Cyberscope

Audit Report

OTO Protocol

March 2022

Type	ERC20
Network	AVAX
Address	0x3e5a9F09923936427aD6e487b24E23a862FCf6b7
Audited by	© cyberscope

Table of Contents

Contract Review

Contract Name	OTO
Compiler Version	v0.7.4+commit.3f05b770
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	None
Explorer	https://snowtrace.io/token/0x3e5a9F09923936427aD6e487b24E23a862FCf6b7
Symbol	OTO
Decimals	5
Total Supply	325,000
Source	contract.sol
Domain	otoprotocol.info

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	19th March 2022
Corrected	

Contract Analysis

Critical Medium Minor Pass

Severity	Code	Description
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling

ULTW - Unlimited Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L843

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds to the team wallet. These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract. The owner may take advantage of it by calling withdrawAllToTreasury().

```
function withdrawAllToTreasury() external swapping onlyOwner {

    uint256 amountToSwap = _gonBalances[address(this)].div(_gonsPerFragment);
    require( amountToSwap > 0,"There is no OTO token deposited in token
contract");
    address[] memory path = new address[](2);
    path[0] = address(this);
    path[1] = router.WAVAX();
    router.swapExactTokensForAVAXSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
        amountToSwap,
        0,
        path,
        treasuryReceiver,
        block.timestamp
    );
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of funds that can be swapped. Since a huge amount may violate the token's price.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

BC - Blacklisted Contracts

Criticality	medium
Location	contract.sol#L1009

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop contracts from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setBotBlacklist` function.

```
require(!blacklist[sender] && !blacklist[recipient], "in_blacklist");
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner’s account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

Critical Medium Minor

Severity	Code	Description
	MTS	Manipulate Total Supply
	CO	Code Optimization
	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
	L05	Unused State Variable
	L09	Dead Code Elimination
	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation
	L14	Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

MTS - Manipulate Total Supply

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L639

Description

The contract is manipulating the total supply. This change will have a direct impact on the token price and Market Cap

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < times; i++) {
    _totalSupply = _totalSupply
        .mul((10**RATE_DECIMALS).add(rebaseRate))
        .div(10**RATE_DECIMALS);
}
```

Recommendation

The contract owner should carefully manage the adjustment of the circulating supply (increases or decreases), according to the token’s price fluctuations.

CO - Code Optimization

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L692

Description

The algorithmic flow does not follow the required business logic.

In the following statement the third and the forth **if** will never be fulfilled since an unsigned integer is either less than or greater/equal to 365 days. Hence, always the first two **if** statements will be fulified.

```
if (deltaTimeFromInit < (365 days)) {
    rebaseRate = 2355;
} else if (deltaTimeFromInit >= (365 days)) {
    rebaseRate = 211;
} else if (deltaTimeFromInit >= ((15 * 365 days) / 10)) {
    rebaseRate = 14;
} else if (deltaTimeFromInit >= (7 * 365 days)) {
    rebaseRate = 2;
}
```

Recommendation

Rewrite some code segments so the runtime will be more performant.

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L458,471,476,502,506,510,995,1014

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
setPairAddress
getLiquidityBacking
decimals
symbol
name
transferOwnership
renounceOwnership
owner
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L550,551,524,522,523,548,543,539,541,542 and 2 more

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
treasuryFee
swapEnabled
sellFee
otoVaultFundFee
liquidityFee
firePitFee
feeDenominator
_symbol
_name
...
```

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L153,155,181,225,892,901,964,984,985,986 and 18 more

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_totalSupply
_lastAddLiquidityTime
_lastRebasedTime
_initRebaseStartTime
_autoAddLiquidity
_autoRebase
ZERO
DEAD
_isFeeExempt
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L9

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

```
MAX_INT256
```

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L37

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
abs
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L620,730,995

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
liquidityBalance = _gonBalances[pair].div(_gonsPerFragment)
_gonBalances[autoLiquidityReceiver] =
_gonBalances[autoLiquidityReceiver].add(gonAmount.div(feeDenominator).mul(liquid
ityFee))
_gonBalances[address(this)] =
_gonBalances[address(this)].add(gonAmount.div(feeDenominator).mul(_treasuryFee.a
dd(otoVaultFundFee)))
_gonBalances[firePit] =
_gonBalances[firePit].add(gonAmount.div(feeDenominator).mul(firePitFee))
feeAmount = gonAmount.div(feeDenominator).mul(_totalFee)
times = deltaTime.div(900)
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L623

Description

The are variables that are defined in the local scope and are not initialized.

```
rebaseRate
```

Recommendation

All the local scoped variables should be initialized.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
SafeMathInt	Library			
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	abs	Internal		
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IJoeSwapPair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-

	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IJoeSwapRouter	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WAVAX	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityAVAX	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityAVAX	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityAVAXWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-

	swapExactAVAXForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactAVAX	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForAVAX	External	✓	-
	swapAVAXForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
	removeLiquidityAVAXSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityAVAXWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactAVAXForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForAVAXSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
IJoeSwapFactory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	migrator	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
	setMigrator	External	✓	-
Ownable	Implementation			
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	isOwner	Public		-

	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
ERC20Detailed	Implementation	IERC20		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
OTO	Implementation	ERC20Detailed, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20Detailed Ownable
	rebase	Internal	✓	
	transfer	External	✓	validRecipient
	transferFrom	External	✓	validRecipient
	_basicTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_transferFrom	Internal	✓	
	takeFee	Internal	✓	
	addLiquidity	Internal	✓	swapping
	swapBack	Internal	✓	swapping
	withdrawAllToTreasury	External	✓	swapping onlyOwner
	shouldTakeFee	Internal		
	shouldRebase	Internal		
	shouldAddLiquidity	Internal		
	shouldSwapBack	Internal		
	setAutoRebase	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setAutoAddLiquidity	External	✓	onlyOwner
	allowance	External		-
	decreaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	checkFeeExempt	External		-
	getCirculatingSupply	Public		-

	isNotInSwap	External		-
	manualSync	External	✓	-
	setFeeReceivers	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getLiquidityBacking	Public		-
	setWhitelist	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setBotBlacklist	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setPairAddress	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setLP	External	✓	onlyOwner
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	isContract	Internal		
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-

Contract Flow



Domain Info

Domain Name	otoprotocol.info
Registry Domain ID	c3ae8b825c1a4208a0a684b877b5965a-DONUTS
Creation Date	2022-03-09T21:35:04Z
Updated Date	2022-03-14T21:35:19Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-03-09T21:35:04Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL	https://www.namecheap.com/
Registrar	NameCheap, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID	1068

The domain has been created 10 days before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner, like blacklisting contracts and transferring funds to the team’s wallet. The maximum fee percentage that can be set is 14% in buys and 16% in sales. The contract is also using a rebase technique that manipulates the total supply. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

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Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.

The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io