

Audit Report Wenabis

February 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xAfe91443bd6A8ceFD50d3095D8E24a4F0D205aA0

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Contract Review

The contract is part of an upgradable mechanism. In this audit we focus on the upgradable content rather than the proxy contract.

Contract Name	mytoken5
Compiler Version	v0.8.9+commit.e5eed63a
Optimization	1 runs
Licence	
Explorer	https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xafe91443bd6a 8cefd50d3095d8e24a4f0d205aa0#code
Symbol	MTK



Source	contracts/mytokenv4.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/E RC20Upgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/e xtensions/ERC20BurnableUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/Pausa bleUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/Access ControlUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initia lizable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUP SUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUP SUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/I ERC20Upgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/e xtensions/IERC20MetadataUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ContextUp gradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressU pgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUp gradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUp gradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/introspecti on/ERC165Upgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/ERC1967 /ERC1967Upgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/ERC1967 /ERC1967Upgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/beacon/I BeaconUpgradeable.sol, @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/beacon/I BeaconUpgradeable.sol,
Domain	wenabis.co



Audit Updates

Initial Audit	11th February 2022
Corrected	



Contract Analysis

CriticalMediumMinorPass

Severity	Code	Description
•	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
•	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
•	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
•	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
•	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
•	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
•	ВТ	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
•	ВС	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling



ST - Stop Transactions

Criticality	medium
Location	contract.sol#L158,162

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop transactions for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by setting the _maxTxAmount or _maxWalletAmount to zero.

```
require(amount < _maxTxAmount, "AntiWhale 1% transfer 5% WalletHold.");</pre>
```

```
require((balanceOf(recipient) + amount) < _maxWalletAmount, "AntiWhale: 1%
transfer 5% WalletHold.");</pre>
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for not allowing setting the _maxTxAmount and _maxWalletAmount less than a reasonable amount. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be more than a fixed percentage of the total supply.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

```
Criticality critical

Location contract.sol#L351
```

Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the updateFee function with a high percentage value.

```
function updateFee(uint256 _txFee,uint256 _burnFee,uint256 _charityFee) public
onlyRole(UPGRADER_ROLE) {
    require(_txFee < 100 && _burnFee < 100 && _charityFee < 100);
    _Tax_Fee = _txFee* 100;
    _Burn_Fee = _burnFee * 100;
    Orig_Tax_Fee = _charityFee* 100;
    Orig_Tax_Fee = _Tax_Fee;
    Orig_Burn_Fee = _Burn_Fee;
    Orig_Charity_Fee = _Charity_Fee;
}

...
uint256 tFee = ((tAmount.mul(taxFee)).div(_Granularity)).div(100);
uint256 tBurn = ((tAmount.mul(burnFee)).div(_Granularity)).div(100);
uint256 tCharity = ((tAmount.mul(charityFee)).div(_Granularity)).div(100);</pre>
```

Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.



BC - Blacklisted Contracts

Criticality	medium
Location	contract.sol#L154

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop addresses from transactions. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the enableBlacklist function.

```
require(!isBlacklisted(msg.sender), "sender en lista negra");
require(!isBlacklisted(recipient), "receptor en blacklisted");
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

Contract Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor

Severity	Code	Description
•	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
	L09	Dead Code Elimination
	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic
	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation



L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality	minor
Location	contracts/mytokenv4.sol#L46,139,351

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

updateFee
enableBlacklist
initialize

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contracts/mytokenv4.sol#L12,46,100,351,24,25 and 15 more

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow _ at the beginning of the mixed_case match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
Orig_Charity_Fee
Orig_Burn_Fee
Orig_Tax_Fee
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention. https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions



L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	minor
Location	contracts/mytokenv4.sol#L339

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

_getTaxFee

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.



L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality	minor
Location	contracts/mytokenv4.sol#L100

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

_tTotal -= _amount

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	minor
Location	contracts/mytokenv4.sol#L46

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
_minSupply = _tTotal.div(2) * _DecimalsFactor
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



Contract Functions

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
AccessControl Upgradeable	Implementation	Initializable, ContextUpg radeable, IAccessCon trolUpgrade able, ERC165Upg radeable		
	AccessControl_init	Internal	✓	onlyInitializing
	AccessControl_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	supportsInterface	Public		-
	hasRole	Public		-
	_checkRole	Internal		
	getRoleAdmin	Public		-
	grantRole	Public	✓	onlyRole
	revokeRole	Public	1	onlyRole
	renounceRole	Public	1	-
	_setupRole	Internal	✓	
	_setRoleAdmin	Internal	✓	
	_grantRole	Internal	✓	
	_revokeRole	Internal	✓	
IAccessContro IUpgradeable	Interface			
	hasRole	External		-
	getRoleAdmin	External		-
	grantRole	External	1	-
	revokeRole	External	1	-
	renounceRole	External	1	-
IBeaconUpgra deable	Interface			



	implementation	External		-
ERC1967Upgr adeUpgradeab le	Implementation	Initializable		
	ERC1967Upgrade_init	Internal	✓	onlyInitializing
	ERC1967Upgrade_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	_getImplementation	Internal		
	_setImplementation	Private	1	
	_upgradeTo	Internal	✓	
	_upgradeToAndCall	Internal	✓	
	_upgradeToAndCallSecure	Internal	✓	
	_getAdmin	Internal		
	_setAdmin	Private	✓	
	_changeAdmin	Internal	✓	
	_getBeacon	Internal		
	_setBeacon	Private	1	
	_upgradeBeaconToAndCall	Internal	1	
	_functionDelegateCall	Private	✓	
Initializable	Implementation			
	_isConstructor	Private		
UUPSUpgrade able	Implementation	Initializable, ERC1967Up gradeUpgra deable		
	UUPSUpgradeable_init	Internal	✓	onlyInitializing
	UUPSUpgradeable_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	upgradeTo	External	1	onlyProxy
	upgradeToAndCall	External	Payable	onlyProxy
	_authorizeUpgrade	Internal	✓	
PausableUpgr adeable	Implementation	Initializable, ContextUpg radeable		
	Pausable_init	Internal	✓	onlyInitializing
	Pausable_init_unchained	Internal	/	onlyInitializing



	paused	Public		-
	_pause	Internal	1	whenNotPause d
	_unpause	Internal	√	whenPaused
ERC20Upgrad eable	Implementation	Initializable, ContextUpg radeable, IERC20Upg radeable, IERC20Met adataUpgra deable		
	ERC20_init	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	ERC20_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	1	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	1	-
	transferFrom	Public	1	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	1	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	1	-
	_transfer	Internal	1	
	_mint	Internal	1	
	_burn	Internal	1	
	_approve	Internal	1	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	1	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	/	
ERC20Burnabl eUpgradeable	Implementation	Initializable, ContextUpg radeable, ERC20Upgr adeable		
	ERC20Burnable_init	Internal	1	onlyInitializing



	ERC20Burnable_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	burn	Public	1	-
	burnFrom	Public	1	-
IERC20Metada taUpgradeable	Interface	IERC20Upg radeable		
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
IERC20Upgrad eable	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	1	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	1	-
	transferFrom	External	1	-
AddressUpgra deable	Library			
	isContract	Internal		
	sendValue	Internal	1	
	functionCall	Internal	1	
	functionCall	Internal	1	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	1	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	verifyCallResult	Internal		
ContextUpgra deable	Implementation	Initializable		
	Context_init	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	Context_init_unchained	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		



ERC165Upgra deable	Implementation	Initializable, IERC165Up gradeable		
	ERC165_init	Internal	1	onlyInitializing
	ERC165_init_unchained	Internal	✓	onlyInitializing
	supportsInterface	Public		-
IERC165Upgra deable	Interface			
	supportsInterface	External		-
SafeMathUpgr adeable	Library			
	tryAdd	Internal		
	trySub	Internal		
	tryMul	Internal		
	tryDiv	Internal		
	tryMod	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
StorageSlotUp gradeable	Library			
	getAddressSlot	Internal		
	getBooleanSlot	Internal		
	getBytes32Slot	Internal		
	getUint256Slot	Internal		
StringsUpgrad eable	Library			




	toString	Internal		
	toHexString	Internal		
	toHexString	Internal		
mytoken5	Implementation	Initializable, ERC20Upgr adeable, ERC20Burn ableUpgrad eable, PausableUp gradeable, AccessCont rolUpgradea ble, UUPSUpgra deable		
	initialize	Public	Payable	initializer
	setMaxTxPercent	External	1	onlyRole
	setMaxWalletPercent	External	1	onlyRole
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	tokenFromReflection	Public		-
	burn	Public	1	-
	excludeAccount	External	✓	onlyRole
	includeAccount	External	1	onlyRole
	enableBlacklist	Public	✓	onlyRole
	disableBlacklist	External	1	onlyRole
	isBlacklisted	Public		-
	_transfer	Internal	1	
	_transferStandard	Private	1	
	_standardTransferContent	Private	✓	
	_transferToExcluded	Private	✓	
	_excludedFromTransferContent	Private	✓	
	_transferFromExcluded	Private	✓	
	_excludedToTransferContent	Private	✓	
	_transferBothExcluded	Private	✓	
	_bothTransferContent	Private	✓	
	_reflectFee	Private	1	



_getValues	Private		
_getTBasics	Private		
getTTransferAmount	Private		
_getRBasics	Private		
_getRTransferAmount	Private		
_getRate	Private		
_getCurrentSupply	Private		
_sendToCharity	Private	✓	
removeAllFee	Private	✓	
restoreAllFee	Private	✓	
_getTaxFee	Private		
minSupply	External		-
maxWalletAmount	External		-
updateFee	Public	✓	onlyRole
unpause	External	✓	onlyRole
_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	whenNotPause d
_authorizeUpgrade	Internal	✓	onlyRole



Contract Flow





Domain Info

Domain Name	wenabis.co
Registry Domain ID	D2BEC39862EE14CFDAAD19477EE0D6C32-NSR
Creation Date	2021-05-06T03:33:40Z
Updated Date	2021-07-17T01:32:25Z
Registry Expiry Date	2022-05-06T03:33:40Z
Registrar WHOIS Server	whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL	whois.godaddy.com
Registrar	GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID	146

The domain has been created 9 months before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 3 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.



Summary

Wenabis is aiming to build massive cannabis production for medical and industry use. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner, like manipulating fees, blacklisting contracts and stopping transactions. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.



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About Coinscope

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Coinscope is aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. It provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Coinscope.co team

https://www.coinscope.co