Appendix A: Outliers

First I measure the cook's distance of my models. Observations that have a cook's distance greater than 4 times the mean are considered as influential and are summarized in figures 1, 2 and 3.

Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR

96 32 2015 -0.72 0.93 -1.62 2016 1167 389 2015 0.06 1.40 0.60 2016 GreenScore EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 96 0.20~0.00~0.04~0.00~1167~0.58~0.08~0.09~0.05 WasteProductivity Green.Revenue SustainabilityPayLink 96 0.00 0.01 1 1167 0.04 0.12 1 SustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 96 0 1 10.28 3.54 -3.63 1167 1 1 9.99 5.22 8.62 Industry 96 3 1167 1 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 10 4 2013 0.06 2.18 0.44 2014 11 4 2014 0.11 $2.54\ 0.34\ 2015\ 12\ 4\ 2015\ 0.20\ 2.17\ 0.46\ 2016\ 64\ 22\ 2013\ 0.09\ 0.19\ 0.11\ 2014\ 96\ 32\ 2015\ -0.72\ 0.93\ -1.62\ 2016\ 0.99\ 0.9$ 136 46 2013 -0.02 0.80 -0.11 2014 GreenScore EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 10 $0.57\ 0.92\ 0.96\ 0.96\ 11\ 0.75\ 0.11\ 0.13\ 0.11\ 12\ 0.74\ 0.10\ 0.15\ 0.12\ 64\ 0.49\ 0.19\ 0.21\ 0.31\ 96\ 0.20\ 0.00\ 0.04\ 0.00$ 136 0.50 0.68 0.60 0.00 WasteProductivity Green.Revenue SustainabilityPayLink 10 0.94 0.01 0 11 0.14 0.11 $1\ 12\ 0.11\ 0.11\ 1\ 64\ 0.72\ 0.87\ 0\ 96\ 0.00\ 0.01\ 1\ 136\ 0.72\ 0.49\ 0\ Sustainable The med Commitment\ Audit Score$ $FirmSize\ Leverage\ NetMargin\ 10\ 0\ 0\ 11.35\ 6.06\ 0.09\ 11\ 0\ 1\ 11.42\ 7.41\ 0.23\ 12\ 0\ 1\ 11.47\ 4.35\ 0.23\ 64\ 1\ 1\ 11.09$ 0.03 0.16 96 0 1 10.28 3.54 -3.63 136 1 1 10.18 0.43 -0.02 Industry 10 7 11 7 12 7 64 4 96 3 136 1 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 10 4 2013 0.06 2.18 0.44 2014 11 4 2014 0.11 $2.54\ 0.34\ 2015\ 12\ 4\ 2015\ 0.20\ 2.17\ 0.46\ 2016\ 64\ 22\ 2013\ 0.09\ 0.19\ 0.11\ 2014\ 96\ 32\ 2015\ -0.72\ 0.93\ -1.62\ 2016\ 0.90\ 0.9$ 136 46 2013 -0.02 0.80 -0.11 2014 GreenScore EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 10 $0.57\ 0.92\ 0.96\ 0.96\ 11\ 0.75\ 0.11\ 0.13\ 0.11\ 12\ 0.74\ 0.10\ 0.15\ 0.12\ 64\ 0.49\ 0.19\ 0.21\ 0.31\ 96\ 0.20\ 0.00\ 0.04\ 0.00$ 136 0.50 0.68 0.60 0.00 WasteProductivity Green.Revenue SustainabilityPayLink 10 0.94 0.01 0 11 0.14 0.11 $1\ 12\ 0.11\ 0.11\ 1\ 64\ 0.72\ 0.87\ 0\ 96\ 0.00\ 0.01\ 1\ 136\ 0.72\ 0.49\ 0\ Sustainable The med Commitment\ Audit Score$ $FirmSize\ Leverage\ NetMargin\ 10\ 0\ 0\ 11.35\ 6.06\ 0.09\ 11\ 0\ 1\ 11.42\ 7.41\ 0.23\ 12\ 0\ 1\ 11.47\ 4.35\ 0.23\ 64\ 1\ 1\ 11.09$ $0.03\ 0.16\ 96\ 0\ 1\ 10.28\ 3.54\ -3.63\ 136\ 1\ 1\ 10.18\ 0.43\ -0.02\ \mathrm{Industry}\ 10\ 7\ 11\ 7\ 12\ 7\ 64\ 4\ 96\ 3\ 136\ 1$

Table 1: Model 1 - Energy

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.001	-0.002	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.009^{*}	0.013***	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	
AuditScore	-0.003	-0.001	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	
CarbonProductivity	-0.022	-0.020	
	(0.017)	(0.013)	
EnergyProductivity	0.011	0.005	
	(0.014)	(0.011)	
WaterProductivity	0.033***	0.028***	
	(0.012)	(0.009)	
WasteProductivity	0.001	0.003	
	(0.012)	(0.009)	
Leverage	-0.00001	-0.00001	
	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	
NetMargin	0.058***	0.160***	
	(0.004)	(0.008)	
FirmSize	-0.028***	-0.034***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Industry	-0.003***	-0.004***	
*	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Constant	0.356***	0.410***	
	(0.045)	(0.040)	
Observations	1,191	1,189	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.173	0.309	
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.302	
F Statistic	$22.414^{***} (df = 11; 1179)$	$47.801^{***} (df = 11; 1177)$	

Note: p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Model 1 - No Energy

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.010^* (0.005)	$0.013^{***} $ (0.004)	
AuditScore	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	
CarbonProductivity	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.016^* (0.008)	
WaterProductivity	0.034*** (0.012)	0.028*** (0.009)	
WasteProductivity	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.009)	
Leverage	-0.00001 (0.00004)	-0.00001 (0.00003)	
NetMargin	0.059*** (0.004)	0.160*** (0.008)	
FirmSize	-0.028^{***} (0.004)	-0.034^{***} (0.004)	
Industry	-0.003^{***} (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	
Constant	$0.357^{***} $ (0.045)	0.411*** (0.040)	
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,191 \\ 0.173 \\ 0.166 \\ 24.619^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1180) \end{array} $	1,189 0.309 0.303 52.597*** (df = 10; 1178)	

Table 3: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:	
	ROA	
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.003	
v	(0.003)	
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.013***	
	(0.004)	
AuditScore	-0.001	
	(0.004)	
Leverage	-0.00001	
-	(0.00003)	
NetMargin	0.161***	
	(0.008)	
FirmSize	-0.034***	
	(0.004)	
Industry	-0.004***	
	(0.001)	
Constant	0.411***	
	(0.040)	
Observations	1,189	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.300	
Adjusted R ²	0.296	
F Statistic	$72.473^{***} (df = 7; 1181)$	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.02	

Table 4: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA		
CarbonProductivity	-0.014^{*}		
	(0.008)		
WaterProductivity	0.029***		
	(0.009)		
WasteProductivity	0.002		
	(0.009)		
Leverage	-0.00001		
	(0.00003)		
NetMargin	0.159***		
<u> </u>	(0.008)		
FirmSize	-0.033***		
	(0.004)		
Industry	-0.003***		
·	(0.001)		
Constant	0.398***		
	(0.039)		
Observations	1,189		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.304		
Adjusted R ²	0.300		
F Statistic	$73.579^{***} (df = 7; 1181)$		
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

5

Table 5: Model 2 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	$Dependent\ variable:$		
	$\log(\text{TobinsQ})$		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	0.033 (0.026)	$0.038 \\ (0.026)$	
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.041 (0.037)	$0.065^* \ (0.035)$	
AuditScore	0.033 (0.036)	0.063^* (0.034)	
CarbonProductivity	-0.025 (0.057)	-0.071 (0.057)	
WaterProductivity	0.053 (0.063)	0.097 (0.064)	
WasteProductivity	-0.173^{***} (0.062)	-0.187*** (0.064)	
Leverage	$0.00002 \\ (0.0002)$	-0.002 (0.002)	
NetMargin	$0.0005 \\ (0.023)$	0.113** (0.057)	
FirmSize	-0.694^{***} (0.045)	$-1.030^{***} \ (0.050)$	
Industry	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.021^* (0.012)	
Constant	7.471*** (0.470)	10.936*** (0.521)	
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,049 \\ 0.198 \\ 0.190 \\ 25.565^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1038) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,021 \\ 0.306 \\ 0.299 \\ 44.561^{***} \text{ (df = 10; 1010)} \end{array} $	

Table 6: Model 3 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	Dependent variable:		
	ROE		
	(1)	(2)	
SustainabilityPayLink	$0.004 \\ (0.029)$	$0.001 \\ (0.027)$	
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.130*** (0.034)	0.118*** (0.032)	
AuditScore	0.003 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.031)	
CarbonProductivity	-0.109 (0.070)	-0.119^* (0.065)	
WaterProductivity	$0.100 \\ (0.078)$	0.113 (0.073)	
WasteProductivity	$0.062 \\ (0.077)$	0.076 (0.073)	
Leverage	$0.003^{***} \ (0.0003)$	-0.021^{***} (0.002)	
NetMargin	0.114*** (0.029)	$0.193^{***} \ (0.056)$	
FirmSize	-0.105^{***} (0.029)	-0.072^{**} (0.028)	
Industry	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.006)	
Constant	1.211*** (0.295)	0.937*** (0.290)	
Observations R^2 Adjusted R^2 F Statistic	1,191 0.116 0.108 15.441*** (df = 10; 1180)	1,163 0.123 0.116 16.221*** (df = 10; 1152)	

Table 7: Hausman Test PValue

Model	P-Value
Model 1 without outliers	0.0876
Model 2 without outliers	0.6436
Model 3 without outliers	0

Table 8: Fixed Effect Model - NoOutlier NoEnergy

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA	$\log(\mathrm{TobinsQ})$	ROE
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SustainabilityPayLink	-0.005	0.034	-0.021
	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.031)
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.019***	0.059	0.180***
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.048)
AuditScore	0.001	0.038	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.046)
CarbonProductivity	-0.022**	-0.078	-0.152**
V	(0.009)	(0.057)	(0.068)
WaterProductivity	0.029***	0.090	0.142*
V	(0.010)	(0.063)	(0.074)
WasteProductivity	0.004	-0.192^{***}	0.054
v	(0.010)	(0.064)	(0.076)
Leverage	-0.00003	-0.002	-0.032***
	(0.00004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
NetMargin	0.169***	0.118**	0.299***
O	(0.009)	(0.059)	(0.068)
FirmSize	-0.025***	-0.832***	-0.018
	(0.008)	(0.094)	(0.068)
Observations	1,189	1,021	1,163
\mathbb{R}^2	0.329	0.143	0.227
Adjusted R^2	-0.018	-0.322	-0.183
F Statistic	$42.681^{***} (df = 9; 783)$	$12.255^{***} (df = 9; 661)$	$24.776^{***} (df = 9; 759)$

Figure 1: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e. $\operatorname{Roa})$




Figure 2: Observations considered as outliers in model 2 (i.e. Tobin's Q)




Figure 3: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e. Roe)

