ 861.517741] rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0 [ 861.518449] pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0 [ 861.519144] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.519831] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.520522] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.521220] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.521925] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.522622] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.523299] INFO: task kworker/6:0:1329 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 861.523977] Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.524644] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 861.525349] kworker/6:0 D 0 1329 2 0x80000000 [ 861.526073] Workqueue: events nvif_notify_work [nouveau] [ 861.526751] Call Trace: [ 861.527411] __schedule+0x322/0xaf0 [ 861.528089] schedule+0x33/0x90 [ 861.528758] rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850 [ 861.529399] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [ 861.530073] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90 [ 861.530798] nouveau_connector_detect+0x7e/0x510 [nouveau] [ 861.531459] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532097] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80 [ 861.532819] ? drm_modeset_lock+0x88/0x130 [drm] [ 861.533481] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0xa0/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534127] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa4/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.534940] nouveau_connector_hotplug+0x98/0x120 [nouveau] [ 861.535556] nvif_notify_work+0x2d/0xb0 [nouveau] [ 861.536221] process_one_work+0x231/0x620 [ 861.536994] worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0 [ 861.537757] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.538463] ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140 [ 861.539102] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.539815] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.540521] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 861.541696] 2 locks held by kworker/0:2/61: [ 861.542406] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543071] #1: 0000000076868126 ((work_completion)(&drm->hpd_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.543814] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64: [ 861.544535] #0: 0000000059db4b53 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185 [ 861.545160] 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/320: [ 861.545896] #0: 00000000d9e1bc59 ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.546702] #1: 00000000c9f92d84 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.547443] #2: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: nouveau_display_fini+0x96/0x170 [nouveau] [ 861.548146] 1 lock held by dmesg/983: [ 861.548889] 2 locks held by zsh/1250: [ 861.549605] #0: 00000000348e3cf6 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 [ 861.550393] #1: 000000007009a7a8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870 [ 861.551122] 6 locks held by kworker/6:0/1329: [ 861.551957] #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.552765] #1: 00000000ddb499ad ((work_completion)(¬ify->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620 [ 861.553582] #2: 000000006e013cbe (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x6c/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.554357] #3: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x78/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.555227] #4: 0000000044f294d9 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x3d/0x100 [drm_kms_helper] [ 861.556133] #5: 00000000db193642 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x4b/0x130 [drm] [ 861.557864] ============================================= [ 861.559507] NMI backtrace for cpu 2 [ 861.560363] CPU: 2 PID: 64 Comm: khungtaskd Tainted: G O 4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 861.561197] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N0B/20EQS64N0B, BIOS N1EET78W (1.51 ) 05/18/2018 [ 861.561948] Call Trace: [ 861.562757] dump_stack+0x8e/0xd3 [ 861.563516] nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.3+0x14/0x5a [ 861.564269] ? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.27+0x42/0x42 [ 861.565029] nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xa1/0xae [ 861.565789] arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x19/0x20 [ 861.566558] watchdog+0x316/0x580 [ 861.567355] kthread+0x12b/0x150 [ 861.568114] ? reset_hung_task_detector+0x20/0x20 [ 861.568863] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 861.569598] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 861.570370] Sending NMI from CPU 2 to CPUs 0-1,3-7: [ 861.571426] NMI backtrace for cpu 6 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571429] NMI backtrace for cpu 7 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571432] NMI backtrace for cpu 3 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571464] NMI backtrace for cpu 5 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571467] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571469] NMI backtrace for cpu 4 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.571472] NMI backtrace for cpu 1 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120 [ 861.572428] Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks So: fix this by making it so that normal hotplug handling /only/ happens so long as the GPU is currently awake without any pending runtime PM requests. In the event that a hotplug occurs while the device is suspending or resuming, we can simply defer our response until the GPU is fully runtime resumed again. Changes since v4: - Use a new trick I came up with using pm_runtime_get() instead of the hackish junk we had before Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
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A kernel crash occurrs when defragmented packet is fragmented in ip_do_fragment(). In defragment routine, skb_orphan() is called and skb->ip_defrag_offset is set. but skb->sk and skb->ip_defrag_offset are same union member. so that frag->sk is not NULL. Hence crash occurrs in skb->sk check routine in ip_do_fragment() when defragmented packet is fragmented. test commands: %iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE %hping3 192.168.4.2 -s 1000 -p 2000 -d 60000 splat looks like: [ 261.069429] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/ip_output.c:636! [ 261.075753] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 261.083854] CPU: 1 PID: 1349 Comm: hping3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #3 [ 261.100977] RIP: 0010:ip_do_fragment+0x1613/0x2600 [ 261.106945] Code: e8 e2 38 e3 fe 4c 8b 44 24 18 48 8b 74 24 08 e9 92 f6 ff ff 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 da 07 00 00 48 8b b5 d0 00 00 00 e9 25 f6 ff ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 44 8b 54 24 58 4c 8b 4c 24 18 4c 8b 5c 24 60 4c 8b 6c [ 261.127015] RSP: 0018:ffff8801031cf2c0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 261.134156] RAX: 1ffff1002297537b RBX: ffffed0020639e6e RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 261.142156] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff880114ba9bd8 [ 261.150157] RBP: ffff880114ba8a40 R08: ffffed0022975395 R09: ffffed0022975395 [ 261.158157] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0022975394 R12: ffff880114ba9ca4 [ 261.166159] R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff880114ba9bc0 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 261.174169] FS: 00007fbae2199700(0000) GS:ffff88011b400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 261.183012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 261.189013] CR2: 00005579244fe000 CR3: 0000000119bf4000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 261.198158] Call Trace: [ 261.199018] ? dst_output+0x180/0x180 [ 261.205011] ? save_trace+0x300/0x300 [ 261.209018] ? ip_copy_metadata+0xb00/0xb00 [ 261.213034] ? sched_clock_local+0xd4/0x140 [ 261.218158] ? kill_l4proto+0x120/0x120 [nf_conntrack] [ 261.223014] ? rt_cpu_seq_stop+0x10/0x10 [ 261.227014] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0 [ 261.233008] ip_finish_output+0x51d/0xb50 [ 261.237006] ? ip_fragment.constprop.56+0x220/0x220 [ 261.243011] ? nf_ct_l4proto_register_one+0x5b0/0x5b0 [nf_conntrack] [ 261.250152] ? rcu_is_watching+0x77/0x120 [ 261.255010] ? nf_nat_ipv4_out+0x1e/0x2b0 [nf_nat_ipv4] [ 261.261033] ? nf_hook_slow+0xb1/0x160 [ 261.265007] ip_output+0x1c7/0x710 [ 261.269005] ? ip_mc_output+0x13f0/0x13f0 [ 261.273002] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xe9/0x1b0 [ 261.278152] ? ip_fragment.constprop.56+0x220/0x220 [ 261.282996] ? nf_hook_slow+0xb1/0x160 [ 261.287007] raw_sendmsg+0x21f9/0x4420 [ 261.291008] ? dst_output+0x180/0x180 [ 261.297003] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x126/0x170 [ 261.301003] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0 [ 261.306155] ? stop_critical_timings+0x420/0x420 [ 261.311004] ? check_flags.part.36+0x450/0x450 [ 261.315005] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 [ 261.320995] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 [ 261.326142] ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 [ 261.330139] ? raw_bind+0x280/0x280 [ 261.334138] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x126/0x170 [ 261.338995] ? check_flags.part.36+0x450/0x450 [ 261.342991] ? __lock_acquire+0x4500/0x4500 [ 261.348994] ? inet_sendmsg+0x11c/0x500 [ 261.352989] ? dst_output+0x180/0x180 [ 261.357012] inet_sendmsg+0x11c/0x500 [ ... ] v2: - clear skb->sk at reassembly routine.(Eric Dumarzet) Fixes: fa0f527 ("ip: use rb trees for IP frag queue.") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The following lockdep report can be triggered by writing to /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.18.0-rc6-00152-gcd3f77d74ac3-dirty #18 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ sh/3358 is trying to acquire lock: 000000004ad3989d (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: static_key_enable+0x14/0x30 but task is already holding lock: 00000000c1b31a88 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}, at: sched_feat_write+0x160/0x428 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xb8/0x148 down_write+0xac/0x140 start_creating+0x5c/0x168 debugfs_create_dir+0x18/0x220 opp_debug_register+0x8c/0x120 _add_opp_dev+0x104/0x1f8 dev_pm_opp_get_opp_table+0x174/0x340 _of_add_opp_table_v2+0x110/0x760 dev_pm_opp_of_add_table+0x5c/0x240 dev_pm_opp_of_cpumask_add_table+0x5c/0x100 cpufreq_init+0x160/0x430 cpufreq_online+0x1cc/0xe30 cpufreq_add_dev+0x78/0x198 subsys_interface_register+0x168/0x270 cpufreq_register_driver+0x1c8/0x278 dt_cpufreq_probe+0xdc/0x1b8 platform_drv_probe+0xb4/0x168 driver_probe_device+0x318/0x4b0 __device_attach_driver+0xfc/0x1f0 bus_for_each_drv+0xf8/0x180 __device_attach+0x164/0x200 device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18 bus_probe_device+0x110/0x178 device_add+0x6d8/0x908 platform_device_add+0x138/0x3d8 platform_device_register_full+0x1cc/0x1f8 cpufreq_dt_platdev_init+0x174/0x1bc do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x4b8/0x56c kernel_init+0x10/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #2 (opp_table_lock){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xb8/0x148 __mutex_lock+0x104/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x28 _of_add_opp_table_v2+0xb4/0x760 dev_pm_opp_of_add_table+0x5c/0x240 dev_pm_opp_of_cpumask_add_table+0x5c/0x100 cpufreq_init+0x160/0x430 cpufreq_online+0x1cc/0xe30 cpufreq_add_dev+0x78/0x198 subsys_interface_register+0x168/0x270 cpufreq_register_driver+0x1c8/0x278 dt_cpufreq_probe+0xdc/0x1b8 platform_drv_probe+0xb4/0x168 driver_probe_device+0x318/0x4b0 __device_attach_driver+0xfc/0x1f0 bus_for_each_drv+0xf8/0x180 __device_attach+0x164/0x200 device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18 bus_probe_device+0x110/0x178 device_add+0x6d8/0x908 platform_device_add+0x138/0x3d8 platform_device_register_full+0x1cc/0x1f8 cpufreq_dt_platdev_init+0x174/0x1bc do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x4b8/0x56c kernel_init+0x10/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #1 (subsys mutex#6){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xb8/0x148 __mutex_lock+0x104/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x28 subsys_interface_register+0xd8/0x270 cpufreq_register_driver+0x1c8/0x278 dt_cpufreq_probe+0xdc/0x1b8 platform_drv_probe+0xb4/0x168 driver_probe_device+0x318/0x4b0 __device_attach_driver+0xfc/0x1f0 bus_for_each_drv+0xf8/0x180 __device_attach+0x164/0x200 device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18 bus_probe_device+0x110/0x178 device_add+0x6d8/0x908 platform_device_add+0x138/0x3d8 platform_device_register_full+0x1cc/0x1f8 cpufreq_dt_platdev_init+0x174/0x1bc do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x4b8/0x56c kernel_init+0x10/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: __lock_acquire+0x203c/0x21d0 lock_acquire+0xb8/0x148 cpus_read_lock+0x58/0x1c8 static_key_enable+0x14/0x30 sched_feat_write+0x314/0x428 full_proxy_write+0xa0/0x138 __vfs_write+0xd8/0x388 vfs_write+0xdc/0x318 ksys_write+0xb4/0x138 sys_write+0xc/0x18 __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem --> opp_table_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); lock(opp_table_lock); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by sh/3358: #0: 00000000a8c4b363 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x238/0x318 #1: 00000000c1b31a88 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}, at: sched_feat_write+0x160/0x428 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 PID: 3358 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.18.0-rc6-00152-gcd3f77d74ac3-dirty #18 Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x13c/0x1ac print_circular_bug.isra.10+0x270/0x438 check_prev_add.constprop.16+0x4dc/0xb98 __lock_acquire+0x203c/0x21d0 lock_acquire+0xb8/0x148 cpus_read_lock+0x58/0x1c8 static_key_enable+0x14/0x30 sched_feat_write+0x314/0x428 full_proxy_write+0xa0/0x138 __vfs_write+0xd8/0x388 vfs_write+0xdc/0x318 ksys_write+0xb4/0x138 sys_write+0xc/0x18 __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 This is because when loading the cpufreq_dt module we first acquire cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem lock, then in cpufreq_init(), we are taking the &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key lock. But when writing to /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features, the cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem lock depends on the &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key lock. To fix this bug, reverse the lock acquisition order when writing to sched_features, this way cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem no longer depends on &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key. Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiada Wang <jiada_wang@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com> Cc: George G. Davis <george_davis@mentor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731121222.26195-1-jiada_wang@mentor.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Sep 19, 2018
When netvsc device is removed it can call reschedule in RCU context. This happens because canceling the subchannel setup work could (in theory) cause a reschedule when manipulating the timer. To reproduce, run with lockdep enabled kernel and unbind a network device from hv_netvsc (via sysfs). [ 160.682011] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 160.707466] 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 Not tainted [ 160.709937] ----------------------------- [ 160.712352] ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:302 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 160.723691] [ 160.723691] other info that might help us debug this: [ 160.723691] [ 160.730955] [ 160.730955] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 160.762813] 5 locks held by rebind-eth.sh/1812: [ 160.766851] #0: 000000008befa37a (sb_writers#6){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.773416] #1: 00000000b097f236 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xe2/0x1a0 [ 160.783766] #2: 0000000041ee6889 (kn->count#3){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xeb/0x1a0 [ 160.787465] #3: 0000000056d92a74 (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x250 [ 160.816987] #4: 0000000030f6031e (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.828629] [ 160.828629] stack backtrace: [ 160.831966] CPU: 1 PID: 1812 Comm: rebind-eth.sh Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-uio+ #2 [ 160.832952] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v1.0 11/26/2012 [ 160.832952] Call Trace: [ 160.832952] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 160.832952] ___might_sleep+0x1a3/0x240 [ 160.832952] __flush_work+0x57/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __mutex_lock+0x83/0x990 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x24f/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? __kernfs_remove+0x1b2/0x2e0 [ 160.832952] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? get_work_pool+0x90/0x90 [ 160.832952] __cancel_work_timer+0x13c/0x1e0 [ 160.832952] ? netvsc_remove+0x1e/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] ? __lock_is_held+0x55/0x90 [ 160.832952] netvsc_remove+0x9a/0x250 [hv_netvsc] [ 160.832952] vmbus_remove+0x26/0x30 [ 160.832952] device_release_driver_internal+0x18a/0x250 [ 160.832952] unbind_store+0xb4/0x180 [ 160.832952] kernfs_fop_write+0x113/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] __vfs_write+0x36/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6b/0x80 [ 160.832952] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2e/0x60 [ 160.832952] ? __sb_start_write+0x141/0x1a0 [ 160.832952] ? vfs_write+0x184/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] vfs_write+0xbe/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] ksys_write+0x55/0xc0 [ 160.832952] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 [ 160.832952] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 160.832952] RIP: 0033:0x7fe48f4c8154 Resolve this by getting RTNL earlier. This is safe because the subchannel work queue does trylock on RTNL and will detect the race. Fixes: 7b2ee50 ("hv_netvsc: common detach logic") Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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…inux-nfs Pull NFS client bugfixes from Anna Schumaker: "These are a handful of fixes for problems that Trond found. Patch #1 and #3 have the same name, a second issue was found after applying the first patch. Stable bugfixes: - v4.17+: Fix tracepoint Oops in initiate_file_draining() - v4.11+: Fix an infinite loop on I/O Other fixes: - Return errors if a waiting layoutget is killed - Don't open code clearing of delegation state" * tag 'nfs-for-4.19-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs: NFS: Don't open code clearing of delegation state NFSv4.1 fix infinite loop on I/O. NFSv4: Fix a tracepoint Oops in initiate_file_draining() pNFS: Ensure we return the error if someone kills a waiting layoutget NFSv4: Fix a tracepoint Oops in initiate_file_draining()
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Jan 10, 2019
OOM report contains several sections. The first one is the allocation context that has triggered the OOM. Then we have cpuset context followed by the stack trace of the OOM path. The tird one is the OOM memory information. Followed by the current memory state of all system tasks. At last, we will show oom eligible tasks and the information about the chosen oom victim. One thing that makes parsing more awkward than necessary is that we do not have a single and easily parsable line about the oom context. This patch is reorganizing the oom report to 1) who invoked oom and what was the allocation request [ 515.902945] tuned invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6200ca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 2) OOM stack trace [ 515.904273] CPU: 24 PID: 1809 Comm: tuned Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #3 [ 515.905518] Hardware name: Inspur SA5212M4/YZMB-00370-107, BIOS 4.1.10 11/14/2016 [ 515.906821] Call Trace: [ 515.908062] dump_stack+0x5a/0x73 [ 515.909311] dump_header+0x55/0x28c [ 515.914260] oom_kill_process+0x2d8/0x300 [ 515.916708] out_of_memory+0x145/0x4a0 [ 515.917932] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x7d2/0xa16 [ 515.919157] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x277/0x290 [ 515.920367] filemap_fault+0x3d0/0x6c0 [ 515.921529] ? filemap_map_pages+0x2b8/0x420 [ 515.922709] ext4_filemap_fault+0x2c/0x40 [ext4] [ 515.923884] __do_fault+0x20/0x80 [ 515.925032] __handle_mm_fault+0xbc0/0xe80 [ 515.926195] handle_mm_fault+0xfa/0x210 [ 515.927357] __do_page_fault+0x233/0x4c0 [ 515.928506] do_page_fault+0x32/0x140 [ 515.929646] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 515.930770] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 3) OOM memory information [ 515.958093] Mem-Info: [ 515.959647] active_anon:26501758 inactive_anon:1179809 isolated_anon:0 active_file:4402672 inactive_file:483963 isolated_file:1344 unevictable:0 dirty:4886753 writeback:0 unstable:0 slab_reclaimable:148442 slab_unreclaimable:18741 mapped:1347 shmem:1347 pagetables:58669 bounce:0 free:88663 free_pcp:0 free_cma:0 ... 4) current memory state of all system tasks [ 516.079544] [ 744] 0 744 9211 1345 114688 82 0 systemd-journal [ 516.082034] [ 787] 0 787 31764 0 143360 92 0 lvmetad [ 516.084465] [ 792] 0 792 10930 1 110592 208 -1000 systemd-udevd [ 516.086865] [ 1199] 0 1199 13866 0 131072 112 -1000 auditd [ 516.089190] [ 1222] 0 1222 31990 1 110592 157 0 smartd [ 516.091477] [ 1225] 0 1225 4864 85 81920 43 0 irqbalance [ 516.093712] [ 1226] 0 1226 52612 0 258048 426 0 abrtd [ 516.112128] [ 1280] 0 1280 109774 55 299008 400 0 NetworkManager [ 516.113998] [ 1295] 0 1295 28817 37 69632 24 0 ksmtuned [ 516.144596] [ 10718] 0 10718 2622484 1721372 15998976 267219 0 panic [ 516.145792] [ 10719] 0 10719 2622484 1164767 9818112 53576 0 panic [ 516.146977] [ 10720] 0 10720 2622484 1174361 9904128 53709 0 panic [ 516.148163] [ 10721] 0 10721 2622484 1209070 10194944 54824 0 panic [ 516.149329] [ 10722] 0 10722 2622484 1745799 14774272 91138 0 panic 5) oom context (contrains and the chosen victim). oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_NONE,nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0-1,task=panic,pid=10737,uid=0 An admin can easily get the full oom context at a single line which makes parsing much easier. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542799799-36184-1-git-send-email-ufo19890607@gmail.com Signed-off-by: yuzhoujian <yuzhoujian@didichuxing.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Jan 10, 2019
If we're using the default implementation of kgdb_roundup_cpus() that uses smp_call_function_single_async() we can end up hanging kgdb_roundup_cpus() if we try to round up a CPU that failed to round up before. Specifically smp_call_function_single_async() will try to wait on the csd lock for the CPU that we're trying to round up. If the previous round up never finished then that lock could still be held and we'll just sit there hanging. There's not a lot of use trying to round up a CPU that failed to round up before. Let's keep a flag that indicates whether the CPU started but didn't finish to round up before. If we see that flag set then we'll skip the next round up. In general we have a few goals here: - We never want to end up calling smp_call_function_single_async() when the csd is still locked. This is accomplished because flush_smp_call_function_queue() unlocks the csd _before_ invoking the callback. That means that when kgdb_nmicallback() runs we know for sure the the csd is no longer locked. Thus when we set "rounding_up = false" we know for sure that the csd is unlocked. - If there are no timeouts rounding up we should never skip a round up. NOTE #1: In general trying to continue running after failing to round up CPUs doesn't appear to be supported in the debugger. When I simulate this I find that kdb reports "Catastrophic error detected" when I try to continue. I can overrule and continue anyway, but it should be noted that we may be entering the land of dragons here. Possibly the "Catastrophic error detected" was added _because_ of the future failure to round up, but even so this is an area of the code that hasn't been strongly tested. NOTE #2: I did a bit of testing before and after this change. I introduced a 10 second hang in the kernel while holding a spinlock that I could invoke on a certain CPU with 'taskset -c 3 cat /sys/...". Before this change if I did: - Invoke hang - Enter debugger - g (which warns about Catastrophic error, g again to go anyway) - g - Enter debugger ...I'd hang the rest of the 10 seconds without getting a debugger prompt. After this change I end up in the debugger the 2nd time after only 1 second with the standard warning about 'Timed out waiting for secondary CPUs.' I'll also note that once the CPU finished waiting I could actually debug it (aka "btc" worked) I won't promise that everything works perfectly if the errant CPU comes back at just the wrong time (like as we're entering or exiting the debugger) but it certainly seems like an improvement. NOTE #3: setting 'kgdb_info[cpu].rounding_up = false' is in kgdb_nmicallback() instead of kgdb_call_nmi_hook() because some implementations override kgdb_call_nmi_hook(). It shouldn't hurt to have it in kgdb_nmicallback() in any case. NOTE #4: this logic is really only needed because there is no API call like "smp_try_call_function_single_async()" or "smp_csd_is_locked()". If such an API existed then we'd use it instead, but it seemed a bit much to add an API like this just for kgdb. Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
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Since __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 is marked as notrace, the function called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 shouldn't be traceable either. ftrace_graph_caller() gets called every time func write_comp_data() gets called if it isn't marked 'notrace'. This is the backtrace from gdb: #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff8010201920 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff8010439714 in write_comp_data (type=5, arg1=0, arg2=0, ip=18446743524224276596) at ../kernel/kcov.c:116 #3 0xffffff8010439894 in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (arg1=<optimized out>, arg2=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/kcov.c:188 #4 0xffffff8010201874 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743524226602768, parent=0xffffff801014b918, frame_pointer=18446743524223531344) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:27 #5 0xffffff801020194c in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Rework so that write_comp_data() that are called from __sanitizer_cov_trace_*_cmp*() are marked as 'notrace'. Commit 903e8ff ("kernel/kcov.c: mark funcs in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() as notrace") missed to mark write_comp_data() as 'notrace'. When that patch was created gcc-7 was used. In lib/Kconfig.debug config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp) That code path isn't hit with gcc-7. However, it were that with gcc-8. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206143011.23719-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Aug 16, 2019
A deadlock with this stacktrace was observed. The loop thread does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, it calls into dm-bufio shrinker and the shrinker depends on I/O completion in the dm-bufio subsystem. In order to fix the deadlock (and other similar ones), we set the flag PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO at loop thread entry. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 PID: 14127 TASK: ffff881455749c00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "loop1" #0 [ffff88272f5af228] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff88272f5af280] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff88272f5af2a0] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8173fd5e #3 [ffff88272f5af2b0] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff81741fb5 #4 [ffff88272f5af330] mutex_lock at ffffffff81742133 #5 [ffff88272f5af350] dm_bufio_shrink_count at ffffffffa03865f9 [dm_bufio] #6 [ffff88272f5af380] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a86bd #7 [ffff88272f5af470] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #8 [ffff88272f5af500] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adb34 #9 [ffff88272f5af590] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff811adef8 #10 [ffff88272f5af610] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff811a09c3 #11 [ffff88272f5af710] alloc_pages_current at ffffffff811e8b71 #12 [ffff88272f5af760] new_slab at ffffffff811f4523 #13 [ffff88272f5af7b0] __slab_alloc at ffffffff8173a1b5 #14 [ffff88272f5af880] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff811f484b #15 [ffff88272f5af8d0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff812535b3 #16 [ffff88272f5afb00] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff81255dc3 #17 [ffff88272f5afb30] xfs_vm_direct_IO at ffffffffa01fe3fc [xfs] #18 [ffff88272f5afb90] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81198994 #19 [ffff88272f5afc50] __dta_xfs_file_read_iter_2398 at ffffffffa020c970 [xfs] #20 [ffff88272f5afcc0] lo_rw_aio at ffffffffa0377042 [loop] #21 [ffff88272f5afd70] loop_queue_work at ffffffffa0377c3b [loop] #22 [ffff88272f5afe60] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff810a8a0c #23 [ffff88272f5afec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #24 [ffff88272f5aff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Aug 22, 2019
…OL_MF_STRICT were specified When both MPOL_MF_MOVE* and MPOL_MF_STRICT was specified, mbind() should try best to migrate misplaced pages, if some of the pages could not be migrated, then return -EIO. There are three different sub-cases: 1. vma is not migratable 2. vma is migratable, but there are unmovable pages 3. vma is migratable, pages are movable, but migrate_pages() fails If #1 happens, kernel would just abort immediately, then return -EIO, after a7f40cf ("mm: mempolicy: make mbind() return -EIO when MPOL_MF_STRICT is specified"). If #3 happens, kernel would set policy and migrate pages with best-effort, but won't rollback the migrated pages and reset the policy back. Before that commit, they behaves in the same way. It'd better to keep their behavior consistent. But, rolling back the migrated pages and resetting the policy back sounds not feasible, so just make #1 behave as same as #3. Userspace will know that not everything was successfully migrated (via -EIO), and can take whatever steps it deems necessary - attempt rollback, determine which exact page(s) are violating the policy, etc. Make queue_pages_range() return 1 to indicate there are unmovable pages or vma is not migratable. The #2 is not handled correctly in the current kernel, the following patch will fix it. [yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: fix review comments from Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563556862-54056-2-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561162809-59140-2-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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reply_cache_stats uses wrong parameter as seq file private structure and thus causes the following kernel crash when users read /proc/fs/nfsd/reply_cache_stats BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f9 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#3] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 1502 Comm: cat Tainted: G D 5.3.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Broadwell Client platform/Basking Ridge, BIOS BDW-E2R1.86C.0118.R01.1503110618 03/11/2015 RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa520106fe08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000cfe1a77123 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b46 RDX: 000000cf00000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa520106fe20 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 000000cfe17e55dd R10: ffffa424e47c0000 R11: 000000000000030b R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e5697000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e5697000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: seq_read+0x194/0x3e0 __vfs_read+0x1b/0x40 vfs_read+0x95/0x140 ksys_read+0x61/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f805728b861 Code: fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 86 b4 09 00 e8 79 e0 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 05 d9 19 0d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 RSP: 002b:00007ffea1ce3c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f805728b861 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f8057183000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8057183000 R08: 00007f8057182010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559a60e8ff10 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000000001f9 ---[ end trace 01613595153f0cba ]--- RIP: 0010:nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show+0x3b/0x2d0 Code: 41 54 49 89 f4 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 b3 10 33 88 53 bb e8 03 00 00 e8 88 82 d1 ff bf 58 89 41 00 e8 eb c5 85 00 48 83 eb 01 75 f0 <41> 8b 94 24 f8 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 be 10 33 88 4c 89 ef bb e8 03 00 RSP: 0018:ffffaa52004b3e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000002bab45a7c6 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000291b4c RDX: 0000002b00000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000291b28 RBP: ffffaa52004b3e20 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000002bab1c8c7a R10: ffffa424e5500000 R11: 00000000000002a9 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffa424e4475000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffa424e4475000 FS: 00007f805735f580(0000) GS:ffffa424f8f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000001f9 CR3: 00000000655ce005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Killed Fixes: 3ba7583 ("nfsd4: drc containerization") Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Revert the commit bd293d0. The proper fix has been made available with commit d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread"). Note that the fix offered by commit bd293d0 doesn't really prevent the deadlock from occuring - if we look at the stacktrace reported by Junxiao Bi, we see that it hangs in bit_wait_io and not on the mutex - i.e. it has already successfully taken the mutex. Changing the mutex from mutex_lock to mutex_trylock won't help with deadlocks that happen afterwards. PID: 474 TASK: ffff8813e11f4600 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [ffff8813dedfb938] __schedule at ffffffff8173f405 #1 [ffff8813dedfb990] schedule at ffffffff8173fa27 #2 [ffff8813dedfb9b0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81742fec #3 [ffff8813dedfba60] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8173f186 #4 [ffff8813dedfbaa0] bit_wait_io at ffffffff8174034f #5 [ffff8813dedfbac0] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173fec8 #6 [ffff8813dedfbb10] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff8173ff81 #7 [ffff8813dedfbb90] __make_buffer_clean at ffffffffa038736f [dm_bufio] #8 [ffff8813dedfbbb0] __try_evict_buffer at ffffffffa0387bb8 [dm_bufio] #9 [ffff8813dedfbbd0] dm_bufio_shrink_scan at ffffffffa0387cc3 [dm_bufio] #10 [ffff8813dedfbc40] shrink_slab at ffffffff811a87ce #11 [ffff8813dedfbd30] shrink_zone at ffffffff811ad778 #12 [ffff8813dedfbdc0] kswapd at ffffffff811ae92f #13 [ffff8813dedfbec0] kthread at ffffffff810a8428 #14 [ffff8813dedfbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81745242 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bd293d0 ("dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device") Depends-on: d0a255e ("loop: set PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO for the worker thread") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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…s_blob()
Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() may result in
freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can
be fixed by having this function returning the old blob buffer and have
the callers of this function freeing it when the lock is released.
The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 649, name: fsstress
4 locks held by fsstress/649:
#0: 00000000a7478e7e (&type->s_umount_key#19){++++}, at: iterate_supers+0x77/0xf0
#1: 00000000f8de1423 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x7b/0xc60
#2: 00000000562f2b27 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3bd/0xc60
#3: 00000000f83ce16a (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: ceph_check_caps+0x3ed/0xc60
CPU: 1 PID: 649 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #439
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x90
___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1
vfree+0x4b/0x60
ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60
__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x12b/0x170
__send_cap+0x302/0x540
? __lock_acquire+0x23c/0x1e40
? __mark_caps_flushing+0x15c/0x280
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30
ceph_check_caps+0x5f0/0xc60
ceph_flush_dirty_caps+0x7c/0x150
? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20
ceph_sync_fs+0x5a/0x130
iterate_supers+0x8f/0xf0
ksys_sync+0x4f/0xb0
__ia32_sys_sync+0xa/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7fc6409ab617
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Calling ceph_buffer_put() in fill_inode() may result in freeing the
i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by
postponing the call until later, when the lock is released.
The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/070.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3852, name: kworker/0:4
6 locks held by kworker/0:4/3852:
#0: 000000004270f6bb ((wq_completion)ceph-msgr){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
#1: 00000000eb420803 ((work_completion)(&(&con->work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
#2: 00000000be1c53a4 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x288/0x1476
#3: 00000000559cb958 (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476
#4: 000000000d5ebbae (&req->r_fill_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x2fc/0x1476
#5: 00000000a83d0514 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: fill_inode.isra.0+0xf8/0xf70
CPU: 0 PID: 3852 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #441
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x90
___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1
vfree+0x4b/0x60
ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60
fill_inode.isra.0+0xa9b/0xf70
ceph_fill_trace+0x13b/0xc70
? dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476
dispatch+0x320/0x1476
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x4d/0x2a0
ceph_con_workfn+0xc97/0x2ec0
? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0
process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
kthread+0x105/0x140
? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0
? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes This patchset includes two small fixes for the mlxsw driver and one patch which clarifies recently introduced devlink-trap documentation. Patch #1 clears the port's VLAN filters during port initialization. This ensures that the drop reason reported to the user is consistent. The problem is explained in detail in the commit message. Patch #2 clarifies the description of one of the traps exposed via devlink-trap. Patch #3 from Danielle forbids the installation of a tc filter with multiple mirror actions since this is not supported by the device. The failure is communicated to the user via extack. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch fixes the lock inversion complaint: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.3.0-rc7-dbg+ #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u16:6/171 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000035c6e6c (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: rdma_destroy_id+0x78/0x4a0 [rdma_cm] but task is already holding lock: 00000000bc7c307d (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: iw_conn_req_handler+0x151/0x680 [rdma_cm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/u16:6/171: #0: 00000000e2eaa773 ((wq_completion)iw_cm_wq){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x472/0xac0 #1: 000000001efd357b ((work_completion)(&work->work)#3){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x476/0xac0 #2: 00000000bc7c307d (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: iw_conn_req_handler+0x151/0x680 [rdma_cm] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 171 Comm: kworker/u16:6 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7-dbg+ #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8a/0xd6 __lock_acquire.cold+0xe1/0x24d lock_acquire+0x106/0x240 __mutex_lock+0x12e/0xcb0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 rdma_destroy_id+0x78/0x4a0 [rdma_cm] iw_conn_req_handler+0x5c9/0x680 [rdma_cm] cm_work_handler+0xe62/0x1100 [iw_cm] process_one_work+0x56d/0xac0 worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0 kthread+0x1bc/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 This is not a bug as there are actually two lock classes here. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190930231707.48259-3-bvanassche@acm.org Fixes: de910bd ("RDMA/cma: Simplify locking needed for serialization of callbacks") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
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Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== Add bpf_object__open_file() and bpf_object__open_mem() APIs that use a new approach to providing future-proof non-ABI-breaking API changes. It relies on APIs accepting optional self-describing "opts" struct, containing its own size, filled out and provided by potentially outdated (as well as newer-than-libbpf) user application. A set of internal helper macros (OPTS_VALID, OPTS_HAS, and OPTS_GET) streamline and simplify a graceful handling forward and backward compatibility for user applications dynamically linked against different versions of libbpf shared library. Users of libbpf are provided with convenience macro LIBBPF_OPTS that takes care of populating correct structure size and zero-initializes options struct, which helps avoid obscure issues of unitialized padding. Uninitialized padding in a struct might turn into garbage-populated new fields understood by future versions of libbpf. Patch #1 removes enforcement of kern_version in libbpf and always populates correct one on behalf of users. Patch #2 defines necessary infrastructure for options and two new open APIs relying on it. Patch #3 fixes bug in bpf_object__name(). Patch #4 switches two of test_progs' tests to use new APIs as a validation that they work as expected. v2->v3: - fix LIBBPF_OPTS() to ensure zero-initialization of padded bytes; - pass through name override and relaxed maps flag for open_file() (Toke); - fix bpf_object__name() to actually return object name; - don't bother parsing and verifying version section (John); v1->v2: - use better approach for tracking last field in opts struct; - convert few tests to new APIs for validation; - fix bug with using offsetof(last_field) instead of offsetofend(last_field). ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== This patch set adds ability to auto-generate list of BPF helper definitions. It relies on existing scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py and include/uapi/linux/bpf.h having a well-defined set of comments. bpf_helper_defs.h contains all BPF helper signatures which stay in sync with latest bpf.h UAPI. This auto-generated header is included from bpf_helpers.h, while all previously hand-written BPF helper definitions are simultaneously removed in patch #3. The end result is less manually maintained and redundant boilerplate code, while also more consistent and well-documented set of BPF helpers. Generated helper definitions are completely independent from a specific bpf.h on a target system, because it doesn't use BPF_FUNC_xxx enums. v3->v4: - instead of libbpf's Makefile, integrate with selftest/bpf's Makefile (Alexei); v2->v3: - delete bpf_helper_defs.h properly (Alexei); v1->v2: - add bpf_helper_defs.h to .gitignore and `make clean` (Alexei). ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Andrii Nakryiko says:
====================
This patch set makes bpf_helpers.h and bpf_endian.h a part of libbpf itself
for consumption by user BPF programs, not just selftests. It also splits off
tracing helpers into bpf_tracing.h, which also becomes part of libbpf. Some of
the legacy stuff (BPF_ANNOTATE_KV_PAIR, load_{byte,half,word}, bpf_map_def
with unsupported fields, etc, is extracted into selftests-only bpf_legacy.h.
All the selftests and samples are switched to use libbpf's headers and
selftests' ones are removed.
As part of this patch set we also add BPF_CORE_READ variadic macros, that are
simplifying BPF CO-RE reads, especially the ones that have to follow few
pointers. E.g., what in non-BPF world (and when using BCC) would be:
int x = s->a->b.c->d; /* s, a, and b.c are pointers */
Today would have to be written using explicit bpf_probe_read() calls as:
void *t;
int x;
bpf_probe_read(&t, sizeof(t), s->a);
bpf_probe_read(&t, sizeof(t), ((struct b *)t)->b.c);
bpf_probe_read(&x, sizeof(x), ((struct c *)t)->d);
This is super inconvenient and distracts from program logic a lot. Now, with
added BPF_CORE_READ() macros, you can write the above as:
int x = BPF_CORE_READ(s, a, b.c, d);
Up to 9 levels of pointer chasing are supported, which should be enough for
any practical purpose, hopefully, without adding too much boilerplate macro
definitions (though there is admittedly some, given how variadic and recursive
C macro have to be implemented).
There is also BPF_CORE_READ_INTO() variant, which relies on caller to allocate
space for result:
int x;
BPF_CORE_READ_INTO(&x, s, a, b.c, d);
Result of last bpf_probe_read() call in the chain of calls is the result of
BPF_CORE_READ_INTO(). If any intermediate bpf_probe_read() aall fails, then
all the subsequent ones will fail too, so this is sufficient to know whether
overall "operation" succeeded or not. No short-circuiting of bpf_probe_read()s
is done, though.
BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO() is added as well, which differs from
BPF_CORE_READ_INTO() only in that last bpf_probe_read() call (to read final
field after chasing pointers) is replaced with bpf_probe_read_str(). Result of
bpf_probe_read_str() is returned as a result of BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO() macro
itself, so that applications can track return code and/or length of read
string.
Patch set outline:
- patch #1 undoes previously added GCC-specific bpf-helpers.h include;
- patch #2 splits off legacy stuff we don't want to carry over;
- patch #3 adjusts CO-RE reloc tests to avoid subsequent naming conflict with
BPF_CORE_READ;
- patch #4 splits off bpf_tracing.h;
- patch #5 moves bpf_{helpers,endian,tracing}.h and bpf_helper_defs.h
generation into libbpf and adjusts Makefiles to include libbpf for header
search;
- patch #6 adds variadic BPF_CORE_READ() macro family, as described above;
- patch #7 adds tests to verify all possible levels of pointer nestedness for
BPF_CORE_READ(), as well as correctness test for BPF_CORE_READ_STR_INTO().
v4->v5:
- move BPF_CORE_READ() stuff into bpf_core_read.h header (Alexei);
v3->v4:
- rebase on latest bpf-next master;
- bpf_helper_defs.h generation is moved into libbpf's Makefile;
v2->v3:
- small formatting fixes and macro () fixes (Song);
v1->v2:
- fix CO-RE reloc tests before bpf_helpers.h move (Song);
- split off legacy stuff we don't want to carry over (Daniel, Toke);
- split off bpf_tracing.h (Daniel);
- fix samples/bpf build (assuming other fixes are applied);
- switch remaining maps either to bpf_map_def_legacy or BTF-defined maps;
====================
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Daniel Vetter uncovered a nasty cycle in using the mmu-notifiers to invalidate userptr objects which also happen to be pulled into GGTT mmaps. That is when we unbind the userptr object (on mmu invalidation), we revoke all CPU mmaps, which may then recurse into mmu invalidation. We looked for ways of breaking the cycle, but the revocation on invalidation is required and cannot be avoided. The only solution we could see was to not allow such GGTT bindings of userptr objects in the first place. In practice, no one really wants to use a GGTT mmapping of a CPU pointer... Just before Daniel's explosive lockdep patches land in v5.4-rc1, we got a genuine blip from CI: <4>[ 246.793958] ====================================================== <4>[ 246.793972] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4>[ 246.793989] 5.3.0-gbd6c56f50d15-drmtip_372+ #1 Tainted: G U <4>[ 246.794003] ------------------------------------------------------ <4>[ 246.794017] kswapd0/145 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 246.794030] 000000003f565be6 (&dev->struct_mutex/1){+.+.}, at: userptr_mn_invalidate_range_start+0x18f/0x220 [i915] <4>[ 246.794250] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 246.794263] 000000001799cef9 (&anon_vma->rwsem){++++}, at: page_lock_anon_vma_read+0xe6/0x2a0 <4>[ 246.794291] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 246.794307] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 246.794322] -> #3 (&anon_vma->rwsem){++++}: <4>[ 246.794344] down_write+0x33/0x70 <4>[ 246.794357] __vma_adjust+0x3d9/0x7b0 <4>[ 246.794370] __split_vma+0x16a/0x180 <4>[ 246.794385] mprotect_fixup+0x2a5/0x320 <4>[ 246.794399] do_mprotect_pkey+0x208/0x2e0 <4>[ 246.794413] __x64_sys_mprotect+0x16/0x20 <4>[ 246.794429] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794443] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794456] -> #2 (&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem){++++}: <4>[ 246.794478] down_write+0x33/0x70 <4>[ 246.794493] unmap_mapping_pages+0x48/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_revoke_mmap+0x81/0x1b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_unbind+0x11d/0x4a0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_destroy+0x31/0x300 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] __i915_gem_free_objects+0xb8/0x4b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] drm_file_free.part.0+0x1e6/0x290 <4>[ 246.794519] drm_release+0xa6/0xe0 <4>[ 246.794519] __fput+0xc2/0x250 <4>[ 246.794519] task_work_run+0x82/0xb0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_exit+0x35b/0xdb0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_group_exit+0x34/0xb0 <4>[ 246.794519] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 <4>[ 246.794519] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794519] -> #1 (&vm->mutex){+.+.}: <4>[ 246.794519] i915_gem_shrinker_taints_mutex+0x6d/0xe0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_address_space_init+0x9f/0x160 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_ggtt_init_hw+0x55/0x170 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_driver_probe+0xc9f/0x1620 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_pci_probe+0x43/0x1b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120 <4>[ 246.794519] really_probe+0xea/0x3d0 <4>[ 246.794519] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120 <4>[ 246.794519] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50 <4>[ 246.794519] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0 <4>[ 246.794519] bus_add_driver+0x13f/0x210 <4>[ 246.794519] driver_register+0x56/0xe0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4>[ 246.794519] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f6 <4>[ 246.794519] load_module+0x25bd/0x2a40 <4>[ 246.794519] __se_sys_finit_module+0xd3/0xf0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794519] -> #0 (&dev->struct_mutex/1){+.+.}: <4>[ 246.794519] __lock_acquire+0x15d8/0x1e90 <4>[ 246.794519] lock_acquire+0xa6/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0x9b0 <4>[ 246.794519] userptr_mn_invalidate_range_start+0x18f/0x220 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x85/0x110 <4>[ 246.794519] try_to_unmap_one+0x76b/0x860 <4>[ 246.794519] rmap_walk_anon+0x104/0x280 <4>[ 246.794519] try_to_unmap+0xc0/0xf0 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_page_list+0x561/0xc10 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_inactive_list+0x220/0x440 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_node_memcg+0x36e/0x740 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_node+0xcb/0x490 <4>[ 246.794519] balance_pgdat+0x241/0x580 <4>[ 246.794519] kswapd+0x16c/0x530 <4>[ 246.794519] kthread+0x119/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4>[ 246.794519] other info that might help us debug this: <4>[ 246.794519] Chain exists of: &dev->struct_mutex/1 --> &mapping->i_mmap_rwsem --> &anon_vma->rwsem <4>[ 246.794519] Possible unsafe locking scenario: <4>[ 246.794519] CPU0 CPU1 <4>[ 246.794519] ---- ---- <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&anon_vma->rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&anon_vma->rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&dev->struct_mutex/1); <4>[ 246.794519] *** DEADLOCK *** v2: Say no to mmap_ioctl Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111744 Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111870 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190928082546.3473-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk (cherry picked from commit a431174) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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May 2, 2020
Use follow_pfn() to get the PFN of a PFNMAP VMA instead of assuming that vma->vm_pgoff holds the base PFN of the VMA. This fixes a bug where attempting to do VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA on an arbitrary PFNMAP'd region of memory calculates garbage for the PFN. Hilariously, this only got detected because the first "PFN" calculated by vaddr_get_pfn() is PFN 0 (vma->vm_pgoff==0), and iommu_iova_to_phys() uses PA==0 as an error, which triggers a WARN in vfio_unmap_unpin() because the translation "failed". PFN 0 is now unconditionally reserved on x86 in order to mitigate L1TF, which causes is_invalid_reserved_pfn() to return true and in turns results in vaddr_get_pfn() returning success for PFN 0. Eventually the bogus calculation runs into PFNs that aren't reserved and leads to failure in vfio_pin_map_dma(). The subsequent call to vfio_remove_dma() attempts to unmap PFN 0 and WARNs. WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 5130 at drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c:750 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1] Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio ... CPU: 8 PID: 5130 Comm: sgx Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc5-705d787c7fee-vfio+ #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Mehlow UP Server Platform/Moss Beach Server, BIOS CNLSE2R1.D00.X119.B49.1803010910 03/01/2018 RIP: 0010:vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1] Code: <0f> 0b 49 81 c5 00 10 00 00 e9 c5 fe ff ff bb 00 10 00 00 e9 3d fe RSP: 0018:ffffbeb5039ebda8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a55cbf8d480 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9a52b771c200 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00000000fffffff2 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9a51fa896000 R12: 0000000184010000 R13: 0000000184000000 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: ffff9a55cb66ea08 FS: 00007f15d3830b40(0000) GS:ffff9a55d5600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561cf39429e0 CR3: 000000084f75f005 CR4: 00000000003626e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: vfio_remove_dma+0x17/0x70 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0x9e3/0xa7b [vfio_iommu_type1] ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f15d04c75d7 Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 Fixes: 73fa0d1 ("vfio: Type1 IOMMU implementation") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
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When using the flushoncommit mount option, during almost every transaction
commit we trigger a warning from __writeback_inodes_sb_nr():
$ cat fs/fs-writeback.c:
(...)
static void __writeback_inodes_sb_nr(struct super_block *sb, ...
{
(...)
WARN_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&sb->s_umount));
(...)
}
(...)
The trace produced in dmesg looks like the following:
[947.473890] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 930 at fs/fs-writeback.c:2610 __writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3
[947.481623] Modules linked in: nfsd nls_cp437 cifs asn1_decoder cifs_arc4 fscache cifs_md4 ipmi_ssif
[947.489571] CPU: 5 PID: 930 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 95.16.3-srb-asrock-00001-g36437ad63879 #186
[947.497969] RIP: 0010:__writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x7e/0xb3
[947.502097] Code: 24 10 4c 89 44 24 18 c6 (...)
[947.519760] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000777e10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[947.523818] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000963300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[947.529765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000fa51 RDI: ffffc90000777e50
[947.535740] RBP: ffff888101628a90 R08: ffff888100955800 R09: ffff888100956000
[947.541701] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888100963488
[947.547645] R13: ffff888100963000 R14: ffff888112fb7200 R15: ffff888100963460
[947.553621] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88841fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[947.560537] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[947.565122] CR2: 0000000008be50c4 CR3: 000000000220c000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[947.571072] Call Trace:
[947.572354] <TASK>
[947.573266] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1f1/0x998
[947.576785] ? start_transaction+0x3ab/0x44e
[947.579867] ? schedule_timeout+0x8a/0xdd
[947.582716] transaction_kthread+0xe9/0x156
[947.585721] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0x407/0x407
[947.590104] kthread+0x131/0x139
[947.592168] ? set_kthread_struct+0x32/0x32
[947.595174] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[947.597561] </TASK>
[947.598553] ---[ end trace 644721052755541c ]---
This is because we started using writeback_inodes_sb() to flush delalloc
when committing a transaction (when using -o flushoncommit), in order to
avoid deadlocks with filesystem freeze operations. This change was made
by commit ce8ea7c ("btrfs: don't call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots
in flushoncommit"). After that change we started producing that warning,
and every now and then a user reports this since the warning happens too
often, it spams dmesg/syslog, and a user is unsure if this reflects any
problem that might compromise the filesystem's reliability.
We can not just lock the sb->s_umount semaphore before calling
writeback_inodes_sb(), because that would at least deadlock with
filesystem freezing, since at fs/super.c:freeze_super() sync_filesystem()
is called while we are holding that semaphore in write mode, and that can
trigger a transaction commit, resulting in a deadlock. It would also
trigger the same type of deadlock in the unmount path. Possibly, it could
also introduce some other locking dependencies that lockdep would report.
To fix this call try_to_writeback_inodes_sb() instead of
writeback_inodes_sb(), because that will try to read lock sb->s_umount
and then will only call writeback_inodes_sb() if it was able to lock it.
This is fine because the cases where it can't read lock sb->s_umount
are during a filesystem unmount or during a filesystem freeze - in those
cases sb->s_umount is write locked and sync_filesystem() is called, which
calls writeback_inodes_sb(). In other words, in all cases where we can't
take a read lock on sb->s_umount, writeback is already being triggered
elsewhere.
An alternative would be to call btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() with a
number of pages different from LONG_MAX, for example matching the number
of delalloc bytes we currently have, in which case we would end up
starting all delalloc with filemap_fdatawrite_wbc() and not with an
async flush via filemap_flush() - that is only possible after the rather
recent commit e076ab2 ("btrfs: shrink delalloc pages instead of
full inodes"). However that creates a whole new can of worms due to new
lock dependencies, which lockdep complains, like for example:
[ 8948.247280] ======================================================
[ 8948.247823] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 8948.248353] 5.17.0-rc1-btrfs-next-111 #1 Not tainted
[ 8948.248786] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 8948.249320] kworker/u16:18/933570 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 8948.249812] ffff9b3de1591690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs]
[ 8948.250638]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 8948.251140] ffff9b3e09c717d8 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs]
[ 8948.252018]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 8948.252710]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 8948.253343]
-> #2 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 8948.253950] __mutex_lock+0x90/0x900
[ 8948.254354] start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs]
[ 8948.254859] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.255408] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x32f/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 8948.255942] btrfs_mksubvol+0x380/0x570 [btrfs]
[ 8948.256406] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x81/0xb0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.256870] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x17f/0x190 [btrfs]
[ 8948.257413] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xbb/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 8948.257961] btrfs_ioctl+0x1196/0x3630 [btrfs]
[ 8948.258418] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
[ 8948.258793] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 8948.259146] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 8948.259709]
-> #1 (&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 8948.260330] __mutex_lock+0x90/0x900
[ 8948.260692] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x97/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.261234] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x32f/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 8948.261766] btrfs_set_free_space_cache_v1_active+0x38/0x60 [btrfs]
[ 8948.262379] btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0x119/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 8948.262909] open_ctree+0x1511/0x171e [btrfs]
[ 8948.263359] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs]
[ 8948.263863] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 8948.264242] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 8948.264594] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
[ 8948.265017] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.265462] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
[ 8948.265851] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
[ 8948.266203] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0
[ 8948.266554] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140
[ 8948.266940] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[ 8948.267300] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 8948.267790]
-> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 8948.268322] __lock_acquire+0x12e8/0x2260
[ 8948.268733] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310
[ 8948.269092] start_transaction+0x44c/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.269591] find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs]
[ 8948.270087] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x14b/0x280 [btrfs]
[ 8948.270588] cow_file_range+0x17e/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 8948.271051] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x345/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.271586] writepage_delalloc+0xb5/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 8948.272071] __extent_writepage+0x156/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.272579] extent_write_cache_pages+0x263/0x460 [btrfs]
[ 8948.273113] extent_writepages+0x76/0x130 [btrfs]
[ 8948.273573] do_writepages+0xd2/0x1c0
[ 8948.273942] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x68/0x90
[ 8948.274371] start_delalloc_inodes+0x17f/0x400 [btrfs]
[ 8948.274876] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.275417] flush_space+0x1f2/0x630 [btrfs]
[ 8948.275863] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x108/0x1b0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.276438] process_one_work+0x252/0x5a0
[ 8948.276829] worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0
[ 8948.277189] kthread+0xf2/0x120
[ 8948.277506] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 8948.277868]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 8948.278548] Chain exists of:
sb_internal#2 --> &fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex --> &root->delalloc_mutex
[ 8948.279601] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 8948.280102] CPU0 CPU1
[ 8948.280508] ---- ----
[ 8948.280915] lock(&root->delalloc_mutex);
[ 8948.281271] lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex);
[ 8948.281915] lock(&root->delalloc_mutex);
[ 8948.282487] lock(sb_internal#2);
[ 8948.282800]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 8948.283333] 4 locks held by kworker/u16:18/933570:
[ 8948.283750] #0: ffff9b3dc00a9d48 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d2/0x5a0
[ 8948.284609] #1: ffffa90349dafe70 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d2/0x5a0
[ 8948.285637] #2: ffff9b3e14db5040 (&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x97/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.286674] #3: ffff9b3e09c717d8 (&root->delalloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: start_delalloc_inodes+0x78/0x400 [btrfs]
[ 8948.287596]
stack backtrace:
[ 8948.287975] CPU: 3 PID: 933570 Comm: kworker/u16:18 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-btrfs-next-111 #1
[ 8948.288677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 8948.289649] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
[ 8948.290298] Call Trace:
[ 8948.290517] <TASK>
[ 8948.290700] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73
[ 8948.291026] check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110
[ 8948.291375] ? start_transaction+0x228/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.291826] __lock_acquire+0x12e8/0x2260
[ 8948.292241] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310
[ 8948.292714] ? find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs]
[ 8948.293241] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140
[ 8948.293601] start_transaction+0x44c/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.294055] ? find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs]
[ 8948.294518] find_free_extent+0x141e/0x1590 [btrfs]
[ 8948.294957] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
[ 8948.295312] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x124/0x290 [btrfs]
[ 8948.295813] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x14b/0x280 [btrfs]
[ 8948.296270] cow_file_range+0x17e/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 8948.296691] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x345/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.297175] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x247/0x270 [btrfs]
[ 8948.297678] writepage_delalloc+0xb5/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 8948.298123] __extent_writepage+0x156/0x3c0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.298570] extent_write_cache_pages+0x263/0x460 [btrfs]
[ 8948.299061] extent_writepages+0x76/0x130 [btrfs]
[ 8948.299495] do_writepages+0xd2/0x1c0
[ 8948.299817] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x110
[ 8948.300160] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0
[ 8948.300494] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x68/0x90
[ 8948.300874] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0
[ 8948.301243] start_delalloc_inodes+0x17f/0x400 [btrfs]
[ 8948.301706] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0
[ 8948.302055] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x194/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.302564] flush_space+0x1f2/0x630 [btrfs]
[ 8948.302970] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x108/0x1b0 [btrfs]
[ 8948.303510] process_one_work+0x252/0x5a0
[ 8948.303860] ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0
[ 8948.304221] worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0
[ 8948.304543] ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0
[ 8948.304904] kthread+0xf2/0x120
[ 8948.305184] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 8948.305598] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 8948.305921] </TASK>
It all comes from the fact that btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() takes the
delalloc_root_mutex, in the transaction commit path we are holding a
read lock on one of the superblock's freeze semaphores (via
sb_start_intwrite()), the async reclaim task can also do a call to
btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(), which ends up triggering writeback with
calls to filemap_fdatawrite_wbc(), resulting in extent allocation which
in turn can call btrfs_start_transaction(), which will result in taking
the freeze semaphore via sb_start_intwrite(), forming a nasty dependency
on all those locks which can be taken in different orders by different
code paths.
So just adopt the simple approach of calling try_to_writeback_inodes_sb()
at btrfs_start_delalloc_flush().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20220130005258.GA7465@cuci.nl/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/43acc426-d683-d1b6-729d-c6bc4a2fff4d@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6833930a-08d7-6fbc-0141-eb9cdfd6bb4d@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20190322041731.GF16651@hungrycats.org/
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[ add more link reports ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.17, take #3 - Fix pending state read of a HW interrupt
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This driver, like several others, uses a chained IRQ for each GPIO bank, and forwards .irq_set_wake to the GPIO bank's upstream IRQ. As a result, a call to irq_set_irq_wake() needs to lock both the upstream and downstream irq_desc's. Lockdep considers this to be a possible deadlock when the irq_desc's share lockdep classes, which they do by default: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- init/307 is trying to acquire lock: c2dfe27c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by init/307: #0: c1f29f18 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_reboot+0x90/0x23c #1: c20f7760 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0xf4/0x224 #2: c2e804d8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0x104/0x224 #3: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 307 Comm: init Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun8i Family unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x1680/0x31a0 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x148/0x3dc lock_acquire from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x6c _raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 __irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0x2c/0x19c irq_set_irq_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x13c/0x19c [tail call from sunxi_pinctrl_irq_set_wake] irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0x80/0x1a4 gpio_keys_suspend from gpio_keys_shutdown+0x10/0x2c gpio_keys_shutdown from device_shutdown+0x180/0x224 device_shutdown from __do_sys_reboot+0x134/0x23c __do_sys_reboot from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c However, this can never deadlock because the upstream and downstream IRQs are never the same (nor do they even involve the same irqchip). Silence this erroneous lockdep splat by applying what appears to be the usual fix of moving the GPIO IRQs to separate lockdep classes. Fixes: a59c99d ("pinctrl: sunxi: Forward calls to irq_set_irq_wake") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org> Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216040037.22730-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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…e_zone
btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already
held, which will lead to a deadlock:
insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex
`-> insert_dev_extent()
`-> btrfs_insert_empty_item()
`-> btrfs_insert_empty_items()
`-> btrfs_search_slot()
`-> btrfs_cow_block()
`-> __btrfs_cow_block()
`-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
`-> btrfs_reserve_extent()
`-> find_free_extent()
`-> find_free_extent_update_loop()
`-> can_allocate_chunk()
`-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again
Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we
can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse
the list of active devices.
We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation
happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the
chunk_mutex.
btrfs_create_chunk()
lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex);
gather_device_info
list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)
Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list
yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in
the context of the chunk alloc.
[15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 Not tainted
[15.167487] --------------------------------------------
[15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock:
[15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.167733]
[15.167733] but task is already holding lock:
[15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
[15.167733]
[15.167733] other info that might help us debug this:
[15.167733] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[15.167733]
[15.171834] CPU0
[15.171834] ----
[15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
[15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
[15.171834]
[15.171834] *** DEADLOCK ***
[15.171834]
[15.171834] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[15.171834]
[15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146:
[15.171834] #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
[15.171834] #1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
[15.176244] #2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs]
[15.176244] #3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
[15.176244] #4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs]
[15.179641]
[15.179641] stack backtrace:
[15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79
[15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
[15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
[15.179641] Call Trace:
[15.179641] <TASK>
[15.179641] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
[15.179641] __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2
[15.179641] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
[15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.183838] __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970
[15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.183838] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
[15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.183838] find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
[15.183838] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40
[15.183838] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs]
[15.187601] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs]
[15.187601] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs]
[15.187601] __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs]
[15.187601] btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs]
[15.187601] btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs]
[15.187601] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
[15.187601] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs]
[15.187601] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs]
[15.187601] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[15.192037] flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs]
[15.192037] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[15.192037] ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs]
[15.192037] ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0
[15.192037] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs]
[15.192037] process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0
[15.192037] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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There is possible circular locking dependency detected on event_mutex
(see below logs). This is due to set fail safe mode is done at
dp_panel_read_sink_caps() within event_mutex scope. To break this
possible circular locking, this patch move setting fail safe mode
out of event_mutex scope.
[ 23.958078] ======================================================
[ 23.964430] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 23.970777] 5.17.0-rc2-lockdep-00088-g05241de1f69e #148 Not tainted
[ 23.977219] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 23.983570] DrmThread/1574 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 23.988763] ffffff808423aab0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_dp_displ ay_enable+0x58/0x164
[ 23.997895]
[ 23.997895] but task is already holding lock:
[ 24.003895] ffffff808420b280 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_c rtcs+0x80/0x8c
[ 24.012495]
[ 24.012495] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 24.012495]
[ 24.020886]
[ 24.020886] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 24.028570]
[ 24.028570] -> #5 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 24.035472] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384
[ 24.039695] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74
[ 24.044272] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c
[ 24.048222] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0
[ 24.053413] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc
[ 24.057452] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c
[ 24.062826] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74
[ 24.067403] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908
[ 24.072508] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168
[ 24.077086] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370
[ 24.081123] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc
[ 24.085602] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150
[ 24.090895] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114
[ 24.095294] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8
[ 24.100668] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54
[ 24.105242] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4
[ 24.109548] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4
[ 24.114381] el0t_32_sync+0x178
[ 24.118688]
[ 24.118688] -> #4 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 24.125408] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384
[ 24.129628] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74
[ 24.134204] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c
[ 24.138155] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0
[ 24.143345] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc
[ 24.147382] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c
[ 24.152755] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74
[ 24.157323] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x68/0x90
[ 24.162869] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x394/0x648
[ 24.167535] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168
[ 24.172102] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370
[ 24.176135] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc
[ 24.180621] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150
[ 24.185904] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114
[ 24.190302] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8
[ 24.195673] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54
[ 24.200241] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4
[ 24.204544] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4
[ 24.209378] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178
[ 24.213680] -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 24.220308] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.20+0xe8/0x878
[ 24.225951] ww_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd0
[ 24.230166] modeset_lock+0x190/0x19c
[ 24.234467] drm_modeset_lock+0x34/0x54
[ 24.238953] drmm_mode_config_init+0x550/0x764
[ 24.244065] msm_drm_bind+0x170/0x59c
[ 24.248374] try_to_bring_up_master+0x244/0x294
[ 24.253572] __component_add+0xf4/0x14c
[ 24.258057] component_add+0x2c/0x38
[ 24.262273] dsi_dev_attach+0x2c/0x38
[ 24.266575] dsi_host_attach+0xc4/0x120
[ 24.271060] mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x48
[ 24.275456] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x28/0x68
[ 24.280298] ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x2b4/0x2dc
[ 24.285137] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x78/0x90
[ 24.289893] really_probe+0x1e4/0x3d8
[ 24.294194] __driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x164
[ 24.299298] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xf8
[ 24.304043] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x118
[ 24.309145] bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd4
[ 24.313628] __device_attach+0xcc/0x158
[ 24.318112] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30
[ 24.322954] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x9c
[ 24.327439] deferred_probe_work_func+0xd4/0xf0
[ 24.332628] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498
[ 24.337289] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48
[ 24.342391] worker_thread+0x1e4/0x26c
[ 24.346788] kthread+0xe4/0xf4
[ 24.350470] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 24.354683]
[ 24.354683]
[ 24.354683] -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 24.361489] drm_modeset_acquire_init+0xe4/0x138
[ 24.366777] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x44/0x114
[ 24.372327] check_connector_changed+0xbc/0x198
[ 24.377517] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xcc/0x11c
[ 24.382804] dsi_hpd_worker+0x24/0x30
[ 24.387104] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498
[ 24.391762] worker_thread+0x1d0/0x26c
[ 24.396158] kthread+0xe4/0xf4
[ 24.399840] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 24.404053]
[ 24.404053] -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 24.411032] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384
[ 24.415247] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74
[ 24.419819] dp_panel_read_sink_caps+0x23c/0x26c
[ 24.425108] dp_display_process_hpd_high+0x34/0xd4
[ 24.430570] dp_display_usbpd_configure_cb+0x30/0x3c
[ 24.436205] hpd_event_thread+0x2ac/0x550
[ 24.440864] kthread+0xe4/0xf4
[ 24.444544] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 24.448757]
[ 24.448757] -> #0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 24.455116] __lock_acquire+0xe2c/0x10d8
[ 24.459690] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x2d0
[ 24.463988] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384
[ 24.468201] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74
[ 24.472773] msm_dp_display_enable+0x58/0x164
[ 24.477789] dp_bridge_enable+0x24/0x30
[ 24.482273] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x78/0x9c
[ 24.488006] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1bc/0x244
[ 24.494801] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x248/0x3d0
[ 24.499992] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc
[ 24.504031] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c
[ 24.509404] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74
[ 24.513976] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908
[ 24.519079] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168
[ 24.523650] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370
[ 24.527689] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc
[ 24.532175] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150
[ 24.537463] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114
[ 24.541861] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8
[ 24.547235] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54
[ 24.551806] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4
[ 24.556106] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4
[ 24.560948] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178
Changes in v2:
-- add circular lockiing trace
Fixes: d4aca42 ("drm/msm/dp: always add fail-safe mode into connector mode list")
Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481396/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649451894-554-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.
System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload
Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd]
215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0
[kworker/0:2]
2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd
4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty
4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty
32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0
[kworker/26:3]
32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd
32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail
33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail
33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup
33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd
33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail
33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd
EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd"
#0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
#1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
#2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
#3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
#4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
#5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
#6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
#7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
#8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
#9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64
And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702
6697 {
6698 might_sleep();
6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
6700
6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702 msleep(1);
6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
6704 msleep(1);
6705
6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
6707
6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
6709 }
EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:
bnx2x_io_error_detected()
+-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
+-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
+-> __netif_napi_del()
bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
+-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
+-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
+->napi_disable()
Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.
Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep #6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- to=dianders@chromium.org Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651007534-31842-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed: [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788! [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G E 5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3 [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00 [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.286641] FS: 00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1160.289498] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 1160.293031] Call Trace: [ 1160.293724] <TASK> [ 1160.294334] get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570 [ 1160.295474] memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0 [ 1160.296474] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 [ 1160.297524] hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80 [ 1160.298684] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 1160.299829] new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160 [ 1160.300810] vfs_write+0x209/0x290 [ 1160.301835] ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0 [ 1160.302718] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1160.303664] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7 As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page(). The below explains the mechanism of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 memory_failure get_hwpoison_page get_any_page dump_page compound = PageCompound free_pages_prepare page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP folio_entire_mapcount VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220427053220.719866-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 74e8ee4 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502125010.1319370-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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'rmmod pmt_telemetry' panics with: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 1697 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W -------- --- 5.18.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.3056.B00.2201310233 01/31/2022 RIP: 0010:device_del+0x1b/0x3d0 Code: e8 1a d9 e9 ff e9 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 08 eb dc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d af 80 00 00 00 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 18 <4c> 8b 67 40 48 89 ef 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb520415cfd60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffb520415cfd78 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb520415cfd78 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f7e198e5740(0000) GS:ffff905c9f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000010782a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __xa_erase+0x53/0xb0 device_unregister+0x13/0x50 intel_pmt_dev_destroy+0x34/0x60 [pmt_class] pmt_telem_remove+0x40/0x50 [pmt_telemetry] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0xc1/0x150 driver_detach+0x44/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xd0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x12/0x20 pmt_telem_exit+0xc/0xe4a [pmt_telemetry] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13a/0x250 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x11e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1803a05b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2d 4e 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fd 4d 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 The probe function, pmt_telem_probe(), adds an entry for devices even if they have not been initialized. This results in the array of initialized devices containing both initialized and uninitialized entries. This causes a panic in the remove function, pmt_telem_remove() which expects the array to only contain initialized entries. Only use an entry when a device is initialized. Cc: "David E. Box" <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Gross <markgross@kernel.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Arcari <darcari@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429122322.2550003-1-prarit@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.18, take #3 - Correctly expose GICv3 support even if no irqchip is created so that userspace doesn't observe it changing pointlessly (fixing a regression with QEMU) - Don't issue a hypercall to set the id-mapped vectors when protected mode is enabled (fix for pKVM in combination with CPUs affected by Spectre-v3a)
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Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c #6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 #7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] #9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b #10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d #11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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The splat below can be seen when running kvm-unit-test:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.18.0-rc7 #5 Tainted: G IOE
-----------------------------
/home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:80 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by qemu-system-x86/35124:
#0: ffff9725391d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x77/0x710 [kvm]
#1: ffffbd25cfb2a0b8 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0xdeb/0x1900 [kvm]
#2: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0x79/0x1e0 [kvm]
#3: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: irqfd_resampler_ack+0x5/0x110 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 35124 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G IOE 5.18.0-rc7 #5
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b
irqfd_resampler_ack+0xfd/0x110 [kvm]
kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x32/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0xc5/0x1e0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_set_msr_common+0xec1/0x1160 [kvm]
kvm_set_msr_common+0x7c3/0xf60 [kvm]
vmx_set_msr+0x394/0x1240 [kvm_intel]
kvm_set_msr_ignored_check+0x86/0x200 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x4f/0x1f0 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x6fb/0x7e0 [kvm_intel]
vcpu_enter_guest+0xe5a/0x1900 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16e/0xac0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
resampler-list is protected by irq_srcu (see kvm_irqfd_assign), so fix
the false positive by using list_for_each_entry_srcu().
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1652950153-12489-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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…f-times'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times
This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:
static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
{
ctx->i = 0;
return 0;
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
{
struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };
bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
}
This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.
The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch #6 is the main part of the series;
- patch #7 adds test cases for #6;
- patch #8 extend patch #6 with same speculative scalar widening
logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch #9 adds test cases for #8;
- patch #10 extends patch #6 to track maximal number of callback
executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch #11 adds test cases for #10.
Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
------------------------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o benchmark 1 2 +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 322 407 +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 113 151 +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 341 291 -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 344 301 -43 (-12.50%)
Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.
Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
- validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch #10;
- renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
- fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
- callback_result_precise;
- parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
- parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
- renamings (suggested by Alexei):
- s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
- s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
- s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
- prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
for callsite;
- test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
value check instead of verifier log message checks
(suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
- small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
- callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
- R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
- log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
iteration depth messages;
- __no_msg macro removed;
- bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
- commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024000917.12153-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] git@github.com:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231116021803.9982-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231118013355.7943-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231120225945.11741-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] #9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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Due to the cited patch, devlink health commands take devlink lock and this may result in deadlock for mlx5e_tx_reporter as it takes local state_lock before calling devlink health report and on the other hand devlink health commands such as diagnose for same reporter take local state_lock after taking devlink lock (see kernel log below). To fix it, remove local state_lock from mlx5e_tx_timeout_work() before calling devlink_health_report() and take care to cancel the work before any call to close channels, which may free the SQs that should be handled by the work. Before cancel_work_sync(), use current_work() to check we are not calling it from within the work, as mlx5e_tx_timeout_work() itself may close the channels and reopen as part of recovery flow. While removing state_lock from mlx5e_tx_timeout_work() keep rtnl_lock to ensure no change in netdev->real_num_tx_queues, but use rtnl_trylock() and a flag to avoid deadlock by calling cancel_work_sync() before closing the channels while holding rtnl_lock too. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u16:2/65 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888122f6c2f8 (&devlink->lock_key#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888121d20be0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x70/0x280 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 mlx5e_rx_reporter_diagnose+0x71/0x700 [mlx5_core] devlink_nl_cmd_health_reporter_diagnose_doit+0x212/0xa50 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e9/0x2f0 genl_rcv_msg+0x2e9/0x530 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 netlink_sendmsg+0x788/0xc40 sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x1c1/0x290 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 -> #0 (&devlink->lock_key#2){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2c8a/0x6200 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 mlx5e_health_report+0xc9/0xd7 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0x2ab/0x3d0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x1c1/0x280 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock(&devlink->lock_key#2); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock(&devlink->lock_key#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u16:2/65: #0: ffff88811a55b138 ((wq_completion)mlx5e#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x6e2/0x1340 #1: ffff888101de7db8 ((work_completion)(&priv->tx_timeout_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x70f/0x1340 #2: ffffffff84ce8328 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x53/0x280 [mlx5_core] #3: ffff888121d20be0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x70/0x280 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_tx_timeout_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d check_noncircular+0x278/0x300 ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 ? __stack_depot_save+0x24c/0x520 ? alloc_chain_hlocks+0x228/0x700 __lock_acquire+0x2c8a/0x6200 ? register_lock_class+0x1860/0x1860 ? kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 ? kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 ? ____kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x1b0 ? kfree+0x1ba/0x520 ? devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x171/0x3a0 ? devlink_health_report+0x3d5/0x7e0 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 ? devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 ? devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 ? devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1320/0x1320 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100 ? bit_wait_io_timeout+0x170/0x170 ? devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x171/0x3a0 ? kfree+0x1ba/0x520 ? devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x171/0x3a0 devlink_health_report+0x2f1/0x7e0 mlx5e_health_report+0xc9/0xd7 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0x2ab/0x3d0 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? mlx5e_reporter_tx_err_cqe+0x1b0/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_dump+0x70/0x70 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq+0x320/0x320 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x70/0x280 [mlx5_core] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1320/0x1320 ? process_one_work+0x70f/0x1340 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x1c1/0x280 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 ? process_one_work+0x1340/0x1340 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: c90005b ("devlink: Hold the instance lock in health callbacks") Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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When working on LED support for r8169 I got the following lockdep warning. Easiest way to prevent this scenario seems to be to take the RTNL lock before the trigger_data lock in set_device_name(). ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/383 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888103aa1c68 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 set_device_name+0xa9/0x120 [ledtrig_netdev] netdev_trig_activate+0x1a1/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 -> #0 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by bash/383: #0: ffff888103ff33f0 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 #1: ffff888103aa1e88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x210 #2: ffff8881036f1890 (kn->active#82){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x210 #3: ffff888108e2c358 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x30/0x140 #4: ffffffff8cdd9e10 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x75/0x140 #5: ffff888108e2c270 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0xe3/0x140 #6: ffffffff8cdde3d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0x120 #7: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 383 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Hardware name: Default string Default string/Default string, BIOS ADLN.M6.SODIMM.ZB.CY.015 08/08/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xd0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x2dd/0x410 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x11c/0x1b0 ? __mutex_lock+0x123/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xc0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f269055d034 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 c3 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffddb7ef748 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007f269055d034 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 000055bf5f4af3c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055bf5f4af3c0 R08: 0000000000000073 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: 00007f26906325c0 R14: 00007f269062ff20 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fixes: d5e0126 ("leds: trigger: netdev: add additional specific link speed mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fb5c8294-2a10-4bf5-8f10-3d2b77d2757e@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot found a potential circular dependency leading to a deadlock:
-> #3 (&hdev->req_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common+0x1b6/0x1bc2 kernel/locking/mutex.c:599
__mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:732 [inline]
mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:784
hci_dev_do_close+0x3f/0x9f net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:551
hci_rfkill_set_block+0x130/0x1ac net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:935
rfkill_set_block+0x1e6/0x3b8 net/rfkill/core.c:345
rfkill_fop_write+0x2d8/0x672 net/rfkill/core.c:1274
vfs_write+0x277/0xcf5 fs/read_write.c:594
ksys_write+0x19b/0x2bd fs/read_write.c:650
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:55 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x51/0xba arch/x86/entry/common.c:93
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
-> #2 (rfkill_global_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common+0x1b6/0x1bc2 kernel/locking/mutex.c:599
__mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:732 [inline]
mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:784
rfkill_register+0x30/0x7e3 net/rfkill/core.c:1045
hci_register_dev+0x48f/0x96d net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2622
__vhci_create_device drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:341 [inline]
vhci_create_device+0x3ad/0x68f drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:374
vhci_get_user drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:431 [inline]
vhci_write+0x37b/0x429 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:511
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2109 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:509 [inline]
vfs_write+0xaa8/0xcf5 fs/read_write.c:596
ksys_write+0x19b/0x2bd fs/read_write.c:650
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:55 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x51/0xba arch/x86/entry/common.c:93
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
-> #1 (&data->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common+0x1b6/0x1bc2 kernel/locking/mutex.c:599
__mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:732 [inline]
mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:784
vhci_send_frame+0x68/0x9c drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:75
hci_send_frame+0x1cc/0x2ff net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2989
hci_sched_acl_pkt net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3498 [inline]
hci_sched_acl net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3583 [inline]
hci_tx_work+0xb94/0x1a60 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3654
process_one_work+0x901/0xfb8 kernel/workqueue.c:2310
worker_thread+0xa67/0x1003 kernel/workqueue.c:2457
kthread+0x36a/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:319
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->tx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3053 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3172 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3787 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2d32/0x77fa kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5011
lock_acquire+0x273/0x4d5 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5622
__flush_work+0xee/0x19f kernel/workqueue.c:3090
hci_dev_close_sync+0x32f/0x1113 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4352
hci_dev_do_close+0x47/0x9f net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:553
hci_rfkill_set_block+0x130/0x1ac net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:935
rfkill_set_block+0x1e6/0x3b8 net/rfkill/core.c:345
rfkill_fop_write+0x2d8/0x672 net/rfkill/core.c:1274
vfs_write+0x277/0xcf5 fs/read_write.c:594
ksys_write+0x19b/0x2bd fs/read_write.c:650
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:55 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x51/0xba arch/x86/entry/common.c:93
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
This change removes the need for acquiring the open_mutex in
vhci_send_frame, thus eliminating the potential deadlock while
maintaining the required packet ordering.
Fixes: 92d4abd ("Bluetooth: vhci: Fix race when opening vhci device")
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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Calling led_trigger_register() when attaching a PHY located on an SFP
module potentially (and practically) leads into a deadlock.
Fix this by not calling led_trigger_register() for PHYs localted on SFP
modules as such modules actually never got any LEDs.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc4-next-20231208+ #0 Tainted: G O
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:2/43 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffc08108c4e8 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_register+0x4c/0x1a8
but task is already holding lock:
ffffff80c5c6f318 (&sfp->sm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cleanup_module+0x2ba8/0x3120 [sfp]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&sfp->sm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x88/0x7a0
mutex_lock_nested+0x20/0x28
cleanup_module+0x2ae0/0x3120 [sfp]
sfp_register_bus+0x5c/0x9c
sfp_register_socket+0x48/0xd4
cleanup_module+0x271c/0x3120 [sfp]
platform_probe+0x64/0xb8
really_probe+0x17c/0x3c0
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x164
driver_probe_device+0x3c/0xd4
__driver_attach+0xec/0x1f0
bus_for_each_dev+0x60/0xa0
driver_attach+0x20/0x28
bus_add_driver+0x108/0x208
driver_register+0x5c/0x118
__platform_driver_register+0x24/0x2c
init_module+0x28/0xa7c [sfp]
do_one_initcall+0x70/0x2ec
do_init_module+0x54/0x1e4
load_module+0x1b78/0x1c8c
__do_sys_init_module+0x1bc/0x2cc
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x18/0x20
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xdc
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xbc
el0_svc+0x34/0x80
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf8/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
-> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x88/0x7a0
mutex_lock_nested+0x20/0x28
rtnl_lock+0x18/0x20
set_device_name+0x30/0x130
netdev_trig_activate+0x13c/0x1ac
led_trigger_set+0x118/0x234
led_trigger_write+0x104/0x17c
sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x64/0x80
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1b4
vfs_write+0x178/0x2a4
ksys_write+0x58/0xd4
__arm64_sys_write+0x18/0x20
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xdc
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xbc
el0_svc+0x34/0x80
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf8/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
-> #1 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
down_write+0x4c/0x13c
led_trigger_write+0xf8/0x17c
sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x64/0x80
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1b4
vfs_write+0x178/0x2a4
ksys_write+0x58/0xd4
__arm64_sys_write+0x18/0x20
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xdc
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xbc
el0_svc+0x34/0x80
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf8/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
-> #0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x12a0/0x2014
lock_acquire+0x100/0x2ac
down_write+0x4c/0x13c
led_trigger_register+0x4c/0x1a8
phy_led_triggers_register+0x9c/0x214
phy_attach_direct+0x154/0x36c
phylink_attach_phy+0x30/0x60
phylink_sfp_connect_phy+0x140/0x510
sfp_add_phy+0x34/0x50
init_module+0x15c/0xa7c [sfp]
cleanup_module+0x1d94/0x3120 [sfp]
cleanup_module+0x2bb4/0x3120 [sfp]
process_one_work+0x1f8/0x4ec
worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d8
kthread+0x104/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
triggers_list_lock --> rtnl_mutex --> &sfp->sm_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sfp->sm_mutex);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(&sfp->sm_mutex);
lock(triggers_list_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/u8:2/43:
#0: ffffff80c000f938 ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x150/0x4ec
#1: ffffffc08214bde8 ((work_completion)(&(&sfp->timeout)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x150/0x4ec
#2: ffffffc0810902f8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x18/0x20
#3: ffffff80c5c6f318 (&sfp->sm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cleanup_module+0x2ba8/0x3120 [sfp]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 43 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G O 6.7.0-rc4-next-20231208+ #0
Hardware name: Bananapi BPI-R4 (DT)
Workqueue: events_power_efficient cleanup_module [sfp]
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xa8/0x10c
show_stack+0x14/0x1c
dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xa0
dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
print_circular_bug+0x328/0x430
check_noncircular+0x124/0x134
__lock_acquire+0x12a0/0x2014
lock_acquire+0x100/0x2ac
down_write+0x4c/0x13c
led_trigger_register+0x4c/0x1a8
phy_led_triggers_register+0x9c/0x214
phy_attach_direct+0x154/0x36c
phylink_attach_phy+0x30/0x60
phylink_sfp_connect_phy+0x140/0x510
sfp_add_phy+0x34/0x50
init_module+0x15c/0xa7c [sfp]
cleanup_module+0x1d94/0x3120 [sfp]
cleanup_module+0x2bb4/0x3120 [sfp]
process_one_work+0x1f8/0x4ec
worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d8
kthread+0x104/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Fixes: 01e5b72 ("net: phy: Add a binding for PHY LEDs")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/102a9dce38bdf00215735d04cd4704458273ad9c.1702339354.git.daniel@makrotopia.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Trying to suspend to RAM on SAMA5D27 EVK leads to the following lockdep
warning:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
sh/92 is trying to acquire lock:
c3cf306c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
but task is already holding lock:
c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
6 locks held by sh/92:
#0: c3aa0258 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xd8/0x178
#1: c4c2df44 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x138/0x284
#2: c32684a0 (kn->active){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x148/0x284
#3: c232b6d4 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x13c/0x4e8
#4: c387b088 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_suspend+0x1e8/0x91c
#5: c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 92 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532
Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x19ec/0x3a0c
__lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0x124/0x2d0
lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x78
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100
__irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0xa8/0x204
irq_set_irq_wake from atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake+0x58/0xb4
atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x100/0x204
irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0xec/0x2b8
gpio_keys_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0xe4/0x248
dpm_run_callback from __device_suspend+0x234/0x91c
__device_suspend from dpm_suspend+0x224/0x43c
dpm_suspend from dpm_suspend_start+0x9c/0xa8
dpm_suspend_start from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1e0/0xa84
suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x460/0x4e8
pm_suspend from state_store+0x78/0xe4
state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1a0/0x284
kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x38c/0x6f4
vfs_write from ksys_write+0xd8/0x178
ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
Exception stack(0xc52b3fa8 to 0xc52b3ff0)
3fa0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 005a0ae8 00000004 00000001
3fc0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 00000004 00000004 b6c616c0 00000020 0059d190
3fe0: 00000004 b6c61678 aec5a041 aebf1a26
This warning is raised because pinctrl-at91-pio4 uses chained IRQ. Whenever
a wake up source configures an IRQ through irq_set_irq_wake, it will
lock the corresponding IRQ desc, and then call irq_set_irq_wake on "parent"
IRQ which will do the same on its own IRQ desc, but since those two locks
share the same class, lockdep reports this as an issue.
Fix lockdep false positive by setting a different class for parent and
children IRQ
Fixes: 7761808 ("pinctrl: introduce driver for Atmel PIO4 controller")
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215-lockdep_warning-v1-1-8137b2510ed5@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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For rq, we have three cases getting buffers from virtio core:
1. virtqueue_get_buf{,_ctx}
2. virtqueue_detach_unused_buf
3. callback for virtqueue_resize
But in commit 295525e("virtio_net: merge dma operations when
filling mergeable buffers"), I missed the dma unmap for the #3 case.
That will leak some memory, because I did not release the pages referred
by the unused buffers.
If we do such script, we will make the system OOM.
while true
do
ethtool -G ens4 rx 128
ethtool -G ens4 rx 256
free -m
done
Fixes: 295525e ("virtio_net: merge dma operations when filling mergeable buffers")
Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231226094333.47740-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Hi,
i tested g_serial with a Raspberry Pi Zero (OTG mode, Linux 4.11-rc1) as gadget and a Linux Laptop as host (Linux 4.10.9). In case g_serial is build as a kernel module the RPi gets enumerated on the Linux host and in case of g_serial builtin not (CONFIG_USB_DWC2_DUAL_ROLE=y). In both cases i didn't provide any gadget configuration via configfs or kernel commandline.
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