

Indian Altruism: A Study of the Terms *bodhicitta* and *cittotpāda*

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The highest form of altruism in scholastic Mahāyāna Buddhism is conveyed by the term *cittotpāda* ("mind-production, lifting up the heart").¹ In an earlier paper² I dealt with the place of this altruism in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (=AA) and its commentaries. In those texts *cittotpāda* enjoys pride of place as entrance into the Mahāyāna, the first of seventy topics (Tib. *don bdun bcu*) under which the concealed meaning (Tib. *sbas don*) of the *Prajñā-pāramitā* (=PP) *sūtras* is discussed. In this paper I shall attempt to identify the PP *sūtra* from which the *cittotpāda* doctrine originates and show how it differs, in its origins, from *bodhicitta*.

Identification of the Original-Passage

The most important PP *sūtra* we possess is the [*Ārya*]-*jaṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā* (=A). As Conze remarks, it, or a now-lost precursor, was the first PP *sūtra*. The later Indian and Tibetan PP tradition, based on Haribhadra's (circa 800) *Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā* (=AAA), traces the origin of the *cittotpāda* doctrine to the opening lines of the AAA in accord with the AA's elaborate schema of understanding. Though helpful for making sense of the different PP *sūtras*, as we shall show, this position is not historically justifiable. The origin of *cittotpāda* is rather to be found in the following passage from a later part of the A (Wogihara's ed. 116.3-118).⁴ For convenience's sake I will refer to this throughout as the Origin-Passage.

[subhūti:] *nāham āyusman śāriputra icchāmi bodhisattvaṃ mahāsattvaṃ duṣkara-cārikāṃ carantaṃ nāpi sa bodhisattvo mahāsattvo yo duṣkara-saṃjñāyā carati. tat kasya hetoḥ? na hy āyusman śāriputra duṣkara-saṃjñāṃ janayitvā śakyo aprameyānāṃ asaṃkhyeyānāṃ sattvānāṃ arthaḥ kartum. api tu sukha-saṃjñāṃ eva kṛtvā sarva-sattvānāṃ antike māṭṛ-saṃjñāṃ, pitṛ-saṃjñāṃ, putra-saṃjñāṃ, duhitṛ-saṃjñāṃ kṛtvā, strī-puruṣeṣv evam etaṃ saṃjñāṃ kṛtvā bodhisattvo mahāsattvo bodhisattva-cārikāṃ carati. tasmān māṭṛ-saṃjñā, pitṛ-saṃjñā, putra-saṃjñā, duhitṛ-saṃjñā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvo-sattvānāṃ antike yāvad ātma-saṃjñotpādayitavyā. yathātmā sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ sarva-duḥkhebhya mocayitavyaḥ evaṃ sarva-sattvāḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ, sarva-duḥkhebhya mocayitavyā iti. evaṃ ca sarva-sattveṣu saṃjñotpādayitavyā. mayaite sarva-sattvā na parityaktavyāḥ. mayaite sarva-sattvāḥ parimocayitavyā aparimānto duḥkha-skandhāt. na ca mayaiteṣu citta-pradoṣa utpādayitavyo 'naśaḥ śataśo 'pi chidyamāneneti. evaṃ hi bodhisattvena mahāsattvena cittam utpādayitavyam. saced evaṃ-citto vihariṣyati na duṣkara-saṃjñā vihariṣyati. punar aparam āyusman śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvenaivaṃ cittam utpādayitavyaṃ yathā sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ sarva-dharmā na saṃvidyante nopalabhyante.*

(I do not look for a *bodhisattva* who goes on the difficult pilgrimage. In any case, one who courses in the perception of difficulties is not a *bodhisattva*. because one who has generated a perception of difficulties is unable to work the weal of countless beings. On the contrary, he forms the notion of ease, he forms the notion that all beings, whether men or women, are his parents and children, and thus he goes on the pilgrimage of a *bodhisattva*. A *bodhisattva* should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self, like this: "As I myself want to be quite free from all sufferings, just so all beings want to be quite free from all

sufferings.” In addition with regard to all beings he should form the notion: “I ought not to desert all these beings. I ought to set them free from the quite measureless heap of sufferings! And I should not produce towards them a thought of hate, even though I might be dismembered a hundred times!” It is thus that a *bodhisattva* should lift up his heart. When he dwells as one whose heart is such, then he will neither course nor dwell as one who perceives difficulties.)

The context for this Origin-Passage is the response to an inquiry (beginning with the phrase [W75] *bodhisattva[sya] mahāsattva[sya] mahāsaṃnaha-saṃnaddha[sya] mahāyāna-saṃprastita[sya] mahāyāna-saṃārūḍh[sya]*...“A *bodhisattva*, a great being, who is armed with the great armor, who has set out in the great vehicle, who has mounted on the great vehicle...” about the use of great in great vehicle and great being. The A’s response develops two lines of thought: a) of *aprameyatva* (“immeasurability”), which is further developed into b) the notion of *samatā* (“self-identity” or “state of being found equally everywhere”). Asked just “how great” (*kiyatā*) is the *bodhisattva*’s armor the Lord says (W87) “A *bodhisattva* thinks: immeasurable and beyond number (*asaṃkhyeya*) are the beings to be liberated by me...and yet there are no beings liberated by anyone... for this is the ultimate reality of things (*dharmatā*), based on the fact that ultimate reality is illusory (*māyā-dharmatām upādāya*)... It is just as if a magician (*māyākāra*) who conjures up a host of creatures then causes them to disappear again.” We are told (W106-7) that a great vehicle holds an infinite number of living beings, just as there is room for an infinite number of living beings in space (*ākāśa*). Such spaciousness is on account of the sameness (*samatā*) of space, i.e., its “self-identity” or “state of being found equally everywhere.” It is on account of this *samatā* that there is no beginning, middle or end and that no vehicle sets out to a beyond. It is also on account of this sameness that none of the constituent aggregates of a *bodhisattva*, indeed, of any *dharma* whatsoever, has a beginning (= *utpāda*) or end (= *nirodha*).’ It is (W111) “as with the self (*ātman*) which does not come forth on account of being

completely beyond limits (*atyantatayābhiniṣṛta*).” Hence duality is not applicable to any *dharma* since every *dharma* is unproduced (W114). At the point that a *bodhisattva* is equated with every other *dharma* in the ultimate, uncreated and self-identical state,⁶ Śāriputra asks the question to which the Origin-Passage is direct answer. His question boils down to: how could this unity, this lack of duality, also be an illusion? How could the universe really be such a nothingness as all that?

There are so many threads of meaning, introduced earlier in the A, woven so intricately together in this Origin-Passage that it is hard to conceive of a later writer interpolating it so skillfully.⁷ The notions of a) immeasurability, b) sameness, c) similarity with self and d) non-duality are all woven together skillfully on the basic fabric of unfindability. Furthermore, Lancaster’s analysis of the earlier and later Chinese translations of the A, dating from 179 to 985, enable a reader to know in general what parts of the A are earlier and later. The entire first *parivarta* (W1-128) is present, in the main, in the earliest versions and there is no definite reason, based on Lancaster’s work, to preclude the entire Origin-Passage from the earliest version. In particular, the presence in the earliest versions of the A of the Origin-Passage is corroborated by the *Ratna-guṇa-samuccaya-gāthā* (=RGS). The presence of lines in the RGS corresponding to a passage in the A strongly suggests the A passage to have been in the original version, even if we do not know, for sure, exactly where the passage was situated,⁸ and there are correspondences between verses of the RGS and the sentiments expressed in the Origin-Passage.

Based on the Origin-Passage, *cittotpāda* was originally an attitude, constructed out of the willful manipulation of ideas or imagination, that welled up within the person⁹ banishing negativism and depression and inspiring further effort. In the earliest formulation of *cittotpāda* this uplifting of the heart was to be caused by thinking about living beings in a certain fashion: (a) imagining them to be relatives and (b) reflecting on the sameness of them and oneself. Such thoughts or ideas were to make bearable the difficult work of a *bodhisattva*. Although altruistic sentiments are clearly identifiable in the Origin-Passage there is no unequivocal altruistic message, in

the sense of an exhortation urging the *bodhisattva* to make work for others his primary motivation.

Bodhicitta and cittotpāda in the original PP sūtra

As mentioned at the outset the first of the AA's seventy topics is *cittotpāda*. In explaining it the AA first mentions its two *ālambana* ("objective supports"): (i) perfect enlightenment (*samyak-saṃbodhi*) and (ii) the needs of others (*parārtha*) and then gives twenty-two examples corresponding to stages on the *bodhisattva*'s path and to the stage of enlightenment. Of the many PP *sūtras*, one, the *Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā* (=Pañca) has sections which correspond exactly to this presentation,¹⁰ though in the Pañca, unlike the AA, the actual term [*bodhi*]-*cittotpāda* does not occur.¹¹

The older PP *sūtras* do not contain a passage which corresponds exactly to the AA's initial presentation of *cittotpāda*. Whereas the Pañca mentions both enlightenment and the great number of living beings, conspicuous by its absence, not only from the A, but also from the *Śata-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā* (=Śata), is any passage which corresponds to others and their needs, i.e., to *parārtha*, the second of the two objective supports for *cittotpāda* spelt out in AA:1.18 *cittotpādaḥ parārthāya samyak saṃbodhi-kāmatā*. At the beginning of the A there is no reference to a great number of living beings at all.¹²

The presence of a specific *parārtha* ("others' needs") objective support passage at the very beginning of the Pañca suggests that this later PP *sūtra* was constructed by a person or persons with the AA's developed notion of path (*mārga*). The difference between the opening lines of the Pañca and earlier PP *sūtras* is best accounted for by modifications introduced into the Pañca based on the basic *cittotpāda* doctrine set forth in the Origin-Passage, under the influence of a systematic understanding of a Mahāyāna path different from a Śrāvaka-yāna.

Although there is no obvious correspondence between the opening lines of the A and the AA's *cittotpāda*, Haribhadra, in his two commentaries on the A (the AAA and AASp) and in his commentary on the RGS¹³ attempts to show that the words of these two earlier *sūtras* also correspond equally to the AA's categories. An indication of just how hard it is to find such correspondences is Haribhadra's statement that he considered his insight that there is, in fact, a correspondence to be divinely inspired.¹⁴ Haribhadra says just the opening line of the A contains the entire meaning of *cittotpāda*.. Packed into it are the two objective supports and twenty-two examples explained in AA 1.18-19. The correspondence must appear forced to any ordinary reader not blessed with Haribhadra's divine insight.¹⁵

Though there is no reference to the needs of others in the opening lines of the A, the corresponding section of the RGS at first sight presents a difficulty because its opening verses refers explicitly to *bodhicitta*.¹⁶ If this *bodhicitta* is the *bodhi-cittotpāda* of later scholasticism the RGS would corroborate the position of the AA that the origin of the *bodhi-cittotpāda* doctrine is to be found in the A's opening lines. It is clear, however, that the *citta* in the *citta bodheḥ* of RGS 7, as well as the *citta* in the entire opening section of the A does not correspond to the *citta* in the *cittotpāda* of the Origin-Passage. The *citta* in these former compounds is not a thought or intention but something more fundamental. The A says of *citta* that it is *a-citta* (absence of mind) because the fundamental nature of *citta* is clear illumination (*prakṛtiś citasya prabhāsvarā*). And it says of this mind, which is an absence of mind, that it is *avikāra* (unmodified) and *avikalpa* (without conceptualization). Since the *cittotpāda* of the Origin-Passage is described as requiring to be produced (*utpādayitavya*) and hence as arising (*utpāda*), and since it is caused to arise by a set of notions (*saṃjñā*) that others have been one's parents, etc., it can hardly be the same as this fundamental *citta* which is taken here to be the very locus of personality and existence.¹⁷

The first part of the compound *bodhi-citta* (synonymous with *bodhi-sattva* in the early PP *sūtras*?) should be understood not as referring to a for-others state of enlightenment (a *saṃbhoga-kāya*)

but to the the Prajñā-pāramitā herself, beyond all conceptualization and absorbed indivisibly with the ultimate. Rather than a dative *tat-puruṣa*, the compound is better construed as a curious Buddhist sort of *bahuvrīhi* meaning (one whose) fundamental state of being or mind is perfect wisdom, i.e., the ultimate. It is a curious compound because the Buddhist axiom which denies the existence of a person beyond the five constituent-aggregates (*skandha*) leaves both compounds without a clearly identifiable noun to qualify.

The *cittotpāda* set forth in the Origin-Passage cannot, then, be equated with *bodhicitta* (or *bodhisattva*) nor can it be thought of as the outcome of a systematic understanding. Rather it was a notion which would itself contribute, as an integral part of a revealed text requiring explanation, to the development of Mahāyāna scholasticism's systematic understanding of two truths. The early notion of *cittotpāda* would be transformed, under the influence of later systematization associated particularly with Mādhyamikas, into the conventional or surface level (*sāmvṛtya*) *bodhi-cittotpāda*, i.e., one concerned with conventional realities such as the needs of other living beings and the attainment of enlightenment. This would be unlike the ultimate *bodhi-cittotpāda* which was none other than the original *bodhicitta* (i.e., the non-dual liberating vision and ultimate reality called Prajñā-pāramitā) changed insofar as it was now a part of an edifice of scholastic thought.

This explanation of the terms has the great benefit of explaining what are, otherwise, confusing usages of *bodhicitta*, *cittotpāda* and *bodhi-cittotpāda*. The two former terms were originally different in meaning. Later, however, *bodhicitta* became even more popular, as a shortened form of *bodhi-cittotpāda*, than the original *cittotpāda* itself and it was used with this secondary sense by later writers in contexts where it is historically inappropriate to do so.

The Sameness of Self and Other Lineage

In tracing the earliest developments of the *bodhi-cittotpāda* doctrine an important source is Śāntideva's *Śikṣa-samuccaya* (=ŚSa). This companion volume to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (=BCA) contains

passages from earlier *sūtras* on which, Śāntideva tells us, his BCA was based. Since the BCA is little more than a verse monograph on *bodhi-cittotpāda* the *sūtra* passages Śāntideva quotes in his ŚSa provide the best clues to the *bodhi-cittotpāda* doctrine's early developments.

Śāntideva (writing ca. 650) had no modern sense of history and accepted as authentic works of the Buddha (*buddha-vacana*) those which historically are quite late, in particular the *Gagana-gaṇja-sūtra* and the *Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa*, both of which can be seen as part of a second wave of revelation (cp. the *Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā*), building on and systematizing the early proto-Mahāyāna doctrines found in PP *sūtras* like the A.¹⁸ These second wave *sūtras*, all anonymous, contain the earliest known interpretations of the A's Origin-Passage.

There are two *bodhi-cittotpāda* traditions¹⁹ found in Tibetan lineage lists (*gsan yig*). Of them, one tradition is traced back to Śāntideva and then to the mythological figures Nāgārjuna and Mañjuśrī. This is called the "sameness of self with others" (*parātma-samatā*) tradition and it begins with the *Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa*'s interpretation of the Origin-Passage. The *Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa*, a work on which Śāntideva draws heavily, is, in the main, a reformulation of the A. In it we find a first stage in the systematization of *bodhi-cittotpāda*, based particularly on the equation of *nairātmya* with dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), and an emphasis on the sameness of self and others (*parātma-samatā*) an idea that Śāntideva would make a central pivot of his presentation.

The very first of the twenty-seven *mūla-kārikās* of the ŚSa is *yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca bhayaṃ duṣkhaṃ ca na priyam / tad-ātmanāḥ ko viśeṣo yat taṃ rakṣāmi netaram* // ("Since I and my fellow man abhor pain and fear alike, what distinction can I rightly make for self, that I should preserve it and not other?")²⁰ It contains a distinctive echo of the *cittotpāda* of the Origin-Passage.²¹ There is hardly a mention of the A in the entire ŚSa, however, and this echo might be an interesting, but otherwise inconsequential footnote, were it not that (i) in a long quotation from the *Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa*²² with which Śāntideva brings the ŚSa to its conclusion this theme is developed at

length and (ii) the most important section in the BCA for understanding Śāntideva's conception of *bodhi-cittotpāda*, the so-called "changing self into others meditation" (Tib. *bdag gzhan mnyam brjes*) (BCA 8.96ff) has the very same verse and is, in essence, an elaboration on this same ŚSa *kārikā* 1.

The importance of the "sameness of self with others" passage (BCA 8.96ff) has already been recognized by La Vallée Poussin who says of Śāntideva's formulation of the *bodhi-cittotpāda* doctrine that it is at once "orthodox and yet original."²³ La Vallée Poussin notes that the "nothingness of the ego does not warrant us in remaining inactive; we find in it a reason for sacrificing ourselves for our neighbour." He intimates that, to some extent at least, Śāntideva's explicit exhortation to the religiously minded to renounce personal needs in favour of the needs of others is not so much a reinterpretation of *parātma-samatā* but a valid understanding of it: "This practice of abnegation... results... in purging the mind of error; that is to say, since every idea, as such is erroneous, abnegation 'purifies' the mind by emptying it (*moha=jñeyāvaraṇa; śuddha=śūnya*)."²⁴

Elsewhere, in his translation of BCA 8.90,²⁵ La Vallée Poussin points us in the direction of two sources for Śāntideva's formulation of *bodhi-cittotpāda*. Dividing BCA 8.90 into two parts he translates 90a "Le [Bodhisattva] s'applique d'abord, avec diligence et scrupule, à ne pas faire de différence entre le moi et le prochain, [de qui est de l'essence de la pratique du futur Bouddha]." This is the PP *sūtra*'s notion of *parātma-samatā* (interpreted in light of the *Tathāgata-guhyā-nirdeśa*) based on the progression of ideas from *anutpāda* through to *advaya* mentioned earlier. He then translates 90b "Ce qu' est la joie pour moi, elle l'est pour autrui; ce qu' est la douleur pour moi, elle l'est pour autrui. Je dois faire pour autrui ce que je fais pour moi," citing *Dhammapada* 129 as the probable source. We thus find here the fusion of two different observations: a) that self and other are ultimately undifferentiable (the doctrine of the PP *sūtras*) and b) that empathy with the plight of others is natural because one shares feelings of happiness and sorrow in common with them. This later idea, enshrined in pre-Mahāyāna texts, is not distinctly Buddhist but is also found associated with a universalist Kṛṣṇa, for instance in the

reformulation of the notion of sacrifice and the body of the deity in the *Bhagavad-gītā*.

The Seven-point Lineage

Śāntideva's formulation of *bodhi-cittotpāda* developed from the Origin-Passage's sameness of self and other (*parātma-samatā*) interpreted along the lines of the *Tathāgata-guhya-nirdeśa*. Another important stream of development of the *cittotpāda* doctrine takes as its point of departure the Origin-Passage's specific mention of family members ("A *bodhisattva* should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self...") and developed the idea of equalizing attachment, especially the equalization of attachment to sons. This stream of development, systematized in seven points (Tib. *rgyu 'bras man ngag bdun*), is associated with the names of Maitreya and Asaṅga in the Tibetan tradition and like the *parātma-samatā* developments associated with Śāntideva its source is an interpretation of the Origin-Passage. Together the two streams provide an interesting example of parallel interpretations of a PP *sūtra*.²⁶

Although the ideas in the "sameness of self and other" and "seven points" traditions are not fully developed in the Origin-Passage, and are unlikely part of the original intention of the A, it was open to later writers to interpret the A's statements about (i) sameness of self and other and (ii) others as family members in such a way if only because the inspired language of the early PP *sūtras* lent itself to creative interpretation.

Unlike the ŚSa which provides an explicit record of the sources which Śāntideva used, in the so-called "seven points" stream of interpretation not only is there no record of any particular text, but even a specific section in the texts attributed to Maitreya and Asaṅga setting out a coherent way of producing altruism is not readily identifiable.

Thinking of all living beings as one's son is found in an different and older form in the *Udgradatta-paripṛcchā*.²⁷ There it says that a

father should not be too attached to his own son and should think all other beings are as dear as his son. This is a sentiment not far removed from the much older, pre-Mahāyāna notion enshrined in the legend of Prince Siddhārtha, the Buddha-to-be, leaving Yaśodharā and Rahula to seek enlightenment. As in older pre-Mahāyāna texts, the relatively late *Udgradatta-paripṛcchā* focuses on equalizing (i.e., making the same) (*sama-kṛ*) excess attachment to a son. There is also evident, however, a shift in emphasis towards actually imagining (*saṃjñōtpāda*) that other people are one's son and calling up, thereby, emotions of tenderness and concern.

Based on later explanations of *bodhi-cittotpāda* attributed to Asaṅga²⁸ the essential element in the seven point tradition is that the uplifting of the heart comes about by reflecting on the relation between oneself and one's close family members. In the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, which Tibetan writers consider to be a work of Asaṅga, and which in its completed form presents a systematization of the path (*mārga*) at about the same stage of development as the Pañca and AA²⁹ there is a passage³⁰ that says one dimension of a *bodhisattva*'s *sama-citta* is his consideration that all beings are as beloved as a son. In later Tibetan works the protective feeling of a child for his or her parents is emphasized and the original notion of treating all as a son is lost. This development is also, however, anticipated to some extent in the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*³¹ where a *bodhisattva* is mentioned as sometimes looking after living beings like a wife (*kalatra-bhāvena*) and sometimes as a head of a household (*svāmi-bhūta*).

The earliest versions of the A were concerned with the question of the person of the Buddha. The PP's great *bodhisattva*, of whom no *dharma* can be found (so 'ham bhagavan bodhisattvaṃ vā bodhisattva-dharmāṃ vāvindann anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan... W31) was, originally at least, the Buddha himself before final *nirvāṇa*. The idea of a *bodhisattva* referring to all truly altruistic persons who deny themselves *nirvāṇa* for the benefit of others is a later development.³² The reformulation of Bodhisattva Siddhārtha's setting out for *nirvāṇa* into an altruistic person setting out for full enlightenment based on an empathy with others seen as oneself, or on seeing all living beings as a son, was not, therefore, a part of the

original message of the A. They are interpretations that later fit in well with the general tendency of proto- and early Mahāyāna writers to redefine the meaning of *buddha* and enlightenment in more universalist terms.

Some final remarks about the place of altruism in Mahāyāna Buddhism are in order. No group, theoretical or real, has a monopoly on kindness. Most religious faiths nevertheless reserve for their own particular religion possession of a unique compassion. Mahāyāna writers are not different in this regard. They say Mahāyāna Buddhism has a special altruism that distinguishes it from what they call the earlier deficient (*hīna*) Buddhism. While such statements retain little importance for understanding the rise and development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, they remind the modern reader of a tension that distinguishes much early Mahāyāna thought. In the course of a more general discussion of a *bodhisattva*'s (=altruistic person's) two equipments (*sambhara*) La Vallée Poussin mentions these tensions in Mahāyāna Buddhism which make the role of altruism, or lack of it, problematic:³³

Buddhists . . . endeavored to . . . reconcile the serious antinomy of the two dogmas: "Nothing exists," and "We must work, labour, suffer for our neighbour." It is certain, says a Mādhyamika philosopher, that our neighbour does not exist, but the Bodhisattva cherishes within himself this illusion (*moha*) that he must become a Buddha for the salvation of creatures.

The mature attitude of Mahāyāna Buddhist writers, arrived at over the course of developing a viable theory of *bodhicittotpāda* can be compared with a theory of tragedy. What value, in an ultimate sense, has the uplifting of the heart in a feeling of oneness and commiseration when reflecting on a tragic actor's plight? Such tears, after all, are shed for a hardship that was never experienced, and seen by a rational person from behind the side of the curtain, as it were, we, the audience, wallow in the enjoyment of a feeling of pity for a suffering that was never there. Altruism, pity for others' hardship, has no place beyond that, and the insistence that there should be a basis for pity

in “real” misery felt by “real” persons merely misses the point of the entire drama.

NOTES

1. The meaning of the term *cittotpāda*, (later, more fully *bodhi-cittotpāda*, reduced often simply to *bodhicitta*) is found in the AA and its later commentaries. There, encapsulated in the statement *cittotpādaḥ parārthāya samyak saṁbodhi-kāmatā* (“*cittotpāda* is the state of wanting full enlightenment for the sake of others”) *cittotpāda* is the altruistic desire (*kāma*), intention (*cetanā* at MSA:4.1; *prārthana* at Bbh:1.2) or thought (*citta* at AAA:22 and AAV:15) motivating a *bodhisattva*’s religious activity.

2. “Background Material for the First of the Seventy Topics in Maitreya-nātha’s *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*” JIABS 10.2 (1987):139-158.

3. *pratibhātu te subhūte bodhisattvānām mahāsattvānām prajñā-pāramitāyām ārabhya yathā bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ prajñā-pāramitām niryāyuh*. Conze translates: “Make it clear now, Subhūti, to the Bodhisattvas, the great beings, starting from perfect wisdom, how the Bodhisattvas, the great beings go forth into perfect wisdom.”

4. In the corresponding section of the other PP *sūtras* and in the explanation of this passage in the AAV and AAA no special attention is paid to it whatsoever. In Pañca 260.9ff (translated by Conze p. 196) the basic outline of the Origin-Passage remains but there is an explicit reference to working for the benefit of innumerable living beings (*aprameyānām asaṁkhyeyānām sattvānām arthaṁ kartum*) and it is said, explicitly, that it is for this purpose that one imagines everyone to be one’s parents and so forth. It is also interesting to note that the notion of *parātma-samatā* (sameness of self and other) which was to be picked up as the central notion of *cittotpāda* by Śāntideva is absent from this part of the Pañca. It says simply *yathā ātmā ātmeti cocyate atyantatayānūtpanna ātmā evaṁ sarveṣv ādhyātmika-bahyeṣu dharmeṣu saṁjñotpādayitavyaḥ*. Ārya Vimuktisena (AAV 126) does no more than mention the existence of the passage in a list (...*duṣkara cāryānupapattya*).

The corresponding passage is not in Ghoṣe’s 1888-1900 edition of the Śata. The fact that his ed. runs to three, not inconsiderably sized volumes, and that he condensed the repetitious passages in the text by a variety of ingenious strategies (unfortunately making the admittedly overwhelmingly wordy text unreadable in the process) and yet still does not quite reach the corresponding section, points to its incredible length. The originality of the notion of *cittotpāda* which comes across so forcefully in the A is impossible in the Śata where the different themes of illusory living beings (Vol 3 130ff), greatness (Vol 3, 228ff) space (Vol 3 294ff) and immeasurability (Vol 3 313ff) are thrashed to death by repetition.

Since the rationale behind Haribhadra’s comments in his AAA is, as

mentioned earlier, rooted in the axiom that the message of each of the major PP *sūtras* is one and the same it is not surprising that he adheres strictly to the AA schema which lumps the Origin-Passage under the general rubric *sarvākārajñatā-niryāna-pratipatti* (on the place of which in the AA's scheme see Obermiller's *Analysis of the AA*, Calcutta 1933-36, p. 189). Although arbitrary when taken as a rubric under which to include the Origin-Passage, the *Gagana-gaṇja-sūtra* quoted in the *ŚSa* (Bendal ed. p. 117, trans. p. 115) gives a clear indication of how the part of the A within which the Origin-Passage is embedded relates to the more general context of being armed with great armor. "Just as the wind enters through a chink, so Māra takes his opportunity from any part where there is a chink in the heart." Therefore the *bodhisattva*'s heart must be whole and without chink. This is what is meant by whole-heartedness, namely full realization of the doctrine of the void, which implies *sarvākārajñatā*.

I have not been able to consult A. Wayman's "A Report on the *Akṣayamatīrdeśa-sūtra* (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 2)," *Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture*, Vol. 6, ed. by Lokesh Chandra (International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, Cot. 1980), pp. 211-232. In his recent *Ethics of Tibet*, (Albany: SUNY, 1991), p. 9 Professor Wayman cites the *Akṣayamatīrdeśa-sūtra*'s reformulation of a *Bodhisattva-piṭaka-sūtras* a possible important source for Aśaṅga's formulation of the *bodhi-cittotpāda* doctrine. See also Mark Tatz, *Aśaṅga's Chapter on Ethics* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986).

5. The different dimensions of *samatā* are brought together in a description of the ultimate *cittotpāda* (*pāramārthika-cittotpāda*) at MSA 4.9: *dharmēṣu ca sattveṣu ca tat-kṛtyeṣūttame ca buddhatve / sama-cittopālambhāt prāmodya-viśiṣṭatā tasya*. This is explained (Levi's ed. 15.23-25) as follows: "There is *sama-cittatā* in regards to *dharma*s because of understanding them as being devoid of reality (*dharma-nairātmya*); then *sama-cittatā* in regard to living beings because of realizing the sameness of self and others; *sama-cittatā* in regard to what is to be done for others because of others wanting, like oneself, to end their misery and there is *sama-cittatā* in respect of the state of awakening (*buddhatva*) because it and the sphere of ultimate reality (*dharma-dhātu*) are, in their final nature (*ātmani*), seen as undivided."

6. I take this to be the import of *yadī cāyuṣman subhūte bodhisattvo 'py anupādaḥ kiṃ bodhisattvo duṣkara-cārikāṃ caratī yāni vā tāni sattvānāṃ kṛtaṣo duḥkhāny utsahate pratyānubhavitum?*

7. The *evam etat* ("How right you are") refrain immediately following the Origin-Passage (W119) (this is a refrain that recurs time and again in the PP *sūtras* where there is a direct, unanswerable question about the ultimate) may have been the A's original response to Śāriputra's question. In that case the Origin-Passage would not have been part of the very earliest PP *sūtra*, but an addition to an earlier version of the text aimed at toning down the unyieldingly nihilistic tone in the original.

8. As Conze has pointed out, we have no access to an edition of the RGS

earlier than Haribhadra's version set forth in accord with the divisions of the AA, and we have, therefore, no way of knowing what changes to the original order of the verses of the RGS Haribhadra did or did not introduce.

9. The MSA appears to be attempting to recapture the original notion of a welling up of feeling when *cittotpāda* is described as an intention (*cetanā*) "that is a full coming into being of *citta*" (*citta-sambhava*). This welling up is captured in Conze's "It is thus that a Bodhisattva should lift up his heart."

10. Pañca 18 begins *sarvākāraṃ sarva-dharmān abhisambodhukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñā-pāramitāyāṃ yogaḥ karaṇīyaḥ* ("The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to be completely, fully awakened to all *dharma*s should make a practice of perfect wisdom.") This corresponds to the first *ālambana* set out in the *samyak-sambodhi kāmata* of AA 1.18. Immediately following this and corresponding to the second *ālambana* is the statement *daśa-dikṣu pratyekaṃ gaṅga-nadī-vālukopameṣu loka-dhātuṣu ye sattvās tān sarvān anupadhiṣeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātau parinivāpayikukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñā-pāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam*. ("The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to place in the realm of non-residual *nirvāṇa* all those beings who are in each of the ten directions, in world-spheres like [in numbers] to sand-grains of the river Gaṅgā should learn perfect wisdom.")

The correspondence between the Pañca and the AA, at this point, both in terms of the position assigned by the AA to the first occurrence of the discussion of *cittotpāda*, and in the general conception of *cittotpāda* presents us with further evidence, were we to need it, that the AA was, in its origins, a commentary on, or even a part of, the Pañca. Ārya Vimuktisena's AAV, the earliest extant commentary on the AA treats it throughout as a commentary on the Pañca without mentioning any of the shorter PP *sūtras*.

11. The term *cittotpāda* is not found in the Pañca until some pages later in a passage corresponding, according to the AA, to the *cittotpāda* exemplified by a treasury (*mahā-nidhana*). Pañca 21.18 says: *matsariṇaḥ sattvān dāne pratiṣṭāpayitukāmena sarva-śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhebhyo dānāni dīyamānāni ekena anumodanā-sahagatena cittotpādena abhibhavitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñā-pāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam*. "The bodhisattva, the great being, wanting to foster charity in miserly beings, wanting to surpass the charity made by every *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* with the single thought that arises (*cittotpāda*) accompanied with rejoicing, should learn perfect wisdom."

It is not irrelevant, perhaps, that this first explicit use of the term *cittotpāda* in the Pañca is in the context of what has been called increased sectarianism (perhaps "self awareness as distinct Mahāyānists" would be a more apt description) implicit in the denigration of the Śrāvaka vehicle, such denigrations being one of the criteria Lancaster identified for ascertaining a PP *sūtra* passage to be a later addition to the text.

12. The absence of such a passage, even in the Śāta is particularly interesting as evidence that one should not understand the interminably long Śāta

as simply a further expansion of the Pañca, but rather as an expansion of the A along independent lines.

¹³ *Bhagavad-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā-pañjikā-nāma*. Also called *Subodhini*. Extant only in Tibetan as *Bcom ldan 'das yon tan rin po che sdud pa'i tshig su byas pa'i dka' 'grel shes bya ba* (P5190).

¹⁴ So, at least according to the Tibetan interpretation of the opening verses of his AASp where he first says "I make homage (*namah*) reverently (*sādaram*) to the PP by discriminating/sorting out/showing (*vivij*) the verses (*kārikā*) ornamenting it (*tad-ālaṃkṛ*) which are an ornament of all (*sarva/nikhilālaṃkṛ*). (*shes rab pha rol phyin pa ni // de'i rgyan tshigs su 'gyur pa dag // kun gyi rgyan du 'gyur pa ni / / mam par dbye phyir dgus phyag 'tshal*) AASp2. His statement, in verses 6 and 7 (AASp 3) that it is astonishing and only through the grace of the Buddha that he fathomed the whole of the AA in this way, especially in view of the host of brilliant scholar saints who had earlier written explanations of it, refers just to his insight, mentioned in verse one, namely that the AA is an ornament (i.e., explanation) of not just the Pañca but of the A and Śata as well.

¹⁵ Haribhadra's main scriptural source for his opinion about the A is a verse from the *Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha* (PPP) which describes the A as a condensed version (*grantha-saṃkṣepa*) of the other longer PP *sūtras*, containing all their topics. The verse is quoted by Haribhadra just a few pages earlier at W12 as well. It is worth mentioning here in passing that, so far as is known, no mention is made of the PPP (a very brief work systematizing the Yogācāra *tri-svabhāva* doctrine) prior to Haribhadra, and it is worth noting that Haribhadra makes a point each and every time he cites the text to prefix the quotation with *āhācārya-dignāgaḥ*. The verse is clearly identified in this manner both times it is quoted, even though Haribhadra style is usually to simply write *itī*, or *ityapare*, etc. when referring to other authors from whose works he repeatedly quotes. Since the sanctity of the author of the PPP becomes very important for Haribhadra's argument there is a certain self-interest evident in this repeated insistence on Dignāga's name. At the very least some people during Haribhadra's time required being told again and again that it was indeed Dignāga's text, a circumstance Frauwallner does not mention when accepting the PPP as one of Dignāga's authentic works.

While premature, in the absence of further documentation, to deny that the Dignāga who wrote the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* also wrote the PPP, it should be noted that the question of its authorship does bear heavily on other issues: (i) the extent to which it is correct to understand the logico-epistemological works of Dignāga as being the output of a Vijñapti-mātrin, (ii) the period in Indian history during which it was first felt necessary to reconcile the revelation contained in differing versions of the PP *sūtras*, and (iii) the person of Ārya-Vimuktisena.

I acknowledge a series of conversations with Dr. A. Singh which stimulated this line of thought.

16. RGS 7: *citta* [sic] *bodheḥ*.

17. Similarly, when immediately following (W41) Śāriputra says it is for

this reason (*etaś ca*) that a *bodhisattva* is not reversible from *bodhi*, one should understand the reason for his statement not (as in Conze's translation p. 84) in terms of his wish (*kāma*) or intention (*cetanā*) for enlightenment in order to be able to work on others' behalf, which characterizes the *bodhi-cittotpāda* at the beginning of the Pañca, but rather in terms of the ultimate truth (*paramārthataḥ*) that all *dharma*s, including the *bodhisattva*'s perfect wisdom are equally unproduced (*anutpanna*) and are, therefore, equally free of defilement and to that extent awakened or in a state of enlightenment.

Such an interpretation of *bodhicitta* as equivalent to *bodhisattva* ("one whose essence/mind/soul is perfect awareness/enlightenment") is further corroborated by a passage later in the A (W81-83), where, in answer to the question "Why is a great being called a great being (*mahāsattva*)?" Subhūti answers that he is called a great being if he remains unattached to, and uninvolved in the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*), the mind of all-knowledge, the undefiled mind, the unequalled mind, the mind equal to the unequalled.

18. The dating of these texts based on translations into Chinese (most recently in Akira Hirakawa *A History of Indian Buddhism* trans. and ed. by Paul Groner, Asian Studies at Hawaii 36, University of Hawaii Press, 1990) would fit with Conze's dating of the A and RGS to the first century BCE though Hirakawa assigns the entire PP literature a slightly later date than Conze. The appearance of the earliest versions of what I have called the second wave of PP revelation in Chinese translation, texts like the *Tathāgata-guhyā-nirdeśa*, would also appear to predate the accepted dates of the works associated with the names of Aśaṅga and Maitreya, particularly the date assigned to the AA.

19. Two streams of interpretation of, or method to produce, *byang chub sems* (= *bodhi-cittotpāda*) are an accepted fact in popular Tibetan oral teaching. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, in *Meaningful to Behold* (London: Tharpa, 1985, p. 22) talks of two unbroken lineages. Of these *bdag gzhan gnyam rjes sgo nas byang chub sems bskyed tshul* ("equalizing and changing yourself into others method") can be traced back to BCA8.89ff. The *rgyu 'bras man ngags bdun...* ("seven-fold cause and effect method"), though anticipated in parts of both the Bbh and MSA, and in the process of systematization in Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanā-krama* and Dīpaṃkara Śrī-jñāna's *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*, is not set forth clearly in any texts earlier than those of the fully developed Tibetan *lam rim* and *blo sbyong* genre.

20. ŚSa p.xxxix; trans. p.3.

21. ...*tasmān mātṛ-saṃjñā, pitṛ-saṃjñā, putra-saṃjñā, duhitṛ-saṃjñā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvo-sattvānām antike yāvad ātma-saṃjñōtpādayitavyā. yathātmā sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ sarva-duḥkhebhya mocayitavyaḥ evaṃ sarva-sattvāḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ sarva-duḥkhebhya mocayitavyā iti.* ("A *bodhisattva* should therefore identify all beings with his parents or children, yes, even with his own self, like this: 'As I myself want to be quite free from all sufferings, just so all beings want to be quite free from all sufferings.'")

22. The long quotation, which runs from 357.15-366.2 in Bendall's ed.; trans. pp. 315-320 is, in the main, a reformulation of the opening of the A. It begins *parāṭma-samatābhyāsād bodhi-cittaṃ dṛḍhibhavet / āpekṣitvaṃ parāṭmatvaṃ paravaraṃ yathā mṛṣā // tat-kūlaṃ na svataḥ paraṃ kim apeksyastv apāratā / ātmatvaṃ na svateḥ siddhaṃ kim apeksya paro bhavet?* "One must exercise oneself in making no difference between other and self if *bodhicitta* is to become strong. Self and other exist only relatively, just as the hither and further banks of the river, and are false. That bank is not of itself the other bank; then in relation to what could this bank exist? Selfhood is not of itself realized, then in relation to what should there be another?"

23. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 2, pp. 752-753.

24. Ibid., p. 752.

25. BCA trans. pp. 96-97.

26. A similar parallel interpretation is found in the *Maitreya-pariprcchā*'s three nature (*tri-rūpa*) explanation and the *Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra*'s three nature (*tri-svabhāva*) explanation and the *Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra*'s three nature (*tri-svabhāva*) explanation of the PP's *dharma-nairātmya* doctrine. These two streams of thought, like the profound and vast *bodhi-cittotpāda* traditions are also associated, more or less with Mādhyamika and Yogācāra thinkers.

27. Quoted ŚSa p.19; trans. p. 21.

28. Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, in the *skye bu chen po* section.

29. See, for example, the order of the opening sections on *gotra*, *cittotpāda* and *sva-parārtha* and the explicit mention of *cittotpāda*'s two *ālambana*.

30. Pañca:194 *sarva-sattveṣv eka-putraka iva prema-sahagatena cittena sama-citto bhavati*.

31. Bbh:249ff.

32. See, for example, Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932).

33. La Vallée Poussin, ERE 2, p.741 note.

Abbreviations:

A [*Ārya-jaṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*. Ed. by Wogihara in AAA. Translated by E. Conze. Bibliotheca Indica, 284. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1958; revised reprint ed., San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973.

AA *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-nāma-prajñā-pāramitopadeśa-śāstra-[kārikā]*. Ed. by Wogihara in AAA. The *kārikās* of the first *abhisamaya* are numbered in accordance with Obermiller's 1929 ed.; i.e., *kārikā* 1 in Wogihara's ed. is numbered as *kārikā* 3 and so forth.

- AAA *Abhisamayālamkāraḥ Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā* Ed. by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932-35; reprint ed. 1973.
- AASp *Abhisamayālamkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstra-vṛttiḥ*. (Short Tib. title, 'grel pa don gsal = *Vṛttiḥ Sphuṭārthā*). Tib. text ed. by Bhikṣu Samdong Rinpoche. Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica-2. Sarnāth, 1977.
- AAV *Abhisamayālamkāra-vṛtti*. (Ārya Vimuktisena). Ed. by C. Pensa. Rome: Is.M.E.O., 1967.
- Bbh *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*. Ed. by N. Dutt. Tibetan Skt. Works Series, 7. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966.
- BCA *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Ed. by V. Bhattacharya. Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960. Trans. by L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Bodhicaryāvatāra: Introduction a la Pratique des Futurs Bouddhas*. Paris: Librairie Blond et Cie., 1907.
- MSA *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālamkāra*. Ed. by Sylvan Levi. Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 190. Paris: Champion, 1907-11.
- Pañca *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*. Ed. by N. Dutt. Calcutta Oriental Series, 28. London: Luzac, 1934. Trans. by E. Conze in *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom*. Berkeley 1975; reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
- PPP *Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha-[saṃgraha]*. Ed. by E. Frauwallner. WZKS (1959) 3:140-144.
- RGS [*Bhagavad-prajñā-pāramitā*]-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā. Ed. by E. Obermiller. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 29. Leningrad, 1937; reprint ed. by E. Conze. 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1960
- Śata *Śata-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*. Ed. by P. Ghōṣa. Calcutta: Baptist Press, 1902.
- ŚSa *Śikṣa-samuccaya*. Ed. by C. Bendall. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 1. St Petersburg, 1902. Trans. by C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse in *Śikṣa-samuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine*; reprint ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
- W U. Wogihara's ed. of the AAA.