Cyberscope

Audit Report

LFGdoge

March 2022

Type	BEP20
Network	BSC
Address	0x0711b6F1D4205AAf7b02a6De014394646b1D841b
Audited by	© cyberscope

Table of Contents

Contract Review

Contract Name	LFGdoge
Compiler Version	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	None
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/token/0x0711b6F1D4205AAf7b02a6De014394646b1D841b
Symbol	LFGdoge
Decimals	9
Total Supply	1,000,000,000,000,000
Source	contract.sol
Domain	lfgdoge.com

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	10th March 2022
Corrected	

Contract Analysis

Critical Medium Minor Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions	Resolved
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address	
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens	
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)	Resolved
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent	Resolved
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens	
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet	
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling	Resolved

ST - Stop Transactions

Criticality	medium
Location	contract.sol#L635

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `_maxTxAmount` or `_walletMax` to zero.

```
if(!isTxLimitExempt[sender] && !isTxLimitExempt[recipient]) {
    require(amount <= _maxTxAmount, "Transfer amount exceeds the maxTxAmount.");
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the _maxTxAmount less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Corrected 10 April 2022

The team has renounced ownership and the threats have been eliminated.

ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L534

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setTaxes` function with a high percentage value.

```
function setTaxes(uint256 newMarketingFee) external onlyOwner() {
    _marketingFee = newMarketingFee;
    _totalTax = _marketingFee;
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Corrected 10 April 2022

The team has renounced ownership and the threats have been eliminated.

ULTW - Unlimited Liquidity to Team Wallet

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L671

Description

The contract owner has the authority to transfer funds to the team wallet. These funds have been accumulated from fees collected from the contract and sold for bnb.

```
function swapAndLiquify(uint256 tAmount) private lockTheSwap {
    swapTokensForEth(tAmount);
    uint256 amountReceived = address(this).balance;

    if(amountReceived > 0)
        transferToAddressETH(marketingWalletAddress, amountReceived);
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum amount of tokens that can be sold in one transaction.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner’s account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Corrected 10 April 2022

The team has renounced ownership and the threats have been eliminated.

BC - Blacklisted Contracts

Criticality	medium
Location	contract.sol#L1

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop contracts from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `isbotBlackList` function.

```
require(!isbotBlackList[sender], "account is bot");
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Corrected 10 April 2022

The team has renounced ownership and the threats have been eliminated.

Contract Diagnostics

Critical Medium Minor

Severity	Code	Description
	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
	L05	Unused State Variable
	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
	L09	Dead Code Elimination
	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L165,170,176,471,475,479,483,491,495,500 and 11 more

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
transferFrom
transfer
changeRouterVersion
rescueToken
getCirculatingSupply
setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly
setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled
setIsExcludedFromFee
setMarketPairStatus
...
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L389,387,388,146,145

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
asdasd
_lockTime
_symbol
_name
_decimals
```

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L145,146

Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

```
_lockTime
asdasd
```

Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L213,214,230,249,563,699,394,403,405,408 and 1 more

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_walletMax
_maxTxAmount
_totalTax
_marketingFee
_balances
_account
_enabled
WETH
MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L123,106,110,114,118,87,98

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
sendValue
isContract
functionCallWithValue
functionCall
_functionCallWithValue
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L534,539,551,555

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit
_walletMax = newLimit
_maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount
_totalTax = _marketingFee
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	

	_functionCallWithValue	Private	✓	
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	waiveOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	getTime	Public		-
IUniswapV2Factory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-

	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Router01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-

IUniswapV2Router02	Interface	IUniswapV2Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
LFGdoge	Implementation	Context, IERC20, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	allowance	Public		-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	minimumTokensBeforeSwapAmount	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	_approve	Private	✓	
	setMarketPairStatus	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setIsTxLimitExempt	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setIsExcludedFromFee	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setTaxes	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setMaxTxAmount	External	✓	onlyOwner
	enableDisableWalletLimit	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setIsWalletLimitExempt	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setWalletLimit	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setNumTokensBeforeSwap	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setMarketingWalletAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner

	setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	getCirculatingSupply	Public		-
	burnBNB	External	✓	onlyOwner
	rescueToken	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferToAddressETH	Private	✓	
	changeRouterVersion	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Private	✓	
	_basicTransfer	Internal	✓	
	swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	lockTheSwap
	swapTokensForEth	Private	✓	
	setblocklist	External	✓	onlyOwner
	takeFee	Internal	✓	

Contract Flow



Domain Info

Domain Name	lfgdoge.com
Registry Domain ID	2680473873_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Creation Date	2022-03-09T19:24:04Z
Updated Date	2022-03-09T19:24:04Z
Registry Expiry Date	2023-03-09T19:24:04Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL	http://www.godaddy.com
Registrar	GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID	146

The domain has been created about 19 hours before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner, like manipulating fees, transferring funds to the team’s wallet, blacklisting contracts and stopping transactions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

Corrected 10 April 2022

The team has renounced ownership and the threats have been eliminated.

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Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.

The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io