

# **Audit Report**

# **Future**

April 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0x0af2b1d9c424752e5efe150ec103d728d86c6f79

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# **Contract Review**

Contract Name	Future
Compiler Version	v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	Unlicense
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/token/0x0af2b1d9c424752e5efe1 50ec103d728d86c6f79
Symbol	Future
Decimals	9
Total Supply	100,000,000
Domain	

# Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	b3f78c527079f22d6d8f70edddf13163a32e2800528bf8 da3a10451047746021

# **Audit Updates**

Initial Audit	1st April 2022
Corrected	25th April 2022

# **Contract Analysis**

CriticalMediumMinorPass

Severity	Code	Description
•	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
•	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
•	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
•	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
•	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
•	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
•	ВТ	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
•	ВС	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling



## ST - Stop Transactions

```
Criticality critical

Location contract.sol#L656,759
```

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the sales for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the \_totalTaxIfSelling to a high value.

```
else if(isMarketPair[recipient]) {
    feeAmount = amount.mul(_totalTaxIfSelling).div(100);
}
```

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the \_maxTxAmount to zero.

```
if(!isTxLimitExempt[sender] && !isTxLimitExempt[recipient]) {
    require(amount <= _maxTxAmount, "Transfer amount exceeds the maxTxAmount.");
}</pre>
```

#### Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the \_maxTxAmount less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



## ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L553

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the setSellTaxes function with a high percentage value.

```
function setSellTaxes(uint256 newLiquidityTax, uint256 newMarketingTax, uint256
newTeamTax) external onlyOwner() {
    _sellLiquidityFee = newLiquidityTax;
    _sellMarketingFee = newMarketingTax;
    _sellTeamFee = newTeamTax;

    _totalTaxIfSelling =
    _sellLiquidityFee.add(_sellMarketingFee).add(_sellTeamFee);
}
```

### Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

# **Contract Diagnostics**

CriticalMediumMinor

Severity	Code	Description
•	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
•	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
•	L05	Unused State Variable
•	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic
•	L09	Dead Code Elimination



## L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L161,166,172,483,487,491,495,503,507,512,517,521,534,542,598,60 3,607,615,637,642

## Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
transferFrom
transfer
changeRouterVersion
getCirculatingSupply
setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly
setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled
setIsExcludedFromFee
setMarketPairStatus
approve
...
```

### Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.

## L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L385,383,384,142,141

## Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
asdasd
_lockTime
_symbol
_name
_decimals
```

### Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

# L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L209,210,226,245,598,391,402,403,404,406,407,408,410,411,412,41 4,415,416,419,420

### Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow \_ at the beginning of the mixed\_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_walletMax
_maxTxAmount
_totalDistributionShares
_totalTaxIfSelling
_totalTaxIfBuying
_teamShare
_marketingShare
_liquidityShare
_sellTeamFee
...
```

### Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions

## L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L141,142

## Description

There are segments that contain unused state variables.

\_lockTime asdasd

### Recommendation

Remove unused state variables.

# L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L546,554,562,570,582,586

### Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
minimumTokensBeforeSwap = newLimit
    _walletMax = newLimit
    _maxTxAmount = maxTxAmount
    _liquidityShare = newLiquidityShare
    _totalTaxIfSelling = _sellLiquidityFee.add(_sellMarketingFee).add(_sellTeamFee)
    _totalTaxIfBuying = _buyLiquidityFee.add(_buyMarketingFee).add(_buyTeamFee)
```

### Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

## L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L119,102,106,110,114,83,94

## Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

sendValue
isContract
functionCallWithValue
functionCall
\_functionCallWithValue

### Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

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# **Contract Functions**

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	1	-
	transferFrom	External	1	-
CofoRdodo	Library			
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	<b>√</b>	
	functionCall	Internal	1	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	<b>✓</b>	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	1	



	_functionCallWithValue	Private	1	
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<constructor></constructor>	Public	1	-
	owner	Public		-
	waiveOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	getTime	Public		-
IUniswapV2Fa ctory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	1	-
	setFeeTo	External	1	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	1	-
IUniswapV2Pai r	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	1	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	1	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-



	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	burn	External	1	-
	swap	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	skim	External	1	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IUniswapV2Ro uter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	1	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	<b>✓</b>	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-



IUniswapV2Ro uter02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOn TransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSuppor tingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportin gFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingF eeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingF eeOnTransferTokens	External	<b>✓</b>	-
Future	Implementation	Context, IERC20, Ownable		
	<constructor></constructor>	Public	1	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	allowance	Public		-
	increaseAllowance	Public	1	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	1	-
	minimumTokensBeforeSwapAmount	Public		-
	approve	Public	1	-
	_approve	Private	1	
	setMarketPairStatus	Public	1	onlyOwner
	setIsTxLimitExempt	External	1	onlyOwner
	setIsExcludedFromFee	Public	1	onlyOwner
	setBuyTaxes	External	1	onlyOwner
	setSelTaxes	External	<b>✓</b>	onlyOwner
	setDistributionSettings	External	<b>√</b>	onlyOwner
	setMaxTxAmount	External	<b>√</b>	onlyOwner
	enableDisableWalletLimit	External	<b>√</b>	onlyOwner
	setIsWalletLimitExempt	External	<b>✓</b>	onlyOwner
	setWalletLimit	External	1	onlyOwner



setNumTokensBeforeSwap	External	✓	onlyOwner
setMarketingWalletAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTeamWalletAddress	External	1	onlyOwner
setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled	Public	1	onlyOwner
setSwapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly	Public	✓	onlyOwner
getCirculatingSupply	Public		-
transferToAddressETH	Private	✓	
changeRouterVersion	Public	✓	onlyOwner
<receive ether=""></receive>	External	Payable	-
transfer	Public	✓	-
transferFrom	Public	✓	-
_transfer	Private	✓	
_basicTransfer	Internal	✓	
swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	lockTheSwap
swapTokensForEth	Private	✓	
addLiquidity	Private	✓	
takeFee	Internal	✓	



# **Contract Flow**



# Domain Info

Domain Name	futuretoken.best
Registry Domain ID	D286543389-CNIC
Creation Date	2022-03-31T15:52:29+00:00
Updated Date	2022-03-31T19:55:53+00:00
Registry Expiry Date	2023-03-31T23:59:59+00:00
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.namesilo.com
Registrar URL	https://www.namesilo.com
Registrar	NameSilo, LLC
Registrar IANA ID	1479

The domain has been created about one month before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

# Summary

Future Token is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. There are some functions that could be abused by the owner, like manipulating fees up to 100% and stopping transactions for everyone except the owner. The contract could be converted into a honeypot and prevent users from selling if the owner abuses the admin functions. The buys in the first three block numbers after the initial trade are taxed with 90%. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

## Disclaimer

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The Cyberscope team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

# About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io