

AuditBlock



Sandwich Bot

v0.8.0

✦ Low-Risk

low-risk code

✦ Medium-Risk

medium-risk code

✦ High-Risk

high-risk code

Sandwich Bot

Disclaimer AUDITBLOCK is not responsible for any financial losses. Nothing in this contract audit is financial advice, please do your own research.

Executive Summary

Project Name

Sandwich Bot

Overview

This bot is a type of automated trading bot that exploits price slippage on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) like Uniswap. It works by placing a buy order for a token in a Uniswap pair and then placing a sell order for the same token in the same pair at a slightly higher price. The bot then cancels the buy order and takes the profit from the difference in prices.

Method

Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.

Scope of Audit

The scope of this audit was to analyze the contract codebase for quality, security, and correctness.



High

Medium

Low

Informational

| | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
|---------------------------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| Open Issues | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Acknowledged Issues | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Partially Resolved Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Resolved Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC) Vulnerabilities for Attacks

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| ✓ Re-entrancy | ✓ Tautology or contradiction |
| ✓ Timestamp Dependence | ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation |
| ✓ Gas Limit and Loops | ✗ Return values of low-level calls |
| ✓ Exception Disorder | ✓ Revert/require functions |
| ✓ Gasless Send | ✓ Private modifier |
| ✗ Use of tx.origin | ✓ Using block.timestamp |
| ✗ Compiler version not fixed | ✓ Multiple Sends |
| ✓ Address hardcoded | ✓ Using SHA3 |
| ✓ Divide before multiply | ✓ Using suicide |
| ✗ Integer overflow/underflow | ✓ Using throw |
| ✓ Dangerous strict equalities | ✗ Using inline assembly |

Types of Severities

High

A high-severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

Techniques and Methods

The overall quality of code.

- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behavior.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper.
- implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrance and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

Static Analysis

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, and their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

Tools and Platforms Used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

Manual Testing

A. Project - Sandwich Bot

High Severity Issues

1. Unsecured code activities

Description

in the auditing process has found some unsecured code activities in your bot. This means that there is a vulnerability in the code of your wallet that could allow a bot to access your wallet completely. This could work as a vulnerability if they are not fixed

Remediation

Implement To prevent this issue, it is important to always Save your funds in other Wallet. Just keep trading funds in this account. Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). 2FA adds an extra layer of security to your wallet by requiring you to enter a code from your phone in addition to your password. Keep your bot up to date. Bot updates often include security patches that can help to protect your wallet from vulnerabilities.

Status

open

Medium Severity Issues

1.Certain unused functions

Description

Unused functions can be a problem because they can make your code less efficient. When the Solidity compiler compiles your code, it has to create bytecode for every function, even if the function is never called. This can add unnecessary size and complexity to your code.

Remediation

Be careful when defining functions. Only define functions that you are sure you will need.

Status

Acknowledged

3. Contract That Lock Ether

Description

The contract has no function to withdraw ethers, then it is impossible to withdraw the ether from the contract. This means that the user will lose their ether if they deposit or send directly into the contract.

Remediation

Implement To prevent this issue. if you are considering depositing ether into a contract, it is important to carefully Make sure that you understand why the contract has no function to directly withdraw ethers. Contract using just simple methods to receive Erc20 Token and make sure that you are comfortable with the risks involved.

Status

Acknowledged

4. Local or state variable.

Description

The return value of an external call in Solidity. In Solidity, when you call a function on another contract, the return value of the function is not stored in a local or state variable by default. This means that the return value of the function is lost after the function call has finished executing.

Remediation

It is important to note that not storing the return value of an external call can lead to security vulnerabilities. For example, if you call a function on another contract and do not store the return value, an attacker could modify the return value of the function and trick your contract into doing something malicious.

Status

Acknowledged

Automated Test

Contract locking ether found:

Contract Sandwich (contracts/Sandwich.sol#191-329) has payable functions:

- Sandwich.receive() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#204)
- Sandwich.fallback() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#234-307)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#contracts-that-lock-ether>

Sandwich.sellToken(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Sandwich.sol#309-327) ignores return value by (reserve0,reserve1) =

IUniswapV2Pair(pair).getReserves() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#313)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return>

Function IUniswapV2Pair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#155) is not in mixedCase

Function IUniswapV2Pair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#156) is not in mixedCase

Function IUniswapV2Pair.MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#173) is not in mixedCase

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions>

Sandwich.constructor(address)._owner (contracts/Sandwich.sol#206) lacks a zero-check on :

- user = _owner (contracts/Sandwich.sol#207)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation>

Sandwich.fallback() (contracts/Sandwich.sol#234-307) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (contracts/Sandwich.sol#238-306)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage>

Different versions of Solidity are used:

- Version used: ['>=0.5.0', '>=0.8.0']
- >=0.5.0 (contracts/Sandwich.sol#138)
- >=0.8.0 (contracts/Sandwich.sol#7)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used>

SafeTransfer.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256)

(contracts/Sandwich.sol#122-131) is never used and should be removed

SafeTransfer.safeTransferETH(address,uint256) (contracts/Sandwich.sol#133-136) is never used and should be removed

SafeTransfer.safeTransferFrom(IERC20,address,address,uint256)

(contracts/Sandwich.sol#94-109) is never used and should be removed

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code>


```
Low level call in SafeTransfer.safeTransferFrom(IERC20,address,address,uint256)
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#94-109):
    - (s) =
address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transferFrom.selector,from,to,value)) (contracts/Sandwich.sol#100-107)
Low level call in SafeTransfer.safeTransfer(IERC20,address,uint256)
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#111-120):
    - (s) =
address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.transfer.selector,to,value))
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#116-118)
Low level call in SafeTransfer.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256)
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#122-131):
    - (s) =
address(token).call(abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC20.approve.selector,to,value))
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#127-129)
Low level call in SafeTransfer.safeTransferETH(address,uint256)
(contracts/Sandwich.sol#133-136):
    - (s) = to.call{value: value}(new bytes(0)) (contracts/Sandwich.sol#134)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sliether/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
```

Functional Testing

Some of the tests performed are mentioned below:

- ✓ Should revert when non-owner calls the sellToken function
- ✓ Should be able to start bot activities after the bot owner successfully calls the functions
- ✓ Should revert when users call Recover ERC20 when the bot has not started
- ✓ Should be able to Recover ERC20 successfully and continuously.
- ✓ Should revert if the none-owner user attempts SafeTransfer.safeTransferETH
- ✓ Should be able to start the bot with IUniswapV2Pair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR()
- ✗ Should be able to stop bot by contract owner when the market is unstable
- ✗ withdraw funds from the contracts without any hindrance.

SOLDITY TESTING

Contracts/Sandwich.sol

```
7:1 warning Found more than One contract per file. 4 contracts found! one-contract-per-file
100:22 warning Avoid to use low level calls avoid-low-level-calls
108:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
116:22 warning Avoid to use low level calls avoid-low-level-calls
119:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
127:22 warning Avoid to use low level calls avoid-low-level-calls
130:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
135:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
138:1 error Compiler version >=0.5.0 does not satisfy the ^0.8.0 semver requirement compiler-version
141:68 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
142:62 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
147:51 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
148:62 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
149:79 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
151:39 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
152:35 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
153:53 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
155:5 warning Function name must be in mixedCase func-name-mixedcase
156:5 warning Function name must be in mixedCase func-name-mixedcase
157:59 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
159:53 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
159:65 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
161:40 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
161:54 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
162:40 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
162:54 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
165:9 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
166:9 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
167:9 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
173:5 warning Function name must be in mixedCase func-name-mixedcase
173:57 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
178:60 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
179:60 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
180:45 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
182:49 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
183:49 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
183:63 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
184:19 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
184:36 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
195:5 warning Immutable variables name are set to be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE immutable-vars-naming
212:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
234:5 warning Fallback function must be simple no-complex-fallback
238:9 warning Avoid to use inline assembly. It is acceptable only in rare cases no-inline-assembly
310:9 warning Use Custom Errors instead of require statements custom-errors
315:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
316:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
317:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
321:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
322:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
323:13 warning Rule is set with explicit type [var/s: uint] explicit-types
```

SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | | Test Result |
|---------|---|--|-------------|
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | ✓ |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | ✓ |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | ✓ |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | ✓ |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function TypeVariable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | ✗ |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | ✓ |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | ✓ |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | ✓ |

| ID | Title | | Test Result |
|---------|--------------------------------------|---|-------------|
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | ✓ |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | ✓ |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | ✓ |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | ✓ |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | ✓ |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | \$ |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | ✓ |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | \$ |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | ✓ |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | ✗ |

Solidity Call graph

```
UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | draw.io
library SafeTransfer {
  ftrace | funcSig
  function safeTransferFrom(
    IERC20 token,
    address from,
    address to,
    uint256 value
  ) internal {
    (bool s, ) = address(token).call(
      abi.encodeWithSelector(
        IERC20.transferFrom.selector,
        from,
        to,
        value
      )
    );
    require(s, "safeTransferFrom failed");
  }

  ftrace | funcSig
  function safeTransfer(
    IERC20 token,
    address to,
    uint256 value
  )
}
```

```
UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | draw.io
contract Sandwich {
  using SafeTransfer for IERC20;



  // Authorized
  address internal immutable user;

  // transfer(address,uint256)
  bytes4 internal constant ERC20_TRANSFER_ID = 0xa9059cbb;

  // swap(uint256,uint256,address,bytes)
  bytes4 internal constant PAIR_SWAP_ID = 0x022c0d9f;

  // Contractor sets the only user
  ftrace
  receive() external payable {}

  ftrace
  constructor(address _owner) {
    user = _owner;
  }
}
```



Closing Summary

In this report, we have considered the security of this bot. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of Medium, Low, and Informational severity were found, Some suggestions and best practices are also provided in order to improve the code quality and security posture. In the end, Sandwich Bot. Team Acknowledged all Issues.

Disclaimer

AuditBlock smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of this Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee for the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them.

Securing smart contracts is a multi-step process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the contract Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.

About AudiTBlock

Contractsaudit is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by Auditblock

We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



300+

Audits Completed



\$3B

Secured



300K

Lines of Code Audited

Audit Report,
3 September 2023



For
Sandwich Bot



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AudiTBlock