## Appendix A: Outliers

First I measure the cook's distance of my models. Observations that have a cook's distance greater than 4 times the mean are considered as influential and are summarized in figures 1, 2 and 3.

## Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR

96 32 2015 -0.72 0.93 -1.62 2016 1167 389 2015 0.06 1.40 0.60 2016 GreenScore EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 96 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.00 1167 0.58 0.08 0.09 0.05 WasteProductivity Green.Revenue SustainabilityPayLink 96 0.00 0.01 1 1167 0.04 0.12 1 SustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 96 0 1 10.28 3.54 -3.63 1167 1 1 9.99 5.22 8.62 Industry 96 3 1167 1 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 10 4 2013 0.06 2.18 0.44 2014 68 23 2014 0.08  $8.25\ 0.14\ 2015\ 96\ 32\ 2015\ -0.72\ 0.93\ -1.62\ 2016\ 157\ 53\ 2013\ 0.17\ 5.06\ 0.23\ 2014\ 229\ 77\ 2013\ 0.12\ 5.07\ 0.26\ 2014$ 246 82 2015 -0.01 1.42 -5.42 2016 GreenScore EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity  $10\ 0.57\ 0.92\ 0.96\ 0.96\ 68\ 0.17\ 0.00\ 0.00\ 0.00\ 96\ 0.20\ 0.00\ 0.04\ 0.00\ 157\ 0.76\ 0.69\ 0.83\ 0.85\ 229\ 0.57\ 0.74$  $0.76\ 0.75\ 246\ 0.18\ 0.00\ 0.02\ 0.00\ Waste Productivity\ Green. Revenue\ Sustainability Pay Link\ 10\ 0.94\ 0.01\ 0\ 68$  $0.00\ 0.17\ 0.96\ 0.00\ 0.01\ 1\ 157\ 0.97\ 0.53\ 1\ 229\ 0.00\ 0.91\ 0\ 246\ 0.00\ 0.16\ 0\ Sustainable The med Commitment$ AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 10 0 0 11.35 6.06 0.09 68 0 0 9.62 0.25 0.12 96 0 1 10.28 3.54  $-3.63\ 157\ 0\ 1\ 10.07\ 0.13\ 0.27\ 229\ 0\ 1\ 10.13\ 0.75\ 0.22\ 246\ 0\ 0\ 10.59\ -776.59\ -0.03\ \mathrm{Industry}\ 10\ 7\ 68\ 5\ 96\ 3\ 157\ 1000\ 10$ 5 229 5 246 1 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 10 4 2013 0.06  $2.18\ 0.44\ 2014\ 68\ 23\ 2014\ 0.08\ 8.25\ 0.14\ 2015\ 96\ 32\ 2015\ -0.72\ 0.93\ -1.62\ 2016\ 157\ 53\ 2013\ 0.17\ 5.06\ 0.23$ 2014 229 77 2013 0.12 5.07 0.26 2014 246 82 2015 -0.01 1.42 -5.42 2016 GreenScore EnergyProductivity  $Carbon Productivity\ Water Productivity\ 10\ 0.57\ 0.92\ 0.96\ 0.96\ 68\ 0.17\ 0.00\ 0.00\ 0.00\ 96\ 0.20\ 0.00\ 0.04\ 0.00$  $157\ 0.76\ 0.69\ 0.83\ 0.85\ 229\ 0.57\ 0.74\ 0.76\ 0.75\ 246\ 0.18\ 0.00\ 0.02\ 0.00\ WasteProductivity\ Green. Revenue$ 0.16 0 SustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 10 0 0 11.35 6.06 0.09 68 0  $0\ 9.62\ 0.25\ 0.12\ 96\ 0\ 1\ 10.28\ 3.54\ -3.63\ 157\ 0\ 1\ 10.07\ 0.13\ 0.27\ 229\ 0\ 1\ 10.13\ 0.75\ 0.22\ 246\ 0\ 0\ 10.59\ -776.59$ -0.03 Industry 10 7 68 5 96 3 157 5 229 5 246 1

Table 1: Model 1 - Energy

	$Dependent\ variable:$		
	ROA		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.001	-0.002	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
SustainableThemedCommitment	$0.009^{*}$	0.013***	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	
AuditScore	-0.003	-0.001	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	
CarbonProductivity	-0.022	-0.020	
	(0.017)	(0.013)	
EnergyProductivity	0.011	0.005	
	(0.014)	(0.011)	
WaterProductivity	0.033***	0.028***	
	(0.012)	(0.009)	
WasteProductivity	0.001	0.003	
	(0.012)	(0.009)	
Leverage	-0.00001	-0.00001	
	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	
NetMargin	0.058***	0.160***	
	(0.004)	(0.008)	
FirmSize	-0.028***	-0.034***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Industry	-0.003***	-0.004***	
*	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Constant	0.356***	0.410***	
	(0.045)	(0.040)	
Observations	1,191	1,189	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.173	0.309	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.165	0.302	
F Statistic	$22.414^{***} (df = 11; 1179)$	$47.801^{***} (df = 11; 1177)$	

Note: p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Model 1 - No Energy

	Dependent variable:  ROA	
	(1)	(2)
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	$0.010^*$ $(0.005)$	$0.013^{***} $ $(0.004)$
AuditScore	-0.003 $(0.005)$	-0.001 (0.004)
CarbonProductivity	-0.012 (0.011)	$-0.016^*$ (0.008)
WaterProductivity	0.034*** (0.012)	0.028*** (0.009)
WasteProductivity	0.0002 $(0.012)$	0.003 (0.009)
Leverage	-0.00001 $(0.00004)$	-0.00001 $(0.00003)$
NetMargin	0.059*** (0.004)	0.160*** (0.008)
FirmSize	$-0.028^{***}$ (0.004)	$-0.034^{***}$ $(0.004)$
Industry	$-0.003^{***}$ (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Constant	$0.357^{***} $ $(0.045)$	0.411*** (0.040)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,191 \\ 0.173 \\ 0.166 \\ 24.619^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1180) \end{array} $	1,189 0.309 0.303 52.597*** (df = 10; 1178)

Table 3: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:	
	ROA	
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.003	
v	(0.003)	
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.013***	
	(0.004)	
AuditScore	-0.001	
	(0.004)	
Leverage	-0.00001	
-	(0.00003)	
NetMargin	0.161***	
	(0.008)	
FirmSize	-0.034***	
	(0.004)	
Industry	-0.004***	
	(0.001)	
Constant	0.411***	
	(0.040)	
Observations	1,189	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.300	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.296	
F Statistic	$72.473^{***} (df = 7; 1181)$	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.02	

Table 4: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA		
CarbonProductivity	$-0.014^{*}$		
	(0.008)		
WaterProductivity	0.029***		
	(0.009)		
WasteProductivity	0.002		
	(0.009)		
Leverage	-0.00001		
	(0.00003)		
NetMargin	0.159***		
<u> </u>	(0.008)		
FirmSize	-0.033***		
	(0.004)		
Industry	-0.003***		
·	(0.001)		
Constant	0.398***		
	(0.039)		
Observations	1,189		
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.304		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.300		
F Statistic	$73.579^{***} (df = 7; 1181)$		
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

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Table 5: Model 2 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	$Dependent\ variable:$		
	TobinsQ		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	0.033 $(0.066)$	$0.053 \\ (0.045)$	
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	$0.031 \\ (0.091)$	$0.067 \\ (0.063)$	
AuditScore	-0.039 (0.088)	0.071 $(0.059)$	
CarbonProductivity	0.017 $(0.146)$	-0.167 (0.102)	
WaterProductivity	-0.093 (0.162)	-0.040 (0.111)	
WasteProductivity	-0.219 (0.158)	-0.133 (0.110)	
Leverage	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	
NetMargin	-0.003 (0.058)	0.125 (0.113)	
FirmSize	$-0.898^{***}$ (0.092)	$-1.400^{***}$ (0.081)	
Industry	-0.017 (0.028)	$-0.050^{***}$ (0.018)	
Constant	11.177*** (0.959)	16.337*** (0.836)	
Observations R <sup>2</sup> Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> F Statistic	$   \begin{array}{r}     1,059 \\     0.095 \\     0.087 \\     11.027^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1048) \end{array} $	1,021 0.274 0.267 38.055*** (df = 10; 1010)	

Table 6: Model 3 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	Dependent variable:  ROE	
	(1)	(2)
SustainabilityPayLink	0.004	0.005
	(0.029)	(0.026)
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.130***	0.119***
	(0.034)	(0.032)
AuditScore	0.003	-0.004
	(0.034)	(0.031)
CarbonProductivity	-0.109	-0.114*
	(0.070)	(0.063)
WaterProductivity	0.100	0.110
	(0.078)	(0.069)
WasteProductivity	0.062	0.062
	(0.077)	(0.069)
Leverage	0.003***	-0.020***
	(0.0003)	(0.002)
NetMargin	0.114***	0.365***
	(0.029)	(0.062)
FirmSize	-0.105***	-0.092***
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Industry	-0.003	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	1.211***	1.119***
	(0.295)	(0.306)
Observations	1,191	1,153
$R^2$	0.116	0.138
Adjusted $R^2$	0.108	0.130
F Statistic	$15.441^{***} (df = 10; 1180)$	$18.288^{***} (df = 10; 1142)$

Table 7: Hausman Test PValue

Model	P-Value
Model 1 without outliers	0.0876
Model 2 without outliers	0.0446
Model 3 without outliers	0

Table 8: Fixed Effect Model - NoOutlier NoEnergy

		$Dependent\ variable:$	
	ROA	TobinsQ	ROE
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.005 $(0.004)$	0.024 $(0.046)$	-0.020 (0.030)
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.019*** (0.006)	0.095 $(0.073)$	0.179*** (0.049)
AuditScore	$0.001 \\ (0.006)$	$0.038 \ (0.067)$	$0.001 \\ (0.045)$
CarbonProductivity	$-0.022^{**}$ (0.009)	$-0.192^*$ (0.101)	-0.148** (0.066)
WaterProductivity	0.029*** (0.010)	-0.061 (0.109)	0.132* (0.071)
WasteProductivity	0.004 $(0.010)$	-0.127 (0.109)	0.040 $(0.072)$
Leverage	-0.00003 $(0.00004)$	-0.005 $(0.003)$	$-0.031^{***}$ (0.002)
NetMargin	0.169*** (0.009)	0.144 (0.117)	0.489*** (0.074)
FirmSize	$-0.025^{***}$ (0.008)	$-1.859^{***}$ $(0.174)$	-0.144 (0.107)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$	1,189 0.329 -0.018	1,021 $0.175$ $-0.277$	$1{,}153$ $0.247$ $-0.155$
F Statistic	$42.681^{***} (df = 9; 783)$	$15.513^{***} (df = 9; 659)$	$27.420^{***} (df = 9; 751)$

Figure 1: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e.  $\operatorname{Roa})$ 




Figure 2: Observations considered as outliers in model 2 (i.e. Tobin's Q)




Figure 3: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e. Roe)

