



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Lava Token

April 2022

File	LavaToken.sol
Commit	d59617e3ac107eea6d7601aac6e73e7f45ee00eb
Github	https://github.com/lavafinancial/LavaContracts
Audited by	© cyberscope

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Contract Review

Github	LavaToken
commit	d59617e3ac107eea6d7601aac6e73e7f45ee00eb
File	LavaFinance.sol

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	9th April 2022
Corrected	

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	75e3c97011e75627ffb36f4a2799a4e887e1a3e27ed427490e82d7b6f51cc5c9
@openzeppelin/contracts/security/Pausable.sol	5b6abc290190f46b9941c674594eee083a3fe6b92d1828d0cfefacc94d1cac9a
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol	f7831910f2ed6d32acff6431e5998baf50e4a00121303b27e974aab0ec637d79
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol	af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	c2b06bb4572bb4f84bfc5477dadcfcc497cb66c3a1bd53480e68bedc2e154a6
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721.sol	a88e8e63c7a737436f7ec62542620609ab07bb9a772e77146ed4dc98539e03d3
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol	1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol	701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b3064325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5
contracts/interfaces/JoeRouter.sol	dd1c237f78c9eea8d6378ebdaa91c3002e85bb0a1b70517413e158c5f4bf9b48
contracts/LavaToken.sol	5cc4866f96efb8f73fd7e21393aafe5eb432902d96856c2d786162aed7d69d71

Contract Analysis

Severity	Code	Description
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling

ST - Stop Transactions

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L157,152,131

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the sales for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `salesTax` to a high value. This action may cause the contract to operate as a honeypot.

```
if (lpPairs[to] && !whitelistedTax[from] && from != address(this)) {
    // Sales Tax
    uint totalSalesTax = salesTax;
    if (nodeSalesTax > 0) {
        totalSalesTax += nodeSalesTax * IERC721(lavaFinance).balanceOf(from);
    }
    uint feeAmount = (amount * totalSalesTax) / 1e4;
    amount -= feeAmount;
    if (feeAmount > 0) {
        _transfer(from, address(this), feeAmount);
        swapLavaForTokens(feeAmount);
    }
}
```

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users after their initial transaction. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `liquidityCooldown` to a high value.

```
if (block.number < liquidityCooldown + additionalLiquidityCooldown &&
    blacklisted[to] == 0 && !whitelisted[to]) {
    blacklisted[to] = block.number;
    botsCount++;
}
```

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the `maxPerWallet` to a very low value.

```
require(!paused() || whitelisted[from] && whitelisted[to], "Paused");
if (!whitelisted[to]) {
```

```
require(balanceOf(to) + amount <= maxPerWallet, "Max wallet amount  
reached");  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody checks for not allowing the contract owner to manipulate the configurable properties more than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L96

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setTaxes` function with a high percentage value.

```
function setTaxes(uint _transferTax, uint _salesTax, uint _nodeSalesTax)
external onlyOwner {
    transferTax = _transferTax;
    salesTax = _salesTax;
    nodeSalesTax = _nodeSalesTax;
}
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

BC - Blacklisted Contracts

Criticality	critical
Location	contract.sol#L128

Description

The contract owner has the authority to massively stop contracts from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setBlacklistMultiple` function.

```
require(!isBlacklisted(from), "Not allowed");
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor

Severity	Code	Description
●	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality

minor

Location

contracts/LavaToken.sol#L119

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

burn

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality

minor

Location

contracts/LavaToken.sol#L65,78,83,90,96,102,107

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_cooldownBlocks  
_maxPerWallet  
_nodeSalesTax  
_salesTax  
_transferTax  
_status  
_lpPair  
_lpRouter  
_usdce  
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>

Unit Test

- Test blacklist
- Test pausable
- ✓ Test max wallet (52ms)
- ✓ Test transfer tax (93ms)
- Test sales tax
- ✓ Test lp buy (120ms)

Contract Functions


Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
Pausable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	paused	Public		-
	_pause	Internal	✓	whenNotPaused
	_unpause	Internal	✓	whenPaused
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Meta data		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-

	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_mint	Internal	✓	
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	
	_spendAllowance	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
IERC20Metadata	Interface	IERC20		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
IERC721	Interface	IERC165		
	balanceOf	External		-
	ownerOf	External		-
	safeTransferFrom	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	approve	External	✓	-
	getApproved	External		-
	setApprovalForAll	External	✓	-
	isApprovedForAll	External		-
	safeTransferFrom	External	✓	-
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		

IERC165	Interface			
	supportsInterface	External		-
JoeRouter	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
LavaToken	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable, Pausable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	ERC20
	setWhitelistMultiple	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setBlacklistMultiple	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setWhitelistTaxMultiple	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setTaxCollectors	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setLavaFinance	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setUsdcAndRouter	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setLpPair	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setTaxes	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setMaxPerWallet	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setLiquidityControl	External	✓	onlyOwner
	pause	External	✓	onlyOwner
	unpause	External	✓	onlyOwner
	burn	Public	✓	-
	isBlacklisted	Internal	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	_transferFrom	Internal	✓	
	swapLavaForTokens	Private	✓	

LavaTokenTest net	Implementation	LavaToken		
	mint	External	✓	-

Contract Flow



Summary

There are some functions that can be abused by the owner, like manipulating fees, stopping transactions and blacklisting wallets. The contract can be converted into a honeypot and prevent users from selling if the owner abuses the admin functions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

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About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>