## Appendix A: Outliers

First I measure the cook's distance of my models. Observations that have a cook's distance greater than 4 times the mean are considered as influential and are summarized in figures 1, 2 and 3.

## Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR

225 225 2012 0.14 NA 0.77 2014 353 353 2012 -0.46 3.85 -2.27 2014 1168 374 2014 -0.33 11.92 -0.64 2016 EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 225 0 0.00 0 353 0 0.00 0 1168 0 0.01 0 WasteProductivity Green.Revenue SustainabilityPayLink 225 0 0.00 0 353 0 0.39 0 1168 0 0.17 0 SustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 225 0 1 9.86 0.27 5.96 353 0 0 9.05 3.30 -0.96 1168 0 0 9.37 0.74 -1.27 Industry 225 1 353 1 1168 5 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 2 2 2012 0.09 0.09 0.35 2014 4 4 2012 0.29 2.42 0.43 2014 11 11 2012  $0.04\ 0.27\ 0.22\ 2014\ 22\ 22\ 2012\ 0.11\ 0.14\ 0.15\ 2014\ 46\ 46\ 2012\ -0.09\ 0.32\ -0.43\ 2014\ 156\ 156\ 2012\ 0.01\ 1.03$ -0.13 2014 EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 2 0.05 0.14 0.16 4 0.92 0.96 0.96 11  $0.06\ 0.09\ 0.55\ 22\ 0.19\ 0.21\ 0.31\ 46\ 0.68\ 0.60\ 0.00\ 156\ 0.00\ 0.00\ 0.00\ Waste$ Productivity Green. RevenueSustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize Leverage NetMargin 2 1 0 10.37 0.50 0.06 4 0 0 11.29  $3.18\ 0.22\ 11\ 1\ 0\ 10.65\ 0.36\ 0.13\ 22\ 1\ 1\ 11.10\ 0.05\ 0.22\ 46\ 1\ 1\ 10.24\ 0.33\ 0.03\ 156\ 0\ 0\ 12.51\ 444.04\ 0.07\ Industry\ 2$ 6 4 7 11 2 22 4 46 1 156 4 Companies YearFinancialIndicator ROA TobinsQ ROE YearNewsWeekGR 2 2 2012  $0.09\ 0.09\ 0.35\ 2014\ 4\ 4\ 2012\ 0.29\ 2.42\ 0.43\ 2014\ 11\ 11\ 2012\ 0.04\ 0.27\ 0.22\ 2014\ 22\ 22\ 2012\ 0.11\ 0.14\ 0.15\ 2014$ 46 46 2012 -0.09 0.32 -0.43 2014 156 156 2012 0.01 1.03 -0.13 2014 EnergyProductivity CarbonProductivity WaterProductivity 2 0.05 0.14 0.16 4 0.92 0.96 0.96 11 0.06 0.09 0.55 22 0.19 0.21 0.31 46 0.68 0.60 0.00 156 0.00~0.00~0.00~ Waste Productivity Green. Revenue Sustainability PayLink 2~0.23~0.28~1~4~0.94~0.01~0~11~0.000.19 0 22 0.72 0.87 0 46 0.72 0.49 0 156 0.00 0.82 0 SustainableThemedCommitment AuditScore FirmSize  $\text{Leverage NetMargin 2 1 0 } 10.37\ 0.50\ 0.06\ 4\ 0\ 0\ 11.29\ 3.18\ 0.22\ 11\ 1\ 0\ 10.65\ 0.36\ 0.13\ 22\ 1\ 1\ 11.10\ 0.05\ 0.22$  $46\ 1\ 1\ 10.24\ 0.33\ 0.03\ 156\ 0\ 0\ 12.51\ 444.04\ 0.07\ \text{Industry}\ 2\ 6\ 4\ 7\ 11\ 2\ 22\ 4\ 46\ 1\ 156\ 4$ 

Table 1: Model 1 - Energy

	(1)	(2)
SustainabilityPayLink	0.005	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	-0.003	0.0004
	(0.005)	(0.004)
AuditScore	0.002	-0.0002
	(0.005)	(0.004)
CarbonProductivity	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.014)	(0.011)
EnergyProductivity	0.002	0.002
	(0.012)	(0.010)
WaterProductivity	0.010	0.009
v	(0.010)	(0.008)
WasteProductivity	-0.006	-0.005
v	(0.010)	(0.008)
Leverage	-0.00004	-0.00002
Ü	(0.0001)	(0.00004)
NetMargin	0.080***	0.212***
	(0.005)	(0.009)
FirmSize	-0.027***	$-0.034^{***}$
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Industry	-0.004***	-0.004***
v	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.355***	0.410***
	(0.041)	(0.036)
Observations	1,191	1,188
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.195	0.351
Adjusted $R^2$	0.187	0.345
F Statistic	$25.937^{***} (df = 11; 1179)$	$57.775^{***} (df = 11; 1176)$

Table 2: Model 1 - No Energy

	Dependent variable:  ROA	
	(1)	(2)
SustainabilityPayLink	$0.005 \\ (0.004)$	$0.004 \\ (0.003)$
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	-0.003 $(0.005)$	$0.0005 \\ (0.004)$
AuditScore	0.002 $(0.005)$	-0.0002 $(0.004)$
CarbonProductivity	-0.005 $(0.009)$	-0.004 (0.007)
WaterProductivity	0.011 $(0.010)$	$0.009 \\ (0.008)$
WasteProductivity	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.005 $(0.008)$
Leverage	-0.00004 $(0.0001)$	-0.00002 $(0.00004)$
NetMargin	$0.080^{***} $ $(0.005)$	0.212*** (0.009)
FirmSize	$-0.027^{***} $ $(0.004)$	$-0.034^{***}$ $(0.004)$
Industry	$-0.004^{***}$ (0.001)	$-0.004^{***}$ (0.001)
Constant	0.355*** $(0.041)$	0.410*** (0.036)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,191 \\ 0.195 \\ 0.188 \\ 28.556^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1180) \end{array} $	1,188 0.351 0.345 63.597*** (df = 10; 1177)

Table 3: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:
	ROA
SustainabilityPayLink	0.004
• •	(0.003)
SustainableThemedCommitment	0.0004
	(0.004)
AuditScore	-0.0001
	(0.004)
Leverage	-0.00002
	(0.00004)
NetMargin	0.213***
	(0.009)
FirmSize	-0.034***
	(0.004)
Industry	-0.004***
	(0.001)
Constant	0.409***
	(0.036)
Observations	1,188
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.350
Adjusted $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.346
F Statistic	$90.825^{***} (df = 7; 1180)$
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.0

Table 4: Model 1 - Short Version

	Dependent variable:	
	ROA	
CarbonProductivity	-0.006	
	(0.007)	
WaterProductivity	0.009	
	(0.008)	
WasteProductivity	-0.005	
	(0.008)	
Leverage	-0.00002	
	(0.00004)	
NetMargin	0.212***	
	(0.009)	
FirmSize	$-0.033^{***}$	
	(0.003)	
Industry	-0.004***	
	(0.001)	
Constant	0.403***	
	(0.035)	
Observations	1,188	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.350	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.346	
F Statistic	$90.599^{***} (df = 7; 1180)$	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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Table 5: Model 2 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	$\frac{Dependent\ variable:}{\log(\text{TobinsQ})}$	
	(1)	(2)
SustainabilityPayLink	0.051 $(0.032)$	$0.038 \\ (0.030)$
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.019 $(0.044)$	$0.066* \\ (0.040)$
AuditScore	$0.083^*$ $(0.043)$	0.125*** (0.039)
CarbonProductivity	$-0.340^{***}$ $(0.070)$	$-0.339^{***} $ $(0.066)$
WaterProductivity	-0.051 (0.078)	-0.083 $(0.074)$
WasteProductivity	$-0.224^{***}$ (0.076)	$-0.139^*$ (0.075)
Leverage	$0.0001 \\ (0.0005)$	-0.0005 $(0.001)$
NetMargin	0.002 $(0.096)$	0.238** (0.096)
FirmSize	$-0.589^{***}$ (0.053)	$-0.815^{***}$ (0.055)
Industry	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.012)
Constant	6.321*** (0.543)	8.609*** (0.561)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,052 \\ 0.206 \\ 0.199 \\ 27.064^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1041) \end{array} $	1,023 0.263 0.256 36.115*** (df = 10; 1012)

Table 6: Model 3 - Comparaison with and without outliers

	(1)	(2)
Sustainability Pay Link	$0.001 \\ (0.041)$	$0.031 \\ (0.038)$
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	0.123*** (0.040)	0.086** (0.037)
AuditScore	$0.006 \\ (0.040)$	$0.006 \\ (0.037)$
CarbonProductivity	-0.049 (0.123)	$0.036 \\ (0.116)$
WaterProductivity	-0.006 (0.139)	$0.109 \\ (0.133)$
WasteProductivity	-0.132 (0.136)	-0.118 (0.132)
Leverage	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
NetMargin	0.351*** (0.069)	0.469*** (0.066)
FirmSize	$-0.081^{***}$ $(0.029)$	$-0.077^{***} $ $(0.027)$
Industry	-0.0001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
Constant	0.933*** (0.292)	0.870*** (0.274)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$ F Statistic	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,191 \\ 0.036 \\ 0.027 \\ 4.364^{***} \text{ (df} = 10; 1180) \end{array} $	1,162 0.052 0.044 6.332*** (df = 10; 1151)

Table 7: Hausman Test PValue

Model	P-Value
Model 1 without outliers	0.0355
Model 2 without outliers	0
Model 3 without outliers	0.018

Table 8: Fixed Effect Model - NoOutlier NoEnergy

	Dependent variable:		
	ROA	$\log(\text{TobinsQ})$	ROE
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sustainability Pay Link	0.003 $(0.003)$	0.031 $(0.029)$	-0.005 $(0.073)$
	(0.000)	(0.020)	(0.010)
${\bf Sustainable The med Commitment}$	-0.007	0.050	-0.014
	(0.005)	(0.043)	(0.111)
AuditScore	-0.003	0.109***	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.106)
CarbonProductivity	-0.005	-0.304***	-0.010
v	(0.008)	(0.063)	(0.158)
WaterProductivity	0.006	-0.088	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.069)	(0.173)
WasteProductivity	-0.006	$-0.132^*$	-0.142
	(0.008)	(0.071)	(0.177)
Leverage	-0.00005	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
NetMargin	0.221***	0.147	0.242**
	(0.011)	(0.097)	(0.104)
FirmSize	-0.023***	0.371***	0.122
	(0.006)	(0.116)	(0.139)
Observations	1,188	1,023	1,162
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.361	0.223	0.013
Adjusted $R^2$	0.030	-0.202	-0.514
F Statistic	$49.077^{***} (df = 9; 782)$	$21.041^{***} (df = 9; 661)$	1.101 (df = 9; 757)

Figure 1: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e.  $\operatorname{Roa}$ )




Figure 2: Observations considered as outliers in model 2 (i.e. Tobin's Q)




Figure 3: Observations considered as outliers in model 1 (i.e. Roe)

