



Cyberscope

Audit Report

NUTGAIN Staking

April 2022

Type BEP20

Network BSC

Address 0xF1477207249C4429a0B872dFE91E276176DCedff

Audited by © cyberscope

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Contract Review	3
Source Files	3
Audit Updates	3
Contract Diagnostics	4
Notes	5
Data Structure Optimization	6
Description	6
Recommendation	6
CO - Code Optimization	7
Description	7
Recommendation	7
STC - Succeeded Transfer Check	8
Description	8
Recommendation	8
CR - Code Repetition	9
Description	9
Recommendation	9
MC - Missing Check	10
Description	10
Recommendation	10
L01 - Public Function could be Declared External	11
Description	11
Recommendation	11
L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant	12
Description	12

Recommendation	12
L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	13
Description	13
Recommendation	13
L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic	14
Description	14
Recommendation	14
L09 - Dead Code Elimination	15
Description	15
Recommendation	15
L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation	16
Description	16
Recommendation	16
L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope	17
Description	17
Recommendation	17
Contract Functions	18
Contract Flow	21
Summary	22
Disclaimer	23
About Cyberscope	24

Contract Review

Contract Name	NutGainSingleStaking
Compiler Version	v0.8.7+commit.e28d00a7
Optimization	200 runs
Licence	MIT
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/token/0xf1477207249c4429a0b872dfe91e276176dcedff

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contract.sol	1d7015d97935ed3fc35fbd55165d192b66105ecde365fbd4642989491e0dcca8

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	21st April 2022
Corrected	

Contract Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor

Severity	Code	Description
●	DSO	Data Structure Optimization
●	CO	Code Optimization
●	STC	Succeeded Transfer Check
●	CR	Code Repetition
●	MC	Missing Check
●	L01	Public Function could be Declared External
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation
●	L14	Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Notes

- if $\text{tokenSupply} * \text{apy}$ is less than 1051200000, then no rewards will be distributed since the division will be less than 1.
- A user can withdraw the deposited amount with two ways. The `emergencyWithdraw()` that receives the entire amount, and the `withdraw()` that receives the amount redacted by an early withdrawal tax. The users have no reason to withdraw tokens using the `withdraw()` method since they have the option to call the `emergencyWithdraw()` method

Data Structure Optimization

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L778

Description

The poolInfo contains the array of the pools. The userInfo contains a map from the pool index to a map from the user's address to the user info. The first mapping of userInfo is mirroring the poolinfo array, as a result the code should keep in sync these to structures.

```
PoolInfo[] public poolInfo;  
// Info of each user that stakes LP tokens.  
mapping(uint256 => mapping(address => UserInfo)) public userInfo;
```

Recommendation

Since the userInfo is a subset of the poolInfo structure, the PoolInfo could embody the mapping(address => UserInfo) structure. Hence, the source will not have to keep in sync these to indexes.

```
struct PoolInfo {  
    uint256 apy;  
    uint256 lastRewardBlock;  
    uint256 accTokenPerShare;  
    uint256 withdrawLockPeriod;  
    uint256 balance;  
    mapping(address => UserInfo) userInfo;  
}
```

CO - Code Optimization

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L856,876

Description

The contract is declaring that there are properties that will be used for storage even if they are used for temporary calculations.

```
function pendingToken(uint256 _pid, address _user) public view returns (uint256)
{
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][_user];

    ...
function canHarvest(uint256 _pid, address _user) public view returns (bool) {
    UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][_user];
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    return block.timestamp >= user.lastDepositTime.add(pool.withdrawLockPeriod);
}
```

Recommendation

The class properties that are not affected should be declared as *memory*.

STC - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L1045

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
function safeTokenTransfer(address _to, uint256 _amount) internal {  
    uint256 tokenBal = token.balanceOf(address(this));  
    if (_amount > tokenBal) {  
        token.transfer(_to, tokenBal);  
    } else {  
        token.transfer(_to, _amount);  
    }  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful.

CR - Code Repetition

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L973,943,985,1001

Description

There are code segments that are repetitive in the contract. Those segments increase the code size of the contract unnecessarily.

```
pool.balance = pool.balance.sub(amount);
user.amount = 0;
user.rewardDebt = 0;
user.rewardLockedUp = 0;

///

uint256 totalRewards = pending.add(user.rewardLockedUp);

// reset lockup
totalLockedUpRewards = totalLockedUpRewards.sub(user.rewardLockedUp);
user.rewardLockedUp = 0;
// send rewards
safeTokenTransfer(msg.sender, totalRewards);
```

Recommendation

Create an internal function that contains the code segment and remove it from all the sections.

MC - Missing Check

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L891,914,935,955,981,994

Description

The following functions require the pid or the sender's address but are not checking if the pool id and sender's address exist in the current structures.

- updatePool
- Deposit
- Harvest
- Withdraw
- emergencyWithdraw
- payOrLockupPendingToken

```
function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) external nonReentrant {  
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];  
    UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];  
    updatePool(_pid);  
    payOrLockupPendingToken(_pid);  
    ...  
}
```

Recommendation

The contract should properly check if the indexes exist in the current structures.

L01 - Public Function could be Declared External

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L671,680,856,1054

Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared external to save gas.

```
getBlock  
pendingToken  
transferOwnership  
renounceOwnership
```

Recommendation

Use the external attribute for functions never called from the contract.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L786

Description

Constant state variables should be declared constant to save gas.

DEAD

Recommendation

Add the constant attribute to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	minor
Location	contract.sol#L819,820,836,837,847,856,876,891,914,935,955,981,994,1016,1024,1045,786

Description

Solidity defines a naming convention that should be followed. Rule exceptions:

- Allow constant variable name/symbol/decimals to be lowercase.
- Allow `_` at the beginning of the `mixed_case` match for private variables and unused parameters.

```
DEAD
_amount
_to
_earlyFeePercent
_pid
_user
_from
_withdrawLockPeriod
_withUpdate
...
```

Recommendation

Follow the Solidity naming convention.

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.4.25/style-guide.html#naming-conventions>

L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L1058

Description

Detected missing events for critical arithmetic parameters. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
treasure = treasure.sub(amount)
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L392,417,466,476,442,452,366,542,567,558

Description

Functions that are not used in the contract, and make the code's size bigger.

```
safeIncreaseAllowance
safeDecreaseAllowance
safeApprove
sendValue
functionStaticCall
functionDelegateCall
functionCallWithValue
functionCall
...
```

Recommendation

Remove unused functions.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L856,891

Description

Performing divisions before multiplications may cause lose of prediction.

```
tokenPerBlock = tokenSupply.mul(pool.apy).div(100).div(10512000)
```

Recommendation

The multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality

minor

Location

contract.sol#L962

Description

There are variables that are defined in the local scope and are not initialized.

```
burnAmount
```

Recommendation

All the local scoped variables should be initialized.


Contract Functions

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
SafeMath	Library			
	tryAdd	Internal		
	trySub	Internal		
	tryMul	Internal		
	tryDiv	Internal		
	tryMod	Internal		
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
IBEP20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	name	External		-
	getOwner	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		

	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionStaticCall	Internal		
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	functionDelegateCall	Internal	✓	
	_verifyCallResult	Private		
SafeBEP20	Library			
	safeTransfer	Internal	✓	
	safeTransferFrom	Internal	✓	
	safeApprove	Internal	✓	
	safeIncreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	safeDecreaseAllowance	Internal	✓	
	_callOptionalReturn	Private	✓	
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
ReentrancyGuard	Implementation			
	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
NutGainSingle Staking	Implementation	Ownable, Reentrancy Guard		

	<Constructor>	Public	✓	-
	poolLength	External		-
	add	External	✓	onlyOwner
	set	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getMultiplier	Public		-
	pendingToken	Public		-
	canHarvest	Public		-
	massUpdatePools	Public	✓	-
	updatePool	Public	✓	-
	deposit	External	✓	nonReentrant
	harvest	External	✓	nonReentrant
	withdraw	External	✓	nonReentrant
	emergencyWithdraw	External	✓	nonReentrant
	payOrLockupPendingToken	Internal	✓	
	setEarlyWithdrawFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
	addRewardTreasure	External	✓	-
	mint	Internal	✓	
	safeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	getBlock	Public		-
	recoverTreasure	External	✓	onlyOwner

Contract Flow



Summary

NUTGAIN staking contract implements a staking related functionality. There are pools that combine different APYs and Locking periods. The users have the ability to deposit funds in one of the pools. The users can either redeem the rewards or withdraw the entire amount. This audit focuses on some security concerns, performance optimizations and business logic improvements.

Disclaimer

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment.

Cyberscope team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed.

The Cyberscope team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Cyberscope receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website.

Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token.

The Cyberscope team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.

About Cyberscope

Coinscope audit and K.Y.C. service has been rebranded to Cyberscope.

Coinscope is the leading early coin listing, voting and auditing authority firm. The audit process is analyzing and monitoring many aspects of the project. That way, it gives the community a good sense of security using an informative report and a generic score.

Cyberscope and Coinscope are aiming to make crypto discoverable and efficient globally. They provides all the essential tools to assist users draw their own conclusions.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>