



Cyberscope

# Audit Report

## **BULLGOLD**

April 2022

Type       BEP20

Network     BSC

Address     0x46eF8d452d415f8c7E4E49Ba3782E394c919D794

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## Contract Review

<b>Contract Name</b>	BULLGOLD
<b>Compiler Version</b>	v0.6.12+commit.27d51765
<b>Optimization</b>	200 runs
<b>Licence</b>	Unlicense
<b>Explorer</b>	<a href="https://bscscan.com/token/0x46eF8d452d415f8c7E4E49Ba3782E394c919D794">https://bscscan.com/token/0x46eF8d452d415f8c7E4E49Ba3782E394c919D794</a>
<b>Symbol</b>	BULLG
<b>Decimals</b>	18
<b>Total Supply</b>	1,000,000,000
<b>Domain</b>	bullgold.finance

## Source Files

<b>Filename</b>	<b>SHA256</b>
<b>contract.sol</b>	2dadf13363d0f020ce9e0c7967d85e0d06ef2e6782dce2d152a8dc659e5528c0

## Audit Updates

<b>Initial Audit</b>	24th April 2022
<b>Corrected</b>	

# Contract Analysis

● Critical    ● Medium    ● Minor    ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description
●	ST	Contract Owner is not able to stop or pause transactions
●	OCTD	Contract Owner is not able to transfer tokens from specific address
●	OTUT	Owner Transfer User's Tokens
●	ELFM	Contract Owner is not able to increase fees more than a reasonable percent (25%)
●	ULTW	Contract Owner is not able to increase the amount of liquidity taken by dev wallet more than a reasonable percent
●	MT	Contract Owner is not able to mint new tokens
●	BT	Contract Owner is not able to burn tokens from specific wallet
●	BC	Contract Owner is not able to blacklist wallets from selling

## ELFM - Exceed Limit Fees Manipulation

<b>Criticality</b>	critical
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L729

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to increase over the allowed limit of 25%. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `setLiquidityFeePercent` function with a high percentage value.

```
function setLiquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFee) external onlyOwner() {  
    _liquidityFee = liquidityFee;  
}
```

### Recommendation

The contract could embody a check for the maximum acceptable value.

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions. That risk can be prevented by temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership.

# Contract Diagnostics

● Critical    ● Medium    ● Minor

Severity	Code	Description
●	FSA	Fixed Swap Address
●	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation

## FSA - Fixed Swap Address

<b>Criticality</b>	minor
<b>Location</b>	contract.sol#L617

### Description

The swap address is assigned once in the constructor and it can not be changed. The decentralized swaps sometimes create a new swap version or abandon the current. A contract that cannot change the swap address may not be able to catch-up the upgrade.

```
IPancakeRouter02 _pancakeswapV2Router =  
IPancakeRouter02(0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E);  
    // Create a uniswap pair for this new token  
    pcsV2Pair =  
IPancakeFactory(_pancakeswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),  
_pancakeswapV2Router.WETH());
```

### Recommendation

It could be better to allow the swap address mutation in case of future swap updates.



## L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L332,341,632,636,640,644,652,657,661,665 and 6 more

### Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
reflectionFromToken  
reflect  
totalFees  
decreaseAllowance  
increaseAllowance  
transferFrom  
approve  
allowance  
excludeFromFee  
...
```

### Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract

## L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L603,594,596,601,595,602

### Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

```
_symbol  
_numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity  
_name  
_maxWalletToken  
_maxTxAmount  
_decimals
```

### Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

## L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L359,513,534,535,552,715,585,588,589,591 and 4 more

### Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow `_` at the beginning of the `mixed_case` match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
_maxWalletToken  
_numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity  
_maxTxAmount  
_previousLiquidityFee  
_previousTaxFee  
_liquidityFee  
_taxFee  
_tTotal  
_amount  
...
```

### Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>

## L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L729

### Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
_liquidityFee = liquidityFee
```

### Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

## L09 - Dead Code Elimination

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L715

### Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
calculateLiquidityFee
```

### Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

## L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

**Criticality**

minor

**Location**

contract.sol#L821

### Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
tLiquidity = tAmount.div(10 ** 2).mul(_liquidityFee)
tFee = tAmount.div(10 ** 2).mul(_taxFee)
```

### Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

# Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<b>IUniswapV2Factory</b>	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
<b>IBEP20</b>	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	name	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
<b>Context</b>	Implementation			
	<Constructor>	Internal	✓	
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
<b>SafeMath</b>	Library			
	add	Internal		

	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
<b>Ownable</b>	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Internal	✓	
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	_transferOwnership	Internal	✓	
<b>IPancakeRouter01</b>	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-




	getAmountsIn	External		-
<b>IPancakeRouter02</b>	Interface	IPancakeRouter01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
<b>IPancakeFactory</b>	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
	INIT_CODE_PAIR_HASH	External		-
<b>IPancakePair</b>	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-

	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
<b>BULLGOLD</b>	Implementation	Context, IBEP20, Ownable		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-
	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	excludeFromFee	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-

	totalFees	Public		-
	reflect	Public	✓	-
	reflectionFromToken	Public		-
	tokenFromReflection	Public		-
	calculateLiquidityFee	Private		
	_approve	Private	✓	
	setLiquidityFeePercent	External	✓	onlyOwner
	removeAllFee	Private	✓	
	restoreAllFee	Private	✓	
	_transfer	Private	✓	
	_transferStandard	Private	✓	
	_reflectFee	Private	✓	
	_getValues	Private		
	_getTValues	Private		
	_getRValues	Private		
	_getRate	Private		
	_getCurrentSupply	Private		
	_takeLiquidity	Private	✓	
	swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	lockTheSwap
	swapTokensForBNB	Private	✓	
	addLiquidity	Private	✓	
	<Receive Ether>	External	Payable	-

# Contract Flow



## Domain Info

<b>Domain Name</b>	bullgold.finance
<b>Registry Domain ID</b>	5457e04c8a8e46cd9b16f84d9265fe48-DONUTS
<b>Creation Date</b>	2022-04-08T14:25:41Z
<b>Updated Date</b>	2022-04-13T14:25:50Z
<b>Registry Expiry Date</b>	2023-04-08T14:25:41Z
<b>Registrar WHOIS Server</b>	http://www.hostinger.com
<b>Registrar URL</b>	http://www.hostinger.com
<b>Registrar</b>	Hostinger, UAB
<b>Registrar IANA ID</b>	1636

The domain has been created 16 days before the creation of the audit. It will expire in 12 months.

There is no public billing information, the creator is protected by the privacy settings.

## Summary

The Smart Contract analysis reported one critical issue. The contract Owner can manipulate fees without limit. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

# Disclaimer

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# About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>