CIRT Playbook Battle Card: GSPBC-1000 - Impact - Data Encrypted For Impact - Ransomware		
(P) Preparation	(I) Identification	(C) Containment
Patch asset vulnerabilities	1. Monitor for:	Inventory (enumerate & assess)
2. Perform routine inspections of controls/weapons	a. Ransomware notes/messages	2. Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive Destroy
3. Confirm backups are free of malware	b. Unusual file extensions or maliciousextensions	3. Observe -> Orient -> Decide -> Act
4. Establish ability to pay ransoms w/cryptocurrency	c. User reports of files being corrupt or notreadable	4. Locate and isolate the assets responsible for encrypting files
5. Obtain decryption keys for ransomware variants	d. Emails with suspicious attachments	5. Isolate impacted file sharing systems
6. Confirm cybersecurity insurance coverages	e. Unusual DNS traffic	6. Close the attack vector
7. Conduct ransomware simulations	f. High velocity renaming of files	7. Fortify non-impacted file sharing systems
Conduct phishing simulations	g. CPU spikes on file sharing systems	Fortify non-impacted critical assets
Conduct user awareness training	h. Unusual userland executable binaries	Issue perimeter enforcement for known threat actor locations
10. Conduct response training (this PBC)	i. Anomalous network connections on hosts	10. Deploy EDR hunter/killer agents and terminate offending
11. Examine file shares for loose/open privileges	j. Firewall denies to well known file sharingports	processes
12. Maintain Antivirus/EDR application updates	k. Network connections to known C2 and exploit kit locations	
13. Create network segmentation	I. Use of TOR or I2P	
14. Log traffic between network segments	2. Investigate and clear ALL alerts of possible ransomware	
15. Incorporate threat intelligence	a. IDS/IPS	
16. Incorporate deception technology	b. Antivirus/EDR	
17. Perform routine inspections of asset backups	c. Threat intelligence	
18. Validate proper functionality	d. Deception technology	
(E) Eradication	(R) Recovery	(L) Lessons/Opportunities
Close the attack vector	1. Restore to the RPO within the RTO	Perform routine cyber hygiene due diligence
2. Patch asset vulnerabilities	2. Restore from known clean backups	Engage external cybersecurity-as-a-service providers and
3. Re-image impacted assets	3. Address collateral damage	response professionals
4. Inspect all assets for IOC consistent with the attack profile		3. Avoid opening email and attachments from unfamiliar senders
5. Inspect user activity for IOC consistent with the attack profile		4. Avoid opening email attachments from senders that do not
Inspect backups for IOC consistent with the attack profile PRIOR to systems recovery		normally include attachments
7. Implement newly obtained threat signatures		References:
		1. MITRE ATT&CK Technique T1486:
		https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
		2. Paying ransoms is discouraged, but it should be a contingency available to executives (SEE Preparation #4 and #6).

Resources:

- $\textbf{\rightarrow} \ \, \textbf{GuardSight GSVSOC Incident Response Plan: https://github.com/guardsight/gsvsoc_cybersecurity-incident-response-plan.} \\$
- → IT Disaster Recovery Planning: https://www.ready.gov/it-disaster-recovery-plan
- → Report Cybercrime: https://www.ic3.gov/Home/FAQ

