Bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.16.0 to 0.17.0 in /integration #788
Workflow file for this run
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# This and other workflows that use `pull_request_target` event are dangerous | |
# and should be handled with a lot of care to avoid security problems. | |
# We use this event to give pull requests access to secrets with permissions to query projects, | |
# login into Docker registry, etc. | |
# But rogue PR authors could try to steal our secrets. | |
# We prevent that with the following: | |
# | |
# * We require approval for PRs from first-time contributors. That's a built-in feature for all actions. | |
# * For workflows that checkout source code, | |
# we require the `trust` label to be assigned to PRs by FerretDB maintainers after reviewing changes. | |
# Only a few trusted people have permission to do that. | |
# * Thanks to the way `pull_request_target` trigger works, | |
# PR changes in the workflow itself are not run until they are merged. | |
# * We use short-lived automatic `GITHUB_TOKEN`s instead of a long-living personal access tokens (PAT) where possible. | |
# * Both `GITHUB_TOKEN`s and PATs have minimal permissions. | |
# * We publish Docker images from PRs as separate packages that should not be run by users. | |
# * We limit what third-party actions can be used. | |
# | |
# Relevant GitHub documentation is a bit scattered. The first article gives a good overview: | |
# * https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ | |
# * https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication | |
# * https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions | |
name: Conform PR | |
on: | |
pull_request_target: | |
# https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/events-that-trigger-workflows#pull_request_target | |
# List all types to make it easier to enable new ones when they are needed. | |
types: | |
- assigned | |
- unassigned | |
- labeled | |
- unlabeled | |
- opened | |
- edited | |
# - closed | |
- reopened | |
- synchronize | |
- converted_to_draft | |
- ready_for_review | |
# - locked | |
- unlocked | |
- review_requested | |
- review_request_removed | |
- auto_merge_enabled | |
- auto_merge_disabled | |
# Do not run this workflow in parallel for any PR change. | |
concurrency: | |
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.head_ref || github.ref_name }} | |
cancel-in-progress: false | |
env: | |
GOPATH: /home/runner/go | |
GOCACHE: /home/runner/go/cache | |
GOLANGCI_LINT_CACHE: /home/runner/go/cache/lint | |
GOMODCACHE: /home/runner/go/mod | |
GOPROXY: https://proxy.golang.org | |
GOTOOLCHAIN: local | |
CONFORM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CONFORM_TOKEN }} # repo-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN is not enough to query org-level projects | |
jobs: | |
conform-pr: | |
name: Conform PR | |
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04 | |
timeout-minutes: 5 | |
# No `trust` label check because we don't checkout PR's code. | |
# No `not ready` label to prevent accidental auto-merges: jobs skipped with `if` conditional are considered successful. | |
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' | |
steps: | |
# Do not add a source code checkout step because we don't check the `trust` label. | |
# See the warning at the top of the file. | |
- name: Setup permissions monitoring | |
uses: GitHubSecurityLab/actions-permissions/monitor@v1 | |
if: false | |
- name: Setup Go | |
uses: FerretDB/github-actions/setup-go@main | |
with: | |
cache-key: conform-pr | |
- name: Conform PR | |
uses: FerretDB/github-actions/conform-pr@main |