



Cyberscope

# Audit Report

## **Lava G Token**

April 2022

File gLava.sol

Commit 605b9971b669eabf3e6727cb61d55f7cdd620e5a

Github <https://github.com/lavafinancial/LavaContracts>

Audited by © cyberscope

# Table of Contents

<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Contract Review</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Audit Updates</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Source Files</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Contract Analysis</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>MT - Mint Tokens</b>	<b>5</b>
Description	5
Recommendation	5
Update 13 April	5
<b>BC - Blacklisted Contracts</b>	<b>6</b>
Description	6
Recommendation	6
Update 13 April	6
<b>Unit Test</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Contract Functions</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Contract Flow</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Summary</b>	<b>11</b>
Update 13 April	11
<b>Disclaimer</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>About Cyberscope</b>	<b>13</b>

## Contract Review

<b>Github</b>	LavaFinance
<b>commit</b>	605b9971b669eabf3e6727cb61d55f7cdd620e5a
<b>File</b>	gLava.sol

## Audit Updates

<b>Initial Audit</b>	10th April 2022
<b>Corrected</b>	13th April 2022

## Source Files

Filename	SHA256
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	75e3c97011e75627ffb36f4a2799a4e887e1a3e27ed427490e82d7b6f51cc5c9
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol	f7831910f2ed6d32acff6431e5998baf50e4a00121303b27e974aab0ec637d79
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol	af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	c2b06bb4572bb4f84bfc5477dad0fcc497cb66c3a1bd53480e68bedc2e154a6
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol	1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a
contracts/gLava.sol	faf09e35229019b58557d181176000f49440519132b486ad9f97c280236a7b25

# Contract Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Resolved
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions	
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address	
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens	
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)	
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent	
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens	Multisig Wallet
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet	
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling	Multisig Wallet

## MT - Mint Tokens

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L31
Resolved	Multisig wallet

### Description

The lavaFinance address as a “minter” role has the authority to mint tokens. The “minter” role may take advantage of it by calling the `mint` function. As a result the contract tokens will be highly inflated. The contract owner can set the minter role.

```
function mint(address recipient, uint amount) external onlyMinters virtual {  
    _mint(recipient, amount);  
}
```

### Recommendation

The owner should carefully manage the credentials of the owner’s account. We advised considering an extra-strong security mechanism that the actions may be quarantined by many users instead of one. The owner could also renounce the contract ownership for a period of time or pass the access to the zero address.

### Update 13 April

The team has noted that all administrative functionality is secured by a 3/5 multisig wallet with doxxed and KYC’d members.

## BC - Blacklisted Contracts

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L49
Resolved	Multisig wallet

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to massively stop contracts from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setBlacklistMultiple` function.

```
require(!blacklisted[from], "Not allowed");
```

### Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

### Update 13 April

The team has noted that all administrative functionality is secured by a 3/5 multisig wallet with doxxed and KYC'd members.

# Unit Test

- ✓ Test minting (58ms)
- ✓ Test blacklist transfer (92ms)
- ✓ Test blacklist voting power (89ms)




# Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<b>Ownable</b>	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
<b>ERC20</b>	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_spendAllowance	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	

<b>IERC20Metadata</b>	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
<b>IERC20</b>	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
<b>Context</b>	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
<b>gLava</b>	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20
	setLavaFinance	External	✓	onlyOwner
	mint	External	✓	onlyMinters
	setBlacklistMultiple	External	✓	onlyOwner
	votingPower	External		-
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
<b>gLavaTestnet</b>	Implementation	gLava		
	mint	External	✓	-

# Contract Flow



## Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner, like minting tokens and blacklisting addresses. We state that the owner privileges are necessary and required for proper protocol operations of the Lava Finance ecosystem. Thus, we emphasise the contract owner to be extra careful with the credentials. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

## Update 13 April

The team has noted that all administrative functionality is secured by a 3/5 multisig wallet with doxxed and KYC'd members.

## Disclaimer

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment.

Cyberscope team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed.

The Cyberscope team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Cyberscope receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website.

Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token.

The Cyberscope team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

# About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>