

SUSTO: Systematic Universal Security Testing Orchestration

Collaboration in Security and Compliance

May 2021

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Creando Oportunidades

MM0003CA:~ whoami luissaiz



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Telecomm. Eng. - Cryptography -
Sys.Sec - Info.Sec - Tech. Fraud
Prevention - Fraud Prevention Tech. -
Global Security Center - Innovation in
Security [@BBVA](#)

📍 Madrid

🔗 bbva.com/en/featured/bb...

📅 Se unió en julio de 2010

01

Intro

Who we are?

BBVA in numbers



€736
miles de millones
de activo total

80,7
millones de clientes

>30
países

7.432
oficinas

31.000
cajeros

123.174
empleados

Innovation Labs

- Innovation is about **new questions**, not new answers
- **Hyperscale, AI, Cybersecurity**
- Multidisciplinar cross pollination
- Learning by doing
- Doing to learn

Our way of doing

- Explorations vs projects
- Team self prioritization of their own agenda
- Coolness is not an acceptance criteria
- Pre approved exploration
- From Fail Fast to Drop Fast
- Collateral benefits... always





BBVA

BBVA

📍 Madrid

🔗 <http://bbva.com>

✉️ opensource@bbva.com

Repositories 97

Packages

People 36

Teams 6

Projects 1

Pinned repositories

kapow

Kapow! If you can script it, you can HTTP it.

Go ⭐ 505 🏷 20

apicheck

The DevSecOps toolset for REST APIs

Python ⭐ 118 🏷 30

qed

The scalable, auditable and high-performance tamper-evident log project

Go ⭐ 73 🏷 13

patton

The clever vulnerability dependency finder

Gherkin ⭐ 79 🏷 11

timecop

Time series based anomaly detector

Python ⭐ 56 🏷 13

susto

Systematic Universal Security Testing Orchestration

⭐ 10

02

The problem

Security and Compliance in Agile times

NEED FOR SPEED™ PAYBACK



Goals Alignment

- Adjust development lifecycle security to **rapid** evolving risks in **design time**
 - Fast changing threats
 - Agile product development
- Accelerate detection and reaction to abnormal behaviours in **runtime**
- Achieve **constant** risk exposure **monitoring & assurance**

Continuous Risk Control by Automated Agile Cybersecurity



53% of enterprises have no idea if their security tools are working

The majority of organizations don't know if the **security tools** they deploy are working, and are not confident they can avoid data breaches, according to AttackIQ.


RISK MANAGEMENT



COMPLIANCE



ASTO



Plateau will be reached:

- less than 2 years
- 2 to 5 years
- 5 to 10 years
- ▲ more than 10 years
- ✗ obsolete before plateau



Justin Garrison
@rothgar

Siguiendo

The new OSI model is much easier to understand

Traducir Tweet

Software

Software

Software

Software

Software

Software

Software

18:22 - 18 jul. 2017

2.820 Retweets 3.930 Me gusta



93


2,8K

3,9K



Tuitear

X



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Condiciones Política de privacidad Cookies
Información sobre anuncios



Justin Garrison

@rothgar

Here to spread love and learn from others.
Co-author of [cnibook.info](#) Tweets about tech
and K8s. ❤️ community & OSS.

@DisneyAnimation - DMs open

📍 Clever phrase


🔗 [medium.com/@rothgar](#)

📅 Se unió en abril de 2008

The long tail of security control checks



The long tail of security control checks



The overwhelming number of tests a single organization should develop makes it difficult to start a project that will require a high development and maintenance cost

03

Looking for other successful patterns

Testing and security

The Addison-Wesley Signature Series



CONTINUOUS DELIVERY

RELIABLE SOFTWARE RELEASES THROUGH BUILD,
TEST, AND DEPLOYMENT AUTOMATION


JEZ HUMBLE,
DAVID FARLEY



Copyrighted Material
The Addison Wesley Signature Series

TEST-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT BY EXAMPLE

KENT BECK



Copyrighted Material

A KENT BECK
SIGNATURE
BOOK

The Addison Wesley Signature Series

ATDD BY EXAMPLE

A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ACCEPTANCE
TEST-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT


Markus Gärtner



Forewords by Kent Beck and Dale Emery

A KENT BECK
SIGNATURE
BOOK

[Deploys] can be treated as standard or routine changes that have been pre-approved by management, and that don't require a heavyweight change review meeting.



Feature testing

Feature: Record a ledger entry

As an Accountant

I want to account according COA selected by accountant

In order to account all movements and comply with legislation and accounting rules

Scenario: Record a ledger entry

Given a bank named "Gringotts"

And "Gringotts" bank has the default Accounting Periods, Chart of Accounts and Statements

When the system registers an financial event with date "2016-05-25"

description	accountCode	Debit	Credit
Cash and Balance with central Banks	11000	1000 EUR	
Share Capital	31000		1000 EUR

Then the following accounting entries in the Journal are added

description	entryDate	requestDate	accountingPeriod	periodCodes
society (bank) constitution	2016-05-25	2016-05-25	FY2016	2016M05, 2016Q2, FY2016

And all accounting movements are recorded

description	accountCode	Debit	Credit
Cash and Balance with central Banks	11000	1000 EUR	
Share Capital	31000		1000 EUR

Simple tests can be safely extrapolated

Business dependent: Difficult to reuse

A lesson about intentional risk



Security Controls testing complexity

All or nothing + Orchestration

In security we need to test for "**all of**" or "**none of**" conditions, making it necessary to **pipeline and orchestrate outputs** of tools as inputs of other tools

Standardizing Security Controls Testing

Unlike Functional Features, Security Controls are similar among different projects (Common Controls) and across organizations

We even have industry standards

Snort IDS Console - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Address  https://[REDACTED]

Snort IDS Console Unfilter Refresh every 30 secs. View alerts since 6 AM or on <----

Alert Information		Sensors			Top Sources			Top Targets			Top Target Ports			
#	%	Sensor	Sigs	Alerts	IP Address	Sigs	Alerts	IP Address	Sigs	Alerts	TCP	#	UDP	#
Signatures:	62	[REDACTED]	19	482	[REDACTED]	6	186	[REDACTED]	6	186	80	513	1434	1,259
TCP Alerts [View]:	1,126 42%	[REDACTED]	13	177	[REDACTED]	5	5	[REDACTED]	5	5	139	186	53	242
UDP Alerts [View]:	1,523 57%	[REDACTED]	11	240	[REDACTED]	3	21	[REDACTED]	3	24	443	122	177	9
ICMP Alerts [View]:	0 0%	[REDACTED]	11	131	[REDACTED]	2	108	[REDACTED]	2	352	1433	23	111	6
Total Alerts [View]:	2,649 100%	[REDACTED]	9	298	[REDACTED]	2	92	[REDACTED]	2	92	3389	19	69	2

Alert Overview by Signature

Earliest Alert: 2004-12-29 06:01:03
Latest Alert: 2004-12-29 15:57:12

Signatures					
Prio	Signature	# Sensors	# Alerts	# Srcs	# Dests
1	WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt [sid 1497]	2	353	2	2
1	P2P Fastrack kazaa/morpheus traffic [sid 1699]	2	145	3	49
1	MS-SQL/SMB raiserror possible buffer overflow [sid 1386]	2	117	1	1
1	WEB-MISC NetObserve authentication bypass attempt [sid 2441]	1	110	1	1
1	MS-SQL/SMB xp_cmdshell program execution [sid 681]	2	33	1	1
1	WEB-MISC PCT Client Hello overflow attempt [sid 2515]	2	25	1	8
1	MS-SQL xp_cmdshell - program execution [sid 687]	1	17	2	1
1	MS-SQL/SMB xp_req* registry access [sid 689]	2	12	1	1
1	MS-SQL/SMB sp_password password change [sid 677]	2	10	1	1
1	MS-SQL/SMB sp_delete_alert log file deletion [sid 678]	2	10	1	1
1	MS-SQL sp_start_job - program execution [sid 673]	2	6	1	1
1	MS-SQL sa login failed [sid 688]	1	5	1	1



Awesome YARA

A curated list of awesome YARA rules, tools, and resources. Inspired by [awesome-python](#) and [awesome-php](#).

YARA is an acronym for: YARA: Another Recursive Anronym, or Yet Another Ridiculous Acronym. Pick your choice.

-- *Victor M. Alvarez (@plusvic)*

[YARA](#), the "pattern matching swiss knife for malware researchers (and everyone else)" is developed by [@plusvic](#) and [@VirusTotal](#). View it on [GitHub](#).



SIGMA

Sigma

Generic Signature Format for SIEM Systems

What is Sigma

Sigma is a generic and open signature format that allows you to describe relevant log events in a straight forward manner. The rule format is very flexible, easy to write and applicable to any type of log file. The main purpose of this project is to provide a structured form in which researchers or analysts can describe their once developed detection methods and make them shareable with others.

Sigma is for log files what [Snort](#) is for network traffic and [YARA](#) is for files.



Sigma

Generic Signature Format for SIEM Systems

What is Sigma

Sigma is a generic and open signature format that allows you to describe relevant log events in a straight forward manner. The rule format is very flexible, easy to write and applicable to any type of log file. The main purpose of this project is to provide a structured form in which researchers or analysts can describe their once developed detection methods and make them shareable with others.

Sigma is for log files what [Snort](#) is for network traffic and [YARA](#) is for files.

Pattern

SUSTO would be for security control testing what

- Sigma is for log files
- Snort is for network traffic
- YARA is for files

04

SUSTO: Systematic Universal Security Testing Orchestration

Open Collaboration

Proposing SUSTO

Extending the concept of ASTO

Systematic: Long tail coverage

Universal: Full stack testing, not only Application


SUSTO: Also Pun-intended



SUSTO implementation main features

- Tests should be generic in their objectives: WHAT?
- Tests should be configurable in their instantiation
 - Target Instance
 - Desired Goal (Boolean, Score, ...)
- It should facilitate the integration of existing tools to
 - Obtain intermediate information
 - Launch the execution of more specific tests
- Manual intervention should be minimized
- Test execution should not introduce new threats

Overlord Architecture



**AWS Security Hub**

User Guide



PCI DSS controls

[PDF](#) | [Kindle](#) | [RSS](#)

The PCI DSS security standard in Security Hub supports the following controls. For each control, the information includes the severity, the resource type, the AWS Config rule, and the remediation steps.

[PCI.AutoScaling.1] Auto Scaling groups associated with a load balancer should use health checks

Severity: Low**Resource:** Auto Scaling group**AWS Config rule:** [autoscaling-group-elb-healthcheck-required](#)**Parameters:** None

This control checks whether your Auto Scaling groups that are associated with a load balancer are using Elastic Load Balancing health checks.

PCI DSS does not require load balancing or highly available configurations. However, this check aligns with AWS best practices.

Related PCI DSS requirements

This control is related to the following PCI DSS requirements:

PCI DSS 2.2: Develop configuration standards for all system components. Assure that these standards address all known security vulnerabilities and are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.

Replicating systems using load balancing provides high availability and is a means to mitigate the effects of a DDoS event.

This is one method used to implement system hardening configurations.

Remediation

To enable Elastic Load Balancing health checks

1. Open the Amazon EC2 console at <https://console.aws.amazon.com/ec2/>.
2. On the navigation pane, under **Auto Scaling**, choose **Auto Scaling Groups**.
3. To select the group from the list, choose the right box.
4. From **Actions**, choose **Edit**.
5. For **Health Check Type**, choose **ELB**.
6. For **Health Check Grace Period**, enter **300**.
7. Choose **Save**.

For more information on using a load balancer with an Auto Scaling group, see the [Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling User Guide](#).

On this page

[PCI.AutoScaling.1] Auto Scaling groups associated with a load balancer should use health checks

[PCI.CloudTrail.1] CloudTrail logs should be encrypted at rest using AWS KMS CMKS

[PCI.CloudTrail.2] CloudTrail should be enabled

[PCI.CloudTrail.3] CloudTrail log file validation should be enabled

[PCI.CloudTrail.4] CloudTrail trails should be integrated with CloudWatch Logs

[PCI.CodeBuild.1] CodeBuild GitHub or Bitbucket source repository URLs should use OAuth

[PCI.CodeBuild.2] CodeBuild project environment variables should not contain clear text credentials

[PCI.Config.1] AWS Config should be enabled

[PCI.CW.1] A log metric filter and alarm should exist for usage of the "root" user

[PCI.DMS.1] AWS Database Migration Service replication instances should not be public

[PCI.EC2.1] Amazon EBS snapshots should not be publicly restorable

[PCI.EC2.2] VPC default security group should prohibit inbound and outbound traffic

[PCI.EC2.3] Unused EC2 security groups should be removed

[PCI.EC2.4] Unused EC2 EIPs should be removed

[PCI.EC2.5] Security groups should not allow ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 to port 22

[PCI.EC2.6] VPC flow logging should be enabled in all VPCs

Examples

Rule:

```
ALL ?users  
WITH ?old_passwords  
MUST BE ?a_disabled_user
```

Rule:

```
?vulnerabilities  
OF ?repositories  
CAN'T BE ?critical
```

Rule:

```
ALL ?possible_connections_to(?server, ?port)  
MUST BE ?from_legitimate_host
```

Examples

Example1.BaseRule

Safe Haskell: None
Language: Haskell2010

Documentation

```
ruleOldPasswords :: (Member Rule Effs, _) => Eff Effs Bool # Source
```

This function is a transcription of the high-level rule that can be found in `src/Example1/BaseRule.rule`:

```
Rule:
  ALL ?users
  WITH ?old_passwords
  MUST BE ?a_disabled_user
```

The signature has a type hole to be filled by the compiler with the found implicit parameters. This is the result:

```
>>> :t ruleOldPasswords
ruleOldPasswords
  :: (Data.OpenUnion.Internal.FindElem Rule Effs,
      ?users::Eff Effs [t]
      ?old_password:t -> Eff Effs Bool,
      ?a_disabled_user:t -> Eff Effs Bool,
    ) =>
  Eff Effs Bool
```

By the type of the found implicit parameters we know that:

- `?users`: Is a list of elements of some type `t`.
- `?old_password`: Is a function that given an element of type `t` returns a `Bool`.
- `?a_disabled_user`: Is a function that given an element of type `t` returns a `Bool`.

For a concrete implementation of this rule see `ruleLDAPOldPassword`.

Examples

Example1.LDAPOldPasswords

Safe Haskell: None
Language: Haskell2010

This module contains some functions to illustrate a concrete rule (`ruleLDAPOldPassword`) over a general one (`ruleOldPasswords`).

The main purpose is to check if the users of a given LDAP database that haven't changed their password in a while, have been disabled.

Documentation

```
ruleLDAPOldPassword :: (Member Rule Effs, _) => Eff Effs _
```

Source

This function is a transcription of the high-level rule that can be found in `src/Example1/LDAPOldPasswords.rule`:

```
Rule:
  FROM /src/Example1/BaseRule.rule
Given:
  ?users = ldapUsers
  ?old_password = userOldDays > ?max_user_days
  ?a_disabled_user = disabled
```

The signature has a type hole to be filled by the compiler with the found implicit parameters. This is the result:

```
>>> :t ruleLDAPOldPassword
ruleLDAPOldPassword
  :: (Data.OpenUnion.Internal.FindElem Rule Effs,
      ?max_user_days::Integer
    ) =>
    Eff Effs Bool
```

This rule simply extends `ruleOldPasswords` filling its holes (`?users`, `?old_password` and `?a_disabled_user`) and generating a new smaller hole (`?max_user_days`).

```
runRuleLDAPOldPassword
```

Source

```
:: Integer The maximum number of days allowed for an LDAP password to be unchanged before the user becomes disabled
-> IO Bool The result of running the rule over the (fake) LDAP database
```

Run `ruleLDAPOldPassword` filling the remaining hole (`?max_user_days`) with the given parameter

Illustrative

Stakeholders

CSPs/XaaS (AWS/GCP/Azure/Salesforce/RedHat/...)

Security Vendors

Application Security Requirements & Threat Management

Governance, Risk&Compliance

AST/DAST/IAST/SCA/AVC (Build-time checking tools)

SOAR (Run-time response automation tools)

Start-ups opportunity

And anyway: Your organization

Next steps: Feedback&Contribution

Roadmap & Features

“Overlord” as the OWASP SUSTO tool

Plug-ins to existing tools

Map standard control sets to Rules

Contribute Community Rules

Contribute CSP/Vendor Rules

Don't fear the long tail
You better choose
SUSTO

THANKS

