


Oblivious Transfer

- Sender has $m_1, \dots, m_n \in M$.
- Receiver has $i \in [1..n]$
- Goal. (1) Receiver learns m_i , and no other m_j .
 (2) Sender does not learn i


OT from El Gamal

- Group \mathbb{G} ; $\langle G \rangle = q$; hash func $H: \mathbb{G}^2 \rightarrow M \times k$
- CPA secure (E_s, D_s) channel.




- The article i which Bob wants to read is encrypted with Bob's public key.
- Other articles encrypted with some other public keys (unknown).
- Bob can decrypt and read c_i , the article

Digital Signatures



Security Game.



Adv wins of $V(pk, m, o)$ = 'accept' and $m \in \{m_1, \dots, m_q\}$

Secure
Signature
Scheme

Def. $SS = (Gen, S, V)$ is secure if for all eff. A:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}}[A, SS] = \Pr[A \text{ wins}] < \text{negl.}$$

Example. $SS = (Gen, S, V)$. Attackers can't find $m_0 \neq m_i$, s.t.

$$V(pk, m_0, o) = V(pk, m_i, o) \quad \forall o, (pk, sk) \in Gen$$

Q: Can this SS be secure?

\hookrightarrow No, signatures can be forged: (1) Ask to sign m_0 . Guess o_0 .
(2) Forge (m, o_0) .

Euler Theorem.

- $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$ is called a cyclic group, that is

$\exists g \in (\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$ such that $\{1, g, g^2, g^3, \dots, g^{p-2}\} = (\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$

g is called a generator of $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$.

Example. $p=7$

$$\{1, 3, 3^2, 3^3, 3^4, 3^5\} = \{1, 3, 2, 6, 4, 5\} = (\mathbb{Z}_7)^*$$

- Not every element is a generator:

$$\{1, 2, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5\} = \{1, 2, 4\}$$

Solving Quadratic Equations (mod p)

- Solve: $ax^2 + bx + c \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_p$

- Solution: $x = (-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}) / 2a \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_p$

i) Find $(2a)^{-1}$ in \mathbb{Z}_p using Euclid

ii) Find square root of $b^2 - 4ac$ in \mathbb{Z}_p (if exists)
using a square root algorithm.