

Security of distributed Model Predictive Control under False Data injection

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2022-12-07



<https://bit.ly/3g3S6X4>



Context

“Necessity is the mother of invention”



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- Electricity Distribution System
- Heat distribution
- Water distribution
- Traffic management
- (include your problem here)

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- Multiple systems interacting
- Coupled by constraints
 - Technical/ Comfort
- Optimization objectives
 - Minimize energy consumption
 - Maximize user satisfaction
 - Follow a trajectory
- Solution \rightarrow MPC

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Model-based Predictive Control

Find best control sequence using predictions based on a model.

- We need an optimization problem
 - Decision variable is the control sequence
 - Objective function to optimize
 - System's Model (states and inputs)
 - Other constraints to respect



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subject to

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
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In a nutshell

Find optimal control sequence





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Model Predictive Control

In a nutshell


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
Find optimal control sequence, apply first element



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

Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat



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

Find optimal control sequence, apply first element, rinse repeat → Receding Horizon



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Model Predictive Control

Nothing is perfect

- Problems
 - Complexity of calculation
 - Topology (Geographical distribution)
 - Flexibility (Add/remove parts)
 - Privacy
- Solution: Divide and Conquer (distributed MPC)
 - Break calculation
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


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Distributed Model Predictive Control

It is about communication



- We break the MPC into multiple
- Make them Communicate
 - Many flavors to choose from
 - Hierarchical/Anarchical
 - Sequential/Parallel
 - Synchronous/Asynchronous
 - Bidirectional/Unidirectional



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


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


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


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



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



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



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



- We break the MPC into multiple
- Make them Communicate , But how?
 - Many flavors to choose from¹
 - Hierarchical/Anarchical
 - Sequential/Parallel
 - Synchronous/Asynchronous
 - Bidirectional/Unidirectional
 - ...



Distributed Model Predictive Control

It is about communication




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




¹ Distributed Model Predictive Control made easy

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
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Distributed Model Predictive Control

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


- Coordinator \rightarrow Hierarchical
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Distributed Model Predictive Control

Optimization Frameworks




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


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


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


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


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Negotiation works if agents comply.

But what if some agents are ill-intentioned and attack the system?

- How can an agent attack?
- What are the consequences of an attack?
- Can we mitigate the effects?

Let's have a preview!



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
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
Literature



- [Vel+17a; CMI18] present attacks
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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
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(Internal change)

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Our approach




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- What matters is the interface
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 - False Data Injection



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


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


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
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


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


Consequence of an attack

- Attack modifies optimization problem
- Optimum value is shifted




Original minimum.




Minimum after attack.

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


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


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Mitigating the effects

- We can recover by
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 - Recuperating original behavior (at least trying)




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


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


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


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


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Recover original behavior.



Classification of mitigation techniques

- Passive (Robust) - 1 mode
- Active (Resilient) - 2 modes {
 - ① Detection/Isolation
 - ② Mitigation



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State of art

Security dMPC

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[Vel+17b] [Vel+18]	Dual	Robust (f-robust)	NA	NA
[CMI18]	Jacobi-Gauß	–	–	–
[Ana+18] [Ana+19] [Ana+20]	Dual	Resilient	Analyt./Learn.	Disconnect (Robustness)
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- ③ Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity

Outline

1 Vulnerabilities in distributed MPC based on Primal Decomposition

What is the Primal Decomposition?

How can an agent attack?

Consequences



Primal Decomposition

or Quantity Decomposition | or Resource Allocation

- Objective is sum of local ones
- Constraints couple variables

- 1 Allocate a part for each agent
- 2 They solve local problems and
- 3 communicate how dissatisfied
- 4 Allocation is updated
(respecting global constraint)

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_M}{\text{minimize}} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} J_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \\ & \text{s.t.} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{h}_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{u}_i) \leq \mathbf{u}_{\text{total}} \end{aligned}$$

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
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
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
Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation



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

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
Allocation θ_i



Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation




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Allocation θ_i
Dissatisfaction λ_i




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



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
Quantity Decomposition | Resource Allocation

Until everybody is equally dissatisfied



How can a non-cooperative agent attack?


Our approach



- λ_i is the only interface
- λ_i depends on local parameters
- Malicious agent modifies λ_i

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
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
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


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$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \gamma_i(\lambda_i)$$

How does an agent lie?

Liar, Liar, Pants of fire



- $\lambda \geq 0$ means dissatisfaction
- $\lambda = 0$ means complete satisfaction


Assumptions

- *Attacker is not naïve*
 $\gamma(\lambda) = 0 \rightarrow \lambda = 0$
- *Attacker is greedy* $\gamma(\lambda) > \lambda$
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 $\lambda_b > \lambda_a \rightarrow \gamma(\lambda_b) > \gamma(\lambda_a)$
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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4 distinct agents

- Agent 1 is non-cooperative
- It uses $\tilde{\lambda}_1 = \gamma_1(\lambda_1) = \tau_1 I \lambda_1$
- We can observe 3 things
 - Global minimum when $\tau_1 = 1$
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
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
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
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
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② Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC for deprived systems

- Analyzing deprived systems

- Building an algorithm

- Applying mechanism



What are deprived systems?

TL;DR: Systems where all constraints are active

- Unconstrained Solution $\overset{\circ}{U}_i^*[k]$
- All constraints active = Scarcity
- Solution projected onto boundary
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
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TL;DR: Systems where all constraints are active

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
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
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
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
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- No coordination needed
- No incentive to cheat

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Deprived Systems

Analysis

Assumptions

- Quadratic local problems
- Scarcity

- Transform into equality constraints
- Solution is analytical

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Analysis (Negotiation)

- Update expression also becomes analytical
- If we input $\lambda_i[k] = -P_i\theta_i[k] - s_i[k] \rightarrow$ DTS with forced input

$$\theta[k]^{(p+1)} = \text{Proj}^{\mathcal{S}}(\theta[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)}\lambda[k]^{(p)})$$



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 - Affine solution

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We know nominal \bar{P}_i

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$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = -\hat{P}_i[k]\theta_i - \hat{s}_i[k]$$

- If $\left\| \hat{P}_i[k] - \bar{P}_i \right\|_F > \epsilon_P \rightarrow \text{Attack}$
- Ok, but how can we estimate $\hat{P}_i[k]$?

¹Using Recursive Least Squares for example

Estimating $\hat{P}_i[k]$

- We need to estimate $\hat{P}_i[k]$ and $\hat{s}_i[k]$ simultaneously
- Challenge: Estimation during negotiation fails
 - Update function couples θ_i^p and $\lambda_i^p \rightarrow$ low input excitation
- Solution: Send a random³ sequence to increase excitation.

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³A random signal has persistent excitation of any order ( Adaptive Control)

Classification of mitigation techniques

- Active (Resilient)
 - 1 Detection/Isolation ✓
 - 2 Mitigation ?



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Mitigation mechanism

Reconstructing λ_i

- We now have $\widehat{\widehat{P}}_i[k]$
 - Since $\tilde{P}_i[k] = T_i[k]\bar{P}_i$
 - We can recover $T_i[k]^{-1}$

$$\widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} = P_i \widehat{\widehat{P}}_i[k]^{-1}$$

- Reconstruct λ_i

$$\lambda_i^{\text{rec}} = -\bar{P}_i \theta_i - \widehat{T_i[k]^{-1}} \widehat{\widehat{s}}_i[k]$$

- Choose adequate version for coordination

$$\lambda_i^{\text{mod}} = \begin{cases} \lambda_i^{\text{rec}}, & \text{if attack detected} \\ \tilde{\lambda}_i, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



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
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Complete Mechanism




- Supervise exchanges by inquiring the agents
- Estimate how they will behave

Two Phases

- 1 Detect which agents are non-cooperative
- 2 Reconstruct λ_i and use in negotiation

Complete Mechanism




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


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


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


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
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
Complete algorithm

RPdMPC-DS




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
Example



District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C (monozone)
- Not enough power
- Period of 5h
- 3 scenarios
 - ① Nominal
 - ② Agent 1 cheats (dMPC)
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Results

Temporal



Temperature in house I.


Error $E_I(k)$.

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
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S Temperature close to reference

C Temperature close to **N**

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
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Objective functions J_i (% error)

Agent	Scenario N	Scenario S	Scenario C
I	299.5	190.8 (−36.3)	301.0 (0.0)
II	192.4	234.1 (21.7)	191.4 (−0.5)
III	305.9	359.1 (17.4)	305.9 (−0.0)
IV	297.5	349.9 (17.6)	297.2 (−0.1)
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Outline

③ Resilient Primal Decomposition-based dMPC using Artificial Scarcity

- Relaxing some assumptions

- Adapting the algorithm

- Results



Relaxing scarcity assumption

- Let's relax the scarcity assumption
- And add some local constraints
- Similarly we have the local problems and update

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\mathbf{U}[k]}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{U}[k]\|_H^2 + \mathbf{f}[k]^T \mathbf{U}[k] \\
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Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$

Instead of having

$$\lambda_i[k] = -P_i \theta_i[k] - s_i[k]$$

Now we have

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Increasingly
Sparse

For n_{ineq} constraints $\rightarrow 2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}$ permutations



Analyzing System

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
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Analyzing System

Solution for $\lambda_i[k]$ (Continued)



Two constraints partitioning θ_i solution space.

Analyzing System

Negotiation

$$\text{Proj}^{\mathcal{S}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)}) = \underset{\boldsymbol{x}}{\text{argmin}} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \underset{\boldsymbol{U}[k]}{\text{minimize}} \quad \left\| \boldsymbol{x} - \boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)} \right\| \\ \text{subject to} \quad \boldsymbol{I}_c^M \boldsymbol{x} \leq \boldsymbol{U}_{\max} : \boldsymbol{\mu} \end{array} \right\}$$



Analyzing System

Negotiation (Continued)

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p+1)} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{x}_0 + I_c^{M(0)} \left[-P_{\mu}^{(0)} \mathbf{U}_{max} + \mathbf{s}_{\mu}^{(0)}[k] \right], & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathcal{R}_{\mu}^0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{x}_0, & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathcal{R}_{\mu}^{2^c-1} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } \mathbf{x}_0 = \boldsymbol{\theta}[k]^{(p)} + \rho^{(p)} \boldsymbol{\lambda}[k]^{(p)}$$

Analyzing System

Conclusion

$$\bar{\epsilon} = \overbrace{2^c}^{\text{regions in projection}} \times \underbrace{2^{n_{\text{ineq}}} \times \dots \times 2^{n_{\text{ineq}}}}_{M \times \text{regions in each } \lambda_i} = 2^{c+Mn_{\text{ineq}}}$$



Mitigation

- Ideal

$$\widehat{T_i[k]}^{-1} = \bar{P}_i \hat{P}_i[k]^{-1}$$

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Artificial Scarcity

Who is it? Who is it?

- Since we control θ_i let's choose one where all constraints are active



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
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
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
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
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Expectation Maximization




Figure 1: Gaussian Mixture for a 1D PWA function with 2 modes.

Expectation Maximization

Algorithm




Figure 2: Gaussian Mixture for a 1D PWA function with 2 modes.

Detection

Same same

- Error $E_i^{(0)}[k] = \left\| \hat{\bar{P}}_i^{(0)}[k] - \bar{P}_i^{(0)} \right\|_F$
- Create threshold $\epsilon_{P_i^{(0)}}$
- Indicator $\mathfrak{d}_i \in \{0, 1\}$ detects the attack in agent i .
- $\mathfrak{d}_i^{(0)} = \mathbb{1}_{\{E_i^{(0)}[k] \geq \epsilon_{P_i^{(0)}}\}}$



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
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
Complete algorithm

RPdMPC-AS Refaire




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Example




District Heating Network (4 Houses)

- Houses modeled using 3R-2C
- Not enough power
- Period of 5h ($T_s = 0.25h$)
- 3 scenarios
 - N** Nominal
 - C** Agent I cheats (dMPC)
 - S** Agent I cheats (RPdMPC-AS)

• $T_I = \begin{bmatrix} 14.43288267 & 0. & 0. & 0. \\ 0. & 13.4590903 & 0. & 0. \\ 0. & 0. & 6.93065061 & 0. \\ 0. & 0. & 0. & 3.4447393 \end{bmatrix}$

Example




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


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Results

Temporal




Temperature in house I and the variable $E_I(k)$ for different scenarios.

N Nominal, **S** Selfish behavior, **C** Selfish + Correction



Results

Temporal




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
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
Temperature in house I and the variable $E_I(k)$ for different scenarios.

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Results

Temporal (Continued)




Air temperature in all houses for different scenarios.

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Results

Control



Control applied in all houses for different scenarios.

Ⓝ Nominal, Ⓢ Selfish behavior, Ⓢ Selfish + Correction



Results

Costs

Objective functions J_i (% error).

Agent	Scenario N	Scenario S	Scenario C
I	19868.2	12618.5 (−36.5)	19868.2 (−0.0)
II	13784.5	18721.1 (35.8)	13784.5 (0.0)
III	17276.0	22324.9 (29.2)	17276.1 (0.0)
IV	10086.0	13872.4 (37.5)	10086.0 (0.0)
Global	61014.7	67536.9 (10.7)	61014.7 (−0.0)



Summary

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- Resilient strategy for 2 kinds of systems
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 - Systems with possible artificial scarcity (sensible optimal demand)



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- Partial reconstruction of cheating matrix
- Resilient strategy with soft constraints
- Recursive EM (or alternative)
- ...



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Thank you!

Repository

<https://github.com/Accacio/thesis>



Contact

rafael.accacio.nogueira@gmail.com



Temporary page!

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If you rerun the document (without altering it) this surplus page will go away, because \LaTeX now knows how many pages to expect for this document.