

Security of distributed Model Predictive Control under False Data injection

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<https://bit.ly/3g3S6X4>



Context

“Necessity is the mother of invention”



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- Electricity Distribution System
- Heat distribution
- Water distribution
- Traffic management
- (include your problem here)

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- Multiple systems interacting
- Coupled by constraints
 - Technical/ Comfort
- Optimization objectives
 - Minimize energy consumption
 - Maximize user satisfaction
 - Follow a trajectory
- Solution \rightarrow MPC

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Model-based Predictive Control

Find best control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem
 - Decision variable is the control sequence
 - Objective function to optimize
 - System's Model (states and inputs)
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

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Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell

Find optimal control sequence





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Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell



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
Find optimal control sequence, apply first element



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

Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat



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
Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat → Receding Horizon



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In a nutshell

Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat → Receding Horizon



Model Predictive Control

Nothing is perfect

- Problems
 - Complexity of calculation
 - Topology (Geographical distribution)
 - Flexibility (Add/remove parts)
 - Privacy
- Solution: Divide and Conquer (distributed MPC)
 - Break calculation
 - Make Systems Communicate



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


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Distributed Model Predictive Control

It is about communication




- We break the MPC into multiple
- Make them Communicate
 - Many flavors to choose from
 - Hierarchical/Anarchical
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 - Synchronous/Asynchronous
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


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

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


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



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



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




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Distributed Model Predictive Control

It is about communication





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



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




¹ Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy

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
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Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Frameworks




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Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Frameworks




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


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


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


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


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Negotiation works if agents comply.

But what if some agents are ill-intentioned and attack the system?

- How can an agent attack?
- What are the consequences of an attack?
- Can we mitigate the effects?

Let's have a preview!



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
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
Literature



- [Vel+17a; CMI18] present attacks
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 - Fake weights
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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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
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(Internal change)

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Our approach




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- What matters is the interface
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


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


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
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


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


Consequence of an attack

- Attack modifies optimization problem
- Optimum value is shifted



Original minimum.




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


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


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


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Mitigating the effects

- We can recover by
 - Ignoring attacker
 - Recuperating original behavior (at least trying)




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


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


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


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


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Recover original behavior.



Classification of mitigation techniques

- Passive (Robust) - 1 mode
- Active (Resilient) - 2 modes {
 - ① Detection/Isolation
 - ② Mitigation



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State of art

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[Vel+17b] [Vel+18]	Dual	Robust (f-robust)	NA	NA
[CMI18]	Jacobi-Gauß	–	–	–
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	Decomposition	Resilient/Robust	Detection	Mitigation
[Vel+17a] [Mae+21]	Dual	Robust (Scenario)	NA	NA
[Vel+17b] [Vel+18]	Dual	Robust (f-robust)	NA	NA
[CMI18]	Jacobi-Gauß	–	–	–
[Ana+18] [Ana+19] [Ana+20]	Dual	Resilient	Analyt./Learn.	Disconnect (Robustness)
Our	Primal	Resilient	Active Analyt./Learn.	Data reconstruction



- ① Vulnerabilities in distributed MPC based on Primal Decomposition
- ② Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC for deprived systems
- ③ Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity
- ④ Conclusion

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Outline

1 Vulnerabilities in distributed MPC based on Primal Decomposition


What is the Primal Decomposition?

How can an agent attack?


Consequences




Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation



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

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
Allocation θ_i



Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation




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Allocation θ_i
Dissatisfaction λ_i




Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation



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Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation



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Dissatisfaction λ_i



Primal Decomposition

or Quantity Decomposition | or Resource Allocation

- Objective is sum of local ones
- Constraints couple variables

- 1 Allocate θ_i for each agent
- 2 They solve local problems and
- 3 Send dual variable λ_i
- 4 Allocation is updated
(respecting global constraint)

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_M}{\text{minimize}} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ & \text{s.t.} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \mathbf{u}_{\text{total}} \end{aligned}$$

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

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
Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation

Until everybody is equally dissatisfied



How can a non-cooperative agent attack?


Our approach



- λ_i is the only interface
- λ_i depends on local parameters
- Malicious agent modifies λ_i

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
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
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


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$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \gamma_i(\lambda_i)$$

How does an agent lie?

Liar, Liar, Pants of fire




- $\lambda \geq 0$ means dissatisfaction
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Assumptions

- *Attacker satisfied only if it really is*
 $\lambda = 0 \rightarrow \gamma(\lambda) = 0 \rightarrow \lambda = 0$
- *Attacker is greedy* $\gamma(\lambda) > \lambda$
- *Attack is monotonically increasing*
 $\lambda_b > \lambda_a \rightarrow \gamma(\lambda_b) > \gamma(\lambda_a)$
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- If $\tilde{\lambda}_i = T_i[k]\lambda_i \rightarrow \exists T_i[k]^{-1}$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Example

4 distinct agents

- Agent 1 is non-cooperative
- It uses $\tilde{\lambda}_1 = \gamma_1(\lambda_1) = \tau_1 I \lambda_1$
- We can observe 3 things
 - Global minimum when $\tau_1 = 1$
 - Agent 1 benefits if τ_1 increases (inverse otherwise)
 - All collapses if too greedy



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
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
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
Example



4 distinct agents

- Agent 1 is non-cooperative
- It uses $\tilde{\lambda}_1 = \gamma_1(\lambda_1) = \tau_1 I \lambda_1$
- We can observe 3 things
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
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Outline

② Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC for deprived systems

- Analyzing deprived systems

- Building an algorithm

- Applying mechanism



What are deprived systems?

Systems whose optimal solution has all constraints active

- Unconstrained Solution $\mathring{U}_i^*[k]$
- $\bar{\Gamma}_i \mathring{U}_i^*[k] \geq \theta_i[k] \rightarrow \text{Scarcity}$
 - Solution projected onto boundary
 - Same as with equality constraints²

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{U_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|U_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + f_i[k]^T U_i[k] \\ & \text{subject to} && \bar{\Gamma}_i U_i[k] \leq \theta_i[k] : \lambda_i[k] \end{aligned}$$

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
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
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
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
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
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Deprived Systems

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Assumptions

- Quadratic local problems
- Scarcity
- Solution is analytical and affine

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Under attack!

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 - Affine solution

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Assumption

We know nominal \bar{P}_i

- If we estimate¹ $\hat{P}_i[k]$ and $\hat{s}_i[k]$ such as:

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- We estimate $\hat{P}_i[k]$ and $\hat{s}_i[k]$ simultaneously using RLS
- Challenge: Online estimation during negotiation fails
 - Update function couples θ_i^p and $\lambda_i^p \rightarrow$ low input excitation
- Solution: Send a random³ sequence to increase excitation until convergence.

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
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Classification of mitigation techniques

- Active (Resilient)
 - 1 Detection/Isolation ✓
 - 2 Mitigation ?



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Mitigation mechanism

Reconstructing λ_i

- Now, we have $\hat{\tilde{P}}_i[k]$
 - Since $\tilde{P}_i[k] = T_i[k]\bar{P}_i$
 - We can recover $T_i[k]^{-1}$

$$\widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} = P_i \hat{\tilde{P}}_i[k]^{-1}$$

- Reconstruct λ_i

$$\lambda_i^{\text{rec}} = -\bar{P}_i \theta_i - \widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} \hat{\tilde{s}}_i[k]$$

- Choose adequate version for coordination

$$\lambda_i^{\text{mod}} = \begin{cases} \lambda_i^{\text{rec}}, & \text{if attack detected} \\ \tilde{\lambda}_i, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



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
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Complete Mechanism




- Supervise exchanges by inquiring the agents
- Estimate how they will behave

Two Phases

- 1 Detect which agents are non-cooperative
- 2 Reconstruct λ_i and use in negotiation

Complete Mechanism




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


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


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


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
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
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RPdMPC-DS




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C (monozone)
- Not enough power
- Period of 5h
- 3 scenarios
 - ① Nominal
 - ② Agent 1 cheats (dMPC)
 - ③ Agent 1 cheats (RPdMPC-DS)


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
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
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
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
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
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


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Temperature in house I.


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
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
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
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Objective functions J_i (Normalized error %)

Agent	Selfish	Corrected
I	-36.3	0.503
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III	17.387	-0.004
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Outline

③ Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity

- Relaxing some assumptions

- Adapting the algorithm

- Applying mechanism



Relaxing scarcity assumption

- Systems are not completely deprived
 - We can't change our constraints to equality ones anymore
 - Nor use the simpler update equation

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{\mathbf{U}_i[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}_i[k]\|_{H_i}^2 + \mathbf{f}_i[k]^T \mathbf{U}_i[k] \\ & \text{subject to} && \bar{\Gamma}_i \mathbf{U}_i[k] \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_i[k] : \boldsymbol{\lambda}_i[k] \end{aligned}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p+1)} = \text{Proj}^{\mathcal{S}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)})$$



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Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$

Instead of having one single affine solution

$$\lambda_i[k] = -P_i \theta_i[k] - s_i[k]$$

Now, we may have multiple (Piecewise affine function)

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
$$\lambda_i[k] = \begin{cases} -P_i^{(0)} \theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ -P_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)} \theta_i[k] - s_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^{2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1} \end{cases}$$

Still the $P_i^{(n)}$ are time independent



Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.
Unknown by the coordinator.

Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



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Analyzing System


Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



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
Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



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
Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



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
Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.
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
Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.
Unknown by the coordinator.

Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Separation surfaces depend on state and local parameters.
Unknown by the coordinator.

Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued) Still?

$$\lambda_i[k] = \begin{cases} -P_i^{(0)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ -P_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^{2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1} \end{cases}$$

\uparrow
Scarcity

\downarrow
Sparsity

All constraints active	$-P_i^{(0)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(0)}[k]$	→	$-P_i\theta_i[k] - s_i[k]$
None constraints active	$-P_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}\theta_i[k] - s_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}[k]$	→	0



Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued) Still?

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Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued) Still?

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Analyzing System

Under attack!

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i[k] = T_i[k] \lambda_k$$

Parameters are modified. But not the regions' limits

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i[k] = \begin{cases} -\tilde{P}_i^{(0)} \theta_i[k] - \tilde{s}_i^{(0)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ -\tilde{P}_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)} \theta_i[k] - \tilde{s}_i^{(2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1)}[k], & \text{if } \theta_i[k] \in \mathcal{R}_{\lambda_i}^{2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}-1} \end{cases}$$

- If we can estimate $\tilde{P}_i^{(0)}$ we can use same strategy than before
- Problem: We don't know in which region θ_i is
- Solution: Let's force it using Artificial Scarcity



Analyzing System

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


Artificial Scarcity

Who is it? Who is it?

Assumption

We known a point $\bar{\theta}_i$ which activates all constraints⁴




⁴If we have local constraints, we suppose this point respects them.

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
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
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Artificial Scarcity

Who is it? Who is it?

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We known a point θ_i^\emptyset which activates all constraints⁴




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
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
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We known a point $\bar{\theta}_i$ which activates all constraints⁴



- How to know the radius?
 - We don't.
 - Let's estimate $\hat{\bar{P}}_i^{(0)}[k]$ nonetheless


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
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Enter Expectation Maximization

- Iterative method to estimate parameters of multimodal models⁵
- We give multiple observations $\theta_i^o[k]$ and $\tilde{\lambda}_i^o[k]$
- At each step we calculate
 - ③ the probability of each $(\hat{P}_i^{(n)}[k], \hat{s}_i^{(n)}[k])$ having generated each $\tilde{\lambda}_i^o[k]$
 - ③ new estimates $(\hat{P}_i^{(n)}[k], \hat{s}_i^{(n)}[k])$ based on the probabilities
- At the end we have
 - ① Parameters with associated region index
 - ② Observations with associated region index
- We consult the index associated to θ_i^\emptyset
- We recover the associated parameter, i.e., $\hat{P}_i^{(0)}[k]$

⁵Such as our PWA function using some tricks

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 - Ⓔ the probability of each $(\hat{P}_i^{(n)}[k], \hat{s}_i^{(n)}[k])$ having generated each $\tilde{\lambda}_i^o[k]$
 - Ⓜ new estimates $(\hat{P}_i^{(n)}[k], \hat{s}_i^{(n)}[k])$ based on the probabilities
- At the end we have
 - Ⓛ Parameters with associated region index
 - Ⓜ Observations with associated region index
- We consult the index associated to θ_i^\emptyset
- We recover the associated parameter, i.e., $\hat{P}_i^{(0)}[k]$

⁵Such as our PWA function using some tricks

Enter Expectation Maximization

- Iterative method to estimate parameters of multimodal models⁵
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Detection and Mitigation

Same same, but different

Assumption

We know nominal $\bar{P}_i^{(0)}$

- Detection

$$\left\| \hat{\bar{P}}_i^{(0)}[k] - \bar{P}_i^{(0)} \right\|_F \geq \epsilon_{P_i^{(0)}}$$

- Mitigation

$$\widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} = \bar{P}_i^{(0)} \hat{\bar{P}}_i^{(0)}[k]^{-1}.$$

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i^{\text{rec}} = \widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} \tilde{\lambda}_i.$$



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
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
Complete algorithm

RPdMPC-AS




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
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
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


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
Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C
- Not enough power
- Period of 5h ($T_s = 0.25h$)
- 3 scenarios
 - Ⓝ Nominal
 - Ⓒ Agent I cheats (dMPC)
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


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Results

Temporal



Temperature in house I.


Error $E_I(k)$.

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Results

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Results

Costs

Objective functions J_i (Normalized error %)

Agent	Selfish	Corrected
I	-36.489	-0.0
II	35.813	0.0
III	29.225	0.0
IV	37.541	0.0
Global	10.689	-0.0

Too good to be true!

It's a kind of magic!

- Unfortunately EM is not magic
 - Slow convergence
 - Dependency on initialization
 - No guarantee of achieving global optimal
- Some “solutions”:
 - Force some parameters to converge faster (case dependant)
 - Run multiple times with different initialization and pick best
 - Associate with other methods of the same family



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Outline

4 Conclusion



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Main takeaways

- How can an agent attack? ✓
 - Attacker can change the communication to receive more resources.
- What are the consequences of an attack? ✓
 - Suboptimality and maybe instability
- Can we mitigate the effects? ✓
 - Yes! By exploring the scarcity of the systems!



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- Insights from the analysis of the solutions of the optimization problems
 - We found some parameters that are constant when there is no cheating
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**TO BE
CONTINUED...** →



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- Study of robustness + noise
- Resilient strategy with soft constraints
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Thank you!

Repository

<https://github.com/Accacio/thesis>



Contact

rafael.accacio.nogueira@gmail.com



For Further Reading I



K.J. Åström and B. Wittenmark. Adaptive Control. Addison-Wesley series in electrical and computer engineering: Control engineering. Addison-Wesley, 1989. ISBN: 9780201097207. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-662-08546-2_24](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-08546-2_24).



José M Maestre, Rudy R Negenborn, et al. Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy. Vol. 69. Springer, 2014. ISBN: 978-94-007-7005-8.



Wicak Ananduta et al. “Resilient Distributed Model Predictive Control for Energy Management of Interconnected Microgrids”. In: Optimal Control Applications and Methods 41.1 (2020), pp. 146–169. DOI: [10.1002/oca.2534](https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.2534). URL: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/oca.2534>.



For Further Reading II



José M. Maestre et al. “Scenario-Based Defense Mechanism Against Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-Based Dmpc”. In: [Control Eng Pract](#) 114 (2021), p. 104879. ISSN: 0967-0661. DOI: [10.1016/j.conengprac.2021.104879](#).



Pablo Velarde et al. “Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-Based Distributed Model Predictive Control”. In: [Optimal Control Applications and Methods](#) 39.2 (Sept. 2018), pp. 601–621. DOI: [10.1002/oca.2368](#).



Wicak Ananduta et al. “Resilient Distributed Energy Management for Systems of Interconnected Microgrids”. In: [2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control \(CDC\)](#). 2018, pp. 3159–3164. DOI: [10.1109/CDC.2018.8619548](#).



For Further Reading III



Wicak Ananduta et al. “A Resilient Approach for Distributed MPC-Based Economic Dispatch in Interconnected Microgrids”. In: [2019 18th European Control Conference \(ECC\)](#). 2019, pp. 691–696. DOI: [10.23919/ECC.2019.8796208](#).



P. Chanfreut, J. M. Maestre, and H. Ishii. “Vulnerabilities in Distributed Model Predictive Control based on Jacobi-Gauss Decomposition”. In: [2018 European Control Conference \(ECC\)](#). June 2018, pp. 2587–2592. DOI: [10.23919/ECC.2018.8550239](#).



Pablo Velarde et al. “Scenario-based defense mechanism for distributed model predictive control”. In: [2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control \(CDC\)](#). IEEE. Dec. 2017, pp. 6171–6176. DOI: [10.1109/CDC.2017.8264590](#).



For Further Reading IV



Pablo Velarde et al. “Vulnerabilities in Lagrange-Based DMPC in the Context of Cyber-Security”. In: [2017 IEEE International Conference on Autonomic Computing \(ICAC\)](#). July 2017, pp. 215–220. DOI: [10.1109/ICAC.2017.53](#).



One way to ensure this, is to make the original constraint (??) to have at most as many rows as columns, i.e., $\# \mathbf{u}_{\max} \leq n_u$, although it may be a little restrictive.

$$\theta^{(p+1)} = \mathcal{A}_\theta \theta^{(p)} + \mathcal{B}_\theta[k]$$

where

$$\mathcal{A}_\theta = \begin{bmatrix} I - \frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_1 & \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_2 & \dots & \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_M \\ \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_1 & I - \frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_2 & \dots & \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_M \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_1 & \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_2 & \dots & I - \frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} P_M \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\mathcal{B}_\theta[k] = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_1[k] + \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_2[k] \dots - \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_M[k] \\ \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_1[k] - \frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_2[k] \dots - \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_M[k] \\ \vdots \\ \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_1[k] + \frac{1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_2[k] \dots - \frac{M-1}{M} \rho^{(p)} \mathbf{s}_M[k] \end{bmatrix}$$