

On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārśṭāntika Theories

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I. Introduction

In the first five centuries C.E., both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools increasingly turned to the analysis of perception and specifically of the locus and existential status of objects of perception. These schools¹ elaborated their theories on the dynamics of the perceptual process as a whole through an examination of seemingly minor issues. Among these, the question of whether or not a nonexistent object can produce perception, and the explanations offered for the perception of objects of questionable existential status such as illusions and dream images, had significant ramifications for their interpretations of ordinary external or internal perception and cognitive functioning. On the one hand, admitting that nonexistent objects can stimulate the arising of perception not only undermines the existential status of the objects of ordinary perception, but also jeopardizes the possibility of certain knowledge. On the other hand, demanding that all perception depend only upon existent objects makes it extremely difficult to account for the perception of these objects that have questionable existential status.

Within Buddhism, this issue of a nonexistent object of perception was extensively treated in northern Indian Abhidharma texts. These discussions not only reveal the position of Buddhist Abhidharma schools, but also provide the indispensable background and context for understanding the epistemological positions of the later Buddhist logicians.² The Sarvāstivāda³ and Dārśṭāntika-Sautrāntika⁴ schools have particular importance be-

cause their positions best represent the two logically contrary views on this issue. The Sarvāstivādins hold that all perception requires an existent object, while the Dārśṭāntikas admit that, in certain cases, the object is nonexistent.⁵ This difference of opinion reflects a broader disagreement concerning the dynamics of the perceptual process and its relation to other cognitive functions, such as memory and conceptual thought.

On this, as on many other issues, the opposing views of the Sarvāstivādins and Dārśṭāntikas generated a complex and rich dialectic of argument. As will be shown, their recurrent and detailed arguments can be reduced to two basic concerns: developing a defensible model of the perceptual process, and accounting for the perception of objects of questionable existential status. The important texts that present the Sarvāstivādin position include the early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma canon,⁶ the Vibhāṣā commentaries,⁷ and the later Sarvāstivādin expository works, notably Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*, and the *Abhidharmadīpa*.⁸ The Vibhāṣā commentaries and Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* serve as the primary sources for Dārśṭāntika views.⁹ Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*¹⁰ is also a valuable source for views often identical to those of the Dārśṭāntikas presented elsewhere.¹¹

Like many of the controversies between the Sarvāstivādins and Dārśṭāntika-Sautrāntikas, their debates about perception often seem to revolve around minor, obscure, and inherited doctrinal issues. Closer inspection, however, shows that these debates, including those over perception, are actually structured according to two fundamental disagreements. The first concerns the way in which constituent factors of experience (*dharma*) are thought to exist.¹² The Sarvāstivādins argue that factors exist as real entities (*dravya*) in the three time periods of past, present, and future. As such, they are defined as intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), characterized by a particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). Given appropriate causes and conditions, these existent factors manifest a particular activity (*kāritra*), which then defines them as present. However, since factors also exist as past or future, they are capable of serving as conditions in those states as well. Saṅghabhadra defines this past and future functioning of a factor as capability (*sāmarthyā*), thereby distinguishing it from that factor's activity (*kāritra*), which occurs only in

the present.

By contrast, the Dārśṭāntikas equate a factor's existence with its present activity. One cannot meaningfully distinguish a factor's intrinsic nature from its activity, and thereby speak of its existence in the past or future. Further, they argue, factors do not exist as isolated units of intrinsic nature that manifest a particular activity through the influence of other isolated conditions. For the Dārśṭāntikas, the process of causal interrelation is the only fact of experience; the fragmentation of this process into discrete factors possessed of individual existence and unique efficacy is only a mental fabrication.

The second fundamental area of disagreement between the Sarvāstivādins and the Dārśṭāntikas concerns the dynamics of conditionality.¹³ The Sarvāstivādins allow both successive and simultaneous models of causation: certain causes (*hetu*) or conditions (*pratyaya*) arise prior to their effects, while others, which exert a supportive conditioning efficacy, arise simultaneously with them. The Dārśṭāntikas, however, allow only successive causation; a cause must always precede its effect. These basic disagreements about the nature of existents and causality consequently set the framework within which the Sarvāstivādins and Dārśṭāntikas conducted their debates.

II. The Sarvāstivādin Model of Perception

In order to construct their model of perception, the northern Indian Abhidharma schools begin from the description of perception found in the scripture. There, a given type of perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*) is said to arise in dependence upon a sense organ and an object.¹⁴ Both the sense organ and the object are necessary conditions; if either is lacking, perceptual consciousness will not arise.¹⁵ There are six such sense organs and six corresponding objects, referred to as the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), which together with their six corresponding types of perceptual consciousness constitute the eighteen elements (*dhātu*), of which all experience is composed. These eighteen elements include the five external objects, the five externally directed sense organs, and the five corresponding types of externally directed perceptual consciousness. Internal mental

awareness is also analysed according to the model of external sensory perception: the previous moment of perceptual consciousness, which serves as the mental organ, and mental factors condition the arising of a corresponding moment of mental perceptual consciousness.¹⁶

In their attempts to clarify aspects of the perceptual process left ambiguous in the scripture, Abhidharma texts focus their examination of perception on three questions: 1) what has the power of sensing the object: the sense organ, perceptual consciousness, or some other mental faculty; 2) what is the character of mental perceptual consciousness, and how does it differ from the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness; and 3) in what sense do the sense organ and object act as conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness, and what is the specific character of the object perceived? In their divergent answers to these questions, the northern Indian Abhidharma schools developed different models of the process of perception.

For the Sarvāstivāda school, the perceptual process begins with the sense organ (*indriya*), or basis (*āśraya*) that senses or grasps an object-field (*viśaya*) appropriate to it. A given sense organ grasps an object-field, only when supported by perceptual consciousness;¹⁷ nevertheless, this function of grasping the object-field is attributed only to the sense organ, and not to perceptual consciousness, or to some other thought concomitant (*caitta*)¹⁸ associated with perceptual consciousness.¹⁹ The function of perceptual consciousness consists simply in being aware of (*vijānāti*), or generically apprehending (*upalabdhi*) the nature of the object-field grasped by the sense organ.²⁰ In this way, the function of perceptual consciousness is distinguished from that of its associated thought concomitants (*caitta*). Perceptual consciousness generically apprehends the nature of a particular object-field: for example, visual perceptual consciousness grasps an object as visible material form. The associated thought concomitants, however, grasp the particular characteristics of the object-field: for example, whether that object is pleasant or unpleasant, male or female, and so on.²¹ In other words, perceptual consciousness apprehends only the particular characteristic of an object-field in its generic category as a sense sphere (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*): for example, as form, sound, and so on. It does not

apprehend the distinguishing particular characteristic of a given object-field as an individual real entity (*dravyasvalakṣaṇa*) within that generic category. These individual particular characteristics are apprehended only by the associated thought concomitants.²²

Each of the five externally directed sense organs is restricted in its functioning to one object-field: the eye can grasp only visible material form, the ear only sound, and so on. The object-field of the sense organ exists as a real entity (*dravyataḥ*), and not merely as a provisionally existing composite (*ho-ho, sāmagrī, samghāta?*).²³ Further, the appropriate sense organ grasps a particular object-field only when both are in the present time period. The present sense organ and present object-field then serve as conditions for the arising of a corresponding simultaneous instance of perceptual consciousness.²⁴ When apprehended in the present moment by perceptual consciousness and its associated thought concomitants, the object-field (*vिषया*) is referred to as the object-support (*ālambana*).²⁵

When the Sarvāstivādins assert that the externally directed sense organ, the external object-field, and the resulting externally directed perceptual consciousness must be present in the same moment, they assume a simultaneous model of conditioning. Indeed, to support their contention that conditions may arise simultaneously with their effect, the Sarvāstivādins cite the scriptural statement that perceptual consciousness arises in dependence upon two conditions.²⁶ The Sarvāstivādins further invoke the fact of direct perception as proof of the simultaneity of the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness. In direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), a momentary external object-field is grasped by a momentary externally directed sense organ and apprehended by an equally momentary instance of one of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness. This is possible only if the object-field, sense organ and perceptual consciousness are simultaneous.²⁷

Mental perception differs from external perception in several significant respects. The mental organ (*manas*), which conditions the arising of a present moment of mental perceptual consciousness, is defined as the immediately preceding moment of perceptual consciousness, regardless of its type.²⁸ That is to say, any of the six varieties of perceptual consciousness may be designated as the mental organ for a subsequent moment of

mental perceptual consciousness. Unlike the other five externally directed sense organs, this mental organ, precisely because it is past, cannot be said to perform its distinctive activity (*kāritra*) of sensing or grasping the object-support of the present moment of perceptual consciousness. Instead, it serves simply as the door, or immediately contiguous condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) for the arising of the present moment of mental perceptual consciousness, which then apprehends the object-support.²⁹ Therefore, unlike the five externally directed sense organs and corresponding types of perceptual consciousness, the prior mental organ and its resultant present mental perceptual consciousness are not simultaneous, and do not necessarily share the same object-support.³⁰ Nevertheless, the two requisite conditions for the arising of a present moment of mental perceptual consciousness, that is, a basis (*āśraya*) and an object-support (*ālambana*), are still provided through the past mental organ and the object-support.

Mental perceptual consciousness also differs from the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness in its mode of operation. Mental perceptual consciousness not only apprehends the particular characteristic of an object-field in its generic category, for example, visible material form like the color blue, but also apprehends the designation, "this is blue." Thus, unlike the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, mental perceptual consciousness operates by means of designation (*adhivacana*), or names.³¹

In addition, mental perceptual consciousness is distinguished from the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness on the basis of the different types of conceptual thought (*vikalpa*) with which each is associated. According to the Sarvāstivādins, there are three types of conceptual thought:³² 1) simple conceptual thought, or conceptual thought in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvavikalpa*), which is identified with initial inquiry (*vitarka*);³³ 2) conceptual thought through discrimination (*abhinirūpaṇavikalpa*); and 3) conceptual thought through recollection (*anusmaraṇavikalpa*). Even though the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness are said, by tradition, to be without conceptual thought (*avikalpika*), the Sarvāstivādins interpret this as indicating that only the last two types of conceptual thought, that through discrimination and that through re-

collection, are absent.³⁴ Each moment of perceptual consciousness is associated with both insight (*prajñā*) and mindfulness (*smṛti*). When they are associated with mental perceptual consciousness they are strong and are identified, respectively, with conceptual thought through discrimination and conceptual thought through recollection. However, when insight and mindfulness are associated with the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, their activity is weak; therefore, the corresponding types of conceptual thought are said to be absent.³⁵ Nevertheless, since inquiry (*vitarka*) still characterizes these five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, they can still be said to have the first variety of conceptual thought in its intrinsic nature. By contrast, moments of mental perceptual consciousness associated with strong insight and mindfulness are characterized by all three varieties of conceptual thought.

Saṅghabhadra³⁶ offers a further explanation of the characterization, “without conceptual thought (*avikalpika*)” as it is applied to the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness. A given type of perceptual consciousness can be said to have conceptual thought under two conditions: 1) that a given type of perceptual consciousness can apprehend, within one moment, an object-field of more than a single category, or 2) that a series of many moments of the same type of perceptual consciousness can occur with regard to the same object-support. The five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness fail to meet these two conditions: they apprehend only a present object-field of a single category, and a subsequent moment of the same type of perceptual consciousness cannot apprehend that same object-support. However, since mental perceptual consciousness is unrestricted with regard to both the category and time period of its object-field, it may apprehend an object-field of more than a single category in one moment, and several moments of mental perceptual consciousness can apprehend the same object-support. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra concludes that it can be said, in agreement with tradition, that only mental perceptual consciousness has conceptual thought.

Further, the scope of the object-field of mental perceptual consciousness is much broader than that of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness. Within the tradi-

tional classification of eighteen elements (*dhātu*), the object-field of the mental organ and mental perceptual consciousness is the *dharma* element, or all constituent factors (*dharma*) not included in any of the other five object-field categories. The ten externally directed sense organs and their corresponding types of perceptual consciousness are restricted to present object-fields of a single category. The mental organ and mental perceptual consciousness have no such restriction. Mental perceptual consciousness can apprehend all factors (*dharma*) belonging to any of the eighteen categories of elements. Therefore, the five external object-fields may be apprehended by both their own respective perceptual consciousness and mental perceptual consciousness. The other thirteen elements, that is, the six sense organs, the six types of perceptual consciousness, and the *dharma* element, which includes the three unconditioned factors (*asamkṛtadharma*), are apprehended only by mental perceptual consciousness.³⁷ Mental perceptual consciousness also can apprehend factors of any of the three time periods, past, present, or future.³⁸ Therefore, mental perceptual consciousness, being unrestricted in both the category and time period of its object-field, is said to be capable of apprehending all factors.³⁹

In addition to these eighteen categories of constituent factors, which exist as real entities (*dravyasat*) in the three time periods, the scope of the object-field of mental perceptual consciousness includes composite entities (*ho-ho, sāmagrī, samghāta?*), whose existence is merely provisional (*prajñaptisat*).⁴⁰ Since these composites are apprehended only by conceptual thought through discrimination (*abhinirūpaṇavikalpa*), they are the object-field of mental perceptual consciousness alone.

III. The Dārśāntika Model of Perception

The Dārśāntikas also accept, as a provisional description, the Sarvāstivādin model of perception as involving a sense organ, object, and perceptual consciousness, but they differ from the Sarvāstivādins on the following points: 1) the process through which perception occurs; 2) the temporal relation among the provisionally designated sense organ, object, and perceptual consciousness; and 3) the nature of the object perceived.

On the first point of disagreement, concerning the process of perception, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* notes that according to the Dārśāntika view, it is not the sense organ, but rather the collocation (*sāmagrī*) of the sense organ, and so on, that can be said to sense or perceive.⁴¹ The *Abhidharmaśabhbāṣya* and the *Nyāyānusāra* elaborate upon this Dārśāntika model of perception.⁴² Perception, like all experience, can be described only provisionally as consisting of individual factors possessing unique activities; actually, in the case of perception, as in all causal relations, there exists no distinct agent or cause possessing its own activity of producing a distinct effect.⁴³ Instead, there is simply a stream of experience, or more precisely, a stream of cause and effect (*hetuphalamātra*). These provisionally designated individual causes and effects can be said to have activity only in the sense that they constitute a conventionally existing collocation of factors.⁴⁴ In the experience of perception, words such as sense organ, object, or perceptual consciousness can be used only figuratively to refer to moments abstracted from the causal process as a whole; there is no single factor that perceives or others that are perceived.

In the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmaśabhbāṣya*, Vasubandhu presents a model of the perceptual process which, though not attributed explicitly to the Dārśāntikas, similarly refuses to allocate distinct activity to any of the components through which the process is described:⁴⁵

In that case, when it is said in the scripture that “perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*) is aware (*vijānāti*),” what does perceptual consciousness do? It does not do anything. Just as it is said that the effect conforms to the cause since it attains its existence (*ātmalābha*) through similarity (*sādrśya*) [to its cause] even without doing anything, in this way also it is said that perceptual consciousness is aware since it attains its existence through similarity [to its object] even without doing anything. What is [this that is referred to as] its “similarity”? It is the fact that it has the aspect of that [object]. For this reason, even though that [perceptual consciousness] has arisen due to the sense organ, it is said to be aware of the object-field and not of the sense organ. Or, just as the series of perceptual consciousness is the cause with regard to a given [moment of] perceptual consciousness, so there is no fault in saying that perceptual consciousness is aware, since one can apply the word “agent” to the cause.

Thus, for Vasubandhu, perceptual consciousness should not be interpreted as a factor having unique activity: that is, as an awareness of a distinct object-field. The word awareness only refers to a causal series of moments of consciousness that arises with the particular aspect of what is referred to as its object. One can also provisionally describe perceptual consciousness as aware in the sense that it conditions the arising of subsequent moments of perceptual consciousness. Therefore, as in the Dārśāntika model, Vasubandhu suggests that one cannot sharply distinguish the activity of the object from that of the perceptual consciousness that is said to apprehend it; instead, one must view perception as a causal process.

Saṅghabhadra's response to this Dārśāntika model of perception is simple: even though all conditioned factors do indeed arise from a collocation of causes and conditions, each factor within the collocation has a distinct particular characteristic and activity.⁴⁶ Similarly, even though perception results from a collocation, the existence of its individual causes and conditions as real entities each having a distinct intrinsic nature and activity may be proved through scriptural references and argument.

On the second point of disagreement concerning the temporal relation among the provisionally designated components of perception, the Dārśāntikas also reject the Sarvāstivādin claim that, in the case of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, a simultaneous temporal relation obtains among the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness. Their rejection is a consequence of their refusal to accept any type of simultaneous causal relation: the Dārśāntikas claim that there is no possibility of a relation of producer and produced (*janyajanakabhāva*) between factors that are simultaneous (*sahotpanna*). If such simultaneous causal relations were possible, then the generative factor (*janakadharma*) would be without any generative capability, since the factor that it supposedly produces arises simultaneously with it. Therefore, the factor that is designated as the generative cause must exist at a time different from (*bhinnakāla*), that is, specifically prior to its effect. Consequently, the two provisional conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness, the sense organ and the object, must exist prior to, not simultaneously with their effect.⁴⁷

This refusal to accept the simultaneity of the sense organ,

the object, and the perceptual consciousness results in a model of perception as a successive causal process. This model is attributed to the Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta.⁴⁸ The sense organ and the object-field in the first moment condition the arising of perceptual consciousness in the second moment. Then, with the assemblage (*sannipāta*) of the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness, the three thought concomitants—feelings (*vedanā*), concepts (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*)—arise in the third and subsequent moments.

Both Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu criticize Śrīlāta's successive model of perception. In their view, it results in a multi-level structure of cognitive functioning, in which the various mental activities such as perceptual consciousness, feelings, and so on, that occur in the same moment have different object-supports. They claim that, according to Śrīlāta's model, an object-field and sense organ present in one moment "A" condition the arising of the corresponding perceptual consciousness of that particular object-field in the subsequent moment "B." For example, visible material form and the eye in one moment would condition the arising of visual perceptual consciousness of its particular object-field in the next moment. This assemblage (*sannipāta*) or collocation (*sāmagrī*) of these three over two moments⁴⁹ acts as a cause to produce feelings with regard to that original object-field in the third moment "C." However, in this second moment "B" another object-field and sense organ, for example, sound and the ear, occur and condition the arising of auditory perceptual consciousness in the third moment "C." This auditory perceptual consciousness in this third moment "C" would have sound as its object-support, while the concurrent thought concomitant, feeling, would be supported by the prior visual object-field. In this way, moment after moment, perceptual consciousness and its associated thought concomitants would have different object-supports. This model then contradicts the Sarvāstivādin provision that perceptual consciousness, or thought, and its associated thought concomitants must share the same object-support.⁵⁰

This first criticism of the Dārśāntika position is valid only if one accepts the Sarvāstivādin model of cognitive functioning through both thought (*citta*) and thought concomitants (*caittā*). Each moment of experience contains one factor of thought

(*citta*), or perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*), in addition to at least ten thought concomitants (*caitta*), including feelings, concepts, volition, and so on. Since thought and thought concomitants exist as distinct real entities with different particular characteristics and activities, they can exist simultaneously and function independently with one restriction: those that occur within one moment must function having the same object-support. The Dārśāntikas, however, assert that thought concomitants do not exist as entities distinct from thought or perceptual consciousness. They claim that the various mental functions performed by these supposed thought concomitants are actually functions of thought itself.⁵¹ Therefore, each of the cognitive functions indicated by the so-called thought or thought concomitants occur only successively.⁵² A particular object-field and sense organ in one moment "A" would give rise to perceptual consciousness in the subsequent moment, which would then produce, in succession, various mental functions with regard to that object-field. Thus, from the Dārśāntika perspective, the Sarvāstivādin criticism that perceptual consciousness and its associated thought concomitants have different object-supports is unfounded.

Throughout the *Nyāyānusāra*, Saṅghabhadra raises a second criticism of this successive perceptual model, a criticism that reflects the controversy concerning the possibility of a nonexistent object of perceptual consciousness. If perception is successive, as the Dārśāntikas claim, then even in the case of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, the object-field would be past when its corresponding perceptual consciousness arises.⁵³ The Dārśāntikas must then explain why a given moment of perceptual consciousness takes as its support only the immediately preceding object-field, and not all past object-fields. If the Dārśāntikas claim that a present moment of perceptual consciousness perceives only its own cause, that is, the immediately preceding moment, then they must explain why an object-field of the distant past is not also considered to be its cause. They might respond that the object-field of the immediately preceding moment is the cause because it alone has a connection (*sambandha*) with that present moment of perceptual consciousness. However, since the immediately preceding object-field, like that of the distant past, is, in their opinion,

equally nonexistent, how can they justify a special “connection” between consecutive moments? The Dārṣṭāntikas might defend this unique connection by replying that the object-field of the immediately preceding moment acts as a condition when that succeeding moment of perceptual consciousness is on the point of arising. In this case, Saṅghabhadra argues, the Dārṣṭāntikas controvert their initial claim that a present moment of perceptual consciousness perceives only past objects; for their reply entails that a future visual perceptual consciousness, that is, one that is about to arise, perceives a present object-field. Thus, the Dārṣṭāntika theory of a successive perceptual model requires some explanation for the unique character of the immediately preceding object-field, a character that distinguishes it from all other past objects and specifies it as the only possible object of present perceptual consciousness.

In his concluding criticism, Saṅghabhadra argues that the proponents of this successive perceptual model have made their position completely untenable by rejecting the existence of past and future factors.⁵⁴ When the sense organ and object-field exist, their corresponding perceptual consciousness has not yet arisen, and hence does not exist; when perceptual consciousness arises, the sense organ and object have already passed away, and hence no longer exist. Since no causal interaction can be established between a factor that exists and one that does not exist, the previous sense organ and object-field can have no causal effect upon perceptual consciousness. Thus, in Saṅghabhadra’s opinion, this successive model of perception leads to the conclusion either that perception occurs without its two requisite conditions, thereby contradicting the scripture, or that perception is conditioned by nonexistents, which, from the Sarvāstivādin perspective, is absurd.⁵⁵ In either case, the Dārṣṭāntika position results in a denial of direct perception,⁵⁶ and an implicit admission that all perception depends upon a nonexistent object.

IV. The Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness

The *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* is one of the first northern Indian Abhidharma texts that explicitly raises the issue of the possibility of a nonexistent object of knowledge or perceptual

consciousness.⁵⁷ Regarding the possibility of knowledge that is without an existent object-field, the text offers two opinions: 1) such knowledge is not possible; or 2) particular knowledge of past and future factors can be said to have a nonexistent object-field. The existential status of past and future factors as objects of knowledge is also discussed in the first fascicle of the *Vijñānakāya*.⁵⁸ Here, the author argues for the existence of past and future factors against an opponent, Maudgalyāyana,⁵⁹ who allows the existence only of present and of unconditioned (*asamkṛta*) factors.⁶⁰ In defending his view, the author cites numerous scriptural passages that refer either to the causal activity of past factors, or to the perception and knowledge of both past and future factors. The author, in using these passages to support the existence of past and future factors, implicitly assumes that only existent factors can exert causal efficacy, and that knowledge or perception arises only with an existent object-support. Maudgalyāyana replies that thought without an existent object-support is indeed possible: precisely, that thought which depends upon past and future factors.⁶¹ If this is the case, the author responds, the definition of thought or perceptual consciousness given in the scripture must be rejected. Perceptual consciousness is defined as intentional awareness; that is, as that which is aware (*vijānāti*) of visible material form, sound, and so on up to mental factors (*dharma*). If the object-support were nonexistent, there would be no object of awareness and awareness itself would be impossible. Further, the scriptural passage stating that perceptual consciousness arises on the basis of two conditions, the sense organ and the object-support, would be contradicted. If a nonexistent object-support were allowed, these two conditions would not be present. Here the author again assumes that only existent factors can function as conditions.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* further develops the arguments of the *Vijñānakāya*; it supports the position that perception and knowledge depend only upon an existent object-support,⁶² and that only actually existing entities can function as conditions.⁶³ This opinion of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is evident in an argument with the Dārśāntikas and other schools concerning whether instances of knowledge (*jñāna*) or its objects are more numerous.⁶⁴ For the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, all knowledge depends upon an existent object. Further, knowledge itself can become an object for subsequent

moments of knowledge. Therefore, the objects of knowledge are more numerous. However, the Dārśāntikas apparently consider instances of knowledge more numerous, since they assert that knowledge can depend upon nonexistent object-fields, including illusions, sky-castles, circles made from whirling firebrands, and mirages.

These and other cases of nonexistent object-fields given by the Dārśāntikas indicate that by the time of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the range of possible objects of knowledge or perceptual consciousness whose existence was disputed exceeded that of simply past and future factors. For example, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* cites the Dārśāntikas as rejecting the existence of objects of mistaken cognition,⁶⁵ such as the snake that is cognized in place of the actual rope, or the human being in place of the pillar, or the self that is seen to exist within one's own body (*satkāyadrsti*). The Dārśāntikas also reject reflections and echoes,⁶⁶ dream images,⁶⁷ illusions (*māyā*) and magical creations (*nirmāṇa*),⁶⁸ negative expressions, such as impermanence,⁶⁹ and denials.⁷⁰ In the opinion of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, such examples do not prove that knowledge or perceptual consciousness may depend upon a nonexistent object-support. Instead, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* concludes the converse: because such things act as supporting conditions in the production of perception, there must in each case be some existent object-field.

Among the post-Vibhāṣā northern Abhidharma texts, the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, *Abhidharmaśabdhāṣṭya*, *Nyāyānusāra*, and *Abhidharmadīpa* all contain extensive discussions of the possibility of a nonexistent object of perceptual consciousness. In these texts, as in the *Vijñānakāya*, the impetus for raising this issue is the controversy concerning the existence of past and future factors. Each text, regardless of its particular stance on this controversy, appeals to both scriptural references (*āgama*) and arguments (*yukti*) as reasons to support its position. The similarity between the reasons and examples employed by the *Abhidharmaśabdhāṣṭya*, *Nyāyānusāra*, and *Abhidharmadīpa*, which have documented historical connections, with those cited in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* suggests a shared store of arguments and scriptural references on the topic, a common source, or intentional borrowing.

Among the reasons offered by these texts in support of the

existence of past and future factors, particular importance is accorded to the fact that knowledge or perceptual consciousness depends only upon an existent object-support.⁷¹ For example, in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, out of the nineteen reasons for the existence of past and future factors presented by the opponent, seven require the existence of an object of perceptual consciousness. The following four are relevant here:⁷² 1) since thought is produced only with regard to factors that exist; 2) since mental perceptual consciousness takes the immediately past moment of perceptual consciousness as its basis (*āśraya*) and may depend upon future factors as its object-support (*ālambana*), if past and future factors did not exist, mental perceptual consciousness would have no basis or support; 3) since ordinary mental perceptual consciousness cannot apprehend the five external object-fields when they are present, if past factors did not exist, recollection of those object-fields would be impossible; and 4) since thought and thought concomitants cannot know themselves, factors associated with them, or their co-present causes, these various factors can only be known when they are past by a subsequent moment of thought.⁷³

The *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*⁷⁴ offers four reasons in support of the existence of past and future factors, two of which concern perceptual consciousness and its object-support: 1) according to scripture, "there is the arising of perceptual consciousness in dependence upon two,"⁷⁵ that is, the sense organ and the object-support; and 2) according to argument, since perceptual consciousness operates only when there is an existent object-field, if past and future factors did not exist, perceptual consciousness of past and future factors would have a nonexistent object-support, and hence, would not arise.

The *Nyāyānusāra* and *Abhidharmadīpa*, even though patterned closely on the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, display a striking similarity to the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* in their treatment of the existence of past and future factors. The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* begins its discussion with the following observations.⁷⁶

There are people who claim that factors of the two time periods [of past and future] exist, and [others who claim that they] do not exist. [Question:] For what reasons are they said to exist; for what reasons are they said not to exist? [Response:] Those [who

state that they] exist, [claim that] if a factor exists, thought is produced with regard to it. Since one is able to produce thought with regard to factors of the two time periods [of past and future], one should acknowledge that they exist. [Question:] You should first state the characteristic [i.e., definition] of existence. [Response:] That range (*gocara*) upon which knowledge operates is referred to as the characteristic of existence.

For Saṅghabhadra⁷⁷ also, establishing the existence of past and future factors first requires defining or stating the characteristic of existence (*sallakṣaṇa*, *sattvalakṣaṇa*). Once this defining characteristic of existence is understood, he claims, the existence of past and future factors will be universally accepted. Some teachers, he notes, define the characteristic of existence as that which has already been produced and has not yet passed away. For Saṅghabhadra, this is simply to identify existence with the present, and thereby to assume, *a priori*, that past and future factors do not exist. Instead, Saṅghabhadra offers the following definition that will include factors of all three time periods:⁷⁸ “To be an object-field that produces cognition (*buddhi*) is the true characteristic of existence.” Similarly, the *Abhidharmadīpa*,⁷⁹ defines the characteristic of existence (*sattvalakṣaṇa*) as “that of which the indicative mark (*cihna*) is considered by cognition,” and explains it as follows:⁸⁰

An objective thing, whose own form is established by intrinsic nature, is said to exist as a real entity when one observes its defining characteristic determined by an observation of factors, which is free from mistaken aspects.

Thus, the *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Abhidharmadīpa*, like the opponent in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, define existence as that which serves as the object of cognition.

These texts, however, admit several categories of existence, and hence, several categories of possible objects of cognition. Saṅghabhadra⁸¹ first broadly distinguishes between existence as a real entity (*dravyasat*), equated with absolute existence (*paramārthasat*), and existence as a provisional entity (*prajñaptisat*), equated with conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*). Saṅghabhadra subsumes within these two categories of existence a third category of relative existence (*apekṣā*) recognized by some teachers,

including the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa*.⁸²

The first category of real entities includes factors such as visible material form or feeling, which produce cognition without depending upon anything else. These real entities exist in several modes (*bhāva*): specifically, present existence as intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) together with distinctive activity (*kāritra*), and past or future existence as intrinsic nature alone. Since this intrinsic nature, whether past, present, or future, can serve as the object-support for knowledge, past and future factors also can be said to exist.⁸³

The second category of provisional entities, such as a pot or an army, produces cognition only in dependence upon a real entity. This dependence is twofold: 1) direct dependence upon real entities, as in the case of a pot, which depends upon the fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta*) of which it is made; and 2) dependence first upon other provisional entities, and secondarily upon a real entity, as in the case of an army, which depends first upon its human members, and finally upon the ultimate factors of which humans are composed.

This Sarvāstivādin definition of existence in terms of objects that give rise to cognition has significant implications for the dispute concerning the possibility of a nonexistent object-support of perceptual consciousness. Since an entity's status as an object-support condition for the arising of perceptual consciousness is the very criterion by which the existence of that entity is established, no such object-support can, by definition, be nonexistent. However, it is important to note that the object perceived may exist in different ways. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā* makes clear, all conditions must actually exist as real entities, and the object-support, as one such condition, must also so exist. Nevertheless, provisionally designated entities may also become the objective content of mental perceptual consciousness. Does this then imply that the object-support condition may exist only provisionally? The answer lies in the definition of provisional existence: all provisional entities depend primarily or secondarily upon a real entity. Thus provisional entities, exclusive of their actually existing bases, cannot serve as the object-support condition for the arising of perceptual consciousness. Instead, the real entity upon which provisional entities depend serves as the object-support.⁸⁴

V. Objects Whose Existence is Disputed

Since the Dārśṭāntikas deny that conditions must exist as real entities, they reject this Sarvāstivādin definition of existence and consider their use of it to prove the existence of past and future factors groundless. This Dārśṭāntika objection is presented in the *Nyāyānusāra*:⁸⁵ “This [definition] also does not yet constitute the true characteristic of actual existence because [we] allow that nonexistent [objects] also are able to serve as object-fields that produce cognition.” The *Mahāvibhāṣā*, *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, *Nyāyānusāra*, and *Abhidharmadīpa* all provide examples of objects of cognition claimed to be nonexistent:⁸⁶ 1) products of sensory error, such as two moons, and products of mistaken cognition, such as a circle made from a whirling firebrand, a pillar mistaken for a human being, or the concept of self; 2) objects perceived in certain meditative states; 3) dream images; 4) reflected images, echoes, illusions, and magical creations; 5) expressions having a nonexistent object including: a) certain negations, such as nonexistence, or the prior nonexistence of sound, b) affirmative expressions referring to unattested and putatively impossible objects, such as the horn of a hare, and c) logically contradictory objects such as the thirteenth sense sphere (*āyatana*), or the son of a barren woman; 6) past and future objects either cognized through inferential memory and anticipation, respectively, or perceived directly.

The Sarvāstivādins respond to these examples by indicating, in each case, the existent object-field that supports perception, and hence, cognition.

1. Sensory Error and Mistaken Cognition

Sensory error,⁸⁷ such as the visual distortions produced by ophthalmic disorders, or the image of two moons, results from faulty sense organs and does not imply a nonexistent object-field. For example, a visual sense organ afflicted by ophthalmic disorders does grasp existent visual material form, albeit unclearly. This then results in mistaken cognition with regard to that existent object-field. In the case of the image of two moons, Saṅghabhadra explains that the visual sense organ and that initial moment of visual perceptual consciousness depend upon

or see the single existent moon. However, the clarity of perception is influenced by the sense organ, which is a condition co-equal with the object-field in the arising of perceptual consciousness. Therefore, the deteriorated state of the visual sense organ produces an unclear visual perceptual consciousness, which results in the confused cognition of two moons. Nevertheless, the object-field, the single moon, actually exists. This is evident because no such cognition of the moon, confused or otherwise, arises where the moon is not found.

Instances of mistaken cognition⁸⁸ also do not arise without an existent object-field. The circular form in which a whirling firebrand appears, or the human form in which a pillar appears do not, in themselves, exist as real entities (*dravya*). However, the cognition that apprehends them does have an existent object-field: the individual points of light comprising the apparent circle, or the form of the pillar. Similarly, regarding the view that the self exists in one's own body (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*),⁸⁹ the existent object-field is the five appropriating aggregates (*upādāna-kandha*), which are then mistakenly cognized as self (*ātman*), and as what belongs to self (*ātmīya*).

The Sarvāstivādin explanation of these instances of sensory error and mistaken cognition assumes that cognition may be either correct, that is consistent with the object-field, or mistaken, that is deviating from the true character of the object-field due to certain intervening conditions. However, whether correct or mistaken, cognition only arises if supported by an existent object-field. The status of cognition as correct or mistaken is determined by whether or not that cognition apprehends the object-field through a correct or a mistaken aspect (*ākāra*). For example, the conditioning influence of a visual sense organ afflicted with an ophthalmic disorder causes the visual object-field to be grasped unclearly, and produces cognition (*buddhi*) characterized by a mistaken aspect (*viparītākāra*). Similarly, cognition of a whirling firebrand has the mistaken aspect of circularity, and cognition of the five appropriating aggregates has the mistaken aspect of self and what belongs to self.⁹⁰ However, in none of these cases does the object-field itself, in its true nature, possess these mistaken aspects, nor is it nonexistent.⁹¹ Instead, error resides in the aspect of cognition through which the object-field is apprehended.

In this Sarvāstivādin account of mistaken cognition, the term, aspect (*ākāra*), is used in a restricted sense as identical to insight (*prajñākāra*), and not in the general sense in which all thought and thought concomitants may be said to have an aspect (*sākāra*). Thought and thought concomitants are said to “have an aspect” only in the general sense that the object-support is apprehended through their own activity.⁹² Aspect in the restricted sense is identified with insight because it represents the discrimination of the characteristics of the object-field in a particular way as carried out by insight.⁹³ Insight characterized by a mistaken aspect may be the result of faulty sense organs, defilements, ignorance, or past action. However, this mistaken aspect is not associated with the initial moment of externally directed perceptual consciousness in which insight, though present, is not acute. Instead, it occurs only in the subsequent moment of mental perceptual consciousness in which there is discriminative conceptual thought (*abhinirūpanavikalpa*), or discrimination of the characteristics of the object-field.⁹⁴

2. Meditative Objects

The Sarvāstivādins explain objects perceived in certain meditative states also as resulting from the application of a specific aspect (*ākāra*) to an existent object-support. The meditative objects in question are those perceived in such states as mindfulness with regard to breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti*), meditation on the repulsive (*aśubhā*), the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the eight spheres of mastery (*abhibhvāyatana*), and the ten spheres of totality (*kṛtsnāyatana*).⁹⁵ All of these states occur as a result of attention through resolution (*adhimuktimanaskāra*),⁹⁶ by which practitioners intentionally perceive the object in a certain way, or with certain aspects, in accord with their resolve. For example, in the sphere of totality with regard to the color blue (*nīlakṛtsnāyatana*), perceptual consciousness is concentrated on the color blue, and perceives everything, everywhere, exclusively and totally as blue.⁹⁷ These aspects (*ākāra*) of totality and exclusiveness are the product of the practitioner’s attention through resolution: that is to say, attention is directed in accordance with the practitioner’s intention to perceive the object-field, “blue,” as total and exclusive. For

the Dārśṭāntikas,⁹⁸ this perceived blueness does not actually exist because it results simply from the meditator's resolution. The Sarvāstivādins, however, as in the case of mistaken cognition, distinguish the aspects that characterize cognition from the object-field that supports it. The practitioner produces cognition with the aspects, totality and exclusiveness, through the power of his own resolution, but this cognition is supported by an existent object-support, a small patch of blue color.⁹⁹

3. Dream Images

The Dārśṭāntikas claim that dream images are nonexistent because the dreamer discovers when awakened that events experienced in a dream did not actually occur. For example, one eats and satisfies the senses when asleep and nevertheless wakes up hungry and weak.¹⁰⁰ The *Mahāvibhāṣā* defines dreaming¹⁰¹ as the simple operation of thought and thought concomitants with regard to an object-support during sleep. Since the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness do not arise in a dream, these object-supports, whether external material form, or internal mental factors (*dharma*), are apprehended only by mental perceptual consciousness.¹⁰² For Saṅghabhadra, dreaming is the recollection of past object-fields that have already been experienced,¹⁰³ but this recollection is influenced by the mind's sluggishness during sleep. For example, in the case of dream images that have never been experienced as such, like the horn of a hare, the dreamer combines in one place separate waking memories of a horn and a hare. However, the object-support for the dream image is not nonexistent; it is precisely those past factors that support the various parts of the recollection separately.

The dream images themselves result from several causes, which the *Mahāvibhāṣā*¹⁰⁴ summarizes as follows: 1) they are stimulated by other beings, for example, sages, spirits, gods, and so on; 2) they result from previous experiences, or habitual activity; 3) they presage a future event, that is to say, the dreamer first perceives the indicative mark of an auspicious or inauspicious future event in a dream;¹⁰⁵ 4) they result from conceptual thought, specifically, discriminative consideration that occurs in the waking state when one is about to fall asleep; 5) they result

from illness, that is to say, due to a conflict or imbalance among the fundamental material elements (*dhātu, mahābhūta*), the dreamer sees a dream image that conforms to the predominant element.¹⁰⁶

4. Reflected Images, Echoes, Illusions and Magical Creations

For the Dārśṭāntikas, reflected images, echoes, illusions and magical creations, like the objects of sensory error or mistaken cognition, meditative objects, or dream images, do not exist as perceived and have no existent support. For the Sarvāstivādins, however, reflected images, and so on, are themselves varieties of existent material form. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā*¹⁰⁷ explains, the Dārśṭāntikas claim that reflected images do not actually exist because the object reflected does not itself enter the reflecting surface. Similarly, echoes do not actually exist because all sound is momentary, and one moment of sound cannot travel to produce a distant echo. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* responds that these reflected images and echoes do indeed exist because they act as conditions supporting the arising of perceptual consciousness, and because they are grasped by the sense organs and, hence, can be included within the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), which the Buddha declared to exist. Even though the reflected image and echo are not themselves the original visual material form or sound, they still consist of material form derived from the original object. Indeed, material form can result from a variety of causes and conditions: for example, liquid may be produced from moonlight on a moonstone (*candrakānta*), heat from cow dung or from sunlight on a sun-crystal (*suryakānta*), and sound from hitting together the lips, teeth, tongue, and so on. These varieties of liquid, heat, and sound, though perhaps not produced in the conventional way, can be said to exist precisely because they exert the activity of liquid, heat, or sound. Similarly, the material form of which a reflected image or echo is composed actually exists because it has the function of producing cognition.

Saṅghabhadra¹⁰⁸ also argues at length for the actual existence of reflected images and echoes as varieties of material form. The reflected image as such, like all composite entities, exists provisionally, but also like all provisionally existing entities, it has an actually existing basis. In the case of reflected

images and echoes, this basis is the fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta*) and derivative material form (*bhautika*). Subtle varieties of the fundamental elements, which are generated by the original object, reach the reflecting surface to produce the material reflected image.¹⁰⁹

In Saṅghabhadra's argument for the existence of reflected images, several points are raised that indicate the criteria by which the Sarvāstivādins establish an entity's existence. First, Saṅghabhadra¹¹⁰ notes that his opponents allow only certain nonexistent objects, such as reflected images, to be apprehended by perceptual consciousness. However, since no distinctions can be drawn among nonexistents, they should admit that all nonexistent objects are apprehended. Further, distinctions in the apprehension of an object as correct or incorrect, which result from the clarity of the sense organ, the distance of the object, and so on, are only possible with regard to an existent entity. Second, Saṅghabhadra criticizes Vasubandu's¹¹¹ assertion that the reflected image in no way exists, but is simply a particular efficacy of a collocation of conditions such that one sees the reflection. Saṅghabhadra asserts that a collocation (*sāmagrī*) does not exist as a real entity (*dravya*), and therefore cannot be said to have its own particular efficacy. Further, he demands why Vasubandhu will not allow this collocation of conditions, that is, the original object and the reflecting surface, to produce a separately existing reflected image. It is the nature of all separately existing conditioned factors to arise from a given collocation of conditions; similarly, a reflected image that arises from such a collocation should be allowed to exist as a separate entity. Third, Saṅghabhadra¹¹² offers several reasons in support of the existence of the reflected image: 1) most importantly, a reflected image satisfies the criterion for existence, that is, it serves as the object-support condition for the arising of perceptual consciousness; 2) like all actually existing conditioned factors, a reflected image is apprehended only when that reflection is present, and the presence of the reflection is dependent upon the collocation of its requisite conditions; 3) the reflected image is the object-support of visual perceptual consciousness, which, as an externally directed type of perceptual consciousness, is without conceptual thought, and therefore, must be supported by an actually existing object-field; 4) like all material form, a reflected image

is able to obstruct the arising of other material form (i.e., another reflected image) in the same place; and 5) a reflected image, like all existent factors, is produced from various separately existing conditions.

The Sarvāstivādins further argue that illusions (*māyā*) and magical creations (*nirmāṇa*), like reflected images and echoes, are varieties of existent material form. Magical creations consist of material form emanated by magically creative thought (*nirmāṇacitta*), which itself results from supernormal power (*abhi-jñā*) developed in trance (*dhyāna*).¹¹³ Similarly, in the case of illusions (*māyā*),¹¹⁴ the source of the illusion exists as actual material form and results from techniques in illusion.

5. Negations and Expressions Referring to a Nonexistent Object

Of all the examples raised by the Dārśāntikas to prove the possibility of a nonexistent object-support of perceptual consciousness, negations and expressions having a nonexistent object-referent receive the greatest attention from both Saṅghabhadra and the *Abhidharmadīpa*.¹¹⁵ Saṅghabhadra focuses his extensive treatment of the topic on an examination of the nature and force of negating expressions. First, he cites a Dārśāntika objection that the scriptural passage,¹¹⁶ “one knows nonexistence (*asat*) as nonexistent,” indicates that knowledge may depend upon a nonexistent object-field. Saṅghabhadra responds:¹¹⁷

What does this cognition take as its object-support? It is produced supported by a specification (*abhidhāna*)¹¹⁸ that negates existence; it does not take nonexistence as the object-field by which it is supported. That is to say, the specifying expression that negates existence is precisely a particular specification that asserts nonexistence. As a result, when cognition is produced with regard to the expression specifying nonexistence, it forms the understanding of nonexistence. Therefore, this cognition is not produced supported by nonexistence. [Objection:] Isn’t this specification that asserts nonexistence [itself] existent; how can cognition deny it as nonexistent? [Response:] Cognition is not produced denying the expression itself; it is only able to cognize [the object] specified by that [specification] as nonexistent. That is to say, cognition is produced supported by an object-field that

negates existence, but it is not produced taking nonexistence as its object-field. [Objection:] What is this object-field that is able to negate existence? [Response:] It is the specification (*abhidhāna*) that has arisen with regard to nonexistence. Since this cognition is supported by the specification as its object-field, reason demands that one should not claim that this [cognition] is produced supported by a nonexistent object-field.

For Saṅghabhadra, these negating expressions are of two types:¹¹⁹ 1) those that have an existent specified object (*abhidheya*), as in the case of expressions such as non-brahman (*abrāhmaṇa*), or impermanence (*anitya*); and 2) those whose specified object does not exist, as in the case of expressions such as nonexistence (*asat*), or absence (*abhāva*). In the first case, the expressions non-brahman and impermanence implicitly refer to an existent object: a *kṣatriya* and conditioned factors, respectively. The specifying expressions, non-brahman or impermanence, negate the particular quality, brahman or permanence, within the existent specified object. This first type of negating expression produces knowledge in two stages: knowledge first depends upon the specification, non-brahman or impermanence, and cognizes that the negated quality does not exist. Next, it depends upon the specified object, the *kṣatriya* or conditioned factors, and cognizes that the negated quality does not exist within the specified object. In the second case, the expressions nonexistence, absence, and so on, do not refer implicitly to an existent specified object. The resulting knowledge produced by these expressions depends only upon the specification itself; it is aware of the nonexistence of that which is negated in that particular context.¹²⁰

For Saṅghabhadra, the existence of a specification (*abhidhāna*) does not demand the corresponding existence of a specified object (*abhidheya*).¹²¹ As in this second type of negation, the specifying expression, “nonexistence,” itself exists and can serve as the object-support for the arising of cognition. However, the specification does not correspond to an existent specified object; that is to say, there exists no specified object, “nonexistence,” to which the specifying expression, “nonexistence,” refers. If all specifying expressions required existent specified objects, then such expressions as the horn of a hare, the thirteenth sense sphere, and the son of a barren woman would also be

required to have an existent specified object.¹²² Such specifying expressions arise in accordance with one's own intentions as a result of both immediately preceding thought concomitants, namely, volition (*cetanā*), and simultaneous thought concomitants. The former acts as the causal arouser (*hetusamutthāna*), and the latter act as arousers in that moment (*tatkṣanasamutthāna*).¹²³ Since the immediate causes of the specifying expression are these prior and simultaneous arousing thought concomitants, and not the specified object itself, the object specified by a given expression need not exist. Although a specifying expression can indicate a nonexistent specified object, this does not justify the conclusion that, in a similar fashion, cognition can be supported by a nonexistent object-field. Unlike the relation between the specified object and the specifying expression, the object-field acts as a condition for the arising of cognition, and as such, must exist.

In this explanation, Saṅghabhadra implicitly responds to an objection that nonexistent object-fields must themselves serve as the support for perceptual consciousness because they serve as the object-referent in speech. As the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* claims,¹²⁴ “there should be perceptual consciousness that depends upon the horn of a hare, and so on. If there were not, how would one be able to speak of them?” According to Saṅghabhadra’s explanation, one can indeed speak of such nonexistent objects, but the specifying expression does not depend upon a nonexistent specified object, but rather upon preceding and simultaneous thought concomitants. Similarly, the cognition of this nonexistent object depends only upon the existent specifying expression, and not upon any nonexistent specified object.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Abhidharmadīpa* next raise the case of the denial of putatively impossible or logically contradictory objects, as in statements such as “there is no thirteenth sense sphere,” or “there is no son of a barren woman.” Such denials are to be explained in a way similar to Saṅghabhadra’s analysis of the second type of negation, illustrated by expressions such as “nonexistence,” or “absence.” Just as in the affirmative statement, “thirteenth sense sphere” (*trayodaśāyatana*), so in its denial, “there is no thirteenth sense sphere,” the object-field for the arising of one’s cognition of the expression is not a nonexis-

tent object, “no thirteenth sense sphere,” but rather is simply the speech event itself (*vāgvastumātra*).¹²⁵

The *Abhidharmadīpa*,¹²⁶ explains in more detail the process by which negation occurs, and the object-support that conditions the arising of the cognition of a particular negation. A denial cannot negate either an existent (*sat*) or nonexistent (*asat*) in and of itself. If this were possible, a king’s enemies would become nonexistent simply as a result of declaring them to be so, and a nonexistent should, through double negation, become existent. Using the example of negating the horn of a hare, the *Abhidharmadīpa* concludes:¹²⁷

Neither the horn of a bull, nor the horn of a hare is negated through that negative particle. How is it then? In dependence upon the cognition of a relation between the hare and the element of space, cognitions of a lack of relation between real entities such as [that relation between] a bull and a horn, and so on, are indicated [in case of the hare and the horn].

Therefore, in denying the horn of a hare, one does not negate either an existent (i.e., the horn of a bull), or a nonexistent (i.e., the horn of a hare). Instead, one merely denies the relation between a bull and its horn perceived previously as it pertains to a hare’s head, in which only a relation with space is perceived.

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* raises one final example of a negative expression: “there is the prior nonexistence of sound.” Saṅghabhadra¹²⁸ explains our cognition of this expression in accordance with his treatment of the first type of negation. He refers to a prior disagreement with Vasubandhu concerning the meaning of the phrase, “there is the prior nonexistence of sound; there is the subsequent nonexistence [of sound]” (*asti śabdasya prāg abhāvo ‘sti paścād abhāva ity ucyate*).¹²⁹ Saṅghabhadra inquires whether the phrase, “there is the nonexistence,” is used with regard to an absolutely nonexistent object, or with regard to an existent object in which something else is negated. Only the second option, Saṅghabhadra claims, is possible. In that case, the phrase, “there is the prior nonexistence of sound,” indicates that there is no sound within another existent entity. The cognition of this prior nonexistence of sound then depends upon that other existent entity in which sound is not found. Specifically, it is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), or the assisting

circumstances in which sound has not yet arisen that serves as the object-support for the cognition of the phase, “there is the prior nonexistence of sound.” Thus, cognition of the prior nonexistence of sound does indeed have an existent object-support, that is, the substratum or assisting circumstances that lack sound.

Saṅghabhadra¹³⁰ also defends the explanation attributed to the Vaibhāśikas in the *Abhidharmaśabdhāśya*,¹³¹ that the perceptual consciousness of the prior nonexistence of sound depends upon the future sound itself. For the Sarvāstivādins, this future sound does exist, and therefore may serve as the object-support for the arising of a cognition. It does not, however, exist in the same way as the present. A present factor exists characterized by both intrinsic nature and activity, whereas past and future factors exist only as intrinsic nature. Therefore, even though this future sound exists as intrinsic nature, it is not heard because, as future, it does not exert its activity. This future sound may be cognized due to its existence as intrinsic nature, but insofar as it lacks activity, it is cognized as nonexistent.¹³²

6. Cognition of Past and Future Factors

For the Dārṣṭāntikas, the most common experience of perceptual consciousness without an existent object-field is that of memory of the past, and anticipation of the future. The Dārṣṭāntikas claim that in these cases, the object-field does not exist precisely because the past factors recollected and future factors anticipated do not actually exist. Nevertheless, no one would deny that recollection or anticipation is possible. Therefore, the Dārṣṭāntikas conclude one must admit that thought and thought concomitants can arise with a nonexistent object-support.

For the Sarvāstivādins, however, the mental perceptual consciousness of past or future factors, like the perceptual consciousness of present factors, must be supported by an existent object-field. The *Mahāvibhāṣā*¹³³ explains recollection as follows: “through the power of habitual practice, sentient beings obtain knowledge homogeneous with a certain factor, which enables them to cognize [that factor when past] in the same way in which it was previously experienced.” Vasumitra further suggests three causes that make recollection possible:¹³⁴ 1) securely grasping

the characteristic of the object previously experienced; 2) the present occurrence of a series homogeneous with that previous experience; and 3) not losing mindfulness. Therefore, once one apprehends and duly notes an object, one can recollect it at a later time when homogeneous knowledge, or knowledge similar to that previously experienced knowledge is stimulated by practice, by a similar object-support, or by circumstances conducive to recollection. This recollection then takes the original object, now past, as its object-support.

The thought concomitant, mindfulness (*smṛti*), which occurs associated with all moments of thought, plays an instrumental role in this process of recollection. Whereas the *Abhidharmaśabhaṣya*¹³⁵ defines mindfulness simply as the non-loss (*asampramoṣa*) of the object-support, Saṅghabhadra defines mindfulness as the cause of the notation (*abhilapana*) and non-loss (*asampramoṣa*) of the object-support.¹³⁶ The reason for Saṅghabhadra's inclusion of notation in the definition of mindfulness becomes clear in a subsequent argument with the Dārśṭāntika master Śrīlāṭa concerning the existence of mindfulness as a separate thought concomitant occurring in each moment of thought.¹³⁷ Saṅghabhadra asserts that notation occurs in each moment of perceptual consciousness whenever thought is aware of an object-field.¹³⁸ Therefore, the thought concomitant, mindfulness, functions with regard to present as well as past factors. Indeed, as Saṅghabhadra suggests, if there were no present mindfulness in the sense of noting the object-field, the recollection of previously experienced objects would be impossible. Mindfulness as the noting of present factors becomes the cause of their non-loss; this notation, in turn, enables the arising of subsequent recollection, which takes that past object as its object-support.¹³⁹

The *Mahāvibhaṣā*¹⁴⁰ uses several models to explain knowledge of future factors. First, one can infer a future event on the basis of the past and present. That is to say, one observes the causal relation between past and present factors and infers that a given present factor will produce a certain future factor. Or, one anticipates a future effect on the basis of one's observation of a certain present characteristic or indicative mark (*phalacihna*), which exists in the psycho-physical series as a conditioned factor dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuk-*

tasamśkāra).¹⁴¹ Finally, future (or past) factors may be perceived directly as in the case of certain special types of knowledge, such as knowledge resulting from one's vow (*prañidhijñāna*).¹⁴² As Saṅghabhadra¹⁴³ explains, there are two types of cognition of the past and future. The first, impure worldly cognition, can only recollect objects that have already been experienced. Since the future has not yet been experienced, worldly cognition can anticipate it only dimly. The second, pure cognition, observes with perfect clarity past and future objects that have never been experienced. In all these cases, however, the direct perception and resulting cognition of past and future factors demands an existent object-support.

VI. Conclusion

The Sarvāstivādins counter all such examples of seemingly nonexistent objects of cognition by finding, in each case, some existent to serve as the object-support. To summarize their argument, all perceptual consciousness or knowledge arises only in dependence upon an object-support, and this object-support, as a condition for the arising of that perceptual consciousness or knowledge, must actually exist. Since the cognition of such things as illusions, dream images, past and future factors, and so on, does occur, it also must have some existent object-support as its condition. The Sarvāstivādin explanation of these cases further implies that the object-support need not exist exactly in the manner in which it is cognized; hence, there may be a disparity between the content of cognition and the character of the object-field in itself.

Two principles are central to this Sarvāstivādin position: 1) conditions or causes must actually exist, and therefore, the object-support condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), as one of two conditions required for the arising of perceptual consciousness, must actually, in some manner, exist; and 2) the object-field may exist in a way other than that in which it is cognized, and therefore, cognition or insight may apprehend the object-support with an aspect (*ākāra*) that is not found in the object-field itself. The Dārṣṭāntikas, however, dispute both these points. The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, Vasubandhu, and Śrīlāta clearly suggest that 1) even

though the object-support may, in some sense, be considered a condition, it is not the generative cause for the arising of perceptual consciousness, and 2) the object-support is the actual content of cognition.

Concerning the first point of disagreement, the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*¹⁴⁴ asserts that precisely because there is knowledge without an object-support, perceptual consciousness is not, in every case, produced by two causes and conditions. Vasubandhu¹⁴⁵ takes a more conservative position: while still admitting two conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness as prescribed in the scripture, he reinterprets the function of the object-support condition. He distinguishes the object-support condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) from generative conditions (*janakapratyaya*), and claims that the object, though an object-support condition, cannot be considered a generative condition. For example, in the case of mental perceptual consciousness (*manovijñāna*), the generative cause is that prior moment of mind (*manas*) within the same mental series. The object of mental perceptual consciousness (*dharma*) is not a generative cause, but rather a mere object-support. Vasubandhu notes that if the object-support condition were also the generative cause, the unconditioned factor, *nirvāṇa*, which cannot function as a generative cause, could not become the object-support of perceptual consciousness.¹⁴⁶ Since the object-support is not the generative cause, it need not exist. Therefore, Vasubandhu concludes that such nonexistent objects as past and future factors can still be considered the object-support of perceptual consciousness.

The Dārśāntika master, Śrīlāṭa, presents a similar view:¹⁴⁷

Mental perceptual consciousness that depends upon past factors, and so on, is not without an object-support, [but] it does not depend only upon an existent [object-support]. For what reason is this so? [It is so because] mental perceptual consciousness that is produced taking the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness as its immediate contiguous condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) is able to experience the object-field apprehended by the prior [moment] of mind. Such mental perceptual consciousness takes this [previous moment of mind] as its cause; its object-support condition is the object of [that previous moment of] the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness.

[This previous moment of mind can be said to be its cause because] this [mental perceptual consciousness] is able to be produced only when preceded by that [moment of mind], and therefore “this [mental perceptual consciousness] exists or does not exist in accordance with whether that [moment of mind] exists or does not exist.”¹⁴⁸ However, this mental perceptual consciousness does not depend only on an existent [object-support] because at the time [of its arising] that object-field has already passed away. It is not without an object-support because this mental perceptual consciousness exists or does not exist in accordance with whether that [object-field] exists or does not exist. Further, when one recollects an object-field long past, [the recollection] is produced in the present time taking the prior [moment of] perceptual consciousness of that object as its condition because this recollection falls into the same series [as the prior moment of perceptual consciousness] and is produced through a mediated sequence. Even though there are other conditions that give rise to recollecting perceptual consciousness, it is produced only in dependence upon that previous object.

Thus for Śrīlāṭa, a given moment of mental perceptual consciousness takes as its object-support that object apprehended by the previous moment of perceptual consciousness. Though this previous object has passed away and hence, in Śrīlāṭa’s opinion, is nonexistent, it can still be designated the object-support condition because it satisfies the traditional formula defining a conditioning relation: “when this exists, that exists,” and so on. It is important to note that Śrīlāṭa interprets this formula as indicating a relation among successive conditions; he claims that a condition cannot be simultaneous with its effect, but rather must precede it. In this case, the existence or nonexistence of present perceptual consciousness depends upon the prior existence or nonexistence of this object-field. However, the generative cause of a present moment of perceptual consciousness is a previous moment of perceptual consciousness within its own series, and not the nonexistent object-support.

In another passage,¹⁴⁹ Śrīlāṭa clarifies the process by which present mental perceptual consciousness apprehends nonexistent past and future objects. Past and future objects are known through a mediated process of successive causation; that is to say, one infers the nature of past or future objects after having apprehended the present. As Śrīlāṭa states:¹⁵⁰

One is able to infer that a given present effect is produced from a certain type of past cause, and this [past] cause in turn arises from a certain cause, and so on, into the distance past in a way appropriate to each case, [and thus] one attains [past objects] through inference just as one would present [objects].

This inferential knowledge of various past objects is produced from causes that are found within the series of knowledge or perceptual consciousness itself. Previous knowledge of a particular type functions in a mediated causal process to produce present knowledge, and this present knowledge can be said to take the object-field of this particular previous knowledge as its own object-support. Thus, the cause of present recollecting knowledge is a previous moment of knowledge within its own series, and not the content of the present recollection. However, because the past object serves as the object-support for the previous knowledge, it can, by extension, be considered the object-support also of the present recollection, even though it no longer exists. Śrīlāṭa explains knowledge of past objects not yet experienced and future objects in the same way: one applies a process of inference based on the knowledge of causes and effects that one has already experienced.

Saṅghabhadra¹⁵¹ rejects Vasubandhu's distinction between the generative cause and the object-support condition, and his identification of the generative cause as a prior moment within the series of perceptual consciousness. In Saṅghabhadra's opinion, the scriptural passage stating that perceptual consciousness is produced in dependence upon two conditions, clearly indicates that the basis (*āśraya*), and the object-support (*ālambana*) are equally generative causes in the production of perceptual consciousness. Since the object-support acts as a generative cause in the production of perceptual consciousness, it must actually exist.

In his criticism of Śrīlāṭa's model of the arising of mental perceptual consciousness in dependence upon past nonexistent object-supports, Saṅghabhadra focuses upon three major points.¹⁵² First, since Śrīlāṭa does not admit that the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness and the object-support they apprehend are simultaneous, even these five types of perceptual consciousness arise only when their object-field

has passed away. The following moment of mental perceptual consciousness would then be two moments removed from its object-field. Therefore, before Śrīlāta discusses the knowledge of past and future factors by mental perceptual consciousness, he must first explain how it is possible for the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness to perceive a past nonexistent object-field. Second, Śrīlāta states that mental perceptual consciousness is not without an object-support. This, Saṅghabhadra claims, is tantamount to an admission of the existence of that object-support in some form. Śrīlāta's position would then be equivalent to that of the Sarvāstivādins: a past factor, though lacking activity, is not absolutely nonexistent like a sky flower, and yet it does not exist like the present, which is characterized by both activity and intrinsic nature. Third, Śrīlāta cannot meaningfully appeal to the traditional formula defining conditioning relations, "when this exists, that exists," and so on, or to a model of mediated successive causation because he does not allow the existence of past or future factors. According to Śrīlāta's model, when the object-support exists, the perceptual consciousness that apprehends it has not yet arisen, and when that perceptual consciousness arises, its object-support has already passed away. Similarly, in the case of mediated successive causation within the series of perceptual consciousness, the prior causal moment of perceptual consciousness no longer exists when its subsequent effect arises. By maintaining a causal relation between these successive moments, Śrīlāta is, in effect, admitting that there can be a causal relation of dependence between existents and nonexistents, which neither Śrīlāta nor Saṅghabhadra would accept.¹⁵³ Thus, Saṅghabhadra concludes that object-support conditions act as generative causes coequal with the basis (*āśraya*) in the production of cognition, and must, therefore, in some sense, exist.

The second major point of disagreement between the Sarvāstivādins and the Dārśṭāntikas concerns the relation between the content of cognition and the object-support. In all of the examples of seemingly nonexistent objects of cognition cited previously, the Dārśṭāntikas assume that the object-support is the object as cognized, or the content of cognition. For example, in the case of the cognition of two moons, the object-support is precisely the two moons; in the case of meditation on the spheres

of totality, the object-support of one's cognition of total and exclusive blueness is the total expanse of blue. This Dārśāntika assumption that the object-support is the content of cognition leads inevitably to their conclusion that the object-support does not exist because in these cases this content of cognition has no actually existing counterpart. The Sarvāstivādins, however, assume that one's cognition in mental perceptual consciousness may diverge from the actual character of the existent object-field that serves as its support. In the case of the cognition of two moons, one's cognition is supported by the single existent moon, and so on.

This difference in assumptions becomes apparent in the discussion of deliberative reflection (*vimarśa*) on the nature or characteristics of a perceived object. As Vasubandhu states:¹⁵⁴ "When all cognition has an existent object-support, how would there be deliberative reflection with regard to that [object-support]?" He assumes that since the object-support is the very content of cognition, if all such object-supports exist, no cognition may be questioned or judged mistaken. In other words, deliberative reflection and doubt are possible only so long as nonexistent objects are allowed; mistaken cognition would then be cognition based on such a nonexistent object-support.

For Saṅghabhadra, such deliberative reflection or doubt is only possible with regard to an existent object. The possibility of investigating whether one's cognition of a particular object is accurate or mistaken (*viparīta*) does not demand that the object-support be nonexistent. On the contrary, distinctions, such as that between accurate and mistaken cognition, are possible only with regard to or among existents; existence and nonexistence share no characteristic by which they may be compared. Accordingly, it is only possible to distinguish accurate from mistaken cognition when those cognitions have an existent object-support. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra assumes that mistaken cognition is not the product of a nonexistent object-support, but rather is a function of the accuracy of cognition. The fact of mistaken cognition demands not only an existent object, but also the possibility that the object in itself and our cognition of it differ.

Vasubandhu explicitly asserts this identity of the object-support with the content of cognition in a discussion of the

manner of existence of objects of memory and anticipation.¹⁵⁵ When asked how past and future factors that do not exist can be considered object-supports for perceptual consciousness, Vasubandhu responds that an object can be said to exist in the manner in which it becomes an object-support. That is to say, past factors are recollected as "having existed," and, therefore, may be described as "having existed;" future factors are anticipated as "coming to exist," and, therefore, may be described as "coming to exist." Since objects are not recollected or anticipated as "existing," one cannot claim that they "exist." Further, Vasubandhu notes that past factors are recollected as they existed when experienced in the present; that is to say, the particular characteristics of a recollected object are not different from those of the object when it was experienced in the present. If, like the Sarvāstivādins, one claimed that these past factors "exist," one would be forced into the contradictory position that past factors are present, because they are cognized with the characteristics of a presently experienced object. Since, for Vasubandhu, the object-support of cognition is the very content of cognition, the object-support of the recollection of a past object is that object in its form as presently experienced. But, since these factors are not present when recollected, we must conclude that the object-support has no existent counterpart.

Saṅghabhadra¹⁵⁶ responds by sharply distinguishing the existent object-support from the cognition of that object-support. For example, when one perceives a pillar as a human being, the object-support, the pillar, does not exist as cognized, that is, as a human being. Likewise, in the case of past and future factors, though they are cognized as they were or will be when experienced in the present, they exist as past or future. Therefore, precisely because the object-support need not be identical to the content of cognition, an existent object-support may condition the arising of an instance of mental perceptual consciousness whose cognitive content has no existing counterpart.

Thus, underlying these specific controversies between the Sarvāstivāda and Dārśāntika schools on the existence or nonexistence of the object-support of perceptual consciousness are two fundamental points of disagreement: first, concerning the causal nature of the object-support, and second, concerning

the relation between the object-support and the content of cognition. The controversies precipitated by these disagreements would provide the background for the extensive epistemological inquiries of the Buddhist logicians. Specifically, their later controversies concerning the location of the perceived object, its existential status, the nature of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), the nature of knowledge as having aspects (*sākāra*), or as being without aspects (*nirākāra*), and the conditioning relations through which perception occurs were all anticipated in these early discussions.

ABBREVIATIONS

- ADV Padmanabh S. Jaini, ed., *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977).
- AKB P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmaśabhasyam of Vasubandhu*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 8, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967) (reprinted ed., 1975).
- AKV Unrai Wogihara, ed., *Sphuṭarthā Abhidharmaśavyākhyā: The Work of Yasomitra*, (Tokyo: The Publishing Association of the Abhidharmaśavyākhyā, 1932).
- AVB *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*, T28.1546. Tr. Buddhavarman.
- Fa-pao *Chü-she-lun-shu*, T41.1822.
- HTAKB *A-p'i-ta-mo-chü-she-lun*, T29.1558. By Vasubandhu, tr. Hsüan-tsang.
- PAKB *A-p'i-ta-mo-chü-she-lun*, T29.1559. By Vasubandhu, tr. Paramārtha.
- P'u-kuang *Chü-she-lun-chi*, T41.1821.
- MA *Madhyamāgama*, T1.26. Tr. Saṅghadeva.
- MN Robert Chalmers, ed., *The Majjhima-Nikāya*, 3 Vols., (London: The Pali Text Society, Henry Frowde, 1896–1899) (reprinted ed., London: The Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960).
- MVB *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T27.1545. Tr. Hsüan-tsang.
- NAS *Nyāyānusāra*, T29.1562. By Saṅghabhadra, tr. Hsüan-tsang.
- SA *Samyuktāgama*, T2.99. Tr. Guṇabhadra.
- SN *The Samyutta-Nikāya*, 5 Vols., (London: The Pali Text Society, Henry Frowde, 1884–1898) (reprinted ed., London: The Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960).
- T Junjirō Takakusu, Kaikyoku Watanabe, and Gemmyō Ono, eds., *Taishō shinshū Daizōkyō*, (Tokyo, 1924–1932).
- TS *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, T32.1646. By Harivarman, tr. Kumārajīva.
- VB *Vibhāṣāśāstra*, T28.1547. Tr. Saṅghabhadra.
- VK *Vijñānakāya*, T26.1539. Tr. Hsüan-tsang.

NOTES

1. For discussions in early non-Buddhist texts see the *Nyāyasūtra* (Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha, eds., *Nyāyadarśnam*, 2 Vols., The Calcutta Sanskrit Series, Nos. 18, 29, (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing, 1936–44) (reprinted ed., Kyoto: Rinsen, 1982)); for perception and the time period of the object perceived see 2.1.42, Vol. 1, p. 523; for the composition of objects of perception see 4.2.4–17, Vol. 2, pp. 1043–1058; for the existential status of the object of cognition and false apprehension see 4.2.26–37, Vol. 2, pp. 1072–1089; for references to objects of questionable existential status including the whirling firebrand 3.2.58, Vol. 2, p. 897, eye disorders 4.2.13, Vol. 2, p. 1054, dream images 4.2.34ff, Vol. 2, pp. 1083ff, a pillar seen as a human being 4.2.35 (*bhāṣya*) Vol. 2, p. 1087.

2. Of particular interest to the topic of this paper is Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. See Susumu Yamaguchi (in collaboration with Henriette Meyer), "Dignāga: Examen de l'objet de la connaissance," *Journal Asiatique*, Vol. 214, (1926), pp. 1–65; Erich Frauwallner, "Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Bd. 37 (1930), pp. 174–194 (reprinted in Gerhard Oberhammer and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), *Erich Frauwallner Kleine Schriften* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982), pp. 340–360). For the perception of an object and error (*bhrānti*) in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* see Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 47, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 28 (I.7 cd-8 ab), pp. 95–97 (notes #1.53–54), pp. 32–35 (II), pp. 116–120 (notes #2.11–28). For the nature of the object of perception and the four categories of *pratyakṣabhāṣa* in the Pratyakṣapramāṇa section of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* see Yūsho Miyasaka, ed., *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā*, in *Acta Indologica*, Vol. 2, (Narita: Naritasan shinshōji, 1971–72), Ch. 2, vss. 194–238, pp. 66–72; Ch. 2, vss. 288–300, p. 80. For the commentary of Prajñākaragupta on the *Pramāṇavārttika* see Rāhula Saṅkṛityāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālankāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 1, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayawal Research Institute, 1953), Ch. 2, vss. 194–239, pp. 279–303; Ch. 2, vss. 289–301, pp. 331–338. See also Hiromasa Tosaki, *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū (jōkan)*, (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1979), pp. 37–43; vss. 194–238, pp. 294–336; vss. 288–300, pp. 382–393. For a discussion of these four categories of *pratyakṣabhāṣa* in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, *Viśālāmalavatī-nāma-pramāṇasamuccayāṭikā*, on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, see Kenshō Hasuba, "Shōshukaku ni yoru Shūryōron no jigenryō kaishaku ni tsuite," in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku ronsō, Yamaguchi Hakushi kanreki kinin*, (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1955), pp. 205–212. For the perceptual process in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasamgraha* and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* see S.D. Sastri *Tattvasamgraha*, 2 Vols., (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968) *Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā* Vol. 1, pp. 448–493; *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* Vol. 2, pp. 670–711; for error and illusion see Vol. 1, vss. 1311–1328, pp. 479–484; for the two requisite conditions for perceptual consciousness and the possibility of perceptual consciousness without an object-support see Vol. 2 vs. 1787 a-b, pp. 614–616, and Vol. 2, vss. 1846–1848, pp. 630–631.

3. There are a number of groups within the Sarvāstivāda school distinguished by geographical location or textual and instructional lineage. Evidence of these groups can be found in the various Sarvāstivādin masters quoted in the Vibhāṣā commentaries, and in the doctrinal differences among early Sarvāstivādin texts. See Baiyū Watanabe, *Ubu Abidatsuma ron no kenkyū*, (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1954), pp. 111–155; Masao Shizutani, *Shōjō Bukkyō shi no kenkyū*, (Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 1978), pp. 137–140; Giyū Nishi, “Ubu shūnai ni okeru hocchikei hi-hocchikei no shoshu no hakusetsu oyobi gakutō no kenkyū,” *Shūkyō kenkyū (shin)*, Vol. 11, (1934–4), pp. 564–579, (1934–5), pp. 768–789. For doctrinal differences among the translations of the Vibhāṣā commentary see Watanabe, op. cit., pp. 253–494; Kōshō Kawamura, *Abidatsuma ronsho no shiryōteki kenkyū*, (Kyoto: Dōhōsha, 1974), pp. 53–206. For doctrinal differences among post-Vibhāṣā Sarvāstivādin texts see Kawamura, op. cit., pp. 39–52; Taiken Kimura, *Abidatsuma ron no kenkyū*, Vol. 4, *Kimura Taiken zenshū*, 6 Vols., (Tokyo: Meiji shoin, 1937), pp. 271–324; Ryūjō Yamada, *Daijō Bukkyō seiritsuron josetsu*, (Kyoto: Keirakuji shoten, 1959), pp. 110–124.

4. In the case of the Sarvāstivāda and Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika schools, the term “school” does not indicate distinct disciplinary lineages or monastic affiliation, but rather simply differences in doctrinal interpretation, or instructional or textual lineage. See Shizutani, op. cit., p. 256. The history of the Dārśāntikas and Sautrāntikas are closely intertwined, with the Dārśāntikas as the probable predecessor of the Sautrāntikas. See Shizutani, op. cit., p. 136, pp. 140–147. Though the Vibhāṣā commentaries cite Sautrāntika and Dārśāntika views separately, references to the Dārśāntikas are far more numerous. See Yamada, op. cit., p. 84. The later literature, however, refers almost exclusively to the Sautrāntikas. Note Yaśomitra: “The Dārśāntikas are a variety of the Sautrāntikas.” *dārśāntikāḥ sautrāntikavīśeṣā ity arthah*. AKV p. 400.17. Therefore, the correct identification of early masters as Dārśāntikas or Sautrāntikas, if such a distinction was justified in the early period, is exceedingly difficult. See Junshō Katō, *Ibushūrinron no tsutaeru Kyōryōbu ni tsuite*, *Daijō Bukkyō kara mikkyō e*, *Katsumata Shunkyō Hakushi koki kinen ronshū*, (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1976), pp. 175–198.

5. Vasumitra’s *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* records the Sarvāstivādin position that thought and thought concomitants must have an object-support (*ālambana*). T49.2031 p. 16.b.21–22; T49.2032 p. 19.a.16; T49.2033 p. 21.b.27–28. It does not refer to a difference of opinion between the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools on this issue. T49.2032 p. 17.b.2ff; T49.2032 p.19.c.11ff; T49.2033 p.22.b.20ff. Compare the *Kathavatthu*. (Arnold C. Taylor, ed., *Kathāvatthu*, 2 Vols., Pali Text Society, Text series Nos. 48, 49, (London: The Pali Text Society, 1894, 1897) (reprinted ed., 1979), 9.4–7 pp. 405–412.

6. The later Sarvāstivādin tradition includes seven texts in their early Abhidharma canon. Following the dating of Hajime Sakurabe (see Hajime Sakurabe, *Kusharon no kenkyū*, (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1971), pp. 41ff), to the earliest period belong the *Saṅgītiparyāya* by Mahākauṭhila (Ch. Śāriputra, tr. Hsüan-tsang, T26.1536), and the *Dharmaskandha* by Śāriputra (Ch. Maudgalyāyana, tr. Hsüan-tsang, T26.1537). To the next period belong the *Vijñānakāya* by

Devaśarman, (tr. Hsüan-tsang, T26.1539), the *Dhātukāya* by Pūrṇa (Ch. Va-sumitra, tr. Hsüan-tsang, T26.1540), and the *Prajñaptisāstra* by Maudgalyāyana (Ch. unidentified, tr. Dharmapāla ?, T26.1538), followed by the *Prakaraṇapāda* by Vasumitra, (tr. Guṇabhadra, T26.1541, and Hsüan-tsang T26.1542). The most recent of the seven texts is the *Jñānaprasthāna* by Kātyāyanīputra, (tr. Saṅghadeva, T26.1543, and Hsüan-tsang, T26.1544). See AKV p. 11.26ff. For further discussions of the dating of these texts see Watanabe, op. cit., pp. 135ff; Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien, II," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Archiv für Indische Philosophie*, Bd. 8, (1964), pp. 59–99.

7. The three Chinese translations, listed in the order of translation, are the *Vibhāṣāsāstra* (tr. Saṅghabhadra ?, T28.1547), the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāsāstra* (tr. Buddhavarman, T28.1546), and the *Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra* (tr. Hsüan-tsang, T27.1545). For a summary of the controversy concerning the dating and doctrinal distinctions among these three translations see Kawamura, op. cit., pp. 53–206, especially pp. 80–83, 118–120, 206.

8. P. Pradhan (ed.), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 8, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, by Vasubandhu (tr. Paramārtha, T29.1559, and Hsüan-tsang T29.1558), and U. Wogihara (ed.), *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: the Work of Yaśomitra*, 2 Vols., (Tokyo: The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, 1932). The *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṅghabhadra (tr. Hsüan-tsang, T29.1562), and a partially extant commentary on the *Nyāyānusāra*, the *Shun-cheng-li-lun shu-wen-chi*, by Yüan-yü (*Dai Nippon zokuzōkyō*, 1.83.3). Padmanabh S. Jaini (ed.), *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977).

9. In the *Nyāyānusāra*, Dārśāntika views are most often represented by the teacher, Sthavira. Later sources identify Sthavira as the Sautrāntika master, Śrīlāta. See P'u-kuang 9 p. 172.a.8–10; Fa-pao 9 p. 604.a.5–6; K'uei-chi, *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun shu-chi*, T43.1830 4 p. 358.a.9ff. However, from numerous references in the *Nyāyānusāra* it is clear that Saṅghabhadra considers Sthavira to be a Dārśāntika. See NAS 3 p. 347.b.6–7; 11 p. 390.c.20ff; 14 p. 412.c.9ff; 18 p. 442.a.25ff; 19 p. 445.c.3–4; 25 p. 482.a.5ff, b.1–2, b.20ff, c.1–3. See also Junshō Katō, "Kyōryōbu Shurirāta (ichi)," *Bukkyōgaku*, Vol. 1, (1976), pp. 45–65. Junshō Katō, "Notes sur les deux maîtres bouddhiques Kumāralāta et Śrīlāta," in *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*, Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 23, (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980), pp. 197–213.

10. For textual references to the dating of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, and to Harivarman as the author of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* and as a student of the Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika master, Kumāralāta, see Katō, "Notes sur le deux maîtres," pp. 199–200. Paramārtha identifies the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* as representing the Bahuśrutīya school. See Chūgan Chōzen's *Sanrongengi kennyūshū* (T70.2300 5 p. 460.c.8ff, especially c.21), which cites Paramārtha's autocommentary on his translation of Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (T49.2033). See Paul Demiéville, "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, Vol. 1, (1931–32), pp. 16ff. How-

ever, there are frequent points of doctrinal similarity between Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika positions and those of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*. Chi-tsang in the *San-lun hsüan-i* (T45.1852 1 p. 3.b.16ff, especially b.24ff) cites various opinions as to the school affiliation of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* and notes the similarity between Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika views and those of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra*. See also Shōson Miyamoto, *Daijō to Shōjō*, (Tokyo: Yakumo shoten, 1944), pp. 152–168. Though the exact date of the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* is not known, all historical references agree that Harivarman precedes Vasubandhu.

11. No attention will be given to the later Buddhist and non-Buddhist characterizations of the early Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika positions. For example, among Buddhist sources, see Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*, Embar Krshnamacharya, *Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 94, (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1942), p. 34.27ff, p. 36.23–24; Yūichi Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of the Mokṣākaragupta*, Memoires of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, (Kyoto: 1966), p. 62, note #148, pp. 139–140, p. 144. See also Yūichi Kajiyama, "Sonzai to chishiki: Bukkyō tetsugaku shoha no ronsō," *Tetsugaku kenkyū*, Vol. 43, (1966 #6), pp. 207–236, Vol. 43, (1967 #11), pp. 1–28; Gadjin Nagao, "Shoengyōsōmon no ichi mondai," in *Chūgān to Yuishihi*, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), pp. 373–388. Among non-Buddhist sources, see Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, V.S. Abhyankar (ed.), *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 1 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1924) (reprinted ed. 1978); for the characterization of the Sautrāntikas as maintaining *bāhyārthānumeya* and the Sarvāstivādins as maintaining *bāhyārtha-pratyakṣa* see 2.41–44, p. 19; for the Sautrāntika theory of perception see 2.220–263 pp. 33–37, 2.268–371 p. 46. See also Enshō Kanakura, "Gekyō no bunken ni mieru Kyōryōbu setsu," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku ronsō, Yamaguchi Hakushi kanreki kinen*, (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1955), pp. 55–68; Yūichi Kajiyama, "Setsuissaiubu no shisō o megutte," *Bukkyōgaku seminā*, Vol. 25, (1977), pp. 93–106.

12. See AKB 3.85 c p.176,12–13, 4.2 c p.193.2; MVB 3 p.12.b.4ff, 39 p.200.a.29ff, 76 p.393.c.14ff, 93 p.480.a.26–27; NAS 13 p.407.c.19ff, 14 p.409.b.2ff, 14 p.410.a.4ff, 15 p.417.b.29ff, 15 p.419.c.2ff, 15 p.421.b.22ff, 18 p.437.c.3ff, 19 p.447.a.10ff, 52 p.631.c.5ff, 52 p.633.b.27ff, 52 p.634.a.26.

13. See AKB 3.32 b p.146.4ff; NAS 6 p.365.a.27ff, 15 p.417.c.12–p.421.c.24, 18 p.440.a.23–24, 20 p.452.a.16ff, 22 p.467.a.22ff, 25 p.482.a.3ff.

14. SA 13 #306 p.87.c.26ff; SN 12.43 *Dukkhasutta*, 44 *Lokasutta*, 45 *Nātikasutta*, Vol. 2, pp. 72–75. *cakkhum ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇam*. See also MA 54 #201 p. 767.a.24ff; MN 1.38 *Mahātanhāsa-nkhayasutta* Vol. 1, p. 259. For references in Abhidharma texts see *Saṅgitiparyāya* T26.1536 15 p.429.a.15ff; *Dharmaskandha* T26.1537 10 p.501.b.9ff, 10 p.502.c.20–21, 11 p.507.c.25; *VK* 3 p.545.b.24; *Dhātukāya* T26.1540 (*shang*) p.615.c.4; *Prakaranapāda* T26.1542 2 p.699.a.4; MVB 16 p.79.b.20; AKB 5.25 b p.295.16; NAS 2 p.338.c.22, 51 p.627.c.17, 57 p.658.c.8.

15. MA 7 #30 p.467.a.3ff; MN 1.28 *Mahāhatthipadopamasutta* Vol. 1, p. 191.

16. MA 47 #181 p. 723.b.16ff, p. 723.c.14ff; MN 3.115 *Bahudhātukasutta* Vol. 3, pp. 62–63.

17. A distinction between homogeneous (*sabhāga*) and partially homogeneous (*tatsabhāga*) sense organs and object-fields was developed in order to distinguish those that have functioned, are functioning, or will function in a moment of perception (i.e., homogeneous), from those that do not so function, but are nevertheless of the same nature as those that do (i.e., partially homogeneous). This category of the partially homogeneous includes those sense organs or object-fields that arise and pass away without performing their particular function of grasping or being grasped, as well as those future sense organs or object-fields that will never arise. The *dharma* element, as the object-field of mental perceptual consciousness, is exclusively homogeneous since it is considered unreasonable that a mental factor will never be apprehended, or arises and passes away without being apprehended. AKB 1.39 b-d p.27.18ff; NAS 6 p.362.a.7ff; AKB 1.42 b p.30.5–7; NAS 6 p.364.a.26ff; MVB 71 p.368.a.10ff, p.371.a.8ff.

18. Perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*) is identified with thought (*citta*), and mind (*manas*), and is then described as occurring simultaneously with thought concomitants (*caitta*), each of which carries out its own specific mental function. Thought and thought concomitants are said to be associated (*sampravukta*) because they are equivalent with respect to basis (*āśraya*), object-support (*ālambana*), aspect (*ākāra*), time period (*kāla*), and the singular instance of their occurrence (*dravya*). AKB 2.34 a-d p.61.22ff; AKV p.141.8.ff; NAS 11 p.394.c.14ff; MVB 16 p.80.b.25ff. For an enumeration of the 46 thought concomitants with which thought may be associated according to the Sarvāstivāda school see AKB 2.23 p.54.3–2.33 p.61.19; NAS 10 p.384.a.8–11 p.394.c.12.

19. See MVB 13 p.61.c.7ff and AVB 8 p.51.b.24ff where four views concerning the proper locus of grasping the object-field are presented: 1) Dharmatrāta claims that visual perceptual consciousness, and not the eye, sees visible color-form; 2) Ghoṣaka claims that the insight (*prajñā*) associated with visual perceptual consciousness sees; 3) the Dārṣṭāntikas claim that the complete collocation (*sāmagrī*) of causes, including the sense organ, and so on, sees; and 4) the Vātsīputriyas claim that only one eye sees in each successive moment. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* replies that the sense organ, specifically both eyes functioning together, sees form. See also AKB 1.42 p.30.3–43 b p.31.25; AKV p.80.10ff; NAS 6 p.364.a.23ff; and ADV p.31.1ff; MVB 95 p.489.b.28ff. The *Abhidharmaśabhaṣya* (AKB 1.42 c-d p.31.12) identifies this Dārṣṭāntika view as that of the Sautrāntikas.

20. See AKB 1.16 a p.11.6ff. *vijñānam prativijñaptih . . . viśayam viśayam prativijñaptir upalabdhīr vijñānaskandha ity ucaye.* AKV p.38.22ff; NAS 3 p.342.a.15ff. See also NAS 11 p.396.b.6ff, 25 p.484.b.17ff; MVB 72 p.371.b.22ff. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 3.p.342.a.17ff; *Samayapradīpika*, T29.1563 2 p.783.b.26ff) clearly delimits the functioning of perceptual consciousness to that of apprehending the generic characteristic of the object-field, thereby distinguishing the activity of perceptual consciousness from that of its associated thought concomitants (*caitta*), which apprehend the specific charac-

teristics of the object-field. See also NAS 11 p.390.c.9–11, 11 p.395.a.29ff; P'u-kuang 1 *mo* p.26.a.3ff; Fa-pao 1 *yü* p.486.c.7ff; ADV #120 b p.78.10–13; Kyokuga Saeki, *Kandō abidatsumakusharon*, Vol. 1 (1886) (reprinted ed., Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1978), p. 29. Hsüan-tsang in translating this section of the *Abhidharmaśabhaṣya*, perhaps under the influence of the *Nyāyānusāra*, modifies “*upalabdhī*” with “*tsung*” meaning grasps in general, or grasps the generic characteristic of the object-field. (HTAKB 1 p.4.a.21; contrast with PAKB 1 p.164.c.2–3).

21. NAS 11 p.395.a.28ff; NAS 3 p.342.a.18ff; VK 11 p.582.c.20ff. For the distinction between those thought concomitants associated with mental perceptual consciousness and those associated with the other five types of perceptual consciousness see NAS 29 p.506.c.7ff; VK 6 p.559.b.27ff.

22. AKB 1.10 d p.7.18ff; AKV p.27.29ff; MVB 13 p.65.a.12ff; 127 p.665.b.1ff. As these passages suggest, this particular characteristic of the object-field as a generic sense sphere (*āyatanaśvalakṣaṇa*) is not to be confused with the common characteristic (*sāmanyalakṣaṇa*), which is apprehended only by mental perceptual consciousness.

23. See NAS 28 p.501.b.24–25, 4 p.352.a.20–21. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 4 p.350.c.5—p.352.a.25) argues at length against the Dārśāntika-Saurāntika master, Śrīlāta, who claims that the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness depend upon object-fields that do not exist as real entities. Śrīlāta claims that single atoms are not the object-support of perceptual consciousness because they do not constitute the content of perception. The five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness rely only upon composites (*ho-ho*) of atoms, and these composites, as such, do not exist as real entities. Therefore, the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness do not apprehend actually existing object-fields. Saṅghabhadra responds by distinguishing the term “composite” (*ho-ho, sāmagrī, samghāta, samnipāta, samhata ?*), used by Śrīlāta, from aggregation (*ho-chi, samcita ?*). Saṅghabhadra claims that atoms form an aggregation, not a composite, and this aggregation then allows direct perception to occur. (See also NAS 32 p. 522.a.5–10.) The actually existing object-field that causes perception is still, however, the individual atom. (See NAS 4 p.352.a.18–19.) This composite (*ho-ho*), as proposed by Śrīlāta, exists only provisionally, and hence is apprehended only by mental perceptual consciousness. Saṅghabhadra's attempt to salvage the Sarvāstivādin theory that atoms in aggregation are the object-field of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness by distinguishing *ho-ho* from *ho-chi* constitutes an innovation not found in the Vibhāṣā commentaries. See MVB 13 p.63.c.22–25, 121 p.632.a.24–26; ADV #317 p.277.15ff. See also Sylvain Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Vimśatikā*), Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, Vol. 245, (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925), vs. 11 p. 6–7; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Vol. 1, (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), p. 44 (notes), p. 45, #1; Junshō Katō, “Wajū to wagō—Ubu to Kyōbu no busshitsu no toraeata,” *Buzan kyōgaku taikai kiyō*, Vol. 1 (not available to me).

24. For the simultaneity of the sense organ and object-field see AKB 1.23 a p.15.24ff; AKV p.50.22ff; NAS 3 p.345.c.9ff. For the simultaneity of

the object-field and perceptual consciousness see AKB 1.44 c p.34.3ff; NAS 8 p.374.a.21ff, 8 p.374.b.9ff, 4 p.351.b.29ff.

25. AKB 1.29 c p.19.16ff; AKV p.59.4ff; NAS 4 p.348.b.5ff. The object-field (*viṣaya*) is defined as that with regard to which a factor carries out its activity (*kāritra*); the object-support (*ālambana*) is that which is apprehended by thought and the thought concomitants. For a comparison of the usage of the terms *artha*, *viṣaya*, *gocara*, and *ālambana* in Abhidharma texts see Akira Hirakawa, "Setsuissaiubu no ninshikiron," *Bungakubu kiyō, Hokkaidō daigaku*, Vol. 2, (1953), pp. 7–8; Kyōdō Yamada, "Abidatsuma Bukkyō ni okeru ninshiki no mondai," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū*, Vol. 5, (1957–1), pp. 184–187. Unfortunately, Hsüan-tsang does not always distinguish *ālambana* from *viṣaya* in his translations, making the clarification of Saṅghabhadra's understanding of the distinction exceedingly difficult.

26. NAS 15 p.420.c.21—p.421.a.11; AKB 3.32 b p.145.15ff; MVB 16 p.79.b.20–21. According to the Sarvāstivādin system of six causes (*hetu*) and four conditions (*pratyaya*), the co-present cause (*sahabhūhetu*), associated cause (*samprayuktahetu*), the efficient variety of the general cause (*kāraṇahetu*), the object-support condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), and the sovereign condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) may be simultaneous with their effects. Though there is some difference of opinion (see MVB 16 p.79.a.28ff), generally, according to the system of six causes, the sense organ and object-support are both designated efficient general causes, while according to the system of four conditions, the object-support is the object-support condition and the sense organ is the sovereign condition. See MVB 20 p.104.a.4ff; NAS 15 p.417.a.15ff, 18 p.438.a.13ff, 20 p.449.c.16ff; TS 2 #17 p.251.a.20–23.

27. NAS 8 p.374.c.2ff. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 73 p.736.a.9ff) admits three types of direct perception: 1) that through the sense organs (*i-ken-hsien-liang*, *indriyapratyakṣa* ?), which grasps the five external object-fields through the five sense organs; 2) that through experience (*ling-na-hsien-liang*, *anubhavapratyakṣa* ?), which is the present occurrence of thought and the thought concomitants of feelings, concepts, and so on; 3) that through cognition (*chüeh-hui-hsien-liang*, *buddhi-pratyakṣa* ?), which attains the particular and common characteristic appropriate to each factor. This third type of direct perception arises in dependence upon the first two. The first among these, direct perception through the sense organs, demands the simultaneity of the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness.

28. AKB 1.17 a-b p.11.21ff; NAS 3 p.342.b.11ff. This mental organ also serves as the basis (*āśraya*) of each of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, which then have two bases: the past mental organ and their respective present sense organ. See MVB 71 p.369.c.14ff; AKB 1.44 c-d p.34.6ff; NAS 8 p.374.a.24ff.

29. NAS 7 p.366.c.4ff; MVB 71 p.369.c.27–29.

30. NAS 6 p.365.c.2ff. The mental organ, as the immediately preceding moment of perceptual consciousness has as its object-support the object apprehended in the preceding moment.

31. AKB 3.30 c-d p.143.25ff; AKV p.305.19ff; NAS 29 p.506.c.3ff; Yüan-yü, *Shun-cheng-li-lun shu-wen-chi*, (Dai Nippon zokuzōkyō, 1.83.3), 29

p.262.d.6ff; VK 6 p.559.b.27ff. In these passages, contact associated with mental perceptual consciousness (*manahsāṃsparśa*) is explained. This mental contact with the object-support is called designation (*adhibacana*) because names are the primary object-support of mental perceptual consciousness, or because mental perceptual consciousness operates on its object through speech.

32. AKB 1.33 a-d p.22.19ff; AKV p.64.22ff; NAS 4 p.350.b.5ff; MVB 42 p.219.b.7ff; AVB 23 p.169.b.5.

33. NAS 4 p.349.a.23–24, 4 p.350.b.11ff; MVB 42 p.219.a.2ff. See the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 42 p.219.b.7) where conceptual thought in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvavikalpa*) is identified with both initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*). For the distinction between *vitarka* and *vicāra* see NAS 11 p.393.c.29ff.

34. MVB 72 p.374.b.5ff; NAS 4 p.349.a.21ff, 4 p.350.b.8; AKB 1.33 a-b p.22.20–23; AKV p.64.29ff.

35. NAS 4 p.350.b.17ff; MVB 42 p.219.b.10ff.

36. NAS 4 p.349.a.16ff.

37. AKB 1.48 a.p.36.21ff; NAS 8 p.377.a.1ff; AKB 2.2 a-b p.39.7ff; NAS 9 p.378.a.12ff; MVB 9 p.44.b.3ff.

38. AKB 1.23 a.p.15.25ff; AKV p.50.26ff; NAS 3 p.345.c.12; MVB 9 p.44.b.11ff.

39. It is important to note that this ability to apprehend all factors is restricted. Mental perceptual consciousness may not apprehend itself, thought concomitants that are associated with it, and those factors that are its co-present causes (*sahabūhetu*). These factors may only be apprehended by a subsequent moment of mental perceptual consciousness. See MVB 13 p.65.b.3ff, 71 p.370.c.9ff; NAS 7 p.370.b.22. For these restrictions on knowledge see the discussion of the process by which one knows all factors as non-self: MVB 9 p.42.c.9ff; AKB 7.18 c-d p.404.22ff; AKV p.630.31ff; NAS 74 p.742.a.27ff. TS 15 #191 p.364.a.4ff.

40. NAS 4 p.350.c.20ff, 4 p.351.a.23–29; MVB 21 p.109.b.25. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 58 p.666.a.7ff) identifies entities that exist conventionally (*saṃvṛtisat*) as composite entities (*ho-ho*). There are two such types of composites: 1) those like a jar that can be broken into finer pieces by another object with the result that the conventionally existing jar is destroyed, and 2) those like water that retain their original conventional nature even when divided into smaller amounts; this kind of conventionally existing entity can, nevertheless, be analyzed by insight (*prajñā*), which resolves it into its constituent factors. When these two types of composite entities are thus broken or analyzed, the cognition of their composite nature no longer arises. However, these composite entities are still said to exist conventionally because they have provisional existence as designated by worldly or conventional names. See AKB 6.4 a-d p.333.23ff; AKV p.524.8ff; P'u-kuang 22 p.337.b.13; Fa-pao 22 p.728.a.4. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'abhidharma: les deux, les quatre, les trois vérités," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, Vol. 5, (1936–1937), pp.169ff.

41. MVB 13 p.61.c.10–11. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 13 p.61.c.16ff) responds that this position is not reasonable. If, for example, in the case of

visual perception, the collocation had the power of sight, it should see at all times, since there is no time when these three are not assembled. The exact referent of this collocation as used in the Dārśāntika view is unclear (perhaps, the sense organ, perceptual consciousness, and the object-field, or all requisite conditions), but the purpose of the Dārśāntika position is to refuse to designate an isolated factor as having prominent causal capability in perception. See ADV p.31.6ff.

42. NAS 7 p.367.b.24ff. The *Abhidharmaśabhaṣya* attributes this theory to the Sautrāntikas (AKB 1.42 c-d p.31.12ff; AKV p.82.27ff). See also ADV #44 p.33.7ff.

43. See NAS 25 p.484.b.19ff where the Dārśāntika master, Śrīlāta rejects the Sarvāstivādin thesis that perceptual consciousness is defined according to its unique function of being aware (*vijānāti*). His intention is to deny that perceptual consciousness exists as an agent, or as a distinct factor having its own unique activity.

44. See NAS 26 p.486.c.18ff.

45. AKB p.473.25ff. *yat tarhi vijñānam vijānāti 'ti sūtra uktam kim tatra vijñānam karoti / na kiṃcīt karoti / yathā tu kāryam kāraṇam anuvidhīyata ity ucyate / sādrśyena 'tmalābhād akurvad api kiṃcīt / evam vijñānam api vijānāti 'ty ucyate / sādrśyena 'tmalābhād akurvad api kiṃcīt / kim punar asya sādrśyam / tadākāratā / ata eva tad indriyād apy utpannam viṣayam vijānāti 'ty ucyate ne 'ndriyam / athavā tathā 'trā 'pi vijñānasamṛtānasya vijñāne kāraṇabhāvād vijñānam vijānāti 'ti vacanān nirdoṣāṇ kāraṇe kartṛśabdānirdeśāt. AKV p.712.31ff. See also P'u-kuang 30 p.448.b.19ff; Fa-pao 30 p.810.a.1ff.*

46. NAS 7 p.367.c.1ff.

47. AKB 3.32 b.p.145.5ff; AKV p.306.27ff. Vasubandhu does not identify this argument as that of the Dārśāntikas, but such identification is justified from references in the *Nyāyānusāra*. P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 10 p. 176.c.4–6) and Fa-pao (Fa-pao 10 p.608.a.15–16) attribute this view to the Sautrāntikas.

48. NAS 10 p.385.b.15ff; AKB 3.32 p.145.20ff; AKV p.307.17ff. See also NAS 10 p.386.b.16ff; 29 p.504.a.29ff. The context for the discussion of this process model of perception is Śrīlāta's acceptance of only three thought concomitants—feelings (*vedanā*), concepts (*samjnā*), and volition (*cetanā*)—rather than the ten thought concomitants (*mahābhūmikadharma*), which are claimed by the Sarvāstivādins to be associated with each moment of thought. See NAS 10 p.384.b.12ff.

49. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 197 p.984.a.1–3) accepts two types of collocation: 1) that among simultaneous factors; and 2) that among factors that act together to produce a single effect. In the case of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness function as a collocation in both ways. However, because mental perceptual consciousness, the mental organ, and the object-field are not simultaneous, they function as a collocation only in the second way, that is as producing a single effect. See also AKB 3.30 b p.143.2ff. The Sarvāstivādins claim that this second type of collocation holds only if the existence of past and future factors is accepted. Since the Dārśāntikas reject the existence of past and future factors, they cannot appeal to a collocation

of causes over time—the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness—in explaining the process of perception. See NAS 10 p.384.c.1ff, 15 p.421.a.12ff.

50. AKB 2.34 b-d p.62.3ff; NAS 11 p.394.c.22ff; MVB 16 p.80.c.16–17.

51. The Dārśāntikas are characterized as rejecting both the distinction between thought and thought concomitants, and the claim that various mental functions arise simultaneously. See MVB 16 p. 79.c.7ff, 52 p.270.a.10ff, 90 p.463.a.20ff, 95 p.493.c.24ff; NAS 11 p.395.a.1ff; Saeki, op. cit., Vol. 1 p. 25. See also TS 5 #60 p. 274.c.19–67 p.278.b.4. For example, Buddhadēva (MVB 2 p.8.c.7–9; 127 p.661.c.17ff; ADV #116 p.76.7ff) identifies the thought concomitants as varieties of thought, and provisionally recognizes three such varieties: feelings, concepts, and volition. For Buddhadēva as a Dārśāntika master see Shizutani, op. cit., p. 140ff. There is, however, some variety in the Dārśāntika position. For example, The Dārśāntika master Śrīlāta (AKB 3.32 p.145.20ff; AKV p.307.17ff; NAS 10 p.384.b.12ff) accepts the three—feelings, concepts, and volition—as thought concomitants, but maintains that these three do not occur simultaneously. See also AKB 3.32 p.146.14ff; AKV p.309.20ff; NAS 10 p.385.b.15ff, 11 p.390.c.20ff, 29 p.503.b.11ff, 29 p.504.a.29ff, 29 p.504.b.15ff. See also Junshō Katō, "Kyōryōbu Shurirāta (III)," *Buzan kyōgaku taikai kiyō*, Vol. 6, (1978), pp. 109–135.

52. According to the Sarvāstivādins and Dārśāntikas, two instances of thought (*citta*) or perceptual consciousness (*vijñāna*) cannot occur simultaneously. See VK 1 p.531.b.6ff, *passim*. NAS 17 p.435.b.8ff, 19 p.443.b.9ff—p.447.a.22ff; MVB 10 p.47.b.1—p.50.a.19, 140 p.720.a.10ff.

53. NAS 8 p.374.b.12ff.

54. NAS 10 p. 384.c.2ff, 15 p.420.c.18ff, 19 p.447.b.16ff.

55. NAS 15 p. 421.c.5ff.

56. NAS 8 p.374.c.2ff; ADV #77 c-d p.47.13ff. "For the Dārśāntikas, nothing is directly perceived. This is due to the fact that the five groups of perceptual consciousness have past object-fields; indeed, when the eye and visual material form are found, perceptual consciousness does not exist, and when perceptual consciousness exists, the eye and visual material form do not exist. Further, this is due to the fact that the apprehension of their own object is impossible given the absence of the continuation [of the object] in the moment of perceptual consciousness." *dārśāntikasya hi sarvam apratyakṣam / pañcānām vijñānakāyānām atītavिसयात्वाद yadā khalu caksürūpe vidyete tadā vijñānam asat / yadā vijñānam sac caksürūpe tadā 'satī vijñānakṣaṇasthityabhāve svārtha-palabdhyanupapatteś ca.*

57. *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* T28.1548 9 p.590.a.7–8, p. 593.c.16–18. For the possibility of states of concentration without an existent object-field see also *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* T28.1548 28 p.701.c.10, 30 p.717.a.29-b.2. Though there is some agreement that the *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* represents the view of the Dharmaguptaka school, the dating of the text is, as yet, disputed. See André Bareau, "Les origines du *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*," *Le Muséon* 63 (1950 #1,2), pp. 69–95; Yamada, op.cit., pp. 79–80; Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien, IV (Fortsetzung)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Archiv für Indische Philosophie*, Bd. 16, (1972), pp. 133–152; Kimura, op.

cit. pp. 140–160, especially pp. 155–160; Kōgen Mizuno, “Sharikotsuabidon-ron ni tsuite,” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku ronshū, Kanakura Hakushi koki kinen*, (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1966), pp. 109–134.

58. VK 1 p.531.a.26ff. See also *Śāriputrābhīdharmaśāstra* T28.1548 9 p.594.c.7ff. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, “La controverse du temps et du pudgala dans le *Vijñānakāya*,” *Études Asiatiques*, publiées à l’occasion du vingt-cinquième anniversaire de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, (Paris: Publications de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1925), pp. 343–376.

59. For the possible identity of this Maudgalyāyana as the acknowledged patriarch of the Dharmaguptaka school see Vasumitra’s *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* T49.2031 p.15.b.16–17; T49.2032 p.18.a.29ff; T49.2033 p.20.b.15–17; Baiyū Watanabe, tr., *Abidatsumashikishinsokuron*, in *Kokuyaku issaikyō, Indo senjutsu, Bidonbu*, Vol. 4, (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1931), p. 12 note #22; Shizutani, op.cit., pp. 173–181.

60. For the attribution of this view to the Dharmaguptaka school, see *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* T49.2031 p.16.c.26–27; T49.2032 p.19.b.12–13; T49.2033 p.22.a.16–17. Compare the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 76 p.393.a.18ff), which cites the following contested view: “Further, there are fools who, with regard to the intrinsic nature of [factors in] the three time periods, deny as nonexistent [those of the] past and future and maintain that [those of the] present are unconditioned.” See also MVB 13 p.65.b.26–27, 37 p.190.a.10–11.

61. VK 1 p.535.a.8ff.

62. MVB 105 p.554.c.15–17, 136 p.704.a.7–9, 146 p.747.b.15–17, 195 p.975.a.3–5, 197 p.983.a.23–25. AVB 55 p.393.b.10–12.

63. MVB 16 p.79.a.19–21, 55 p.283.a.22–24, 131 p.680.b.26–27, 136 p.702.b.13–15. See also AVB 30 p.218.c.14ff.

64. MVB 44 p.228.b.20ff. See also MVB 108 p.558.a.7ff.

65. MVB 8 p.36.a.16ff. See also Johannes Rahder, “La satkāyadṛṣṭi d’après Vibhāṣā, 8,” *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, Vol. 1, (1931–1932), pp. 227–239.

66. MVB 75 p.390.c.34ff. See also AVB 6 p.455.c.8ff.

67. MVB 37 p.193.b.2ff.

68. MVB 135 p.696.b.24ff, 44 p.228.b.22ff.

69. MVB 195 p.975.a.2ff.

70. MVB 9 p.42.a.20ff.

71. See also the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* T25.1509 26 p.255.a.15ff. A text that does not include the need for an existent object-support among the reasons for the existence of past and future factors is the *Samyuktābhīdharmaḥṛdayaśāstra* T28.1552 11 p.963.b.2ff. This reason is also omitted from the two most recent translations of the Vibhāṣā commentary (MVB 76 p.393.a.9ff; AVB 40 p.293.c.18ff), but is found in the oldest translation (VB 7 p.464.b.26ff).

72. TS 2 #21 p.255.b.12ff.

73. See also TS 15 #191 p.364.a.7ff.

74. AKB 5.25 p.295.8ff; AKV p.468.28ff.

75. AKB 5.25 b.p.295.16 *dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyo 'tpāda ity uktam*. See SN 35.93 *Dutiyadvayasutta* Vol. 4 p. 67; SA 8 #214 p.54.a.22ff. See also SN 12.43–45 Vol. 2 pp. 72–75; ADV #306 a—b p.269.2ff.

76. TS 2 #19 p.253.c.27ff.
77. NAS 50 p.621.c.14ff.
78. NAS 50 p.621.c.20–21. See also NAS 17 p.430.a.10–11, 20 p.450.c.24–25. For the necessity of an object-field in the arising of *prajñā* see NAS 17 p.432.a.7ff.
79. ADV #304 a p.262.1. *buddhyā yasye 'kṣaye cihnam . . .*
80. ADV #304 p.262.3ff. *yasya khalv arthavastunāḥ svabhāvasiddha-svarūpasyā 'viparītakārayā dharmopalakṣanayā paricchinnam lakṣanam upalakṣyate tatsadravyam ity ucyate.* See also ADV #305 c-d p.264.2. “Those [past and future factors] have existence like present [factors] due to their nature as the range of thought and name.” *dhīnāmagocaratvāc ca tat sattvaṁ vartamānavat.* See also ADV #305 p.268.22–24. “That object whose particular and common characteristic is determined by cognition having the aspect of that [object], and which is referred to by the group of names and group of factors declared by the Buddha, that exists from the absolute standpoint.” *tadākārayā khalu buddhyā yasyā 'rthasya svāmānyalakṣanam paricchidyate yaś ca buddho-ktanāmakāyadharma-kāyābhyaṁ abhidhyotyate sa paramārthato vidyate.*
81. NAS 50 p.621.c.21ff. See also NAS 15 p.421.b.28ff, 19 p.447.c.23ff. Unlike existence, absolute nonexistence cannot be classified according to types because it lacks any particular characteristic by which it can be distinguished, and thereby compared or contrasted. See NAS 17 p.431.c.8ff.
82. The *Abhidharmadīpa* (ADV #304 p.262.2ff) adds two types of existence to those mentioned by Saṅghabhadra: 1) existence through both (*dvaya, ubhayathā*), referring to entities that can be understood as either real or provisional depending upon the context; for example, earth (*prthivī*), when understood as one of the four fundamental elements (*mahābhūta*), exists in an absolute sense, and when understood as ordinary dirt, exists only in a conventional sense; 2) relative existence (*sattvāpeksā*), which refers to such correlative states as father/son, teacher/student, or agent/action. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 9 p.42.a.24ff) includes three different classifications of types of existence. The first includes two types: 1) existence as a real entity (*dravya*), such as the aggregates (*shandha*), or elements (*dhātu*), and 2) existence as a provisional entity (*prajñapti*), such as male or female. The second classification includes three types: 1) relative existence (*hsiang-tai, apeksā ?*), as when something exists relative to one thing and not relative to another; 2) existence as a composite (*ho-ho, sāmagrī ?*) as when something exists in one place and not in another; and 3) existence in accord with temporal state (*shih-fen, avasthā ?*), as when something exists at one time and not at another. The third classification includes five types: 1) nominal existence (*nāma*), such as hair on a tortoise, the horn of a hare, and so on; 2) existence as a real entity (*dravya*), such as all factors (*dharma*), each of which is defined by intrinsic nature; 3) existence as a provisional entity (*prajñapti*), such as a pot, cloth, a chariot, and so on; 4) existence as a composite (*ho-ho, sāmagrī ?*), such as the personality (*pudgala*), which is a provisional designation based on a collocation of the aggregates; and 5) relative existence (*hsiang-tai, apeksā ?*), such as this and that shore, or long and short.
83. NAS 52 p.636.a.22–24.

84. See NAS 50 p.624.c.6ff. Saṅghabhadra uses this point to suggest that past and future factors cannot be said to exist only provisionally. If this were the case, they would lack a real basis and could not produce cognition. See ADV #303 p.261.10ff.

85. NAS 50 p.622.a.16ff. See TS 2 #19 p.254.a.3ff: "Knowledge also operates with regard to a nonexistent range." See also ADV #305 p.268.27. "[What] if there were cognition even having a nonexistent object-support?" *asad ālambanā 'pi buddhir astī 'ti cet.*

86. TS 2 #19 p.254.a.4ff; NAS 50 p.622.a.19ff; ADV #306 c-d p.271.3ff. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and *Nyāyānusāra*, these examples are attributed to the Dārśāntikas. I have grouped the various examples in similar categories for clarity of exposition. For discussion of these examples see Yukio Sakamoto, *Abidatsuma no kenkyū*, Sakamoto Yukio ronbunshū, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1981), pp. 135–156; Shingyō Yoshimoto, *Abidaruma shisō*, (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1982), pp. 146–156; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'abhidharma: la controverse du temps," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, Vol. 5, (1936–1937), pp. 25–128.

87. NAS 50 p.623.c.18ff. See TS 2 #19 p.254.b.8ff.

88. NAS 50 p.623.b.8ff.

89. See also MVB 8 p.36.a.21–25; AKB 6.58 b p.374.26ff; AKV p.587.18ff. For an extensive discussion of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* see MVB 49 p.255.a.21ff; AKB 5.7 p.281.19ff; NAS 47 p.605.c.29ff.

90. NAS 50 p.623.b.17ff. See also MVB 8 p.36.a.21ff.

91. NAS 50 p.623.b.19. See also NAS 4 p.351.b.19ff.

92. The meaning of the term *ākāra* and the sense in which all thought and thought concomitants are said to have *ākāra* became a controversial issue for the Sarvāstivāda and Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika schools with significant implications for later Buddhist epistemological theory. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vai-bhāṣikas and Saṅghabhadra, *ākāra* means the discriminative function of insight. Thought and thought concomitants are also said to have an aspect (*sākāra*), but only by extension from association with insight, or in the sense that they perform their own activity in apprehending the object-support. This interpretation stands in sharp contrast to Vasubandhu's concept of *ākāra* as thought and thought concomitants taking shape or taking on an aspect consistent with the type or character of the object-support. Contrast AKB 2.34 c-d p.62.6; AKV p.141.29ff; to NAS 11 p.394.c.25–26; *Samayapradipika* T29.1563 6 p.803.a.17–18; ADV #482 p.376.3–4. See also NAS 74 p.741.a.21ff; P'u-kuang 1 *mo* p.26.b.26ff, 4 p.83.b.26ff, 26 p.394.a.21ff; Fa-pao 4 p.534.c.4ff, 26 p.770.b.2ff; Saeki, op. cit., Vol. 3, p.1101ff.

93. MVB 7 p.409.a.10–11; NAS 74 p.741.b.12ff. For the definition of *ākara* as insight see AKB 7.13 b p.401.18ff; NAS 74 p.741.a.19ff; ADV #482 c-d p.375.16ff.

94. MVB 126 p.658.b.27ff. For a discussion of the difference between error (*luan-tao*, *vibhrama*, *bhrānti*?) and mistaken views (*tien-tao*, *viparyāsa*), and their relation to defilements and conceptual thought (*vikalpa*) see MVB 166 p.841.b.2ff; NAS 47 p.608.c.17ff. For a discussion of the relation between the production of defilements and conceptual thought see MVB 61 p.315.b.6ff.

For a discussion of the character of insight when associated with mental perceptual consciousness as distinguished from that associated with the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness see MVB 95 p.490.c.4ff.

95. AKB 6.9 p.337.8—6.13 p.341.6; NAS 59 p.671.a.1—60 p.674.a.24; AKB 8.29 p.452.4—8.36 p.458.10; NAS 79 p.768.c.20—80 p.774.c.5: MVB 81 p.420.b.8—85 p.442.b.14. See also *Kathāvathu*, op. cit., 5.3 pp. 305—307.

96. For a discussion of *adhimuktimanashāra* as one of three types of attention see AKB 2.72 d p.108.11ff; AKV p.246.32ff; NAS 20 p.454.c.14ff; MVB 82 p.422.c.27. For the various meanings of the term “*adhimukti*” see Hajime Sakurabe “Shōge ‘adhimukti’ ni tsuite,” in *Bukkyō go no kenkyū*. (Kyoto: Buneidō, 1975), pp. 34—39.

97. MVB 85 p.440.b.11ff, p.441.a.25ff.

98. NAS 50 p.622.a.19; TS 2 #19 p.254.a.4.

99. NAS 50 p.623.b.23ff. The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (TS 2 #19 p.254.a.27ff) cites another explanation: since the quality or nature of the color blue exists even in things that are not perceived as blue, this blue nature in all things can serve as the object-field for the cognition of total and exclusive blueness.

100. MVB 37 p.193.b.4ff; TS 2 #19 p.254.a.7—8, p.254.c.25ff.

101. See MVB 37 p.193.b.23ff; AVB 28 p.145.c.11ff; NAS 50 p.623.c.9ff.

102. NAS 3 p.346.a.17ff.

103. NAS 50 p.623.c.13ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 38 p.194.a.28ff) presents several opinions as to whether or not all dream images must be the result of past experience. Though no explicit judgment is offered, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* clearly favors the opinion that all dream images result from object-supports that have been experienced. See also NAS 3 p.346.a.17ff.

104. MVB 37 p.193.c.24ff.

105. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 37 p.194.b.27ff) explains that in the case of oneiromancy, one knows future events in a dream through inference; one infers that a certain event will occur in the future on the basis of an experienced cause and effect relation between the past and present.

106. The causes for dreams offered by Saṅghabhadra (NAS 50 p.623.c.9ff) and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (TS 2 #19 p.254.b.13ff) are generally consistent with those in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* with a few exceptions: both Saṅghabhadra and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* omit dream images based on future events, and the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* adds past actions (*karma*) as a possible cause.

107. MVB 75 p.390.c.3ff. See also VB 6 p.455.c.8ff.

108. NAS 23 p.470.a.6—474.a.5; AKB 3.11 c-d p.120.20ff; AKV p.267.29ff. In this section, an opponent offers the example of a reflected image to disprove the existence of the intermediate state (*antarābhava*) between death and rebirth. That is to say, just as there is an interruption between the reflected image and the original object, so there is an interruption between death and rebirth and no intermediate state is required. Vasubandhu claims that since the reflected image does not exist, it should not be compared to the aggregates at rebirth. Saṅghabhadra, on the other hand, argues strongly in defense of the existence of the reflected image, and claims that there is a connection between the reflected image and the original object.

109. NAS 23 p.473.a.8ff.
110. NAS 23 p.471.b.12ff.
111. NAS 23 p.472.a.22; AKB 3.12 a p.121.5–6. *ato nā 'sty eva tat kiṃcit / sāmagryāś tu sa tasyāś tādrśah prabhāvo yat tathā darśanam bhavati*. See also AKV p.269.16ff.
112. NAS 23 p.472.b.23ff.
113. MVB 135 p.696.b.24ff. For a discussion of the arising of magical creations from the supernormal power that actualizes the knowledge of objects produced by magical power (*rddhivisaye jñānasāksāt̄kriyā abhijñā*) see AKB 7.42 p.421.6ff; NAS 76 p.752.c.17ff. (especially AKB 7.44 d p.423.5–6; NAS 76 p.753.c.15–17; AKB 7.48 p.425.5–7.53 p.429.3; NAS 76 p.754.b.29–76 p.755.c.2).
114. NAS 50 p.623.b.27ff.
115. NAS 50 p.623.c.28ff; ADV #306 c-d p.271.1ff.
116. NAS 50 p.622.a.24–25; AKB 5.27 c p.300.18–21; SA 26 #703 p.189.a.22ff.
117. NAS 50 p.623.c.29-p.624.a.8.
118. Saṅghabhadra clearly distinguishes the sound of speech, which is material form, from name (*nāma*), which is classified as an independent conditioned factor dissociated from both thought and material form (*cittaviprayuktaśākāra*). The specification here would be synonymous with name. See NAS 14 p.413.a.17ff; p.413.b.16ff; p.414.a.16ff; p.414.a.29ff; p.414.b.22ff; p.414.b.22ff.
119. NAS 50 p.624.a.8ff.
120. Though Saṅghabhadra does not identify these two types of negations, they appear to correspond to the implicative or exclusionary negation (*paryudāsapratīṣedha*) and simple or prohibitive negation (*prasajyapratīṣedha*), which were used extensively in Indian grammatical, ritualistic and philosophical texts. See George Cardona, “Negations in Pāṇinian Rules,” *Language*, Vol. 43, (1967–1), pp. 34–56; J.F. Staal, “Negation and the Law of Contradiction: A Comparative Study,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 25, (1962–1), pp. 52–71. For references in later Buddhist texts see Yūichi Kajiyama, “Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, Bd. 17, (1973), pp. 181–175.
121. NAS 50 p. 624.a.18ff.
122. Saṅghabhadra here uses the argument that expressions can lack a specified object because otherwise there would be no worldly speech that lacks meaning. Saṅghabhadra then cites another opinion that all expressions must have a specified object because these expressions are specifications. In the case of expressions such as “nonexistence” or “thirteenth sense sphere” the specified object would be the name or concept and not some objective “nonexistence” or “thirteenth sense sphere.” See also AKB 5.27 c p.300.7ff; AKV p.475.11ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 15 p. 72.c.2–5) similarly explains that all names are able to manifest meaning and that even names such as the “thirteenth sense sphere” manifest the concept, “thirteenth sense sphere.”
123. The terms *hetusamutthāna* and *tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna* are used to explain

the immediate causes by which manifest verbal or corporeal action (*vijñap-tirūpa*) arises. See AKB 4.10 p.203.13ff; AKV p.364.17ff; NAS 36 p.547.a.2ff; MVB 117 p.610.a.5ff.

124. TS 15 #191 p.364.b.9–10.

125. ADV #306 c-d p.271.16–17. “If one claimed that there is cognition having a nonexistent object-support due to the existence [of a cognition] whose object-field of cognition is the denial of the thirteenth sense sphere, [we would reply] no, because it has been demonstrated by the Lord that this [cognition] is merely based upon speech.” *trayodaśāyatana-pratiṣedhabuddhi-viśaya* astitvād asadālambanā buddhir astī ‘ti cet / na / Bhagavatai ‘va vāgvastumātram etad iti nirṇitatvāt. In the *Abhidharmakośabhäsyā*, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāskaras respond to a similar objection claiming that the name (*nāma*), “thirteenth sense sphere,” serves as the object-support of one’s cognition of the denial of the thirteenth sense sphere. AKB 5.27 c p.300.8–9 “Then what is the object-support of the perceptual consciousness of the statement, “there is no thirteenth sense sphere?” That has only name as its object-support.” *atha trayodaśam āyatanaṁ nā stūtyasya vijñānasya kim ālambanam / etad eva nāmālambanam*. See also AKV p.475.14ff. Since the Sarvāstivādins claim that names exist as real entities, classified as factors dissociated from thought and material form, names can serve as the existent object-support for the arising of cognition.

126. ADV #306 c-d p.271.1–15, p.272.3–15.

127. ADV #306 c-d p.272.13–15. *tasmān naño na govīṣāñādiḥnā ‘pi śāśa-viśāñādiḥ pratiṣidhyate / kiṃ tarhi / śāśākāśadhatuṣam-bandha-buddhyapekṣena govīṣāñādi-dravyāṣam-bandha-buddhaya ‘vadyotyante.*

128. NAS 50 p.624.b.4ff. See also AKB 5.27 c p.300.9ff; AKV p.475.17ff.

129. NAS 17 p.431.b.12ff; AKB 2.55 d p.93.7ff. See also Louis de la Vallée Poussin, “Documents d’abhidharma: textes relatifs au *nirvāna* et aux *asamṛ̥ktas* en général, II” *Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient*, Vol. 30, (1930), pp.277ff. In this section, Vasubandhu cites the Sautrāntika opinion that the unconditioned factors (*asamṛ̥ktadharma*)—space (*ākāśa*), cessation through application (*pratisamkhyānirodha*), and cessation not through application (*apratisamkhyānirodha*)—do not exist as real entities, but rather are mere absences (*abhāva*). (AKB 2.55 d p.92.4) Nevertheless, the Sautrāntikas assert that unconditioned factors can be said to exist in the same way in which it can be said that there is the prior or subsequent nonexistence of sound. However, this mere statement that they exist does not mean that absences (*abhāva*) themselves exist as entities (*bhāva*).

130. NAS 50 p.624.b.22ff.

131. AKB 5.27 d p.300.10ff.

132. Saṅghabhadra distinguishes absolute nonexistence, like the horn of a hare, from the nonexistence of that which has not yet been produced (i.e., a future factor), or has already passed away (i.e., a past factor). These last two are nonexistent only in the sense that they lack activity. Even though they do exist as entities having intrinsic nature, they are recognized to be nonexistent in comparison to the present, which is characterized by both activity and intrinsic nature. NAS 15 p.419.c.5ff.

133. MVB 12 p.55.c.29ff; AVB 6 p.42.b.16ff. For a discussion of how

recollection occurs without a personality (*pudgala*) or a continuous substratum see MVB 11 p.55.a.16—12 p.58.c.18.

134. MVB 12 p.57.c.24—26.

135. AKB 2.24 p.54.22—23. *smṛtir ālambanāsampramosah*. Whereas Paramārtha's translation (PAKB 3 p.178.b.14—15) corresponds to this definition of *smṛti*, Hsüan-tsang (HTAKB 4 p. 19.a.20—21) in his translation adds *ming-chi* (*abhilapana*), or notation, possibly under the influence of Saṅghabhadra's explanation. Yaśomitra (AKV p.127.32ff) comments: "Mindfulness is that by connection with which the mind does not forget the object-support, and, as it were, notes that [object-support]." *yadyogād ālambanam na mano vismarati tac cā 'bhilapati 'va sā smṛtih.*

136. NAS 10 p.384.b.7—8. See also ADV #112 p.69.6—7 "Mindfulness has as its form the functioning of thought. It is the notation of the object of thought and has the characteristic of not losing action that has been, will be, or is being performed." *cittavyāpārarūpā smṛtih / cittasyā 'rthābhilapanā krtakartavyakriyamānakarmāntāvipramosalakṣaṇā*. Compare *Abhidharmāvatārasāstra* T28.1554 *shang* p.982.a.18—19. See also ADV #446 p.360.14—16. For definitions of *smṛti* in terms of *abhilapana* in the early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts see *Dharmaskandha* T26.1537 7 p.485.a.7; *Dhātukāya* T26.1540 (*shang*) p.614.c.20ff; *Saṅgitiparyāya* T26.1536 16 p.433.b.6ff, 17 p.437.a.13ff; *Pra-karaṇapāda* T26.1541 2 p.699.c.17ff.

137. NAS 10 p.389.b.12ff.

138. This statement is also significant because it indicates that for the Sarvāstivādins, mindfulness as notation (*abhilapana*) operates not only in moments of mental perceptual consciousness, but also in all moments of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness. However, since mindfulness associated with the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness is weak, it is not considered to be conceptual thought through recollection (*anusmarañavikalpa*). (NAS 4 p.350.b.17ff). This view is to be contrasted with that of Yaśomitra (AKV p.65.10—11) who claims that mindfulness does not operate as notation in moments of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness: "Because mindfulness associated with the five types of perceptual consciousness does not operate through the notation of the experienced object, it is not considered to be conceptual thought through recollection." *pañcavijñānākāyasaṃprayuktā tu nā 'nubhūtarthābhilāṣa*(read *abhilāpa*) *pravṛte 'ti nā 'nusmarañavikalpa itī 'syate.*

139. See P'u-kuang 4 p.74.b.21ff; Fa-pao 4 p.527.c.13ff.

140. MVB 11 p.51.b.14ff. Here the *Mahāvibhāṣā* examines the problem of how the Buddha knows the sequence in which future factors arise, since they, as yet, lack sequence and are disordered. (*vyaṅkula*). Compare MVB 179 p.897.b.24ff; AKB 2.62 a-b p.98.29ff; AKV p.233.30ff; NAS 19 p.444.b.9ff; P'u-kuang 7 p.135.a.8ff.

141. Though the particular *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* is not identified in this passage in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, it can only refer to possession (*prāpti*). For *prāpti* described as *cihna* see Yaśomitra (AKV p.148.22—23) who quotes Saṅghabhadra (NAS 12 p.397.b.4—6): "Possession is the indicative mark of the knowledge that 'this belongs to that,' and is the cause of the non-disappear-

ance of factors that have been obtained.” *idam asye 'ti jñānacihnam pratilabhadharmāvīpranāśakāraṇam ca prāptir ity ācāryasāṅghabhadraḥ*.

142. MVB 178 p.895.a.26–179 p.898.a.12. See also MVB 76 p.395.b.29ff; AVB 40 p.295.c.1ff; VB 7 p.466.a.14–15; AKB 7.37 a-b p.417.19ff; AKV p.651.28ff; NAS 75 p.750.b.18. For the various interpretations of the term *pranidhijñāna* see MVB 178 p.896.a.13ff. Two of the Buddha’s powers are also significant here: the power of the knowledge of previous birthstates (*pūrvanivāsaññābala*), which knows past factors, and the power of the knowledge of death and rebirth (*cyutupapattiññābala*), which knows future factors. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 100 p.517.a.3ff) discusses the complex issue of these powers, contrasting them with the supernormal power that actualizes the knowledge of the recollection of previous birthstates (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛtiññānasākṣatkārābhijñā*) and the supernormal power that actualizes the knowledge of death and rebirth (*cyutupapādajñānasākṣatkārābhijñā*). See also AKB 7.29 c p.412.4ff; NAS 75 p.746.a.18ff; AKB 7.42 p.421.6ff; NAS p.752.c.17ff.

143. NAS 51 p.628.b.8ff.

144. TS 15 #191 p.364.a.13ff.

145. AKB 5.27 c p.299.20ff; AKV p.474.9ff; NAS 51 p.627.c.19ff.

146. For a discussion of whether or not unconditioned factors (*asamkṛtadharma*) may serve as causes, and if so, as what type of cause see AKB 2.55 d p.91.18ff; AKV p.218.18ff; NAS 17 p.429.a.3ff.

147. NAS 19 p.447.b.29-p.447.c.9.

148. For various interpretations of the general definition of causal relation—“when this exists, that exists; from the production of this, that is produced” (*asmin sati 'dam bhavati asyo 'tpādād idam utpadyate*)—see AKB 3.28 a-b p.138.28ff; NAS 15 p.419.a.7ff, 25 p.482.a.ff; AKV p.297.9ff. For Śrīlāṭa’s interpretation of the nature of this causal relation see NAS 15 p.419.a.7ff.

149. NAS 51 p.628.c.3ff.

150. NAS 51 p.628.c.6–8.

151. NAS 51 p.628.a.4ff. See also Fa-pao 7 p.578.b.2ff.

152. NAS 19 p.447.c.9ff; 51 p.628.c.27ff.

153. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 19 p.448.a.8ff) also criticizes Śrīlāṭa’s theory of the secondary or subsidiary element (*sui-chieh* = *anudhātu* ?, or *chiu-sui-chieh* = *pūrvānudhātu* ?), which Śrīlāṭa uses to account for all types of causal relations. Saṅghabhadra identifies this secondary element with the seeds (*bija*) proposed by Vasubandhu. Since both the secondary element and seeds function causally only through a successive relation within the psycho-physical series, their proper operation requires the existence of past and future factors. Since neither Śrīlāṭa nor Vasubandhu admits the existence of past and future factors, their models are, in Saṅghabhadra’s opinion, untenable. See NAS 18 p.440.b.3ff.

154. AKB 5.27 c p.300.16–17. ...*sarvabuddhīnām sadālambanavte kuto 'syā vimarśāḥ syāt...* NAS 50 p.622.c.13ff. Yaśomitra (AKV p.476.7–10) glosses *vimarśa* with investigation (*vicāra*), or doubt, (*saṃdeha*). He comments: “When there are existent and nonexistent object-supports of cognition, this deliberative reflection is possible; not otherwise.” *sadasadālambane tu buddhīnām ayam vimarśāḥ sambhavati nā 'nyathā*.

155. AKB 5.27 c p.299.24ff; AKV p.474.15ff; NAS 51 p.628.a.27ff.
 156. NAS 51 p.628.b.11ff.

Chinese Terms

Chüeh-hui-hsien-liang 覺慧現量

Chiu-sui-chieh 舊隨界

Ho-chi 和集

Ho-ho 和合

Hsiang-tai 相待

I-ken-hsien-liang 依根現量

Ling-na-hsien-liang 領納現量

Luan-tao 亂倒

Ming-chi 明記

Tien-tao 賦倒

Tsung 總

Shih-fen 時分

Sui-chieh 隨界

a. 姮羌

b. 依

c. 依果

d. 黃文弼

e. 新疆考古報告