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Declaring End-to-end Encryption stable and turning it on by default for private rooms. #6779

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ara4n opened this Issue May 22, 2018 · 1 comment

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ara4n commented May 22, 2018

Somehow we seem to be missing a high-level tracking bug for the endgame of E2E. (The starting point was matrix-org/matrix-doc#501, but that's a spec bug and feels a bit weird to hijack it for this).

In order to declare E2E stable (and by extension Matrix), we need to:

  • Cross-sign devices at login to eliminate verification warnings (#2714)
  • Improve verification UX (comparing per-verification mnemonic passphrases rather than public keys) (#2142)
  • Hook up key sharing to let history be visible from before you joined a room (but after you were invited to it), history visibility allowing. (#2713) - mainly fixed, other than for edge case where users add devices after being invited to a E2E room
  • Have less than 0.0x% unresolved unable-to-decrypt errors reported through telemetry (#2996, #6390)
  • Fix device lists getting out of sync over federation (#6974)
  • Support full-text search within E2E rooms (#2548, in progress at https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-search)
  • Support push and in-app notifications in E2E rooms at least by locally calculating them. We could also support setting metadata on the messages to bing users, especially if we had pseudonymous MXIDs.
  • Support NotifPanel in E2E rooms (#6874)
  • Turn it on by default for private rooms. All rooms created with the intent of use as a 1:1 or a private group chat must be E2E (and homeservers would enforce that, as best they can, c.f. matrix-org/synapse#3269), although obviously a broken client could still try emitting unencrypted events into such a room). The code exists for this already over at https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/pull/3426/files.

Ideally:

  • Provide some kind of E2E daemon/proxy to stop non-E2E clients/bots/bridges/curl-users being unceremoniously dumped out in the cold. (#6778)
  • Improve the UX for managing the trust of the devices which are in a given room (#4522). In practice if verification is working nicely this might not be so important.
  • Optionally incrementally backup encrypted E2E keys to your HS so if you lose all your devices you can restore your history via a recovery key that you own. (#5675)
  • Optionally hook up key sharing to let history be visible from before you were invited to a room (history visibility allowing) (#2286)
  • Get an end-to-end audit of crypto spanning a set of reference implementations - e.g. matrix-{web,ios,android}-sdk + synapse.
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aaronraimist commented Oct 22, 2018

#6959 should probably be in here at least under ideally

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