forked from kubernetes/kubernetes
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
admission.go
380 lines (324 loc) · 14.2 KB
/
admission.go
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
/*
Copyright 2016 The Kubernetes Authors.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
package podsecuritypolicy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/golang/glog"
apiequality "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/equality"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/labels"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/validation/field"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/admission"
genericadmissioninit "k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/admission/initializer"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/authentication/user"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/authorization/authorizer"
api "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/apis/core"
"k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/apis/extensions"
informers "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/client/informers/informers_generated/internalversion"
extensionslisters "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/client/listers/extensions/internalversion"
kubeapiserveradmission "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/kubeapiserver/admission"
rbacregistry "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/registry/rbac"
psp "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/security/podsecuritypolicy"
psputil "k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/security/podsecuritypolicy/util"
"k8s.io/kubernetes/pkg/serviceaccount"
)
const (
PluginName = "PodSecurityPolicy"
)
// Register registers a plugin
func Register(plugins *admission.Plugins) {
plugins.Register(PluginName, func(config io.Reader) (admission.Interface, error) {
plugin := newPlugin(psp.NewSimpleStrategyFactory(), true)
return plugin, nil
})
}
// PodSecurityPolicyPlugin holds state for and implements the admission plugin.
type PodSecurityPolicyPlugin struct {
*admission.Handler
strategyFactory psp.StrategyFactory
failOnNoPolicies bool
authz authorizer.Authorizer
lister extensionslisters.PodSecurityPolicyLister
}
// SetAuthorizer sets the authorizer.
func (plugin *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) SetAuthorizer(authz authorizer.Authorizer) {
plugin.authz = authz
}
// ValidateInitialization ensures an authorizer is set.
func (plugin *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) ValidateInitialization() error {
if plugin.authz == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s requires an authorizer", PluginName)
}
if plugin.lister == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s requires a lister", PluginName)
}
return nil
}
var _ admission.MutationInterface = &PodSecurityPolicyPlugin{}
var _ admission.ValidationInterface = &PodSecurityPolicyPlugin{}
var _ genericadmissioninit.WantsAuthorizer = &PodSecurityPolicyPlugin{}
var _ kubeapiserveradmission.WantsInternalKubeInformerFactory = &PodSecurityPolicyPlugin{}
// newPlugin creates a new PSP admission plugin.
func newPlugin(strategyFactory psp.StrategyFactory, failOnNoPolicies bool) *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin {
return &PodSecurityPolicyPlugin{
Handler: admission.NewHandler(admission.Create, admission.Update),
strategyFactory: strategyFactory,
failOnNoPolicies: failOnNoPolicies,
}
}
func (a *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) SetInternalKubeInformerFactory(f informers.SharedInformerFactory) {
podSecurityPolicyInformer := f.Extensions().InternalVersion().PodSecurityPolicies()
a.lister = podSecurityPolicyInformer.Lister()
a.SetReadyFunc(podSecurityPolicyInformer.Informer().HasSynced)
}
// Admit determines if the pod should be admitted based on the requested security context
// and the available PSPs.
//
// 1. Find available PSPs.
// 2. Create the providers, includes setting pre-allocated values if necessary.
// 3. Try to generate and validate a PSP with providers. If we find one then admit the pod
// with the validated PSP. If we don't find any reject the pod and give all errors from the
// failed attempts.
func (c *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) Admit(a admission.Attributes) error {
if ignore, err := shouldIgnore(a); err != nil {
return err
} else if ignore {
return nil
}
// only mutate if this is a CREATE request. On updates we only validate.
// TODO(liggitt): allow spec mutation during initializing updates?
if a.GetOperation() != admission.Create {
return nil
}
pod := a.GetObject().(*api.Pod)
// compute the context
allowedPod, pspName, validationErrs, err := c.computeSecurityContext(a, pod, true)
if err != nil {
return admission.NewForbidden(a, err)
}
if allowedPod != nil {
*pod = *allowedPod
// annotate and accept the pod
glog.V(4).Infof("pod %s (generate: %s) in namespace %s validated against provider %s", pod.Name, pod.GenerateName, a.GetNamespace(), pspName)
if pod.ObjectMeta.Annotations == nil {
pod.ObjectMeta.Annotations = map[string]string{}
}
pod.ObjectMeta.Annotations[psputil.ValidatedPSPAnnotation] = pspName
return nil
}
// we didn't validate against any provider, reject the pod and give the errors for each attempt
glog.V(4).Infof("unable to validate pod %s (generate: %s) in namespace %s against any pod security policy: %v", pod.Name, pod.GenerateName, a.GetNamespace(), validationErrs)
return admission.NewForbidden(a, fmt.Errorf("unable to validate against any pod security policy: %v", validationErrs))
}
func (c *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) Validate(a admission.Attributes) error {
if ignore, err := shouldIgnore(a); err != nil {
return err
} else if ignore {
return nil
}
pod := a.GetObject().(*api.Pod)
// compute the context. Mutation is not allowed.
allowedPod, _, validationErrs, err := c.computeSecurityContext(a, pod, false)
if err != nil {
return admission.NewForbidden(a, err)
}
if apiequality.Semantic.DeepEqual(pod, allowedPod) {
return nil
}
// we didn't validate against any provider, reject the pod and give the errors for each attempt
glog.V(4).Infof("unable to validate pod %s (generate: %s) in namespace %s against any pod security policy: %v", pod.Name, pod.GenerateName, a.GetNamespace(), validationErrs)
return admission.NewForbidden(a, fmt.Errorf("unable to validate against any pod security policy: %v", validationErrs))
}
func shouldIgnore(a admission.Attributes) (bool, error) {
if a.GetResource().GroupResource() != api.Resource("pods") {
return true, nil
}
if len(a.GetSubresource()) != 0 {
return true, nil
}
// if we can't convert then fail closed since we've already checked that this is supposed to be a pod object.
// this shouldn't normally happen during admission but could happen if an integrator passes a versioned
// pod object rather than an internal object.
if _, ok := a.GetObject().(*api.Pod); !ok {
return false, admission.NewForbidden(a, fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T", a.GetObject()))
}
// if this is an update, see if we are only updating the ownerRef/finalizers. Garbage collection does this
// and we should allow it in general, since you had the power to update and the power to delete.
// The worst that happens is that you delete something, but you aren't controlling the privileged object itself
if a.GetOperation() == admission.Update && rbacregistry.IsOnlyMutatingGCFields(a.GetObject(), a.GetOldObject(), apiequality.Semantic) {
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
}
// computeSecurityContext derives a valid security context while trying to avoid any changes to the given pod. I.e.
// if there is a matching policy with the same security context as given, it will be reused. If there is no
// matching policy the returned pod will be nil and the pspName empty.
func (c *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) computeSecurityContext(a admission.Attributes, pod *api.Pod, specMutationAllowed bool) (*api.Pod, string, field.ErrorList, error) {
// get all constraints that are usable by the user
glog.V(4).Infof("getting pod security policies for pod %s (generate: %s)", pod.Name, pod.GenerateName)
var saInfo user.Info
if len(pod.Spec.ServiceAccountName) > 0 {
saInfo = serviceaccount.UserInfo(a.GetNamespace(), pod.Spec.ServiceAccountName, "")
}
policies, err := c.lister.List(labels.Everything())
if err != nil {
return nil, "", nil, err
}
// if we have no policies and want to succeed then return. Otherwise we'll end up with no
// providers and fail with "unable to validate against any pod security policy" below.
if len(policies) == 0 && !c.failOnNoPolicies {
return pod, "", nil, nil
}
// sort by name to make order deterministic
// TODO(liggitt): add priority field to allow admins to bucket differently
sort.SliceStable(policies, func(i, j int) bool {
return strings.Compare(policies[i].Name, policies[j].Name) < 0
})
providers, errs := c.createProvidersFromPolicies(policies, pod.Namespace)
for _, err := range errs {
glog.V(4).Infof("provider creation error: %v", err)
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
return nil, "", nil, fmt.Errorf("no providers available to validate pod request")
}
var (
allowedMutatedPod *api.Pod
allowingMutatingPSP string
// Map of PSP name to associated validation errors.
validationErrs = map[string]field.ErrorList{}
)
for _, provider := range providers {
podCopy := pod.DeepCopy()
if errs := assignSecurityContext(provider, podCopy, field.NewPath(fmt.Sprintf("provider %s: ", provider.GetPSPName()))); len(errs) > 0 {
validationErrs[provider.GetPSPName()] = errs
continue
}
// the entire pod validated
mutated := !apiequality.Semantic.DeepEqual(pod, podCopy)
if mutated && !specMutationAllowed {
continue
}
if !isAuthorizedForPolicy(a.GetUserInfo(), saInfo, a.GetNamespace(), provider.GetPSPName(), c.authz) {
continue
}
switch {
case !mutated:
// if it validated without mutating anything, use this result
return podCopy, provider.GetPSPName(), nil, nil
case specMutationAllowed && allowedMutatedPod == nil:
// if mutation is allowed and this is the first PSP to allow the pod, remember it,
// but continue to see if another PSP allows without mutating
allowedMutatedPod = podCopy
allowingMutatingPSP = provider.GetPSPName()
}
}
if allowedMutatedPod != nil {
return allowedMutatedPod, allowingMutatingPSP, nil, nil
}
// Pod is rejected. Filter the validation errors to only include errors from authorized PSPs.
aggregate := field.ErrorList{}
for psp, errs := range validationErrs {
if isAuthorizedForPolicy(a.GetUserInfo(), saInfo, a.GetNamespace(), psp, c.authz) {
aggregate = append(aggregate, errs...)
}
}
return nil, "", aggregate, nil
}
// assignSecurityContext creates a security context for each container in the pod
// and validates that the sc falls within the psp constraints. All containers must validate against
// the same psp or is not considered valid.
func assignSecurityContext(provider psp.Provider, pod *api.Pod, fldPath *field.Path) field.ErrorList {
errs := field.ErrorList{}
psc, pscAnnotations, err := provider.CreatePodSecurityContext(pod)
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, field.Invalid(field.NewPath("spec", "securityContext"), pod.Spec.SecurityContext, err.Error()))
}
pod.Spec.SecurityContext = psc
pod.Annotations = pscAnnotations
errs = append(errs, provider.ValidatePodSecurityContext(pod, field.NewPath("spec", "securityContext"))...)
for i := range pod.Spec.InitContainers {
sc, scAnnotations, err := provider.CreateContainerSecurityContext(pod, &pod.Spec.InitContainers[i])
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, field.Invalid(field.NewPath("spec", "initContainers").Index(i).Child("securityContext"), "", err.Error()))
continue
}
pod.Spec.InitContainers[i].SecurityContext = sc
pod.Annotations = scAnnotations
errs = append(errs, provider.ValidateContainerSecurityContext(pod, &pod.Spec.InitContainers[i], field.NewPath("spec", "initContainers").Index(i).Child("securityContext"))...)
}
for i := range pod.Spec.Containers {
sc, scAnnotations, err := provider.CreateContainerSecurityContext(pod, &pod.Spec.Containers[i])
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, field.Invalid(field.NewPath("spec", "containers").Index(i).Child("securityContext"), "", err.Error()))
continue
}
pod.Spec.Containers[i].SecurityContext = sc
pod.Annotations = scAnnotations
errs = append(errs, provider.ValidateContainerSecurityContext(pod, &pod.Spec.Containers[i], field.NewPath("spec", "containers").Index(i).Child("securityContext"))...)
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
return errs
}
return nil
}
// createProvidersFromPolicies creates providers from the constraints supplied.
func (c *PodSecurityPolicyPlugin) createProvidersFromPolicies(psps []*extensions.PodSecurityPolicy, namespace string) ([]psp.Provider, []error) {
var (
// collected providers
providers []psp.Provider
// collected errors to return
errs []error
)
for _, constraint := range psps {
provider, err := psp.NewSimpleProvider(constraint, namespace, c.strategyFactory)
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("error creating provider for PSP %s: %v", constraint.Name, err))
continue
}
providers = append(providers, provider)
}
return providers, errs
}
func isAuthorizedForPolicy(user, sa user.Info, namespace, policyName string, authz authorizer.Authorizer) bool {
// Check the service account first, as that is the more common use case.
return authorizedForPolicy(sa, namespace, policyName, authz) ||
authorizedForPolicy(user, namespace, policyName, authz)
}
// authorizedForPolicy returns true if info is authorized to perform the "use" verb on the policy resource.
func authorizedForPolicy(info user.Info, namespace string, policyName string, authz authorizer.Authorizer) bool {
if info == nil {
return false
}
attr := buildAttributes(info, namespace, policyName)
decision, reason, err := authz.Authorize(attr)
if err != nil {
glog.V(5).Infof("cannot authorize for policy: %v,%v", reason, err)
}
return (decision == authorizer.DecisionAllow)
}
// buildAttributes builds an attributes record for a SAR based on the user info and policy.
func buildAttributes(info user.Info, namespace string, policyName string) authorizer.Attributes {
// check against the namespace that the pod is being created in to allow per-namespace PSP grants.
attr := authorizer.AttributesRecord{
User: info,
Verb: "use",
Namespace: namespace,
Name: policyName,
APIGroup: extensions.GroupName,
Resource: "podsecuritypolicies",
ResourceRequest: true,
}
return attr
}