Allow pubkey recovery for all-zero messages #369
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After https://github.com/openethereum/openethereum/pull/11406 it is no longer possible to to public key recovery from messages that are all-zero. This create issues when using the `ecrecover` builtin because externally produced signatures may well provide a message (i.e. a preimage) that is all-zeroes. This works around the problem at the cost of cloning the incoming message and create a `ZeroesAllowedMessage` wrapper around it. The `ZeroesAllowedMessage` implements the `ThirtyTwoByteHash` trait from `rust-secp256k1` which circumvents the zero-check. In a follow-up PR we'll likely change the interface of `recover()` to take a `ZeroesAllowedMessage` directly, thus removing the unneeded clone.
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The alternative to this is to add an all-zeros-allowed version of |
ordian
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Apr 9, 2020
ordian
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ordian
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Apr 9, 2020
I think this change can be viewed as a bug fix (as we changed the behavior for zero messages unintentionally) and thus is not a breaking change. |
Co-Authored-By: Andronik Ordian <write@reusable.software>
…s' of github.com:paritytech/parity-common into dp/fix/change-parity-crypto-to-allow-all-zeroes-messages * 'dp/fix/change-parity-crypto-to-allow-all-zeroes-messages' of github.com:paritytech/parity-common: Update parity-crypto/src/publickey/ecdsa_signature.rs
TBH I really think this is a better idea. All-zero message is not safe after all, and not allowing it in default function can prevent misuses. |
Revert `recover()` to previous behaviour: no zero-messages allowed Docs and cleanup
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* master: kvdb-rocksdb: optimize and rename iter_from_prefix (#365) bump parity-util-mem (#376) parity-util-mem: fix for windows (#375) keccak-hash: fix bench and add one for range (#372) [parity-crypto] Release 0.6.1 (#373) keccak-hash: bump version to 0.5.1 (#371) keccak-hash: add keccak256_range and keccak512_range functions (#370) Allow pubkey recovery for all-zero messages (#369) Delete by prefix operator in kvdb (#360) kvdb: no overlay (#313) Ban duplicates of parity-uil-mem from being linked into the same program (#363) Use correct license ID (#362) Memtest example for Rocksdb (#349) Prep for release (#361) parity-util-mem: prepare release for 0.5.2 (#359) travis: test parity-util-mem on android (#358) parity-util-mem: update mimalloc feature (#352) kvdb: remove parity-bytes dependency (#351) parity-util-mem: use malloc for usable_size on android (#355) CI: troubleshoot macOS build (#356)
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* master: (56 commits) primitive-types: add no_std support for serde feature (#385) Add Rocksdb Secondary Instance Api (#384) kvdb-rocksdb: update rocksdb to 0.14 (#379) prepare releases for a few crates (#382) uint: fix UB in uint::from_big_endian (#381) Fix limit prefix delete case (#368) Add arbitrary trait implementation (#378) kvdb-rocksdb: optimize and rename iter_from_prefix (#365) bump parity-util-mem (#376) parity-util-mem: fix for windows (#375) keccak-hash: fix bench and add one for range (#372) [parity-crypto] Release 0.6.1 (#373) keccak-hash: bump version to 0.5.1 (#371) keccak-hash: add keccak256_range and keccak512_range functions (#370) Allow pubkey recovery for all-zero messages (#369) Delete by prefix operator in kvdb (#360) kvdb: no overlay (#313) Ban duplicates of parity-uil-mem from being linked into the same program (#363) Use correct license ID (#362) Memtest example for Rocksdb (#349) ...
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After https://github.com/openethereum/openethereum/pull/11406 it is no longer possible to do public key recovery from messages that are all-zero. This creates issues when using the
ecrecoverbuiltin because externally produced signatures may well provide a message (i.e. a preimage) that is all-zeroes.This works around the problem at the cost of cloning the incoming message and create a
ZeroesAllowedMessagewrapper around it. TheZeroesAllowedMessageimplements theThirtyTwoByteHashtrait fromrust-secp256k1which circumvents the zero-check.In a follow-up PR we'll likely change the interface of
recover()to take aZeroesAllowedMessagedirectly, thus removing the unneeded clone.