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HELLDIVER_Presale

v0.8.20+commit.7dd6d404 v0.8.20

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+Low-Risk

Low-risk code

→ Medium-Risk

Medium-risk code

+ High-Risk

High-risk code

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bsc-testnet

0x9d918588c8fd6d7f294125f3bd1534c641b888df

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Types of Severities

High

A high-severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

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Techniques and Methods

The overall quality of code.

- · Use of best practices.
- · Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behavior.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper.
- implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- · Efficient use of gas.
- · Code is safe from re-entrance and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

Static Analysis

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, and their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

Tools and Platforms Used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

Name

HELLDIVER_Presale

Method

Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.


Scope of Audit

The scope of this audit was to analyze the contract codebase for

quality, security, and correctness.

Audit Team

AuditBlock



High Medium

Low

Informational

	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0 st//a	0	o O	2
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0

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ID	File Name	Audit Status
10022	HELLDIVER_Presale.sol	Pass

Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC) Vulnerabilities for Attacks

Re-entrancy	Tautology or contradiction
Timestamp Dependence	Missing Zero Address Validation
Gas Limit and Loops	Return values of low-level calls
Exception Disorder	Revert/require functions
Gasless Send	Private modifier
Use of tx.origin	Using block.timestamp
Compiler version not fixed	Multiple Sends
Address hardcoded	Using SHA3
Divide before multiply	Using suicide
Integer overflow/underflow	Using throw
Dangerous strict equalities	Using inline assembly

Phase 1

Medium Severity Issues

Low Severity Issues

1. divide-before-multiply (Medium)

```
uint256 bnbToUsdt = (_amount1 * (getLatestPrice())) / (1 ether);
711
              uint256 numberOfTokens = (bnbToUsdt * pricet) / (1e8);
              return numberOfTokens;
```

Description

Our auditor identified that your contract exhibits Solidity's integer truncation behavior. This means that performing division before multiplication can lead to precision loss

Recommendation

It is important to double-check your contract. Consider reordering operations to prioritize multiplication before division.

Acknowledged

2. Reentrancy vulnerabilities (Medium)

```
▲ 675(bool success) = mainToken.transfer(msg.sender, _reward);676require(success, "token transfer failed");677userStake.claimedReward += _reward;678}▲ 679(bool status) = mainToken.transfer(msg.sender, userStake.stakedTokens);
```

Description

During their audit, our auditors identified a reentrancy bug in your contract. Note that reentrancies involving Ether are not reported (see reentrancy-eth for details).

Recommendation

It is important to double-check your contract and apply the check-effects-interactions pattern.

Status

Acknowledged

Phase 2

HELLDIVER_Presale.nativeToToken(uint256,uint256) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#706-714) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:

- bnbToUsdt = (_amount * (getLatestPrice())) / (100000000000000000)
 (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#711)
- numberOfTokens = (bnbToUsdt * price) / (1e8) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#712)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

HELLDIVER_Presale.userStakes (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#505) can be used in cross function reentrancies:

- HELLDIVER_Presale.calculateReward(address,uint256) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#657-667)
- HELLDIVER_Presale.userStakes (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#505)
- userStake.unstakeTime = block.timestamp (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#682)

HELLDIVER_Presale.userStakes (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#505) can be used in cross function reentrancies:

- HELLDIVER_Presale.calculateReward(address,uint256) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#657-667)
- HELLDIVER_Presale.userStakes (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#505)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

HELLDIVER_Presale.updateInfos(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#732-744) should emit an event for:

- soldToken = _sold (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#739)
- amountRaised = raised (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#740)
- amountRaisedUSDT = raisedInUsdt (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#741)
- amountRaisedUSDC = raisedInUsdc (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#742)
- amountRaisedOverall = amountRaisedOverall (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#743)

HELLDIVER_Presale.changeAPY(uint256) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#759-761) should emit an event for:

- APY = _APY (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#760)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic

Ownable2Step.transferOwnership(address).newOwner (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#166) lacks a zero-check on :

pendingOwner = newOwner (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#167)

HELLDIVER_Presale.constructor(IERC20,address,address,address,address)._fundReceiver

- fundReceiver = address(_fundReceiver) (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#518)

HELLDIVER_Presale.changeFundReceiver(address)._addr (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#770) lacks a zero-check on :

- fundReceiver = address(addr) (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#771)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

HELLDIVER Presale percentDivider (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale sol#480) should be constant

HELLDIVER Presale.timeStep (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#481) should be constant


HELLDIVER Presale.tokensToSell (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#482) should be constant

HELLDIVER Presale.totalStages (contracts/HELLDIVER Presale.sol#478) should be constant

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

HELLDIVER_Presale.slitherConstructorVariables() (contracts/HELLDIVER_Presale.sol#434-793) uses literals with too many digits:

- prices =



Closing Summary

In this report, we have considered the security of this **HELLDIVER_Presale**We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Several issues were identified during the audit and classified by severity.

Recommendations and best practices were provided to improve code quality and security posture. The team has acknowledged all findings.

Disclaimer

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