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### **MEXTPresale**

v0. 0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404 v0.8.19

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+Low-Risk

Low-risk code

→ Medium-Risk

Medium-risk code

+ High-Risk

High-risk code

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### **Types of Severities**

### High

A high-severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

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#### Medium

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

#### Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

#### Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

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#### **Techniques and Methods**

The overall quality of code.

- · Use of best practices.
- · Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behavior.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper.
- implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- · Efficient use of gas.
- · Code is safe from re-entrance and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

#### **Structural Analysis**

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

#### **Static Analysis**

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

#### Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, and their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

#### **Gas Consumption**

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

#### Tools and Platforms Used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

Name

**MEXTPresale** 

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Method

Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.

**Scope of Audit** 


The scope of this audit was to analyze the contract codebase for

quality, security, and correctness.

**Audit Team** 

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High



Low

Informational

	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	0	0	1
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0

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ID	File Name	Audit Status
10017	MEXTPresale.sol	Pass

## Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC) Vulnerabilities for Attacks

~	Re-entrancy	<b>S</b>	Tautology or contradiction
<b>✓</b>	Timestamp Dependence	<b>Y</b>	Missing Zero Address Validation
<b>✓</b>	Gas Limit and Loops	X	Return values of low-level calls
<b>✓</b>	Exception Disorder	<b>₹</b>	Revert/require functions
<b>Y</b>	Gasless Send	<b>✓</b>	Private modifier
<b>✓</b>	Use of tx.origin	<b>V</b>	Using block.timestamp
<b>✓</b>	Compiler version not fixed	<b>✓</b>	Multiple Sends
<b>Y</b>	Address hardcoded	<b>✓</b>	Using SHA3
<b>✓</b>	Divide before multiply	<b>Y</b>	Using suicide
<b>✓</b>	Integer overflow/underflow	<b>Y</b>	Using throw
	Dangerous strict equalities	V	Using inline assembly

#### Phase 1

#### Medium Severity Issues

#### **Low Severity Issues**

### 1. unchecked transfer. (ignores return value)

```
A 285
                USDT.transferFrom(beneficiary, treasury, _amount1);
▲ 309
                MEXTToken.transfer(address(msg.sender), tokenAmount);
A 342
                _tokenf.transfer(owner(), _amountf);
                    MEXTToken.transfer(parent, c);
453
```

#### Description

During the automation phase, our auditor identified several instances where methods ignore return values. Although this issue is categorized with high severity, we acknowledge that it may be part of the intended contract behavior in specific scenarios

#### Recommendation

It is important to ensure that you double-check your function's usability and how it's working with different behaviors. We recommend that you fix this by using Use SafeERC20, or by ensuring the transfer/transferFrom return value is checked.

#### Acknowledged

#### Phase 2

MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311) ignores return value by USDT.transferFrom(beneficiary,treasury, amount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#285)

MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311) ignores return value by

MEXTPresale.rescueTokens(IERC20,uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#341-343) ignores return value by

token.transfer(owner(), amount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#342)

MEXTPresale.payReferral(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#438-460) ignores return value by

MEXTToken.transfer(parent,c) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#453)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unchecked-transfer

Reentrancy in MEXTPresale.payReferral(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#438-460):

External calls:

- MEXTToken.transfer(parent,c) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#453)

State variables written after the call(s):

- parentAccount.reward = parentAccount.reward.add(c) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#452)

MEXTPresale.accounts (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#236) can be used in cross function reentrancies:

- MEXTPresale.\_preValidatePurchase(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#313-325)
- MEXTPresale.accounts (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#236)
- MEXTPresale.addReferrer(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#399-431)
- MEXTPresale.getlevelrefcount(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#362-364)
- MEXTPresale.hasReferrer(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#368-370)
- MEXTPresale.isCircularReference(address,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#372-392)
- MEXTPresale.payReferral(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#438-460)
- MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311)
- accounts[parent].levelRefCount[i] += 1 (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#454)

MEXTPresale.accounts (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#236) can be used in cross function reentrancies:

- MEXTPresale.\_preValidatePurchase(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#313-325)
- MEXTPresale.accounts (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#236)
- MEXTPresale.addReferrer(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#399-431)
- MEXTPresale.getlevelrefcount(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#362-364)
- MEXTPresale.hasReferrer(address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#368-370)
- MEXTPresale.isCircularReference(address,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#372-392)
- MEXTPresale.payReferral(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#438-460)
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- MEXTPresale.isCircularReference(address,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#372-392)
- MEXTPresale.payReferral(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#438-460)
- MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311)
- accounts[msg.sender].totalUsdValue += \_amount (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#308)
- MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311)

Reentrancy in MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311):

MEXTPresale.totalSaleToken (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#212) can be used in cross function reentrancies:

- MEXTPresale.\_preValidatePurchase(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#313-325)
- MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311)
- MEXTPresale.totalSaleToken (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#212)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

MEXTPresale.setTotalTokenForSale(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#358-360) should emit an event for:

MEXTPresale.setMaxBuyLimit(uint256) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#462-464) should emit an event for:

- max buy limit = maxbuy (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#463)

Reference: <a href="https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic">https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic</a>

MEXTPresale.setTreasuryWallet(address).\_adr (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#349) lacks a zero-check on:

treasury = \_adr (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#350)

Reference: <a href="https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation">https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation</a> Reentrancy in MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311):

External calls:

- USDT.transferFrom(beneficiary,treasury, amount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#285)
- payReferral(tokenAmount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#295)
  - MEXTToken.transfer(parent,c) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#453)

State variables written after the call(s):

- raised += amount (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#304)
- orders[++ latestOrderId] = OrderInfo(msg.sender,\_amount,block.timestamp,tokenAmount)(contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#298-303)
  - orderIds[msg.sender].push(latestOrderId) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#305)
- orders[++ latestOrderId] = OrderInfo(msg.sender,\_amount,block.timestamp,tokenAmount (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#298-303)

Reference: <a href="https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2">https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2</a> Reentrancy in MEXTPresale.purchaseToken(uint256,address) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#282-311):

External calls:

- USDT.transferFrom(beneficiary,treasury, amount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#285)
- payReferral(tokenAmount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#295)
  - MEXTToken.transfer(parent.c) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#453
- MEXTToken.transfer(address(msg.sender),tokenAmount) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#309) Event emitted after the call(s):
- Purchase(tokenAmount, amount,msg.sender,block.timestamp) (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#310)

Reference: <a href="https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3">https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3</a>
Pragma version=0.8.19 (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#7) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted.
Consider deploying with 0.8.18.

solc-0.8.19 is not recommended for deployment

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity INFO:Detectors:

Low level call in MEXTPresale.rescueFunds() (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#336-339):

- (os) = address(owner()).call{value: address(this).balance}() (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#337

Reference: <u>https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls</u>

MEXTPresale.constructor() (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#254-262) uses literals with too many digits:

- tokenPrice = 10000000000000000000000 (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#257)

MEXTPresale.constructor() (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#254-262) uses literals with too many digits:

- totalToken = 10000000000000000000000 (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#260)

MEXTPresale.constructor() (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#254-262) uses literals with too many digits:

- max\_buy\_limit = 100000000000000000000 (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#261)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits

Loop condition i < refLevelRate.length (contracts/MEXTPresale.sol#379) should use cached array length instead of referencing `length` member of the storage array.

Reference: <a href="https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#cache-array-length">https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#cache-array-length</a>

#### **Closing Summary**

In this report, we have considered the security of this **MEXT Presale contract**. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

One issue was identified during the audit process, and their severity levels have been classified. Recommendations and best practices have also been provided to enhance code quality and security posture. The team has acknowledged all identified issues.

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#### **Disclaimer**

AuditBlock does not provide security warranties, investment advice, or endorsements of any platform. This audit does not guarantee the security or correctness of the audited smart contracts. The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice. The authors are not liable for any decisions made based on the information in this document. Securing smart contracts is an ongoing process. A single audit is not sufficient. We recommend that the platform's development team implement a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties

## **AuditBlock**

AuditBlock is a blockchain security company that provides professional services and solutions for securing blockchain projects. They specialize in smart contract audits on various blockchains and offer a range of services



**100+** Audits Completed





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