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TRADITION and ARGUMENT in CLASSICAL INDIAN LINGUISTICS

*The Bahiranga-Paribhāṣā in the
Paribhāṣenduśekhara*



JOHANNES BRONKHORST

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in the Paribhāṣenduśekhara*

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations and Primary Sources	vii
Other Works Referred to	x
Preface	xi
Introduction	xiii
PART I: NĀGEŚA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BP	
1. The Structure of Nāgeśa's discussion	3
2. The Meanings of <i>Aṅga</i>	15
3. The Justifications of the Paribhāṣā	29
4. Restrictions on the Use of the BP	37
5. The Two-Word Principle	49
6. Summary and Illustrations	54
PART II: MORE FROM THE PS ON PAR. L	
7. Some Difficult Passages in the Discussion of Par. L (I)	61
8. Some Difficult Passages in the Discussion of Par. L (II)	73
9. Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa and Śeṣādrisudhī	81
10. An Apparent Contradiction Resolved	90
11. Excursus: On the Development of Certain of Nāgeśa's Ideas Regarding the Philosophy of Grammar	104
12. A Use of BP ₂ in the Context of BP ₁	109
PART III: THE REMAINDER OF THE PS	
13. Par. LI	117
14. Further Passages from the PS	129
PART IV: WHAT WENT WRONG?	
15. Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa on Par. L	143
16. Concluding Remarks	153

APPENDICES

I. The Original Text of the Paribhāṣenduśekhara on Par. L	157
II. A Contradiction in the <i>PS</i>	163
III. On the Relative Chronology of Nāgeśa's Grammatical Works	173
IV. Changes in Nāgeśa's Opinions Regarding the BP and the NP	177
V. The <i>Laghuśabdaratna</i>	188
Notes	193
Index	211

ABBREVIATIONS AND PRIMARY SOURCES

a: *antaraṅga*. A concise statement of the meanings of this term can be found on p. 54.

b: *bahiraṅga*. A concise statement of the meanings of this term can be found on p. 54.

Bālamanoramā : Commentary on the *SK*, by Vāsudeva Dīkṣita. Edition used: *Bālamanoramā-sahitā Vaiyākaranasiddhāntakaumudi*, Kāśī Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 136, Chaukhambha Sanskrit Samsthāna, Varanasi, 1976 (4 parts).

Bhairavī : Commentary on the *PS*, by Bhairava Miśra. Edition used: *Paribhāṣenduśekharah Bhairavamīśrakṛtaīkayā samalaṅkṛtah*, Chaukhambha, Benares, 1905.

BP : Bahiraṅga-paribhāṣā. A short description of the workings of this Paribhāṣā is found on pp. 54–55.

BŚR: *Brhacchabdaratna*, commentary on the *PrM*, by Hari Dīkṣita, Edition used: *Praudhamanoramā together with Brihacchabdaratna and Laghuśabdaratna*, first volume, edited by Sitaram Shastri, Benares Hindu University, Varanasi, 1964.

BŚŚ: *Brhacchabduśekhara*, commentary on the *SK*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. Edition used: *Bṛhat-Śabdenduśekhara*, edited by Sitaram Shastri, Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamala vol. 87, Varanasi, 1960 (in three parts).

Gadā : Commentary on the *PS*, by Vaidyanātha Pāyagunda. Edition used: *Vaidyanāthakṛtiagādātikāsanvalītah Paribhāṣenduśekharah*, Ānandāśrama, Poona, 1913.

K. : *The Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgojībhāṭṭa*, edited and explained by F. Kielhorn, Part II, Translation and Notes. Second edition by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1960.

Kalā : Commentary on the *LM*, by Vaidyanātha Pāyagunda. For the edition used, see *LM*.

LM: *Vaiyākaranasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa Edition used: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1925.

LŚR: *Laghuśabdaratna*, a commentary on the *PrM*. Regarding the authorship, see Appendix V. Two partial editions have been used: (i) BHU ed., for which see *BŚR*; (ii) Chaukhambha ed. II. The cover of this second book contains the following (partly handwritten) information: Kāśī Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 58, *Praudhamanoramā* II, Caukhambha Saṃskṛta Samsthāna. Since the title page is missing, no further data are available.

LŚŚ: *Laghuśabdenduśekhara*, a commentary on the *SK*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. For the portion from the beginning until the end of the *kārakaprakarāṇa* the edition with the commentary begun by Tata Subbaraya Sastri and continued by Peri Venkateswara Sastri (Andhra University Series No. 26, Kumbakonam, 1941, two volumes) has been used; and from the *tatpuruṣasamāsprakarana* until the end, the edition of Gopālaśāstrī Nene, part II (Vārāṇasi, Saṃvat, 1979).

Mbh: *The Vyākaranā-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, edited by F. Kielhorn. Third edition by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1962–72 (3 volumes).

MP: *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, by Kaiyata. The edition used is the *Mahābhāṣya* edition published in Rohatak, 1962–63 (5 volumes).

MPS: *Pratyākhyānasamgraha* of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, edited in *Sārasvatī Suṣamā* 2–3 (1943, 45).

MPU: *Mahābhāṣyapradipoddyyota*, commentary on the *MP*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. For the edition used see *MP*.

NP: Nājānantarya-paribhāṣā. This is Par. LI in the *PS*.

P.: Pāṇinian sūtra.

Par.: Paribhāṣā.

PLM: *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntaparamalaghumañjūṣā*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. The edition and translation of Kapil Deva Shastri, Kurukṣetra University, Kurukshetra, 1975, has been used.

PrM: *Praudhamanoramā*, a commentary on the *SK*, by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. For the two editions used, see *LŚR*.

PS: *Paribhāṣasamgraha* (a collection of original works on Vyākaranā Paribhāṣās), edited by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1967.

PS: *The Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgojibhaṭṭa*, edited critically with the commentary *Tattvādarśa* of Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1962.

Śabdakaustubha: Commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Edition used: Kāśī, Saṃvat, 1955.

SK: *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Edition used: Chaukhamba Orientalia, Vārāṇasi, 1975.²

SV: *Sphoṭavāda of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa*, edited by V. Krishnamacharya, with his own commentary *Subodhinī*, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1977.²

Tattvādarśa: See *PS*.

V.: *vārttika*.

Vijayā: Commentary on the *PS*, by Jayadeva Mishra. Edition used: *Paribhāṣenduśekharaḥ Vijayākhyavyākhyayā samalaṅkṛtaḥ*, Tīrabhukti-Prakāśana, Ilāhā bāda, 1968.

VSM: *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūṣā*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. Unpublished.

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- . "Authorship of Laghuśabdaratna." *ABORI* 45 (1964), pp. 152–158.
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PREFACE

This book was written as a doctoral thesis. It was submitted to and accepted by the University of Poona in 1979.

Several people contributed to the creation of this book, in various ways. Prof. S. D. Joshi, my supervisor, introduced me to the study of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. His unfailing skepticism towards and disagreement with the ideas worked out in this book contributed more to their development than he may have been aware. Prof. Paul Kiparsky gave encouragement when this was badly needed. In the years following 1979 Dr. Dominik Wujastyk was kind enough to read the manuscript and suggest improvements in language and style. To all of these I owe a debt of gratitude, but most of all I owe such a debt to Pandit Shivarama Krishna Shastri. In the course of several years he read with me many portions of Nāgeśa's grammatical and other works, and much besides. His ability to understand difficult grammatical and philosophical texts in Sanskrit was unequalled, and without his help it would have taken far longer to write this book and indeed might very well have proved impossible. Shivarama Krishna Shastri never saw the result of our reading; he died before this book could appear in print. I dedicate it to his memory.

J. BRONKHORST

INTRODUCTION

In the following pages an attempt will be made to establish that the part of Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* (*PS*) which deals with Par. L (*asiddham bahiraṅgam antarāṅge*) has not been correctly understood from Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa – Nāgeśa's own pupil – onward. In other words, it is here claimed that an important portion (*l'apogée du Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, as Renou calls it) of the most widely studied book written by the most recent grammarian of importance has been misinterpreted.

I shall propose for consideration an interpretation of the *PS* on Par. L which at certain points is closer to the exact wording of the text than any other interpretation of it that I am aware of; which does not contain internal contradictions where other interpretations do; which makes good sense where others stumble. On the other hand, the demand that the text be without contradictions will force me to consider it as slightly deviating from its original form at two places. The difficulties which are thus avoided also existed in the other interpretations of the text, but were not heeded there.¹

The methodological consideration on which this study is based is of such simplicity that one wonders if it deserves to be explicitly stated. It has been expressed as follows by Thieme (*Kleine Schriften* II, pp. 602–603).²

In interpreting a given text, our basic assumption is that the author means to make sensible statements and to be consistent with himself. Our endeavour is to construct and understand his sentences so as to yield sense and consistency.

Let me make it clear that acceptance of this principle does *not* mean that I consider it impossible that, to stick to our text, Nāgeśa made slips in, or somehow failed to remove inconsistencies from, the *PS*. On the contrary, the possibilities range from a text that is meaningful and consistent down to its minutest details on the one hand, to a text that was (to use a well-known metaphor) “produced by a monkey on a typewriter” on the other. That is to say, there is no certain way to decide whether the *PS* is “the product of Nāgeśa's mature intellect and scholarship,”³ or the more or less accidental

outcome of the efforts of someone who understood what he was writing about only imperfectly, or not at all.

My claim⁴ is that one must hold on to the assumption that the text is meaningful and consistent for as long as possible. Even if one cannot find a meaningful and consistent interpretation, he cannot with certainty say that such an interpretation does not exist. Someone else may find one someday.

But if the possibility is admitted that a certain text has no consistent meaning, why should we cling to the assumption that it has? Why should we not be more ready to admit that certain texts are inconsistent, or even meaningless?

I think the answer is as follows: because such interpretations are extremely uninteresting and can be defended always and everywhere. The most interesting and sensible statements can be accounted for as due to chance. In short, such interpretations are *irrefutable*.

Interesting interpretations are those interpretations that "stick out their necks" – which are ready, as it were, to be superseded by better interpretations. If one accepts too soon that the author was careless while writing his book, that he overlooked something, or if one finds another excuse for not taking the text seriously, one has bartered away the possibility of finding a meaningful, consistent interpretation even if it exists. (And finding such an interpretation is the reason we take the trouble to read the text at all.) Such tactics make the interpretation at which one has arrived unassailable. If, on the other hand, one refrains from using such devices, then every clash between the text and the interpretation demands a solution. In such cases the fault is either with the interpretation or with the text as it has reached us. Only when we see no other way out can we tentatively consider our failure to reach a satisfactory interpretation as due to carelessness on the part of the author. And even if we have found a satisfactory interpretation, nothing guarantees that one day someone else will not arrive at an interpretation that fits the text even better.

But the possibility remains that we are wasting our energies on a text which really is inconsistent or even meaningless. I think this is the price we have to pay for an otherwise sound methodological principle. And as consolation we may remember that the number of cases where we shall find a consistent interpretation that fits a text which is "really" inconsistent will be small indeed.

The methodological principle described above has the advantage that it accords well with common sense. This is perhaps the reason why so few people have taken the trouble of giving it an explicit formulation. The

major part of this book, I believe, will be convincing to every careful reader, even without his being aware that a methodological principle is involved. However, in the description of this principle given above no information was provided as to the extent to which the principle is to be followed, information which would answer the question: consistency at what price? There are procedures which, though in agreement with our principle, bring us dangerously close to the limit of what our common sense is willing to accept. Two restrictions must therefore be imposed.

First, the interpretation which we lend to the text should not be extended in an *ad hoc* manner in order to accommodate a recalcitrant passage. Secondly, the interpretation should not deviate from the wording of the text. Obviously, no general rules can be given as to when an interpretation is extended in an *ad hoc* fashion, and when it no longer fits the wording of the text. It will, however, in general be possible to say of two competing interpretations which one is closer to the text and which one requires fewer *ad hoc* measures.⁵

The present work consists of four parts. In parts I – III I shall propound the interpretation of the *PS* on Par. L which I think is the correct one. That is to say, in Part I this interpretation is shown to be in agreement with the text of the *PS*: indeed, it is arrived at on the basis of that text. In Part II other passages of the *PS* on Par. L are studied in the light of the interpretation arrived at in Part I. In Part III the same is done with regard to passages of the *PS* outside Par. L. Not much attention is paid here to the opinions of the commentators. Only Kielhorn's translation is criticized in certain places.

That Kielhorn had difficulties in translating the *PS* on Par. L, and that here more than elsewhere he relied not only on the commentaries, but on the oral instruction of Bhaskara Shastri (for which Kielhorn went to Satara), has been recorded by K. V. Abhyankar in the preface to the second edition of Kielhorn's translation of the *PS* (p. 6). Kielhorn was a very meticulous translator, who in his translation brought together the best which the commentaries known to him had to offer with a sharp eye for the exact wording of the text. Criticizing his translation where it went wrong therefore seemed to me a good starting-point for criticizing the commentarial tradition.

But the fountainhead of this commentarial tradition is Vaidyanātha Pāyagunda's commentary on the *PS*, named *Gadā*. The ideas regarding the BP found therein are expounded and criticized in Part IV. What is more, an attempt is made to reconstruct how Vaidyanātha arrived at his ideas.

As I said above, Kielhorn's translation is close to the text and is based on the best the commentaries had to offer. Indeed, in general it is hard to improve upon, and I have not tried to do so. In most instances, I have made use of his translation with only minor changes; and where I thought his translation was incorrect, I have all the same employed as much of it as possible.

In a number of places it was found that the *PS* did not contain enough information to settle some of the nicer points of Nāgeśa's interpretation of the BP. In such cases I turned to Nāgeśa's other grammatical works. In doing so, however, it soon became clear that Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP had gone through a process of evolution. Considerations which the reader can find reproduced in Appendices III – V led me in the end to trust only the *LŚŚ* as a reliable supplement to the *PS*. Indeed, a study of *all* the passages of the *LŚŚ* which in one way or another make use of the BP convinced me that Nāgeśa's ideas regarding this Paribhāṣā remained unchanged during the time that elapsed between writing the *PS* and the *LŚŚ*.⁶

During the development of the thesis which is the main subject of this book, certain data presented themselves which throw light on the relative chronology of Nāgeśa's grammatical works. On this account it was possible to arrive at a fuller picture of these works and their mutual relations than was hitherto available. In Appendix III the several threads of the investigations by myself and others come together.

PART I

NĀGEŚA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BP

1. THE STRUCTURE OF NĀGEŚA'S DISCUSSION

PS 76.7–8, App. I ll. 1–2

nityād apy antaraṅgam baliyo'ntaraṅge bahiraṅgasyāsiddhatvāt / tad āha / ASIDDHAM BAHIRĀNGAM ANTARAṄGE /

“An *antaraṅga* (rule) possesses greater force even than a *nitya* (rule), because that which is *bahirāṅga* is (regarded as) not having taken effect (or as not existing) when that which is *antaraṅga* (is to take effect). This (the author of the *Paribhāṣas*) expresses (thus):

Par. L: That which is *bahirāṅga* is (regarded as) not having taken effect (or as not existing) when that which is *antaraṅga* (is to take effect).” (K. p. 221.)

This passage merely introduces the BP. We quickly pass on to the next.

PS 76. 9–11, App. I ll. 3–5

*antar madhye bahirāṅgaśāstriyanimittasamudāyamadhye'ntarbhūtāny
aṅgāni nimittāni yasya tad antaraṅgam / evam tadīyanimittasamudāyād
bahirbhūtāṅgakam bahirāṅgam /*

“*Antaraṅga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within the sum of the causes of a *bahirāṅga* rule; in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without the sum of the causes of that (*antaraṅga* rule) is *bahirāṅga*” (Cf. K. pp.221–222.)

As Kielhorn points out in a footnote (p. 222, fn. 1), not only can a rule be *antaraṅga* or *bahirāṅga*, but so can “an operation, or that which is taught in a rule”. Since confusion in this respect does not seem possible, I shall, following in the footsteps of Kielhorn, use “rule” and “operation” arbitrarily, when a noun is required with which the term *antaraṅga* or *bahirāṅga* is to be in apposition.

The translation given here of the passage last cited differs from Kielhorn's translation of the same in two places. Kielhorn translates the first sentence as follows:

Antaraṅga is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahirāṅga* rule;

That is to say, Kielhorn adds in parentheses the words “or before”. Similarly in the next sentence he adds “(or beyond)” after “without”, so that his translation of this second sentence is:

in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (*antarāṅga* rule) is *bahirāṅga*.

It is to be noted that both times Kielhorn gives these words – in the first sentence “or before”, in the second “or beyond” – in parentheses, which indicates that nothing in the Sanskrit original corresponds to these words. Since moreover the translation makes perfect sense without them, one wonders if their inclusion was really necessary.

In spite of this, the two examples discussed in a footnote to Kielhorn’s translation (K. pp. 222–223, fn. 2) both present situations wherein the rules which are supposed to be *antarāṅga* are such that their causes lie *before*, not *within*, the causes of the rules assumed to be *bahirāṅga*. In the first example, *si-ū-na*, two rules apply simultaneously: P. 6.1.77 (*iko yan aci*) teaches the substitution of *y* for *i*; P. 7.3.86 (*pugantalaghīḍpadhasya ca*) prescribes substitution of *Guṇa* for the penultimate *i* before the affix *na*. The cause of P. 6.1.77 is *ū*, the cause of P. 7.3.86 is *na*; *ū* is before *na*, and from this the conclusion is drawn that P. 6.1.77 is *antarāṅga*, and P. 7.3.86 *bahirāṅga*. The case is similar in the second example, the derivation of *nārpatya*.

Let me, at this point, assure the reader that I am well aware that at a later stage Nāgeśa does introduce operations which are *antarāṅga* because their causes lie *before* the causes of the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operations. So it might be argued that Kielhorn here merely anticipates the sequel to help the reader. Be that as it may, what I wish to emphasize is that both the examples given by Kielhorn to illustrate the passage under discussion do not illustrate this passage, because Kielhorn does not give an example where the causes of the application of one rule lie *within* the causes of the application of another rule. But this is what Nāgeśa is talking about. *Antar* means “within”, and if this word is not clear enough, it is immediately followed by *madhye*, which carries the same meaning. Later I shall try to show that Kielhorn’s “anticipating the sequel” made him lose sight of a vital distinction between the earlier and the later passages, as a result of which

the overall scheme of Nāgeśa's discussion became blurred. At this time I merely want to draw attention, not to a mistaken translation on the part of Kielhorn, for this would be saying too much, but to what may very well be the germ from which later mistakes spring.

We do not yet fully know what exact meaning the word *anīga* – which is equated with *nimitta* – is considered to have. The following passage throws some light on this.

PS 76. 12–13, App. I ll. 6–8

atrāṅgaśabdena śabdaruṇam nimittam eva grhyate śabdaśastre tasya pradhānatvāt / tenārthanimittakasya na bahiranīgatvam /

"The word *anīga* in this (Paribhāṣā) denotes only a formal cause (such as a sound or a combination of sounds), because in a work which teaches the formation of words main importance attaches to the wordform. (When) therefore (an operation is) caused by the meaning, it is not (on that account) *bahiranīga*, (and the present Paribhāṣā cannot affect it)." (Cf. K. pp. 223–224.)

The next passage provides further information.

PS 81. 1–2, App. I ll. 34–35

paribhāṣayām anīgaśabdena saptamyādyantopāttam śabdaruṇam nimittam eva grhyate....

"...the word *anīga* in the Paribhāṣā only denotes a formal cause (such as a sound or a combination of sounds) exhibited (in a rule)¹ in a locative or other case." (Cf. K. p. 229.)

This is what Nāgeśa tells us with respect to the significance of the word *anīga*. Some more information to elucidate the phrase "in a locative or other case" would have been welcome. It will, however, become apparent in the course of our study that if we read this phrase as "in a locative case", satisfactory results are obtained in the majority of cases we shall encounter. Later (in Chapter 2) the question of what constitutes the other case or cases will be discussed in detail.

The next passage is polemical in nature. It contests the view that the BP interferes with the proper formation of the words *gaudherāḥ* and *pacet*. The reason for including it here is that it introduces a new criterion of *Antaraṅgatva*.

PŚ 78. 1–3, App. I ll. 12–14

*etenā gaudherah pacet ityādāv eyādīnām angasamjñāpekṣatvena
bahiraṅgatayāsiddhatvād vali lopo na syād iti parāstam / eyādeśāder
aparanimitakatvenāntarāṅgatvāc ca //*

“This (circumstance that the word *aria* in the present Paribhāṣā denotes only a *formal cause*) proves the incorrectness of the assertion that in (the formation of) *gaudhera*, *pacet* etc. the elision, (by P. 6.1.66, of the semivowel *y* of *gaudhey-ra*, *pacey-t* etc.) ought (by the present Paribhāṣā) not to take place because (the substitution, by P. 7.1.2 etc., of *ey* etc. (for the initial consonant of the affix *dhrak* etc.) would be *bahiranga*, because of its dependence on (*dhrak* etc. as preceded by something) termed ‘*Ariga*’, and would therefore be regarded as not having taken effect (when P. 6.1.66 would be applicable; for the ‘dependence on *dhrak* as preceded by something termed ‘*Ariga*’, cannot be called a *formal cause*). Moreover (that assertion is proved to be incorrect) by the fact that (on the contrary) the substitutes *ey* etc. are *antarāṅga* because they are not caused by something following.” (K. pp. 225–226.)

In the derivation of *gaudherah* from *godhā-dhrak* the following two rules apply in this order: P. 7.1.2 (*āyaneyīnīyiyah phaḍhakhaṭṭacchagham pratyayādīnām*) prescribes substitution of *ey* for *dh* of *dhrak*; P. 6.1.66 (*lopo vyor vali*) subsequently causes dropping of *y* before *ra*. P. 7.1.2 has no following cause; P. 6.1.66, on the other hand, does have a following cause: dropping of *y* is caused by the *r* that follows. Such being the case, the above passage states that P. 7.1.2 is *antarāṅga* and P. 6.1.66 *bahiranga*.

The situation is similar in the derivation of *pacet* from *paca-yā-t²*. First P. 7.2.80 (*ato yeyah*) substitutes *iy* for *yā*; it has no following cause. Then P. 6.1.66 causes elision of *y*; the following cause is *t*. Again, the operation without following cause is *antarāṅga*; the one with following cause, *bahiranga*.

Here then Nāgeśa for the first time illustrates how, in his opinion, the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* are to be assigned to rules, or operations. But this first pair of illustrations is also an exception to the general rule, formulated earlier, that the causes of the *antarāṅga* rule must be *within* the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule. For here the *antarāṅga* rule has no following cause, whereas the *bahirāṅga* rule does, so that inclusion is out of the question.

This means that thus far we have met with two conditions which, when fulfilled, make one rule *antarāṅga* with respect to another rule, which is *bahirāṅga*. Since, at least for the time being, only the sounds or combinations of sounds indicated in a rule in a locative case (see above) are accepted as causes we write here throughout “cause”, not “following cause”. The conditions are:

- (1) The causes of the application of the *antarāṅga* rule lie within the causes of the application of the *bahirāṅga* rule.
- (2) The *antarāṅga* rule has no cause, whereas the *bahirāṅga* rule does.

It is, incidentally, interesting to note that the disparity between these two conditions is not as great as might be supposed. In point of fact, they can be reformulated in such a way that one single condition remains, as follows: “The class of causes of the application of the *antarāṅga* rule is properly included in the class of causes of the application of the *bahirāṅga* rule.” That this single condition covers both the conditions enumerated above can be shown as follows: When the causes of the *antarāṅga* rule lie within the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule, obviously the class of causes of the *antarāṅga* rule is properly included in the class of causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule. When the *antarāṅga* rule has no causes, the class of causes of the *antarāṅga* rule is the *null class*. This null class again is properly included in every class which is not itself the null class, i.e., which contains at least one element; it is therefore also properly included in the class of causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule, provided this latter class contains at least one element.

It is, obviously, not contended here that Nāgeśa had this new formulation in mind when he wrote on the BP.³ He could not have, for the new condition makes use of concepts of modern set theory, with which Nāgeśa could not have been acquainted. All that the above exposition is intended to show is that the two conditions for *Antaraṅgatva* introduced thus far by Nāgeśa are less discontinuous than they may seem to be.

After this little digression we return to Nāgeśa's text. The next passage that deserves our attention explains the meaning, not of the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* as the previous passages did, but of the Paribhāṣā in which these terms figure.

PS 84. 1, App. I ll. 51-52

antarāṅge kartavye jātam tatkālaprāptikam ca bahaṅgam asiddham ity arīḥah /

“The meaning (of the Paribhāṣā) is this, that when an *antaraṅga* (rule or operation) is about to take effect, a *bahirāṅga* (rule or operation) which (already) has taken effect, and likewise (a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation) which applies simultaneously (with the *antaraṅga* rule or operation), is (regarded as) not having taken effect or (as) not existing.” (Cf. K. p. 234.)

In the passages to be studied next, Nāgeśa will introduce a second interpretation of the BP which, together with the first interpretation, is expected to cover all cases where this Paribhāṣā is applicable. In order to keep the two interpretations clearly apart, it does not seem out of place here to summarize what has been found so far with respect to the first interpretation.

(1) Concerning the meaning of the words *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, it has been found that a rule or operation is *antaraṅga* with respect to another rule or operation – which is *bahirāṅga* – when its causes lie within the causes of that other one. This condition is also to be considered satisfied when the former rule has no cause, whereas the latter has. “Cause” (*āṅga* or *nimitta*) in this context must be understood to mean formal (*śabdārūpa*) cause, exhibited in a rule (for the time being: merely) in a locative case.

(2) The BP, on this interpretation of the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, comes to mean: When an *antaraṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* rule apply simultaneously, the *antaraṅga* rule takes effect first; when a *bahirāṅga* rule has taken effect, and subsequently an *antaraṅga* rule applies, the former is to be regarded as not having taken effect with respect to the latter.

No more will be said now regarding the first interpretation of the BP. For a proper understanding of what Nāgeśa has to say further, it will be advantageous to become acquainted, even at this early stage, with his second, supplementary, interpretation of this Paribhāṣā.

PS 96. 1–3, App. I ll. 129–132

— *nanv evam asusruvad ity atra laghūpadhagunād uvaño’lpā-nimittatvābhāvād uvañ na syād iti cet / na / tatrāntahkārya-tvārūpāntaraṅgatvasattvāt antahkāryatvam ca pūrvopasthitanimittakatvam arīgaśabdasya nimittaparativāt /*

“Now one might maintain that (if then the term *antaraṅga* were) thus (employed strictly in what has above been considered to be its proper sense, it ought) in (the formation of) the aorist par. (*asusruvat*) of *sru-*,

(where the question arises whether for the radical *u uv* should by P. 6.4.77 be substituted before *a*, or *Guṇa* by P. 7.3.86 before *t*, not to be applied to the substitution of *uv*), because here (the substitution of) *uv* has not (even) fewer causes than (that of) *Guṇa* for the prosodially short penultimate, (and not being *antarāṅga*) *uv* ought not to be substituted (for *u*). But this would be untenable; for (the substitution of *uv*) is *antarāṅga*, viz. *antarāṅga* in the sense which is expressed by the word *antahkārya*; and by *antahkārya* we mean that the cause (*a* of the substitution of *uv*, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds,) precedes (the cause *t* of the substitution of *Guṇa*); for the word *āṅga* is equivalent to *nimitta* i.e. 'cause'." (Cf. K. pp. 259–260.)

It is in trying to understand the present passage that our insistence on interpreting the word *antar* literally (see above) starts bearing fruit. For this is one of the passages that causes Kielhorn – even though this translation of it is impeccable – considerable trouble. For us it is not the least bit problematic, as I shall show first.

In the derivation of *asusruvat*, the following stage is reached: *a-su-sru-a-t*. Here two rules present themselves. P. 6.4.77 (*aci śnudhātubhruvām yvor iyaruvariau*) prescribes substitution of *uv* for the *u* of *sru*; its cause is the following *a*. P. 7.3.86 (*pugantalaṁghīṣpadhasya ca*) prescribes substitution of *Guṇa* for the *u* of *sru*; its cause is *t*. The only condition that we have met so far for calling a rule *antarāṅga* with respect to another rule is that its causes lie *within* the causes of the other rule. This, of course, is possible only when the causes of the *antarāṅga* rule are fewer than the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule. But clearly, the cause of P. 6.4.77, which is *a*, does not lie within the causes of P. 7.3.86, for *a* does not lie within *t*. And since both these rules each have one single cause, the causes of P. 6.4.77 are not even fewer in number than the causes of P. 7.3.86; and *a fortiori* inclusion is absolutely out of the question. It follows that the terms *antarāṅgā* and *bahirāṅga* as defined thus far cannot be applied to these two rules in the derivation of *asusruvat*.

It is for this reason that Nāgeśa, in the present passage, gives the term *antarāṅga* an additional meaning, wherein it becomes synonymous with *antahkārya*. A rule is called *antarāṅga*, in the sense *antahkārya*, when its cause lies *before* the cause of the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rule. Here a completely new meaning is added to the word *antarāṅga*. It is clear that this new meaning makes, in the derivation of *asusruvat*, P. 6.4.77 *antarāṅga*,

and as a result, P. 7.3.86 *bahirāṅga*.

For Kielhorn the matter is less simple. Since he had translated *antar madhye* as “within (or before)”, the word *antarāṅga* had, for him, from the very beginning carried the meaning which in the present passage is ascribed to it. He could not therefore consider the derivation of *asusruvat* irregular, and the passage under consideration must, from his point of view, look obscure at best. The following phrase is especially embarrassing for him: *laghūpadhaguṇād uvāñōlpanimittatvābhāvād*. He translates this correctly: “because here (the substitution of) *uv* has not (even) fewer causes than (that of) *Guna* for the prosodically short penultimate.” But to make sense of this he has to resort to the following devious argument. He writes in a footnote (p. 259, fn. 2):

Some grammarians have maintained that that which has fewer causes is *antarāṅga* in regard to that which has more causes; but not even, if their opinion is adopted, can the substitution of *uv* be regarded as *antarāṅga* compared with that of *Guṇa*, for the latter has only one cause, viz. *t*, just as the former has only one cause, viz. *a*.

It will be agreed that Kielhorn here interprets the passage in a very strange way. According to him, the derivation of *asusruvat* is not irregular in any way; the BP has been legitimately employed in it. This employment of the Paribhāṣā does not even contrast with what was said earlier about its use. The reason *asusruvat* is nevertheless presented as being problematic is, according to Kielhorn, that its derivation cannot be justified by an interpretation of the BP which is, in any case, unacceptable. That that which has fewer causes is *antarāṅga* in regard to that which has more causes had already been rejected by Nāgeśa much earlier in the *PŚ*. Vide the following passage:

PŚ 80. 6–8, App. I ll. 26–28

bahirāṅgāntaraṅgaśabdābhyaṁ bahvapekṣatvālpāpekṣatvayoh śabda-
maryādayālābhāc ca / tathā saty asiddham bahvapekṣam alpāpekṣa ity
eva vadet /

“Moreover, one cannot by any rule of language derive the meanings ‘dependent on a greater number (of causes)’ and ‘dependent on a smaller number (of causes)’ from the words *bahirāṅga* and *antarāṅga*. Had these (words) really been (intended to) convey those meanings, the author of the Paribhāṣās would certainly have said *asiddham*

bahvapekṣam alpapekṣe (instead of saying *asiddham bahirāṅgam antarāṅge*).” (K. p. 228.)

It is not necessary now to study in what context these last remarks were made. It is clear that early in his discussion of the BP Nāgeśa rejects the notion that few causes make a rule *antarāṅga*, while many make it *bahirāṅga*. That Kielhorn, without any indication to that effect from the context, suddenly revives this rejected opinion, because otherwise the passage quoted above makes no sense to him, merely strengthens us in the idea that he is on the wrong track.

Let us further note that if Kielhorn, while translating *antar madhye* as “within (or before)”, merely anticipated the sequel to aid the reader, there would have been no need for him to present this bizarre argument. Or, if he really anticipated the sequel when translating *antar madhye*, he soon forgot that, and came to think that “(or before)” was part of the translation.

Let me, for clarity's sake, repeat in a few words what is, in my opinion, the correct interpretation of Nāgeśa's discussion concerning *asusruvat*. If only the first meaning of the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* is taken into consideration, then the substitution of *uv* for *u* cannot be *antarāṅga* with respect to the substitution of *Guṇa* for *u*, because the causes of the first operation are not included in the causes of the latter operation; what is more, the number of causes of the first operation is not even less than the number of causes of the second one. That is why a new meaning of these two terms is called for, and it is actually provided by Nāgeśa.

Having thus assigned new, additional, meanings to the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, Nāgeśa next teaches us what interpretation of the Paribhāṣā is to be accepted where the new meanings are used.

PS 96.9–10, App. I ll. 138–141

*tad api yugapatprāptau pūrvapravṛttiniyāmakam eva yathā patyety
atra padasya vibhajyānvākhyāne na tu jātasya bahirāṅgasya
tādrśe'ntarāṅge'siddhatāniyāmakam ...*

“The (being *antarāṅga* in this sense) only determines that, when (two operations) apply simultaneously, (the *antarāṅga* operation) shall take effect first, as is the case in *patyā* when this word is dissolved (into its constituent parts) and (its formation out of those parts) accounted for (by the rules of grammar), but it does not cause a *bahirāṅga* (operation) which has (already) taken effect (to be

considered as) not having taken effect in regard to such an *antarāṅga* (operation)," ... (K. p. 261.)

The content of this passage is clear enough: When we are dealing with a rule which is *antarāṅga* in the second sense of this word, which is therefore *antahkārya*, i.e., the cause of which precedes the cause of the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rule, then we also have to interpret the BP in a different way. In such a case the Paribhāṣā merely gives preference to an *antarāṅga* rule when this *antarāṅga* rule applies simultaneously with the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rule. When, on the other hand, a *bahirāṅga* rule already has taken effect at the time that the *antarāṅga* rule applies, *then the BP does nothing*. In other words, when this latter situation prevails, the *bahirāṅga* rule is not to be considered as not having taken effect or not existing.

If what precedes has not been able to convince the reader, the following sentence may change his mind.

PS 97.1, App. I ll. 142–143

ata eva vāyvor ityādau vali lopo yaṇaḥ sthānivattvena vārito bhāsyakṛtā /

"It is for this reason (viz. because a rule or operation which is *bahirāṅga* in the new sense of that word, is not to be considered as not having taken effect in regard to its corresponding *antarāṅga* rule or operation), that in the case of *vāyvoh* etc. (where *y* should have been elided before *v* by P. 6.1.66), the elision (of *y*) has by the author of the Bhāṣya been prevented by (the assumption that) the semivowel (*v*, which has been substituted for *u*), is like the original (*u*; to assume this would have been unnecessary if the *bahirāṅga* substitution of *v* had by the BP been *asiddha* in regard to the *antarāṅga* elision of *y*).” (Cf. K. pp. 261–262.)

It is hard to add anything to the text in order to clarify it. It informs us in no uncertain terms that the BP would *not* have prevented the elision of *y* before *v* in *vāyvoh*. Certainly P. 6.1.77 (*iko yaṇ aci*), which in *vāyu-os* substitutes *v* for *u*, is *bahirāṅga*; its cause is *o*. And P. 6.1.66 (*lopo vyor vali*), which prescribes elision of *y* before *v*, is *antarāṅga*; its cause is *v*. But these rules are *bahirāṅga* and *antarāṅga* in the second sense of those terms. And we know now that when those terms are used in this second sense the BP does *not* cause a *bahirāṅga* rule which has taken effect to be considered as not having taken effect with regard to the corresponding *antarāṅga* rule which then applies.

The passages discussed so far form the framework of what Nāgeśa has to say regarding the BP. They are also the backbone of our argument. A thorough acquaintance with their contents is essential for an understanding of what follows. For this reason a summary of those contents will now be given. In this way some simplifying conventions can also be introduced:

Out of a pair of rules or operations, one is *antarāṅga* with regard to the other, if and only if the other is *bahirāṅga* with regard to the former.

The term *antarāṅga* has two different meanings, to which correspond two different meanings of the term *bahirāṅga*, and two different interpretations of the BP. Therefore I shall speak of *antarāṅga*₁ (short: *a*₁), and *antarāṅga*₂ (short: *a*₂); *bahirāṅga*₁ (short: *b*₁) and *bahirāṅga*₂ (short: *b*₂); and of BP₁ and BP₂. These terms will now be explained.

A rule is *a*₁ with respect to another rule when the causes of the former rule lie within the causes of the latter one; this includes the case where the former rule has no causes, whereas the latter has. The latter rule is *b*₁ with respect to the former.

A rule is *a*₂ with respect to another rule when the cause of the former rule precedes the cause of the latter one. The latter rule is *b*₂ with respect to the former.

Now we turn to the two interpretations of the Paribhāṣā:

BP₁: If in a derivation two rules, one of which is *a*₁ with respect to the other, apply simultaneously, the one that is *a*₁ will take effect first. If in a derivation a rule which is *b*₁ with respect to another rule has taken effect, it is to be regarded as not having taken effect, when that other rule subsequently becomes applicable.

BP₂: If in a derivation two rules, one of which is *a*₂ with respect to the other, apply simultaneously, the one that is *a*₂ will take effect first.

This, I submit, is the basic structure of Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP. It is not complete yet; additions will be made as we proceed. But I would like to urge such readers as disagree with me here or at a later stage to try to find fault with what has been said so far. If some of the things still to come sound dubious to them, let them then attempt to give an alternative interpretation which accounts as well as the present one for the passages dealt with in this first chapter.

Unfortunately, the discussion up to this point contains one flaw, which anyone wishing to show the unsound nature of my contentions will be

ready to use against me. It is the fact that “cause” – a crucial concept in a study of the BP – has here been said to be “what is indicated in a rule in a locative case”, where our text clearly states “in a locative *or other* case”. To justify this statement of mine, and to further elucidate this obscure concept, we turn to the next chapter.

2. THE MEANINGS OF *ĀNGA*

As we have seen (above, p. 5) the amount of explicit information Nāgeśa gives us regarding the meaning of *āṅga* ("cause") leaves much to be desired. If we had to depend exclusively on his explicit statements, there would be no way of getting away from this unsatisfactory state of affairs. Fortunately, another way is open to us. We can study exactly how Nāgeśa puts the BP to use in specific cases. This, we may hope, will yield the information which was withheld from us in a more straightforward manner. The passage to be studied for this purpose will be largely drawn from elsewhere in the *PS* (that is to say, not from Nāgeśa's discussion of the BP) and from the *LŚŚ*. The first one is on Par. XCV.

PS 180. 1

*mimārjiṣati*tyartham¹ ca / tatra vṛddheḥ pūrvam antaraṅgatvād dvitve ...

"Moreover (Par. XCV must be adopted) for (the correct formation of) *mimārjisati* (the desid. of *mrj*); when namely (*mrj*) has been reduplicated – and this must be done before Vṛddhi is substituted (for *r* by P. 7.2.114), because (the reduplication is) *antaraṅga* (in regard to the substitution of Vṛddhi) – , . . . ". (K. p. 461.)

The passage is taken out of context, and may therefore remain somewhat obscure to the reader. But what becomes clear from it is that in the derivation of *mimārjisati* reduplication is *antaraṅga* with respect to the substitution of Vṛddhi.

The rules which prescribe these two operations are P. 6.1.9 (*sanyānoḥ*) and P. 7.2.114 (*mrjer vṛddhiḥ*), respectively. Let us look at these more closely, beginning with the latter.

P. 7.2.114 (*mrjer vṛddhiḥ*) does not, either by itself or by means of *anuvṛtti*, contain any term indicative of the cause of the substitution of Vṛddhi. In spite of that, the *SK* explains the sūtra (no. 2473) as follows: *mrjer iko vṛddhiḥ syād dhātupratyaye pare*, "Vṛddhi is substituted for the root-vowel of the stem *mrj* before any affix that is ordained after a root." Nāgeśa, in the *LŚŚ* (Vāraṇasi ed., part II, p. 571) – which was written after

the *PS*, see Appendix III – expresses his consent in the following words: *dhātoḥ kāryam ucyamānam iti paribhāṣālabdham artham āha dhātupratyaye iti*, “He explains the meaning (of the sūtra), arrived at by means of the Paribhāṣā *dhātoḥ kāryam ucyamānam . . .*, by saying ‘before any affix that is ordained after a root.’” Nāgeśa here refers to Par. LXXXVIII of his own *PS* (171.4), which reads in full: *dhātoḥ kāryam ucyamānam tatpratyaye bhavati*, “When an operation is taught concerning a root, it takes place (only when the root) is followed by such an affix (as can be added to roots)”² (cf. K. p. 429). With the help of this Paribhāṣā, P. 7.2.114 obtains a term indicative of the cause of the operation prescribed by this rule. Thus, once this meaning of P. 7.2.114 is accepted (and it clearly is by Nāgeśa), the cause of the substitution of Vṛddhi for *r*, in the derivation of *mimārjiṣati* from *mrj-sa(n)-ti*, becomes *san*; for *san* is a following “affix that is ordained after a root”.

P. 6.1.9 (*sanyāñoh*) is considered to consist of a compound with a genitive case ending. This can be learnt from the *PS* itself, which says (14.5–6): . . . *sanyāñoh ity asya ṣaṣṭhyantatvāt*³ . . . , “The term *sanyāñoh* in P. 6.1.9 being a genitive . . .” (K. p. 52). This rule prescribes reduplication of that which ends in *san*. However, this reduplication is subject to some conditions, one of which is important for us at present. It is laid down in P. 6.1.1. (*ekāco dve prathamasya*), and holds that only the first part of *mrj-san* may be reduplicated, i.e., only *mrj*. A result of this is that *san*, though part of that which undergoes the reduplication, is itself not reduplicated. And such being the case, the restriction embodied in Par. X – according to which “that which undergoes an operation can, so far as it undergoes that operation, not be made the cause of the application of a grammatical rule” (K. p. 51) – does not affect the affix *san*. In other words, it is quite possible that the cause of the reduplication of *mrj* is *san*.

However, as soon as we assume that *san* is indeed the cause of reduplication in the derivation of *mimārjiṣati*, we are confronted with difficulties. For we have seen above that *san* is also the cause of the substitution of Vṛddhi in this same derivation. That is to say, both reduplication and substitution of Vṛddhi would have one and the same cause, viz. *san*. But then it would become unclear why reduplication should be *antarāṅga* with respect to the substitution of Vṛddhi: As both operations have one and the same cause, it cannot be said that the cause of one operation lies within the causes of the other, nor that the cause of one precedes the cause of the other. In spite of that, according to the present passage, reduplication is *antarāṅga*.

A solution to this problem can easily be found. We have but to accept that *san* is not the cause of reduplication because *sanyāñoh* (in P. 6.1.9) has a genitive case ending. In other words, terms with a genitive case ending occurring in a rule are not to be regarded as causes of an operation, at least not where the *Antarangatva* or *Bahirangatva* of that operation is to be determined.

Once this much is accepted, the above passage becomes clear. In the derivation of *mimārjiṣati*, reduplication of *mrj* has no cause, whereas substitution of *Vṛddhi* does have a cause, viz. *san*. Therefore the former operation is *antaraṅga*, or, more exactly, *a₁*, with respect to the latter, and takes place first. This disposes of the genitive case.

We turn to the ablative case. Two passages, one in the *LŚŚ*, the other in the *PŚ*, allow us to infer that a word in the ablative case cannot in the context of the BP be considered a cause. The first passage reads:

LŚŚ on SK 2202 (Vāraṇasī edition, II, p. 447)

bhavatād iti / lugapekṣayā paratvāddhes tātañ /

“In (the derivation of) *bhavatāt* (out of *bhava-hi*, the substitution of) *tāt* (*an*) for *hi* (by P. 7.1.35 supersedes the substitution of *luk* for *hi* by P. 6.4.105), because (P. 7.1.35) occurs later (in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) than (P. 6.4.105 which prescribes substitution of) *luk* (for *hi*).”

At the stage *bhava-hi* two rules apply, P. 7.1.35 (*tuhyos tātañrāśiṣy anyatarasyām*) prescribes substitution of *tāt* for *hi*; P. 6.4.105 (*ato heḥ*) prescribes substitution of *luk* for *hi*. P. 7.1.35 supersedes P. 6.4.105 because it occurs later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. This is what the above passage says. It seems safe to conclude that P. 7.1.35 is not at the same time *antaraṅga* with respect to P. 6.4.105. Had it been so, our passage would not have failed to mention this, for *Antarangatva* is a stronger criterion for deciding which rule supersedes which than later occurrence in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. What is more, the very next sentence explains why Par. LII (*antaraṅgān api vidhīn bahirāṅgo lug bādhate*) does not apply here: that Paribhāṣā does not apply because it is *anitya*.⁴ This excludes the possibility that the *Antaraṅgatva* of P. 7.1.35 was not mentioned because of an oversight on the part of Nāgeśa.

So P. 7.1.35 is not *antaraṅga*, and P. 6.4.105 not *bahirāṅga*. But if a word with an ablative case ending were indicative of a cause of the kind required by Par. L, then P. 7.1.35 would be *antaraṅga*, and P. 6.4.105 would be *bahirāṅga*. To see why, we may note that neither of these two rules has a

following cause. But whereas P. 7.1.35 has no preceding cause either, P. 6.4.105 would have a preceding cause (*a*) indicated by a word with an ablative case ending (*ato*). And just as a rule without following cause is *antarāṅga* with respect to a rule with a following cause, there would seem to be no way of escaping the conclusion that a rule without preceding cause is *antararīga* with respect to a rule with a preceding cause. To get out of the difficulties we can but assume that preceding causes do not count in the context of Par. L.

The passage from the *PS* which confirms our opinion that words with an ablative case ending do not indicate causes in the context of the BP is the one we have studied above (p. 6) and which mentions the derivation of *pacet*.⁵ For clarity's sake I shall repeat the relevant facts.

At the stage *paca-yā-t* P. 7.2.80 (*ato yeyah*) prescribes substitution of *ey* for *yā*. This operation has no following cause, since the rule prescribing it contains no word with a locative case ending. That rule does, however, contain a word with an ablative case ending: *ataḥ*, “after short *a*”. The next operation, elision of *y* before *t*, is prescribed by P. 6.1.66 (*lopo vyor vali*). Its following cause is *t*, referred to in the rule by the word *vali*, which has a locative case ending.

We know that out of these two operations the first one is *antarāṅga* because it has no following cause. But this means quite simply that *the preceding cause of that operation is completely ignored*. The conclusion is obvious: Preceding causes do not count in the context of Par. L.

Other than the ablative, genitive and locative, none of the cases qualifies as an indicator of the cause of an operation. Since in the realm of the BP the genitive and ablative are disqualified, only the locative remains. But here also a restriction must be added. A *viśayasaptamī*, “locative which conveys the sense that the affix etc. which in the rule has this locative case ending may be added at some time or other”, does not indicate the cause of an operation. This we learn from the passage to be studied presently.

On p. 193 Nāgeśa introduces Par. CXIX *samprasāraṇam tadāśrayam ca kāryam*⁶ *balavat*, “A (substitution of) Samprasāraṇa and the operation dependent on it possess greater force (than other operations which are simultaneously applicable)” (K. p. 512). In the ensuing discussion Nāgeśa rejects this Paribhāṣā and then comes to our passage.

PS 193.13–194.2

*nau ca samścaṇoḥ ityādau⁷ samścaṇor ityādi viśayasaptamīti tatrāpi na
doṣa ity anyatra vistaraḥ*

“Nor (does the rejection of this Paribhāṣā entail) any fault in the case of (rules) like P. 6.1.31, for the locatives *samścaṇoh* etc. (of those rules do not convey the sense ‘when *san* and *cari* follow’, but they convey the meaning) ‘where (*san* etc) may be added (at some time or other)’. More hereof elsewhere.” (K. p. 514.)

This passage is in itself not very clear, and it is worthwhile to see what the *SK* has to say concerning P. 6.1.31, and how Nāgeśa comments on this. First the *SK* (no. 2579):

*nau ca samścaṇoh / sanpare caṇpare ca nau śvayateḥ saṃprasāraṇam vā
svāt / saṃprasāraṇam tadaśrayam ca kāryam balavat iti vacanāt
saṃprasāraṇam / pūrvarūpam / aśūśavat /*

“There is optionally (substitution of) Samprasāraṇa (for the semivowel) of *svi*, when (the affix) *ṇi* follows, when this (affix itself) is followed by the (Desiderative affix) *san* and when it is followed by the (aorist affix) *cari* (In the derivation of the 3. sg. aor. par. *aśūśavat* from *svi-(ṇi) i(c)-(c)a(ṇi)-t* Samprasāraṇa takes place by Par. CXIX (before substitution of Vṛddhi for the vowel *i* of *svi* by P. 7.2.115. Subsequently, by P. 6.1.108, the single substitute for the Samprasāraṇa vowel *u* and the following vowel *i*) is the preceding (vowel *u*. This way) *aśūśavat* (is formed).”

When in the derivation of *aśūśavat* the following stage has been reached

svi-(ṇi)i(c)-(c)a(ṇi)-t,

two rules present themselves. P. 7.2.115 (*aco ḡñiti*) prescribes substitution of Vṛddhi for the final vowel *i* of *svi*. P. 6.1.31 prescribes substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *v* in *svi*.

It is argued that if P. 7.2.115 would take effect first, the form *aśūśavat* would not result. The derivation would, in that case, take this shape⁸:

svi-(ṇi)i(c)-(c)a(ṇi)-t → śvai-i-a-t (7.2.115) → *śvāy-i-a-t* (6.1.78) etc.

The outcome would not be the desired form *aśūśavat*.

It must be concluded that at the stage *svi-(ṇi)i(c)-(c)a(ṇi)-t* it is not P. 7.2.115 but P. 6.1.31 that is to take effect first. However, the cause of the application of P. 7.2.115 is *ṇic*, and of P. 6.1.31 *ṇic* and *cari* together. Clearly *ṇic* lies within the combination *ṇic + san*. P. 7.2.115 must, therefore, be considered *antarāṅga* with respect to P. 6.1.31 and should take effect first.

To avoid this undesired consequence, Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita has recourse to Par. CXIX (*samprasāraṇam tadaśrayaṁ ca kāryaṁ balavat*). The result is that P. 6.1.31, though *bahirāṅga*, takes effect before P. 7.2.115.

Nāgeśa disapproves of this procedure. He is of the opinion that even without Par. CXIX the correct form *asūśavat* can be arrived at. The reason is, he says, that the locative *samścaṇoh* in P. 6.1.31 is a *viṣayasaptamī*. He explains this clearly in his *LŚŚ* (Vāraṇasī ed., II, p. 618):

nau ca sam / atra nau ca samścaṇor iti viṣayasaptamī / evam ca tayor vivakṣitayor antaraṅgatvād vrddhyādeḥ pūrvam samprasāraṇam ; anyathā-ntaraṅgatvād vrddhyāyoh kṛtayoh paścat samprasāraṇe'pi asūśavat ityādyasiddhis tad āha: samprasāraṇam tadaśrayañ ceti / na tv iyam paribhāseti bhramitavyam / tasyā bhāṣye pratyākhyānāt /

"On P. 6.1.31. Here in *nau ca samścaṇoh* (the locative) is a locative which conveys that the affixes concerned may be added at some time or other. Therefore, when it is intended to utter those two (i.e., *nīc* and *san*, or *nīc* and *caṇ*), Samprasāraṇa is substituted before Vṛddhi etc., because it is *antaraṅga*. Otherwise (when the locative of *nau* and of *samścaṇoh* does not convey that these affixes will be added at some time or other, the form) *asūśavat* etc. would not be obtained, even though Samprasāraṇa would be there, (because Samprasāraṇa would be there) afterwards, when (substitution of) Vṛddhi (for the final *i* of śvi by P. 7.2.115), and (substitution of) *āy* (for the resulting Vṛddhi-vowel *ai*, by P. 6.1.78) would have taken place, for (these two substitutions are, on this assumption,) *antaraṅga*. This (Bhāṭṭoji) expresses in the words: *samprasāraṇam tadaśrayaṁ ca...* But it should not erroneously be thought that this is a Paribhāṣā. For it has been rejected in the Bhāṣya."

There may be a difference between what Nāgeśa says here and what he says in the *PS*. Here both *nau* and *samścaṇoh* seem to be considered as ending in a *viṣayasaptamī*, whereas in the *PS* only *samścaṇoh* may be intended to be such. Be this as it may, the conclusion to be drawn remains unaffected: A word in a locative case, if this locative case is a *viṣaya-saptamī*, does not indicate such a cause as is required for the application of the BP.

So the word *aṅga* in our Paribhāṣā denotes a formal cause – such as sound or a combination of sounds – exhibited in a rule in a locative case, and not in any other case. But why then does Nāgeśa say: "exhibited in a rule in a locative *or other* case" (see above, p. 5)? As we have seen, none of the

other eligible cases has been accepted. What then are those other cases?

It is easier to raise this question than to answer it. The only answer I can think of is that Nāgeśa here has the “two-word principle” in mind. According to this principle, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, an operation which depends on two words is *bahirāṅga* (*b₁*) with respect to an operation which does not depend on two words. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the two words (or sounds that are part of two words) which act as causes in the context of the two-word principle are not always referred to by words with a locative case ending. If this solution does not appeal to the reader, he may prefer to believe that Nāgeśa added the word *ādi*, which gave rise to our translation “or other case”, without having anything specific in mind, merely to account for as yet unthought-of eventualities, as indeed is a regular practice in śāstric Sanskrit.⁹

With this much, the two statements of Nāgeśa concerning the meaning of *āṅga*, which he made in his discussion of the BP and which were studied by us earlier (above, p. 5), have been sufficiently clarified. One final observation, however, must be made. These two statements regarding the meaning of *āṅga*, were both made in that portion of the discussion of Par. L which deals with the first interpretation of the BP, i.e., with BP₁. This has as a consequence that it is conceivable that the restrictions here imposed on the meaning of *āṅga* do not apply with the same force where the second interpretation of the BP, i.e., BP₂, is concerned. With respect to this, nothing can be said with certainty until a study has been made of what Nāgeśa has to say about it. Such a study will now be undertaken.

From the example *asusruvat*, which Nāgeśa uses to introduce his second interpretation of the BP, it becomes clear that here also, in the realm of BP₂, the word *āṅga* can denote a formal cause, exhibited in a rule in a locative case. For at the stage *a-su-sru-a-t* both the causes of the competing operations (see p. 9 above) are so exhibited. The cause *a* is indicated by *aci* in P. 6.4.77; the cause *t* by *sārvadhātukārdhādhātukayoh*, which is drawn into P. 7.3.86 from rule 84.

Nowhere in the *PS* and the *LSS* have formal causes that were exhibited in a rule by a word in the genitive or ablative case been used in the context of BP₂. We may therefore safely conclude that also where BP₂ is concerned only such formal causes as are exhibited in a rule in a locative case can be used, just as we found was the case with BP₁.

However, Nāgeśa's discussion of BP₂ contains a passage which adds a

completely new dimension to the meaning of the term *anīga* in BP₂. It reads as follows:

PS 96.5–8, App. I ll. 134–138

arthānām api jātivyakti lingasamkhyākārakāñām bodhakramah śāstra-kṛtkalpitas tatkrāmenaiva ca tadbodhakaśabdaprādurbhāvah kalpita iti tatkrāmenaiva tatkāryāñitī paṭvyetyādāv antarañgatvāt pūrvam pūrvaya-nādeśah parayañādeśasya bahirāngatayāsiddhatvād ity anenācaḥ parasmin iti sūtre bhāṣye spastam //

“It appears from the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.57 that similarly meanings (as, e.g., those expressed by a Prātipadika), viz. a genus, a (particular) individual, gender, number and a (particular) case-relation, are imagined to be apprehended in a certain order (one after the other) by Pāṇini, that the several portions of a word which express those (meanings) are imagined to arise (one after the other) in the same order, and that the operations which concern each (of those portions) take effect therefore in the very same order; in (the formation of) *paṭvā* etc. therefore (from *paṭu-i-ā* etc.), the substitution of a semivowel for the first vowel (*u*), being *antarāṅga*, takes place first; because the substitution of a semivowel for the second vowel (*i*) is *bahirāṅga* and therefore (regarded as) not existing.” (Cf. K. p. 260–261.)

Reading this passage, I see no way of avoiding the conclusion that here *Antarañgatva* is assigned to operations *on the basis of meaning*. This is, in itself, not alarming. We simply conclude from it that, whereas BP₁ does not permit meanings as causes, BP₂ does. That meanings are not allowed to be causes in the realm of BP₁ we had learned long ago (above, p. 5); that BP₂ has no such scruples, we learn now.

In the uniform interpretation of the BP that Kielhorn presents, on the other hand, the presence of two passages, one of which excludes meanings from the range of causes, and another which expressly admits them, must be viewed as nothing less than a contradiction.

At this point, let me admit that it is not impossible that the *PS* contains mutually contradictory passages. All I claim is that it is reasonable to accept as correct that interpretation which reduces the number of such contradictory passages to a minimum, other things being equal. And in the present case, the contradiction which there is for those who refuse to keep

the two interpretations of the BP strictly apart does not exist for those who accept the division.

What then does Kielhorn do to solve his problem? The answer is disappointing. He does nothing. Or perhaps I should say, almost nothing. For he translates the crucial word *arthānām* of the above passage in such an inconspicuous manner – he renders it “whatever is expressed (by a word)” – that the contradiction escapes the notice of the superficial reader.

Criticizing Kielhorn in cases like this is easy. But it should not make us forget that we are not wholly without difficulties either. For one thing, the fact that some extra meaning has been assigned to the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* has repercussions on how BP₂ is to be interpreted. What we knew was that in the derivation of *paṭvya* the stage *paṭu-ī-ā* occurred. Here two operations presented themselves: substitution of the semivowel *v* for the vowel *u* by P. 6.1.77 (its cause is *ī*) and substitution of the semivowel *y* for the vowel *ī*, again by P. 6.1.77 (its cause is *ā*). Here the former operation was *antarāṅga*, because its cause *ī* preceded, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, the cause *ā* of the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation, i.e., of the second operation described above. Both these operations apply simultaneously, but the former takes effect first, due to BP₂.

What we learn from the passage last studied, however, is that an operation can be *antarāṅga* because the sounds on which it depends present themselves earlier in order of time, this again because the meanings which are responsible for those sounds, or combinations of sounds, appear in a certain, chronological, order. This has as a consequence that an operation may be entitled to the name *antarāṅga* before the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation is in sight. In the derivation of *paṭvya* this means that substitution of *v* for *u* in *paṭu-ī*, by P. 6.1.77, will be *antarāṅga* before *ā* – which is to become an integral part of *paṭvya* – has made its appearance. What can the role of BP₂ in such a case possibly be? For haven't we seen already that BP₂ is only to be put into use where the *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* rules apply *simultaneously* (pp. 11f, above)?

It is clear that some adjustments in BP₂ are to be made. This Nāgeśa does in the following passage.

PS 97.2–3, App. I ll. 144–146

*kramenānvākhyāne tūktodāharane pūrvapravṛttikatvam antaraṅgatvam
bahirāṅgasyāsiddhatvam api nimittabhāvād aprāptirūpam bodhyam*

"If, on the other hand, in accounting for the formation of a word, (one makes each expressive portion of it arise) one after the other, (i.e., if one, e.g., first adds *i* to *paṭu*, and afterwards *ā* to *paṭvī*), then the *Antarangatva* (of the substitution of a semivowel for the first vowel *u*) in the above example (*paṭvyā*) must be taken to mean 'its taking place first', and the *Asiddhatva* of the *bahiranga* (substitution of a semivowel for the second vowel *i*) can only mean 'that it does not (yet) apply, because its cause (*ā*) is (as yet) absent'." (K. p. 262.)

The rôle assigned to BP₂ in cases like this is minor indeed. Here BP₂ comes to mean hardly more than "first come, first served".

So the formation of *paṭvyā* can be accounted for in two ways. One is by dissolving the word into its constituent parts and then building it up out of those constituent parts (*vibhajyānvākhyāna*); the other is by making each expressive portion of the word arise one after the other (*kramenānvākhyāna*). BP₂ assumes a different form (henceforth to be called BP₂₁ and BP₂₂ respectively) depending on which of the two alternatives we choose. But the outcome is the same, either way.

More will be said about BP₂₂ later, in Part II. We shall find that this aspect of the Paribhāṣā is employed far more often than BP₁ and BP₂₁ together. (This is, incidentally, also the case in the *LŚŚ*.) Here we are concerned with the meaning of *arīga*, and consequently we have to address ourselves to a problem which remains in connection with the formal causes which figure in BP₁ and BP₂₁.

In order to understand the problem which will now engage our attention, the reader is requested to turn away from Par. L for a short while and look at Par. X. That Paribhāṣā reads: *kāryam anubhavan*¹⁰ *hi kāryī nimittatayā nāśrīyate*, which means: "Surely, that which undergoes an operation can so far as it undergoes that operation not be made the cause (of the application of a grammatical rule)" (K. p. 51). The question which we have to study is: Does Par. X also apply to causes that are employed in the context of Par. L? In other words, does a following cause (which is exhibited in a rule in a locative case) still count as cause for the BP when it itself undergoes the operation concerned?

The answer to the above question is that Par. X does not apply in the context of Par. L. This will now be shown with the help of two passages from the *LŚŚ* and one from the *PS*.

LŚŚ on SK 76 (Kumbakonam ed., I, p. 381)

na ca kartari carṣītyādau gunasya padadvayasaṁbandhivarnadvayāśritatvena bahirangatvād repḥabhāvena na visarga iti vācyam / gunasyeva padadvayasaṁbandhirephakharātmakavarnadvayāśritatvena visargasyāpi tattvāt / paranimittakatvam apy ubhayoh samam /

"And it should not be said that (in such forms as *carsi-*, which are composed of *ca-r̥si* etc., and which occur) in P. 3.2.186 etc., there is no (substitution of) *visarga* (for *r* by P. 8.3.15) because (as far as P. 8.3.15 is concerned) the *r* (in *carṣī-*) does not exist, (and that this is so) because (the substitution of) *Guṇa* (*a* for *a-r̥* of *ca-r̥si* by P. 6.1.87) is *bahiranga* (with respect to the subsequently applying substitution of *visarga* for *r*) on account of the fact that (the substitution of *Guna a* for *a-r̥*) depends on two sounds of two words. (This should not be said) because, like (the substitution of) *Guṇa* (*a* for *a-r̥* in *ca-r̥si-*), also (the substitution of) *visarga* (for *r* in *carsi-*) is (*bahiranga*) since it (also) depends on two sounds, viz. *r* and (*s* which is included in the *pratyāhāra*) *khar*, of two words. Further, both (the substitution of *Guna a* for *a-r̥* and the substitution of *visarga* for *r*) are equal in this respect that (both) have a following cause."

Part of this passage will not be intelligible to the reader until he has read Chapter 5. For our present purpose it is the last sentence which is of importance, and this sentence can be understood without difficulty.

P. 3.2.186 contains the expression *carsidevatayoh*. The first part of this expression, *carṣī*, one can arrive at as follows: *ca-r̥si* → *c-a-si* (6.1.87) → *ca-r̥si* (1.1.51). At the stage *carṣī* P. 8.3.15 applies, but does not take effect, for reasons that do not concern us here. The last sentence of the above passage informs us that both P. 8.3.15 and P. 6.1.87 have a following cause.

That P. 8.3.15 has a following cause the reader can easily verify for himself. Difficulties arise in connection with P. 6.1.87. This rule reads: *ād gunah [aci 77]*, and clearly contains a word with a locative case ending, viz. *aci*. One could therefore say that in *ca-r̥si-* the vowel *r̥* is a cause, because it is exhibited in the rule concerned (P. 6.1.87) in a locative case. But *r̥* itself undergoes the operation! Consequently, if Par. X is valid in the context of Par. L, *r̥* cannot be considered a cause of the substitution of *a* for *a-r̥*.

The conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the above passage says that P. 6.1.87 has a following cause is clear: *Par. X cannot be used in the context of Par. L*.

We shall study a second passage from the *LŚŚ* which will lead us to this same conclusion: that Par. X does not apply in the realm of the BP. This second passage comments on the *SK* on P. 8.2.80. This sūtra reads: *adasoser dād u do mah*. The sound *u* in this rule stands for both *u* and *ū*. It does so, according to Bhaṭṭoī Dīkṣita, because it is a Samāhārvandva of these two sounds. Nāgeśa disagrees, and gives his reason in the following lines:

LŚŚ on *SK* 419 (Kumbakonam ed. II, p. 1043)

*u s ū s iti dvandve sulope ghyantatvāddhrasvasya pūrvanipāte
napumsakahrasvasavarnādīrghayoh prāptaylor dīrghasya
śabdāntaraprāptyānityatvena nityatvād aparanimittakatvenāntaraṅgatvāc
ca hrasvatve tataḥ savarṇadīrghe u iti rūpāsiddheḥ*

“Because the form *u* would not result. In the Dvandva (compound) *u-s-ū-s* (first) elision of (the nominative singular case-endings) *s(u)* (by P. 2.4.71 would take place; then) the short (vowel *u*) would be placed first (by P. 2.2.32) because it ends in (what is called) *ghi* (by P. 1.4.7); when (subsequently the following two rules) apply, (P. 1.2.47 which prescribes) shortening (of *ū* on account of the fact that the Dvandva compound *u-ū* is) neuter, (and P. 6.1.101 which prescribes substitution of the single) long (vowel *ū* for the two) homogeneous (vowels *u-ū*, substitution of) long (*ū* for *u-ū*) would be *anitya* by Par. XLIII; as a result (the substitution of) short (*u* for *ū* by P. 1.2.47 would take precedence) because it is *nitya*, and also *antarāṅga* on account of the fact that it has no following cause; after this, (substitution of) long (*ū* for the two) homogeneous (vowels *u-u* would take place, so that we would end up with *ū*, instead of the desired *u*).”

At the stage *u-ū* two rules apply. P. 1.2.47 prescribes shortening of *ū*; it has no following cause. P. 6.1.101 prescribes substitution of *ū* for *u-ū*. Our passage tells us that P. 1.2.47 is *antarāṅga because it has no following cause*. This indicates that P. 6.1.101 does have a following cause. The following cause of P. 6.1.101 can only be *ū*, in spite of the fact that *ū* undergoes the operation. We must again conclude that Par. X does not apply.

After these two passages from the *LŚŚ* we can study one from the *PS*. This passage from the *PS* comes last because the evidence it contains is less strong than the evidence provided by the two passages from the *LŚŚ*. The

reason is that the crucial part of the passage from the *PS* can be interpreted in two ways, as will be explained below.

PS 148.6-11

nanv ayaje indram ityādāv antaraṅgasyāpi gunasyāpavādena savarnadīrgheṇa bādhah syād ata āha /

APAVĀDO YADY ANYATRA CARITĀRTHAS TARHY ANTARAṄGENA BĀDHYATE (Par. LXV) //

niravakāśatvarūpasya bādhakatvabijasyābhāvāt¹¹ / evam ca prakrte'ntarāṅgena gunena savarnadīrgheṇa samānāśraye caritārtho yaṅguṇayor apavādo'pi¹² bādhya te / pūrvopasīhitānimittakatvarūpāntaraṅgatvaviṣaya¹³ idam / /

"Now one might say that, e.g., in (the formation of) *ayaje indram* (from *ayaja-i-indram*) the (substitution by P. 6.1.87 of) Guṇa (for *a-i*), even though it is *antaraṅga*, ought to be superseded by the (substitution of the) homogeneous long vowel (*ī* for *i-i* which is taught in P. 6.1.101), an *Apavāda* (of the rule which teaches the substitution of Guṇa. The author of the Paribhāṣās) says therefore.

Par. LXV: When an *Apavāda* serves a purpose elsewhere, then it is superseded by a (general) *antaraṅga* (rule);

because the reason why it would supersede (the general *antaraṅga* rule), viz. the circumstance that there would be no opportunity (for the taking effect of it if it did not supersede the *antaraṅga* rule), does (in this case) not exist. And so the (substitution of) a homogeneous long vowel (for *i-i*) is in the present instance (of *ayaja-i-indram*) superseded by the *antaraṅga* (substitution of the) Guṇa (*e* for *a-i*), notwithstanding that the former is an *Apavāda* of (both the substitution of) *yañ* (taught in P. 6.1.77) and (that of) Guṇa, viz. because it serves a purpose when it depends on the same (sounds on which the substitutions of *yañ* or Guṇa depends). This concerns such *antaraṅga* (rules) as are *antaraṅga* for the reason that their causes (in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds) precede (the causes of the *bahirāṅga Apavādas*)". (Cf. K. pp. 347-348.)

To *ayaja-i-indram* two rules apply. P. 6.1.101 (*akah savarne dīrghah*) prescribes substitution of *ī* for *i-i*. P. 6.1.87 (*ad gunah*) prescribes substitution of *e* for *a-i*. We learn from the above passage that P. 6.1.87 is *antaraṅga* with respect to P. 6.1.101, and further that this is so because the

cause of P. 6.1.87 precedes, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, the cause of P. 6.1.101. This leaves us no choice. The cause of P. 6.1.87 must be the first *i* in *ayaja-i-indram*, and the cause of P. 6.1.101 can only be the second *i* in that same form. But both these sounds undergo the operation of which they are the cause. This can be the case only if Par. X is not applicable here.

As was said above, this passage from the *PS* can be interpreted differently, in such a way that the nonapplicability of Par. X cannot be deduced from it. We have assumed that the last sentence of this passage means that Par. LXV operates only in the realm of BP₂₁. For there the cause of the *antaranga* rule precedes *in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds* the cause of the *bahiranga* rule. Unfortunately, the words "in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds" occur in the translation in parentheses. This means that nothing in the Sanskrit original corresponds to these words. In other words, the last sentence of this passage can also be understood as meaning that Par. LXV operates only in the realm of BP₂₂, or generally in the realm of BP₂, i.e., BP₂₁ and BP₂₂ combined. Indeed, we shall see that BP₂₂ provides that operations which take place inside a single word supersede operations which reach over the boundary of single words (Chapter 7, below), so that there is nothing unusual about invoking BP₂₂ where the derivation of *ayaje indram* is the subject of discussion.¹⁴

Even if, in view of the above, the reader discards the passage from the *PS* as evidence regarding the behaviour of Par. X in the context of Par. L, he cannot so easily explain away the two earlier passages from the *LSS*. Our earlier conclusion therefore stands: Par. X cannot be used in the context of Par. L.

3. THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE PARIBHĀṢĀ

By now we have become accustomed to the fact that the BP behaves as if it really is a combination of two Paribhāṣās. To its two main interpretations correspond two meanings assigned to the word *arīga* (even though neither of these departs from the fundamental sense “cause”). It will therefore cause no surprise to find that the BP has been justified by Nāgeśa in a double way: BP₁ by a Jñāpaka, BP₂ by a maxim of common life. We are now ready to come to grips with the passages introducing both.

PS 85.2–6, App. I ll. 56–61

*iyam ca tripādyām na pravartate tripādyā asiddhatvāt / asyām ca vāha
ūṭhsūtrastham ūdgrahaṇam jñāpakam ity eṣā sapādasaptādhyāyīsthā /
anyathā samprasāraṇamātravidhānenā laghūpadhagunē vrddhir eci iti
vrddhau viśvauha ityadisiddhes tadvaiyarthyaṁ spaṣṭam eva / satyām hy
etasyām bahirāṅgasamprasāraṇasyāsiddhatvāl laghūpadhagunō na syāt //*

“This (Paribhāṣā) has no concern (with the rules) in the last three chapters (of Pāṇini’s grammar) because those rules are *asiddha* (in regard to that which precedes them in Pāṇini’s grammar); and that this (Paribhāṣā) has its place among (the rules contained in) the first seven lectures and the first chapter (of the eighth lecture, or in other words, that it precedes the rules contained in the three last chapters of Pāṇini’s work) results from the circumstance that its (existence) is indicated by the word *ūṭh* in the rule P. 6.4.132. If the Paribhāṣā did not exist, that (term *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132) would clearly be superfluous; (to account) for the formation of *viśvauhāḥ* (from *viśva-vāh-as*) etc., it would suffice to enjoin (the substitution of) Samprasāraṇa (for the *v* of *vāh*), for after the substitution by P. 6.1.108 of the Samprasāraṇa *u* for *u-ā*, i.e. after the change of *vāh* to *uh*) the Guṇa (vowel *o* would be substituted) for the prosodically short penultimate (*u* by P. 7.3.86), and afterwards the Vṛddhi (vowel *au* for *a-o*) by P. 6.1.188; whereas, as soon as the present (Paribhāṣā) is (adopted), Guṇa cannot be (substituted) for the prosodically short penultimate (*u*), because (the substitution of) the Samprasāraṇa (*u* for *vā*), being *bahirāṅga* (in

regard to the substitution of Guṇa), is (by this Paribhāṣā regarded as) not having taken place." (K. pp. 235–237.)

If the BP did not exist, and P. 6.4.132 were to read *vāhah*, instead of *vāha īṭh* as it actually does, the form *viśvauhah* could be derived in the following manner:

viśva-vāh-ṇvi-śas
viśva-u-āh-ṇvi-śas, by P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*)
viśva-u-h-ṇvi-śas, by P. 6.1.108
viśva-oh-ṇvi-śas, by P. 7.3.86
viśvauh-ṇvi-śas, by P. 6.1.88

This at least is the part of the derivation we are here interested in.

However, once the BP is accepted, the above derivation, or, rather, partial derivation, becomes impossible. The reason is that the substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v* – in view of Par. CXIX we may say substitution of *u* for *vā*¹ – is *bahirāṅga*, substitution of Guṇa *o* for *u antaraṅga*. The former operation is consequently to be considered *asiddha* with respect to the latter. This, at any rate, is what Nāgeśa says about the matter.

For details concerning this derivation let us listen to what Kielhorn says in a footnote (K. p. 236, fn. 1). He describes the situation as follows: *viśva-vāh-ṇvi-āḥ* becomes *viśva-uh-ṇvi-āḥ* by P. 6.4.132 (now: *vāhah*) and P. 6.1.108. The cause of this operation is *āḥ*. Substitution, following this, of Guṇa for *u* by P. 7.3.86 would have as cause *ṇvi*. Since, however, substitution of *u* for *vā* is *bahirāṅga*, substitution of Guṇa for *u antaraṅga*, this latter operation cannot take place after the former.

Kielhorn's explanation is rather unsatisfactory, for it leaves us with some problems. First, the meaning of P. 6.4.132 (*vāha īṭh*) is, according to the SK (no. 329), *bhasya vāhah samprasāraṇam īṭh syāt*. When we deprive this rule of the word *īṭh*, the remainder, i.e., *vāhah*, comes to mean *bhasya vāhah samprasāraṇam syāt*, "Let there be Samprasāraṇa of *vāh* when it is *Bha*." From this it follows that the immediate cause of the application of P. 6.4.132 (in its new shape: *vāhah*) is the fact that *vāh* carries the name "Bha". Further, *vāh* is called "Bha" because it is followed by the affix *āḥ* – the intervening affix *ṇvi* disappears by P. 1.3.9 and P. 6.1.67 – so that *āḥ* is the indirect cause of the application of P. 6.4.132 (modified). But once it is admitted that *āḥ* is not directly, but indirectly, the cause of the application

of P. 6.4.132 (modified), we are in for trouble. Because elsewhere in his comment on this same Paribhāṣā Nāgeśa has stated that neither dependence on technical terms nor an indirect cause can make an operation *bahirāṅga*. So we are confronted with a contradiction in the *PS*.

A detailed exposition of the contradiction, and of what to do about it, must be deferred to Appendix II. Here it may merely be stated that, more often than not, Nāgeśa does allow indirect causes to make an operation *bahirāṅga*, so it is perfectly legitimate, in the case under discussion, to say that *ah* is the cause of P. 6.4.132 (modified).

The cause of P. 7.3.86 is *nvi*. It is this simple fact that constitutes our second problem, much more threatening than the first one. For *nvi*, the cause of P. 7.3.86, lies *before – not within – ah*, the cause of P. 6.4.132 (modified). And the result of this is that here BP₂₁ applies, not BP₁. And where BP₂₁ applies, a *bahirāṅga* operation may very well be followed by an *antaraṅga* operation.

Let us recall exactly what we are doing. It is claimed, by Nāgeśa, that, if P. 6.4.132 (*vāha īḥ*) were not to contain the word *īḥ* and therefore simply read *vāhāḥ*, the form *viśvauhāḥ* could not then be correctly derived. For at the stage,

viśva-vāh-nvi-ah

first this rule *vāhāḥ*, followed by P. 6.1.108, would bring about

viśva-uh-nvi-ah.

Subsequently, P. 7.3.86, aspiring to put *o* for *u* in *uh*, would be prevented from taking effect by the BP.

But what we have just discovered is in direct conflict with this. True, the first operation is *bahirāṅga* and the second, *antaraṅga*, but they are *b₂* and *a₂*, respectively. And that means that the second interpretation of the BP applies here, BP₂, which does *not* prevent an *antaraṅga* operation from taking place after a *bahirāṅga* one.

The difficulty we are here confronted with is extremely serious. As the Jñāpaka is always one of the main topics to be discussed in connection with a Paribhāṣā, it is impossible to assume that Nāgeśa made a mistake here.

Before we attempt to tackle this problem, we note that Śeṣādrisudhī, who – as can be gathered from K. V. Abhyankar's introduction to the *PS* – in his *Paribhāṣābhāskara* attacked Nāgeśa wherever he could, “in a bitter language which almost shows the bad taste of the author” (p. 32) was puzzled by the same question as we are. He says:

PS 418.22–25

*viśvauhah ity atra samprasāraṇam bahirāṅgam guṇas tv antaraṅga ity
āśritya iyam paribhāṣā jñāpitā / tatra guṇasya nimittam nvi /
samprasāraṇasya nimittam śas / na cāsyā guṇanimittaghaṭitatāsti,
yena bahirāṅgatā syāt /*

“This Paribhāṣā (i.e., the BP) is indicated (by *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132), provided that, in (the derivation of) *viśvauhah*, (substitution of) Samprasāraṇa (*u* for *v* in *viśva-vāh-nvi-śas*) is *bahirāṅga*, but (substitution of) Guṇa (*o* for *u* in the following stage *viśva-uh-nvi-śas*) *antaraṅga*. In that (derivation) the cause of (substituting) Guṇa (*o* for *u*) is *nvi*. The cause of (substituting) Samprasāraṇa (*u* for *v*) is *śas*. But this (suffix *śas*) does not contain as a constituent part (the suffix *nvi* which is) the cause of (substituting) Guṇa, as a result of which substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v*) would be *bahirāṅga*.”

So according to Śeṣādrisudhī as well, substitution of Samprasāraṇa would be *bahirāṅga* for Nāgeśa, if only its cause, *śas* were to contain the cause of substituting Guṇa, *nvi*: in other words, if *nvi* were within *śas*. But this means that, at least in one important respect, Śeṣādrisudhī understood the text of the *PS* exactly the way we understand it.

This is not the only passage in Śeṣādrisudhī’s work from which it is clear that its author understood the part of the *PS* now under consideration to be based on *inclusion* as the criterion of *Antaraṅgatva*.² It is not surprising, in the light of what we know about this choleric grammarian, to hear that Śeṣādrisudhī rejected that criterion.³

All this is of no relevance to our present task. For us it suffices to know that we are not alone in our perplexity about how to understand Nāgeśa’s explanation of the Jñāpaka of Par. L. This again gives us confidence that so far we have been on the right path. And it encourages us to renew our efforts to overcome the present obstacle.

What is required of a cause in the context of the BP – and more particularly so in the context of *BP₁* – is that it be formal (*śabdariṇpa*) and indicated in a rule by a word in the locative case. The suffix *nvi* is, no doubt, indicated in the rule concerned (P. 7.3.86) by a word in the locative case; for P. 7.3.86 draws in the compound *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh* from the preceding sūtra but one. But can this same suffix be considered formal, i.e., *śabdariṇpa* “in the form of sound”?

Let us, at this point, recall that the whole of *nvi* is dropped, viz. by P. 1.3.9 and P. 6.1.67. In other words, this suffix does not survive to the end of

a derivation, and never materializes as sound. What else can this mean but that *ṇvi* cannot be considered *sabdarūpa* and, as a consequence, is not a cause in the sense required by the BP?

This conclusion relieves us, at a stroke, of all our problems. For now, all of a sudden, the substitution of *Guṇa o* for *u* in *viśva-uh-ṇvi-śas* is an operation without following cause. And we know that an operation without following cause is *antarāṅga* with regard to an operation that has a following cause. What is more, it is *antarāṅga* in the first sense of that term, so that it falls under the jurisdiction of BP₁.

Having agreed on this much, we see that the derivation of *viśvauhāḥ* behaves in the expected manner. The new rule *vāhah* (P. 6.4.132 without *ūṭh*) is responsible for the change of *viśva-vāh-ṇvi-śas* into *viśva-uh-ṇvi-śas*; the cause of this operation is *śas*. P. 7.3.86, seeing the conditions for its application fulfilled, would substitute *Guṇa o* for *u*, but, having no following cause, it is prevented by BP₁. Thus the derivation would take a wrong turn here and not lead to *viśvauhāḥ*. And this is exactly what was expected of it.

Let us recapitulate what has, up to now, been said regarding the meaning of *āṅga* in the context of BP₁. We have already seen that *āṅga* is a cause, exhibited in a rule in the locative case. We also know that the cause has to be formal. As to what exactly is meant by the word “formal” (*sabdarūpa*), we have now learnt that it must be a sound which is not elided before the derivation has reached its natural conclusion.⁴

The study of the justification of BP₂ offers far fewer difficulties. But then it offers no novelties either. This time the justification does not take the shape of a Jñāpaka; here it is a maxim from ordinary life.

PS 96.3–8, App. I ll. 132–138

*idam antaraṅgatvam lokanyāyasiddham iti manusyo'yam prātar utthāya
śarīrakāryāṇi karoti tatah suhrdām tatah sambandhinām ... ity anenācāh
parasmin iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam*

“That this (kind of) *Antaraṅgatva* is established by a maxim of common life appears from the *Bhāṣya* on P. 1.1.57 where we read the following: ‘when a man has risen in the morning, he does (first) whatever concerns his own person, afterwards (what concerns) his friends, afterwards (what concerns) his relatives....’” (K. pp. 260–261.)

What is meant by “this kind of *Antaraṅgatva*” is, as appears from the

context, the kind of *Antaraṅgatva* which sets BP₂ working; we could say, further extending a convention introduced earlier, *Antaraṅgatva*₂.

It is worth noting that both the formulations of BP₂ are covered by the above maxim of common life. Both where the cause of one operation lies before the cause of another one, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, and also where the meaning of the Paribhāṣā can be paraphrased as “first come, first served” (see p. 24, above), it is clear that a comparison with the orderly activities of a man in the early morning can happily be drawn.

We have studied the justifications of both the interpretations of the BP. But this does not yet solve all problems. The justification of BP₁ – the presence of *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132 – hinges, as we have seen, on the fact that in the derivation of *viśvauhāḥ* the *antaraṅga* operation, which would be substitution of Guṇa, has no following cause, whereas the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation has a following cause. The cause of the *antaraṅga* operation is therefore not included in the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operation in the ordinary sense of the word “inclusion”. Moreover, in none of the examples studied was the cause of the *antaraṅga* operation included in the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operation. Whenever use was made of BP₁, the *antaraṅga* operation had *no* following cause. We shall see that instances where the causes of the *antaraṅga* operations are included in the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operations are few indeed.⁵ Why then, if neither the Jñāpaka nor actual derivations compel him to do so, does Nāgeśa formulate BP₁ in such a queer way?

The answer to this question consists of two parts. First Nāgeśa wanted to remain true to the letter of the Paribhāṣā. Secondly, there is a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* where one operation is said to be *antaraṅga* with respect to another one because the cause of the former is included in the causes of the latter.

The passage relating to the first part of the answer has been studied already (above, p. 3). In it the word *antaraṅga* is explained as a Bahuvrīhi compound, meaning “of which the cause lies within the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operation”. It is this literal interpretation of the term *antaraṅga* (and *bahirāṅga*) that forces Nāgeśa to formulate BP₁ the way he does. And the fact that the *Mahābhāṣya*, at least in one place, appears to interpret the terms in the same way, could not but strengthen Nāgeśa in his opinion that he was right, even if instances illustrating this interpretation were not easily forthcoming.

The Bhāṣya passage where, at least according to Nāgeśa, BP₁ has been put to use, serves at the same time as evidence to show that the word *āṅga* in

the Paribhāṣā means “cause”. This is pointed out in the first passage from the *PS* to be studied now.

PS 80.12–81.2, App. I ll. 33–35

ūnaśabdam āśrityetyādibhāṣyena ca paribhāṣāyām arīgaśabdena saptamyādyantopāttam śabdārūpam nimittam eva grhyata iti spaṣṭam evoktam

“And the statement of the Bhāṣya (quoted above) that ‘the substitution of *y* (for *i*) would depend on the combination of letters *ūna* etc.’ expresses clearly the view that the word *arīga* in the Paribhāṣā only denotes a formal cause (such as a sound or a combination of sounds) exhibited (in a rule) in a locative or other case.” (Cf. K. p. 229.)

The second part of this passage has been studied earlier. At this moment it is to be noted that here Nāgeśa invokes a Bhāṣya passage to substantiate his views regarding the meaning of *arīga*. That Bhāṣya passage is here merely referred to, but its contents are more fully described elsewhere in the discussion of the BP. There that description is, to be sure, part of a larger whole, in which Kaiyatā’s comments on that Bhāṣya passage are reproduced and subsequently rejected. Of course, the fact that Kaiyatā’s comments are rejected does not mean that the Bhāṣya passage itself is not accepted. This, if it were in need of proof at all, is shown by the fact that this Bhāṣya passage is invoked as authority in Nāgeśa’s remarks quoted above. But let us see how Nāgeśa describes the contents of the Bhāṣya passage.

PS 78.3–79.3, App. I ll. 14–18

... *yena vidhis tadantasya iti sūtre bhāṣya iko yan aci ityādāv api tadantavidhau syona ity atrāntaraṅgatvād yanō guṇabādhakatvam isyate tan na sidhyed ūnaśabdam āśritya yanādeśo naśabdam āśritya guṇa ity antaraṅgatvād guṇa eva syād ity uktam /*

“In the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.72 it has been stated that whereas it is desirable that in (the formation of) *syona* (from *si-ū-na* the substitution of) *y* (for *i*) taught in P. 6.1.77 should, on account of its being *antaraṅga*, supersede (the substitution of) *Guṇa* for *i* taught in P. 7.3.86), such a result would not be attained if P. 1.1.72 were to apply also in rules like P. 6.1.77; for (in this case) the substitution of *y* (for *i*) would depend on the combination of sounds *ūna*, (the substitution of) *Guṇa* (for *i*) on the combination of sounds *na*, and such being the

case, (the substitution of) Guṇa would (contrary to what is desirable), because of its being *antarāṅga*, (supersede the substitution of *y*).” (Cf. K. pp. 226–227.)

Here then we see how use is made of BP₁ in the *Mahābhāṣya*. In the hypothetical argument found therein two operations apply at the stage *si-ūna* of the derivation of *syona*. Substitution of *y* for *i* by P. 6.1.77 has, so it is here assumed, the following cause *ūna*; substitution of Guṇa for *i* by P. 7.3.86 has the following cause *na*. Here, i.e., in this hypothetical argument, the latter of the two operations is *antarāṅga* because its cause, *na*, lies within the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operation, since *na* lies within *ūna*. It is true that Nāgeśa here sets great store by a hypothetical argument in the Bhāṣya. Anyone disagreeing with Nāgeśa might say that this passage from the Bhāṣya gives the view of an opponent rather than that of Patañjali, and this is indeed what Śeṣādrisudhī does (*PS* 419.1). The fact that this seems to be the only time in the *Mahābhāṣya* that such an interpretation of the BP is made use of further indicates that this passage is to be treated with the utmost care.

But all this does not concern us at present. Here it matters only that Nāgeśa considers this Bhāṣya passage authoritative. He, no doubt, does so because the passage agrees so well with the analysis of the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* he has given.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF THE BP

We have obtained a fairly complete picture of what the BP means according to Nāgeśa. To this he adds a few restrictions, which will be studied in this chapter. These restrictions are two in number. The BP, so Nāgeśa tells us, cannot be used in the last three chapters of Pāṇini's grammar (i.e., in the Tripādī), nor in P. 6.4.22–175, the so-called Ābhīya section.

The passage which informs us that the BP cannot be used in the Tripādī has been discussed earlier, where the Jñāpaka of BP₁ made its appearance (above, pp. 29f). The reason the BP has no concern with rules in the Tripādī was that, the Jñāpaka of this Paribhāṣā being part of a rule that precedes the Tripādī, the Paribhāṣā itself is deemed to belong to the part of the Aṣṭādhyāyī that comes before the Tripādī. Such being the case, the rules of the Tripādī are *asiddha* with regard to this Paribhāṣā.

This is not the only reason Nāgeśa adduces to show that the BP does not operate in the Tripādī. Against the earlier reason it could be objected that on the Kāryakālapakṣa, where the Paribhāṣā would be placed near the *antarāṅga* rule and where the latter would consequently not be *asiddha* with regard to that Paribhāṣā, the BP should apply also in the Tripādī. This objection is met in the following manner:

PS 86.8–87.6, App. I ll. 71–78

na ca kāryakālapakṣe tripādyām etatpravṛttir durvāreti vācyam / pūrvam
prati parasyāsiddhatvād antaraṅgābhāvena pūrvasya tannirūpitabahiraṅ-
gatvābhāvāt tayā tasyāsiddhatvapratipādanāsambhavāt / na cānaya
pūrvasyāsiddhatvāt tadabhāvena tam prati parāsiddhatvam pūrvatra ity
anena vaktum aśak yam iti vācyam / evam hi vinigamanāvirahād ubhayor
apy apravṛttyāpatteḥ / kim ca pūrvatrety asya pratyakṣatvena
tenānumānikyā asyā bādha evocitah / atah kāryakālapakṣe'pi tripādyām
asyā anupasthitir eva //

“(Above it has been stated that this Paribhāṣā has no concern with the rules in the three last chapters of Pāṇini's grammar, in other words, that a *bahiraṅga* operation taught in a preceding rule cannot

by this Paribhāṣā be rendered *asiddha* in regard to an *antarāṅga* operation which is taught in the three last chapters of Pāṇini's work). Now one cannot object that (although on the Yathoddeśapakṣa the above statement may be correct) it is impossible to show why on the Kāryakālapakṣa (at any rate) the Paribhāṣā should have no concern (with the rules) in the three last chapters (of Pāṇini's grammar); for (to show this is easy enough). As a subsequent (rule) is (by P. 8.2.1) *asiddha* in regard to a preceding (rule), the (subsequent) *antarāṅga* (rule) ceases to exist (by P. 8.2.1); consequently the preceding (rule) cannot be *bahirāṅga* in regard to it, and can therefore also not be made out to be *asiddha* by the (*Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*). Nor can one maintain that, because the preceding (*bahirāṅga* rule) is *asiddha* by the (*Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*), the subsequent (rule) cannot be said to be *asiddha* in regard to it by P. 8.2.1, viz. because the preceding rule would have ceased to exist (by the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*). For (as) in this manner (P. 8.2.1 would prevent the working of the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*, and the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā* in its turn prevent the working of P. 8.2.1) it would, in the absence of any decisive authority (in favour of either), come to pass that neither of the two would be applicable. Moreover, as (the rule) *pūrvatrāśiddham* is actually enounced (by Pāṇini), whereas the existence of the (*Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*) is (only) inferred (from the word *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132), it is only proper that *pūrvatrāśiddham* should supersede this (Paribhāṣā). Therefore this (Paribhāṣā) is certainly also on the Kāryakālapakṣa not placed near (any of the rules contained) in the three last chapters (of Pāṇini's grammar)." (Cf. K. pp. 240–241.)

The reason this passage has been reproduced here is that it enables us to answer the following question. The first reason for accepting that the BP does not operate in the Tripādī was, as we have seen, that the Jñāpaka of this Paribhāṣā does not occur in the Tripādī. But we know that this Jñāpaka, viz. *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132, merely justifies the first interpretation of the BP, viz. BP₁. Does this mean that only BP₁ does not operate in the Tripādī, while BP₂ does operate there?

The first thing to notice is that where, out of a pair of rules used in a derivation, one is *asiddha* with regard to the other both by P. 8.2.1 and by the BP, there is no problem. Only such cases where P. 8.2.1 and the BP conflict are interesting for us now. In such cases it is the *antarāṅga* rule that finds itself in the Tripādī or, where the *bahirāṅga* rule is also in the Tripādī,

finds itself more towards the end of that section. But where P. 8.2.1 and the BP are in conflict, only P. 8.2.1 counts. This we learn from the last passage discussed. This whole story is completely independent of the question of whether BP_1 or BP_2 is involved. Thus we can say, quite generally, that the BP does not apply when the *antaranya* rule is in the Tripādi.

The question just discussed is of a very theoretical nature. I know of no instances where BP_2 would apply and the *antaranya* rule is in the Tripādi and follows – in the order of the rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* – the *bahiranga* rule. We shall therefore not linger here, but pass on to the second restriction.

The second restriction presents itself as if it concerns both BP_1 and BP_2 , since it comes at the very end of the discussion of Par. L, where the expositions of BP_1 and BP_2 have come to a close and where some final general remarks find their place. In spite of that, this second restriction on the BP is such that, by its nature, it can concern only BP_1 . This will become clear in the sequel.

The passage we shall have to study is interesting in that it was completely misunderstood by Kielhorn. Perhaps it may be said that Kielhorn's confusion, a result of his ignorance Nāgeśa's intentions, here reached its culmination. We shall carefully study what he has to say with respect to the passage to come. But we begin with what seems to be its correct interpretation.

PS 98.8–100.1, App. I ll. 192–194

ābhīye'ntaraṅga ābhīyasya bahirangasya samānāśrayasya nānenāsiddhatvam asiddhatvād ity asiddhavatsūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam /

"From the Bhāṣya on P. 6.4.22 it appears that when an *antaranya* (operation) taught in P. 6.4.22–175 (is to take effect), a *bahiranga* (operation) which is taught in the same portion of Pāṇini's grammar, *and which depends on the same (elements)*, is not by this (Paribhāṣā) *asiddha*, because (all that is taught in that portion of Pāṇini's grammar, *and therefore also the bahiranga operation itself*, is) *asiddha* (by P. 6.4.22)." (Cf. K. p. 265.)

This translation deviates at the two places in italics from Kielhorn's translation. The differences will be studied in detail below. Here it may merely be remarked that the translation offered here does justice to the word *samānāśraya* of the Sanskrit text, where Kielhorn had left it

untranslated. Let us, to start with, try to understand the passage as translated here.

A rule from the Ābhīya section of the *Asṭādhyāyī* (P. 6.4.22–175) which has taken effect is *asiddha* when another rule from the same section subsequently applies. The Bhāṣya on P. 6.4.22 (*Mbh.* III.190.22–23) adds a limiting condition: both rules must depend on the same elements; they must be *samānāśraya*. To find out what exactly is meant by this term, or at any rate how Nāgeśa understood it, we turn to his comments on this word in the *Uddyota*.

MPU IV, p. 697

āśrayanaṇi sthānitvenaiva nimittatvenaiva iti nāgrahah / kim tu yathākathāmcit /

“There is no insistence that the element on which (the rules) depend (must be) a substituend only, or a cause only; on the contrary, (that element can be looked upon) in any way.”

In the examples to be discussed presently, we shall see that one and the same element will indeed be looked upon as cause from the point of view of one rule, and as a substituend from the point of view of another rule.

What the last passage from the *PS* tells us is that, if both an *antarāṅga* and the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rule belong to the Ābhīya section, the *bahirāṅga* rule is *asiddha*, not by the BP, but by P. 6.4.22. But what difference does it make whether a rule is *asiddha* on account of P. 6.4.22 or as a result of the BP? It does make a difference, and a considerable one at that. We have seen already that a rule from the Ābhīya section is *asiddha* when it has taken effect and another rule from the same section subsequently applies. The BP, on the other hand, does not wait till one rule has taken effect before it comes into action. A major part of the energies of this Paribhāṣā are absorbed in deciding which of two simultaneously applying rules takes effect first.

Let us take a concrete example to show the difference. In the derivation of *śādhī* the following stage is reached: *śās-hi*. Here two rules apply. P. 6.4.35 (*śā hau*) prescribes the substitution of *śā* for *śās*; its following cause is *hi*. P. 6.4.101 (*hujhalhyo her dhiḥ*) prescribes substitution of *dhi* for *hi*; it has no following cause. The former rule is *bahirāṅga*, the latter *antarāṅga*. If the BP had free play here, it would say that the *antarāṅga* operation, viz. substitution of *dhi* for *hi*, was to take place first. It is only because the BP is

not allowed to exert its influence here that we are free first to substitute *śā* for *śās*, and subsequently, because this earlier operation is *asiddha* on account of P. 6.4.22, we can substitute *dhi* for *hi*.

The procedure here described regarding the derivation of *śādhi* has the full support of the *Mahābhāṣya*. There we find this same form *śādhi* derived in the second way described above, i.e., in an order that would not have been possible had the BP been valid there. The passage runs as follows:

Mbh. III.187.8–9

edhi śādhīti / astiśāstyor ettvāśabḥavayoh kṛtayor jhallakṣanam dhitvam na prāpnōti / asiddhatvād bhavati / /

“When, in (the derivations of) *edhi* (from *as-hi* and of) *śādhi* (from *śās-hi* respectively) *e* has been substituted for (the final *s* of the root) *as* (by P. 6.4.119) and *śā* has been substituted for (the root) *śās* (by P. 6.4.35), substitution of *dhi* (for *hi* by P. 6.4.101), which applies when (the preceding root ends in a sound contained in the *Pratyāhāra*) *jhal*, would not apply (since now these roots do not end in such a sound any longer. Substitution of *dhi* for *hi*) does (however) take place, because (the rules P. 6.4.119 and P. 6.4.35, which had already taken effect in the derivations of *edhi* and *śādhi* respectively, are here) *asiddha*.”

In this passage the BP is clearly not taken into consideration. This is even clearer from Kaiyāṭa’s commentary on the same passage, where he explains that in the derivation of *edhi* the substitution of *e* for *s* takes place first, because it is *nitya* and because the rule prescribing this operation, P. 6.4.119, comes later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* than the rule which prescribes substitution of *dhi* for *hi*, i.e. P. 6.4.101; with regard to *śādhi* Kaiyāṭa says that the substitution of *śā* for *śās* comes first because it is *nitya* (*MP* IV, p. 687–688). Here the absence of a mention of *Antaraṅgatva* is noteworthy.

We now understand how Nāgeśa could introduce the passage of the *PS* last quoted with the words: “From the *Bhāṣya* on P. 6.4.22 it appears that....” And after the above explanation we also understand that the word *saṁnāśrayasya* (“which depends on the same elements”) is essential in that passage. Only when two operations, both taught in the Ābhīya section, depend on the same elements, does P. 6.4.22 come into action and make the one that has taken place *asiddha* with regard to the one that is

yet to take place. Only in such a case, and only if one of the two operations is *antarāṅga* and the other *bahirāṅga*, can the question of whether *Asiddhatva* is prescribed by P. 6.4.22 or by the BP arise.

Because he interpreted the BP differently, it is not surprising that Kielhorn opted for the following translation of the passage from the *PS*:

From the Bhāṣya on P. 6.4.22 it appears that when an *antarāṅga* (operation) taught in P. 6.4.22–175 (is to take effect), a *bahirāṅga* (operation) which is taught in the same portion of Pāṇini's grammar, is not by this (Paribhāṣā) *asiddha*, because (all that is taught in that portion of Pāṇini's grammar, and therefore also the Paribhāṣā itself, the existence of which is indicated by P. 6.4.132, is) *asiddha* (by P. 6.4.22). (K. p. 265.)

This translation is not satisfactory for several reasons. To begin with, the word *asiddhatvāt* is translated by Kielhorn as: “because . . . the Paribhāṣā is *asiddha*.” But *asiddhatvāt* in the *PS* passage under consideration cannot mean that. Here it clearly means: “because the *bahirāṅga* operation is *asiddha*.”

It must be admitted that Kielhorn's translation creates the impression of being in agreement with what was Nāgeśa's opinion at an earlier time. That this impression is incorrect I shall show below. Let us first read some passages from Kaiyatā's and Nāgeśa's commentaries on P. 6.4.22 which support Kielhorn. In these passages we read that the BP is *asiddha* in the Ābhīya section of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the reason being that this Paribhāṣā is indicated by P. 6.4.132, which itself occurs in that section. Kaiyatā states this in the following terms:

MP IV, p. 697–698

asiddham bahirāṅgam antarāṅge ity eṣā paribhāṣā vāha ḫit̄ḥ ity atra jñāpitety ābhācchāstṛīyā.

“The Paribhāṣā *asiddham bahirāṅgam antarāṅge* is indicated in (P. 6.4.132:) *vāha ḫit̄ḥ*, which belongs to the Ābhīya section; it) belongs therefore (itself) to the Ābhīya section.”

Nāgeśa comments:

MPU IV, p. 698

vāha ḫit̄ḥ ity atreti / etad eva yuktam /

“Regarding (Kaiyāṭa’s remark) ‘in (P. 6.4.132:) *vāha īt̄h*’: only this is the correct (way of looking at the matter).”

Here Nāgeśa seems to endorse Kaiyāṭa’s view that the BP is part of the Ābhīya section and therefore itself *asiddha* with respect to rules belonging to that section.

The same seems to follow from his remarks slightly later in the same section. The Bhāṣya discusses here the derivation of *papuṣaḥ* out of *papā-vas-as*. P. 6.4.131 (*vasoḥ samprasāraṇam*) substitutes *u* for *va*; its following cause is *as*. Subsequently P. 6.4.64 (*āto lopa īti ca*) causes elision of *ā*; its cause is *us*. Clearly *us* precedes *as*. P. 6.4.131 is therefore *bahirāṅga*, and P. 6.4.64 *antarāṅga*. And P. 6.4.131 takes effect before there is a chance for P. 6.4.64 to come into play. In this connection the Bhāṣya says:

Mbh. III.191.8

tatra nimittam eva bahirāṅgam antaraṅgasya.

“Here the *bahirāṅga* (operation is) merely the cause of the *antarāṅga* (operation).”

That is to say, the *bahirāṅga* operation is here not *asiddha* with respect to the subsequently applying *antarāṅga* operation. From the point of view adopted in the *PŚ* this is not at all disturbing. For here, in the derivation of *papuṣaḥ* from *papā-vas-as*, BP₂ applies, or rather, does not apply, since the *antarāṅga* operation here applies after the *bahirāṅga* operation has taken effect.

But Kaiyāṭa cannot look upon this sentence from the Bhāṣya with the same degree of equanimity. He thinks that something must be said in order to justify that sentence:

MP IV, p. 698

tatra nimittam eveti / paribhāṣāyā asiddhatvād apravṛttāv iti bhāvah / vasuṣamprasāraṇam caikam paribhāṣāyā āllopaḍīnām cāśraya iti samānāśrayatvād bhavaty asiddhatvam paribhāṣāyāḥ / /

“The meaning of ‘here the *bahirāṅga* . . .’ is ‘since the Paribhāṣā does not apply on account of the fact that it is *asiddha*’. The Samprasāraṇa (vowel *u* which is substituted for *va* of) *vas(u)* is the single element on which (both) the Paribhāṣā and the elision of *ā* etc. depend; since as a result of this (the Paribhāṣā and the elision of *ā* etc.) are *samānāśraya*

the Paribhāṣā is *asiddha* (with respect to the elision of ā etc.)”

As said above, here again Nāgeśa seems to agree with Kaiyatā, for he says

MPU IV, p. 698

*apravṛttāv iti / paribhāṣāyā apravṛttau satyāṁ bahirāṅgam
saṃprasāraṇam antaraṅgalopasya nimittam ity artha iti bhāvah /*

“The meaning of ‘does not apply’ is that on account of the fact that the Paribhāṣā does not apply the *bahirāṅga* Saṃprasāraṇa (vowel u) is the cause of the elision (of ā which is) *antaraṅga*. This is how (Kaiyatā) interprets (the Bhāṣya passage).”

But then, Nāgeśa suddenly makes a complete volte-face, saying:

MPU IV, p. 698

*pare tu tatra nimittam eveti bhāṣyasya paribhāṣāyā anityatvād
ity arthah / evam cāśiddhavatsūtrapratiyākhyāne'pi na doṣa ity āhuh /*

“But others (who know the true meaning of the Bhāṣya) say: ‘The meaning of the Bhāṣya (passage) “here the *bahirāṅga* . . .” is “because the Paribhāṣā is not universally valid.”’ And such being the case, no fault (results) even when P. 6.4.22 is rejected.”

It is not necessary here to remind the reader that the words *pare tu* introduce Nāgeśa’s own opinion. Something will be said about that in Appendix IV. Here it must be noted that this last passage from the *MPU* cancels both the two earlier passages from that commentary. Or at any rate, it denies that the BP is *asiddha* with respect to rules that belong to the Ābhīya section. If that Paribhāṣā does not apply there, it is because it is not universally valid, not because it is *asiddha* by. P. 6.4.22.

Before we proceed, one more point may be clarified. We know that the BP as interpreted in the *PS* would not in any way interfere with the derivation of *papuṣah*. This has been explained above. Why then does Nāgeśa tell us in his *MPU* that in this derivation no fault arises *because the BP is not universally valid?*

The most obvious answer to this question is that Nāgeśa, at the time he wrote his *MPU*, had not yet fully worked out the interpretation of the BP which he was to present in the *PS*. And this is the answer we shall have to accept. That Nāgeśa’s ideas regarding the BP underwent profound changes

in the course of his life will be shown in Appendix IV.

Let us return to the task at hand. I had argued that *asiddhatvāt* in the sentence from the *PŚ* means: “because the *bahirāṅga* operation is *asiddha*” and not “because the *Paribhāṣā* is *asiddha*”. It could here be objected that there is no need to make so much fuss about the translation of *asiddhatvāt*, since it makes no difference in practice. One might argue that in either case the *bahirāṅga* rule will in the end be *asiddha* by P. 6.4.22, and not by the BP.

This is certainly correct. In the interpretation here offered of the passage under discussion, both translations amount, for all practical purposes, to the same thing. This, however, cannot be said of the interpretation Kielhorn offers of the passage. A glance at the explanatory note which he adds to his translation will be illuminating. It reads (K. p. 265, fn. 2):

E.g., *papuṣah* from *papā-vas-as*; by P. 6.4.131 Samprasāraṇa is substituted for *va* because *as* follows, and we obtain thus *papā-uṣ-ah*; here *ā* is elided before *uṣ* by P. 6.4.64: *papuṣah*. The substitution of *u* is here *bahirāṅga*, the elision of *ā antaraṅga*, and the latter ought therefore not to take place because the substitution of *u* would by the *Antaraṅga-paribhāṣā* [i.e. *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*] be *asiddha*. In reality however such is not the case, because the *Antaraṅga-paribhāṣā* [i.e., *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*] is itself by P. 6.4.22 *asiddha* in regard to the *antaraṅga* elision of *ā*, for it is likewise *ābhīya*, i.e., taught in P. 6.4.22–175, viz. indicated by P. 6.4.132, and also *samānāśraya*, because it aims at the same letters on which the *antaraṅga* elision of *ā* depends.

Kielhorn thinks that our passage refers to the derivation of *papuṣah*. Here the *bahirāṅga* operation is substitution of Samprasāraṇa by P. 6.4.131, and the *antaraṅga* operation, elision of *ā* by P. 6.4.64. Kielhorn further thinks that the BP, if it were valid in the Ābhīya section, would make substitution of Samprasāraṇa *asiddha*. We know that this is incorrect. Substitution of Samprasāraṇa, though *bahirāṅga*, is *b₂*, not *b₁*. In other words, the second aspect of the *Paribhāṣā*, i.e. BP₂, or, more exactly, BP₂₁ applies, and BP₂₁ does not make substitution of Samprasāraṇa *asiddha*. But back to Kielhorn. In his opinion the BP would make substitution of Samprasāraṇa *asiddha*. Since, however, the *Paribhāṣā* itself is *asiddha*, the *bahirāṅga* rule is not *asiddha*. So for Kielhorn the *Asiddhatva* of the *Paribhāṣā* and the *Asiddhatva* of the *bahirāṅga* operation do not amount to the same thing. Rather, the *bahirāṅga* operation is *siddha* because the *Paribhāṣā* is *asiddha*!

There is more. Kielhorn’s interpretation does no justice to *anena* in *anenāsiddhatvam*. He translates: “a *bahirāṅga* operation is not by this

Paribhāṣā asiddha." Indeed, but if Kielhorn is to be believed, the *bahirāṅga* operation under discussion is not in any way *asiddha*, neither by this *Paribhāṣā*, nor by P. 6.4.22. On the contrary, in his opinion it is very much *siddha*.

Then there is Kielhorn's inability to tell us which is the *Bhāṣya* passage referred to by Nāgeśa. This is not surprising. The whole of the *Bhāṣya* on P. 6.4.22 contains not a single remark that indicates what is here supposed to be Nāgeśa's opinion. What we do find quoted in a footnote to Kielhorn's translation is a passage from Kaiyatā's *Pradīpa*. Ironically, this passage comments on the statement in the *Bhāṣya* that the BP does *not* apply in the formation of *papuṣah* and similar forms. This is exactly what we have learnt to view as Nāgeśa's position. For here substitution of *Samprasāraṇa* for *va* by P. 6.4.131 is *b₂*, elision of *ā* by P. 6.4.64 is *a₂*, and BP₂ is such that it does not make the former operation *asiddha* with regard to the latter.

Kaiyatā is aware of the literal meaning of this *Bhāṣya* passage. But he thinks that if the BP is allowed not to apply in the formation of *papuṣah*, it will not apply in the formation of *pacāvedam* either. But in this latter derivation the BP is required, to prevent P. 3.4.93 (*eta ai*) from taking effect. As we know, for Nāgeśa the difference between *papuṣah* and *pacāvedam*, as far as the BP is concerned, is that in the first form BP₂ applies, or rather (in view of the shape of the derivation) does not apply, whereas in the second form BP₁ applies. But clearly Kaiyatā is not aware of this distinction. And to get out of the difficulties, he suggests that the BP itself be regarded as belonging to the Ābhīya section, and therefore as being *asiddha* with respect to rules from that section. He introduces this suggestion with the remark (*MP* IV, p. 697) *evam tarhy anyathā vyākhyāyate*, as if it were another interpretation of the, for him, problematic *Bhāṣya* passage. In reality it is, of course, far removed from that passage.

It is these remarks by Kaiyatā, the content of which does not correspond to anything said in the *Bhāṣya*, that Kielhorn invokes in his footnote. If this was what Nāgeśa had in mind in the above passage of the *PS*, it is not clear why he did not make a reference to Kaiyatā instead of to the *Bhāṣya*, as he actually does.

But the most serious shortcoming of Kielhorn's interpretation is that the word *saṃāśraya* can find no place in it. We have seen that in his explanatory note Kielhorn tries to show that the BP and the *antarāṅga* elision of *ā* are *saṃāśraya*. By saying this, however, Kielhorn disregards the rules of syntax: *saṃāśrayasya* is in apposition to *bahirāṅgasya* and

qualifies the latter.

Obviously, Kielhorn had difficulties in interpreting this passage.¹ And indeed, he added, apparently as an afterthought, the following remark (K. p. 265, fn. 2):

I now consider the reading of Ms. C, which omits the word *samānāśrayasya* in the text p. 99, l. 1 to be the right reading, although Payagunda does give that word; for in the instances *papuṣah* etc. the *bahirāṅga* substitution of Samprasāraṇa and the *antarāṅga* elision of ā etc. are not *samānāśraya*.

This addition almost amounts to admitting defeat. Had Kielhorn known the correct interpretation of the BP, he would have noticed that the example *papuṣah* presented no problem at all to Nāgeśa, and that the sentence of the PS under discussion could not therefore refer to this. Since he did not, the sentence remained an enigma to him.

This chapter would not be complete without a mention of what might be called the third restriction on the BP. In reality, as Nāgeśa points out, this is not a restriction, since of the two rules that play a role in it, one is an *Apavāda* of the other and supersedes it on this account. The sentence which contains this information is the last one of the discussion of Par. L.

PS 100.1–2, App. I ll. 193–195

*evam sici vrddher yenānāprāptinyāyenāntaraṅgabādhakatvamūlakam
na sicy antaraṅgam asitiiko guṇa iti süre bhāṣye spaṣṭam //*

“We see likewise from the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.3 that (an operation, such as the substitution of Guṇa taught in P. 7.3.84) is not *antarāṅga* (in regard to the substitution of Vṛddhi taught in P. 7.2.1 etc.) before *sic*; this (statement) is based on the circumstance that P. 7.2.1 supersedes, in accordance with Par. LVII, the *antarāṅga* (rule P. 7.3.84 because it is an *Apavāda* of it).” (Cf. K. p. 266.)

When in the derivation of *anaisīt* the stage *a-nī-s-ī-t* is reached, two operations apply. P. 7.3.84 (*sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh*) prescribes substitution of Guṇa for *i* of *nī*; the following cause is *s*. P. 7.2.1 (*sici vrddhīḥ parasmaipadesu*), on the other hand, prescribes substitution of Vṛddhi for that same *i*; it has as following causes both *s* and *it*. Clearly, *s* is included in *s-it*. The former rule could therefore be expected to be

antaranga and to take effect first. The present passage tells us that this is not what happens. The reason is that P. 7.2.1 is an *Apavāda* of P. 7.3.84.

This passage does not contain any real problems or provide us with new insights, nor does it pose new questions. In spite of that, something must be said regarding Kielhorn's translation of it. That translation contains a mistake which, though most probably due to a slip of the pen more than to anything else, is potentially very confusing. Where our translation uses the word *antaranga* for the second time, Kielhorn has preferred the word *antahkārya*. Now we have seen that *antahkārya* is synonymous with *antaranga* as this word is used in the context of BP₂; *antahkārya* is synonymous with *a₂*. But P. 7.3.84 in the present context is not *a₂*, it is *a₁*. So the employment of the word *antahkārya* here is quite simply wrong. It is not clear how Kielhorn came to use this word, because all manuscripts seem to have *antaranga*.

5. THE TWO-WORD PRINCIPLE

All the main passages yielding information about Nāgeśa's interpretation of the BP, insofar as they occur in that portion of the *PS* which deals directly with this Paribhāṣā, have now been considered. This does not, however, mean that our knowledge of Nāgeśa's interpretation of the Paribhāṣā is now complete. An entirely new aspect of it makes its appearance when Par. LI is discussed. The discussion of Par. LI, also known by the name "Nājanantarya-paribhāṣā" or NP for short, is difficult and deserves close attention. This will be given to it in a later chapter (Chapter 13, below). At present all that needs to be known is that the NP, together with part of its discussion, is ultimately rejected. What is not rejected, but merely put to a different use, is the alleged Jñāpaka of this Paribhāṣā. It is while establishing that Jñāpaka that use is made of the two-word principle.

PS 101.3-8

NĀJĀNANTARYE BAHIṢTVAPRAKŁPTIH // [Par. LI]

- *atra* *śatvatukoh* *iti* *sūtrastham* *tuggrahaṇam* *jñāpakam* /
*anyathādhi*tya *pretyetyādau* *saṁsottaram* *lyappravr̥tyā* *pūrvam*
saṁsē *jāte* *tatra* *saṁhiīyā* *nityatvāl* *lyabutpattiparyantam* *apy* *asamhitā-*
tyāvasthānāsaṁbhavenaikādeśe *lyapi* *tugapekṣayā* *padadvaya-*
*saṁbandhivarnadvayāpeksaikādeśasya*¹ *bahirāṅgata* *yāsiddhatvena* *tadvai-*
yarthyām *spastam* *eva* /

"Par. LI: (Provided that an operation which by the BP would be *bahirāṅga* has taken effect, it is, contrary to that Paribhāṣā,) not regarded as *bahirāṅga* (and consequently not regarded as *asiddha*, when an *antarāṅga* operation is to take effect) which depends on the immediate sequence of a vowel (and something else).

The word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86 indicates (the existence of) this (Paribhāṣā); else that (*tuk*, by which Pāṇini intends to show that in the formation of *adhi* etc. the substitution of *i* etc. for the *i* of *adhi* etc. and the radical *i* is *asiddha* in regard to the addition, by P. 6.1.71, of the augment *tuk* to the root *i*), would evidently be useless. In (the

formation of) *adhītya*, *pretya* etc. (from *adhī-itvā*, *pra-itvā* etc., the substitution by P. 7.1.37 of) *lyap* (for *ktvā*) takes place after (*adhī* or *pra*) have been compounded (with *itvā*); that composition therefore takes place before (*lyap* is substituted. Now) as in a compound (the final sound of a preceding member) must invariably be joined (with the initial sound of a following member, the final sound of *adhī* or *pra* and the following radical *i*) cannot remain unjoined even until *lyap* takes the place (of *ktvā*); the substitution of one (vowel for the final of *adhī* or *pra* and the following radical *i*) precedes therefore (the substitution of) *lyap*. (Were the BP here applicable), the substitution of the one (vowel *i* or *e*, for *i-i*, or *a-i*,) dependent as it is on two sounds of two words, would be *bahiranga* and would consequently (already by the BP) be considered *asiddha* in regard to (the addition of the augment) *tuk* (to the root *i*, and the special statement in P. 6.1.86 regarding the addition of the augment *tuk* would be superfluous; but the BP does not apply in this case and *tuk* in P. 6.1.86 is therefore absolutely necessary.)" (Cf. K. pp. 267–269.)

In the derivation of *adhītya*, at the stage *adhī-i-tvā*, two rules apply. P. 6.1.101 (*akah savarne dīrgah*) prescribes substitution of *ī* for *i-i*. P. 7.1.37 (*samāse'nañpurve ktvo lyap*) prescribes substitution of (*l*)*yap* for *tvā*. However, for the second rule to take effect it is required that *adhī-i* form a compound; and in a compound internal sandhi must take place without delay. We thus obtain the following two stages, in this order: *adhī-tvā* and *adhī-ya*. Then there is another rule, P. 6.1.71 (*hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk*), which prescribes the addition of *t(uk)* after a short vowel, when a *kṛt*-affix having an indicatory *p* follows. In the above passage it is maintained that this rule P. 6.1.71 is *antarāṅga* and P. 6.1.101 *bahirāṅga*. Since P. 6.1.101 is *bahirāṅga*, the substitution of *ī* for *i-i* is *asiddha*. The *antarāṅga* rule P. 6.1.71 therefore finds *i-i* instead of *ī* and experiences no difficulty in applying.

Let us, to begin with, notice that the *bahirāṅga* rule takes effect, in this derivation, before the *antarāṅga* rule. In spite of that, the *bahirāṅga* rule is here said to be *asiddha* with respect to the *antarāṅga* rule. This leaves us no choice: here BP₁ is at work. Let us see if we would also have reached the same conclusion independently.

The *bahirāṅga* operation in the above derivation is the substitution of *ī* for *i-i*; it has as following cause *i*.² The *antarāṅga* operation consists in the addition of *t(uk)* after *i* in *i-ya*; its following cause is *ya*. It is clear that

independently we would have reached the opposite conclusion to that of our passage. We would rather call the substitution of \bar{i} for $i-i$ *antaranga* (a_2), because its following cause precedes the following cause of the addition of *tuk*, which latter operation would therefore be *bahiranga* (b_2). It follows that it is not the criteria with which we are now familiar that have been applied here.

The passage does not leave us in uncertainty as to what criterion has been applied. The substitution of \bar{i} for $i-i$ is taken to be *bahiranga* because it is "dependent on two sounds of two words". This, indeed, is a criterion not met with hitherto. We shall, on future occasions, refer to it as the "two-word principle".

We may do well to keep in mind that where the two-word principle applies, it makes a pair of rules a_1 and b_1 , respectively. Only because such is the case did it make any sense to introduce it in the discussion regarding the derivation of *adhītya*. It is for this reason that BP₁ comes into action, which makes the *bahiranga* rule which had taken effect *asiddha* with respect to the *antaranga* rule which does not take effect till later. And it is also worth remarking that the two-word principle would not have been necessary to make the substitution of \bar{i} for $i-i b_2$ with regard to the addition of *tuk*, which is a_2 . For Nāgeśa had explained earlier in the *PS*—we shall study the passages in Chapter 7—that the operation which joins a root with an affix is *antaranga*, i.e., a_2 , with respect to the operation that joins that root with a preposition.

As was remarked earlier and will be established in Chapter 13, Nāgeśa rejects the NP, but puts its Jñāpaka to a different use. Immediately after rejecting that Paribhāṣā he says:

PS 104.9–10.

etajjñāpakenantarāṅgaparibhāṣāyā nyāyyatvāt // anityatvabodhanasyaiva

"(And this is the correct view of the matter) because it is simpler that (the word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86), which (has been assumed) to indicate (the existence of) this (Par. LI), should merely teach us that Par. L is not universally valid, (than that it should indicate the existence of a new Paribhāṣā)." (K. pp. 275–276.)

The conclusion to be drawn from this passage is as follows. The alleged Jñāpaka of the NP depended upon the two-word principle. Since that Paribhāṣā has now been rejected, but the Jñāpaka retained – it now indicates

that the BP is not universally valid – we must accept that, in Nāgeśa's opinion, the two-word principle is valid, even though no mention of it had been made while the BP was under discussion.

It must be admitted that the comments in the *PS* on Par. LI form a confused lot. Any conclusion based on this part of the text deserves to be looked at with suspicion as long as no corroborative evidence from elsewhere is forthcoming. Fortunately, such evidence exists in our case. It is the following passage from the *PS* on Par. LXXXV.

PS 164. 2–4

kim ca śatvatukor asiddhaḥ ity etadbalāt kṛti-tuggrahaṇāc ca tugviḍhau bahiraṅgaparibhāṣayā apravṛteḥ //

“Moreover, in consequence of the (*tuk* in the) rule P. 6.1.86, and because (Pāṇini) has employed the words *kṛti tuk* (in P. 8.2.2) Par. L has no concern (with an operation which would by it be *asiddha*) in regard to the addition of (the augment) *tuk*. (K. p. 412.)

This passage merely repeats what we know already. If the BP were universally valid, it would also apply in the derivation of *adhitya* etc. and thus make the word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86 superfluous. However, the BP can only apply in the derivation of *adhitya* when the two-word principle is valid.

A third argument to show that Nāgeśa had retained the two-word principle consists in the fact that he makes explicit use of it³ in the passage which introduces Par. LII.

PS 105.4–6

nanv evam gomatpriya ityādau padadvayanimittakasamāśritatvena bahiraṅgam lukam bādhitvāntaraṅgatvāddhalīyādilope⁴ numādayah⁵ syur ata āha:

ANTARAṄGĀN API VIDH ĪN BAHIRĀNGO LUG BĀDHATE [Par. LII]

“Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all except the particular cases stated above, it ought to be applied) e.g., in (the formation of) *gomatpriyah* (from *gomat-su-priya-su*, and in that case the substitution of) Lopa (for the *su* of *gomat-su*, which is taught in P. 6.1.68) ought, being *antaraṅga*, to supersede the *bahirāṅga* (substitution of) Luk (for the same *su* which is taught in P. 2.4.71. The latter substitution is *bahirāṅga*) because it is dependent on the circumstance that (*gomatpriya*) is a compound (base and as such)

made up of two words (viz. of *gomat* and *priya*, and because it therefore indirectly depends on two words. If Lopa were accordingly substituted for the *su* of *gomat-su*, *gomat* ought by P. 1.1.62 and 7.1.70 etc.) to receive (the augment) *num* etc. (The author of the *Paribhāṣās*) says therefore

Par. LII: A *bahiranga* (substitution of) Luk supersedes even *antaranya* rules." (K. pp. 277-278.)

At the stage *gomat-su-priya-su* two rules apply. P. 6.1.68 (*halīyābbhyo dirghāt surisy aprktam hal*) prescribes Lopa of *su* following *gomat*; it has no following cause. P. 2.4.71 (*supo dhātuprātipadikayoh*) prescribes Luk of the same affix *su*. A cause, in the sense required for the BP, cannot be found here either. There is Luk-elision of *su* because *su* is part of a Prātipadika (P. 2.4.71). And *gomat-su-priya-su* is a Prātipadika because it carries the name *samāsa* (P. 1.2.46). It carries that name because it consists of two *sup*-ending words (P. 2.1.4). So there is no cause in the required sense. The fact that Luk-elision of *su* is all the same considered *bahiranga* is due to the two-word principle.

It is to be noted that the two-word principle in the present passage is somewhat more loosely formulated than on the previous occasion. There, an operation was said to be *bahiranga* because it was "dependent on two sounds of two words". Here an operation is said to be *bahiranga* merely because it depends on two words, and not even directly, but indirectly. It suffices therefore for an operation to be *bahiranga* by the two-word principle that it, somehow or other, depends on two words. Needless to say, the corresponding *antaranya* operation should not depend on two words.

The preceding discussion shows that Nāgeśa, though he has no reason to be proud of the way he introduces the two-word principle, was apparently of the opinion that he could not do without it. The two-word principle must therefore be included in the list of interpretations given by Nāgeśa to the terms *bahiranga* and *antaranya*. No addition, however, has to be made to the number of interpretations of the BP itself. When out of a pair rules or operations the one is *bahiranga* and the other *antaranya*, by the two-word principle, it is simply BP₁ that applies.

6. SUMMARY AND ILLUSTRATIONS

All the passages which contribute to an understanding of the structure of Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP have been discussed. It is true that he imposes further restrictions on this Paribhāṣā in the Paribhāṣās that follow, but since there are no difficulties regarding their interpretation and since they modify the BP only at the periphery of its application they will not be discussed here. And those passages which will be discussed in the next part of this book and which seem to add to our knowledge do so only by showing how Nāgeśa puts BP₂₂ to use. They add nothing to the basic structure. We seem to have reached the stage where a concise restatement of our major findings can appropriately be made.

(1) The meaning of the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* fall into two groups, $a_1 b_1$ and $a_2 b_2$, to which correspond two interpretations of the BP, BP₁ and BP₂. BP₂ itself consists of two parts, BP₂₁ and BP₂₂.

(2) A rule or operation is a_1 with respect to another rule or operation which is b_1 , (i) when the causes of the former lie within the causes of the latter; (ii) when the former has no cause whereas the latter has; (iii) when the latter depends on two words, whereas the former does not (two-word principle). A cause here is what is mentioned or understood in the rule concerned in a locative case. Where out of a pair of rules one is a_1 and the other b_1 , BP₁ applies: If both the rules apply simultaneously, the *antarāṅga* rule supersedes the *bahirāṅga* rule. If the *bahirāṅga* rule has already taken effect when the *antarāṅga* rule applies, the former is *asiddha* with regard to the latter.

(3) A rule or operation is a_2 with respect to another rule or operation which is b_2 , when the cause of the former, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, comes before the cause of the latter. In such cases BP₂₁ applies: If both the rules apply simultaneously, the *antarāṅga* rule supersedes the *bahirāṅga* rule.

(4) A rule or operation is a_2 with respect to another rule or operation which is b_2 , when the former directly or indirectly depends on a meaning which presents itself earlier than the meaning on which the latter depends. In such cases BP₂₂ applies: What depends on a meaning that presents itself earlier takes effect earlier. In short, first come, first served.

(5) The BP does not apply when out of a pair of rules the *antarāṅga* rule is in the *Tripādī*, nor when both the *antarāṅga* and the *bahirāṅga* rule are in the *Ābhīya* section and depend on the same element.

Some illustrations of the BP have been met with in the preceding pages, but they were few. The reason was Nāgeśa's parsimony in this regard. He has been especially miserly where that part of BP₁ was concerned which deal with the inclusion of the cause of an *antarāṅga* rule in the causes of a *bahirāṅga* rule. So far, we have had to be content with the hypothetical argument in the *Mahābhāṣya* on the derivation of *syona* (see above, pp. 35 f). And in the derivation of *aśūśavat*, which seemed to fulfil the conditions, a way was found to prevent BP₁ from applying (pp. 19 f). It is therefore high time to find some illustration where the cause of the *antarāṅga* rule is really included in the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule.

Such an illustration exists in the derivation of *āṭīṭat, the 3. sing. aor. caus. act. of the root *āṭ*, without the augment ā(t) being attached to it. The form can occur in such sentences as *mā bhāvān* *āṭīṭat.¹ In this derivation the stage *āt-(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)-t* is reached. Here P. 7.2.116 (*ata upadhāyāḥ*) takes effect, which leads to *āt-i-a-t*. Now two rules apply. P. 6.1.11 (*caṇī*) prescribes reduplication of *i*; its following cause is *(c)a(n)*. P. 7.4.1 (*nau caṇī upadhāyā hrasvah*) prescribes substitution of short *a* for ā of *āt*; its following causes are *(n)i(c)* and *(c)a(n)*. Clearly *(c)a(n)* lies within the combination *(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)*. P. 6.1.11 is therefore *antarāṅga* (*a₁*) and takes place first, removing the conditions for P. 7.4.1 to take effect.

This explanation of the derivation of *āṭīṭat has the support of the PS. The *Mahābhāṣya*, while discussing this derivation, says that P. 6.1.11 supersedes P. 7.4.1 because the former is *nitya* (*Mbh.* III.344.22–345.3). The PS refers to the Bhāṣya and remarks that in reality that rule is both *nitya* and *antarāṅga*. The passage runs:

PS 76.4-5

nau caṇī iti hrasvāpeksayā nityatvāntarāṅgatvayuktadvitvasya² prathamatāḥ pravṛttau nityatvād ity eva bhāṣya uktam //

"In the Bhāṣya on P. 7.4.1 the only reason which has been assigned for the fact that the reduplication would take effect before the (substitution of the) short vowel is this 'that it is *nitya*', although (the reduplication) is both *nitya* and *antarāṅga*." (K. p. 220.)

In this first example, the *antarāṅga* rule, i.e., the rule whose cause lies within the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rule, applies simultaneously with the

latter. What we need next is a case where the rule that is *antarāṅga* in the above manner does not apply until the *bahirāṅga* rule has taken effect. Such a case is not given anywhere in the *PS*, but here the commentaries come to our help. The one known by the name *Bhairavi* (104.21) mentions the derivation of *atiṣṭhipat*, 3. sing. aor. caus. act. of the root *sthā*. Here, when the stage *sthā-p(uk)-(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)-t* has been reached, P. 7.4.5 (*tīṣṭhater it*) prescribes substitution of *i* for *ā* of *sthā*. This leads to *sthip-(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)-t*. Now P. 7.3.86 (*pugantalaghūpadhasya ca*) applies. It prescribes substitution of *Guṇa* for *i* of *sthip*. Its following cause is *(n)i(c)*. However, the following causes of P. 7.4.5 are *(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)*. Clearly, *(n)i(c)* is included in *(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)*. The result is that P. 7.4.5 is *bahirāṅga* and consequently *asiddha*, so that P. 7.3.86 cannot take effect.³

The derivation of *mimārjiṣati* (above, pp. 15f.) provides an instance where the *antarāṅga* rule has no cause but the *bahirāṅga* rule has. The two rules apply here simultaneously.

This same kind of *Antarāṅgatva*, caused by no cause, plays a role in the argument that shows that *ūth* in P. 6.4.132 indicates the BP (above, pp. 29f.). There the *bahirāṅga* operation, substitution of *u* for *vā*, necessarily precedes the *antarāṅga* operation, substitution of *Guṇa* for the resulting *u*. But this is a hypothetical derivation, one introduced merely to show that it does not lead to the desired form, and which is to be replaced by a better one, by one that does not need, or rather, is not hampered by, the BP.

A derivation in which such a *bahirāṅga* rule and such an *antarāṅga* rule apply in this order, and where BP_1 actually renders the former *asiddha* with respect to the latter, exists in the formation of *pacāvēdam* out of *pacāvā idam*. Here P. 6.1.87 causes *a-i* to be replaced by *e*, so that we get *pacāvēdam*; the cause is *i*. The rule that presents itself at this stage, P. 3.4.93 (*eta ai*) aims at changing *e* into *ai*; it has no following cause. P. 6.1.87 is therefore *bahirāṅga*, P. 3.4.93 *antarāṅga*, and BP_1 applies. As a result, *e* is *asiddha* as far as P. 3.4.93 is concerned, and this latter rule does not take effect.

The derivation of *pacāvēdam* may not be the perfect example of the aspect of the BP under consideration. It can equally well be used to illustrate the two-word principle. Unfortunately, I know of no derivation that could take the place of *pacāvēdam* here. In the derivation of *dve*, to be sure, the conditions for the application of BP_1 are present. Here at the stage *dvi-*au** P. 7.2.102 (*tyadādīnām ah*) teaches the substitution of *a* for *i*; its cause is *au*. In the resulting *dva-*au** P. 4.1.4 (*ajādyatas tāp*) teaches the addition of the feminine suffix (*!ā(p)*); it has no cause. Clearly, P. 7.2.102 is

bahirariga (b_1) and has taken effect when the *antaranga* rule P. 4.1.4 applies. We would expect that BP₁ would prevent P. 4.1.4 from taking effect. It does not, however, because Pāṇini's use of the forms *yā* and *sā* in P. 7.3.54 indicates that the BP is not universally valid (*bahirāṅgāsiddhatvān tu na yāsayoḥ iti nirdeśenānityatvān na pravartate*; LŚŚ on SK 300, Kumbakonam ed. II, p. 877).

It is difficult to find an example of the use of BP₁ where the *antaranga* operation has no cause and does not apply until after the *bahirāṅga* rule has taken effect, an example that cannot also be covered by the two-word principle. Nor is it easy to find an example that exclusively illustrates the workings of the two-word principle. For the case where *bahirāṅga* rule has taken effect when the *antaranga* rule applies, a second use must be made of *pacāvedam*.

The derivation of *dyukāma*, pointed out by Kaiyata while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P. 1.4.2 (MP II, p. 326), illustrates the use of the two-word principle where *antaranga* and *bahirāṅga* rules apply simultaneously. Here two rules apply at the stage *div-kāma*. P. 6.1.131 (*diva ut*) teaches the substitution of *u* for *v*, since the latter is at the end of a Pada. P. 6.2.1 (*bahuṛīhau prakṛtyā pūrvapadam*) inform us that in a Bahuvrī the first component gets its own accent. Neither of these two rules has a following cause; but whereas P. 6.1.131 depends on only one word, P. 6.2.1 depends on two – both *diva* and *kāma*. The two-word principle brings it about that P. 6.1.131 supersedes P. 6.2.1.

A similar situation originates after P. 6.1.131 has taken effect in this same derivation. At that moment we have *di-u-kāma*. The two rules that apply here are the same accent rule P. 6.2.1 and P. 6.1.77 (*iko yan aci*), which prescribes substitution of *y* for *i* before *u*. Even though P. 6.1.77 has a following cause (viz. *u*), its activity is here confined to the single word *di-u*, so that it is *antaranga* with respect to P. 6.2.1, which, as we know, depends on two words.

While explaining BP₂, Nāgeśa was considerably more liberal in giving examples than he had been with respect to BP₁. It will therefore suffice here to remind the reader of what has been elaborately discussed earlier, i.e. *asusruvat* as illustration of BP₂₁ (pp. 8 f.) and *paṭvyā* as illustration of BP₂₂ (pp. 22 f.). It is true that *paṭvyā* can also be considered an illustration of BP₂₁. Illustrations which more particularly belong to BP₂₂ will come as we proceed. In point of fact, the majority of cases where in the PS and in the LŚŚ the BP has been invoked belong to BP₂₂.

For ease of reference the above examples are given in the following table:

Type of BP	Simultaneous	<i>bahirāṅga</i> first
BP₁		
Inclusion	(<i>mā bhavān</i>) * <i>āṭīṭat</i>	<i>atiṣṭhipat</i>
No cause	<i>mimārjiṣati</i>	<i>pacāvedam</i>
Two-word principle	<i>dyukāma</i>	<i>pacāvedam</i>
BP₂₁	<i>asusruvat</i>	
		<i>antaraṅga</i> first
BP₂₂		<i>paṭvya</i>

PART II

MORE FROM THE PS ON PAR. L

7. SOME DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN THE DISCUSSION OF PAR. L. (I)

The difficulties confronting anyone who wants to become acquainted with Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP by reading his *PS* are many and varied. We have come into contact with a number of them, and more will come. It can be said with regard to most of them that they can be solved, even if that requires effort. But some difficulties are such that they cannot be solved unless very drastic measures are taken.

In this chapter and the next I intend discuss two passages which – as far as I can see – are of this latter type. Both occur in that part of the *PS* which deals with the BP. There can, therefore, be no excuse for passing them over in silence. It would indeed be very tempting to do this, for the conclusions that these two passages will force me to draw are such that they can hardly fail to provoke protest on the part of my readers.

The situation being as it is, I can only request the reader not to lay this book aside in exasperation, but to inspect my arguments closely. If they do not convince him even after careful reading, let him then try to give an explanation of these two passages that is more to his liking, and that also agrees with the passages discussed in earlier chapters. If he succeeds in interpreting the passages, without recourse to a *deus ex machina*, I shall be the first to admit that his interpretation is likely to be the correct one. But as long as he has not succeeded in this, I shall stick to my own conclusions. Let us now turn to the text.

The first of the two passages occurs, and this is an important detail, in the discussion of BP₁.

PS 87.13–88.3, App. I ll. 146–151

ata evomānoś ca ity āṅgrahaṇam caritārtham / taddhi khaṭvā ā īdhety atrā param api savarṇadīrgham bādhitvāntaraṅgatvād guṇe krte vrddhiprāptau pararūpārtham / sādhanabodhakapratyayotpattiyanantaram pūrvam dhātor upasargayoge paścāt khaṭvāśabdasya samudāyena yogād guṇasyāntaraṅgatvam iti samprasāraṇāc ca iti sūtre bhāsyे spaṣṭam /

“(Above it was stated that a *bahiranga* rule or operation which applies

simultaneously with an *antaranya* rule or operation is likewise by the present Paribhāṣā *asiddha*). Only because such is the case, (is) the word (*āri*) in P. 6.1.95 (necessary and) serves a purpose. For that (*āri*) is meant to show that (in the case of *khaṭvā-odhā* for *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā*) the subsequent (vowel *o*) takes the place (of the *ā* of *khaṭvā* and the *o* of *odhā*), while (by P. 6.1.88) the Vṛddhi vowel (*au*) should have been substituted (for *ā-o*. This question, however, whether *o* or *au* should be substituted for *ā-o*, can only arise) when in the case of *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā* (the substitution by P. 6.1.87 of) Guṇa (for *ā-ū*) on account of its being *antaranya*, has superseded (the substitution of) the homogeneous long vowel (*ā* for the *ā* of *khaṭvā* and the preposition *ā*), notwithstanding that the latter is (taught in the) subsequent (rule P. 6.1.101), and when (the substitution of) Guṇa (for *ā-ū*) has in consequence taken place. (The substitution of) Guṇa (for *ā-ū* in *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā*) is, as appears from the Bhāṣya on P. 6.1.108, *antaranya*, because after the addition (to the root *vah*) of the affix (*kta*) which denotes that which causes (the action expressed by the root *vah* – in the present instance, its object –) first the preposition (*ā*) is joined to the root, while the word *khaṭvā* is joined with the combined (preposition and root, i.e., with *odhā*.) afterwards." (Cf. K. pp. 243–245.)

This passage occurs, as was said already, in the middle of the section dealing with BP₁. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that BP₁ will find a place in its explanation.

To actually give such an explanation – one in which BP₁ finds a place – turns out to be far from easy. At the stage *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā* two operations apply. P. 6.1.101 (*akah savarne dirghah*) would substitute *ā* for *ā-ā*; it has as following cause the preposition *ā*. P. 6.1.87 would substitute Guṇa *o* for *ā-ū*; it has the following cause *ū*. According to the last sentence of the above passage, the latter of these two operations is *antaranya* and therefore supersedes the former one. Let us see if BP₁ can account for this.

Superficial inspection suffices to make clear that in *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā* there is no place for BP₁. As we know, BP₁ comes into action where the *antaranya* rule has no cause but the *bahiranya* rule has, and where the cause of the *antaranya* rule is included in the causes of the *bahiranya* rule. But neither of the two rules which apply in *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhā*, i.e., neither P. 6.1.101 nor P. 6.1.87, is without cause, nor is the cause of the one included in the causes of the other. The conclusion is unavoidable that at this stage of the derivation

there is no scope for BP₁.¹

So our first attempt to make sense of the above passage has failed. The derivation of *khaṭvodhā* offers no opportunity for BP₁ to exert its influence. But our passage emphatically declares that the substitution of Guṇa for ā-ū is *antaraṅga*. Let us therefore try our luck with BP₂.

Since both P. 6.1.101 and P. 6.1.87 have a following cause in the derivation under consideration, one of which, moreover, is not included in the other, there is scope here for BP₂₁. Unfortunately, where our passage says that P. 6.1.87 is *antaraṅga*, BP₂₁ would start from the assumption that P. 6.1.101 is *antaraṅga*, for the cause of P. 6.1.101, the preposition ā, clearly lies before the cause of P. 6.1.87, i.e., before ū. We cannot but conclude that Nāgeśa did not have BP₂₁ in mind when he wrote the above passage. This leaves us with BP₂₂.

The second formulation of BP₂ states that operations arise in the order in which the meanings upon which they ultimately depend arise. Applied to the present example, this means, we may assume, that the meaning to be expressed by *udhā* does not combine with another meaning until all operations depending on it have taken place, i.e., until the word *odhā* has been formed. This is to say, the meaning to be expressed by *khaṭvā*, and even more so this word itself (since it depends on that meaning), does not come into the picture until all operations necessary to obtain *odhā* have taken place. The fact that ā is a separate word in Pāṇini's grammar constitutes no obstacle here, for even though it is a separate word, it has no separate meaning; it merely brings to light what is expressed by the verbal root. Since we shall have occasion to return to this matter, we shall leave it for the time being.

It is, in view of the above, safe to conclude that BP₂₂ can account for the derivation of *khaṭvodhā*. More particularly, it can explain why in *khaṭvā-ā-udhā* substitution of Guṇa o for ā-ū supersedes substitution of ā for ā-ā. The supposition that Nāgeśa did have the second formulation of BP₂, i.e., BP₂₂, in mind is further supported by the exact wording of the last sentence of the above passage. It contains the following clause: ". . . pūrvam dhātor upasargayoge paścāt khaṭvāśabdasya samudāyena yogād gunasyāntaraṅgatvam. . . (The substitution of) Guṇa (for ā-ū in *khaṭvā-ā-udhā*) is . . . *antaraṅga*, because . . . first the preposition (ā) is joined to the root, while the word *khaṭvā* is joined with the combined preposition and root, i.e., with *odhā*) afterwards." Here then we read that a certain operation is *antaraṅga* because it takes place first. This is possible only where BP₂₂ is involved. Everywhere else, particularly in the sphere of BP₁,

it is the other way round: an operation takes place first because it is *antaraṅga*.

This same clause contains another indication that BP₂₂ is talked about here. It says that “the word *khaṭvā* is joined with the combined preposition and root, i.e., with *odhā*.” If BP₁ were under discussion, it would suffice to say that *ā* is joined with *o*. Mention of the complete words *khaṭvā* and *odhā* would then be superfluous. If, on the other hand, this is a case falling under the jurisdiction of BP₂₂, then mention of the complete words becomes a necessity. It is the whole words that are expressive of the meanings that are combined. And the operations, in this interpretation of the Paribhāṣā, follow on the heels of the meanings, so that, in our example, it is not *ā* and *o* that are combined, but *khaṭvā* and *odhā*.

What has been said so far seems to make satisfactory sense of the passage under consideration. It has the appearance of being an instance of the use of BP₂ where we would have expected BP₁.

Unfortunately, this cannot be true. Two problems remain, the second more serious than the first.

As has been said repeatedly, the present passage occurs in the discussion of BP₁. It is, moreover, not part of a subsidiary argument. There is therefore no justification whatever to introduce BP₂ here. If, all the same, Nāgeśa has at this place brought BP₂ into the picture, we cannot but conclude that such a procedure makes his line of reasoning confused to the point of unintelligibility. If we have to admit this, we may well question our basic assumption: that Nāgeśa’s discussion of Par. L forms a coherent whole (even if it may be hard to discover it). But perhaps the reader does not take such a somber view of the situation. Let us therefore pass on to the second problem.

Our translation of the above passage – which is nearly an exact copy of Kielhorn’s translation – was introduced – again in imitation of Kielhorn – with the following sentence: “(Above it was stated that a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation which applies simultaneously with an *antaraṅga* rule or operation is likewise by the present Paribhāṣā *asiddha*).” This introductory sentence was followed by the translation of the first words of our passage: *ata eva*, “only because such is the case . . .”.

It is not directly obvious that this introductory sentence reflects the real significance of *ata eva*. The fact that “a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation which applies simultaneously with an *antaraṅga* rule or operation is likewise by the present Paribhāṣā *asiddha*” had been stated so much earlier (three pages in Abhyankar’s edition) that its connection with the present passage comes

somewhat as a surprise. But a perusal of all that precedes our passage reveals that there really is no other choice than to accept this connection, and consequently this introductory sentence, as correct. Nothing else qualifies for being referred to by *ata eva* "only because such is the case". So let us assume that the introductory sentence has rightly been added here.

However, if this introductory sentence has rightly been added here, then we must accept that the two rules which apply at the stage *khaṭvā-ā-ūḍhā* apply *simultaneously*. If, on the other hand, this passage is to be understood as suggested above, i.e., with the help of BP₂₂, then simultaneity of application of those rules is out of the question. This second formulation of BP₂ causes an ordered application of rules, one after the other: that is to say, not simultaneous. This has been discussed at length (above, pp. 23 f.) and there is no need of repetition.

The problem that faces us can be summarized as follows. The context of our passage requires that the derivation of *khaṭvodhā* exemplify BP₁, and the wording of this same passage demands with equal force that it be interpreted with the help of BP₂₂.

In this situation I can conceive of only one solution. The context is wrong! By this I mean to say that, for some reason or other, this passage has been wrongly located in the *PS*.

It is this suggestion to relocate a portion of the *PS* that I referred to earlier as a "drastic measure". A drastic measure it is indeed, and it requires that all arguments which support it be enumerated and carefully studied.

Before doing so, let me specify what exactly is to be transferred and where. A superficial glance at the *PS* suffices to show that our passage is intimately connected with what immediately follows it. Our passage contains a passing mention of the fact that affixes are joined to roots before prefixes are joined to the same roots. This statement is elaborately discussed and substantiated in subsequent passages, some of which we shall have occasion to study later in this chapter. Thus our passage cannot easily be disconnected from what comes directly after it. Therefore, I propose to shift the whole section, beginning with *ata evomāriś ca* (*PS* 87.13) and extending up to *astīty alam* (*PS* 92.3).

Where is this long section to be reaccommodated? The answer to this question is at the same time the first argument, albeit the weakest, in defence of the proposed translocation. The reason is that there exists a place in the *PS* where the section fits as if it were made for it. As could have been expected, this place is where the second formulation has just been completed, i.e., after *bodhyam* at *PS* 97.3. I shall – even though this

sentence has been discussed earlier in this book – reproduce the sentence which ends in *bodhyam*, this time followed by the first sentence of the section that is to come immediately after it.

PS 97.2–3, 87.13, App. I ll. 144–147

kramenānvākhyāne tūktodāharane pūrvapravṛttikatvam antaraṅgatvam bahirangasyāsiddhatvam api nimittābhāvād apraptirūpaṁ bodhyam // ota evomānoś ca ity āngrahanam caritārtham /

“If, on the other hand, in accounting for the formation of a word, (one makes each expressive portion of it arise) one after the other, (i.e., if one, e.g., first adds ī to *pātu*, and afterwards ā to *pātvī*), then the *Antaraṅgatva* (of the substitution of a semivowel for the first vowel *u*) in the above example (*pātvyā*) must be taken to mean ‘its taking place first’, and the *Asiddhatva* of the *bahiranga* (substitution of a semivowel for the second vowel ī) can only mean ‘that it does not (yet) apply, because its cause (ā) is (as yet) absent’. Only because such is the case, (is) the word (*ān*) in P. 6.1.95 (necessary, and) serves a purpose.” (See above, pp. 24 and 62.)

The remainder of the relocated section is to follow this. In this position the passage does not leave a trace of doubt about how it is to be interpreted. It is due to BP₂₂ that *ān* in P. 6.1.95 serves a purpose. And it is, consequently, with the help of BP₂₂ (which is to be explained) that in *khatvā-ā-ūdhā* substitution of *o* for *ā-ū* supersedes substitution *ā* for *ā-ā*.

I said above that the relocated section fits the place newly assigned to it as if it were made for it. What I meant to suggest was, as may not have escaped the reader, that the section was indeed made for this place. That the initial sentence of the section is a natural continuation of the preceding sentence has just been shown. It remains to prove that what follows the place to be occupied by the relocated sentence does not interfere. It could do so, for example, by being so closely connected with the sentence ending in *bodhyam* that insertion of additional material in between would leave it dangling in the air.

Such is not the case. The following passage is no continuation of the discussion of BP₂. What it does is propose an alternative interpretation of the BP for the sole purpose of refuting it. By rejecting an interpretation of the BP close to, but different from, BP₂, it heralds the end of the discussion

of BP₂, indeed of the Paribhāṣā as a whole. It will suffice here to reproduce the initial sentence of the following passage, to demonstrate that we have nothing to fear from that side.

PS 97.3–4, App. I l. 180

yat tv evamṛityā pūrvasthānikam apy antaraṅgam iti tac cintyam

"The statement, however, that in this manner (an operation) is likewise *antaraṅga* (in regard to another operation) when it affects a part (of a word) which precedes (that portion of the word which is affected by the other operation), should be regarded with suspicion." (K. pp. 262–263.)

So if the section under discussion is to be removed from the place where all printed editions of the *PS* have it, it does not, for that reason, have to become homeless. It will be more than welcome at the spot indicated above.

That our section also makes sense elsewhere in the *PS*, or even that it makes more sense there, is in itself no strong ground for actually translocating it. But it certainly must constitute a part, albeit perhaps a rather minor part, of the reason for doing so. With a much more important part we are already familiar. It is the fact that the section makes no sense – in view of what we have come to know about the meaning of the BP – at the place where it is found. If the reader wants to refresh his memory with regard to this, our second, argument, he may look again at what was said in the beginning of this chapter. Here we shall turn to the third argument.

The section whose relocation is under discussion is far larger than merely the passage that caused us so much trouble. Indeed, that passage is no more than the beginning of the section. That the remainder of the section must migrate with its initial passage finds its justification in the fact that it cannot well be separated from that beginning.

However, a close look at the contents of this remainder reveals that it contains independent features which make its transfer, if not unavoidable, then at any rate highly desirable. Because here again we find that extensive use has been made of BP₂₂. This happens where the question of the order in which suffix and prefix are joined to a verbal root is studied. This indeed is the topic discussed in the major portion of the remainder of our section. We shall here concentrate on some particularly relevant passages of it.

PŚ 89.1–5, App. I ll. 154–160

*yat tu pūrvam dhātūr upasargena yujyate paścāt sādhanena / upasargena
tatsamjñakaśabdena / sādhanena kārakena tatprayuktakāryena / ata
evānubhūyata ityādau sakarmakatvāt karmaṇī lakārasiddhir iti tan na /
kriyāyāḥ sādhyatvena bodhāt sādhyasya ca sādhanākāṅkṣatayā
tatsaṁbandhottaram eva kriyāyoganimittopasargasamjñākasya
sambāñdhaucityāt /*

“To object that a root is combined first with a preposition, i.e., with a word termed ‘preposition’, afterwards with that which causes (the action expressed by the root), i.e., with an affix which denotes what causes (that action), and to maintain this to be the reason why, e.g., in *anubhūyate* ‘it is experienced’ the letter *l* (for which *te* etc. are substituted) may denote, as it actually does, the object of the action, i.e., why passives like *anubhūyate* may be formed), viz. because (*bhū* after its combination with the preposition *anu*) has become transitive, – is untenable. For as we understand action to be something that is to be accomplished, and as that which is to be accomplished requires (for its accomplishment) something which does accomplish it, we are sure of the actual (existence of an) action only when (the affix which denotes) that (which causes the accomplishment of the action) has been combined (with a root); and it is therefore proper that what is termed ‘preposition’, (the very existence of) which depends on its being united to (a root denoting) an action, should be combined (with the root) not until after the affix (without which the action would not exist) has taken its place.” (K. pp. 246–247.)

The order in which the meanings arise is: first “what accomplishes”, then “action”; or first “what causes accomplishment”, then “what is to be accomplished”; or, finally, first *sādhana*, then *kriyā*. These are three ways of saying the same thing. And because those meanings arise in this particular order, the operations depending on those meanings arise in the very same order. That is to say, first the suffix, being expressive of the first meaning, is combined with the root; then the preposition whose very name (*upasarga*) depends on the second meaning, by P. 1.4.59 (*upasargāḥ kriyāyoge*) – is joined to that same root.

There is no doubt that BP₂₂ is at work here. For BP₂₂ says nothing else but that operations take place in the order in which the meanings on which they depend arise. In keeping with this, Nāgeśa tries to show in the above

passage that certain operations take place in a specific order, by demonstrating that the meanings on which those operations depend arise in that order.

It may not have escaped the notice of the reader that Nāgeśa in the above passage, even though he gives an argument which is based on the BP, does not explicitly say so. He does not even use either of the words *antaraṅga* or *bahiranga*. However, the next passage makes up for this.

PS 90.3–6, App. I ll. 163–167

*upasargadyotyārthāntarbhāvena dhātunaivārthābhidhānād uktesu
karmaṇi lakārādisiddhiḥ / paścācchrotur bodhāya dyotakopasarga-
saṃbandhah / evam cāntaraṅgatarārthakopasarganimittah suṭ sam-kr-
tiy avasthāyām dvitvāditah pūrvam pravartate tato dvitvādi / /*

"In the above-mentioned (passive forms *anubhūyate* etc.) the letter *l* etc. could be added to the root to denote the object, because the root conveys by itself the (transitive) meaning ('to experience'), the meaning, to indicate which is the aim of the preposition (*anu*), being inherent (in the root). After (*l* has been added to *bhū*), the preposition which indicates (the presence of that sense in *bhū*) is combined (with the root) in order that the hearer may understand (the special sense in which the speaker wishes the root *bhū* to be taken). When we have then (e.g. in the formation of the redupl. perfect of the root *kr* preceded by the preposition *sam*) proceeded as far as *sam-kr-ti* (where two operations apply, viz. the addition to *kr* of the augment *suṭ* taught by P. 6.1.137 etc., and the reduplication of *kr* taught by P. 6.1.8, the addition of the augment) *suṭ* takes, in accordance with what has just been stated, place before the reduplication etc., and reduplication etc. take place afterwards, because (the former) depends on the preposition the meaning of which, (being inherent in the root itself which exists before the affix *ti*), is still more *antaraṅga* (than the termination *ti* which causes the reduplication. Accordingly the words *kāt pūrvah* of P. 6.1.135 have in the Bhāṣya been rejected as superfluous)." (K. pp. 247–248.)

We have seen that the meaning "that which accomplishes the action" arises before the meaning "action to be accomplished", but is itself preceded by the meaning of the verbal root. Such being the case, an operation the cause of which is the meaning of the verbal root is *a₂* with

respect to an operation the cause of which is the meaning “that which accomplishes the action.” This is in its turn is *a₂* with respect to an operation the cause of which is the meaning “action to be accomplished”. In other words, among these three operations, the first one is still more *antaraṅga* with respect to the last one than the second is.

This is exactly what the above passage tells us with respect to the concrete instance provided by the derivation of *samcaskāra*. Here three operations play a role, which depends on three different meanings.

(1) The addition of *sū*(*s*) by P. 6.1.137 (*samparibhyām karotau bhūṣane*) depends on the sense “ornamenting” (*bhūṣana*), which, as Nāgeśa has shown in the above passage, is expressed by the root *kṛ*.

(2) Reduplication by P. 6.1.8 (*līti dhātor anabhyāsasya*) depends upon the presence of *līt* (or its substitute *ti*), which itself depends on the meaning “that which accomplishes the action”.

(3) Joining *sam* to *kṛ* depends on the presence of *sam* as *upasarga*. We have seen that this name is given to *sam* on the basis of the meaning “action to be accomplished”.

The three meanings arise in the order in which they have been enumerated here. Accordingly, the operations based on them take place in the same order. This is indeed what the present passage says. But in addition to this, it says what we wanted to hear: that the first operation is more *antaraṅga*. (What it really asserts is that the first *meaning* is more *antaraṅga*; we may assume that this is a loose way of saying the same thing.) In so doing it confirms what we knew already, viz. that this ordering of operations is due to the BP. What the passage does not explicitly say, but without which it would remain unintelligible, is that the ordering is due to BP₂, or, more exactly, to BP₂₂.

I shall discuss one more passage from the section to be transposed. This final passage states as unambiguously as one could wish that there are operations that are *antaraṅga* on the basis of meaning. More clearly perhaps than in the preceding two passages do we learn therefore that it is BP₂₂ which is involved here.

PS 91.1–3, App. I ll. 170–172

yad upasarganimittakam kāryam upasargārthāśritam viśiṣṭopasarganimittatvāt tad antaraṅgam / yat tu na tathā tatra pūrvāgatasādhana-nimittakam evāntaraṅgam /

“When an operation that is caused by a preposition depends on the meaning of that preposition, then it is *antaraṅga*, because it is caused

by that preposition as qualified (by the property of bringing to light the meaning that is inherent in the root, and because that operation is therefore really caused by the meaning of the root which exists before the meaning of the affix); but where such is not the case, (i.e., where the operation depends on the sounds of the preposition), there the operation which is caused by that which causes (the action expressed by the root, and therefore concerns an affix which denotes what causes that action,) is *antaranga*, because (the meaning 'that which causes the action expressed by the root') comes (into existence) before (the meaning 'action to be accomplished', on the basis of which the preposition is actually termed 'preposition', comes into existence)." (Cf. K. p. 249.)

After what has been said earlier, this passage is in no need of comment. What has become abundantly clear by now is that the section whose transfer is here advocated makes a repeated use of BP₂₂. This would be hard to explain, were we to leave this section in its place. In the new place assigned to this section there is nothing problematic about the employment of BP₂₂. On the contrary, this is exactly what we would expect there. It is for this reason that the three passages last discussed constitute the third argument for accepting that the section concerned was originally where we now want to locate it.

It must be admitted that the above three arguments rely to some extent on the interpretation of the BP that was put forward in the earlier chapters of this book. In itself there is nothing wrong in that, for I see no reason to doubt the correctness of that interpretation. But it is possible that some of my readers have not been fully convinced of the its correctness. For them a part of my argument will remain invalid. But even they will have to confess that the position of the section under discussion is hard to explain. It begins with the words *ata eva* "only because such is the case". Such a beginning normally refers back to what immediately precedes it. That this is true can easily be verified with the help of the portion of the PS dealing with Par. L, where this expression is used a number of times. It always refers to what immediately precedes.²

But this cannot be said about the *ata eva* that stands at the head of our section. What immediately precedes it is an argument purporting to prove that the BP is not valid in the *Tripādī*, i.e., the last three sections of Pāṇini's grammar. The topic of discussion in our section, however, has nothing whatever to do with the *Tripādī*, or with any rule contained in it. It would

therefore be absurd to say that because the BP is not valid in the *Tripadī*, *ān* serves a purpose in P. 6.1.95. This cannot possibly be the intended sense of the beginning of our section.

We do not fare any better when we try to connect *ata eva* with the last but one topic dealt with before it. That is the Jñāpaka of the BP, which consists, as we know (pp. 29 f. above) in the presence of *ūth* in P. 6.4.132. To say that *ān* serves a purpose in P. 6.1.95 because *ūth* in P. 6.4.132 is the Jñāpaka of the BP is sheer nonsense.

It is only when we go back even further that we find something that could serve as an antecedent of *ata eva*. There, three pages, or thirty lines, before these two words, we read that “the meaning of the Paribhāṣā is this, that when an *antarāṅga* rule or operation is about to take effect, a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation which already has taken effect, and likewise a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation which applies simultaneously with the *antarāṅga* rule or operation is, regarded as not having taken effect or as not existing” (see p. 8, above). If we take the second part of this sentence, we obtain the antecedent that Kielhorn described in the sentence which preceded his translation of our passage: “(Above it was stated that a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation which applies simultaneously with an *antarāṅga* rule or operation is likewise by the present Paribhāṣā *asiddha*)” (see p. 61 above).

We have already seen how unsatisfactory this antecedent is. That is not our concern now. Here I wish to emphasize that, even if this antecedent did not give rise to the difficulties it actually does give rise to, its distance from the words *ata eva* would be enough to make us wonder if something is not wrong in the text here.

There is one more argument, which I have kept for the end. It is the circumstance that another portion of the PS on Par. L has clearly been tampered with. This can be shown on grounds which to a far lesser extent than those used in connection with our present discussion depend on the results of our enquiry in earlier chapters. If with respect to another passage it can convincingly be shown that our text has not preserved its original form; it will be far easier to accept that it has also undergone some rearrangement elsewhere. To study the new passage in detail, we turn to the next chapter.

8. SOME DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN THE DISCUSSION OF PAR. L (II)

The passage immediately following the section to be transferred reads as follows:

PS 92.4–13

*yat tu viśeṣāpekṣāt sāmānyāpekṣam antaraṅgam viśeṣāpekṣe
viśeṣadharmaśyādhikasya nimittatvāt / yathā rudādibhyah sārvadhātuke
ity atra rudādītvam sārvadhātukatvam ca / tatra sārvadhātukatvajñānāya
prakṛter dhātutvajñānam pratyayasya pratyayatvajñānam cāvaśyakam iti
yāsuṭ antaraṅgah / etena yad anudāttanitah iti sūtre kaiyatēnoktam
lamātrāpeksayāntaraṅgās tibādayo lakāraviśeṣāpekṣatvād bahiraṅgāḥ
syādaya iti tat parāstam / viśeṣāpekṣatvēpi tasya sāmānyadharma-
nimittakatvābhāvena tattvasya durupapādatvāt / paranimittakatvena
syādīnām bahiraṅgatvāc ceti tan na / viśeṣasya vyāpyatvē vyāpaka-
syānumānenopasthitāv api tasya nimittatve mānābhāvenādhikadharma-
nimittakatvānupapādanāt / bhāṣya evamvidhāntaraṅgabahiraṅgabha-
vaya kvāpy anullekhaḥ ca / /*

“(Some grammarians) say: ‘That which depends on something general is *antaraṅga* in regard to that which depends on something special, because anything depending on something special is caused by the special nature (of the latter) *in addition* (to being caused by what may be its general nature). E.g., in the case of (the addition of the augment *it* taught in) P. 7.2.76, (the causes on which that addition depends are) “the being one of *rud* etc.” and “the being a Sārvadhātuka”; here, in order to form the conception of “being a Sārvadhātuka” we must necessarily know that the base (*rud* etc.) has the nature of a root, and we must also know that the termination (*t* etc.) has the nature of an affix; accordingly (the addition of) *yāsuṭ* (taught in P. 3.4.103) is *antaraṅga* (in regard to the addition of the augments *it*, *īt*, and *at*, taught in P. 7.2.76; 7.3.98 and 99; and supersedes the latter). The above proves Kaiyatā’s statement on P. 1.3.12, “that (the substitutes) *tip* etc. are *antaraṅga*, because (their substitution) depends on *l* only,

whereas *sya* etc. are *bahiranga*, because (their addition) depends on a special letter *l* (i.e., on *l* specified by *r* etc.)” to be incorrect, viz. because, although (*sya* etc.) depend on something special, not being caused (also) by the general nature (of the latter), they cannot be shown to be *bahiranga*. Moreover (Kaiyatā’s statement is incorrect,) because *sya* etc. are *bahiranga* on account of their being caused by something following. However, all this is untenable; for, although the general nature (of something special) may be inferred to be present (when the latter presents itself) from the fact that that which is special possesses that general nature, yet there is no proof for its being a cause (of an operation which depends on that which is special), and it cannot therefore be said with propriety that (such an operation) is caused by that (general) nature in addition (to its being caused by the special nature of that on which it depends); moreover such a meaning of (the terms) *antaranga* and *bahiranga* (as would be expressed by the words *sāmānyāpekṣa* and *viśeṣāpekṣa*) has nowhere in the Bhāṣya been ascribed to them.” (K. pp. 251–253.)

The argument contained in the above passage is somewhat involved. It rejects a statement, which itself partly consists of the rejection of another statement. It seems reasonable to assume that the opinion rejected in the rejected statement is the one that is accepted by Nāgeśa. It says “that the substitutes *tip* etc. are *antaranga*, because their substitution depends on *l* only, whereas *sya* etc. are *bahiranga*, because their addition depends on a special letter *l*, i.e., on *l* specified by *r* etc.”

We may do well if we try to understand this opinion, which to all appearances is Nāgeśa’s opinion, in the light of a concrete example – say, the derivation of *bhāviṣyati*. At the stage *bhū-l(r̥t)* two operations apply. P. 3.4.78 (*tiptasjhi* ...) prescribes substitution of *ti(p)* for *l*; P. 3.1.33 (*syatāśī lṛluṭoh*) prescribes *sya* before *lṛt*. In the opinion which we suppose to be Nāgeśa’s, the substitution of *ti(p)* for *l* is *antaranga*, the addition of *sya* before *lṛt* is *bahiranga*. The reason given is that the former operation depends on a mere *l*, whereas the latter depends on *l* specified by *r*.

There can be no doubt that the opinion here assumed to be Nāgeśa’s is of a kind not met with so far. Let us compare it with what our investigations up to this point would cause us to expect.

As we have seen, one of the rules that apply at the stage *bhū-lṛt* is P. 3.4.78. It prescribes substitution of *ti(p)* for *l* and has no following cause. The other rule that applies here, viz. P. 3.1.33, which prescribes the

addition of *sya* before *lr*, has as following cause *lr*. If the present passage did not stand in our way, we would therefore say that the substitution of *ti(p)* for *l* is *antaraṅga*, because it has no following cause, whereas the addition of *sya* is *bahirāṅga*, because it has a following cause.

Surprisingly, this is exactly what we find in the statement that, to all appearance, is rejected by Nāgeśa. There we read: "Moreover Kaiyatā's statement is incorrect, because *sya* etc. are *bahirāṅga* on account of their being caused by something following." It seems as if Nāgeśa is here criticizing his own views.

Those readers who have not yet been convinced of the correctness of what was said in earlier chapters regarding Nāgeśa's interpretation of the BP may not be impressed by the alleged incongruity of Nāgeśa's statements here with what he says elsewhere. Indeed, they may think it constitutes evidence that what was said in those earlier chapters is wrong. I suggest that such readers read the following paragraphs especially carefully.

The above passage contains the views of three persons: of Nāgeśa, of an unnamed opponent, and of Kaiyatā. Nāgeśa rejects the opinion of the unnamed opponent, and the opponent rejects the opinion of Kaiyatā. We saw that one of the arguments the opponent uses against Kaiyatā is such as we would have expected of Nāgeśa. I shall now show that the other argument which the opponent uses against Kaiyatā is the same as the one Nāgeśa uses against the opponent.

All we have to do is look once again at the translation of the above passage. There we read that, according to the opponent, "Kaiyatā's statement ... [is] incorrect ... because, although *sya* etc. depend on something special, not being caused also by the general nature of the latter, they cannot be shown to be *bahirāṅga*". But where Nāgeśa shows the position of the opponent to be untenable, he says that "although the general nature of something special may be inferred to be present when the latter presents itself from the fact that that which is special possesses that general nature, yet there is no proof for its being a cause of an operation which depends on that which is special".

So the argument that Nāgeśa employs against the opponent, the opponent employs against Kaiyatā. And the second argument that the opponent uses against Kaiyatā is one that would befit Nāgeśa better than anyone. It seems that something is amiss in our passage.¹

The opponent, who remains unnamed in Nāgeśa's *PS*, is identified as Bhaṭṭoḍī Dīkṣita by Vaidyanātha Pāyagunḍa in the latter's commentary on the *PS* called *Gadā* (99.12). To see if this is correct, we may see what

opinion the above passage ascribes to the opponent. It clearly illustrates the general principle which the opponent is said to possess with the help of the derivation of words like *rudyāt*. Here *rud-l(iñ)* becomes *rud-ti(p)* by P. 3.4.78, and then *rud-t* by P. 3.4.100. At this stage – *rud-t* – a number of rules apply. On the one hand, there is P. 3.4.103 (*yāsuṭ parasmaipadeśūdātto nič ca*), which prescribes the addition of *yās(uṭ)* before *t*. On the other hand, there are three rules, of which the above passage specifies one, and the translation all three. They are P. 7.2.76, which prescribes addition of *i(t)*, and 7.3.98 and 99, which prescribe addition of *i(t)* and *a(t)*, respectively.

The opinion that the above passage ascribes to the opponent is that the addition of *yās (uṭ)* is *antaraṅga* because it depends on the general conditions that there be a stem and a suffix. That is to say, P. 3.4.103, which prescribes the addition of *yās(uṭ)*, requires little of the stem and the suffix on which the addition of *yās(uṭ)* depends. On the other hand, P. 7.2.76, prescribing the addition of *i(t)*, has a list of demands that must be fulfilled by the stem and the suffix if this rule is to take effect. In other words, P. 7.2.76, and P. 7.3.98 and 99 as well, require specific stems and suffixes. For this reason, still according to the opponent, these rules are *bahirāṅga*.

The view here ascribed to the opponent is indeed found in one of Bhaṭṭoji's writings; to be precise, in the *SK* on P. 7.3.99 (no. 2476, p. 220). There we read:

prakṛtipratyayavīśeṣāpeksābhyaṁ adīdbhyām antaraṅgatvād yāsuṭ, rudyāt /

“(In the formation of the 3rd person Parasmaipada of the potential mood of the root *rud*, when at the stage *rud-t* several operations apply, on the one hand the addition of *yāsuṭ* by P. 3.4.103, on the other hand the addition of *iṭ* by P. 7.3.98 or the addition of *aṭ* by P. 7.3.99, the addition of) *yāsuṭ* (actually takes place) because it is *antaraṅga* with respect to (the addition of) *aṭ* and *iṭ* which (are *bahirāṅga* since they depend on special stems and suffixes.”

So the first part of the opponent's opinion is indeed the opinion of Bhaṭṭoji.

Before we proceed, there is something else worth noting. It is true that what is ascribed to the opponent in the *PS* and what is expressed in the *SK* agree in content, even though there is a difference in the way this opinion has been put to words in the two books. A formal agreement, i.e., a close similarity in wording, can be found between what is ascribed to the

opponent in the *PS* and Nāgeśa's comments in his *BŚŚ* on the passage just quoted from the *SK*. What is remarkable is that the *BŚŚ* shows no signs of disagreement with the content of the passage from the *SK*. Indeed, we have here a case where Nāgeśa changed his mind in the period between writing the *BŚŚ* and writing the *PS* (further instances in Appendix IV).

The relevant part of the *BŚŚ* (p. 1759) reads:

*sāmānyadharmapekṣaśāstrāpekṣayā kaścid viśeṣadharmo'dhiko
nimittakoṭau yasmin viśeṣapekṣaśāstre'sti, tat tato bahiraṅgam iti
tadarthah / yathātra rudāditvam, sārvadhātukatvam ceti bodhyam /
sārvadhātukatvajñānāya prakṛter dhātutvajñānam, pratyayasya tattva-
jñānam cāvaśyakam iti sāmānyadharmanimittakatvam atrāpy astīti
bodhyam² /*

It follows that Nāgeśa in the *PS* is not only criticizing Bhaṭṭoji. He is at the same time criticizing the opinion which he himself had held earlier.

That Nāgeśa had changed his views is confirmed by what he says in his *LŚŚ*, a book which he wrote after the *PS* (see Appendix III). There, while commenting on the same passage of the *SK*, he repeats what he had said in the *BŚŚ*, but then continues (*Vārāṇaśi* ed. II, p. 572):

*vastuta idam bahiraṅgatvam bhāṣye kvāpi nāśritam iti paribhāṣāvṛttau
nirūpitam*

“That in reality this (kind of) *Bahiraṅgatva* has never been made use of in the *Bhāṣya* has been stated in the commentary on the *Paribhāṣās* (i.e., in the *PS*).”³

We must return to our main topic. The first part of what was ascribed to Nāgeśa's opponent is an opinion which we find again in the *SK*. It seems therefore not unlikely that Vaidyanātha is right in identifying the two, the unnamed opponent and Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita. It will be interesting to see what (if anything) Bhaṭṭoji has to say with regard to the opinion of Kaiyatā, which – as we have seen – was rejected by the unnamed opponent with arguments which could also destroy the foundations upon which his own ideas were built.

We find Bhaṭṭoji's thoughts about the topic discussed in Kaiyatā's controversial statement in the former's *Śabdakaustubha* on P. 1.3.12 (p. 460). There we read:

*na ca syādiṣu doṣah . . . iti vācyam / lamātrāpeksayāntaraṅgeṣu tibādiṣu
krteṣu lakāravišeṣāpekṣatayaḥ bahiraṅgānāṁ syādīnāṁ pravṛtteḥ /*

“And it should not be said that a fault would result in the case of *sya* etc. For (the addition of) *sya* etc., which is *bahirāṅga* because it depends on a special letter *l* (i.e., on *l* as specified by *r* etc.), takes place when (the substitution of) *tip* etc. (for *l*), which is *antaraṅga* since it depends on *l* only, has taken place.”

Instead of a rejection of Kaiyatā’s opinion, we find complete agreement with it!

All the problems connected with the passage of the *PS* that we have studied can be solved by one minor rearrangement of the text. This rearrangement leaves the opponent – who can now safely be identified with Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita – with the idea that what depends on something general is *antaraṅga* with regard to what depends on something special. The discussion of the derivation of *rudyāt*, which serves to illustrate the above general statement, also remains part of the section which describes the opponent’s point of view. But the rejection of Kaiyatā’s statement we now apportion to Nāgeśa.⁴

The rearrangement I am talking about consists of a relocation of *iti tan na* and the two sentences following it in the above passage to the position immediately after *iti yāsuḍ antaraṅgah*. The whole passage now comes to look like this:

App. I ll. 88–99

*yat tu višeṣāpeksāt sāmānyāpekṣam antaraṅgam višeṣāpekṣe
višeṣadharmaṣyādhikasya nimittatvāt / yathā rudādibhyah sārvadhātuke
ity atra rudāditvām sārvadhātukatvām ca / tatra sārvadhātukatvajñānāya
prakṛter dhātutvajñānām pratyayasya pratyayatvajñānām cāvaśyakam iti
yāsuḍ antaraṅgah iti tan na / višeṣasya vyāpyatvena vyāpakasyānu-
mānenopasthitīāv api tasya nimittatve mānābhāvenādhikadharma-
nimittakatvānupapādanāt / bhāṣya evamvidhāntaraṅgabahiraṅgabhāvasya
kvāpy anullekhač ca / etena yad anudāttanitah iti sūtre kaiyatēnotktam
lamātrāpeksayāntaraṅgās tibādayo lakāravišeṣāpekṣatvād bahiraṅgā
syādaya iti tat parāstam / višeṣāpekṣatve’pi tasya sāmānya-
dharmanimittakatvābhāvena tattvasya durupapādatvāt / paranimitta-
katvena syādīnāṁ bahiraṅgatvāc ca / /*

“(Some grammarians) say: ‘That which depends on something

general is *antaranga* in regard to that which depends on something special, because anything depending on something special is caused by the special nature (of the latter) *in addition* (to being caused by what may be its general nature). E.g., in the case of (the addition of the augment *iṭ* taught in P. 7.2.76, (the causes on which that addition depends are) “the being one of *rud* etc.” and “the being a Sārvadhātuka”; here, in order to form the conception of “being a Sārvadhātuka” we must necessarily know that the base (*rud* etc.) has the nature of a root, and we must also know that the termination (*t* etc.) has the nature of an affix; accordingly (the addition of) *yāsuṭ* taught in P. 3.4.103) is *antaranga* (in regard to the addition of the augments *iṭ*, *īṭ*, and *aṭ*, taught in P. 7.2.76; 7.3.98 and 99; and supersedes the latter.’ However, this is untenable; for, although the general nature (of something special) may be inferred to be present (when the latter presents itself from the fact that that which is special possesses that general nature, yet there is no proof for its being a cause (of an operation which depends on that which is special), and it cannot therefore be said with propriety that (such an operation) is caused by that (general) nature in addition (to its being caused by the special nature of that on which it depends); moreover such a meaning of (the terms) *antaranga* and *bahiranga* (as would be expressed by the words *sāmānyāpekṣa* and *viśeṣāpekṣa*) has nowhere in the Bhāṣya been ascribed to them. The above proves Kaiyatā’s statement on P. 1.3.12, ‘that (the substitutes) *tip* etc. are *antaranga*, because (their substitution) depends on *l* only, whereas *sya* etc. are *bahiranga*, because (their addition) depends on a special letter *l* (i.e., on *l* specified by *r* etc.)’ to be incorrect, viz. because, although (*sya* etc.) depend on something special, not being caused (also) by the general nature (of the latter), they cannot be shown to be *bahiranga*. Moreover, (Kaiyatā’s statement is incorrect,) because *sya* etc. are *bahiranga* on account of their being caused by something following.”

A number of questions remain with respect to the changes that the text of the *PŚ* has undergone, as has been argued here. They will be dealt with in the following chapter. One question, however, is such that it can better be studied in the present context. It concerns the issue of exactly what change the passage under consideration here has undergone.

It will be remembered that this passage, in the printed editions of the *PŚ*, immediately follows the section that, as was shown in the preceding

chapter, originally occurred somewhere else in the *PS*, viz. where the explanation of BP₂ had just come to an end. Is it possible that the present passage – which, according to the above analysis, has been altered – in the original form of the *PS*, as well as in its present form, immediately followed that section?

An answer to this question can be given, and must be negative. The present passage, then as well as now, was part of the discussion of BP₁. This is indicated by the following circumstance.

BP₁ deals with rules that are *antaranya* because their causes lie *within* the causes of the corresponding *bahiranya* rules. The specification is then given that the causes must be formal (*śabdariūpa*). Challenging this specification, but remaining within the compass of BP₁, the suggestion is made that rules that depend on general conditions are *antaranya* with respect to rules depending on special conditions, because general conditions lie *within* the combination general + special conditions.

So the section to be transferred and the passage in which internal changes must be brought about do not belong together. What is more, the fact that both have undergone changes, the one in position, the other in internal structure, does not seem to point at a common origin of these changes: A single mistake on the part of a copyist, or something like it, cannot account for the two irregularities. What then can explain the present state of our text?

9. VAIDYANĀTHA PĀYAGUNDA AND ŠEŠĀDRISUDHĪ

What makes the irregularities which we discovered in the *PS* so problematic is that all editions of this text give the same wrong readings. If the original text has undergone changes, when can this possibly have taken place? To answer this question, we turn to the last page of the preface to the second edition of Kielhorn's *The Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgojībhāṭṭa*, Part II, Translation and Notes; second edition by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI, Poona, 1960. There we find "a table showing the spiritual relationship of Vyākaraṇa Pandits with Nāgeśabhaṭṭa". A single glance at this table suffices to show that of the grammarians who left their traces in the history of the *PS* – usually in the form of a commentary on that text – only one, Vaidyanātha Pāyagunda, was in direct contact with Nāgeśa. The changes under discussion must therefore have been introduced by Vaidyanātha, or by someone before him. We shall see (p. 83f., below) that Vaidyanātha did not introduce them.

Let us first try to find out what purposes could be served by the present reading of the two passages under discussion. We start with the transposed section.

Vaidyanātha's interpretation of Par. L does not – as does our interpretation of it – contain merely two justifications of that Paribhāṣā, viz. one Jñāpaka and one maxim from ordinary life. Among the additional justifications, it counts a second Jñāpaka, viz. the presence of *āni* in P. 6.1.95.¹ This is, in the words of Kielhorn, a "special Jñāpaka . . . to prove, that a *bahirāṅga* rule which applies *simultaneously* with an *antarāṅga* rule, is likewise *asiddha*" (K. p. 221, fn. 4). The reader may remember that the discussion of *āni* in P. 6.1.95 covered the beginning of the section which – as was shown in Chapter 7 above – originally occupied another place in the *PS*. It can hardly cause surprise that someone who was led by the idea that the passage indeed contained a second Jñāpaka could not but think that the place where he found the passage was not fit for it. From his point of view it would more easily perform its function when placed after the passage dealing with the first Jñāpaka, i.e., where we find it today. There seems no difficulty in supposing that such a person, guided by his incorrect interpretation of Nāgeśa's intentions, went to the extent of reordering the

text to bring out the interpretation which he thought was the correct one.

Difficulties arise in connection with the second passage. Here, more clearly even than in the case of the transposed section, the change has been made deliberately. But what could possibly have been the aim of this deliberate change?

We have to turn to another part of the *PS* to get a clue to the motives behind the changes introduced in this second passage. The passage that will throw light on our problem occurs in the discussion of Par. XLI. The question there raised is as follows. P. 1.3.92 (*vṛdbhyah syasanoḥ*) teaches that the Parasmaipada terminations may optionally be substituted for *lṛ* after the roots *vṛt* etc., when *sya* follows. However, *sya* is added to these roots first, and once *lṛ* is separated from the root by this *Vikaraṇa sya*, P. 1.3.12 (*anudāttanīta ātmanepadam*), which restricts roots like *vṛt* to the Ātmanepada, can no longer apply, since *lṛ* no longer follows immediately upon the root. Such being the case, P. 3.4.78 will prescribe both Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada terminations to be substituted for *lṛ*, and clearly the optional prescription of Parasmaipada terminations by P. 1.3.92 serves no purpose.

The solution to this question, offered in the *PS*, is that P. 1.3.12 unites with the general rule P. 3.4.78, so that one single rule results. Further, the ablative *dhātoḥ*, which is understood in P. 3.4.78 from P. 3.1.91, is a *vihitapañcamī*: that is to say, *dhātoḥ* here means *dhātoḥ vihitasya*. The meaning of P. 3.4.78 now becomes: *dhātor vihitasya lasya tip tas...*, “in the place of *l* which is placed after a root come *tip*, *tas* etc.” The meaning of the combination of P. 1.3.12 and P. 3.4.78 therefore is: “Let those terminations which will be termed Ātmanepada come in the place of *l* which, as has been taught elsewhere, is placed after a root, provided the latter be distinguished by a gravely accented indicatory vowel etc.” (K. p. 203). When this interpretation is accepted, there is no problem even when *sya* is indeed added to the root before the personal terminations have replaced *l*, and *l* is therefore separated from the root by *sya*.

But this is not the only solution to the problem Nāgeśa has to offer. He has another one – one that interests us in particular at present – for he continues:

PS 72.1–4

yad vā lamātrāpeksatvād antaraṅgā ādeśā lakāraviśeṣāpeksatvāt syādayo bahirāṅgā iti digyogalakṣaṇapāñcamyām api na doṣāḥ / atra pakṣe vṛdbhyah sya iti sūtram syavisaya² iti vyākhyeyam /

"Or, (one may say that) the substitutes (*tip* etc.) are *anītarāṅga* because (their substitution) depends on (the presence of) *l* only, and that *sya* etc. are *bahirāṅga* (and therefore to be considered as absent so far as regards the substitution of *tip* etc.) because (the addition of *sya* etc.) depends on (the presence of) the letter *l* specified (by such other letters as *r* etc.); and (on this assumption) there would be nothing wrong were one to explain the ablative (*dhaṭoh* etc.) in accordance with P. 2.3.29 (by 'in the place of *l* which follow upon a root', viz. because the personal terminations would be substituted while *sya* etc. are still absent). On this (second) alternative the rule P. 1.3.92 (or rather the locative of *sya* in that rule) must be explained 'wherever *sya* is added (to *vṛt* etc. at some time or other').'" (K. p. 204–205.)

It does not require deep study to see that the opinion expressed in the above passage is exactly the one ascribed to Kaiyatā in the passage studied in the preceding chapter. There we came to the conclusion that this opinion was rejected by Nāgeśa. The original reading of the text left no room for doubt in this respect. But here that same opinion is put forth, not to be rejected, but as a possible solution to a problem, that is, as an opinion to be accepted.

It cannot be denied that this passage is of a problematic character. More will be said about it later.³ But what may be pointed out now is that the existence of this passage can explain the changes introduced in the other one. For this passage presents Kaiyatā's opinion as correct, whereas the other one – in its original form – rejects it. Nothing seems more natural than to assume that someone, seeing the discrepancy between the two passages, considered the manuscript he read to contain a mistake – which it did not – and tried to bring the two passages into agreement with each other by introducing the apparently innocent rearrangement which we have been able to bring to light in the preceding chapter.

This then could be what happened. To Vaidyanātha or someone before him the present passage, i.e., Kaiyatā's opinion, did not appear objectionable, and to him it could not but seem incorrect to see this opinion rejected by Nāgeśa.

Unfortunately, it cannot be accepted that Vaidyanātha introduced the changes in the text. Vaidyanātha's commentary testifies to the fact that Kaiyatā's opinion was objectionable to him as well. In the context of the passage last quoted he remarks:

Gadā 79.26–27

*kaiyatānurodhenāha – lamātreti / vastutas tv atra mātraśabdena
paranimitamātravyavacchedah / tathā cāparanimitakatvād ity arthah /*

“Following Kaiyatā he says: ‘one may say that . . .’. But in reality by the word *mātra* ‘only’ in this (passage is indicated) that there is not a single following cause. And therefore the meaning (of ‘because their substitution depends on the presence of / only’) is ‘because they have no following cause’.”

And there is another reason for doubting that Vaidyanātha was the culprit responsible for the modifications we are studying. At *Gadā* 179.19–23 Vaidyanātha refers to alternative explanations of the text of the *PS* which had been given before him. Further, on numerous occasions his commentary rejects a variant reading of Nāgeśa’s text.⁴ This is explicable only on the assumption that the *PS* already had quite some history behind it when Vaidyanātha wrote his commentary. Indeed, many of the readings rejected by Payaguṇḍa have survived in certain manuscripts, as a glance at the footnotes to Abhyankar’s edition will confirm.⁵ But not a single manuscript seems to have preserved what we have come to think is the unmodified text of the two passages studied above. This can only mean that those modifications were introduced into the text not long after its creation.

It is a matter of great regret, but hardly untypical in the history of Sanskrit literature, that virtually nothing is known about Nāgeśa besides what he has written. Not even probable guesses can therefore be made regarding who gave the *PS* its present shape where the BP is concerned. As we have seen, it must have been someone versed in grammar, not, that is, an ignorant copyist. But it seems that all the commentators on the *PS* were unaware of the fact that their text was not the original one.

Does this mean that our stock of arguments to prove our contentions regarding the original text of the *PS* is now exhausted? Fortunately, it is not. One remains, which, though it turns out to be an argument *ex silentio*, is not for that reason without value. It is based on Śeṣadrīsudhī’s *Paribhāṣābhāskara*.

We have already been introduced to Śeṣadrīsudhī, the eternal critic of Nāgeśa. On that occasion we saw that this grammarian’s interpretation of a part of the *PS* was closer to Nāgeśa’s intentions than that of Vaidyanātha. Can it be that Śeṣadrīsudhī also made use of a text that preserved the original readings?

Let us note, to begin with, that Šeṣādrisudhī does not make use of Vaidyanātha's commentary. This enhances the chance that the text used by Šeṣādrisudhī had indeed retained the modified passages in their original form.

Unfortunately, Šeṣādrisudhī wrote no commentary on the *PS*. His *Paribhāṣābhāskara* is an independent work, which, however, criticizes the *PS* where it presents a different opinion. Where there is no such difference of opinion, the *PS* is not mentioned. To find out how much help we can expect from this side in finding the original reading of our text, we shall therefore first read that portion of the *Paribhāṣābhāskara* which gives the interpretation of its author with regard to the BP.

PS 420.12–15

idam⁶ cāvadheyam – antaraṅgapadena prathamopasthitiyogyaṛthakatvam ucyate / tac cālpakāle śabdabodhajanakatvam / yatsūtrapadaśravanam ārabhya yāvai kāle tadarthaśabdabodho bhavati, tato'dhikakālāpekṣaśabdabodhajanakatvam bahiraṅgatvam ucyate / lakṣye prathamopasthitanimittakatvam cānyad antaraṅgatvam, paścadupasthitanimittakatvam ca bahiraṅgatvam /

“The following is to be noted: What is expressed by the word *antaraṅga* is the property of having a meaning suited to present itself first. And that (property of having a meaning suited to present itself first) is the property of producing verbal knowledge in a short time (i.e., shorter than the time required by what is *bahirāṅga* to produce verbal knowledge). Starting from (the moment one) hears the words of a certain sūtra, the verbal knowledge of the meaning of that (sūtra) arises after a certain (amount of) time (has elapsed); the property of producing verbal knowledge that requires more time (to come into existence than the amount of time specified above) is called *Bahirāṅgatva*. Another (kind of) *Antaraṅgatva* is the property of having a cause that presents itself first in the actual form (of the language which has to be formed or to be accounted for by Pāṇini's rules; the corresponding) *Bahirāṅgatva* is the property of having a cause that presents itself later (in that actual form).”

As was the case in Nāgeśa's *PS*, here also we find that two meanings have been assigned to each of the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*. But whereas the second meaning here ascribed to these two terms closely resembles the

second meaning Nāgeśa ascribed to them (*PS* 96.2 ff.; App. I ll. 130 et seq.; above, pp. 8f.), the first meaning here differs considerably from what we found in the *PS*. Indeed, Śeṣādrisudhī repeats what he had said regarding the first meaning in the following condensed form: *alpapekṣam antaraṅgam bahvapekṣam bahiraṅgam*, “what is dependent on a smaller number of causes is *antaraṅga*, what is dependent on a greater number of causes is *bahirāṅga*” (*PS* 420.17–18). This is exactly what Nāgeśa had rejected as unacceptable (*PS* 80.5–8; App. I ll. 24–28; above, p. 10). With respect to the second meanings of the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, Śeṣādrisudhī remarks that they are the ones used in the Bhāṣya where the maxim from ordinary life, which served as proof of part of the Paribhāṣā for Nāgeśa as well (above, p. 33), is introduced (*PS* 420.16–17).

Besides two meanings for the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, two interpretations of the Paribhāṣā are offered, as was the case in the *PS*.

PS 420.18–21

alpārthaviṣayakaśābdabodhasyālpakālena jananāt adhikapadajñānatadarthasmṛtipūrvakasābdabodhasyādhikakālena\jananāt tatrobhayatra antaraṅgabaliyastvam\prathamopasthitasya prathamam̄ pravṛttir nyāyasiddhā\prathamapravṛttikakahvapekṣāpekṣayā\ nimittavaśat paścad-upasthitālpapekṣam praty asiddhatvam jñāpakasādhyam /

“Since the production of verbal knowledge which concerns few meanings (takes place) in a short time, and since the production of verbal knowledge which is preceded by the memory of the knowledge of more words and (by the memory) of their meanings (takes place) in more time, the rules which are *antaraṅga* supersede (those which are *bahirāṅga*) in both these (meanings assigned to the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*). That (the operation which) presents itself first (because its cause presents itself first) takes place first, is established by the maxim (from ordinary life which served as an illustration of the second meanings of the terms *antaraṅga* and *bahirāṅga*, and as the proof of this aspect of the Paribhāṣā.) With regard to (a rule) which has taken effect first and is (*bahirāṅga* in the first sense here assigned to this word, i.e.,) dependent on a greater number (of causes), the fact that it is *asiddha* with respect to (a rule) which – due to (the circumstance that) its cause, (i.e., the cause which presents itself in the actual form to be derived, presents itself later, – presents itself later and which is (*antaraṅga* in the sense that it is) dependent on a smaller

number (of causes), is to be established by the Jñāpaka (which consists in the presence of *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132)."

The interpretations of the BP given here are identical with the ones given in the *PS*. Where the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* are used in the first sense assigned to them, the *Paribhāṣā* serves a double function. When an *antarāṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* rule apply simultaneously, the *antarāṅga* rule supersedes the *bahirāṅga* rule. If the *bahirāṅga* rule has already taken effect when the *antarāṅga* rule applies, the former is *asiddha* with regard to the latter. Where the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* are used in the second sense assigned to them, the *Paribhāṣā* stipulates that when the two rules bearing those names apply simultaneously, the *antarāṅga* one supersedes the *bahirāṅga* one. The last two sentences of the above passage are formulated so that they also cover what we have come to know as BP₂₂, according to which operations take place in the order in which the meanings on which they depend present themselves.

What can be learned from the above is that, as far as BP₂ is concerned, there is no disagreement between Śeṣādrisudhī and Nāgeśa. And indeed, Śeṣādrisudhī does not criticize any of Nāgeśa's statements pertaining to BP₂. The case is different where BP₁ is concerned. It is true that here also the interpretation given to the *Paribhāṣā* is the same in the case of both grammarians. But the meanings assigned to the words *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* now differ greatly. We may therefore expect much criticism from Śeṣādrisudhī directed at Nāgeśa's discussion of BP₁.

A comparison of the two discussions of the BP – the one by Śeṣādrisudhī, the other by Nāgeśa – reveals that this expectation is borne out by the facts. Śeṣādrisudhī criticizes what Nāgeśa has to say on BP₁ in such a thorough manner that not a single statement of Nāgeśa whose content differed from Śeṣādrisudhī's ideas in this regard escapes attack. Line after line – either quoted or more obliquely referred to in the *Paribhāṣābhāskara* – is unmercifully condemned. This is true of all that precedes the passage that begins with *ata evomānoś ca ...* (*PS* 87.13).⁷ But there, all of a sudden, Śeṣādrisudhī's anger seems to be exhausted. He says not a word about all that follows this point.

Śeṣādrisudhī's abrupt change of temper can easily be explained as far as BP₂ is concerned. Here his own and Nāgeśa's opinions coincide, so that no room is left for criticism. The same can be said with regard to such opinions as are rejected by both the authors. To this category belongs the first part of the passage the latter part of which we suspected had been changed. In this

first part the opinion that that which depends on what is general is *antarāṅga* with regard to that which depends on something special was explained with the help of the derivation of *rūḍyāt*, and subsequently rejected. We may safely assume that here Śeṣādrisudhī agreed with Nāgeśa, for he maintains complete silence.

But Śeṣādrisudhī's lack of critical spirit regarding the section that begins with *ata evomāriś ca* is wholly inexplicable as long as we assume that he found this section where we find it at present, i.e., where it has been at least since Vaidyanātha wrote his commentary. For at this place it can be accounted for in no other way – and then only with great, far too great, difficulty – than by assuming that it proves one half of BP₁, viz. the half that says that where an *antarāṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* rule apply simultaneously, there the *antarāṅga* rule supersedes the *bahirāṅga* rule. The proof here is in the form of a Jñāpaka, the presence of *ān* in P. 6.1.95.

The passage concerned has been studied in detail earlier (Chapter 7). We found that the so-called Jñāpaka could not serve as a Jñāpaka, and on the basis of this and much other evidence decided that the passage originally did not belong at this place. But all this is at present not our primary concern. What is important here is that if Śeṣādrisudhī had found this passage in its present position, he could not have failed to protest. For Śeṣādrisudhī had his own way of justifying the fact that, where an *antarāṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* rule apply simultaneously, the former supersedes the latter. In his opinion, the first meanings assigned to the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga* can be given as “what depends on a fewer number of causes is *antarāṅga*, what depends on a greater number of causes is *bahirāṅga*” (see above). And these meanings themselves already explain why an *antarāṅga* rule supersedes a *bahirāṅga* rule. The meaning of the former rule comes more quickly to our minds than the meaning of the latter rule. We could perhaps say that for Śeṣādrisudhī the *antarāṅga* rule has already taken effect by the time the *bahirāṅga* rule is fully understood.

So Śeṣādrisudhī has no need for the Jñāpaka which consists of the presence of *ān* in P. 6.1.95. And now we may recall that besides the fact that this Jñāpaka was not capable of proving what it was supposed to prove, the whole section of the *PS* that follows the passage dealing with *ān* in P. 6.1.95 contains a number of difficulties as long as it is supposed to be where it is at present. Why then did Śeṣādrisudhī not mention a single one of these in order to criticize Nāgeśa, something which everywhere else he seems intent on doing?

The answer has already been suggested: Because he did not find the

section in the position where it has been since before Vaidyanātha! If he found the section at the place earlier suggested to be the right one, i.e., immediately after the explanation of BP₂ had come to an end, then there was nothing objectionable in the section, even for Šešādrisudhī. There, this passage introduced no faulty and superfluous Jñāpaka, nor did a long discussion about one of the consequences of BP₂ find its place where BP₁ ought to have been discussed. It seems safe to count Šešādrisudhī's silence among the arguments which support the proposed relocation of the section concerned.

With respect to the other passage which has been modified, as has been argued above, we do not find any criticism on the part of Šešādrisudhī. This is, at first sight, strange. If the original text of the *PS* contained two contradictory passages, as we were led to believe,⁸ nothing would be easier than to find fault with at least one of them. Why then did not Šešādrisudhī raise his voice, as he was wont to do in such cases? Nothing certain can be concluded from Šešādrisudhī's silence here. But it is quite possible that it indicates that once again this opponent of Nāgeśa had understood the text of the *PS* better than Vaidyanātha, its defender. To see how it could indicate this, we must turn to the next chapter.

10. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION RESOLVED

In our attempt to explain why the second passage, i.e., the one which made mention of an opinion of Kaiyata, had been changed, our attention was drawn to another passage, elsewhere in the *PS*, which seemed to present that same opinion, without the name ‘Kaiyata’ being mentioned in it. Since the two passages in their original form contradicted each other – one giving Kaiyata’s opinion as the correct one, the other rejecting the same opinion – the second of these passages had been changed by an unknown hand in such a way that now Kaiyata’s opinion emerged as correct in both cases. It appears therefore that our labours have unveiled the fact that originally the *PS* contained two conflicting passages, which were, however, reconciled by changes introduced in the text.

If this is indeed the true state of affairs, it may legitimately be asked if our procedure was justified after all. It may be true that the ‘restoration’ of the original reading did away with certain difficulties, but at the same time it introduced a contradiction into the text. Can this be warranted in any way?

Nāgeśa’s *PS* is not entirely free from contradictions (see Appendix II). It is therefore not impossible that one of the two passages that engage our attention at present expressed an opinion that Nāgeśa would otherwise not like to call his own. If this is indeed the case, and if we are given the task of dismissing the passage which is least in agreement with what we have found to be Nāgeśa’s interpretation of the BP, there can be no doubt which passage would suffer eviction from the *PS*. It is the passage found at *PS* 72.1–4 and discussed above (pp. 82f.). Let us recall what it had to say.

In the derivation of, say, *bhavisyati* the following phase is reached: *bhū-l(rt)*. Here two rules apply: P. 3.4.78 prescribes substitution of *ti(p)* for *l*; P. 3.1.33 prescribes the addition of *sya* before *l*. What is maintained in the passage mentioned is that the substitution of *ti(p)* for *l* is *antaranga* because it depends on the presence of *l* only; the addition of *sya*, on the other hand, is *bahiranga* because it depends on the presence of *l* qualified by something else.

The reader does not need to be reminded of all we now know about Nāgeśa’s interpretation of the BP in order to see that it is very hard to fit the above into it. Is it possible that here Nāgeśa again made a mistake? Did he

perhaps accidentally make use of an interpretation of the BP that he had formerly believed to belong to it, but that was incongruous with his present ideas? The temptation is great to give an affirmative answer to these questions.¹

Before we make any decision in this matter – either by considering the above as not representing Nāgeśa's final opinion, or by undoing the change, i.e., the restoration of the original reading proposed with regard to the passage which mentions Kaiyatā by name – we may do well once again to look at this other passage in the form supposed to be the original one. In the opinion here ascribed to Kaiyatā, in the derivation of *bhavīṣyati* from *bhū-l* the substitution of *ti* for *l* is *antarāṅga* because it depends on the presence of *l* only; whereas the addition of *sya* is *bahirāṅga* because it depends on the specific feature of *lṛ* (i.e., of *lṛt* and *lṛṇ*) in addition to the general feature of *lṛ*, that is to say, in addition to *l* alone, on which the substitution of *ti* for *l* depends. In other words, according to Kaiyatā as interpreted by Nāgeśa, the cause of the substitution of *ti* for *l* is in some way *included* in the causes of the addition of *sya*.

That this is indeed the intention that Nāgeśa ascribes to Kaiyatā follows again from the first reason adduced by the former to support his rejection of the latter's opinion. Nāgeśa says: “although *sya* etc. depend on something special, not being caused also by the general nature of the latter, they cannot be shown to be *bahirāṅga*” (above, p. 79). It is the manner in which Kaiyatā – according to Nāgeśa – justifies the *Bahirāṅgatva* of the addition of *sya* that evokes criticism. To say that the addition of *sya* is *bahirāṅga* and the substitution of *ti antarāṅga* because the causes of the former include the cause of the latter is unacceptable to Nāgeśa. But he is in complete agreement with Kaiyatā regarding the fact that the addition of *sya* is really *bahirāṅga* and the substitution of *ti antarāṅga*. And our passage does not even seem to exclude the possibility that the substitution of *ti* is *antarāṅga* because it depends on *l* only, whereas the addition of *sya* is *bahirāṅga* because it depends on a special letter *l*. If indeed it leaves this possibility open, then the contradiction which we feared we were confronted with disappears. In that case we have to conclude that Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP permit two justifications of the precedence of *ni* over *sya* in the derivation of, say, *bhavīṣyati*.

Let it be admitted, right at the outset, that if we are now indeed on the trail of Nāgeśa's true intentions, he would have done his readers – and himself, if he wanted to be understood – a great service by expressing them more clearly. By using virtually identical words for describing both an

opinion he rejects and one we must assume is his own, he must himself be held largely responsible for the lack of understanding his work has suffered.

But let us not run ahead of what we know at this stage. The most difficult problem is still to come. How is the statement that *ti* is *antarāṅga* because it depends on *l* alone and *sya bahirāṅga* because it depends on a special letter *l* to be understood in the light of what we know to be Nāgeśa's interpretation of the BP? When we look for formal causes, *ti* turns out to have no following cause, whereas *sya* has the following cause *lr*. This explains that *ti* is *antarāṅga* – this indeed is the second justification Nāgeśa gives for considering *ti antarāṅga* – but not that this is so because *ti* depends on *l* only. Let us therefore try our luck with the other kind of cause we found to play a role in the BP: meaning. According to BP₂₂, operations take place in the order in which the meanings on which they depend arise.

The expressive elements in the word *bhavisyati* are *bhū-sya-ti*. That it is the substitutes *sya* and *ti* that are expressive, not the substituend *l*, is a point of view that the grammarians defended against the Naiyāyikas.² More will be said about it soon. In the present discussion this point of view may be accepted. The question here is what the meanings are of which *sya* and *ti* are expressive, and in what order those meanings arise. Once we know that, we may be able to ascertain in which order the elements *sya* and *ti* come into existence, and which of these two is therefore *antarāṅga*, which *bahirāṅga*. To find an answer to this question, we turn to the *PLM*, probably the last work Nāgeśa wrote on what may be called 'the philosophy of grammar'.

Before we study the relevant passages of that book, it must be remarked that, properly speaking, of the two elements *sya* and *ti* only *ti* is a substitute (of *l(rī)*), *sya* being a Vikarana, which comes into existence as a result of *l(rī)*, but not in the place of *l(rī)*. The first passage from the *PLM* to be studied seems to ascribe all meanings involved to the substitute of *l* (in our case *ti*); the second, however, qualifies that first statement somewhat. Both the passages are found in the chapter called *Daśalakāraḍeśārthanirṇaya*.

PLM pp. 243–244

vartamāne laṭ ityādīvidhāyaka-laḥ karmanī-itiśaktigrāhakasūtrāṇām ādeśārthāṇī sthānīny āropya pravṛttih / tatra saṃkhyā-viśeṣa-kālaviśeṣa-kārakaviśeṣabhbāvāḥ lādeśāmātrasya arthāḥ /

"The rules which enjoin (*l* in one of its ten possible forms on the basis of a particular meaning that is to be expressed,) such as P. 3.2.123,

and the rule which informs (us regarding) the denotative power (which resides in *l*), viz. P. 3.4.69, (all these rules) superimpose (the meanings that figure in them) upon the substituend (*l*), in order to (ascribe those meanings to) the substitutes (*ti* etc.). i.e the meanings that belong to all substitutes of *l* are the being a particular number, a particular time, and a particular *kāraka*."

We learn a number of things from this passage. First of all, it confirms what we had already accepted, viz. that for Nāgeśa the substitutes of *l* are expressive (in view of what further study will teach us, it is better to say: for Nāgeśa those substitutes are *also* expressive). Secondly, the meanings expressed by the substitutes are three in number: a particular number, a particular time, and a particular *kāraka*.

All this can hardly be said to be very exciting information. We knew, or at any rate suspected, it already. The same can, however, not be said of the third bit of information we derive from this passage. It teaches us in what order the meanings enumerated come into play, first the particular time, then the remaining two meanings. How it does so can be seen as follows. In the above passage our attention is drawn to the distinction between two kinds of rules. Some rules *enjoin l* on the basis of a particular meaning, others (in point of fact, there is only one such rule) *inform* us what other meanings belong to *l*, or rather to its substitutes. It goes without saying that the second type of rule can play no useful role until *l* has been enjoined, and consequently has come into existence. As it happens, the rules which *enjoin l* on the basis of a particular meaning all make use of such meanings as can be described as "a particular time". We are subsequently *informed* (by P. 3.4.69) that "a particular *kāraka*" is one of the meanings expressed by the substitutes of *l*. And the meaning describable as "a particular number" does not come into the picture until *l* is being replaced by one of its substitutes.

So we know now in what order the *meanings* of, say, our form *bhavisyati* arise. It is as follows: "future time", "agent", "singular number". But does this help us in determining in what order the elements *sya* and *ti* make their appearance? On the face of it, it does not. If, as seemed to be suggested in the last passage, all three meanings are expressed by the substitute of *l*, i.e. *ti*, and therefore no meaning is left for *sya*, considerations of meaning are not fit to solve questions about the order in which these elements appear. Fortunately, what seemed to be suggested in the above passage is in need of qualification, as appears from the sentence which immediately follows it in the *PLM*. And this qualification enables us to put to use our knowledge of

the order in which the meanings come into play.

The sentence concerned reads:

PLM pp. 244–245

tathā hi laṭādeśasya vartamānakālah. śabādisamabhivyāhāre karta, yakciṇsamabhivyāhāre bhāvakarmani, ubhayasamabhivyāhāre ekatvādisanākhyā cārthah

“For instance: ‘present time’ is (the meaning) of the substitute of *l(at)*; ‘agent’ is (the meaning of the substitute of *l(at)*) when there is the utterance, together (with that substitute of *l(at)*), of (*s*)*a(p)* etc.; ‘action’ or ‘object’ is (the meaning of the substitute of *l(at)*), when there is the utterance, together (with that substitute of *l(at)*), of *ya(k)* or (*c*)*i(n)*; and ‘number’, such as oneness, is the meaning (of the substitute of *l(at)*) when there is the utterance, together (with that substitute of *l(at)*), of either (of the two, viz. one out of the group ‘(*s*)*a(p)* etc.’ or one out of the two elements *ya(k)* and (*c*)*i(n)*).”

This last sentence qualifies and illustrates what was said in the earlier passage with the help of the present tense. We may take our example accordingly. In *bhavati* there are three expressive elements: *bhū-a-ti*. Of the three meanings expressed by the substitute of *l*, i.e., by *ti*, one is expressed by *ti* alone; this is “present time”. The remaining two meanings – “agent” and “oneness” – are expressed by *ti* in combination with *a*, i.e. by *ati*. If we therefore want to know in what order the elements *a* and *ti* come into being, we merely have to remember that the meaning “present time” presents itself first, and also the operations that depend on this meaning. Among these operations is included the substitution of *ti* for *l*, which gives rise to *bhū-ti*. The *Vikarana a*, on the other hand, cannot come into existence until *ti* has been substituted for *l*, since it aids in expressing the meaning “agent”, which makes its appearance later.

The outcome of this discussion regarding *bhavati* is in no way new. That (*s*)*a(p)* has to wait for *ti* before it can make its debut is common knowledge. The reason is that the rule which prescribes (*s*)*a(p)*, i.e., P. 3.1.68, gives as condition that a *sārvadhātuka* affix must follow which is expressive of the sense “agent”. Now the term *sārvadhātuka* applies to the substitutes of *l* (by P. 3.4.113), but not to the substituend *l* itself. So the result of the above discussion about *bhavati* is true, but trivial.

This triviality disappears when we pass on to *bhavisyati*. There is nothing in the rule that prescribes *sya* (P. 3.1.33) to show that it has to wait for *ti*. In

spite of that, this rule is an exception (*apavāda*) to P. 3.1.68, which prescribes “*sya*(*p*). This is pointed out in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudi* (on rule 2186; p. 182). It is therefore safe to include *sya* in the group “*(sya)(p)*etc.” of the passage last studied. Of the elements that make up *bhaviṣyati*, viz. *bhū-sya-ti*, only *ti* is therefore expressive of the “future time” (which is meant by *śeṣe* in P. 3.3.13, see *SK* 2193, p. 182), while the combination *sya-ti* expresses the meanings “agent” and “oneness”. And just as we saw was the case in the derivation of *bhavati*, so here also it is the particular time which finds expression first; this leads to *bhū-ti*. Only afterwards is there occasion for *sya* to enter into that form, since it aids the meaning “agent” to express itself.

That in Nāgeśa’s opinion *ti* of *bhaviṣyati* is expressive of the meaning “future time” is confirmed later in the same chapter of the *PLM*:

PLM p. 253

Ir̥tiñas tu bhaviṣyatsāmānyam arthah.

“The meaning of (an affix contained in the Pratyāhāra) *tiñ* (when this has come in the place) of *Ir̥ti* is future time in general.”

The outcome of our discussion can be summed up as follows. In *bhaviṣyati* the meaning “future time” is expressed by *ti* alone. The meanings “agent” and “oneness” are expressed by *sya* and *ti* jointly. Of these three meanings, the first one, “future time”, comes into action before the other two. As a result, the element *ti* comes into existence before *sya*.

The aim of the above exposition was to find an interpretation of a passage in the *PS*. How well does this interpretation fit Nāgeśa’s actual words? He says that the substitution of *ti* for *l* depends on *l* only. This is true if we understand it to mean that *ti* depends on the meaning that gave rise to *l*, i.e., in the case of *bhaviṣyati* the meaning “future time”. Nāgeśa further says that *sya* depends on the letter *l* specified by something. This is true if we understand it to mean that *sya* depends on the meaning that was ascribed to *l* by P. 3.4.69 after this letter had come into existence. The “something” that specifies *l* is, in this interpretation, not *r*, but the new meaning (“agent”) recently assigned to it.

So even though Nāgeśa’s choice of words is unfortunate, it is possible to interpret the two passages which deal with the *Antaraṅgatvā* of *ti* with respect to *sya* in such a way as to resolve the apparent contradiction between them. The difference turns upon what specifies *l*: in the one case, *r*; in the other, the meaning “agent”. And perhaps Nāgeśa’s choice of words is

not accidental. For these are indeed the words that Kaiyata used in his *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa* in the passage referred to by Nāgeśa. When therefore Nāgeśa uses Kaiyata's words once approvingly, once disapprovingly, does this perhaps mean that Kaiyata's statement is correct when interpreted in one way, i.e., in accordance with BP₂₂, but incorrect when understood as illustrating the principle that that which depends on something general is *antarāṅga*, while that which depends on something special is *bahirāṅga*, a principle which itself is not valid?³

Be this as it may, we must direct our attention to a problem which has made its appearance as a result of the suggestions made above. If indeed the derivation of *bhavīṣyati*, and more particularly the priority of *ti* over *sya*, can be accounted for by BP₂₂, does this not interfere with the alternative justification Nāgeśa gives of this derivation? Nāgeśa gives, as may be remembered, a second ground for rejecting Kaiyata's opinion. He says: "Moreover, Kaiyata's statement is incorrect, because *sya* etc. are *bahirāṅga* on account of their being caused 'by something following'" (above, p. 79). This, as we have seen, explains the *Bahirāṅgatva* of *sya* with the help of BP₁. Does this imply that we are at liberty to choose here between BP₁ and BP₂₂, guided only by personal preference?

Earlier in this book we came across an example where either of two aspects of the BP could be applied. It was the derivation of *paṭvya*. Either BP₂₁ or BP₂₂ could be used to secure a smooth derivation. But the choice between BP₂₁ and BP₂₂ was not an arbitrary one. It depended on the kind of derivational pattern that was to be followed. When the *kramenānvākhyāna* was adopted whereby expressive elements would arise one after the other, the derivation was an illustration of the employment of BP₂₂. When, on the other hand, the *vibhajyānvākhyāna* was resorted to and the derivation started from *paṭu-ī-ā*, BP₂₁ was required. So here it was the derivational pattern adopted that decided which aspect of the BP was to be employed, not anybody's whim.

In the derivation of *bhavīṣyati* from *bhū-l*, BP₂₂ is called upon to play a role when the *kramenānvākhyāna* is followed. This much is clear enough. What aspect of the BP is needed when the *vibhajyānvākhyāna* is adopted? The answer is certainly simple, but nonetheless disturbing. The initial string from which the *vibhajyānvākhyāna* starts, i.e., *bhū-sya-ti*, is one in which the question of whether *ti* or *sya* is *antarāṅga* already belongs to the past. That is to say, in determining which of the two is *antarāṅga*, *ti* or *sya*, and which therefore comes into being first, there is no place for the *vibhajyānvākhyāna*. Here there is only room for the *kramenānvākhyāna*,

and consequently for BP₂₂.

As said before, this is very disturbing. A result of these findings is that the statement which at first we thought to be difficult to understand and perhaps due to error on the part of Nāgeśa now comes to be the one that makes sense. The other statement, according to which the substitution of *ti* is *antarāṅga* because it has no following cause, a statement which we initially considered completely perspicuous, now appears to be the problematic one. What can be done about this reversal of values?

There is, as far as I know, only one way of returning meaningfulness to Nāgeśa's second reason for rejecting Kaiyatā's opinion, viz. that *ti* is *antarāṅga* because it has no following cause. This remark of Nāgeśa makes sense only on the assumption that it is not *sya* and *ti* which are primarily expressive of meaning, but *l*. On this assumption, all meanings to be expressed by the finished form *bhavisyati* have already played their role at the time the phase *bhū-l* has been reached, thus leaving no room for the *kramenānvākhyāna*, nor for BP₂₂. Only in this situation is there scope, and even need, for BP₁.

It may seem that here we have come to ascribe to Nāgeśa ideas directly opposed to the ones he was claimed to have a few pages earlier. If Nāgeśa held the substitutes *ti* etc. to be expressive of meaning, then he must have denied expressiveness to the substituend *l*. And whichever of these two he ultimately considered expressive, it seems a plain absurdity to maintain that in his opinion both the substituend and its substitutes were expressive.

It is exactly this "plain absurdity" which seems to reflect the true state of affairs. In the *PLM* we find both views side by side, something which greatly puzzled its editor. We shall go through some of the relevant passages.

PLM p. 10

sthānino lādayah, ādeśās tibādayah kalpitā eva / tatra rsibhiḥ sthānīnāṁ kalpitā arthāḥ kanṭharaveṇaiva uktāḥ / ādeśānāṁ tu sthānyarthābhidhā-nasamarthasyaivādeśatā iti bhaṣyanyāyat te arthāḥ / evam ca sthānīnāṁ vācakatvam ādeśānāṁ vā iti vicāro nispala eva, kalpitavācakatvasya ubhayatra sattvāt / mukhyam vācakatvam tu kalpanayā bodhitasamudāyarūpe pade vākye vā /

"The substituends *l* etc. as well as the substitutes *tip* etc. are only imagined. With respect to these (substituends and substitutes,) the meanings which the seer (Pāṇini) imagined to belong to the

substituends have been uttered by him in his own voice. But those (same) meanings belong to the substitutes because of the rule accepted in the *Bhāṣya* that only that is a substitute which is capable of expressing the meaning of the substituend. And therefore the discussion whether substituends are expressive or substitutes is completely fruitless, because imagined expressiveness resides in both (the substituends and the substitutes). But the most important (kind of) expressiveness resides in the word or sentence, which is conceived of as being a collection (of expressive elements) due to (our) imagination."

This passage gives us, at one blow, the two opinions of Nāgeśa as to what is really expressive, the substituend or the substitute, as well as the reason why he does not choose one at the expense of the other. The reason is that the expressiveness, both of the substituend and of the substitute, is no more than imagined and is therefore not ultimately real.

It could be asked why, if neither substituends nor substitutes are really expressive, Nāgeśa bothers to attribute imagined meanings to them. The answer is easy enough. In the course of a grammatical derivation we find that meanings are ascribed to, supposed to be expressed by, certain elements which figure in that derivation. In the case of the substituend *l*, it is P. 3.4.69 which endows it with the meaning "agent", and P. 3.3.13 which gives it the meaning "future time", if some such form as *bhavisyati* is to be derived. We can leave these meanings where Pāṇini's sūtras have introduced them, or, following the rule accepted in the *Bhāṣya*, we may pass them on to the substitutes. Since the expressiveness of these grammatical elements (*l*, *sya*, *ti*) is imagined, there is no answer to the question of which of the two courses of action open to us is the correct one.

This, however, does not imply that our decision regarding what we imagine to be expressive, the substituends or the substitutes, has no effect on grammatical derivations. BP₂₂ says that operations take place in the order in which the expressive elements on which they depend are *imagined* to come into existence, because the meanings of which these elements are expressive are *imagined* to be understood in that particular order (see p. 22, above). There can be no doubt that it is meanings which are *imagined* to belong to the grammatical elements concerned that Nāgeśa talks about in this passage of the *PS*. An instance where a difference in assigning meaning, i.e., to the substituend or, alternatively, to the substitute, leads to a difference in grammatical derivation we find in *bhavisyati*. If here we

imagine the substituend *l* to be expressive, BP₁ is needed to ensure a correct derivation from *bhū-l* onward. Since at this stage, on the present alternative, the meanings “agent” and “future time” have already been expressed, viz. by *l*, BP₁ can be used to continue the derivation, independent as it is of meanings. If, on the other hand, we imagine the substitutes *ti* and *sya* to be expressive, it is BP₂₂ which is to be responsible for the form the derivation is to assume.

The few passages of the *PLM* discussed above were all we needed for our purpose, i.e., to understand how Nāgeśa could use both BP₁ and BP₂₂ to account for the formation of *bhavisyati*. Since, however, doubts have recently been raised regarding the authenticity of certain portions of the *PLM*, we must dwell somewhat longer on the opinions regarding the expressiveness or otherwise of substituends and substitutes vented in this text. I shall endeavour to show that, as far as these opinions are concerned, there is no reason for regarding them as not stemming from Nāgeśa.

Kapil Deva Shastri, in an article entitled “On the Authenticity of *Parama-laghu-maṇījusā*”, which constitutes his contribution to the *Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, draws attention to two passages of the *PLM* which, in his opinion, cannot be brought into agreement with each other. He says (p. 301):

... in *śakti-nirūpanam* the author, following the Naiyāyika’s views, opines that it is the *sthānī* which is meaningful and not the *ādeśa*. But in the chapter of *daśalakārādeśārthaḥ* the same author clearly supports the views propounded by Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita, which go against Naiyāyika’s views. Here the author of *PLM* says that the *ādeśa* is meaningful and not the *sthānī*. Obviously these two contradictory views cannot go together by the same author.

The first of the two passages here referred to (and reproduced in a footnote) is the first half of the passage we have discussed last, or, to be more precise, the second and third sentences of it.⁴ There indeed it is said that the seer Pāṇini imagined meanings to belong to the substituends, and that those same meanings belong to the substitutes because of a certain rule accepted in the *Bhāṣya*. Kapil Deva Shastri apparently is under the impression that this means that those meanings really belonged, or should be imagined to belong, only to the substituends. But he could be under this impression only because he had not taken the sentence immediately following into consideration. There, as we have seen, it is said that imagined expressiveness resides in both the substituends and the substitutes. It is

significant that this sentence has not been given together with the two earlier ones in the footnote. The sentences on which Kapil Deva Shastri bases his conclusion that expressiveness is here granted only to the substituends are in themselves not completely clear, and can be fully understood only with the help of the following sentence.

The second passage quoted by Kapil Deva Shastri, which is supposed to be incompatible with the one discussed just now, suffers from the same defect. Here Nāgeśa is believed to say “that the *ādeśa* is meaningful and not the *sthāni*”. That he does not say this will become clear from the quotation – here completed with the help of Kapil Deva Shastri’s own edition of the *PLM* – and its translation.

PLM p. 243

*yady api lakāraṇām evārthanirūpanām tārkikaiḥ kṛtam, tathāpi uccārita
eva śabdo artha-pratyāyako nānuccāritaḥ iti bhāṣyāt loke tathai-
vānubhavāc ca tadādeśatiṇām artho nirūpyate / vartamāne laṭ ityādi-
vidhāyaka-laṭ karmani-iti śaktigrāhakasūtrāṇām, ādeśārtham sthāniny
āropya, pravṛttiḥ*

“Even though meaning has by the logicians been ascribed to the letters *l* only, yet meaning is ascribed to the substitutes of those (letters *l*, viz. the suffixes contained in the Pratyāhāra) *tiṇi* (also,) because of the Bhāṣya (which reads) ‘only a word that is uttered conveys meaning, not (a word that is) not uttered’, and because such is the experience in the world. The rules P. 3.2.123 etc. which enjoin (*laṭ* etc. in the sense ‘present time’ etc.), and the rule P. 3.4.69 which lends denotative power (to the letter *l*) attribute (meaning) to the substituend (which, on this alternative, is meant) for the substitute.”

The word *eva* in the first sentence of this passage is important. It shows that the Naiyāyika – it is the Naiyāyika who is referred to by means of the word “logician” (*tārkika*) – is not criticized for ascribing meaning to the letters *l*, but for ascribing meaning to the letters *l only*, to the exclusion of their substitutes *ti* etc. Nothing in this passage, insofar as it is expressive of Nāgeśa’s views, militates against this interpretation, i.e., the interpretation which does full justice to the first word *eva*. In other words, this passage is not in disagreement with the earlier one, in which Nāgeśa had stated that both substituend and substitute could be considered (imagined) expressive. The only disturbing element is the quotation from the *Mahābhāṣya*, which

denies expressiveness to everything that is not uttered, which includes the letter *l*. But just as in the previous passage Nāgeśa was not intimidated by the express statement of Pāṇini that *l* was to be expressive, similarly, we may assume, he did not consider this sentence from the *Mahābhāṣya* an obstacle to maintaining the view that the letter *l* could also be imagined to be expressive.

But let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that Kapil Deva Shastri is correct in stating that the present passage contradicts the earlier one. Let us further suppose that this contradiction is to be explained by assuming that someone else, other than Nāgeśa, added to the text, or perhaps we should say, completed the work that had been left unfinished by Nāgeśa. To realize the consequences fully, we must see which portions of the *PLM* are to be ascribed to that mysterious person.

In the case of the two passages discussed last, the choice is an easy one. The earlier one occurs in virtually identical form in the *LM* (p. 9), a work with respect to which the authorship of Nāgeśa has, as far as I know, never seriously been doubted. If, therefore, one of these passages is from a hand other than Nāgeśa's it must be the second one, according to which, so it is claimed, expressiveness of substitutes only is allowed. Indeed, this second passage, as far as I have been able to ascertain, does not occur in the *LM*.

In order to find more passages that originally were not part of the *PLM*, we return to Kapil Deva Shastri's article. On pp. 299–300 the author points out that even though "some earlier chapters" of the *LM* and the *PLM* "are somewhat similar in nature and content, . . . the chapters of the latter half of the works (from *daśalakārādēśarthaḥ* to *samāsādvṛtyarthanirūpanam*) differ. These chapters of *PLM* are in no way the abridged versions of those found in *LM*." No more is said with respect to this problem in the article, but its writer takes up the same question again in the introduction to this edition and translation of the *PLM*. One of the sections there mentioned as having no counterpart in the *LM* is the chapter called *Lakārārthanirūpana*, which explains the position of the Naiyāyikas. Kapil Deva Shastri is of the opinion that this chapter does not really belong in this "extremely short" (*parama laghu*) work and characterizes it as altogether superfluous (p. 22 and again p. 27). So this section ranks high on the list of portions of the *PLM* suspected of not being original. But the opening passage of this section states the very opposite of what the "later added" passage studied above proclaims. It should be remembered that, for the sake of argument, we had admitted that this last passage maintained

that only substitutes are expressive. With this in mind we may look at the next passage.

PLM p. 263

atha naiyāyikānāṁ mate saṁkṣepāt lakārāṇāṁ artho nirūpyate / tatra ladādilṛāntāḥ daśa lakārāḥ / tatra lakārasya kartā kālah samkhyā iti trayo'rthāḥ / tatra kartā iti pātamjalāḥ-lah karmaṇi ca ... iti sūtre cakāreṇa kartuh parāmarśāt / kartṛsthāne vyāpārah iti bhāṭṭāḥ / yatnah iti naiyāyikāḥ /

"Now the meaning of the letters *l* will be described in brief in accordance with the opinion of the Naiyāyikas. In this connection (it is to be remembered that) there are ten letters *l*, beginning with *la* and ending with *līn*. Here the letter *l* has three meanings: 'agent', 'time' and 'number'. Here (it must be noted that the first of these three meanings is) 'agent' according to the followers of Patañjali, because (the meaning) 'agent' is considered (to be present) in the sūtra *lah karmaṇi ca . . .* (P. 3.4.69) by dint of (the connective) *ca*. According to the followers of (Kumārila) Bhāṭṭa 'activity' (must stand) in the place of 'agent' (in the three meanings enumerated above). According to the Naiyāyikas it is 'effort' (that must stand in the place of 'agent')."

The followers of Patañjali are the grammarians, among whom we have to count Nāgeśa himself. We learn from the present passage that according to the followers of Patañjali the letter *l* has three meanings: "agent", "time" and "number". Whereas the previous passage granted expressiveness to the substitutes only, or so it was maintained, the present one allows this privilege only to the letter *l*. But both these passages are "later added". Are we to assume that the person who added these passages was not capable of seeing the contradiction between the added passages; or rather that a host of interpolators was at work to give the *PLM* its present shape?

Of course, we are not called upon to entertain these improbable assumptions. All the passages considered can be made to yield satisfactory sense by accepting that Nāgeśa looked upon both substituends and substitutes as expressive, albeit that their expressiveness is only imagined. In the initial passage of the chapter called *Daśalakāranirṇaya*⁵ Nāgeśa emphasizes the expressiveness of the substitutes, while in the initial passage of the chapter called *Lakārārthanirṇaya* it is the expressiveness of the substituend that is stressed.

The above discussion may be summed up by saying that it may be true that the PLM contains passage that were not written by Nāgeśa; but as far as those passages are concerned which deal with the expressiveness of substituends and substitutes, there is no reason to regard them in this way.

11. EXCURSUS: ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN OF NĀGEŚA'S IDEAS REGARDING THE PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR

The preceding discussion has left us at a place where it is very inviting, and possibly also fruitful, to tarry a bit and draw into the picture Nāgeśa's other works on the philosophy of grammar besides the *PLM*. These other works are the *VSM*, the *LM*, and the *SV*.

The *VSM*, *LM* and *PLM* were written in this order,¹ and seem to represent three stages in the development of Nāgeśa's thought, at least as far as his ideas on the expressiveness of substitutes and substituends are concerned. The first of these three books, the *VSM*, has not been published yet, but for our limited purposes the description that Kapil Deva Shastri gives of its contents in the introduction to his edition and translation of the *PLM* may suffice.² We learn from this (p. 23) that the first part of the *VSM*, which covers most of the chapters of the book, is called *Varnasphoṭasāmānyanirūpaṇa*. In this part of the book, among other things, the meanings of verbal roots, particles, nominal stems, and the various kinds of affixes are discussed. We may conclude from this that at this early stage Nāgeśa was not yet ready to look upon the *varṇasphoṭa* as something secondary; he had not yet accepted the opinion that the expressiveness of grammatical elements, be they substituends or substitutes, is merely imagined, not ultimately real. That Nāgeśa held such views appears again from his *SV*, a short treatise in which the view that substitutes are expressive, not substituends, is defended with fervour (*SV* 5.8–8.11). This, incidentally, enables us to ascribe the *SV* to roughly the same, relatively early, period of Nāgeśa's life in which he also wrote his *VSM*.³ At this time Nāgeśa was still convinced that individual grammatical elements, but only those that occurred in utterances of the Sanskrit language, i.e., substitutes, not substituends, could be really expressive.

These ideas changed drastically in the time that elapsed between writing the *VSM* and the *LM*. At the second stage of development of Nāgeśa's ideas, only the sentence remained really expressive. The expressiveness of all smaller units was now no more than imagined. Indeed, the very first words of the *LM*, those which immediately follow the opening verse, are

significant. They are (p. 1): *tatra vākyasphoṭa mukhyah*, “here the *vākyasphoṭa* is the main thing.” Not so much as a mention is made of the other kinds of *sphoṭa*, eight varieties of which had been enumerated in the *SV* (p. 1). The *LM* (9.2–8) then proceeds to state that the discussion regarding what is really expressive, the substituend or the substitute, is futile, since there is only an imagined expressiveness here, and that resides in both. It uses here practically the same words as the *PLM*, the relevant passage of which has been quoted and translated above (p. 97). As far as I have been able to ascertain, the *LM* never again questions the correctness of this its initial point of view, nor does it feel compelled, in certain contexts, to stress the expressiveness of the substituend rather than of the substitute, or vice versa.

This again changes when we come to the *PLM*. Indeed, it seems that we have to assume a second time that Nāgeśa’s opinions regarding what is expressive, the substituend or the substitute, had undergone modifications. By assuming that these modifications were of the kind to be described now, a number of peculiarities of the *PLM* vis-à-vis the *LM* become understandable.

In the *PLM* Nāgeśa still thinks that the *vākyasphoṭa* is the main thing. But whereas in the *LM* he considered the lesser kinds of *sphoṭa* not worthy of mention in the introductory passages of his work, in the *PLM* they are again enumerated there (p. 2), as they were in the *SV* and perhaps in the *VSM*. It is true that much has changed since those early books. As noted above, the *vākyasphoṭa* is now, as in the *LM*, regarded as most important (p. 5), and the expressiveness of both the substituend and the substitute is proclaimed, again as in the *LM*, both being ultimately only imagined. But it is with regard to this imagined expressiveness of substituend and substitute that something important seems to have happened to Nāgeśa. In the *LM* he thought that, since the expressiveness of substituend and substitute was only imagery, it did really not matter in which of the two one chose it to reside in a particular context. But at the time he wrote the *PLM* he had realized that in certain situations it does make a difference which choice is made. Those situations include, as has been extensively discussed above (Chapter 10, especially pp. 96 ff), the derivation of words like *bhavisyati*. Here, to recapitulate, if the substituend *I* is held to be expressive, *BP₁* is required; if the substitute *ti* – and with it the *Vikaraṇa sya* – is held to be expressive, *BP₂₂* is required.

There are various reasons for assuming that Nāgeśa in the *PLM* had become aware of the differences in derivation entailed by the difference

between imagining expressiveness to reside in the substituend or in the substitute, and that he had not been aware of these differences in the *LM*. The first reason has been mentioned already: all eight kinds of *sphoṭa* have again been enumerated in the beginning of the *PLM*, though they were absent in the *LM*. This may indicate, or at the very least is compatible with the view, that those other kinds of *sphota*, and consequently also the expressiveness of other – smaller – units than the sentence, had gained importance in the eyes of Nāgeśa.

This first reason by itself is not very strong. The second reason is stronger. In the derivation of *bhavisyati*, while assuming that the elements *sya* and *ti* were expressive, we had to make use of the information provided by the *PLM*, viz. that *ti* alone is expressive of the meaning “future time”, whereas *ti* and *sya* combined are expressive of the meanings “agent” and “oneness”. Only this information enabled us to decide in which order the elements *sya* and *ti* were to be added to the root. The sentence which contains this crucial information is conspicuous by its absence in the *LM*. This does not necessarily mean that Nāgeśa had different ideas about what expresses what. It appears that he had simply overlooked the difficulties posed by the derivation of *bhavisyati*.

The third reason is based on the presence in the *PLM* of the chapter called *Lakārarthanirṇaya*. In this chapter the meanings of the letter *l* are determined in accordance with the point of view of the Naiyāyikas. There is nothing in the *LM* which corresponds to this chapter of the *PLM*. This led Kapil Deva, as we have seen (p. 101), to suppose that the chapter was not written by Nāgeśa. We have already raised an objection against this supposition (above p. 102), but the question remains why such an “altogether unnecessary” chapter should have been added to increase the bulk of a book that aims at being “extremely short”.

We know that, according to Nāgeśa, imagined expressiveness belongs to both the substituend and the substitute. When Nāgeśa wrote the *LM* he was of the opinion that the mere statement of this fact was enough, and that he did not need to worry about the consequences of assigning this imagined expressiveness to one or another of its two possible places of residence. He simply thought that this would have no consequences. When, therefore, he devotes a long chapter in his *LM* to the “description of the meanings of the suffixes contained in the short form *tiñ*” (*Tiñarthanirūpana*), he is under the impression that these same meanings can also be imagined to belong to the letters *l*.

But at the time Nāgeśa started writing the *PLM*, he knew that the

assignment of imagined meaning to the one or to the other of the pair of substituend and substitute could very well have consequences for the derivation of a word. So the discussion had to be split into two. One chapter would deal with the meanings of the substitutes of the letters *l*; here expressiveness was imagined to reside in those substitutes. Another chapter was to deal with the meanings of the substituend, i.e., of the letters *l*; here the underlying assumption was that now expressiveness was imagined to reside in those letters *l*.

Writing the first of these two chapters was relatively easy for Nāgeśa. Here he could draw upon earlier writings, especially the *Vaiyākaraṇabhbūṣaṇasāra* of Kaundabhaṭṭa, verses from which he indeed regularly quotes there.

The second of these two chapters was going to be more difficult. In it, expressiveness was to be imagined as residing in the letters *l*. Such a point of view had never been represented in grammatical writings. It is therefore not surprising that Nāgeśa here turned to the Naiyāyikas for help. They had for a long time defended the view that *l* is expressive. Besides this point of agreement, that expressiveness belongs to *l*, there were not many points of disagreement. The main difference between Nāgeśa here and the Naiyāyikas is one that could be described – borrowing a term, but not its meaning, from the philosopher Quine – as “semantic ascent”. Where Nāgeśa imagines the meaning “agent” (*kartr*) to reside in the substituend *l*, the Naiyāyikas ascribe the meaning “activity” (*kṛti*) to the same. The difference is only one of level, since “agenthood” (*kartrīva*) is the same as “activity” (*kṛti*). The theory of the Naiyāyikas would therefore largely fulfil Nāgeśa’s needs in the subject matter under consideration, if only it would, so to say, come down one step.

The device that Nāgeśa adopts in the end is as follows. On the face of it he devotes the chapter concerned (called *Lakārārthanirṇaya*) to what the Naiyāyikas have to say regarding the matter. But right in the beginning (p. 263) he states where grammarians and Naiyāyikas differ. What is more, he gives the opinion of the grammarians first, viz. that “agent”, “time” and “number” are the three meanings of *l*, and not till later in the passage does he point out in what respect the Naiyāyikas differ from this. He also gives the views of the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the famous Mīmāṃsaka, perhaps because it was inviting to add this information where it was possible without many extra words, but this does not concern us now.

That at least part of Nāgeśa’s intention in writing the chapter called *Lakārārthanirṇaya* was to describe the opinions of the grammarians – i.e.

his own opinions on the alternative that expressiveness is imagined to reside in *l* – follows again from the fact that on a few occasions, viz. where the views of the Naiyāyikas deviate from those of the grammarians, the views of the grammarians are separately mentioned. Two instances of such a procedure can be found on p. 281 of the *PLM*.

This completes the third, and last, argument supporting the claim that Nāgeśa, while writing the *PLM*, was aware of the difficulties connected with the derivation of forms like *bhavisyati*, which he was not aware of when he wrote the *LM*. If this claim is correct, an obvious corollary would be that the *PLM* was composed after the *PS* or simultaneously with it, or at the earliest not long before that work, when Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP had reached their final form.⁴

One final remark before we leave the *PLM*. This whole long train of arguments, at the end of which we arrive at the rather satisfactory result of being able to throw some light on certain peculiarities of the *PLM* which had puzzled its editor, started from a change we had introduced in the text of the *PS*. Those readers who are more pleased with the outcome of the discussion than they were with its beginning may like to turn the whole argument round and join us, after all, in assuming that the correction made in the text of the *PS* is justified.

12. A USE OF BP₂ IN THE CONTEXT OF BP₁

In an earlier chapter we have transposed a whole section of the *PŚ*, and taken it back to where it belongs. A secondary gain of this was that a number of passages which make use of BP₂ were relocated in their proper places, i.e., in the part of the *PŚ* that deals with BP₂. This removed a potential source of confusion. However, those who think that the earlier part of the *PŚ*, where it discusses BP₁, has thus become free from stains are wrong. One passage employing BP₂ remains in it. It constitutes our object of study in the present chapter.

It is important that we be aware of the location of the passage to be discussed. It may be remembered that Nāgeśa had launched an attack on those who maintained that a rule could be *bahirāṅga* on the basis of a technical term. Nāgeśa had illustrated the advantages of his point of view with the help of the derivations of *gaudherah* and *pacet*. It had been argued by some that in the derivation of *gaudhera* from *godhā-dhra(k)*, to confine ourselves to the first example, the substitution of *ey* for *dh* by P. 7.1.2 is *bahirāṅga*, because it depends on the technical term “Āṅga” that belongs to *godhā*. When the stage *godhā-eyra* is then reached, the subsequent elision of *y* before *r*, by P. 6.1.66, being *antarāṅga*, would be prevented by the BP. The desired form *gaudhera* would not be obtained.

Of course, Nāgeśa grasped the opportunity to point out that the difficulty is a result of the misapplication of the terms *antarāṅga* and *bahirāṅga*. As soon as Nāgeśa's point of view is adopted, viz. that only formal causes count where BP₁ is concerned, the difficulty disappears like snow in the sun. All this has been discussed earlier (pp. 5f., above).

However, another solution to the problem is conceivable. It might be that the BP does not apply where P. 6.1.66 operates. This way, too, a smooth derivation of *gaudhera*, as well as of *pacet*, would be secured.

It goes without saying that this alternative solution would undermine Nāgeśa's position. Consequently, Nāgeśa is bound to reject it. He does so in the following passage.

PŚ 81.4–82.3, App. I. II. 37–41

vali lope'ntarāṅgaparibhāṣā na pravartata iti tu na yuktaṁ /' tatsūtre

bhāṣya eva vraścādiṣu lopātiprasaṅgam āśankyopadeśasāmarthyān na / na ca vrścatītyādau cārītarthyam bahiraṅgatayā samprasāraṇasyāsiddhatvena pūrvam eva tatprāpter iti bhāṣyokteḥ /

“To say that the BP does not apply when (*v* or *y*) may have to be elided by P. 6.1.66, is improper (because the author of the *Bhāṣya* has applied the *Paribhāṣā* in a case of that description). For in the *Bhāṣya* on that very rule (P. 6.1.66, first) the question is raised whether the elision (of *v* or *y* taught by P. 6.1.66) would not, beyond (its proper sphere) apply to (the initial *v* of) *vraśc* etc.; subsequently this is denied, on the ground that (*vraśc* etc. in the *Dhātupāṭha* etc.) have been put down (with an initial *v*, which would be absurd if *v* were always elided by P. 6.1.66). Nor, it is said, would (their enumeration in the *Dhātupāṭha* with an initial *v*) have any sense in the case of forms like *vrścati* (where, as *v* is not followed by one of the sounds contained in the *Pratyāhāra val*, one might think P. 6.1.66 would not apply), for (even here) the elision of *v* would apply *before* (the substitution of) *Samprasāraṇa* (for *r*) because the latter is *bahiraṅga* and therefore (regarded as) not existing (so far as regards P. 6.1.66).” (Cf. K. pp. 230–231.)

In order to understand the passage, we may first turn to the explanation which Kielhorn gives in a footnote (K. p. 231, fn. 1). It reads:

In the formation of *vrścati*, from *vraśc-a-ti*, the elision of *v* is *antaraṅga* because it is caused by *r*, the substitution of *Samprasāraṇa* for *ra bahiraṅga*, because it is caused by the *Vikaraṇa a* (P. 6.1.16).

This is correct as far as it goes. What must be added is that here BP_{21} is at work. For the cause of the elision of *v* is *r*. And *r*, being part of the root, presents itself, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, before the *Vikaraṇa a*, which is the cause of the substitution of *Samprasāraṇa*. So here we catch BP_{21} redhanded in the domain of BP_1 , as announced. The excuse is, of course, that it is needed to settle a subordinate point, which had arisen, more or less accidentally, in the discussion of BP_1 . It is needed to reject the opinion that the BP does not apply where P. 6.1.66 operates.

The fact that in this passage BP_2 is active, not BP_1 (and this is also the opinion of *Nāgeśa*), finds unexpected confirmation in another passage. Before we turn to it, we may make the following observations.

That it is BP_2 that plays a role in the discussion of *vrścati* has a practical consequence. We know that *v* of *vraśc* is not to be dropped, for the simple

reason that if it were to be dropped the occurrence of *vraśc* with initial *v* in the Dhātupāṭha would be futile. But if this had not prevented us, we would have elided *v* by P. 6.1.66 first, and after that would have substituted Samprasāraṇa for *ra*. The reverse order: first substituting Samprasāraṇa, and afterwards – because Samprasāraṇa is to be considered as not having taken effect – dropping *v*, is not allowed under BP₂. Indeed, that this is not allowed under BP₂, whereas it is allowed under BP₁, constitutes one of the major differences between these two aspects of the BP.

It is exactly this, viz. that in cases like *vrścati* the reverse order is not allowed, that Nāgeśa tells us in the next passage. The first sentence of it we have read earlier (above, p. 7). It is here repeated to provide the necessary context for the second one.

PS 84.1–2, App. I ll. 51–53

antarāṅge kartavye jātam tatkālaprāptikāṇ ca bahirāṅgam asiddham ity arthah / vrścatyādiṣu padasamskārapakṣe samānakālatvam eva dvayor iti bodhyam / /

“The meaning (of the Paribhāṣā) is this, that when an *antarāṅga* (rule or operation) is about to take effect, a *bahirāṅga* (rule or operation) which (already) has taken effect, and likewise (a *bahirāṅga* rule or operation) which applies simultaneously (with the *antarāṅga* rule or operation), is (regarded as) not having taken effect or (as) not existing. One ought to remember that in (in the case of) *vrścati* etc. (where the Paribhāṣā has been applied by Patañjali,) on the alternative (that the various elements) of which a word (like *vrścati*) is made up, (viz. *vraśc-a-ti*, are all placed side by side before the rules of Pāṇini’s grammar are applied to them, the Paribhāṣā can) only (be applied) when both (the *antarāṅga* elision of *v* and the *bahirāṅga* substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *ra* apply) simultaneously.” (Cf. K. p. 234.)

When the elements of which the word *vrścati* is made up are placed side by side, we get *vraśc-a-ti*. Here the BP applies only when the *antarāṅga* and the *bahirāṅga* operation apply simultaneously. When, on the other hand, the *bahirāṅga* operation, i.e., substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *ra*, takes place first, then the BP is not in a position to make that *bahirāṅga* operation *asiddha*. All this we knew already, since *vrścati* falls within the jurisdiction of BP₂. The above passage therefore contains a warning not to confuse BP₁

and BP₂. Having introduced an element relating to BP₂ into the discussion of BP₁, Nāgeśa feels obliged to bring this to the notice of his readers.

But this passage does more than merely warn us not to confuse BP₁ and BP₂. It also confirms that BP₂ exists in two forms, which we have called BP₂₁ and BP₂₂. That it does so follows from the fact that it talks about “the alternative that the various elements of which a word is made up are all placed side by side before the rules of Pāṇini’s grammar are applied to them” (*padasamskārapakṣa*). It is not hard to see that this is what we have come to know by the name *vibhajyānvākhyāna* in our study of BP₂. The reader will remember that this *vibhajyānvākhyāna* was there contrasted with the *kramenānvākhyāna* (“explanation by making each expressive portion of the word arise one after the other”). He will further recall that whereas the simultaneity of application of the rules concerned was a condition for the application of BP₂ where the *vibhajyānvākhyāna* was adopted, i.e., of BP₂₁, this same simultaneity was no condition for the application of BP₂ where the *kramenānvākhyāna* had been accepted, i.e. of BP₂₂. In this latter case simultaneity is not even possible. It is in view of this state of affairs that our passage adds the restriction *padasamkārapakṣe*.

So the above passage sounds a note of caution not to apply BP₁ to cases which belong to the sphere of BP₂. Unfortunately, it was of no avail. It is partly, no doubt, Nāgeśa’s obscurity of expression that is responsible for the fact that this passage was not correctly understood by his followers. To illustrate this, we may turn to Kielhorn’s translation of the second sentence of the above passage. It reads (K. p. 234):

One ought to remember that in (the case of) *vṛścati* etc. (where the Paribhāṣā has been applied by Patañjali, it can) only (be applied) when both (the *antarāṅga* elision of *v* and the *bahirāṅga* substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *ra* apply) simultaneously, (and that such is the case only) on the alternative (that the various elements) of which a word (like *vṛścati*) is made up (viz. *vṛśc-a-ti*, are all placed side by side before the rules of Pāṇini’s grammar are applied to them).

Thus Kielhorn’s rendering excludes the possibility that the *antarāṅga* elision of *v* takes place before the *bahirāṅga* operation, i.e., substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *ra*, has even presented itself. But we have seen (pp. 22f, above) that Nāgeśa gave a second formulation of BP₂ for no other reason than to allow for possibilities like this. In Nāgeśa’s opinion elision of *v* in *vṛśc* may take place before the affix *ti* and the Vikaraṇa *a* have made their appearance; this is the case when the *kramenānvākhyāna* is accepted. And

this too is an effect of the BP, viz. of BP₂₂.

This much may suffice to show that when Kielhorn in a footnote (K. p. 234, fn. 1) explains that on accepting the *kramenānvākhyāna*, “the Paribhāṣā would not be applicable in the formation of *vṛścati* etc. because the elision of *v* would apply *before* the substitution of Samprasāraṇa”, he is in disagreement with Nāgeśa’s express statement, which we discussed earlier (p. 23f., above). In other words, as on other occasions, Kielhorn leaves what seems to be a contradiction in Nāgeśa’s text unaccounted for.

PART III

THE REMAINDER OF THE *PS*

13. PAR. LI

Until now we have, with few exceptions, only studied such passages of the PS as occur in the discussion of Par. L. And, it may be added, in all cases we have been able to interpret them in accordance with what we had found to be Nāgeśa's interpretation of the BP in the first part of this book. It is high time that we turned to Par. LI. The discussion of that Paribhāṣā contains probably the most formidable challenge to the main thesis of this book. It contains this challenge in its very first sentence, i.e., in the sentence that introduces the Paribhāṣā. It reads:

PS 101.1

nanv evam akṣadyūr ityādau bahirāṅgasyoṭho 'siddhatvād antaraṅgo yan na syād . . .

"Now one might say that (if the BP were) then (valid in all but the three exceptional cases mentioned above), the *bahirāṅga* (substitution, by P. 6.4.19, of) $\bar{u} \dot{u}h$ (for the *v* of *div*) in (the formation of) *akṣadyū* (from *akṣa-div-kvip*) etc. would have to be considered as *asiddha* (in regard to the *antaraṅga* substitution by P. 6.1.77 of *y* for *i* before *ū*), and in that case the *antaraṅga* (substitution of the) (semivowel *y* (for *i*) would not take place." (Cf. K. p. 267.)

The derivation of *akṣadyūh* passes through the following stages:

akṣa-div-(k)vi(p)-s(up)

akṣa-di-ū(ṭh)-(k)vi(p)-s by P. 6.4.19

akṣa-dy-ū-(k)vi(p)-s by P. 6.1.77

P. 6.4.19 (*cchvoh śūd anunāsike ca*) prescribes substitution of *ū* for *v*; the cause of this operation is *kvip*, or more correctly, since the whole of *kvip* is dropped, this operation has no cause that fulfils the requirements (cf. p. 32f. above). P. 6.1.77 (*iko yan aci*) prescribes substitution of *y* for *i*; the cause of this operation is *ū*. It follows that P. 6.4.19, not having a cause, is *antaraṅga*; P. 6.1.77, depending on the cause *ū*, is *bahirāṅga*. Since P. 6.4.19 takes effect first, P. 6.1.77 afterwards, it is clear that the BP presents no obstacle in the derivation of *akṣadyūh*.

This conclusion of ours is exactly the opposite of what the present passage maintains. There it is stated that the substitution of *ū* for *v* is *bahirarīga* and the substitution of *y* for *i antarāṅga*, where we had found that the former operation is *antarāṅga* and the latter *bahirāṅga*. And this does not exhaust the problems evoked by this passage. For let us accept, for argument's sake, that *kvip* fulfils the requirements for being a cause in the sense necessary in connection with the BP. Then substitution of *ū* for *v* does indeed become *bahirāṅga*, and substitution of *y* for *i antarāṅga*. But they become so in the second sense of these terms; the two operations will be *b₂* and *a₂*, respectively. And this would mean that even on the assumption that substitution of *ū* for *v* is *bahirāṅga*, this operation would not for that reason be *asiddha*. For here the second aspect of the BP would apply – BP₂, which, as we have seen (p. 11, above) has no concern with a *bahirāṅga* rule that has taken effect.

As said above, this passage constitutes a formidable challenge to the interpretation of the BP assigned to Nāgeśa in this book. I shall answer it by showing that although the NP is ultimately rejected in the *PS*, considerable space has all the same been reserved for the defence of that Paribhāṣā. This defence of Par. LI, which can be shown to represent ideas which Nāgeśa held earlier in his life, does indeed cover the larger part of what the *PS* has to say about this Paribhāṣā, from the beginning up to *PS* 104.5.

The *PS* on Par. LI is not always as straightforward in its expressions as we might wish. The reader has already acquired a first taste of its style when we studied the two-word principle (Chapter 5 above). This principle, it may be recalled, was introduced to aid the alleged Jñāpaka of Par. LI in performing its task, viz. establishing that Paribhāṣā. Later on, the Paribhāṣā was rejected, but its Jñāpaka retained. The latter was now said to indicate that Par. L is not universally valid. But together with the Jñāpaka, the two-word principle was also retained. This, at any rate, we were forced to conclude, since without the two-word principle the Jñāpaka would be worthless. This was our introduction to the NP. The two-word principle was here made part of the interpretation of the BP, not in a straightforward, open manner, but through a back door, as it were. We shall find more obscurity soon.

Our first task is to make sure that our earlier statement that Par. LI is not accepted by Nāgeśa is in accordance with the facts. We shall see that Nāgeśa's remarks concerning this question are not as clear as we would like them to be. The passage that will be studied consists of two parts. And a single reading will suffice to show that they represent different opinions.

The first part defends Par. LI; the second rejects it. But what is most remarkable is that our text contains no clear indication that one opinion is rejected to make way for the other. Let us read the passage before we say more about it.

PS 104.2–10

ata eva¹ nalopah sup iti sūtre kṛti tuggrahaṇam caritārtham / anyathā vṛtrahabhyām ityādau bahirbhū tabhyāmnimittakapadatvāśrayatvena bahiranagatayā nalopasyāsiddhatvena² siddhes tadvaiyarthiyam spaṣṭam eva / mama tu tuky ajanantaryasattvān na dosah / na caivam sati³ hrasvasya piti iti sūtrasthabhāśyavirodhah / tatra hi grāmaniputra ity atreko hrasvō'nyah iti hrasve kṛte tukam āśarīkya hrasvasya bahiranagāsiddhatvena samāhitam / nājanantarya ity asya saitve tatra tadaprāptे asamgatiḥ spaṣṭaiveti vacyam / tena bhāśyenaśyā anāvaśyakatvabodhanāt / etajjñāpakenāntaraṅgaparibhāśayā anityatvabodhanasyaiva nyāyyatvāt /

"It is only for (the existence of) this *Paribhāśā* that the words *kṛti tuk* in P. 8.2.2 serve a purpose; otherwise they would evidently be useless; for in (the case of) *vṛtrahabhyām* etc. the elision of the *n* (of *vṛtrahan* etc.) – being *bahirāṅga* on account of the dependence on the fact that (*vṛtrahan* etc.) is a Pada, and that it is termed so only because (it is followed by the termination) *bhyām* which stands beyond (the affix *kvip*, the cause of the addition of the augment *tuk*), – would (by Par. L) be considered *asiddha* (in regard to the addition of *tuk*), and (such being the case, the object of the words *kṛti tuk* in P. 8.2.2) would be accomplished (by Par. L). But according to my (view those words *kṛti tuk* in P. 8.2.2) are quite appropriate (for in my opinion Par. LI does exist and applies in the case of *vṛtrahabhyām* etc.) because (the *antarāṅga* addition of) *tuk* is dependent on the immediate sequence of a vowel (and something else. The elision of *n* cannot therefore be considered *asiddha* by Par. L, Pāṇini was obliged to state that it is *asiddha*).

And one ought not to say that, in case this (Par. LI were admitted to exist), the *Bhāśya* on the rule P. 6.1.71 would be incorrect. There namely the question has been raised whether after the substitution by P. 6.3.61 of short (*i* for the final of *grāmaṇi*) in *grāmaniputra* the augment *tuk* (should be added to the final *i* of *grāmaṇi* by P. 6.1.71); subsequently this (question) has been (answered in the negative and

the non-addition of *tuk*) been accounted for by the fact that (the substitution of) the short (*i* for the *ī* of *grāmanī*) is *bahirāṅga* and therefore *asiddha*. (Here then one might maintain that) if Par. LI did really exist, (the substitution of *i*) in that (word *grāmaniputra*) would not be (*bahirāṅga*), and that consequently (the Bhāṣya in which it is considered *bahirāṅga*) would clearly be incorrect. (But to maintain this would be wrong) because that (passage of the) Bhāṣya shows that this (Par. LI) is unnecessary; (and this is the correct view of the matter) because it is simpler that (the word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86), which (has been assumed) to indicate (the existence of) this (Par. LI), should merely teach us that Par. L is not universally valid, (than that it should indicate the existence of a new Paribhāṣā).” (K. pp. 274–276.)

There can be no doubt that the first part of the above passage defends Par. LI. It emphasizes one of the advantages of accepting that Paribhāṣā. The second part of the passage initially seems to proceed in the same vein, but quite suddenly one discovers that it rejects the Paribhāṣā whose glory it was expected to sing. If it were intended to contrast the two views expressed in the two parts, more effective means would have been available to attain that end.

But let us not be unduly harsh with respect to what may, after all, be no more than a stylistic shortcoming on the part of Nāgeśa. Perhaps Nāgeśa adopts here, be it in a clumsier way, the procedure which he also employed elsewhere in the *PŚ*: He introduces a Paribhāṣā, gives arguments to support it, and then rejects it. He did so, for example, in the case of Par. XLI, which was discarded in favour of the considerations which we studied earlier (pp. 82f.). If we can just condone the way Nāgeśa makes the transition from defence to attack, this seems to be the way his comments on the NP are to be understood. The last sentences on the NP, i.e., the ones that follow our passage, show how well the rejection of this Paribhāṣā accords with the Bhāṣya. And the rejection of the NP is confirmed by the *LŚŚ* on *SK* 46 (P. 1.3.11) where Nāgeśa writes (Kumbakonam ed. I p. 267): *nājānāntaryaparibhāṣā tu nāsty eveti na ayaje indram ityādau doṣāḥ iti paribhāṣenduśekhare vistarah*, “In (the derivation of) *ayaje indram* etc. there is nothing wrong since the NP does not exist; this has been extensively discussed in the *PŚ*.”

So we may agree that Par. LI is rejected by Nāgeśa. Let us now see what Nāgeśa had to say in defence of it before he turned against it. We may begin with the first part of the last-quoted passage. The last sentence of that first part begins with the word *mama* “according to my view”. This word does

not refer to Nāgeśa as he was while writing the *PŚ*, for this sentence, as well as all that precedes it, defends Par. LI, while the *PŚ*, as we have seen, rejects it. We are given the impression that some unidentified person is here allowed to speak in defence of Par. LI.

This impression becomes stronger when we study the arguments used in support of the NP in more detail. Many of them are such as could not have been used by Nāgeśa, at least not at the time he wrote the *PŚ*. In order to be able to investigate them, we may once again bring to mind the form and meaning of the NP:

NĀJĀNANTARYE BAHIṢTVAPRAKLPTIH

“(Provided that an operation which by the BP would be *bahiranga* has taken effect, it is contrary to that *Paribhāṣā*) not regarded as *bahiranga* (and consequently not regarded as *asiddha*, when an *antarāṅga* operation is to take effect) which depends on the immediate sequence of a vowel (and something else).”

Armed with this knowledge we can begin our task.

We do not have to search long. The first argument, which does not seem to suit Nāgeśa as we know him from the remainder of the *PŚ*, occurs right in the first half of the passage from the *PŚ* last quoted. It explains the role of the words *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2. In the derivation of *vrtrahabhyām*, so it is argued, the elision of *n* in *vrtrahan-(kvip)-bhyām* is *bahiranga* because it depends, indirectly, on *bhyām*. The addition of *tuk* to the final *a* of the resulting *vrtraha* is *antarāṅga*, for it depends on *kvip*. Such being the case, the elision of *n* would be *asiddha*, and the addition of *tuk* would be prevented by the BP alone, were it not that the NP disturbs the course of events. The NP does so because the *antarāṅga* operation, viz. addition of *tuk* to *a*, depends on the immediate sequence of a vowel and something else, in our instance on the immediate sequence of *a* and *kvip*. Since the addition of *tuk* cannot then be prevented by the BP, the words *kṛti* and *tuk* are required in P. 8.2.2 to accomplish that.

This is one of the arguments intended to show how advantageous it is to accept Par. LI. It is, however, in conflict with what Nāgeśa says elsewhere in the *PŚ*. As a matter of fact, two other justifications of the presence of *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2 are given in that book. They are discussed in Appendix II. It is especially the first of these that conflicts with the present explanation of *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2. In the discussion of Par. L we read that *kṛti* and *tuk* serve a purpose because an indirect cause cannot make an

operation *bahiranga*; in the discussion of Par. LI, on the other hand, we read that they are needed because of the NP. The two passages seem to wilfully contradict each other.⁴ We therefore assume that the defence of Par. LI in no way reflects Nāgeśa's ideas, so much so that he made no effort to bring it in agreement with his other statements.

Something very similar may be said concerning the fact that the same Bhāṣya passage is invoked twice, each time to prove something different. The Bhāṣya passage concerned (*Mbh.* I.51.8–9) states that in the derivation of *preddha* from *pra-indha-ta* the substitution of Guṇa for *a-i* is *bahirāṅga*, the prohibition of Guṇa by P. 1.1.4 *antarāṅga*. The *PŚ* on Par. LI sees in this passage the justification of the two-word principle (*PŚ* 101.8–10, K. p. 269; also see Chapter 5, above), whereas in the discussion of Par. L the same Bhāṣya passage was said to be explained by the circumstance that only an operation which depends on the meaning of the preposition is *antarāṅga*, but one that depends only on the form of the same is *bahirāṅga* (*PŚ* 91.1–4, App. I ll. 170–173 K. p. 249; also see above p. 70f.) The fact that the two-word principle is accepted by Nāgeśa (see Chapter 5, above), does not imply that this justification of it has his approval. If it had, he would have been more likely to introduce the two-word principle and its justification in the context of Par. L.

Who then is this person who is allowed to speak in defence of Par. LI? This person is Nāgeśa himself as he was at a younger age. In order to show that this is the case, I shall quote a passage from the *Laghuśabdārataṇa* (*LŚR*), a commentary on the *Praudhamaṇorāmā* (*PrM*), Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's own commentary on his *SK*. That the *LŚR* was more likely than not written by Nāgeśa rather than by Hari Dīkṣita as the colophons indicate will be discussed in Appendix V. The passage to be quoted is almost identical with *PŚ* 101.4–8, but, unlike this passage from the *PŚ*, it is here in the *LŚR* not subsequently rejected. The *PrM* reads:

PrM on *SK* 76 (163.4–164.3)

*na ca nājānantarye iti niṣedhah / ... yatra paścāt pravartamāne
ajānantaryam⁵ iti kaiyatamate niṣedhāpravrteḥ⁶ /*

“And (the BP) is not prohibited, on account of the NP, (from applying in the derivation of *prārcchati* from *pra-rcchati*. Here P. 6.1.91 and P. 1.1.51 bring it about that *a-r* is substituted by *ār*. Subsequently P. 8.3.15 would cause substitution of *visarga* for *r*, were it not for the fact that BP prevents this. . . . Prohibition (of the BP by

the NP) does not take effect (here) since (we accept) Kaiyata's opinion that (the NP applies) where there is an immediate sequence of a vowel in what takes effect later."

The *LŚR* comments (164.22–27):

paścat pravartamāne iti / antaraṅge ity arthaḥ / atra ca ṣatvatukoh iti sūtrastham⁷ tukgrahaṇam jñāpakam / anyathā adhītyetyādau lyappravr̥ttaye pūrvam samāse jāte, tatra samhitāyā nityatvāt lyabutpattiparyantam apy asamhitayā avasthānāsambhavena ekādeśe, lyapi, tugapekṣayā padadvayasambandhivarnadvayāpekṣaikādeśasya bahiraṅgatayā asiddhatvena, tadvaiyarthyaṁ spaṣṭam eva / tatra paścat pravartamāne tuki aco'nyānantaryanimitakāryatvān na doṣah / ajānantaryam iti / aco'nyānantaryam ity arthaḥ /

"The meaning of 'in what takes effect later' is 'in the *antaraṅga* (operation).' Further, the word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86 indicates (the existence of) this (*Paribhāṣā*); otherwise that (*tuk*, by which Pāṇini intends to show that in the formation of *adhītya* etc. the substitution of *i* etc. for the *i* of *adhi* etc. and the radical *i* is *asiddha* in regard to the addition, by P. 6.1.71, of the augment *tuk* to the root *i*), would evidently be useless. In (the formation of) *adhītya* etc. (from *adhī-itvā* etc.,) in order that (the substitution by P. 7.1.37 of) *lyap* (for *ktvā*) take place, first the composition (of *adhi* with *itvā*) takes place. (Now) as in a compound (the final sound of a preceding member) must invariably be joined (with the initial sound of a following member,) the final sound of *adhi* (and the following radical *i*) cannot remain unjoined even until *lyap* takes the place of (of *ktvā*); the substitution of one (vowel for the final of *adhi* and the following radical *i*) precedes therefore (the substitution of) *lyap*. (Were the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā* here applicable), the substitution of the one (vowel *i* for *i-i*,) dependent as it is on two sounds of two words, would be *bahirāṅga* and would consequently (already by the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*) be considered *asiddha* in regard to the addition of the augment *tuk* (to the root *i*, and the special statement in P. 6.1.86 regarding the addition of the augment *tuk* would be superfluous). No fault attaches to the (mention of *tuk* in p. 6.1.86) because (the addition of) *tuk*, which (in *adhītya* etc.) takes place after (the single substitute *i* etc. has replaced *i-i* etc.) is an operation the cause of which is the immediate sequence of a vowel and something else. The meaning of 'immediate sequence of a vowel' is 'immediate sequence of a vowel and something else'."

The close similarity of this passage with *PS* 101.4–8 (which we discussed on p. 49, above) is obvious. Besides this, our passage agrees with the account of the NP in the *PS* on the following three points:

(1) The Jñāpaka of the NP is not the rule P. 6.1.86 (*satvatukor asiddhaḥ*) as a whole, but merely the occurrence of *tuk* therein.

(2) The word *ajanantarye*, which occurs in the Paribhāṣā, is interpreted as *aco'nyānantarye*, “when there is an immediate sequence of a vowel and something else”.

(3) This immediate sequence of a vowel and something else must characterize an *antarāṅga* operation that follows a *bahirāṅga* operation.

The first of these three points found expression in *PS* 101.4, which I mentioned just now. The second and third points are explained in the following passage.

PS 102.6–103.4

paribhāṣārthaḥ tv aco'nyānantaryanimittake'ntarāṅge⁸ kartavye jātasya bahirāṅgasya bahiṣṭavapraklptir na / bahiṣpadena bahirāṅgam / tasya bhāvo⁹ bahirāṅgatvam / tatprayuktāsiddhatvasya na praklptih / na prāptir iti / asiddham bahirāṅgam ity uktvā nājānantarya iti vakṣyāmīti bhāṣyoktyā tatrātasyāntarāṅga ity asyānuvr̥ttisūcanāt / /

“The meaning of the Paribhāṣā is this, that a *bahirāṅga* (operation) which has taken effect is not regarded as *bahirāṅga*, when an *antarāṅga* (operation) is to take effect which is caused by the immediate sequence of a vowel and something else. The word *bahiḥ* is equivalent to *bahirāṅga*, and ‘the state of that’ (which is *bahiḥ*, viz. *bahiṣṭva*,) means *bahirāṅgatva*. (‘Not regarded as *bahirāṅga*’ means ‘contrary to Par. L by which a *bahirāṅga* operation) should be regarded as *asiddha*, not regarded (as *asiddha*). The Paribhāṣā must be explained thus) because the remark of the (author of the) Bhāṣya ‘after having said *asiddham bahirāṅgam antarāṅge* I shall say *nājānantarye*’, shows that (the word) *antarāṅge* of the previous (Paribhāṣā) is valid (also in this Paribhāṣā).” (K. p. 271.)

Although of these three points the first one is found, among others, is Śīradeva’s *Bṛhatparibhāṣāvṛtti* (see *PS* 235.22–25), and the second and the third in Bhatṭoja’s *Śabdakaustubha* on P. 1.1.4 (120.23–25), I do not know of any grammatical work which connects all these three points with the NP, with the sole exception of the *LŚR*. We may therefore take it

as proven that Nāgeśa in his *PS* first presented the view of the *LŚR* with regard to the NP with no other aim, of course, than to reject it in order to make place for something better.

It may quite generally be said that we can with advantage look upon the discussion of the NP in the *PS* as consisting of a presentation of earlier and later ideas of Nāgeśa regarding this Paribhāṣā, arranged in such a way that the later views supersede the earlier ones. That those earlier ideas are not only those found in the *LŚR*, I shall show below.

The *PrM* on *SK* 54 contains a remark to the effect that the NP is not universally valid (*PrM* 122.3). The *LŚR* initially states that the non-universality of the NP is indicated by Pāṇini's use of *keñah* in P. 7.4.13. In this respect it follows the *BŚS*, which gives the same argument at *BŚS* 163.9–13. But then the *LŚR* rejects its earlier statement, saying:

LŚR 122.24–26

vastutah omānoś ca ity āngrahanād anityatvam / taddhi śiva ā ihīti sthite param api savarnādīrgham bādhitvā dhātūpasargakāryatvenāntaraṅgatvād guṇe vṛddhibādhanārtham / asyā udāharanān tu akṣadyūr iti / anyathā antarānge yaṇi ūṭh asiddhah syāt /

"In reality (we know) from the word *āñ* in P. 6.1.95 that (the Nājānantarya-paribhāṣā is) not universally valid; for *āñ* is meant to show that, when in the case of *śiva-ā-ihī* the Guṇa (vowel *e*) has been substituted by P. 6.1.87 (for *ā-i*), the (substitution by P. 6.1.88 of) the Vṛddhi (vowel *ai* for the *a* of *śiva* and the *e* of *ehī*) is superseded (by the substitution of the Guṇa vowel *e* for *a-e*. The substitution of) Guṇa (for *ā-i*) supersedes here, because it is an operation which concerns the root (*i*) and its preposition (*ā*), and because it is on that account *antaraṅga*, the substitution of the homogeneous long vowel (*ā* for the *a* of *śiva* and the preposition *ā*), in spite of the latter being (taught in the) subsequent (rule P. 6.1.101. Were however Par. LI applicable in a case like this, then the substitution of *ā* for the *a* of *śiva* and the preposition *ā* would not by Par. L be superseded by the substitution of *e* for the preposition *ā* and the radical *i*; we should form first *śivā-ihī*, and afterwards by P. 6.1.87 *śivehi*, which shows that the word *āñ* of P. 6.1.95 would in that case be altogether superfluous.) An example of this (Nājānantarya-paribhāṣā) is, however, *akṣadyūh*. Otherwise, (if the Nājānantarya-paribhāṣā) did not exist, the substitution of *ūṭh* (for *v* in *akṣa-div-kvip-su* by P. 6.4.19) would be

asiddha (by the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*) with respect to (the substitution of the) *yaṇ* (vowel *y* for *i* by P. 6.1.77, which is) *antaraṅga*, (and consequently the substitution of *y* for *i* would not take place.)”

From this passage, or rather from the end of it, we learn that the author of the *LŚR* considered *akṣadyūḥ* a good example of the use of the NP. This is not very surprising, for the *Paribhāṣā* is mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* exactly in order to account for the derivation of this form (*Mbh.* I.310.4–9). All the same, it explains the mention of *akṣadyūḥ* in the *PŚ*, which puzzled us earlier.

But the first part of this passage from the *LŚR* is far more interesting, for it cannot but be based on a mistake on the part of its author. The reason is that it cannot be brought into agreement with the passage from the *LŚR* which we studied earlier. There we had read that the NP applies only there, where an *antaraṅga* rule applies after the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rule has taken effect (point 3 of the above-mentioned three points). At the stage *sīva-ā-ihī*, on the other hand, the *antaraṅga* rule (P. 6.1.87, which wants to substitute *Guṇa e* for *ā-i*) and the *bahirāṅga* rule (P. 6.1.101, which strives to put *ā* in the place of *a-ā*) apply simultaneously. There is therefore no chance whatever for the NP to apply here.

This mistake in the *LŚR* is therefore so interesting that Nāgeśa has grasped the opportunity in his *PŚ* of rectifying it. He uses exactly the same sentence (*taddhi ... vṛddhibādhanārtham*; *PŚ* 103.8–10), but this time gives a different introduction to it, as a result of which the presence of *āñ* in P. 6.1.95 no longer indicates that the NP is not universally valid; now it has come to illustrate the fact that NP applies only where the *antaraṅga* operation follows the *bahirāṅga* operation. This introduction reads as follows:

PŚ 103.5–8

jātasya bahrāṅgasety uktiyāyaje indram dhiyatītyādau bahrāṅga-dīrgagunāder asiddhatvam siddham / ... ata evomānoś ca ity āngraḥanānam¹⁰ caritārtham / taddhi ...

“As we have stated that (only) a *bahirāṅga* (operation) which has taken effect (is not regarded as *bahirāṅga*, this *Paribhāṣā* does not apply in the formation of *ayaje indram*, *dhiyatī* etc. from *ayaja-i-indram.dhi-a-ti* etc. and) the *bahirāṅga* (substitution of) long (*ī* for *i-i*) and (of the) *Guṇa* (vowel *e* for the *i* of *dhi*) etc. is therefore in the case of *ayaje indram*, *dhiyatī* etc. (in accordance with Par. L) justly

regarded as *asiddha*. . . . It is for the same reason that the word *āñ* in P. 6.1.95 serves a purpose; for *āñ*" (K. p. 272.)

What follows in the *PŚ* we know already, for it is a word-for-word repetition of the *LŚR*.

It serves no purpose to try to show that every sentence of the *PŚ* that defends Par. LI has its counterpart in the *LŚR*. It may or it may not. It has already become sufficiently clear that by and large the discussion of Par. LI in the *PŚ* consists of two parts. One part defends that *Paribhāṣā* and is a restatement of what we find in the *LŚR*; the second rejects the NP and contains Nāgeśa's considered opinion at the time of writing the *PŚ*. However, one question remains, which we shall discuss now.

As we know, the defence of Par. LI considers the word *tuk* in P. 6.1.86 the *Jñāpaka* of this *Paribhāṣā*. After establishing this much, it turns its attention to another word in that same rule, viz. *satva*, and dedicates a whole passage to showing that this word *satva* does not indicate the NP. Why this waste of words to expel an idea from another idea which itself is going to be rejected? Against whom is this attack directed? The passage reads:

PŚ 101.10–102.6

*yat tu satvagrahanam api jñāpakam anyathā ko'sicad ityādau
padadvayasambandhivarnadvayāpekṣatvena bahiraṅgasyaikādeśasyāsi-
ddhatvena satvāpravṛttau kim teneti tan na / inah pūrvapada-
sambandhitvena satvasyāpi padadvayasambandhivarnadvayā-
pekṣatvenobhayoḥ samatvāt / ekādeśasya parādīvattvenausicad¹¹ ity
asya padatvena¹² padāditvābhāvān na sāt padādyoḥ ity anena
niṣedhaḥ¹³ / traipādike 'ntaraṅge kāryakālapakṣe'pi bahiraṅgaparibhāṣāyā
apravṛtteḥ pūrvam upapāditatvāc ca / /*

"But it is wrong to maintain that (not merely *tuk*, but) also the word *satva* (in P. 6.1.86) indicates (the existence of this *Paribhāṣā*), and to support this statement by saying that that (word *satva*) would be useless if the present *Paribhāṣā* did not exist, because in *ko'sicat* etc. the substitution (by P. 6.1.109) of the one (vowel *o* for *o-a*), being *bahirāṅga* on account of its dependence on two sounds of two words, would (already by Par. L) be *asiddha* (in regard to the substitution, by P. 8.3.59, of *ṣ* for the *s* of *sicat*), and because (that substitution of *ṣ* would consequently) even without the special statement in P. 6.1.86

not take place. (This is wrong) because the (substitution of) *s* depends likewise on two sounds of two words, (the vowel *o* which is contained in the *Pratyāhāra*) *in* (of P. 8.3.59) forming part of the preceding word (*ko*), and because both (the substitution of *o* and that of *s*) are therefore alike (in this respect). Nor can one say that *satva* in P. 6.1.86 is *altogether* superfluous, viz. because *sicat* is a Pada and because the substitution of *s* for the initial *s* is therefore prevented by P. 8.3.111; for) as the one substitute (*o* for *o-a*) is (by P. 6.1.85) regarded as the initial of the subsequent word, the (combination of sounds) *osicat* is a Pada, and (the sound *s*) not being therefore the initial sound of a Pada, (the substitution of *s* for it) is not prevented by P. 8.3.111. (The above statement according to which *satva* in P. 6.1.86 likewise indicates the existence of this *Paribhāṣā*, is) moreover (untenable), because, as was shown above, even on the *Kāryakālapakṣa*, Par. L does not concern an *antarāṅga* (operation) taught in the three last chapters of Pāṇini's grammar, (and because consequently it can have no concern with the substitution of *s* which is taught in P. 8.3.59, even should the latter be really *antarāṅga*.)" (Cf. K. pp. 269–70.)

This passage, so it seems, is directed against an opinion Nāgeśa had held even earlier, when he wrote the *BSS*. In that book we find the opinion offered that *satva* in P. 6.1.86 is the *Jñāpaka* of the NP, and the opinion that *tuk* in that same rule plays that role rejected.

I shall not here reproduce and translate the passage concerned. The interested reader will find it at *BSS* 192.3–19, and it is reproduced in Appendix IV.¹⁴ Here it suffices to note that the *PS* on Par. LI contains many, if not all, of the opinions that Nāgeśa held, or had held, regarding that *Paribhāṣā*. They are arranged in this way: at the end come Nāgeśa's latest ideas. These latest ideas imply a rejection of earlier ideas – a slightly improved version of what we find in the *LSR*. These ideas of the *LSP* are fully explained and contain a rejection of a still earlier stratum of thought, which we can identify as belonging to the *BSS*.

This analysis of the *PS* on Par. LI, I submit, takes away the force of the challenge posed by the mention of *akṣadyūḥ* as being in conflict with the BP, where in reality it is not. The force is taken away, since this mention of *akṣadyūḥ* is part of a restatement of a position abandoned long ago. In fact, the formation of *akṣadyūḥ* is not in conflict with the BP, at any rate not with the BP as understood and explained in the *PS*. A final remark regarding the sentence introducing Par. LI can be found in the last paragraph of Chapter 14, below.

14. FURTHER PASSAGES FROM THE *PS*

We have reached a stage where no more need be said about the BP and the NP, or rather, about their discussion in the *PS*. We know what interpretation Nāgeśa, in all likelihood, gave to the first of them, and also how the passages that at first sight seem to conflict with that interpretation are to be understood. None of those passages, on closer inspection, turned out to be a threat to what we think are Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP.

Most of the passages considered so far occurred in that part of the *PS* that was directly devoted to the Paribhāṣās L and LI. But other references to the BP remain. They are scattered through the *PS*. They will be studied in the present chapter in order to find out whether or not they fit Nāgeśa's interpretation of that Paribhāṣā. As might have been expected, we shall find that they do.

It goes without saying that only those passages in which Nāgeśa himself makes explicit use of the BP have to be studied. Where Nāgeśa cites the view of someone else in order to reject that view, there is no reason for us to come into action when that rejected view includes some ideas as to what is *bahiranga* and what *antaranga*. The passages that remain are eight in number. It is remarkable that six of them give instances of the application of BP₂₂, the aspect of the BP that had almost died an untimely death at the hands of Kielhorn. We shall begin with these.

Par. XV teaches that "when a word besides its primary meaning possesses a secondary meaning, an operation which may be taught in grammar concerning this word, takes effect only when the latter conveys its primary, but not when it conveys its secondary meaning." (K. p. 86.) An alarming consequence of a strict application of this Paribhāṣā would be that no case-endings could be added to a word that is to be used in a secondary meaning. For here, so one might say, an operation taught in grammar, viz. the addition of case endings, would have to take effect while the crude form of the word conveys its secondary meaning.

The solution to this problem is easy. Par. XV, we are told, has nothing to do with an operation which concerns the crude form of a word. Why not? This is explained as follows:

PS 31.14-16

pariniṣṭhitasya padāntarasam̄bandhe hi gaur vāhīka ityādau gaṇyatvapratītir na tu prātipadikasam̄skāravelāyām ity antaraṅgatvāj jātasam̄skārabādhāyogah prātipadikakārye pravṛttiabhāve bijam.

“The reason why (this Paribhāṣā) has nothing to do with an operation that concerns a crude form, is namely this that (a word) conveys a secondary meaning (only) when, after its formation has been completed, it is combined with another word, as e.g. (*go* ‘ox’) in *gaur vāhīkah* ‘the Vāhīka is an ox, an unintelligent person’, but not at the time when its crude form is liable to undergo grammatical operations, and that therefore the changes which, because they (are *antaraṅga*, i.e.) apply first, have taken place already (when this Paribhāṣā is applicable), cannot be prevented (by the latter).” (Cf. K. p. 88.)

The formation of *gauḥ* out of *go-s(u)* depends upon the meanings “ox” and “agent”. Not till the formation of *gauḥ* is completed does the meaning “unintelligent person” come into the picture. Any operation that has anything to do with the secondary meaning “unintelligent person” is therefore *bahirāṅga* by BP₂₂, because that meaning arises later. The operations that participate in the formation of *gauḥ*, on the other hand, are *antaraṅga*, because they make use of meanings that arose earlier. There can be no doubt that this passage provides an instance of BP₂₂.

Another such instance is provided by a passage which, in the *PS*, almost immediately follows the passage just discussed. It reads:

PS 31.21-23

agniśomau māṇavakāv ity atra prasiddhadēvatādvandvavācyagniśoma-padyasya tatsadrśaparative'ntaraṅgatvād īttvaśatve bhavata eva / sadṛśalākṣaṇikāgnisomapadayor dvandve tannāmakāv ityarthake ca na¹ ṣatvam ādye gaunalākṣaṇikatvād anye'prasiddhatvā²

“When the word *agniśoma* which denotes the two gods who really are (Agni and Soma) is in *agniśomau māṇavakau* ‘two men Agni and Soma’ applied to (two men) who resemble Agni and Soma, ī and ṣ (that have been substituted for the *i* of *agni*, and the *s* of *soma* by P. 6.3.27 and P. 8.3.82,) remain because they (are *antaraṅga*, i.e.) have been substituted before (*agnisoma* received a secondary meaning. But) in the formation of a Dvandva compound of the two words *agni* and *soma* employed metaphorically to denote (two men) who

resemble (Agni and Soma), and (in the formation of a Dvandva compound) in the sense of ‘a man named Agni and a man named Soma’, *s* is not substituted (for the *s* of *soma*), because in the former case (the words *agni* and *soma*) are metaphorically applied to two men on account of their having certain qualities in common (with the gods Agni and Soma), and because in the latter case the two men are not really Agni and Soma (but are only named thus).” (K. p. 90–1.)

So as long as the words *agni* and *soma* are used in their primary sense and denote the gods Agni and Soma, they will cause no tribulation and unite into *agnīśomau*. Once this has taken place, the word *agnīśomau* may be used in a secondary sense to refer to something that resembles Agni-and-Soma. But clearly this new meaning, “what resembles Agni-and-Soma”, does not come into being until the primary meaning “Agni-and-Soma” has done its job. Since the primary meaning appears before the secondary meaning, the operations depending on the former take place first, on account of the rule “first come, first served”, which is our paraphrase of BP₂₂ (see p. 24, above).

The next two passages are found in the *PS* on Par. LIII. This *Paribhāṣā* states that “the substitution of one vowel for the final of the first and the initial of the second member of a compound does, even when it is *antaraṅga*, not take place before an operation which concerns the first or the second member of the compound” (cf. K. p. 294). The *Paribhāṣā* has a long introduction, where examples are given in which, without it, something would go wrong. Our first passage opens this introduction.

PS 110.1–2

nanv evam saumendre'ntaraṅgatvād³ ād gunē⁴ pūrvapadāt parendraśabdābhāvena nendrasya parasya iti vṛddhiniṣedho vyarthah.

“Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all except the particular cases stated above), the *Guṇa* (vowel *e*) ought in (the formation of) *saumendra* (from *soma-indra-a(n)*) to be substituted (for the *a* of *soma* and the *i* of *indra*), because (its substitution) is *antaraṅga* (when compared with the substitution by P. 7.3.21 of *Vṛddhi* for the first vowels of *soma* and *indra*; and that after the substitution of *Guṇa*) the prohibition of (the substitution of) *Vṛddhi* (for the *i* of *indra*) which is contained in the rule P. 7.3.22 would serve no purpose, because the first member (of the compound) would (after

the substitution of *Guṇa*) no longer be followed by the word *indra*.” (K. pp. 289–90.)

What interests us in this passage is that, in the derivation of *saumendra* from *soma-indra-a(η)*, the substitution of *e* for *a-i* by P. 6.1.87 is *antaraṅga*, and the substitution of Vṛddhi for *o*, as well as the substitution of Vṛddhi for *i*, both by P. 7.3.21, *bahirāṅga*.

This is exactly what we expected. As a matter of fact, this state of affairs can be accounted for in two ways, with BP₂₂ and with BP₂₁. First BP₂₂.

There is no uncertainty regarding the order in which the meanings that play a role in *saumendra* make their appearance. After “Soma” and “Indra”, first comes “and” (*cārtha*; see P. 2.2.29), as a result of which *soma* and *indra* form a Dvandva compound – to be exact, a Devatādvandva. After that, the meaning “this is of that” (*tasyedam*; see P. 4.3.120) finds expression in the affix *a(η)*. The substitution of *e* for *a-i* in *soma-indra* is dependent only on meanings that appear earlier – “Soma”, “Indra” and “and” – and is therefore *antaraṅga*, in the sense this word has in BP₂₂.

It is also possible to leave meanings out and decide what is *antaraṅga* on purely formal grounds. In *soma-indra-a(η)* the substitution of *e* for *a-i* has as following cause *i*. The other operation, substitution of Vṛddhi for *i*, by P. 7.3.21 has as following cause *a(η)*. We come to the same conclusion as before, this time by BP₂₁, that the substitution of *e* for *a-i* is *antaraṅga*.

The case of *pūrvaiśukāmaśama* “born in eastern Iṣukāmaśamī” is in all details parallel to the above. It is mentioned not long after, or rather in the midst of, the discussion of *saumendra*. The passage concerned will not be reproduced here; it occurs at PS 111.2–3. What is of importance here is that in *pūrva-isukāmaśamī-a(η)* two rules apply. P. 6.1.87 prescribes substitution of *e* for *a-i*. P. 7.3.14 prescribes substitution of Vṛddhi for *i*. The former operation depends on meanings that arise earlier; it also has the following cause *i*. The second operation depends on the meaning of the affix, which arises later; it further has as following cause *a(η)*. As in the case of *saumendra*, here also both BP₂₂ and BP₂₁ lead to the desired end.

The next passage introduces Par. LXXV.

PS 156.9–10

nanu vyāghrī kacchapītyādau subantena samāsāt tato'py antaraṅgatvāt tāpy adāntatvābhāvāj jātilakṣaṇo nīś na syād...

“One might say that in the case of *vyāghrī*, *kacchapī* etc. (the feminine affix) *nīś* ought to have been added by P. 4.1.63, because (vi-

ā and *kaccha*) are compounded (with *ghra* and *pa*) after the addition (to the latter) of a case-termination; (previously namely to this addition of a case-termination the feminine affix *tāp* must be added to *ghra* and *pa* because its addition) is *antarāga* even in regard to that of the former, and when *tāp* has thus been added, we have (no longer a base) ending in short *a* (to which P. 4.1.63 could be applicable)."(K. p. 380.)

Kielhorn explains in a footnote why case terminations must be added to *ghra* and *pa* before compounding. He says (K. p. 380, fn. 2): "The supposition being that *supā* of P. 2.1.4 is valid in P. 2.2.19 and in the rule *gatiḥ* which we obtain when we take *gatiḥ* in P. 2.2.18 as a separate rule. It will be shown in the sequel that in reality *supā* is not valid."

So the supposition that *vi-ā* and *kaccha* are compounded with *ghra* and *pa* after the addition to the latter of a case termination is rejected in the sequel. But here, in this passage, it is held to be valid. And on this assumption the passage tells us nothing new. It repeats that a feminine affix is added before a case termination. The reason is, as we know, that the meaning "a particular gender" arises before the meaning "a particular *kāraka*". Nāgeśa himself had stated this clearly earlier in the *PS* (see p. 22, above), and further explanation is not necessary. This is therefore an instance of the application of BP₂₂.

But the above passage contains another case of *Antaraṅgatva*. By saying that the addition of *tāp* is *antarāga* even (*api*) in regard to the addition of a case termination, it tells us that the former is even more *antarāga* in regard to the compound formation: to be exact, the ascription of the name *samāsa*, by P. 2.2.19 or by the newly created rule *gatiḥ*. This again is in perfect agreement with the BP as we have come to know it. First all those meanings that come to be expressed in an individual word make their appearance, and only afterwards can other meanings be joined to those. In our case that means that first the components of the compound are fully formed and afterwards they are joined together into the compound. Here also use is made of BP₂₂.

The following passage offers some difficulties of interpretation at first sight, but a closer inspection reveals that it is an instance of the use of BP₂₂. The passage introduces Par. LXII.

PS 145.5-6

nanu dadhati tyādāv antaraṅgatvād antādeśe'vidhau sthānivattvābhāvād

adādeśo na syād . . .

“Now one might say that, if, e.g., in the (formation of the) 3. plur. pres. ind. par. of *dhā*, *ant* were, because (its substitution) is *antarāṅga*, substituted (by P. 7.1.3 for the *jh* of *dhā-jhi*), then the substitution of *at* (which is taught in P. 7.1.4) would be impossible, for (the substitute *ant* for *jh*) would not be equivalent to the original (*jh*), because (the original *jh*) with reference to which P. 7.1.4 teaches (the substitution of *at*), is a single sound. . . .” (Cf. K. p. 340.)

What this passage tells us is that the substitution of *ant* for *jh* of *jhi* by P. 7.1.3 (*jho'ntah*) is *antarāṅga*. The question is: *antarāṅga* with respect to what? What is the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation? One might think that the reduplication of the root *dhā* owing to P. 6.1.10 (*ślau*) is the *bahirāṅga* operation, for both the substitution of *ant* for *jh* and reduplication apply at one and the same stage of the derivation, viz. at the stage *dhā-(ślu)-jhi*. Unfortunately, this suggestion cannot stand criticism, since neither of the two operations has a cause. And what is more, reduplication is not so much as mentioned in our passage. We can only conclude that the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation is the substitution of *at* for *jh* by P. 7.1.4.

But questions remain. Are we to look upon these two operations – substitution of *ant* or *at* for *jh* – as applying simultaneously at the stage *da-dhā-jhi*? If this were the case, the fight for priority between the two rules P. 7.1.3 and 4 would be an unequal one indeed. For even if the former rule is *antarāṅga* with respect to the latter, the latter is an *Apavāda* of the former. And “an *Apavāda* possesses greater force even than an *antarāṅga* rule” (K. p. 320). So why should our passage bother to specify that the substitution of *ant* for *jh* is *antarāṅga*, and even suggest that, but for the intervention of Par. LXII, this substitution of *ant* would take place before, and in spite of, the substitution of *at*?

A solution comes within reach when we realize that the expressive elements of *dadhāti* arise in a certain order. At the stage *dhā-l(at)*, first *l(at)* is replaced by *jhi*, and only after that the *Vikaraṇa* (*ś)a(p) is added. *śap* in its turn is elided by P. 2.4.75 (*juhotyādibhyah śluḥ*), after which reduplication takes place by P. 6.1.10 (*ślau*). Such being the case, we can apply BP₂₂, which says that operations take place in the order in which the elements on which they depend come into existence. In the derivation of *dadhāti* this means that the substitution of *ant* for *jh* in *dhā-jhi* takes place as soon as *jhi* has made its appearance, for this substitution requires nothing but *jhi*. The*

substitution of *at* for *jh*, on the other hand, does not depend only on *jhi*. It requires that *jhi* follow a reduplicated root (*abhyasta*). But reduplication does not take place until *śap* has been elided by P. 2.4.75, and *śap* itself does not come into being until after *jhi* has made its appearance. We can therefore safely say that the substitution of *ant* for *jh* is *antarāṅga*, and the substitution of *at* for *jh bahirāṅga*.⁵

Let us tarry a while and see how Nāgeśa solves the problem raised in the above passage. As a remedy he cites Par. LXII:

PŪRVAM HY APAVĀDĀ ABHINIVISANTE PAŚCĀD UTSARGĀH

“*Apavādas*, it is certain, are considered first (in order to find out where they apply); afterwards the general rules (are made to take effect in all cases to which it has thus been ascertained that the *Apavādas* do not apply).” (K. p. 340.)

In practical terms this seems to mean that, in the derivation of *dadhati*, once *jhi* has come into being, this *jhi* remains unchanged while other operations take place, such as the insertion and elision of *śap*, and the reduplication of the root. In other words, substitution of *ant* is not even thought of until the stage has been reached where the substitution of *at* can be considered, or rather, has been considered; and then it is too late for *ant*.

An instance of BP₁ in action, or rather, in inaction, is found in the following passage, which comes in the trail of Par. LXVI. The meaning of that *Paribhāṣā* is that “so far as changes of a reduplicative syllable are concerned, rules which teach those changes do not supersede one another” (K. p. 349). This meaning is further specified, and exemplified, in our passage.

PS 149.4–150.1

iyam⁶ parāntarāṅgādibādhakānām apy abādhakatvabodhikā / tenācīkarat mīmāṃsata ityādi siddham / ... antye māṇbadha iti dirghenāntarāṅgatvād ittvasya bādhah prāptah //

“This (*Paribhāṣā*) teaches that subsequent, *antarāṅga*, and other (rules) which (according to preceding *Paribhāṣās*) would supersede (other rules), do likewise not possess that superseding power (when both concern changes of a reduplicative syllable); the result thereof is (the correct formation of forms like) *acīkarat*, *mīmāṃsate* etc.; ... in the latter (i.e., in *mīmāṃsate*) the substitution of short ī (taught in P.

7.4.79) would be superseded by the substitution taught in P. 3.1.6 of a long vowel (for the vowel of the reduplicative syllable), because (this latter rule is) *antaranga* (in regard to the former)." (K. pp. 349–350.)

In the derivation of *mīmāṃsate* the following stage is reached: *ma-mān-sa-te*. Here two rules apply. P. 3.1.6 (*mānbhadhadānśānbhyo dīrghaś cābhyaśasya*) prescribes the affix *sa(n)* after *mān* and lengthening of the vowel of the reduplicative syllable, i.e., substitution of *ā* for *a* of *ma*. This operation has no following cause. P. 7.4.79 (*sany atah*), on the other hand, prescribes substitution of *i* for *a* of *ma*. The following cause is *sa*. Clearly, the former operation is *antaranga* (*a₁*), and the latter *bahiranga* (*b₁*).

We conclude with a problematic case. It is the introduction to Par. CXII.

PS 190. 11–13

nanu syandūdhātōḥ syantsyatītyādau⁷ ātmanepadanimittatvābhāvanimittatvān na vṛdbhyaś caturbhyaḥ iti niṣedhasya bahirāngatvenāntarāngatvād ūdillakṣaṇasyedvikalpasyāpatti [h] ...

"(P. 7.2.44 enjoins the optional addition of the augment *iṭ* to *ārdhadhātuka* affixes commencing with one of the sounds contained in the Pratyāhāra *val*, after roots characterized by an indicatory *ū*; and P. 7.2.59 prohibits the addition of *iṭ* to *ārdhadhātuka* affixes commencing with *s*, after the roots *syandū* etc., *in the absense of the Ātmanepada terminations*. Such being the case,) one might say that, e.g., in (the formation of) the simple fu. par. of the root *syandū*, (characterized by the Anubandha *ū*), *iṭ* ought (by the former rule) to be optionally prefixed (to the affix *sya*), because (the rule P. 7.2.44 which enjoins its optional addition) is *antaranga* in regard to P. 7.2.59 which prohibits *iṭ*, the latter rule being *bahiranga* because (the taking effect of it) depends on the absence of any reasons for the Ātmanepada terminations." (Cf. K. 503–4.)

In *syand(ū)-sya-ti* two rules apply. P. 7.2.44 (*svaratīśūtiśūyatidhūñūdito vā*) prescribes the optional addition of *i(t)* to *sya*; this operation has no following cause. P. 7.2.59 (*na vṛdbhyaś caturbhyaḥ*) prohibits the addition of *i(t)* to *sya*. The prohibition is, in the above passage, said to be *bahiranga*, the prescription *antaranga*. The prescription of *iṭ* has, as we saw, no following cause; we may therefore expect that the prohibition of *iṭ* does have a following cause. Such a following cause can indeed easily be found. P. 7.2.59 is preceded by P. 7.2.58, which contains the word

parasmaipadeṣu. This word is, by *anuvṛtti*, to be understood in our rule 59 which prohibits the addition of *it* in *syand-sya-it*. This means that the following cause of the prohibition is *ti*. Since, moreover, the prescription of *it* has no following cause, that prescription is *antarāṅga*, and the prohibition *bahirāṅga*. To be precise, they are *a₁* and *b₁*, respectively.

So we find ourselves in agreement with the above passage in believing that the optional prescription of *it* by P. 7.2.44 is *antarāṅga*, and the prohibition of *it* by P. 7.2.59 *bahirāṅga*. But this is where the harmony ends. For the reason which our passage gives to show that the prohibition is *bahirāṅga* is of a kind unheard of in the *PS*. This reason is that the prohibition “depends on the absence of any reasons for the Ātmanepada terminations”. It goes without saying that an “absence of reasons” cannot be a formal cause. Formal causes are required for *BP₁* and *BP₂₁*. Nor can “absence of reasons” be considered the meaning of some expressive element. But such a meaning is needed as cause in *BP₂₂*. How then are we to understand this reason given by Nāgeśa?

It is not difficult to find the origin of Nāgeśa’s peculiar mode of expression. P. 7.2.59 is explained in the following manner in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*:

SK on rule 2348, p. 203

na vṛdbhyas caturbhyah [P. 7.2.59] / *ebhyah sakārāder ārdhadhātukasyen na syāt tañānayor abhāve*

“P. 7.2.59 (means:) After these (four roots *vṛt* etc.) let there not be *it* (added) to an Ārdhadhātuka affix beginning with *s*, when there is absence of (an affix contained in the Pratyāhāra) *tañor* of (the affix) *āna*.”

The affixes contained in *tañi*, and *āna*, together constitute what is known as “Ātmanepada”, by P. 1.4.100. So it seems that Nāgeśa, while writing the passage under consideration, was influenced by the above explanation in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*.

This explanation in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī* does not do much harm where it stands. In fact, Nāgeśa points out in his *BSS* that the word *parasmaipadeṣu*, which is understood in P. 7.2.59 by *anuvṛtti*, implies (*upalakṣaka*) that there is absence of *tañi* and *āna* (*BSS* 1704. 15–16). But this does not yet mean that such an absence is the cause of the prohibition of *it*, certainly not a cause of the sort required by the BP. It must be concluded

that Nāgeśa, whether by mistake or deliberately, used an argument that, properly speaking, did not belong to him, but to Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita. What is more, this argument violated all that Nāgeśa had said about the BP in the *PS*.

This conclusion finds confirmation in a passage of the *LŚŚ*. This work, as we know, was written after the *PS* and represents, so it seems, the same views as that book (see Appendix IV). Here it comments on the following line of the *Siddhānta-Kaumudi*:

SK on rule 2348, p. 203

vṛdbhyah syasanoh iti parasmaipade krte ūdillakṣanam antaraṅgam api vikalpam bādhitvā caturgrahaṇasāmarthyāt na vṛdbhyah iti nisedhah /

“When (in the derivation of *syantsyati*) a Parasmaipada (affix) has been substituted (for *l*) by P. 1.3.92, the prohibition (of *it*) taught in P. 7.2.59 (takes effect) on the strength of the presence of *catur* ‘four’ (in P. 7.2.59, thus) preventing the optional employment (of *it* prescribed by P. 7.2.44) on account of (the fact that the root *syandū*) has *ū* as Anubandha, even though (that optional employment of *it*) is *antaraṅga*.”

Nāgeśa comments:

LŚŚ (Vāraṇasī ed. II, p. 526)

*antaraṅgam apīti / sakārādiviśeṣāpekṣatvād ātmanepadanimit-
tatvābhāvanimittatvāc ca nisedhasya bahiraṅgatvam ity
abhimānah /*

“On ‘even though(that optional employment of *it*) is *antaraṅga*’. It is the mistaken opinion (of Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita) that the prohibition (of *it* by P. 7.2.59) is *bahiraṅga* for (the two reasons that it) depends on something special, (viz. that the following Ārdhadhātuka affix must) begin with *s*, and (that it) depends on the absence of any reasons for the Ātmanepada terminations.”

We could not possibly have expected more of Nāgeśa. Here he clearly disavows the opinion which seemed to be his in the *PS*.

What does this mean? Did Nāgeśa change his views on the BP in the time that elapsed between the *PS* and *LŚŚ*? There is no reason to assume this. We have found that the passage of the *PS* under discussion is in conflict

with the rest of that book. It can indeed only mean, as we observed earlier, that Nāgeśa, by mistake or purposely, gave expression to an opinion that was not his own.

We may draw a moral from this discovery. If Par. CXII is introduced in a way that does not reflect Nāgeśa's own views, it becomes far less improbable that Par. LI is introduced in the same way. Of course, we had already come to this conclusion regarding Par. LI, but at that time we may have appeared to be defending a very exceptional point of view. We see now that the case of Par. LI has a corroborative parallel in that of Par. CXII.

PART IV

WHAT WENT WRONG?

15. VAIDYANĀTHA PĀYAGUŃDA ON PAR. L

In the beginning of his comments on the *PS* on Par. L Vaidyanātha gives a survey of the meanings of *Antaraṅgatva*. It reads as follows:

Gadā 84.24–26; 85.6–18

tattvam ca pūrvasthitatvāt¹ paranimittābhāvād alpatvāt pūrvo-pasthitatvād vā / atra ṛṭīyam ghaṭakatvena saṃkhyayā vā / anyam api prakriyākrameṇa prayogiyoccāraṇakrameṇa vā / ādyam apy evam dvidhā / ... tatra sarvāntyapakṣeṇa² tattvam yugapatpravṛttau pūrvapravṛttinīyāmakam eva na tu purastāj³ jātasya bahiraṅgasya tādrśe'ntararige kārye'siddhatāniyāmakam / tāvatesṭasiddhāv api lokatas tathaiva lābhāt / tatra kṛte punar bahiraṅgaprāptau bhavaty eva tat / anyathā tu na tat / ādyapakṣeṇa tu tattvam tatraivā-siddhatāniyāmakam / āṅgrahaṇāt tathaiva lābhāt / ata eva tadanantaram bahiraṅgam naiva / evam cedam ubhayam yugapat-prāptiviṣayakam / dvividhasarvādyapakṣeṇa tattvam tu kvacit pūrvapravṛttinīyāmakam kvacid asiddhatāniyāmakam / ata evedam jātayaugapadyasvamātraprāptikatvarūpatritayaviṣayakam / ata eva tadanantaram kvacit tatpravṛttiḥ kvacin na / etallābhās tu lokato jñāpakāc ca yathāyatham bodhyah / laksyānurodhena sarvesām vyavastheti na doṣāḥ kvāpi / etadanyapakṣadvaye tu tattvam asiddhatāniyāmakam jātasyaiveti punar bahiraṅgasya prasaṅga eva na / ūṭhgraḥaṇāt tathaiva lābhāt / evam cedam dvayam yugapat-prāptiviṣayakam na / tatrādyah paksāḥ paṭvyetyādau krameṇā-vākhyāne / ... dvitīyah pacāvedam ityādau / ṛṭīyādyah syona ityādau / taddvitīyo viśvauha ityādau / turiyādyah khaṭvodha ityādau / tadantyo vibhajyānvākhyāne paṭvyetyādau prādudruvad ityādau ceti bodhyam /

"(Causes of rules or operations, which, on this account, are *antarāṅga*, are) that (viz. *antarbhūta*⁴) (1) because they stand earlier (than the causes of the corresponding *bahirāṅga* rules or operations), (2) because there are no following causes, (3) because they are fewer (than the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rules or operations,) or (4) because they present themselves earlier (to our understanding than the causes

of the *bahirāṅga* rules or operations). Here the third (reason why causes of rules or operations can be considered *antarbhūta*, viz. because they are fewer, means (3a) that these causes are fewer because they are included (in the causes of the *bahirāṅga* rules or operations,) or (3b) (that they are fewer simply) in number. Also the last (reason given above can be divided into two, according as (4a) the causes present themselves earlier to our understanding) following the order of the derivation, or (4b) following the order of the pronunciation (of the utterance) as it is used in language. Also the first (reason) is twofold in the same way (as the fourth reason, which yields : (1a) the causes stand earlier following the order of the derivation, and (1b) the causes stand earlier following the order of the pronunciation of the utterance as it is used in language). . . .

The fact of being *antaraṅga*⁵ in accordance with the view (presented) last of all in the (list of reasons for being *antarbhūta* given above, i.e., in accordance with (4b)) only determines that, when (two operations) apply simultaneously, (the *antaraṅga* operation) shall take effect first, but it does not determine that a *bahirāṅga* (operation) which has taken effect earlier is *asiddha* in regard to such an *antaraṅga* operation. That such is the case is learned from (the maxim from) ordinary life (on the basis of which this aspect of the *Paribhāṣā* is established; this) in spite of the fact that by (accepting) that (rejected possibility) desired (results) would be obtained. In case the *bahirāṅga* (operation) applies again after the (*antaraṅga* operation) has taken effect, that (*bahirāṅga* operation) does take place. But (if it had been) otherwise, (i.e., if the fact of being *antaraṅga* in accordance with (4b) had determined that a *bahirāṅga* operation is *asiddha*, then) that (*bahirāṅga* operation would) not (take place). The fact of being *antaraṅga* (of an operation) in accordance with the first view (contained in the fourth reason, i.e., in accordance with (4a)), however, determines, in that same (situation – where the *bahirāṅga* operation applies again after the *antaraṅga* operation has taken effect –) that (the *bahirāṅga* operation) is *asiddha*, nonexistent. That such is the case, is learned from the word *āni* (in P. 6.1.95, which indicates this aspect of the *Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā*). For this reason the *bahirāṅga* (operation does) not (take place) after the (*antaraṅga* operation has taken effect). And so both these (views, (4a) and (4b),) have as object simultaneous application (of an *antaraṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* operation). On the other hand, the fact of being *antaraṅga* in

accordance with the first view, which (itself) consists of two parts ((1a) and (1b)), determines in some cases (which operation) shall take effect first; in other cases it determines that (the *bahirāṅga* operation) is *asiddha*. For this very reason, this first (view) concerns itself with the (following) three (possibilities: (i) an *antarāṅga* operation applies after a *bahirāṅga* operation) has taken effect, ((ii) an *antarāṅga* operation and a *bahirāṅga* operation) apply simultaneously, (iii) only (the operation) itself (which is under consideration) applies. For this reason the (*bahirāṅga* operation) in some cases takes effect after the (*antarāṅga* operation has taken effect,) in other cases it does not. It must, however, be understood that this is learned from (the maxim from) ordinary life and from the Jñāpaka (of this Paribhāṣā – which consists in the word *ūth* in P. 6.4.132 –), respectively. No fault results anywhere, because all (cases) are settled in such a way that they suit the actual forms (of the language which have to be formed or to be accounted for by Pāṇini's rules). In the two views different from these, (i.e., in (2) and (3),) on the other hand, being *antarāṅga* determines that only (a *bahirāṅga* operation) which has taken effect is *asiddha*. Consequently, there is no occasion whatever for a *bahirāṅga* (operation to apply) again. That such is the case, is learned from the word *ūth* (in P. 6.4.132, which indicates these aspects of the Bahirāṅga-paribhāṣā). And such being the case, these two (views) do not concern themselves with simultaneous application (of both an *antarāṅga* and a *bahirāṅga* operation).

Among these (four views) the first one (i.e., (1), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *paṭvya* etc., (on the alternative that) in accounting for the formation of a word (one makes each expressive portion of it arise) one after the other. The second (view, i.e., (2), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *pacāvedam* etc. The first (part) of the third (view, i.e., (3a), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *syona* etc. The second (part) of that (third view, i.e., (3b), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *viśvauhah* etc. The first (part) of the fourth (view, i.e., (4a), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *khaṭvodhah* etc. The last (part) of that (fourth view, i.e., (4b), is illustrated) in (the formation of) *paṭvya* etc. on (the alternative that) the word is dissolved (into its constituent parts) and (its formation out of those parts) accounted for (by the rules of grammar), and in (the formation of) *prādudruvat* etc. This (the reader) should know."

Vaidyanātha's style is far from easy. The following schematization of the most important points may be helpful.

antarbhūtatvam

1. *pūrvasthitatvāt*
 - a. *prakriyākramena*
characteristics:
(i) *kvacit pūrvapravṛttiniyāmakam kvacit asiddhatāniyāmakam*
(ii) *jātayaugapadyasvamātraprāptikatvarūpatritayaviṣayakam*
 - b. *prayogīyoccāraṇakramena*

examples:
patvya (kramenānvākhyāne)
2. *paranimitābhāvāt*
charateristics:
asiddhatāniyāmakam jātasyaiva
examples:
pacāvedam
3. *alpatvāt*
 - a. *ghāṭakatvena*
characteristics:
asiddhatāniyāmakam jātasyaiva
 - b. *samkyayā*

examples:
a. *syonah*
b. *viśvauḥah*
4. *pūrvopasthitatvāt*
 - a. *prakriyākramena*
characteristics:
a. *yugapatprāptiāt asiddhatāniyāmakam*
examples:
a. *khatvodhah*
 - b. *prayogīyoccāraṇakramena*
b. *yugapatpravṛttāt pūrvapravṛttiniyāmakam eva ubhayam yugapatprāptivिषयकम्*
b. (i) *patvya (vibhajyānvākhyāne)*
b. (ii) *prāduḍruvat*

Our passage contains some information about the way the several aspects of the Paribhāṣā are established. More information of this kind is contained in another passage (*Gadā* 102.25 ff.), which we are not going to study here. The above scheme provides sufficient material for criticism.

To begin with: Where does Vaidyanātha get this fourfold (or should we say, sevenfold) division of *Antarbhūtatva*, and consequently of *Antaraṅgatva*? Certainly not from the *PS*, which makes a completely different division, as we know.

One might think that Vaidyanātha here presents another arrangement of the material that is found in the *PS*. But even this is untenable. Vaidyanātha's scheme contains at least one element that has been explicitly rejected in the *PS*. This is (3b), according to which an operation which has fewer causes is *antaraṅga* in regard to one that has more causes. This is in direct contradiction with *PS* 80.6–8 (App. I ll. 26–28).

Further, Vaidyanātha's point (1), where he uses the term *pūrvasthitatva*, seems to be an invention of his own. The *PS* only uses the word *pūrvopasthita*⁶ in connection with the BP, which is Vaidyanātha's point (4).

It seems hard to doubt that Vaidyanātha's interpretation of the BP, whatever its merits and demerits, is not the one meant in the *PS*. But in view of what we now know about the text of the *PS*, it is equally hard to blame Vaidyanātha for this. Let us recall the most important factors which contributed to the unintelligibility of the text as Vaidyanātha knew it:

(1) The section beginning with *ata evomānoś ca ity āngrahaṇam caritārtham* (*PS* 87.13 ff.; App. I ll. 146 et seq.) was in the wrong place (see Chapter 7 above). The words *ata eva* can be made to yield sense in this place only if the twofold division of the BP (in BP_1 and BP_2) is sacrificed. This means that the words *antar madhye* in the beginning of the text (*PS* 76.9; App. I 1.3) must be interpreted freely in order to accommodate the whole of the interpretation of the BP. This is exactly what Vaidyanātha has done in the passage studied above. Once the literal interpretation of *antar madhye* is thought to be insufficient, there is no limit to what meanings can be ascribed to these words. In point of fact, the above passage from Vaidyanātha's *Gadā* illustrates to what extremes this belief can lead.

(2) The repeated use of BP_2 in a section which was erroneously thought to precede the introduction of BP_2 (above, pp. 67 ff.) could not but strengthen Vaidyanātha in his impression that the full interpretation of the BP was meant to be conveyed by the initial sentences of the *PS* on Par. L.

(3) The incorrect form of *PS* 92.4–13 (cf. App. I ll. 88–89, and see Chapter 8, above) may not have influenced Vaidyanātha much. In spite of that, the passage further contributed to the general confusion of the *PS* on Par. L. No wonder Vaidyanātha attempted to impose order from without, with the help of the total interpretation which we have come to know in the above passage.

(4) But the perhaps most important single factor which almost forced Vaidyanātha to give his own interpretation of the BP, is the sentence introducing Par. LI. Here the derivation of *akṣadyūḥ* is depicted as being in disagreement with the BP. Indeed, this fact posed the most serious threat to our interpretation of the BP. Fortunately, we were able to dispel this threat by showing that the first part of the *PS* on Par. LI, including the introductory sentences, is no more than a restatement of a position which Nāgeśa had abandoned long before. But Vaidyanātha was not aware of this. For him the derivation of *akṣadyūḥ* must really be prevented by the BP. The scheme which he adopts in his commentary is, it goes without saying,

admirably suited to lodge this case. It is classified under point (1), which, for the occasion, is said also to concern derivations where the *bahiranga* operation has taken effect when the *antaranga* operation applies.

The above four factors shed some light on the question of why Vaidyanātha presents us in his commentary with an interpretation of the BP which is not directly derived from the *PŚ*. They do not tell us much yet about why Vaidyanātha gives exactly *this* interpretation of the BP. In order to gain some insight into this, let us put ourselves in Vaidyanātha's position for a while, and look at the text of the *PŚ* the way he did.

It cannot be denied that according to Nāgeśa an operation can be *antaranya* because its cause presents itself earlier to our understanding (*pūrvopasthitatvāt*). This is clearly stated in *PŚ* 96.1–3. It is equally clear that, when an operation is *antaranya* on this account, *Antarāngatva* merely determines that, when two operations apply simultaneously, the *antaranya* operation shall take effect first (*PŚ* 96.9). How then is the formation of *akṣadyūḥ* out of *akṣa-div-kvip-su* prevented by the BP? This is the question, we may imagine, that occupied Vaidyanātha. In *akṣa-div-kvip-su* the substitution of *ūṭh* for *v* by P. 6.4.19 has *kvip* as its cause. The subsequent substitution of *y* for *i* by P. 6.1.77 has *ū* as its cause. *ū* precedes *kvip*. How could this derivation *not* fall under the heading *pūrvopasthitatva*?

Vaidyanātha, we may assume, realizes the difficulty. If the derivation of *akṣadyūḥ* falls under the heading *pūrvopasthitatva*, the BP will not interfere with it. But the sentence introducing Par. LI says that the BP *does* interfere with the derivation of *akṣadyūḥ*. Vaidyanātha's solution is easy: The derivation of *akṣadyūḥ* does not fall under the heading *purvopasthitatva*: it falls under the different heading *pūrvasthitatva*. And where this new heading is valid, there the BP does not confine itself to determining which operation shall take effect first out of a pair of simultaneously applying operations. Here the BP also brings it about that a *bahiranga* operation, which has taken effect, is *asiddha* when subsequently an *antaranya* operation applies. So the sentence introducing Par. LI is saved.

In the account of the derivation of *akṣadyūḥ* here given, it has been assumed that *kvip* counts as cause, even though it is elided before the derivation comes to an end. Indeed, Vaidyanātha had no choice but to make this assumption. If he had considered *kvip* to be a non-cause, he would have lost all hope of making satisfactory sense of the statement according to which the BP would interfere with the formation of *akṣadyūḥ*.

But if the disappearing element *kvip* is here accepted as cause, then the disappearing element *ṇvi* in the derivation of *viśvauḥah* must also be accepted as cause.

This, however, is not without consequences for the way Vaidyanātha looks upon the Jñāpaka of this Paribhāṣā, *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132. The argument runs, as we remember,⁷ as follows. If the BP did not exist, *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132 would serve no purpose. That rule would read, without *ūṭh*, *vāhah*, and prescribe substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v* of *vāh*, provided *vāh* had the technical denomination “Bha”. The derivation of *viśvauḥah* would look like this: *viśva-vāh-ṇvi-sas* → *viśva-u-āh-ṇvi-sas* (P. 6.4.132: *vāhah*) → *viśva-u-h-ṇvi-sas* (P. 6.1.108) → *viśva-oh-ṇvi-sas* (P. 7.3.86) → *viśvauḥ-ṇvi-sas* (P. 6.1.88) and so on. But if the BP is valid here, P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) will be *bahirāṅga* with respect to the subsequently applying P. 7.3.86. P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) will be *asiddha* with respect to P. 7.3.86, and the latter rule will not take effect.

The reason we accepted for P. 7.3.86 being *antaraṅga* in regard to P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) was that P. 7.3.86 has no following cause, whereas P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) has. In order to accept this, we had to assume that disappearing elements, in the present case *ṇvi*, do not count as causes (see p. 32f., above). But for Vaidyanātha, disappearing elements *do* count as causes. He must therefore find another device to make it understandable that P. 7.3.86 is *antaraṅga* in regard to P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*).

Vaidyanātha has already created such a device in the context of the derivation of *akṣadyūṭh*, and it can be employed here without modification. The following cause of P. 7.3.86 is *ṇvi*, the following cause of P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) is *sas*. *ṇvi* occurs before *sas*, and P. 7.3.86 is therefore *antaraṅga* because it falls under the heading *pūrvasthitatva*. Here an earlier applying *bahirāṅga* operation is indeed *asiddha* with respect to a subsequently applying *antaraṅga* operation, so that, once again, the text of the *PS* is saved for Vaidyanātha.

However, this time there is a drawback. The Jñāpaka of a Paribhāṣā is rather important to that Paribhāṣā. It not only indicates the existence of the Paribhāṣā, it also helps us in determining how the Paribhāṣā is to be interpreted. But if Vaidyanātha is correct, the Jñāpaka of the BP indicates that Paribhāṣā because it falls under the heading *pūrvasthitatva*, which is not even mentioned once in the *PS*. This is very strange, to say the least.

No wonder Vaidyanātha looks for another reason why the word *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132 should indicate the BP. Such a second reason is not easily to be found. But Vaidyanātha seems to feel desperately in need of one, ready to

go to any length to get it. This I conclude from the surprising reason for which he settles in the end. What he says is that P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) is *bahirāṅga* because it depends on a greater number of conditions. And what are those conditions? That what follows *vāh-kvip*, i.e., *sas*, “be one of the suffixes up to *kap*” etc. Let us remind ourselves that P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) prescribes substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v*, provided *vāh* has the technical domination “Bha”. And according to SK 231, something is called “Bha” when “a suffix follows, which begins with *y* or with a vowel, which is one of the suffixes from *su* up to *kap*, and which is not a Sarvanāmasthāna” (*yakārādiśv ajādiśu ca kappratyayāvadhiśu svādiśv asarvanāmastiḥāneśu parataḥ pūrvam bhasamjñam syāt*). Vaidyanātha’s own words are:

Gadā 90.28 91.12

na ca ...paranimittakatvasya tulyatvāt katham tattvam /⁸ kappratyayāvadhiṭyādiviṣeṣaṇabāhulyena tasyādhikanimittakatvena samkhyākrtatattvena tattvasattvāt / ubhayathāpi parasthititatvena tattvāc ca /

“And (one should) not (ask) how (the substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v* in *viśva-vāh-kvip-sas* by P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) can be) *bahirāṅga*, (objecting that in reality it is not *bahirāṅga*) because (the substitution of Samprasāraṇa is) equal (to the subsequently applying substitution of Guṇa *o* for *u* by P. 7.3.84) in that (both these operations) have a following cause. (Such an objection should not be made,) for (the substitution of Samprasāraṇa) is *bahirāṅga*. It is *bahirāṅga* on account of the number (of its causes) since it has more causes (than the corresponding *antarāṅga* operation, substitution of Guṇa *o* for *u*). And that it has more causes is) due to the fact that it (is dependent upon) many conditions, such as ‘being one of the suffixes up to *kap*.’ Moreover, (the substitution of Samprasāraṇa by P. 6.4.132 (*vāhah*) is) *bahirāṅga* since its cause (*sas*) stands later (than the cause *kvip* of the substitution of Guṇa by P. 7.3.84) on both the alternatives (of our opting for the order of the derivation or for the order of the pronunciation of the utterance as it is used in language).”

Apparently Vaidyanātha wanted to make up for the lack of one good reason by giving two bad ones. And bad reasons they are. The one which we discussed first, and which falls under the heading *pūrvasthitatva*, is of a kind not met with in the PS. The other one, according to which an operation can be *bahirāṅga* because it has many causes, is in direct

contradiction to the express statement of the *PS*.⁹ All this we know. It is interesting to note that the validity of this last reason seems to have been accepted merely to make sense of the Jñāpaka of the BP. Indeed, the illustration that Vaidyanātha gives of this point (3b) is precisely the formation of *viśvauhāḥ*.

It is clear from what has been said so far that this same formation could also serve to illustrate Vaidyanātha's point (1), which carries the heading *pūrvasthitatva*. But obviously, a repeated mention of *viśvauhāḥ*, both under point (1) and under point (3b), would make it all too obvious that these points were introduced in order to come to terms with the obscure Jñāpaka. Fortunately, something else was at hand to illustrate point (1).

The example *paṭvyā* is used in the *PS* to illustrate both BP₂₁ and BP₂₂. In the first case the *vibhajyānvākhyāna* is adopted; in *paṭu-ī-ā* the substitution of *v* for *u* is *antaranga* because its cause, *ī*, presents itself earlier than *ā*, the cause of the substitution of *y* for *ī*. This case, further, is the first mentioned after Nāgeśa used the term *pūrvopasthita*.¹⁰ Vaidyanātha therefore places it under that heading.

In the second case, i.e., in the derivation of *paṭvyā* in accordance with BP₂₂, the *krameṇānvākhyāna* is adopted. Here the grammatical elements come into being one after the other, so that the following stages are passed through: *paṭu*, *paṭu-ī* (→ *paṭvī*), *paṭvī-ā* (→ *paṭvyā*). It may be recalled that we had understood this derivation to take place in such a way that the grammatical elements come into being in the order of the meanings which they express. This we came to see as a second kind of *pūrvopasthitatva*, different from the one used in the first derivation of *paṭvyā* just described (see pp. 22 ff., above).

Vaidyanātha cannot look upon these two derivations of *paṭvyā* in this light. For him the *PS* on Par. L is not divided into two parts, the one describing BP₁, the other BP₂. So for him the restriction that meanings cannot make an operation *bahiranga* (*PS* 76.13; App. I l. 8) covers the whole of the BP. He cannot therefore accept BP₂₂ the way we have accepted it. And consequently he cannot accept the division of *pūrvopasthitatva* into two, which we approved of.

But what then does he do with the second derivation of *paṭvyā*? How does he classify it? The first derivation of *paṭvyā* has come under the heading *pūrvopasthitatva*, so here there is no place for the second derivation. Where does that go? Again Vaidyanātha's solution is easy. The second derivation of *paṭvyā* is classified under the heading *pūrvasthitatva*, newly introduced to solve some other difficulties.

Clearly, the heading *pūrvasthitatva* is used as a kind of garbage-can, ready to accept everything that would preferably have been apportioned to *pūrvopasthitatva*, but for some reason or other could not be accommodated there. That this is indeed the case is again corroborated by the circumstance that *pūrvopasthitatva* and *pūrvasthitatva* have identical subdivisions, viz. (a) *prakriyākramena* and (b) *prayogīyoccāraṇakramena*. Moreover, the “characteristics” accompanying the heading *pūrvasthitatva* are such that almost everything can be accommodated here. The “characteristics” of point (4), *pūrvopasthitatva*, on the other hand, are more directly derived from the text of the *PS* and are therefore so austere that only a selected few derivations comply with them.

One of the happy candidates which Vaidyanātha has allowed into his fourth category is the derivation *khaṭvodhah* from *khaṭvā-ā-ūdhah*. We are already familiar with this derivation (see pp. 61 ff., above), and the similarity with the derivation of *paṭvyā* from *paṭu-ī-ā* is clear. But there is one important difference. In *khaṭvodhah* the union of *ā-ū* into *o* presents itself earlier to our understanding in the order of the derivation, not in the order of pronunciation. This explains the division of point (4) into (a) *prakriyākramena* and (b) *prayogīyoccāraṇakramena*. It may be remarked in passing that Vaidyanātha correctly classifies the derivation of *khaṭvodhah* under the heading *pūrvopasthitatva*. Ironically, this correct classification would have been impossible, had Vaidyanātha understood the basic structure of Nāgeśa’s argument – this, of course, in view of the corrupted state of the text which Vaidyanātha used.

The remaining points ((2) and (3a)) can go without comment. They are in agreement with Nāgeśa’s intentions. Vaidyanātha considers (2) an extreme case of (3), which accords well with our interpretation (*Gadā* 102.28–29¹¹; see above p. 7).

If the above partial reconstruction of Vaidyanātha’s thoughts is correct, something can be said, on the basis of this, about what aspects of the Paribhāṣā are established in what way. Point (3b) and part of point (1), as we saw, were created to make sense of the Jñāpaka *ūṭh* in P. 6.4.132. One would therefore expect that these points were considered established by this Jñāpaka. This is indeed in accordance with Vaidyanātha’s statements. This state of affairs was hinted at in the passage which we quoted in the beginning of this chapter, and is again confirmed in *Gadā* 102.26–27.¹² Regarding the way the other points are justified, nothing need be said except that Vaidyanātha considers *āñ* in P. 6.1.95 a second Jñāpaka which establishes (4a) (*Gadā* 102.29–30¹³).

16. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the preceding pages we have seen Nāgeśa's conception of the BP and its workings. This conception may well be unique in the history of Sanskrit grammar in its simplicity. No longer do we find unspecified, highly intuitive concepts, no longer a haphazard list of conditions which make an operation *bahirāṅga* or *antarāṅga*. Here, everything is brought together under two heads: An operation is *antarāṅga*(1) when its causes lie *within* the causes of the *bahirāṅga* operation and (2)when its cause lies before the cause of the *bahirāṅga* operation. What may be counted as cause is precisely specified. And fitting to the twofold division of the meaning of *antarāṅga*, a twofold division of the meaning of the Paribhāṣā is given. A more neatly designed interpretation could hardly be imagined.

It is true that this neat interpretation of the BP does not account for all the facts that it should cover. Nāgeśa himself has to admit that the BP is not universally valid. But then his predecessors had not fared better. The BP always had to be qualified by auxiliary Paribhāṣās, at the very least.¹ Nāgeśa's advance over his predecessors, as far as the BP is concerned, may or may not lie in his ability to account better for derivations. I do not know. He certainly excelled them in beauty of design.

It is the tragedy of Nāgeśa that this beautiful construction remained unknown to almost all but himself. Some change which had inexplicably found its way into the text prevented Nāgeśa's direct student, Vaidyanātha Pāyagunḍa, from grasping his master's intentions. The only other person who may have been Nāgeśa's pupil,² and commented upon the *PS*, Bhairava Miśra, does not deviate much from Vaidyanātha's interpretation.

If there is a moral to be drawn from all this, it clearly is that the much cherished *guru-śiṣya-paramparā* is not always such an infallible guide in interpreting a text as is often supposed. Vaidyanātha, though Nāgeśa's direct pupil, interprets the latter's *PS* as if he had never known its author.³ Given that much, it must be admitted that he did as much as we could possibly expect of him. But the interpretation he arrived at was not the one which had been intended by his teacher.

APPENDICES

I. THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE *PARIBHĀṢENDUŠEKHARA* ON PAR. L

In this appendix the text of the *PŚ* on Par. L is reproduced, incorporating such modifications as were shown to be necessary in Chapters 7 and 8 above. Apart from these modifications, this appendix does not in any way deviate from the text as edited by K. V. Abhyankar. Indeed, the variant readings given in that edition are also reproduced here in the notes.

- nityād apy antaraṅgam baliyo'ntaraṅge bahiraṅgasyāsiddhatvāt / tad āha / - ASIDDHAM BAHIRĀNGAM ANTARĀNGE [Par. L]
- antar madhye bahiraṅgaśāstriyanimittasamudāyamadhye'ntarbhūtāny aṅgāni nimittāni yasya tad antaraṅgam / evam tadiyanimittasamudāyād bahirbhūtāṅgakam bahiraṅgam / etac ca kharavaśānayoḥ [P. 8.3.15] iti sūtre'siddhavatsūtre ca bhāṣyakaiyaṭayoh spaṣṭam // atrāṅgaśabdena śabdārūpam nimittam eva¹ grhyate śabdaśāstre tasya pradhānatvāt / tenārthanimittakasya² na bahiraṅgatvam / ata eva na tiṣṭatas [P. 6.4.4.] iti niṣedhaś caritārthaḥ / anyathā strītvārūpārthanimittakatisrapekṣayāntaraṅgatvāt³ trayādeśe tadasaṃgatiḥ spaṣṭaiva / ata eva trayādeśe srantasya pratiṣedha iti sthānivatsūtrasthabhāṣyavārttikādi⁴ saṃgacchate // etena gaudherah paced ityādāv⁵ eyādīnam aṅgasamjñāpekṣatvena⁶ bahirangatayasiddhatvād vali lopo na syād iti parāstam / eyādeśāder aparanimittakatvenāntaraṅgatvāc ca // nanu yena vidhis tadantasya [P. 1.1.72] iti sūtre bhāṣya iko yaṇṇaci⁷ [P. 6.1.77] ityādāv api tadantavidhau syona ity atrāntaraṅgatvād yaṇo guṇabādhakatvam iṣyate tan na sidhyed ūnaśabdam āśritya yaṇādeśo naśabdam āśritya guṇa ity antaraṅgatvād guṇa eva syād ity uktam / atra kaiyaṭaḥ / siver bāhulakād auṇādike nāpratyaye guṇavalopothām prasaṅge ūḍ apavādatvād valopam bādhate guṇam tv antaraṅgatvād bādhate / guṇo hy aṅgasam̄bandhinīm īglakṣaṇām laghvīm upadhām ārdhadhātukam cāśrayati / ūṭh tu vakārāntam aṅgam anunāsikādīm ca pratyayam ity alpāpekṣatvād antaraṅgaḥ / tatra kṛte yaṇguṇau prāpnuta iti / evam ca samjñāpekṣasyāpi bahiraṅgatvam spaṣṭam evoktam iti cet / na / tadantavidhāv api bahupa-dārthāpekṣatvarūpabahiraṅgatvasya guṇe sattvena tatra doṣakathanaprabhāṣyāsaṅgateḥ / bahiraṅgantaraṅgaśabdābhāyām bahvapekṣatvālpāpekṣatvayoh śabdāmaryādayālābhāc ca / tathā saty asiddham

bahvapekṣam alpāpekṣa ity eva vadet // / ata eva vīpratiṣedhaśūtre bhāṣye
 guṇād yanādeśo'ntaraṅgatvād ity asya syona ity udāharanām na tu guṇād
 30 ūd antaraṅgatvād ity uktam / tvadrītyā tad api vaktum ucitam / prāthā-
 myāt tad eva vā vaktum ucitam / mama tv antaraṅgaparibhāṣyā tadvāra-
 ṇāsamṛbhavāt tan noktam / kiṁ ca siddhānte nityatvāt⁸ pūrvam ūd guṇas
 tūhi yanā bādhitatvād anityah / ūnaśabdām āśrityetyādibhāṣyena⁹ ca
 35 paribhāṣyām aṅgaśabdena saptamyādyantopāttam¹⁰ śabdārūpam nimit-
 tam eva gr̄hyata iti spaṣṭam evoktam // yat tu kaiyatena tadanta vidhi-
 pakṣe paratvād guṇah prāpnōtīt yuktam tat tūnaśabdām
 40 āśrityetyādibhāṣyāsamṛgatyā cintyam // vali lope'ntaraṅgaparibhāṣā na
 pravartata iti tu na yuktam / tatsūtre bhāṣya¹¹ eva vraścādiṣu lopātipra-
 saṅgam āśaṅkyopadeśasāmarthyān na na ca vr̄scatītyāda u cāritārthyam
 45 bahiraṅgatayā samprasāraṇasyāsiddhatvena pūrvam eva tatprāptter iti
 bhāṣyokteḥ // yat tu nalopasya ṣaṭsamjñāyām asiddhatvāt pañcety atra
 na ṣaṭ [P. 4.1.10] iti niṣedha iti tac cintyam / nalopasya hi¹² padasamjñāsā-
 pekṣatvena bahirangatvām vācyam / tac ca na samjñākṛtabahirangatva-
 50 syānāśrayaṇāt¹³ / pañcety atra niṣedhas tu striyām yat prāpnoti tan neti
 vyākhyānasāmarthyena bhūtapūrvaṣaṭtvam ādāyeti bodhyam // ata eva
 kṛti tuggrahaṇām caritārtham / vr̄trahabhyām ityāda u padatvanimitta-
 katve'pi nalopasya bahiraṅgatvābhāvāt / bhyāmaḥ padasamjñānimittat-
 ve'pi nalopasya tannimittakatvābhāvāt / paramparayā nimittatvam ādāya
 55 bahiraṅgatvāśrayaṇe tu na mānam / dhvanitam cedaṁ nalopah sup-[P.
 8.2.2] iti sūtre bhāṣya iti tatraiva¹⁴ bhāṣyapradīpoddyyote nirūpitam //
 - antaraṅge kartavye jātaṁ tatkālaprāptikam ca bahiraṅgam asiddham ity
 arthaḥ / vr̄scatītyādiṣu¹⁵ padasamkārapakṣe samānakālatvam eva
 dvayor¹⁶ iti bodhyam // etenāntaraṅgam bahirangād balīya iti paribhā-
 60 sāntaram¹⁷ ity apāstam / enām āśritya vīpratiṣedhaśūtre bhāṣye¹⁸ tasyāḥ
 pratyākhyānāc ca¹⁹ // antaraṅgaśāstratvam asyā²⁰ liṅgam //
 - iyām ca tripādyām na pravartate tripādyā asiddhatvāt / asyām ca vāha
 ūṭhsūtrastham ūdgraḥanām jñāpakam ity esā sapādasaptādhyāyīsthā /
 anyathā samprasāraṇamātravidhānenā laghūpadhaguṇe vr̄ddhir eci [P.
 6.1.88] iti vr̄ddhau viśvauha ityādisiddhes tadvaiyarthyaṁ spaṣṭam eva
 65 / satyām hy etasyām²¹ bahiraṅgasamprasāraṇasyāsiddhatvāl laghū pad-
 haguṇo na syāt // na ca puganta [P. 7.3.867] iti sūtre nimittam iko
 višeṣaṇam ata eva bhinattītyāda u na guṇa evam ca nājānantarye [Par. LI]
 iti niṣedhāt kathaṁ paribhāṣāpravṛttir iti vācyam / pratyayasyāṅgāṁsa
 utthitākāṅkṣatvena tatraivānvayāt / pugantetyāda u karmadhārayāśraya-
 70 nena pratyayaparāṅgāvayavalaghūpadhārūpeko guṇa itiko guṇavr̄ddhī²²
 [P. 1.1.3] iti sūtrabhaṣyasammatē'rthe bhinattītyādāv adoṣāc

ca // akārāntopasarge'nakārānte copapade vaher vā ḥvivicāv
 anabhidhānān na sta eva / vāryūhetyādi²³ tūhateḥ kvipi bodhyam / dhāt-
 ūnām anekārthatvān nārthāsamgatih / prauha ityādy asādhv eva vrddher
 aprāpteh / asyohasyā nārthakyān na prād ūhoḍho - [V. 6.1.89.3] ity
 70 asyāpi pravṛttih // na ca kāryakālapakṣe tripādyām²⁴ etatpravṛttir dur-
 vāreti vācyam / pūrvam̄ prati parasyāsiddhatvād antaraṅgābhāvena pūr-
 vasya tannirūpitabahiraṅgatvābhāvāt tayā²⁵ tasyāsiddhatvapratipāda-
 nāsambhavāt / na cānayā pūrvasyāsiddhatvāt tadabhāvena²⁶ tam̄ prati
 75 parāsiddhatvam̄ pūrvatra [P. 8.2.1] ity anena vaktum aśakyam iti
 vācyam / evam̄ hi vinigamanāvirahād ubhaylor apy apravṛttyāpatteḥ
 / kiṁ ca pūrvatrety asya pratyakṣatvena tenānumānikyā asyā bādha evc-
 citāḥ / ataḥ kāryakālapakṣe'pi tripādyām asyā²⁷ anupasthitir eva // ata
 80 eva kāryakālapakṣam evopakramyoktayuktīr uktvāto'yukto'yaṁ pariḥāro
 na vā bahiraṅgalakṣaṇatvād itīty uktam̄ visarjanīyasūtre bhāṣye²⁸ sid-
 dhāntinā / tripādīsthe'ntaraṅge kartavye'yaṁ pariḥāro na yucta iti tadar-
 thaḥ / kiṁ tu vacanam evārabdhavyam iti tadāśayah / ata eva nigālyata
 85 ityādau latvārthaṁ tasya doṣa iti²⁹ vacanam evārabdhām / anyathānta-
 raṅgatvān ṇilopāt pūrvam̄ vaikalpikalatve tadvaiyarthiyam̄ spaṣṭam
 eva // ye'pi lakṣyānurodhād ānumānikyāpy antaraṅgaparibhāṣyā pra-
 tyakṣasiddhasya pūrvatrety asya bādhaḥ vadanti te'pi lakṣaṇaikacakṣurb-
 hir nādartaḥavyā³⁰ iti dik //

- yat³¹ tu višeṣāpeksāt sāmānyāpeksam̄ antaraṅgam̄ višeṣāpekṣe višeṣad-
 harmasyādhikasya nimittatvāt / yathā rudādibhyaḥ sārvadhātuke [P.
 7.2.76] ity atra rūdāditvam̄ sārvadhātukatvam̄ ca / tatra sārvadhātukat-
 vajñānāya prakṛter dhātutvajñānam̄ pratyayasya pratyayatvajñānam̄
 cāvaśyakam iti yāsuḍ antaraṅgaḥ iti tan na / višeṣasya³² vyāpyatvena
 vyāpakasyānumānenopasthitāv api taṣya nimittatve mānābhāvenādhi-
 kadharmanimittakatvānupapādanāt / bhāṣya evam̄vidhāntaraṅgaparibhi-
 raṅgabhāvaya kvāpy anullekhaḥ ca³³ / etena yad anudāttanitāḥ iti sūtre
 90 kaiyatēnoktaṁ lamātrāpeksayāntaraṅgās tibādayo lakāra višeṣāpekṣatvād
 bahiraṅgāḥ syādaya³⁴ iti tat parāstam³⁵ / višeṣāpekṣatve'pi tasya sāmā-
 nyadharmanimittakatvābhāvena tattvasya durupapādatvāt / paranimit-
 takatvena syādinām̄ bahiraṅgatvāc ca // yat tu matupsūtre bhāṣye pañca
 95 gāvo yasya santi sa pañcagur ity atra matuprāptim³⁶ āśāñkyā pratyekam
 asāmarthyāt samudāyād aprātipadikatvāt samāsāt samāsenoktavād iti
 siddhāntinokte³⁷ naitat sāram ukte'pi hi pratyayārtha utpadyate dvigos
 taddhito yathā pāñcanāpitir iti pūrvapakṣyuktih³⁸ / dvigor lug anapatye
 [P. 4.1.88] iti lugvidhānāt taddhitārthadvigos taddhito bhavati pañcagu-
 100 śabdaś ca dvigur iti tadāśayaṁ kaiyatāḥ / tato dvaimāturaḥ pāñcanāpitih

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pañcasu kapaleśu saṃskṛta ityādau sāvakāśadvigor bahuvrīhiṇā prakṛte
 paratvād³⁹ bādhā ityāśayena⁴⁰ naiṣa dviguḥ kas tarhi bahuvrīhir iti sid-
 dhāntinokte tam avakāśam⁴¹ ajānāno'pavādatvād dviguḥ prāpnotīti pūr-
 vapakṣi / anyapadārthe subanta mātrasya vidhīyamāna bahuvrīheḥ
 110 samkhyāyās taddhitārthe⁴² vidhīyamāno dvigur viśeṣa vihītavād bād-
 hakaḥ prāpnotīti kaiyatāḥ⁴³ / tataḥ siddhāntyekadeśy āha / antaraṅgat-
 vād bahuvrīhiḥ / kāntaraṅgatā / anyapadārthe bahuvrīhir viśiṣṭe'nyapa-
 dārthe dvigus tasmiṁścāya taddhite'stigrahaṇam kriyata iti / adhikāstyā-
 rthāpeksamatvarthanimitto dvigur bahiraṅga iti kaiyatā iti / naisā
 siddhāntyuktir etā vatāpy apavādatvāhāneḥ / acsāmānyāpeksayaṇo viśi-
 ṣṭasavarnājapeksadīrgheṇa bādhadarśanāt / kim coktarītyā paratvenaiva
 bādhasiddheḥ / kim cātrādhikāpeksatvenaiva bahiraṅgatvam na⁴⁴ keva-
 laviśeṣāpeksatveneti nātad bhāṣyārūḍham viśeṣāpeksayaṇa bahiraṅgatv-
 120 m / ata eva subantasāmānyāpeksō bahuvrīhis tadviśeṣāpeksō⁴⁵ dvigur iti
 noktam bhāṣye / na cārthakṛtabahiraṅgatvasyānāśrayaṇād⁴⁶ idam ayuk-
 tam / ekadeśyuktiveneṇādoṣāt / ata evāstigrahaṇam nopādhyartham kim
 tv astisabdān matubartham iti tvadabhīmatam bahiraṅgatvam api dvigor
 nāstīti pratipādyā siddhāntinā matvarthe dvigoh pratīṣedho vaktavya⁴⁷ iti
 125 vacanenaitat siddham ity uktam // ata eva tadoḥ saḥ sau [P. 7.2.106] iti
 sūtre'nantyayor iti caritārtham / anyathā pratyayasāmānyāpeksatvenān-
 taraṅgatvād antyasyātve'nantyasyaiya⁴⁸ satve siddhe tadvaiyarthyaṁ spa-
 ṣṭam eva // pādaḥ pat [P. 6.4.130] iti sūtre bhāṣyakaiyatayor apy
 etadantaranagatvābhāva eva sucita iti sudhiyo vibhāvayantu //
 - nanv evam asusruvad ity atra laghūpadhaguṇād uvaṇo'l panimittatvāb-
 130 hāvād uvaṇ na syād iti cet / na / trāntaḥkāryatvarūpāntaraṅgatvasat-
 tvāt / antaḥkāryatvam ca pūrvopasthitānimitkatvatvam aṅgaśabdasya
 nimittaparātvāt / idam antaraṅgatvam lokanyāyasiddham iti manu-
 shyo'yaṁ prātar utthāya śarīrakāryāṇi karoti tataḥ suhṛdām tataḥ sam-
 bandhinām / arthānām api jātivyakti lingingasamkhyākārakānām
 135 bodhakramāḥ śāstrakṛtkalpitās tatkrāmeṇaiva⁴⁹ ca tad bodhakaśabdaprā-
 durbhāvāḥ kalpita iti tatkrāmeṇaiva tatkāryāṇīti paṭyetyādāv antaraṅ-
 gatvāt pūrvam pūrvayaṇādeśah parayaṇādeśasya bahiraṅgata yāsiddhat-
 vād ity anenācaḥ⁵⁰ parasmin [P. 1.1.57] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam // tad api
 140 yugapatprāptau pūrvapra vṛttiniyāmakam eva yathā paṭyety atra padasya
 vibhājyānvākhyāne na tu jātasya bahiraṅgasya tādṛṣe'ntaraṅge'siddhatā-
 niyāmakam prāguktalokanyāyena tathaiva lābhād iti vāha ūṭh [P. 6.4.132]
 sūtre kaiyate spaṣṭam / ata eva vāyvor ityādau vali lopo yaṇaḥ sthānivat-
 tvena vāṇito⁵¹ bhāṣyakṛtā //
 - kramenānvākhyāne tūktodāharaṇe pūrvapra vṛttikatvam⁵² antaraṅgat-

vam bahiraṅgasyāsiddhatvam api nimittābhāvād⁵³ aprāptirūpaṁ bodhyam // ata⁵⁴ evomānoś⁵⁵ ca [P. 6.1.95] ity āṅgrahaṇam caritārtham / taddhi khaṭvā-ā-ūḍhety atra param api savarṇadīrgham bādhītvāntaraṅgatvād guṇe⁵⁶ kṛte vṛddhiprāptau pararūpārtham / sādhana-bodhakapratyayotpattyanantaram⁵⁷ pūrvam dhātor upasargayoge paścāt khaṭvāśabdasya samudāyena yogād guṇasyāntaraṅgatvam iti saṃprasāraṇāc ca [P. 6.1.108] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam / ehiṭy anukaraṇasya śivādiśabdasaṃbandhe tu nāsyā pravṛttir jñāpakaparasāraṇāccetisūtrasthabhāṣyaprāmāṇyenānityam prakṛti-vad anukaraṇam ity atideśam ādāya labdhāṇtva etadapravṛtteḥ // yat tu pūrvam dhātūr upasargeṇa yuṣyate paścāt sādhanena / upasargeṇa tatsaṃjñakaśabdena / sādhanena kārakeṇa tatprayuktakāryena / ata evānubhūyata ityadau sakarmakatvāt karmaṇi lakārasiddhir iti tan na / kriyāyāḥ sādhyatvena bodhāt sādhyasya ca sādhanākāṇkṣatayā⁵⁸ tatsaṃbandhottaram eva niścitakriyābodhena sādhanakāryapravṛtti-yuttaram eva kriyāyoganimittopasargasamjñakasya saṃbandha-ucityāt / ata eva suṭ kāt pūrvah [P. 6.1.135] iti sūtre pūrvam dhātūr upasargeṇety uktvā naitat sāram pūrvam⁵⁹ dhātuh sādhanena yuṣyate paścāt upasargeṇety uktvoktayuktyāṣyaiva yuktatvam uktam sādhanam hi⁶⁰ kriyām nirvartayatiṭyādinā⁶¹ / upasargadyotyārthāntarbhāvena dhātunaivārthābhidhānād ukteṣu karmaṇi lakārādisiddhiḥ / paścācchrotur bodhāya⁶² dyotakopasargasambandhaḥ // evam cāntaraṅgatarārthakopasarganimittah suṭ saṃ-kṛ-tity avasthāyām dvitvāditah pūrvam pravartate tato dvitvādi // ata eva praṇidāpayatiṭyādau ṣatvam yadāgamāḥ [Par. XI] iti nyāyena samāhitam bhāṣye // ata eva pratyeti pratyaya ityādisiddhiḥ / anyathāntaraṅgatvāt savarṇadīrghe rūpāsiddhiḥ⁶³ // yad upasarganimittakam⁶⁴ kāryam upasargārthāśritam viśiṣṭopasarganimittatvāt tad⁶⁵ antaraṅgam / yat tu na tathā tatra pūrvāgatasādhananimittakam evāntaraṅgam / ata eva na dhātu- [P. 1.1.4] iti sūtre preddha ity atra guṇo bahiraṅga iti bhāṣya uktam // kim ca pūrvam upasargayoge dhātūpasargayoh samāsa aikasvaryādyāpattir ity upapadam atiṇ [P. 2.2.19] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam // bhāvārtha-pratyayasyāpi pūrvam evotpattiḥ / ata eva ṇer adhyayane [P. 7.2.26] iti nirdesāḥ saṃgacchate / idam ca sāmānyāpeksaṃ⁶⁶ jñāpakam bhāvatiṇo'pi pūrvam utpatteḥ⁶⁷ / anyathā tatra samāsāpattiḥ / tini tv atiṇniti niṣedhān na doṣo yadi bhāvatiṇy upasargayogo'stīty alam //

- yat⁶⁸ tv evaṁṛityā pūrvasthānikam apy antaraṅgam iti tac cintyam / srajiṣṭha ityādau vinmator luki⁶⁹ tilopasyā-pavādavinmatorlukpravṛtti⁷⁰ jātipakṣāśrayaṇena vāraṇaprayāsasya prakṛtyaikāc [P. 6.4.163] iti sūtrapravojanakhanḍanāvasare bhāṣyakṛtkṛtasya naiṣphalyāpatteḥ / tvaduk-

tarītyā vinmator luko bahiraṅgāsiddhatvenānāyāsatas⁷¹
 185 tadvāraṇāt / bhāṣya īdṛśarītyā bahiraṅgāsiddhatvasya kvāpy anāśrayaṇāc
 ca / paribhāṣāyām aṅgaśabdasya nimittaparativāc ca //
 - iyaṁ cottarapadādhikārasthabahiraṅgasya⁷² nāsiddhatvabodhiketīca
 ekācom [P. 6.3.68] iti sūtre bhāṣye pūrvapakṣyuktir iti sā⁷³ nādartavyā /
 paramṭapa ityādāv anusvāre nāsiddhatvam̄ mumas tripādyām̄ tadapravṛttteḥ //
 190 navyamate'pi yathoddeśapakṣāśrayaṇenānyathāsiddhodāharanādānena
 tasya taduktivam̄ āvaśyakam̄ ity āhuḥ / ābhīye'ntaraṅga ābhīyasya
 bahiraṅgasya samānāśrayasya⁷⁴ nānenāsiddhatvam̄ asiddhatvād ity
 asiddhavatsūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam̄ / evam̄ sici vṛddher⁷⁵
 195 yenanāprāptinyāyenāntaraṅgabādhakatvamūlakam̄ na sicy antaraṅgam̄
 astītiko guṇa [P. 1.1.3] iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam̄ / /

II. A CONTRADICTION IN THE PS

Early in his discussion of the BP Nāgeśa states that neither dependence on technical terms nor an indirect cause can make an operation *bahiranga*. The passage concerned reads as follows:

PS 82.5–83.3, App. I ll. 43–49

tac ca na samjñākṛtabahirāngatvasyānāśrayanāt / . . . ata eva kṛti
tuggrahaṇām caritārtham / vṛtrahabhyām ityādau padatvanimittakatve'pi
nalopasya bahirāngatvābhāvāt / bhyāmaḥ padasamjñānimittatve'pi
nalopasya tannimittakatvābhāvāt / paramparayā nimittatvam ādāya
bahirāngatvāśrayane tu na mānam /

“And (to assume) this (i.e., that the elision of *n* of *pañcan* is *bahiranga* on account of its dependence on the circumstance that the technical denomination ‘Pada’ attaches to *pañcan*,) is impossible because (dependence on) technical terms cannot be admitted to make (an operation) *bahiranga*. . . . (Because then dependence on technical terms does not make an operation *bahiranga*), therefore the statement (in P. 8.2.2, ‘that the elision of *n* shall be as if it had not taken effect) so far as regards the addition (taught in P. 6.1.71) of the augment *tuk* before a Kṛt-affix (distinguished by the indicatory letter *p*)’ serves a purpose. For the elision (by P. 8.2.7) of the *n* (e.g., of *vṛtrahan*) in *vṛtrahabhyām* etc. is not *bahiranga* although it is caused by the fact that (*vṛtrahan*) is a Pada. (Nor is it possible to say that the termination *bhyām* makes the elision of *n* *bahiranga*), because, although *bhyām* (according to P. 1.4.17) is the cause why the technical denomination ‘Pada’ (attaches to *vṛtrahan*), still the elision of *n* is not caused (directly) by *bhyām*; on the other hand, there is no authority for the assumption that (the elision of *n*) is *bahiranga* because it is indirectly caused (by *bhyām*).” (Cf. K. p. 232-233.).

As said earlier, two things are stated in this passage. The first is that “technical terms cannot be admitted to make an operation *bahiranga*”; the second, that there is no authority for the assumption that an operation is *bahiranga* due to its indirect cause.

The first of these two opinions has to be taken at its face value. I know of no passages in the *PS* that contradict it. What is more, the same opinion had already been expressed, somewhat less clearly, by Nāgeśa in a passage which we studied earlier (above, p. 6). What we read there amounted to this: The contention that, in the derivation of *gaudhera* from *godhā-dhrak*, the substitution of *ey* for *dh* by P. 7.1.2 is *bahirāṅga* because it is dependent upon the technical term ‘Āṅga’ is mistaken. In other words, technical terms do not make an operation *bahirāṅga*.

It is the second of the two opinions set forth in the passage now under consideration which comes into conflict with other parts of the *PS*. In order to understand this clearly, we must look somewhat more closely at the derivation of *vrtrahabhyām*.

At the stage *vrtrahan-bhyām*, P. 8.2.7 (*nalopah prātipadikāntasya*) causes elision of the final *n* of *vrtrahan*. The *SK* explains this sūtra (no. 236): *prātipadikasamjñakam yat padam tadantasya nakārasya lopah syāt*, “let there be elision of *n* which is final in such a Pada as is also called ‘Prātipadika.’” As a result of this, one of the conditions imposed upon *vrtrahan*, so that P. 8.2.7 may apply to it, is that it be a Pada. In other words, the elision of *n* is dependent upon the technical term ‘Pada’. That *vrtrahan* is worthy of this name it owes – through the agency of P. 1.4.17 – to the affix *bhyām*. But the operation which consists in dropping *n* depends only indirectly on this same affix *bhyām*.

Once the final *n* of *vrtrahan* has been elided, another rule presents itself to us for consideration. It is P. 6.1.71 (*hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk*), which, after *n* has been removed, recognizes that all conditions for its application are fulfilled, because the remaining form *vrtraha* ends in a short vowel and is followed by a Kṛt-affix which has *p* as indicatory letter. It should not be forgotten that between *vrtraha* and *bhyām* we still have to imagine (by P. 1.1.62) *kvip* to be present, which was dropped earlier by force of the rules P. 1.3.9 and P. 6.1.67. That is to say, for all practical purposes the situation is *vrtraha-kvip-bhyām*. What can be done to prevent P. 6.1.71 from taking effect?

If, in one way or another, the elision of *n* could be shown to be *bahirāṅga* with regard to the addition of *tuk* – in such a way that BP₁ would have a say in the derivation – then this Paribhāṣā would stop the *antarāṅga* rule P. 6.1.71. But how could the earlier operation be shown to be *bahirāṅga*? On the basis of the technical term ‘Pada’, which attaches to *vrtrahan* and is operative in bringing about elision of *n*? This is categorically rejected in the above passage. Then perhaps on the basis of the indirect cause *bhyām*? We

must remember that *kvip*, which disappears in the course of the formation of *vrtrahabhyām*, in spite of being the cause of P. 6.1.71, counts in the context of the BP as “no following cause”; this has been shown above, p. 32f. As a result of this, once *bhyām* is accepted as the cause of P. 8.2.7, all conditions are fulfilled for BP₁ to come into play and then block P. 6.1.71. But our present passage informs us that there is no authority for assuming that dropping of *n* is *bahiranga* on the basis of its indirect cause *bhyām*. This leaves us no other possibility than to accept that there is no scope here for the BP. Some other device is required to prevent P. 6.1.71 from taking effect. It exists in the form of the words *tuk* and *kṛti* in P. 8.2.2.

The previous passage has been given much attention because the next passage from the PS is going to say the exact opposite. It occurs among the comments on Par. LXXXV.

PS 164.2–4

kim ca ṣatvatukor asiddhah ityetadbalāt kṛti tuggrahaṇāc ca tugvidhau bahirangaparibhāṣāyā apravṛtteḥ

“Moreover, in consequence of the (*tuk* in the) rule P. 6.1.86, and because (Pāṇini) has employed the words *kṛti tuk* (in P. 8.2.2), Par. L has no concern (with an operation which would by it be *asiddha*) in regard to the addition of (the augment) *tuk*.” (K. p. 412.)

So, according to this last passage, in a derivation like that of *vrtrahabhyām*, the BP does *not* fail to apply because its conditions are not fulfilled. On the contrary, even though its conditions *are* fulfilled, that Paribhāṣā does not apply, because the words *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2 indicate that in derivations of this type it should not apply. And whereas the earlier passage made clear that, in the absence of the words *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2, the correct formation of *vrtrahabhyām* could not be accounted for, the present passage tells us that these two words really do nothing but make known what could also be known by means of the BP; and it is the threat of superfluity of the same two words (and not their absolute necessity, as the earlier passage has it), which leads to the conclusion that the BP apparently does not apply in instances like this.

We conclude that, but for the presence of *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2, the BP would have applied unhindered in the derivation of *vrtrahabhyām*.

But how can this be explained? If the derivation of *vrtrahabhyām* offers scope to the BP, we must accept that the elision of *n* is *bahiranga*. And it can

be *bahiraṅga* on the basis of the technical term ‘Pada’ or on the basis of the indirect cause *bhyām*. The former alternative is ruled out. Not only is a technical term not in any way a formal (*sabdarūpa*) cause; we have seen that Nāgeśa, twice over, rejected the acceptability of technical terms as causes. This leaves us with the second alternative: the elision of *n* is *bahiraṅga* on the basis of the *indirect* cause *bhyām*. We already know that, as soon as *bhyām* is accepted as cause of elision of *n*, BP₁ bars the taking effect of P. 6.1.71.

We cannot but admit, on the strength of the above exposition, that Nāgeśa in one place rejects an indirect cause in the context of Par. L, and in another makes use of it. The question remains which of the two opinions is to be regarded as a mistake on the part of Nāgeśa (whose presence in the text may be ascribed to an oversight, made in the heat of an argument), and which represents Nāgeśa’s considered opinion. Or do we perhaps have to assume that, in matters like these, Nāgeśa adjusted his opinion to the circumstances? Only the text of the *PS* can give us a clue.¹ One of the relevant passages is part of the introductory remarks to Par. LVI.

PS 123.1-2

nanv evam seduṣa ityādau kvasor antarangatvād iṭi tataḥ samprasāraṇe pīṭah² śravaṇāpattih . . .

“Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all but the particular cases mentioned in Par. LII–LV, the augment) *iṭ* ought in (the formation of) *seduṣah* etc. (from *sed-vas-as* etc. in accordance with that Paribhāṣā) to be prefixed to *vas* because it is *antaraṅga*, and that (having been prefixed to *vas*) *iṭ* would also subsequently, after the substitution of Samprasāraṇa (for *v*) remain audible.” (Cf. K. p. 307.)

At the stage *sed-vas-as*, two operations apply. P. 7.2.35 (or its restriction P. 7.2.67) prescribes addition of the augment *iṭ* to *vas*; it has no cause. P. 6.4.131 prescribes substitution of Samprasāraṇa *u* for *v* of *vas*. The former of these two rules is, on the authority of the present passage, *antaraṅga*. This is quite possible, as it has no cause. But it can be *antaraṅga* thus only on condition that the other rule of this pair – i.e. P. 6.4.131 – has some cause. So let us look more closely at the second rule.

P. 6.4.131 (*vasoh samprasāraṇam*) is thus explained in the *SK* (no. 435): *vasvantasya bhasya samprasāraṇam syāt*, “let there be Samprasāraṇa of

the semivowel of what ends in *vas* and is called ‘Bha’.” Clearly, no cause – i.e., a cause as required in the context of the BP – is indicated in this rule or its explanation. But to make sense of the above passage, some cause of P. 6.4.131 is needed.

A solution to this problem is, of course, easy to find. For one of the conditions of the application of P. 6.4.131 is the technical term ‘Bha’, which must belong to what ends in *vas*. But this technical term, in its turn, has been assigned to the form *sed-vas*, because *as* follows; this on the strength of P. 1.4.18. And the cause of P. 6.4.131 must be *as*, *even though it is only indirectly responsible for that rule taking effect*.

One more passage will be adduced to show that Nāgeśa’s assignment of *Bahirāṅgatva* on the basis of an indirect cause is not exceptional in the PS. Once again, the factor that stands between the operation and its cause is the technical term ‘Bha’. The passage occurs in the discussion of Par. LVI.

PS 132.5–133.1

... cau pratyāṅgasya prativedha iti vacanam vārītikakṛtārabdhām
bhāsyakṛtā ca na pratyākhyātam / pratyāṅgam antaraṅgam /

“... the author of the Vārtikas (on P. 6.3.138) has stated ‘that a *pratyāṅga*, i.e. *antaraṅga*, (operation) is forbidden (to take effect) before *cu* (i.e. *añcu*)’ and this statement has not been refuted by the author of the Bhāṣya.” (Cf. K. pp. 317–8.)

Here Nāgeśa cites with approval what he thinks to be a statement of the author of the Vārtikas (or of an author of Vārtikas).³ The import of this statement is explained by Kielhorn in a footnote (K. p. 318, fn. 1):

In the formation of *prati-caḥ* from *prati-ac-as* two rules are applicable, P. 6.1.77 which teaches the substitution of *y* for the *i* of *prati*, and P. 6.4.138 which teaches the elision of the *a* of *ac*; the former of these two rules is *antaraṅga*, and the latter *bahirāṅga*. Now we are taught by the Vārtika on P. 6.3.138 that the *antaraṅga* substitution of *y* for *i* shall not take place before *ac*; we accordingly form *prati-c-as*, and subsequently by P. 6.3.138 *prati-caḥ*.

What interests us at this moment in particular is *why*, in the formation of *prati-caḥ* from *prati-ac-as*, P. 6.1.77 is *antaraṅga* and P. 6.4.138 *bahirāṅga*. For this we have to look at the causes of both these rules. The cause of P. 6.1.77 is the *a* of *as*. Since this rule is here supposed to be *antaraṅga*, the

causes of the corresponding *bahiranga* rule must either encompass this *a* (in which case the latter rule will be *b₁*) or follow it (the rule will then be *b₂*).

But determining the cause of P. 6.4.138 is not so easy. The rule reads: *acah*, which the *SK* explains (no. 416): *luptanakārasyāñcater bhasyākārasya lopah syāt*, “let there be elision of the *a* of *āñc*, when this form bears the technical name ‘Bha’, and its *n* has been elided.” So there is no trace here of a locative case ending, which might indicate which is the cause of P. 6.4.138.

There is no point in detaining the reader, who by now – in cases where there is no locative case ending to do the job – has become sensitive to technical terms as possible indicators, albeit indirectly, of the cause of a rule. And indeed, it is not hard to see that in the case of P. 6.4.138 the technical term ‘Bha’ is a condition of its application. Needless to add, the cause (in the sense of the BP) of the application of the last mentioned *sūtra*, at the stage *prati-ac-as*, is *as*.

This suffices, I trust, to show that in the context of the BP indirect causes are a common feature of the *PS*.

Before leaving this topic, we shall study one more passage, which may throw some light on the question of how such indirect causes are to be justified, and perhaps also on the question of why Nāgeśa let the mutually contradictory passages discussed above exist side by side in his *PS*. This passage occurs in the *PS* on Par. LXXXV and requires some introduction.

Par. LXXXV states that “that which is taught in a rule the application of which is occasioned by the combination of two things, does not become the cause of the destruction of that combination” (K. p. 410). As a result of the existence of this Paribhāṣā, the part *kumbhakāre-* of *kumbhakārebhyah*, as well as the part *ādhe-* in the derivation of *ādhaye*, are not termed *avyaya*, as we might have expected on the basis of P. 1.1.39. The reason is that if these forms were indeed called *avyaya*, the case terminations following them (*bhyah* and *e*) would be elided by P. 2.4.82. Here then the combinations that were responsible for the final *e* of *kumbhakāre-* and *ādhe-* would be destroyed as the result of a consequence of that *e*. In the case of *kumbhakārebhyah*, the combination of an Āṅga ending in *a* and a plural case ending beginning with any one of the sounds contained in the Pratyāhāra *jhal* brings about the substitution of *e* for the final *a* of *kāra* in *kumbhakāra-bhyas*, by P. 7.3.103. By eliding *bhyah*, the combination would obviously be destroyed. In the case of *ādhaye*, from *ādhi-(n)e*, the combination of something called *ghi* (see P. 1.4.7) and a case ending which has *n* as Anubandha causes the substitution of *e* for *i*, by P. 7.3.111. This

combination also would meet with its end if (*n̄i*)e were to be elided. It is due to Par. LXXXV that the correct forms *kumbhakārebhyah* and *ādhaye* are obtained.

Here an objection could be raised. Granted that Par. LXXXV is needed to secure the correct forms *kumbhakārebhyah* and *ādhaye*, there is no need to refuse the name *avyaya* to *kumbhakāre* and *ādhe*. This term does no harm by itself. What *does* do harm, and what must therefore be prevented by this *Paribhāṣā*, is the elision of *bhyah* and (*n̄i*)e by P. 2.4.82. This particular result of being termed *avyaya* is prevented by our *Paribhāṣā*, because it destroys the combination on which the term *avyaya* ultimately depends. But other results of being termed *avyaya* are not necessarily to be prevented. One such result is the insertion of *ak(ac)* before e by P. 5.3.71. This clearly does not destroy the combination on which the term *avyaya* ultimately depends, so that there seems to be no reason to prevent it.

Nāgeśa does not accept the above argument and rejects it by further specifying the meaning of Par. LXXXV in such a way that in the above two instances the term *avyaya* cannot be used. The exact way he specifies the meaning of the *Paribhāṣā* does not concern us here. But we find something to our liking in the passage immediately following.

PS 169.2-5

na ca kāryakālapakṣe lugekavākyatāpannasamjñābādhe'py akajekavākyatāpannā syād iti vācyam / antaraṅgāyām tadekavākyatāpannasamjñāyām bahirāṅgaguṇāder asiddhatvāt / lugekavākyatāpannā tu na guṇādito'ntaraṅgobhayaḥ⁴ api śabdataḥ subāśrayatvāt / /

"Nor can one say that (when) on the Kāryakālapakṣa (the *Avyayasamjñā*- rule P. 1.1.39 has united itself both with the rule P. 2.4.82 which teaches the substitution of *luk* for *bhyah* etc., and with P. 5.3.71 which teaches the insertion of *akac*.) the term *avyaya*, so far as it would be united with (the rule P. 5.3.71 which teaches the insertion of) *akac*, might be (assigned to *kumbhakāre*, *ādhe* etc.), although it could (in consequence of this *Paribhāṣā*) not be (assigned to them) so far as it would be united with (the rule P. 2.4.82 which teaches the substitution of) *luk*; for the *Guna* (e) etc. (of *ādhē* etc.), being *bahirāṅga* in regard to the *antaraṅga* term(*avyaya*) united with *akac*, would be *asiddha* in regard (to the latter); on the other hand (the term *avyaya*) united with *luk* is not *antaraṅga* in regard to the *Guṇa* (e) etc. (of *ādhe* etc.) because both are dependent on the same

formal cause viz. the case-terminations (*e*, *bhyāḥ* etc.)" (K. pp. 419–420.)

In this passage an ingenious suggestion is made. Formerly we were concerned with two steps in the derivations of *kumbhakārebhyāḥ* and *ādhaye*. The first step consisted of assigning the term *avyaya* to the forms *kumbhakāre-* and *ādhe-*, and the second step was the taking effect of an operation which was the result of the new name given to those forms. These two steps combined would lead to undesired forms. The question was whether both the steps were to be prevented by Par. LXXXV, or only the second one. It is now proposed to telescope the two steps into one, by uniting the rules concerned into a single sentence. This way, so it is argued, the term *avyaya* as united with the objectionable operation (elision of case endings) will not be assigned to the forms concerned, but the same term, now united with the other operation (the insertion of *akac*), will be given to those forms.

What is remarkable about our passage is that the proposal to telescope rules is not rejected. Rather, the proposal seems to be accepted as legitimate, for arguments are adduced that in this way the term *avyaya* does not come to be assigned to the forms *kumbhakāre-* and *ādhe-* either. Let us study these arguments more closely. For the purposes of discussion we shall confine ourselves to the example *kumbhakārebhyāḥ*.

At the stage *kumbhakāra-bhyas*, *e* is substituted for the *a* of *kāra* by P. 7.3.103 (*bahuvacane jhaly et*). The following cause of this operation is *bhyas*. The above passage informs us that this operation is *bahirāṅga* and *asiddha* with respect to the *antarāṅga* term *avyaya* united with *akac*. Since the *bahirāṅga* operation here takes effect before there is scope for the *antarāṅga* assignment-cum-insertion, we are here dealing with BP₁. A result of this is that the following cause of the *antarāṅga* assignment-cum-insertion must either be included in *bhyas* or be nonexistent. Let us see how far this is borne out by the facts.

The form *kumbhakāre-* is termed *avyaya* by P. 1.1.39 (*kṛn mejantah*). This rule contains no word in the locative case, either directly or by *anuvṛtti*, so that no following cause is indicated by it. Insertion of *akac* is prescribed by P. 5.3.71 (*avyayasarvanāmnām akac prāk tēh*). Again there is no trace of a following cause. We conclude that the assignment-cum-insertion prescribed by the combination of these two rules has no following cause either. This result is in perfect agreement with our expectations.

No such perfect agreement is found when we turn to the last sentence of

the above passage. The term *avyaya* united with *luk*, so we are told, is not *antaranga* in regard to the substitution of *e* for the final *a* of *kumbhakāra-*. The reason is, so we further learn, that both are dependent on *bhyas*.

That the substitution of *e* for *a* has *bhyas* as following cause we know already. We also know that the assignment of the term *avyaya* to the form *kumbhakāre-* has no following cause. Therefore the question that remains is whether *bhyas* is the following cause of the *lu-* elision of *bhyas*.

We do not have to study the exact wording of the rule which prescribes this elision, i.e., of P. 2.4.82 (*avyayād āpsupah*), to see that the answer to this question must be in the negative. The affix *bhyas* cannot be the following cause of its own elision. We are forced to conclude that what is not the following cause of either of the rules separately is the following cause of those two rules when combined. Vaidyanātha Pāyagundā combines the two rules P. 1.1.39 and 2.4.82 into the following: *supi pare krd ya ejantas tadantam avyayasamjñāṇi tasmat tasya ca luk* (Gadā 182.16). I do not know if we have to follow Vaidyanātha to the extent of rewriting the two rules in such a way that their combination actually contains a word in the locative case (here *supi*). In effect, it makes no difference. The general principle that seems to have been applied here is that where two rules are united into one – one of these two rules assigning a name, the other prescribing an operation – all that figures in the two rules which lies beyond what is covered by the name concerned is to be considered to be following cause. This way the case ending *bhyas*, which is referred to in P. 2.4.82 by means of the word *sup*, becomes the following cause of the combined two rules P. 1.1.39 and 2.4.82, even though this word *sup* does not appear in the locative case.

If we have interpreted the above passage correctly, we may have come somewhat closer to a solution of the contradiction described in this appendix. It is conceivable that Nāgeśa looked upon the combination of two rules – one assigning a technical term to a certain form, the other prescribing an operation which depends upon this technical term – as permissible, but not compulsory. Where such a combination is not made, no following cause may be forthcoming, whereas such a following cause does present itself where the combination is made. If this is correct, it can quite generally be said that no indirect causes are allowed in the context of the BP. A following cause which makes its appearance as a result of combining two rules is not an indirect cause, precisely because the two rules concerned have been combined into one.

This explanation has the advantage of throwing some light upon the

riddle that surrounds the presence of a contradiction in the *PS*. It further saves the passage discussed last from the darkness of complete unintelligibility. Unfortunately, it provides us with no clue as to when two rules of the types mentioned are to be combined, and when not. Indeed, it seems to leave this decision to the whims of the grammarian. This arbitrariness deprives the explanation of most of its value.⁵ We cannot but conclude that the contradiction in the *PS* pointed out earlier remains largely unsolved.

III. ON THE RELATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF NĀGEŚA'S GRAMMATICAL WORKS

In his *Saṃskṛta Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra kā Itihāsa* (part I, p. 247) Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka mentions the following eight grammatical works written by Nāgeśa:

- | | |
|---|----------------|
| (1) <i>Laghuśabdenduśekhara</i> | (<i>LŚŚ</i>) |
| (2) <i>Brhacchabdenduśekhara</i> | (<i>BŚŚ</i>) |
| (3) <i>Paribhāṣenduśekhara</i> | (<i>PŚ</i>) |
| (4) <i>Laghumañjuṣā</i> | (<i>LM</i>) |
| (5) <i>Paramalaghumañjuṣā</i> | (<i>PLM</i>) |
| (6) <i>Sphoṭavāda</i> | (<i>SV</i>) |
| (7) <i>Mahābhāṣyapratyākhyānasamgraha</i> | (<i>MPS</i>) |
| (8) <i>Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyyota</i> | (<i>MPU</i>) |

To this list must be added, as was shown by Kapil Deva Shastri in the introduction to his edition of the *PLM*:

- (9) *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjuṣā* (*VSM*)

In Appendix V it will be argued that another work must be added:

- (10) *Laghuśabdaraṭna* (*LŚR*)

In this appendix an attempt will be made to establish as far as possible the relative chronology of these works.¹

Of the above-mentioned works² the *BŚŚ* and the *LŚŚ* together form a group of their own, as do the *VSM*, the *LM* and the *PLM*. The reason is that the *LŚŚ* is an abridgement of the *BŚŚ* and succeeds the latter. Similarly, the *LM* is an abridgement of the *VSM*, and the *PLM* in its turn is an abridgement of the *LM*. That the abridgements may at certain points deviate from their originals is not denied.

If we use an arrow to indicate that the book named before the arrow was composed earlier than the book named after the arrow, we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} B\acute{S}\acute{S} &\rightarrow L\acute{S}\acute{S} \\ VSM &\rightarrow LM \rightarrow PLM^3 \end{aligned}$$

Several of Nāgeśa's works refer to each other. Many references of this kind have been collected by P. K. Gode in an article called "The Relative Chronology of Some Works of Nāgojibhāṭṭa – Between c. A.D. 1670 and 1750." Let it here merely be restated that the *PŚ* refers by name to the *Śabdenduṣekhara*, to the *MPU* and to the *Mañjuṣā* (Gode, op. cit., p. 217); the *LŚŚ* mentions the *MPU* (*ibid.*); the *MPU* mentions the *Mañjuṣā* (*ibid.*); the *LM* mentions the *Śabdenduṣekhara* (*ibid.*),⁴ the *LŚŚ* refers to the *BŚŚ* (*ibid.*, p. 214).

Gode further claims that he has gone through a manuscript of the *VSM* kept at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. This manuscript mentions the *MPU*. Unfortunately, Gode was mistaken in thinking that he had read a manuscript of the *VSM*. The manuscript concerned (No. 33 of 1907–1915) contains not the *VSM*, but the *LM*, as I was able to ascertain at the above-mentioned institute. Probably Gode was led astray by the colophon, which calls the book *vaiyākaraṇasiddhāṁtamamjūṣākhyāḥ sphoṭavādāḥ*. As Kapil Deva Shastri pointed out in the introduction to his edition of the *PLM* (p. 19), this colophon has been given to the *LM*, perhaps by mistake. The difference between *VSM* and *LM* is indicated in the introductory stanzas. The introductory stanza of the manuscript consulted by Gode clearly uses the name *laghuh vaiyākaraṇasiddhāṁtamamjūṣā*. We may preserve Gode's remark in this form, that the *LM* refers to the *MPU*.

Mīmāṃsaka adds to our knowledge by pointing out that the *MPU* and the *BŚŚ* refer to each other. He proposes to conclude from this that the two works were written simultaneously (*Itihāsa*, part I, p. 426). Before discussing this proposal, I should like to draw attention to two passages of the *LŚŚ* which mention the *PŚ*. They are: *vastuta idam bahirangatvam bhāṣye kvāpi nāśritam iti paribhāṣavṛttau nirūpitam* (Vārāṇasī ed., II, p. 572); and *nājānantaryaparibhāṣā tu nāsty eveti na ayaje indram ityādau doṣa iti paribhāṣenduṣekhare vistarah* (Kumbakonam ed. I, p. 267). It may further be worthwhile to point out that the *BŚŚ* mentions the *Mañjuṣā* at several places, e.g., at *BŚŚ* 73.20 and 76.8.⁵ Sitaram Shastri has adduced arguments (in the introduction to the *BŚŚ*, p. 42) to show that in each of these places the *BŚŚ* refers to the *VSM*. He concludes that the *LM* and the *PLM* were composed after the *BŚŚ*.

But let us direct our attention to Mīmāṃsaka's proposal to look upon the *MPU* and the *BŚŚ* as written at the same time. It cannot be denied that the *BŚŚ* bristles with references to the *MPU*. They are found at *BŚŚ* 34.14, 53.1, 131.1, 154.1, 182.6, and 198.11, to name but a few. But a study of the positions taken with regard to the BP in Nāgeśa's grammatical works will

show (in Appendix IV) that the *BSS* must have been composed before the *MPU*. And in Appendix V we shall see that it is very difficult indeed to avoid the conclusion that the *LśR* was composed after the *BSS*, but before the *MPU*. How then can we make sense of the references to the *MPU* in the *BSS*?

I think a rather obvious answer can solve this problem. Nāgeśa was already working on his *MPU* when he wrote the *BSS*, but for some reason or other did not complete it till much later. Perhaps, indeed, a first draft of the *MPU* was already written when he studied the *Mahābhāṣya* with his teacher, "eighteen times over" (see *Mimāṃsaka, Itihāsa*, I, p. 426).

A few words must be said here concerning the manuscripts used by Sitaram Shastri for his edition of the *BSS*. As the editor points out in the introduction to that work (especially pp. 28–37), these manuscripts are six in number and show considerable differences among themselves. These differences are of a kind that can most satisfactorily be explained by assuming that the *BSS* went through a rather lengthy process of growth. Earlier passages were dropped, new ones were added, and so on. These changes were made, so Sitaram Shastri maintains, by Nāgeśa himself. The final version of the *BSS* is the one found in manuscript *ka.*, with the exception of certain passages which in manuscript *ka.* are encircled (*kundalita*) and at the same time are also found in manuscript *kha.*.

The question that is provoked by this description is: Is it perhaps not the case that all the references to the *MPU* belong to the latest stratum of the *BSS*, whereas the passages that show that the *BSS* preceded the *MPU* belong to earlier strata? If this is true, we do not have to assume that references were made in the *BSS* to an as yet nonexistent, or only partially completed, book.

The answer to this question must be negative: Almost all the passages from the *BSS* reproduced in Appendix IV in order to show that the *BSS* is earlier than the *MPU* belong to the latest stratum of that text. A glance at the notes will confirm this. The references to the *MPU*, on the other hand, have not all been introduced in the latest stratum of the *BSS*. This also appears from the footnotes, or absence of them, in the edition of the *BSS*.⁶

Appendix IV further gives us some reason to assume that the *MPU* preceded the *Pś* in time. This gives us the following chronological order for Nāgeśa's technical grammatical works:

BSS → *LśR* → *MPU* → *Pś* → *LśŚ*.

In Chapter 11 above I argued that the *SV* is an early work which belongs to the same time as the *VSM*.⁷ I also tried to show there that the *PLM*

belongs to the period when Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP had reached their final form, i.e., the time of the *PŚ* and the *LŚŚ*. It seems reasonable to assign the *LM* to the period in which these ideas were taking shape, i.e., the period in which the *LŚR* and the *MPU* were written.

This leaves us with the *MPS*. This work neither makes detailed statements about the BP, nor does it occupy itself with the expressiveness of words and sentences. Since it also does not refer to other works, nor – as far as I know – has it been mentioned in any of Nāgeśa's other works, it is hard to say anything definite about its date. However, we may derive a clue from the colophon, which reads: *iti śrīmatkālopākhyānāgojībhāṭaviracitah pratyākhyānasamgrahah sampūrnah*. Here the surname *kāla* is used. In most of his other works (*BŚŚ*, *SV*, *PŚ*, *LŚŚ*, *LM* in certain manuscripts) the surname *upādhyāya* employed. Only at the end of the first half (*pūrvārddha*) of the *BŚŚ* do we find the surname *kāla* again (*BŚŚ* 1574.14). Indeed, K. V. Abhyankar (*Prastāvanā Khanda*, p. 21) and Sitaram Shastri (introduction to *BŚŚ*, p. 51) tell us that *kāla* was Nāgeśa's surname, while *upādhyāya* became his surname later. If this is correct, the *MPS* must be considered a very early work.

The outcome of the above discussion can be summarized in the following, tentative, scheme. For ease of classification. Nāgeśa's life has been divided into three periods.

<i>Period</i>	<i>Philosophy of grammar</i>	<i>Technical grammar</i>
1st period	<i>VSM</i>	<i>BŚŚ</i>
	<i>SV</i>	<i>MPS</i>
2nd period	<i>LM</i>	<i>LŚR</i>
		<i>MPU</i>
3rd period	<i>PLM</i>	<i>PŚ</i>
		<i>LŚŚ</i>

IV. CHANGES IN NĀGEŚA'S OPINIONS REGARDING THE BP AND THE NP

In this appendix an attempt will be made to show that the ideas which Nāgeśa held regarding the BP while writing the *PŚ* were, in many respects, not identical with his ideas at the time he wrote his *BŚŚ*, and, in at least one respect, were different from those which he held while writing the *MPU*. On the other hand, no important changes can be found between the *PŚ* and the *LŚŚ* as far as the interpretation of the BP is concerned.

Comparing the four works mentioned above is not always as easy as it may seem to be at first sight. It is true that all of them give expression to Nāgeśa's opinions as they were when he wrote these books, but unfortunately they do not always do so in as clear a manner as one might wish. To begin with, three of the above works are commentaries: the *MPU* on Kaiyatā's *Pradīpa*, itself a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, and the *BŚŚ* and the *LŚŚ* on the *SK*. And as commentaries, they primarily explain the opinions of the authors of the works that are being commented upon, which do not in all cases coincide with the opinions of Nāgeśa. Fortunately, Nāgeśa is not too shy to confess where and in what respects he differs from those authors, but often he does so after explaining the "wrong" views in considerable detail. This means in practice that while reading an exposition we are not sure that it represents Nāgeśa's ideas until we have come to the end of it and have seen that it is not subsequently rejected.

The second difficulty connected with reading Nāgeśa's books consists in the fact that he often gives a number of opinions regarding a particular subject. His own opinion he usually keeps for the end. Here again we must be careful not to consider as Nāgeśa's an opinion that does not really belong to him.

Nāgeśa's own opinion is often introduced with the words *vastutas tu*, "but in reality", and *pare tu (āhuḥ)*, "but others (say)". That in Nāgeśa's writings *pare tu* is to be interpreted thus has been repeatedly observed. Thieme, for example, in his article "The Interpretation of the Learned", writes: "His [i.e., Nāgojibhaṭṭa's] final view, his *siddhānta*, he would introduce by *pare tu* 'others (who are correct)', which amounts, with him, to *bhāṣyatattvavidas tu*: 'those who know the true meaning of the *Bhāṣya*'"

(*Kleine Schriften* II, p. 599). Sitaram Shastri also puts forward this view on p. 14 of the introduction of his edition of the *BŚŚ*.

What no one seems to have observed is that Nāgeśa's writings contain at least one passage where the words *pare tu* have clearly not been used in the sense described above. This passage is *BŚŚ* 426.22–427.9. The skeleton of it reads as follows: *pare tu ... iti vadanti / tac cintyam / ... vastutas tu....*

The lesson to be learned from this last observation is that in order to arrive at Nāgeśa's opinion each statement has to be studied with great care in its context. It is left to the reader to decide if I have succeeded in presenting only Nāgeśa's own views in the passages that follow.

Just as great care must be taken even where Nāgeśa uses such words as *pare tu*, similarly (but now the other way round) we must be careful where Nāgeśa uses such words as *iti bhāvah*, "this is the meaning". Although as a rule Nāgeśa here merely explicates the meaning of the main text, without approving or rejecting that meaning, sometimes he may use this device in order to ascribe his own ideas to the main text. However, not to get onto slippery ground, I have in what follows not included such statements as are accompanied by words like *iti bhāvah*, *ity arthah*, and *ayam bhāvah*.

In this appendix the text of the *PS* as reconstituted in Appendix I is taken as point of departure as far as Par. L is concerned. Following the order of that text, passages from the *BŚŚ* are reproduced where these disagree with the *PS*. At the same time, passages from the *LŚŚ* are reproduced in order to show that their contents do not differ from what we find in the *PS*. Also, the position of the *MPU* is taken notice of wherever possible. The passages represent no more than a selection from what is available in the books concerned.

1. Early in the discussion of Par. L (App. I, ll. 8–10), we read in the *PS* that meanings cannot make an operation *bahiranga*. Because such is the case, so we further learn, P. 6.4.4 (*na tisṛcatasṛ*) serves a purpose. This rule forbids the lengthening of *r* before *nam* in the formation of *tisṛnām*. If meanings could make an operation *bahiranga*, the substitution of *tisṛ* for *tri* by P. 7.2.99 at an earlier stage of the derivation would have been superseded by the substitution of *traya* for that same *tri* in accordance with P. 7.1.53. For P. 7.2.99 has as a cause, in addition to the causes which it shares with P. 7.1.53, the circumstance that the resulting form must be expressive of the feminine gender. The situation is saved by the stipulation that meanings cannot make an operation *bahiranga*.

The *LŚŚ* agrees with the *PS*, saying: *tasyām [bahirangaparibhāṣayām]*

aṅgaśabdena śabdarūpasya saptamyādyantopattasya nimittasyaiva grahaṇam na tu samjñāyā arthasya vā . . . (on SK 2212; Vāraṇasī ed. II, p. 453). That the *BSS* is not of the same opinion as the *PS* follows from the following passage which justifies the presence of *tisr-* in P. 6.4.4 in a way which is diametrically opposed to what we saw to be the case in the *PS*. It reads: *na¹ tisrcataṣṭi sūtre tisrgrahaṇenaitatsūtravīṣaye bahirāṅga-paribhāṣānāśrayanāt / anyathāntaraṅgatvāt trayādeśe tadasaṅgatih spaṣṭaiva /* (*BSS* 542.12–14).

The *MPU* on P. 1.1.56 rejects the opinion that the substitution of *traya* would be *antaraṅga*, saying: *arthasamjñākṛtabahirāṅgatvasya śāstre nāśrayanāt* (*MPU* vol. I, p. 419). As in almost all the cases that follow, the *MPU* here takes the side of the *PS* and the *LSS*.

2. That a technical denomination (*saṃjñā*) cannot make an operation *bahirāṅga* either is very clearly stated in Appendix I, ll. 43–44. That the *LSS* agrees follows from the sentence quoted above. The *PS* further informs us that the derivations of *gaudhera* and *pacer* run smoothly, precisely because technical denominations do not make an operation *bahirāṅga* (App. I, ll. 12–14). If it had been otherwise, the substitution of *ey* for *dh* in *godhā-dhrak* by P. 7.1.2 would have been *bahirāṅga*, because it depends on the circumstance that *dhrak* is preceded by an *Anga*. Being *bahirāṅga*, it would be nonexistent with respect to the subsequently applying P. 6.1.66, which would effect the elision of *y* before *r*. On account of the nonexistence of *ey*, elision of *y* would not take place, and the desired form *gaudhera* would not be obtained.

The *BSS* follows a different stratagem to obtain the correct form, one which is directly opposed to what we found in the *PS*. We read:² *na ca lopo vyor ityetadvīṣaye bahirāṅgāsiddhatve gaudherah pacerannityādāv āṅgatvena bahirāṅgatayā eyādīnām asiddhatvena yalopāpattir iti ḥācyam/ tadadvīṣaye nirnītalakṣyatayānityatvena tadapravṛttau . . .* (*BSS* 135.19–21). This passage not only differs from the *PS* where the latter states that a technical denomination does not make an operation *bahirāṅga*, it also disagrees with another passage of the *PS*, viz. Appendix I, ll. 37–41. There the idea that the BP cannot be applied where P. 6.1.66 is used is rejected on the ground that in the *Mahābhāṣya* this Paribhāṣā has been made use of in the context of that rule. But the present passage from the *BSS* adheres exactly to that idea, at least as far as the derivations of *gaudhera* and *paceran* are concerned.

Something more must be said regarding this passage from the *BSS*.

There seems to be no reason to doubt that here in, say, the derivation of *gaudhera* from *godhā-dhra(k)*, the substitution of *ey* for *dh* by P. 7.1.2 is considered *bahirāṅga* because it depends on the technical denomination “Āṅga”. But in order to remove all traces of doubt, I shall reproduce another passage from that same commentary, in which dependence upon a technical denomination is given as the reason for considering an operation *bahirāṅga*. The passage comments on the vārttika *anvādesé napumṣake enad vaktavyaḥ*, which is to account for the forms *enat*, *ene*, *enāni*, etc. It reads:³ evam cāmy evāyam / auśasādiṣ enenaiva siddheḥ / na tatrāpi paratvāt tyadādyatve, tata enadādeśe, laksye lakṣaṇasyeti nyāyena pūnar atvāpravṛttau višeṣo'sty eveti vācyam⁴ / atvasyāṅgasanjñāsapekṣatvena bahirāṅgatvāt ntaraṅgatvād enadādeśasyaiva pūrvam pravṛtteḥ / (BŚŚ 678.11–14)

In the *MPU* we find that the point of view repeatedly defended is also the one which is adopted in the *PŚ* (and the *LŚŚ*). A few instances must suffice. On the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 8.2.2 we read: *bhāṣyakṛtā tu samjñānimitasya na bahirāṅgatvam* (*MPU* vol. V, p. 360), and again *idam cintyam, samjñākṛtabahirāṅgatvasyānāśrayaṇāt* (*ibid.*). And on P. 1.1.72: *tasmāt samjñāpekṣam na bahirāṅgam* (*MPU* vol. I, p. 543).

3. Let us return to the *PŚ*. Related to our previous topic of discussion is the contention that *bahirāṅga* can never mean “depending on many”, nor can *antaraṅga* mean “depending on few”. This we learn from Appendix I, ll. 26–28, where it is further stated that if such were the case, the BP would read *asiddham bahvapekṣam alpāpekṣē*, instead of *asiddham bahirāṅgam antaraṅge*, as it actually does.

Again the *BŚŚ* is of a different opinion, as is shown in the following remark: *bahirbhūtasupnimittakapadasamjñāpekṣatvena bahvapekṣatayāsyāpi bahirāṅgatvāt* (*BŚŚ* 666.1–2). I have not been able to find corresponding passages in the *MPU* and the *LŚŚ*.

4. Appendix I, l. 56 tells us that the BP does not apply in the *Tripādī*. This is not only true on the *Yathoddeśapakṣa*. A special section (ll. 71–87) is inserted to show that in that part of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the BP cannot be used on the *Kāryakālapakṣa* either.

In the *BŚŚ* the BP *does* apply in the *Tripādī*, provided that the *Kāryakālapakṣa* is adopted. This is shown by the following two quotations: ⁵cakry atreti / iha skor iti lopo yaṇāḥ kāryakālapakṣe bahirāṅgasiḍḍhatvān na / (*BŚŚ* 216.3–4). And again: ⁶kāryakālapakṣe

bahirāṅgapaṛibhāṣopasthitisāmarthyena pūrvatrāśiddhatvasya bādhāt / ata eva nārkuṭa ityādau na visargāḥ / (*BŚŚ* 191.10–11). There is no need to remind the reader that in the *PŚ* Nāgeśa referred with approval to a passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* according to which, so Nāgeśa tells us, a special statement is required in order to obtain correct forms like *nārkuṭa*, precisely because the BP cannot in any way be used (App. I ll. 78–82). It is therefore all the more interesting here to quote what immediately follows the second of the two passages from the *BŚŚ* cited above. What we read here is closely similar to Appendix I, ll. 71–78, but reaches the opposite conclusion: *na caivam api kim kāryakālapakṣam āśritya pūrvatrāśiddham ity asya bādhāḥ kāryāḥ, uta yathoddeśam āśrityāntaraṅgaparibhāṣāyā bādhā ity atra vinigamakābhāvād anayā pūrvatrāśiddham ity asya pravṛtti-bandhena, tena ca parasyāśiddhatve, tannirūpitabahirāṅgaṭavabhāvenāsyāḥ pratibandhena, parasparavirodhe,⁷ dvayor apy apravṛttiāpattau⁸ visargo durvāraḥ / spaṣṭam cedam kharavasānayor iti sūtre bhāṣye iti vācyam / lakṣyānurodhenātra kāryakālapakṣasyaiva, bahirāṅgapaṛibhāṣāyā eva cāṅgikārāt /* (*BŚŚ* 191.12–18). Nāgeśa probably had the last sentence of this passage still in his memory when he wrote in his *PŚ*: *ye'pi lakṣyānurodhdād ānumānikyāpy antaraṅgaparibhāṣāyā pratyakṣasiddhasya pūrvatrety asya bādhām vadanti te'pi lakṣanaikacakṣurbhir nādartavyā ...* (App. I. ll. 85–87).

The *LŚŚ*, of course, supports the *PŚ*, saying: *bahirāṅgapaṛibhāṣā tu traipādike'ntarāṅge nety asakrd āveditam* (Vārāṇasi ed. II, p. 587). As this passage indicates, statements to the same effect occur repeatedly in the *LŚŚ*.

The *MPU* sides with the *PŚ* and the *LŚŚ* against the *BŚŚ*, most clearly on the *Bhāṣya* on P. 8.3.15: *evam ca kāryakāle yathoddeśe ca tripādāyām bahirāṅgāśiddhatvāpravṛttir iti bhāṣyāl labhyate / vastutah pratyakṣatvena balavatā pūrvatrāśiddham ity anerānumānikyā asiddhaparibhāṣāyā bādhā evocitah /* (*MPU* vol. V, p. 439). Again we seem forced to conclude that the *MPU* was written after the *BŚŚ*.

5. The next passage of the *PŚ* to be considered is Appendix I, ll. 88–99. Here the question of whether that which depends on something general is *antarāṅga* and that which depends on something special *bahirāṅga* is dealt with and answered in the negative. The passage has been studied in much detail in Chapter 8 above, and its contents do not need to be recounted here further. The first passage to be reproduced here brings the rejected position back to mind. It is needless to add that this position is here, in the *BŚŚ*, presented as the correct one. The passage comments on the following line

of the *SK* (on no. 2476): *prakṛtipratyayaviśeṣapekṣābhyaṁ adīdbhyāṁ antaraṅgatvād yasut, rudyāt.* It reads: *prakṛti ti / pratyayaviśeṣapekṣa-*
yasudapeksayāntaraṅgatvāt itaś ceti lope, yasudiḥōḥ prāptaylor antaraṅgat-
vād yasud ity arthah / idrśam antaraṅgatvam ca matupvidhāyake bhāṣye
uktam / ⁹sāmānyadharmapekṣaśāstrāpeksayā kaś cid višeṣadharma'dhiko
nimittakoṭau yasmin višeṣapeksaśāstre'sti, tat tato bahiraṅgam iti tadarthah /
yathātra rudāditvam, sārvadhātukatvam ceti bodhyam / sārvadhātukat-
vajñānāya prakṛter dhātutvajñānam, pratyayasya tattvajñānam
cāvaśyakam iti sāmānyadharmanimittakatvam atrāpy asti ti bodhyam /
(BŚŚ 1759.12–19).

This time, it is extremely simple to find out that the *LŚŚ* represents a point of view different from that which we find in this last passage. The reason is that the *LŚŚ*, where it comments on this same rule (*SK* 2476), repeats this passage virtually unchanged, but then continues: *vastuta idam bahiraṅgatvam bhāṣye kvāpi nāśritam iti paribhāṣavṛttau nirūpitam* (*Vārāṇasi* ed. II, p. 572).

The most important difference between the passage in the *BŚŚ* (which is there accepted) and the one in the *LŚŚ* (where it is rejected, as we have seen) is that the *LŚŚ* leaves out the sentence according to which this kind of *Antaraṅgatva* is found in the *Bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* which teaches *matup*. Apparently Nāgeśa's views regarding the correct interpretation of that section of the *Mahābhāṣya* had undergone a change during the time that had elapsed between the *BŚŚ* and the *LŚŚ*. That this was indeed the case is also clear from the *PS*, which dedicates a long and difficult passage to the correct interpretation of that section of the *Mahābhāṣya* (App. I ll. 99–124). The conclusion here reached is that where the *Mahābhāṣya* seems to assign *Antaraṅgatva* to an operation on the basis of the fact that it depends on something general, it is not the *siddhāntin* who is speaking, but the *siddhāntyekadeśin*. That same passage of the *Bhāṣya* had been considered to represent the opinion of the *siddhāntin* at the time that Nāgeśa wrote his *BŚŚ*. Let us see how the passage is interpreted in the *MPU*.

That commentary does not leave us in suspense for long. We read: *siddhāntyekadeśy āha antaraṅgatvād ityādi astigrahanām kriyata ityantam* (*MPU* vol. IV, p. 155). And the following passage is almost identical with Appendix I, ll. 114–120, and indeed deals with the same subject: *naiṣā siddhāntyuktih, tāvatāpy apavādatvāhāneḥ / acsāmānyāpeksayāno viśiṣṭ-asavarṇājapeksadīrgheṇa bādhadarśanāt / yat tu sāmānyāpeksaṁ višeṣapekṣād antaraṅgam iti etadbhāṣyena sūcītam iti, tan*

na / adhikāpekṣatvena bahiranigatva evaitadbhāṣyatātparyāt / ata eva subantasāmānyāpekṣo bahuvrīhis tadvišeṣāpekṣo dviguḥ iti bhāṣye noktam / (ibid.). The close similarity between the *MPU* and the *PŚ* and its difference from the *BSS* do not surprise us any longer.

6. We now come to the portion of the *PŚ* which introduces *BP₂*, i.e., Appendix I, ll. 129 et seq. As we remember, the derivation of *vāyvoḥ* illustrated one of the peculiarities of *BP₂*. In *vāyu*-os the substitution of *v* for *u* has as following cause *o*; in *vāyvos* P. 6.1.66 would cause elision of *y*, the cause of which would be *y*. Clearly, *v* lies before *o*, and elision of *y* is therefore *antarāṅga* with respect to the substitution of *v* for *u*. But *BP₂* does not make a *bahirāṅga* rule *asiddha* with respect to a subsequently applying *antarāṅga* rule. Therefore, in order to prevent the elision of *y* in *vāyvos*, the *Bhāṣya* has resorted to the *sthāṇivat* principle.

All this we know. But the *BSS* has different ideas. There we read:¹⁰ *ata eva vāyvor ityāder bahiranāgaparibhāṣayā siddhir ākare uktā* (*BSS* 135.22–136.1).

As usual, the *MPU* takes the side of the *PŚ*. The following passage not only takes the same stand as the *PŚ* with respect to the derivation of *vāyvoḥ*, it further contains much that is also found in Appendix I, ll. 138–146: *tatra padasyaiva vibhajyānvākhyāne sarveṣāṁ yugapatprāptiāv anayā¹¹ vyavasthā / krameñānvākhyāne tu pūrvapravṛttikatvarūpam antaranāgatvam pūrvayanādēśasya* [i.e., in *paṭvya*, *mṛdvyā*] *bodhyam / asiddhatvam parayañādēśasya nimittābhāvād aprāptatvarūpam bodhyam / ata eva vāyvor ity atra nāsiddhatvam / evaṁvidhāntaranāgatvasya dr̥ṣṭāntādibalena yugapatprāptivिशयत्वं /* (*MPU* vol. I, p. 434).

7. The next point that deserves our attention here is the question of whether a verbal root is first joined with the suffix or with the preposition. The *PŚ* states that the first of the two alternatives is correct, the second false. It says so at Appendix I, ll. 148–149 and takes the matter up again at ll. 154–179. In this latter passage we further read that the verbal root alone conveys the meaning that is indicated (*dyotya*) by the preposition. The result is that operations which depend on the *meaning* of the preposition take place even before the root is joined with the suffix. An example is the derivation of *samcaskāra*. At the stage *sam-kṛ-ti*, first *s(u)* is added by P. 6.1.135, because it depends on the meaning indicated by the preposition (viz. *bhuṣana*; see P. 6.1.137), and after that, reduplication takes place by

P. 6.1.8, because it depends on the suffix. Last of all, the preposition is actually joined to the verbal form. This way of looking at derivations also allows us to explain forms like *pratyeti* and *pratyaya*. If here the verbal root (*i*) had been joined to the preposition (*prati*) first, the outcome of the derivations would have been different.

I shall first reproduce the comments of the *BŚŚ* and the *LŚŚ* on the following line from the *SK* (on no. 2399): *pūrvam̄ dhātūr upasargeṇa yujyate tataḥ sādhanena iti bhāṣyam / pūrvam̄ sādhanena iti matāntare tu ...* The *BŚŚ* (1736.4–5) comments: *pūrvam̄ sādhaneneti / tunārucir bodhitā /*. In other words, according to the *BŚŚ*, the root is joined to the preposition first. The *LŚŚ* comments on this same line as follows: *matāntare tv iti / idam eva sāram iti vakṣyate /* (Vāraṇasī ed. II, p. 547). That is to say, according to the *LŚŚ* the root is joined to the suffix first.

The comments in the *BŚŚ* and the *LŚŚ* evoked by some remarks of the *SK* on P. 6.1.135 (no. 2553) are also worth quoting. The *SK* reads: *tathā hi pūrvam̄ dhātūr upasargeṇa yujyate*. The *BŚŚ* (1794.1–5) comments: *pūrvam̄ dhātūr iti / ata eva anubhūyate ity atra karmani lakārah / pūrvam̄ dhātūh sādhaneneti tarkaviruddham iti bhāvah / pratyaya ityādinirdeśena upasargakāryāt pūrvam̄ api kvacit sādhanakāryapravṛttir jñāpyate iti pratyetītyādau na dosah / anyathā dīrghe, tataḥ kṛtaikādeśasya gune, rūpāsiddhiḥ spaṣṭaiveti dik /*. So the *BŚŚ* has its own way of accounting for *pratyaya* and *pratyeti*. The *LŚŚ* is not in need of such a special device, since it sides, as ever, with the *PŚ*. In the present context (where the derivation of *sāṃcaskaratuḥ* is under discussion) it says, *pūrvam̄ dhātūh iti / upasargenety asya tadarthenety arthaḥ / ata eva anubhūyate iti karmani lakārah / evañ cāntaraṅgārthakopasorganimittakatvād dvitvādyapekṣyā sud antaraṅga ityāśayah /* (Vāraṇasī ed. II, pp. 594–595).

To show that the *MPU* agrees with the *PŚ* and the *LŚŚ*, first a portion of the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 6.1.135 will be given. It reads: *Pūrvam̄ dhātūh sādhanena yujyate paścad upasargeṇa / sādhanam̄ hi kriyām̄ nirvartayati tām upasargo viśinasty abhinirvṛttasya cārthasyopasargeṇa višeṣah śakyo vaktum / satyam evam etat / yas tv asau dhātūpasargayor abhisambandhas tam abhyantaram kṛtvā dhātūh sādhanena yujyate /* (Mbh. vol. III, p. 93, ll. 22–26). Excerpts from the *MPU* on this passage: *pūrvam̄ dhātūh sādhanena ity asya yuktatvam̄ darśayati sādhanam̄ hīti / / ... satyam evam etat / yas tv asāv iti / upasargasamjñakaśabdayogāt pūrvam̄ sādhanayoga iti satyam eva / paran tu tvadabhimatām dhātūpasargasambandhakṛtam artham abhyantaram kṛtvā svabodhyam̄ kṛtvā dhātōh pūrvam̄ niyamenākāṅkṣitārthatvāt sādhanasambandhah / tatkārya-*

pratyayayoge krte kriyātvāvagatāv upasargasamjñakaśabdayogah / (MPU. vol. IV, pp. 477–478).

8. The *PŚ* now proceeds to refute the view that an operation can be *antaraṅga* on account of the fact that it affects an earlier part of the word than what is affected by the corresponding *bahirāṅga* operation (App. I ll. 180–186).

I have not been able to find a passage from the *BŚŚ* which clearly shows its position in this respect, but the following seems to indicate that it disagrees with the *PŚ*:¹² *parasthānikam iva paranimittakam api bahirāṅgam ity āśayena tatsattvād iti yāvadbādhām sādhu* (*BŚŚ* 197.3–4).

The *MPU* shows its preference for the position taken in the *PŚ* in the following words: *yat tv anayā rītyā pūrvasthānikam apy antaraṅgam iti / tad ayuktam / antaraṅgaśabdārthābhāvāt / aṅgaśabdasya tatra nimittaparavat* / (*MPU* vol. I, p. 434).

9. Appendix I, ll. 187 f. rejects the opinion that the BP does not cause a *bahirāṅga* operation which is taught in the third Pāda of the sixth Adhyāya of Pāṇini's grammar, where the word *uttarapade* is understood, to be regarded as *asiddha*. The *BŚŚ* repeatedly shows its allegiance to the rejected opinion, e.g., in the following statement: ¹³ *iyam cottarapadādhikāre na pravartate iti ica ekāca iti sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam* (*BŚŚ* 130.12–3). The *LŚŚ* parrots the *PŚ* thus: *uttarapadādhikāre eṣā paribhāṣā nety uktis tu bhāṣye uktapratyuktikrameṇa pūrvapakṣina iti spaṣṭam tadvidām / parantapahity asya tripādyām bahirāṅgaparibhāṣāyā apravr̥tyā susādhatvena phalābhāvena cottarapadādhikāre tatpravṛttih sattvāt* / (*Vāraṇasi* ed. II, p. 780).

To get the opinion of the *MPU*, we turn to the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* referred to by the *BŚŚ*. It is the last part of the Bhāṣya on P. 6.3.68, and it reads: *naiṣā paribhāṣā* [i.e., the BP] *iḥottarapadādhikāre śakyā vijñātum / iha hi doṣāḥ syāt / dviṣamṛtapaḥ paramṛtapaḥ / samyogaṅtalopo na syāt / tasmācśrimanyam iti bhavitavyam //* (*Mbh.* vol. III, p. 167, ll. 12–14). This passage cannot fail to make the impression that the Bhāṣya supports, or even proclaims, the view rejected in the *PŚ* and accepted in the *BŚŚ*. And indeed, initially the *MPU* says that this Bhāṣya passage represents the correct view. But then Nāgeśa revises his opinion in a passage that is flanked by the words *pare tu ... āhuh*, words which commonly indicate, as we know, that here Nāgeśa's considered opinion is being given. The portion of this passage that is

relevant for us is: *pūrvapakṣy āha naiśā iti ity eva bhavitavyam ityantam / kāryakālapakṣe'pi traipādike 'ntarāṅge bahiraṅgaparibhāśāpravṛtter visarjanīyasūtre bhāṣye vārtikakhandakasiddhāntinoktavāt yat-hoddeśapakṣeṇa sādhayitum śakyatvāc cedam prayojanam śithilam ...* (*MPU* vol. IV, p. 640).

10. One line of the *PŚ* on Par. L remains to be compared with Nāgeśa's other grammatical works. It is Appendix I, ll. 192 f., which reads: *ābhīye'ntaraṅga ābhīyasya bahiraṅgasya samānāśrayasya nānenāsiddhatvam asiddhatvād ity asiddhavatsūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam //*

This line was studied in great detail in Chapter 4 above, and a satisfactory interpretation of it was reached. It recurs in a virtually identical form in the *BŚŚ*: ¹⁴*ābhīye'ntaraṅge ābhīyasya bahiraṅgasya samānāśrayasya nānenāsiddhatvam ity asiddhavatsūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭam* (*BŚŚ* 130.13–14).

However, it is not our task here to find where Nāgeśa's earlier and later works agree. More interesting is that in our study of the above passage we came across a sentence in the *MPU* which did not agree with what we found to be Nāgeśa's position in the *PŚ* (above, p. 44). For details the reader may refer back to Chapter 4. Here it may be remarked that this is the first point of disagreement between *MPU* and *PŚ* that we have come across.

11. There remains something to say about the NP. As a matter of fact, most of it has been said already in Chapter 13 above. Let us recapitulate the most important points: The *PŚ* rejects the NP. The *BŚŚ*, on the other hand, accepts the existence of this Paribhāśā, and considers the word *satva* in P. 6.1.86 Jñāpaka of it, rejecting the word *tuk* in that same rule as Jñāpaka. The passage in which all this can be read is *BŚŚ* 192.3–18: *nanu nājānantarye iti niṣedhah / atra ca ṣatvatukor iti sūtras-thaṣatvagrahaṇam jñāpakam / anyathā ko'sicad ityādau padāntarasāpeksabahiraṅgaikādeśasyāsiddhatvena ṣatvāpravṛttau kin tena /* ¹⁵*tri-pādīsthe'pi ṣatve kāryakālapakṣāśrayeṇāsyyāsiddhatvam iti cen na / paścāt pravartamāne vidhāv ajānantarye tatpravṛtteḥ / ata eva pacāvedam ityādisiddhiḥ / na ca ṣatvavidhāv ingrahaṇam, tac ca pareṇaiveti na tatrājānantaryam / tanmadhyecām apy antarbhāvasattvenādoṣāt / ata eva acor ānantaryam iti vadantaḥ parāstiḥ / dharmigrāhakamānād eva cāsyāḥ svabodhakottaravibhaktibhodhitājniṣhānāntaryā eva pravṛttiḥ / ... etena tuggrahaṇam api jñāpakam iti parāstam / pretyetyādau* ¹⁶*dhātūpasargakāryatvenaikādeśasyāntaraṅgat-*

vāc ca / kim ca) samāsottaram lyappravṛtyā pūrvam pūrvapadasambandhena samāse jāte, tatra samhitāyā nityatvāt, lyabutpatti paryantam apy asamhitayā vasthānāsambhavena pūrvam ekādeśe,¹⁷ bahirbhūtalyabapekṣatugapekṣaya dhaūpasargakāryatvena tasyāntaraṅgatvena bahirangāsiddhatvasya durupapādatvāc ca /

The beginning of this passage may cause confusion, since it could erroneously be thought that there the Jñāpaka *satva* of the NP is rejected. In reality it is the applicability of this Paribhāṣā in the example under consideration (i.e., *sukhārtta*) that is rejected. The Paribhāṣā itself, as well as its Jñāpaka *satva*, is very much accepted, as becomes clear from the remainder of the passage.

That the *LŚŚ* rejects the NP we have also seen in Chapter 13 (p. 120, above). So the only question that remains here is what position the *MPU* takes with regard to this Paribhāṣā. And in answer it must be said that the *MPU* again fully backs the *LŚŚ* and the *PŚ*. Witness the following comment on Kaiyatā: *yady api nājānantaryeti / vastuta iyam siddhāntyasammatey asakrd āveditam* / (*MPU* vol. IV, p. 698).

V. THE *LAGHUŚABDARATNA*

The *Laghuśabdaratna* (*LŚR*) is a commentary on the *Praudhamanoramā* (*PrM*) of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, which is itself a commentary on Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhāntakaumudi* (*SK*). If the colophons are to be believed, the *LŚR* was written by Hari Dīkṣita, the author of the *Brhacchabdaratna* (*BŚR*) and grandson of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. However, a tradition exists that the real author of the *LŚR* was Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, who honoured his teacher Hari Dīkṣita by writing this book in the latter's name. This last opinion has been defended in particular by the two editors of the *BŚR*, i.e., by Sitaram Shastri in the introduction to his partial edition of the *BŚR* (pp. 23–39) and by Venkatesh Laxman Joshi in three appendices to his partial edition of the same text (pp. 276–328). Their arguments seem to me strong enough to warrant acceptance of Nāgeśa's authorship of the *LŚR*, at least tentatively. Let me repeat their main points.

Sitaram Shastri begins by showing that the *LŚR* cannot have been written by Hari Dīkṣita. He gives three reasons:

(1) In many places the explanations of the *LŚR* contradict the explanations of the *BŚR*.

(2) Sometimes the *LŚR* disagrees with the *PrM*; the *BŚR*, on the other hand, does not show such rebellious features.

(3) The *LŚR* at times explains the sentences of the *PrM* in such a clever way that they come to mean something different from what they were intended to mean; the *BŚR* uses no such devices.

Each of these three points is extensively illustrated by the author. The same can be said of the last two of his next three points, which aim more directly at establishing Nāgeśa's authorship of the *LŚR*:

(1) The style of the *LŚR* is the same as that of the *BŚŚ*, *LŚŚ*, the *Mañjuṣā*, and the *PŚ*, as well as other works written by Nāgeśa.

(2) Certain passages of the *LŚR* recur in virtually identical form in other books of Nāgeśa. Examples from the *BŚŚ* are given.

(3) Opinions accepted by Nāgeśa in his *BŚŚ* and other works are implicitly or explicitly stated in the *LŚR*, even where they are opposed to the opinions of Hari Dīkṣita.

Finally, Sitaram Shastri shows that Nāgeśa, consciously or

unconsciously, left some features in the *LŚR* which betray that he himself, not Hari Dīkṣita, had written this book:

(1) Never does the *LŚR* refer to Bhattoji Dīkṣita as “grandfather” or to Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa as “uncle”, as the *BŚR* does.

(2) Two manuscripts advise the reader to consult “the *Śabdenduśekhara* etc. of my student”.

(3) One manuscript at one place calls the *LŚR* a “commentary on the *Manoramā* written by Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa”.

Venkatesh Laxman Joshi does in his third appendix what Sitaram Shastri also had done: he shows that the *LŚR* at certain places rejects what had been said in the *BŚR*. In his first appendix Joshi shows that Vaidyanātha Pāyagūṇḍa in his commentary *Bhāvaprakāśa* on the *LŚR* repeatedly refers to someone by the name *mānya*. This person can be identified as Hari Dīkṣita, the author of the *BŚR*.¹ Joshi shows that virtually all opinions ascribed to this *mānya* can be found in the *BŚR*, and further that these opinions as a rule deviate from the ones represented in the *LŚR*. Although Joshi does not explicitly say so, one might conclude from this that in Vaidyanātha’s opinion the author of the *BŚR* and the author of the *LŚR* are different persons.

In his second appendix Joshi shows that, where the *LŚR* uses some such words as *ity anyatra vistarah*, *ity anyatra prapañcitam* etc., Pāyagūṇḍa specifies the work referred to as one of Nāgeśa’s books. This behaviour of Pāyagūṇḍa as well as certain other remarks made by him, are looked upon by Joshi as strong evidence that Nāgeśa is the author of the *LŚR*.²

As I said earlier, I think that the arguments brought forward by Sitaram Shastri and Venkatesh Laxman Joshi are strong, strong enough to warrant our accepting Nāgeśa’s authorship of the *LŚR* at least as a working hypothesis. It is therefore worthwhile seeing what position the *LŚR* takes with regard to the BP.

Unfortunately, the *LŚR* is somewhat parsimonious in the information it gives regarding its standpoint in this respect. In spite of that, I shall here reproduce what I have been able to find in the *LŚR* up to and including the *yāṇīnta* section of the *SK*. For ease of comparison I shall give comparable subsections the same numbers as have been employed in Appendix IV.

1. Regarding the question of whether meanings can make an operation *bahirariga*, the *LŚR* sides with the *BŚS* against the *MPU*, the *PŚ* and the *LSS*. The *SK* on P. 5.4.31 (no. 2099) reads: *lohitā lingabādhanam vā / lohitikā, lohinikā kopena /*. Here the *LŚR* remarks (Chaukhamba

ed. II, p. 280): *antaraṅgatvād bādhakatvam ity api bodhyam / strītvā-nirapekṣatvenāśyāntaraṅgatvam /*

2. Regarding the role that technical denominations can play in making an operation *bahirāṅga*, the *LŚR* seems to be in a stage of transition. This may explain the fact that the *LŚR* contains two passages, one accepting a technical denomination as a cause for calling an operation *bahirāṅga*, the other rejecting this. The first passage states: *na ca tadā lāvasthāyām ad iti pakṣe akārśid ityādau dosāḥ / clisicor api syatasival lāvasthāyām eva pravr̥tyāṅgasamjñānirapekṣatvenāntaraṅgatvād vikaranottaram evādādi-pravṛtteḥ / spaśām cedam ekāco dve ity atra bhāṣye /* (Chaukhambha ed. II, p. 345–6). We find the opposite point of view here: *pare tu samjñākṛtabahirāṅgatvāśrayaṇena nityatvād asuṇi rūpāsi-ddhiḥ / . . . ity āhuh /* (BHU ed., p. 419).
4. It is repeatedly stated in the *LŚR* that the BP does not apply in the *Tripādī* even on the *kāryakālapakṣa*. Two instances: *visarjanī yasūtrabhāṣyāt tu kāryakālapakṣe'pi tripādyām tadaapravrttir iti labhyate / mūlan tu kaiyaṭānusāreṇeti pare /* (BHU ed., p. 138); and again, *kāryakālapakṣe'pi tripādyām bhāṣyamate bahirāṅgaparibhāṣyā apravṛtteḥ* (Chaukhambha ed. II, p. 156). Here the *LŚR* has adopted Nāgeśa's later point of view.
5. An equally modern approach is displayed by the *LŚR* where the question of whether or not something special can make an operation *bahirāṅga* is at stake. The *LŚR* thinks that it cannot. See the following: *na ca pratyayavīśeṣāpekṣasatvāpēkṣayāntaraṅgatvād atve rūpasiddhyedam vyartham / tādrśāntaraṅgasya sāstre 'nāśrayaṇajñāpanārīhatvāt / ata eva bhāṣye idṛśam antaraṅgatvam na kvāpy āśritam /* (BHU ed., p. 504).
7. Roots are first joined with suffixes, then with prepositions. This point of view of Nāgeśa's later works is already accepted in the *LŚR*: *pūrvam dhātuḥ sādhaneneti pakṣasya mukhyatvād iti bodhyam* (Chaukhambha ed. II, p. 359).
11. We know already (see above, pp. 122 ff.) that regarding the NP the *LŚR* has a different opinion from both the *BŚŚ* and *PŚ*. It accepts the Paribhāṣā but not *śatva* in P. 6.1.86 as its Jñāpaka. On the contrary, the Jñāpaka is here *tuk* in that same sūtra. The discussion of Par. LI in the *PŚ* suggests that the *LŚR* represents a later phase in the development of

Nāgeśa's ideas regarding the BP than the *BŚŚ*.

It is clear from the above that the *LŚR* fits beautifully between the *BŚŚ*, on the one hand, and the *MPU* and what follows it, on the other.³ It is therefore no more than natural to accept that the *LŚR* was written after the *BŚŚ* and before the *MPU*. The circumstance that the *LŚR* fits here so well is also additional evidence that it was written by Nāgeśa.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ This answers the objection that could be raised against my interpretation and that would run as follows: "Your interpretation forces you to consider the received text of the *PS* not to be original in two places. The other interpretations did not lead to such complications and were therefore closer to the text. This shows that your interpretation is unacceptable." In reality it is not so much my interpretation, but rather the methodological principle to be described below, which forces me to consider the present text of the *PS* not to be original in two places. The same difficulties exist in the other interpretations. That they have been passed over in silence there does not plead for, but rather against, those interpretations.

² Thieme is the only author I know of who has explicitly stated this principle. Some limitations on an unrestrained use of it will be mentioned below.

³ This is how P. K. Gode described the *VSM* and the *MPU* (*Studies in Indian Literary History*, Vol. III, p. 218).

⁴ Much of what follows is inspired by the philosophy of Karl R. Popper. Perhaps it is more correct to say that it is an application of that philosophy to a new field. For although Popper writes mainly about the methodology of science, he nevertheless thinks that the "method of learning by trial and error – of learning from our mistakes – seems to be fundamentally the same whether it is practised by lower or by higher animals, by chimpanzees or by men of science. My interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the theory of knowledge in general" (*Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 216). Knowledge in general includes, no doubt, knowledge regarding the meaning of a text.

⁵ Both these restrictions have been transgressed, in differing degrees, in the following pages. See note 3 to Chapter 10, and note 5 to Appendix II.

⁶ A possible exception is mentioned at p. 20 below.

CHAPTER 1

¹ Strictly speaking, Nāgeśa does not say "in a rule". The presence of this phrase in the translation does no harm as long as it does not exclude what is to be read in a rule either by *anuvṛtti* or through the working of a *Paribhāṣā*.

² The question could legitimately be raised whether the *v.l. paceraṇ* is the original reading,

and not *pacet*. A number of reasons could be adduced to support this supposition. First of all, the two words *gaudherah* and *paceran* (not *pacet*) occur together in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Śivasūtra 5 (Kielhorn's edition, vol. I, p. 28, l. 8), and at BSS 135.19–20. The co-occurrence of the word *gaudherah* here in the *PS* therefore favours the reading *paceran*. Secondly, the fact that Vaidyanātha in his *Gadā* (86.20–21) rejects *paceran* on grammatical grounds suggests that he may have altered the text. A third ground is that Bhairava Miśra, the second commentator in chronological order, upholds the reading *paceran* and counters the arguments used by Vaidyanātha (*Bhairavī* 106.20–24). However, abandoning the reading *pacet* would remove the foundation from a line of reasoning that will be employed in Chapter 2 below (see p. 18); or so it might be argued. In reality the situation is not all that serious. In the *LSS* – a work which represents the same views regarding the BP as the *PS* (see Appendix IV) – Nāgeśa repeats what we find in our present passage of the *PS*, with respect to *bhavet*, the derivation of which is in all essentials identical with the derivation of *pacet*. The passage concerned (*LSS* on SK 2212; Vārāṇasī edition, vol. II, p. 453) comments on the phrase *yalopah / bhavet /* of the *Siddhāntakaumudi* and reads: *yalopa iti / na ca tatra kartavye ṅagasañjñāsapekṣasyeyo bahiraṅgatayāsiddhatvam iti vācyam / tasyām aṅgaśabdena śabdarūpasva saptamīyādantopattasya nimittasyaiva grahanam na tu sañjñāyā arthasya vety adoṣāt / evaṁ ceyo'paranimittakatvenāntaraṅgatvam iti bodhyam /*. So whatever the original reading in the *PS* was, *paceran* or *pacet*, we can rest assured that in accepting *pacet* there is no danger that we might come to ascribe opinions to Nāgeśa which were not his.

³Vaidyanātha Pāyagundā makes a remark from which we may conclude that he considered the two conditions as belonging together, the one being an extreme case of the other. See below, Chapter 15, p. 152 and fn. 11.

CHAPTER 2

¹Fn. 1: B.C.H. -*tyartham ca sā*. G. *tyartham caśā* / .

²Where in the *LSS* Nāgeśa invokes the help of Par. LXXXVIII, in his *BSS* (which was written before the *PS*) he makes use, in the same context (1758.9), of the *Paribhāṣā dhātoḥ svarūpagrahane tatpratyaye kāryavijñānam*, which is, however, rejected in the *PS*; see *PS* 171.5–7 and K. pp. 429–430. We have here an instance of Nāgeśa changing his opinions. For other such instances see Appendix IV.

³Fn. 4: A.C. *sasthītvāt*.

⁴*antaraṅgān api iti nyāyas tu jñāpakasiddhamna sarvatra iti nyāyenānityatvān na* (*LSS*, Vārāṇasī ed. II, pp. 447–448). The passage testifies that Par. LII has the general effect of making the substitution of *luk* supersede any other operation (except an *Apavāda*), not merely such an operation as is *antaraṅga* with respect to the substitution of *luk*.

⁵On the question of whether we are permitted to make use of the example *pacet*, see note 2 to Chapter 1.

⁶Fn. 4: B.H. om. *kāryam*.

⁷Fn. 1 (p. 194): C. *ityādau samścarior ityādir viṣaya-*; B. *ityādi viṣaya-*.

⁸The *Bālamanoramā* on this passage of the *SK* says: *nanv antaraṅgatvāt samprasāraṇāt pūrvamī vṛddhyāyādeśayoh kṛtayoh paścāt samprasāraṇe purvarupe aśiśavad iti syāt, aśiśavad iti na syāt . . .* (part IV, p. 293). That is to say, according to this commentary, *aśiśavat* would result if substitution of *Vṛddhi* by P. 7.2.115 were to take place first and subsequently substitution of *āy* for *āi* by P. 6.1.78. This is incorrect. Once *āy* has been substituted for *ai*, *aśiśavat* can no longer be obtained. For there is no rule that causes the elision of *y* once it has arisen in this derivation.

⁹An instance from Nāgeśa's writings where the word *ādi* is used apparently without serving a purpose is found at *SV* 29.2, in the following context: . . . *yasya yathāśaktigrahah*[-*grāhah* must be a misprint], *tasya tata eva bodhah / avyavahitottaravādiniveśena ca kāryakāraṇabhāvē vyabhicāraparihārah /* (*SV* 29.1-2). The commentary *Subodhini* (29.12-15) explains: *yatra padaśaktigrahāvyavahitottarami vākyārthabodha utpadyate tatra padaśaktigrahah kāraṇam / yatra tu vākyāśaktigrahāvyavahitottarami sa utpadyate tatra vākyāśaktigrahah kāraṇam iti kāryakāraṇabhāvaparikalpanān na vyabhicāra ity arthaḥ /*.

Another way of accounting for *ādi* in our passage of the *PŚ* would be to follow the suggestion made in Appendix II and accept as following cause of two rules united into one (one rule assigning a name, the other prescribing an operation) all that figures in the two rules and lies beyond what is covered by the name considered, irrespective of the case ending attached to the term which refers to that following cause (see p. 171-72, below).

¹⁰Fn. 2 (p. 14): C. *anubhavan kāryī*.

¹¹Fn. 2: B. *bādhakabīja*.

¹²Fn. 3: B, om. *api*.

¹³Fn. 4: C.G.H. *-ntaraṅgaviṣaya*.

¹⁴In spite of this I tend to think that our passage refers to *BP*₂₁, not to *BP*₂₂. One reason is that Par. LXV seems to be used exclusively in cases closely similar to *ayaja-i-indram*. Here the two rules concerned operate on the three sounds *a-i-i*. It seems only natural to assume that it is that aspect of the BP which finds its causes among these three sounds and which is invoked here, i.e., *BP*₂₁ and not *BP*₂₂, which would draw the complete words *ayaje* and *indram* into the picture. A second reason is that Nāgeśa may have had a preference for using the expression *pūrvopasthitāmittakatva* in connection with *BP*₂₁, employing *pūrvapravṛttikatva* with *BP*₂₂. See *PŚ* 96.2-3 and 97.2 (App. I ll. 131 and 144).

CHAPTER 3

¹The fact that Nāgeśa does not accept Par. CXIX does not in any way jeopardise this statement, for the reason he does not accept it is that it is superfluous, i.e., that all its supposed results can be accounted for without it. See *PŚ* 193.10-194.2; K. pp. 513-514.

²Cf. PS 418.21–22: *yannimittaghātitanimittakam yad* [the edition reads *yan na*, which seems to make no sense] *bhavati, tat tadapeksyā bahirāṅgam iti tāvan nārthah, dharmigrāhakamānāvirodhat*. That this sentence describes, and rejects, Nāgeśa's opinion is clear from the preceding sentence, which quotes the *PS* verbatim.

³See the previous note.

⁴This restriction, unavoidable as long as we stick to the assumption that the *PS* is consistent with itself, must be used with extreme caution. In the derivation of *aśūśavat* from *svi-(ṇ)ī(c)-(c)a(n)-i*, which we studied on pp. 19f., the substitution of Vṛddhi for the radical *i* is *bahirāṅga* because its cause is *nic*, whereas the *antarāṅga* substitution of Samprasāraṇa for *v* was shown to have no cause. But *nic* does not survive to the end: it is elided by P. 6.4.51 and does not appear in *aśūśavat*. Here then, apparently, *nic* has to be accepted as a cause even though it is dropped in the course of the derivation.

⁵I know of no examples besides (the incorrect form) **āṭīṭat* and *atiṣṭhipat*, and some forms whose derivation is in all respects parallel to these, such as *adidipat*. See Chapter 6, pp. 55f. and notes 1 and 3.

CHAPTER 4

¹Not only Kielhorn. Jayadeva Miśra says in his commentary *Vijayā* (p. 212, ll. 7–9): *ābhīye antaraṅge ābhīyasya bahirāṅgasya samānāśrayasyeti / iyam pañktir na samicinatayā yojayitum śakyate /*.

CHAPTER 5

¹Fn. 1: B. *-pekṣasyaikādeśasya bahi-*. P. reads *-pekṣaikādeśasya bahi-*.

²This is so because Par. X does not apply in the context of the BP. See pp. 24f.

³It might be argued that the passage which follows makes use of BP₂₂, not of the two-word principle. However, the words used in that passage make such an assumption not very likely to be true.

⁴Fn. 2: C.G.H.P. *-ntaraṅgatvāddhal-*; B. *-ntaraṅgatvena hal-*.

⁵Fn. 3: *-pera numādayah*.

CHAPTER 6

¹The fact that *atīṭat*, rather than *āṭīṭat*, is the correct form, does not affect the argument. A Jñāpaka is required to let us know that *atīṭat* is correct; see *Mbh.* III.345.3–7. Application of

rules would by itself lead to *ātiyat*. In the words of Nāgeśa: *ātiyat iti prayoge drṣyate, nyāyena tv ātiyat iti prāpnoti...* (MPU V, p. 245).

² Fn. 3: A.C.E.G.H.K.M. -*dvitvasya*; B. -*dvivacanasya*.

³ We find a closely similar situation in the derivation of *adīdipat*, as pointed out by Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar in his *Tattvādarśa* (76.15). here *dī-p-(ṇ)ī(c)-(c)a(ṇ)-t* becomes *dīp-i-a-t* by P. 7.4.1; the causes are *(ṇ)ī(c)* and *(c)a(ṇ)*. Subsequently P. 7.3.86 applies; its cause is *(ṇ)ī(c)*. P. 7.4.1 is *bahirāṅga* and therefore *asiddha* with respect to P. 7.3.86.

CHAPTER 7

¹ The two-word principle is of no help either. The two operations – joining *ā-ā* into *ā* and joining *ā-ū* into *o* – are on a par in that both connect two different words. The independent position of prepositions in Pāṇini's grammar may in this connection be recalled.

² Cf. PS 76.13: *arthanimittakasya na bahirāṅgatvam / ata eva ...* and PS 77.1, where *ata eva* again refers back to this same statement. At PS 80.8 *ata eva* refers back to the immediately preceding denial that *bahirāṅga* can mean "depending on many" etc. Similarly at PS 82.7 *ata eva* introduces a corollary of the fact that a rule cannot be *bahirāṅga* on account of its depending on a *samjñā*, stated two lines earlier. Further occurrences of these words at PS 87.6, 9; 90.1, 6, 7; 91.3; 94.6, 8; 95.2 etc.

CHAPTER 8

¹ Most commentators pass over the contradiction in silence. Vijayadeva Mishra tries to save the passage in a far-fetched way, saying: *sāmānyadharmanimittakatvābhāveneti / na hi śāstrapramāṇasiddhasya sārvadhātukatvasya pratyayatvadhātutvajñānam antarājñānatvatvam iva pratyakṣapramāṇasiddhasya lṝtvasya latvajñānam vinājñānatvatvam yena lṝtvajñāne latvajñānam āvāsyakam syād iti bhāvah / lṝtvajñānāya katham cil latvajñānāpeksāyām api syādikārye ghaṭe kulālpitv ivānyathāsiddhatvena latvayānimittatvād adhikanimittakatvaprayuktasya bahirāṅgatvasya durupādatvāt /* (Vijayā 207.12-17).

² This same passage, together with what precedes it, is again reproduced in Appendix IV, p. 182.

³ Again reproduced in Appendix IV, p. 182.

⁴ It is interesting to note that Nāgeśa already had misgivings about the correctness of Kaiyatā's statement when he wrote his *Uddyota*. While commenting on this statement (i.e., in the *Uddyota* on P. 1.3.12) he says: *aparanimittakatvena lādeśānām antarangatvam vaktum yogyam, idr̄śāntaraṅgatvasya bhāṣye kvāpy anāśrayaṇād iti kecit* (MPU vol. II, p. 236).

CHAPTER 9

¹ See *Gadā* 93.15, where the passage beginning with *ata evomānos ca* is introduced with the words: *nanūktajñāpakenādyārthalābhē'pi nāntyārthalābhōtah sa nirmūlo'ā āha: ata evometi /*. Later he refers back to this feature as “the second Jñāpaka”: *dviīyajñāpakena prakriyākramena pūrvopasthitānimitakatvasya lābha iti bodhyam /* (*Gadā* 102.29–30). Besides two Jñāpkas and the maxim from ordinary life, Vaidyanātha invokes the authority of the Bhāṣya to justify that aspect of the BP according to which that operation is *antaraṅga* whose causes lie within the causes of the corresponding *bahiraṅga* operation. Cf. *Gadā* 102.27–28: *yena vidhir iti sūtrasthoktabhāṣyaprāmānyād ghaṭakatvenety asyāpi lābhāḥ*. For a further discussion of Vaidyanātha’s views, see Chapter 15 below. Vaidyanātha’s idea that *āñ* in P. 6.1.95 is a Jñāpaka of the BP was not new. The same idea had been expressed in a vārttika (no. 9) on P. 6.1.108: *āñi pararūpavacanam tu jñāpakam antaraṅgabaliyastvasya* (*Mahābhāṣya*, Kielhorn’s edition III, 83.25).

² Fn. 1: C.H. sye visaye.

³ In Chapter 10 below.

⁴ For example, Vaidyanātha’s commentary to Par. LXXXV mentions variant readings at *Gadā* 178.12–13; 180.28; 181.13–14, 16–19; 182.10, 15.

⁵ For example, the reading *paceran* instead of *pacet* in *PS* 78.1 (App. I 1. 12), which Pāyagunḍa rejects (see note 2 to Chapter 1), has survived in seven (or six?) out of ten manuscripts (see *PS* 78 fn. 1 and App. I note 5; manuscript A is mentioned twice, which must be a mistake). See further *PS* 26 fn. 3; 31 fn. 6; 32 fn. 2 (?); 36 fn. 4; 42 fn. 2 and 5; 46 fn. 2 etc.

⁶ Fn. 5: *ka. idam tv avadheyam*.

⁷ *PS* 76.9–12 is attacked in *PS* 418.4–6; *PS* 76.13–77.2 in *PS* 420.2–5; *PS* 78.1–3 and *PS* 81.4–82.3 in *PS* 420.5–8; *PS* 78.3–80.10 in *PS* 418.8–21; *PS* 80.12–81.2 in *PS* 418.25–419.3; *PS* 82.3–7 in *PS* 419.12–16; *PS* 82.7–83.2 in *PS* 419.25–420.1; *PS* 85.2–6 in *PS* 418.22–25; *PS* 86.4–7 in *PS* 421.6–12; *PS* 86.8–87.12 in *PS* 422.5–17.

⁸ See p. 83 above.

CHAPTER 10

¹ The temptation becomes even greater when we see that Nāgeśa uses the same argument once in his *LŚŚ* in a passage which also occurs in the *BŚŚ* and which at the same time contains a remark that is clearly incompatible with the point of view which he had adopted in the *PS*. The passage comments on the Vārttika *satiśīṭasavarabaliyastvam anyatra vikaraṇebhya iti vācyam* (cf. V. 6.1.158.9 and 11) and reads (*LŚŚ* on SK 3650, Vārāṇasi ed. II, p. 917 = *BŚŚ* 2208.13–17): *anyatreti / atra ca jñāpakam tāseh parasya lasārvadhātukasya nighātavidhānam / anyathā vikaranānāñi lakāraviśeṣāpekṣatayā tibādinām lāmātrāpekṣatvād antaraṅgatvena tibādinām api kartrādyarthāpekṣatvena bahiraṅgatve tu paratvena – tibādiṣu kṛteṣu*

kriyamānasya tāsiśvarasya satiśītatvācchesanighātēna siddhe tadvaiyarthyan spastam eva /. The remark that substitution of *ti(p)* etc. for *l* is *bahirariga* because it requires the meanings *karī* etc. contradicts *PŚ* 76.13 (*tenārthanimittakasva na bahirarigatvam* = App. II. 8) and suggests that the whole of this passage was thoughtlessly transferred to the *LŚŚ*.

² See Jayashree A. Gune, *The Meaning of Tenses and Moods*, p. 3.

³ Cf. Thieme's remark: "With all his criticism of Kaiyaṭa, Nāgojī remains a most generous opponent. Wherever it is possible, he tries to save Kaiyaṭa's formulation by showing it to be capable of being interpreted in a way that would yield an unimpeachable view." (*Kleine Schriften* II, p. 608, fn. 10.)

Of course, it cannot but be admitted that the fact of some effort being required to make the interpretation fit Nāgeśa's actual words can be used as an objection against this interpretation. The interpretation is, therefore, presented with no more than a moderate amount of confidence. It must, however, be emphasized that the correctness or otherwise of this interpretation has no repercussions elsewhere in this book, not even on the discussion immediately following.

⁴ Above, p. 97.

⁵ Above, p. 100.

CHAPTER 11

¹ See note 3 to Appendix III.

² No manuscript of the *VSM* exists in Poona, as far as I know. (See also Appendix III, p. 174 below.) I have therefore not been able to acquaint myself directly with this book.

³ It seems likely that the *SV* is nothing more than a repetition of certain parts of the *VSM*, most probably of the chapters called *Varnaspotasāmānyanirūpana*, *Sakhandapadavākyaspotanirūpana*, *Akhandapadavākyaspotanirūpana* and *Jātispotanirūpana* (see the table on pp. 23–24 of Kapil Deva Shastri's introduction to the *PLM*). The reason is that on two occasions the *SV* refers forward to what seem to be chapters of the *VSM*: to the *Tinarthanirūpana* at *SV* 8.4–5 (*tathā ākhyātarārthanirūpanāvasare prapañcayiṣyāmah*), perhaps to the *Samāsaśaktinirūpana* at *SV* 55.12–13 (*śakyasambandha eva lakṣaṇā na bodhyasam̄bandhe ity ekārthibhāvāde prapañcayiṣyate*). It is disturbing that this second sentence must, in the *VSM*, have belonged, not to the *Varnaspotasāmānyanirūpana*, but to one of the other three chapters enumerated above, most probably to the *Sakhandapadavākyaspotanirūpana*. But these three chapters come at the end of the *VSM*, and therefore do not precede the chapter *Samāsaśaktinirūpana*, nor any other chapter to which our sentence could be understood to refer. We may thus have to assume that the *SV* was the beginning of a complete reorganization of the *VSM*, which was

never completed. The identity of names (the *VSM* also calls itself *Sphoṭavāda*; see the introduction to the *PLM*, pp. 21–22) further support this.

That the *SV* was written *after* the *VSM*, not *before* it, is testified to by the circumstance that in the *LM* and in the *PLM* we find one single chapter about the *sphoṭa*, as we assume the *SV* was intended to be for the *VSM*. Moreover, that chapter of the *LM* is often identical with the *SV*. And Vaidyānaṭha Pāyagunda's commentary *Kalā* on the *LM* often takes whole passages from the *SV*, especially of course while commenting on the chapter on *sphoṭa*. Close similarities exist between *SV* 29.2–30.3 and *LM* 429.13–25, *SV* 31.2–4 and *LM* 429.14–15, *SV* 32.1–2 and *LM* 430.5–7, *SV* 34.4–35.1 and *LM* 430.7–9, *SV* 35.3–6 and *LM* 430.10–13, *SV* 37.1–2 and *LM* 13.8–10, *SV* 38.1–39.2 and *LM* 17.1–9, *SV* 51.6–8 and *LM* 430.14–16, *SV* 52.4–6 and *LM* 430.17–20, etc. Further similarities exist between *SV* 5.1 and *Kalā* 495.17–18, *SV* 30.3–4 and *Kalā* 432.17, *SV* 30.6–31.2 and *Kalā* 432.11–14, *SV* 31.4–35.7 and *Kalā* 15.7–30, *SV* 52.6–9 and *Kalā* 433.3–6, *SV* 60.1 and *Kalā* 442.24–25, *SV* 61.4–62.2 and *Kalā* 443.3–7, *SV* 96.8–9 and *Kalā* 495.20, *SV* 99.4–5 and *Kalā* 495.16–17, *SV* 100.2–3 and *Kalā* 495.18–19, *SV* 100.3 and *Kalā* 497.6. Inspection of a manuscript of the unpublished *VSM* (unfortunately not accessible to me) may solve the problem of the exact relation between the *SV* and the *VSM*.

⁴ Regarding Sitaram Shastri's contention that the *LM* was written after the *LŚŚ* (a consequence of which would be that the *LM* postdated the *PS*; see Appendix III), see note 4 to Appendix III.

CHAPTER 13

¹ Fn. 4: B. *ata eva ca nalopah*.

² Fn. 5: P. *nalopasyāsiddhatvena*; B.H. *nalopāsiddhatvena siddhes ta-*; C.G. *nalopāsiddhes ta-*.

³ Fn. 6: C. om. *sati*.

⁴ The other passage discussed in Appendix II tells us that the words *kṛti* and *tuk* in P. 8.2.2 indicate that the BP cannot be used when *tuk* is added. This also conflicts with the statement according to which these words serve a function on account of the NP.

⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 164): 'aca ānantaryam' *iti gha. na. pāṭhah* /.

⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 164): 'nisedhāprāpteh' *iti mudritesu paṭhah* /.

⁷ Fn. 3: 'sū trasthatugrahanam' *iti gha. pāṭhah* /.

⁸ Fn. 4 (p. 102): C.G.H. -*ntaryanimittake*; B. -*ntaryanimitte*.

⁹ Fn. 1 (p. 103): P. mentions the reading *tasya bhāvo bahiṣṭyam bahiraṅgatvam*.

¹⁰ Fn. 4: C.G.H. *ity āṅgrahaṇam*; B. *ity atrāṅgrahaṇam*.

¹¹ Fn. 1 (p. 102): C.G. *parādivattvenau-*; B.H. *parādiivenau-*.

¹² Fn. 2 (p. 102): P. reads *padatvena sasya padādi-*.

¹³ Fn. 3 (p. 102): C.G.H. *nisedhah*; B. *satvanisedhah*.

¹⁴ Below, p. 186.

CHAPTER 14

¹ Fn. 6: G.P. *na satvam ādye*; A.B.C.H.M. *nettvaśatve ādye*; the latter reading is also mentioned by P.

² Fn. 7: C. *aprasiddhatvāt*; B. *aprasiddhatvāc ca*.

³ Fn. 1: G.H.P. *saumendre*; B.C. *somendre*.

⁴ Fn. 2: C.G.H. *-dgune pūrva-*; B. *-dgune krte pūrva-*.

⁵ It must be admitted that here BP₂₂ is used not because the meanings involved arise in a certain order. Rather, the substitution of *ant* seems to be *antaraīga* here quite simply because it presents itself earlier in the derivation than the substitution of *at*. It is to cover cases like this that I like to paraphrase BP₂₂ as “first come, first served”. It is also possible to assume that in the passage under consideration the word *antaraīga* is used in a nontechnical sense. On this alternative, however, the theoretical difficulty remains of whether BP₁ or BP₂ is to be applied.

⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 149): B.H. *iyam ca parāntaraṅgādibadhānāma-*.

⁷ Fn. 5: B.H. *syantsyatityādau sakārādiviśeṣāpekṣatvād ātmamepda-*; P. rejects this reading.

CHAPTER 15

¹ Fn. 1 (p. 84): *ga. -rvavihitativāt tadabhā-*.

² Fn. 2 (p. 85): *gha. -ṇa tattvāta-*.

³ The edition reads *paratvāj* and gives no variant readings. All the same, *paratvāj* cannot be correct. The emendation *purastāj* is tentative, but gives, no doubt, the intended meaning.

⁴ I understand *tattvam* here to mean *antarbhūtatvam*, since the word *antarbhūta* is used in the immediately preceding sentence.

⁵ Here I take *tattvam* to mean *antaraīgatvam*. My reason is as follows: The PS contains a line which is almost identical with this line from the *Gadā*. It reads: *tad api yugapatprāptau*

pūrvapravṛttinīyāmakam eva ...na tu jātasya bahiraṅgasya tādrśe'ntaraṅge'siddhatāni-vāmakam . . . (PS 96.9–10; App. I ll. 138–141). The word *tad* in the *PS* corresponds to *tattvam* in our passage of the *Gadā*. The word *tad* is explained by Vaidyanātha as follows: *tad apī ti / tatra bhāṣye spaṣṭam uktam idam antaraṅgatvam ity arthah / (Gadā 103.17)*.

⁶ At *PS* 96.2–3 (App. I ll. 131) and at *PS* 148.11.

⁷ See pp. 30f., above.

⁸ The edition reads *kapratyaya-*. This seems to be a misprint.

⁹ This we observed in the beginning of this chapter, p. 146–147.

¹⁰ The term *pūrvopasthita* is used at *PS* 96.2.3, the derivation of *paṭyā* (*vibhajyānvākhyāne*) appears at *PS* 96.9. This same derivation (*kramenānvākhyāne*) does not come in till later, at *PS* 97.2.

¹¹ *alpanimittasya tatrve paranimittasyaivābhāvenānaimittikasya tattvam kaimutikanyāyena siddham . . .*

¹² *tatrādyajñāpakena jātasyetyasyeva pūrvavihitatvādya!panimittatvayor lābhāḥ / alpanimittatvam api saṃkhyayā labdhām /*

¹³ *dvitiyajñāpakena prakriyākramena pūrvopasthitanimittakatvasya lābha iti bodhyam.*

CHAPTER 16

¹ Siradeva considers the Paribhāṣā *anitya* (*PS* 234.12). So do Puruṣottamadeva (*PS* 129.19 ff.), Nīlakanṭha Dīkṣita (*PS* 304.21–22), and Śesādrisudhi (*PS* 423.9–10). Of the authors belonging to the Pāninian school whose treatises are included in the *PS*, only Vyādi and Haribhāskara do not seem to accept that the BP is *anitya*. Haribhāskara, however, refers to the opinion of those who think it is (*PS* 354.9–10).

² It is far from certain that Bhairava Miśra was Nāgeśa's direct pupil. See K.V. Abhyankar, *Prastāvanā Khaṇḍa*, pp. 24–25.

³ This would agree with the opinion of Govind Das, according to which the author of the *Gadā* and other grammatical works was the same Bālam Bhaṭṭa who was in his old age known to Colebrooke in the early years of the 19th century. Says Das: “Another question namely, whether Bālam Bhaṭṭa was merely a pet name of the author, his real name being Vaidyanātha as is generally believed, is solved by the opening Shlokas of the Digest he was compiling for Colebrooke. It is clearly stated there that his father's name was Vaidyanātha, his mother's Lakshmi Devī. It seems that all his works on grammar were composed in his father's name and all his law works in his mother's name. There is a Benares tradition that his father took the child to Nagesh, for whom he had great respect and asked him to bless the youngster. Nāgesh did it and said that he would grow up to write commentaries on his works. If all this is true, it would prove that *Bālam Bhaṭṭa became a pupil of the famous Nāgesh only towards the close of*

his life." (J. R. Gharpure (ed.), *Bālambhattī*, Book I, Introduction, p. 32; my italics.) That this Bālam Bhaṭṭa had been a pupil of Nāgeśa we learn from one of the ślokas referred to by Das: *nāgeśapādanirato vaidyanāthātmajah sudhīḥ* (*ibid.* p. 33).

APPENDIX I

¹ Fn. 5 (p. 76): H.P. *nimittam eva*; A.B.C.D.E.G.M. om. *eva*.

² Fn. 6 (p. 76): C. *tenārthanimittasya*.

³ Fn. 7 (p. 76): B.D.E.M. *strītvanimittaka-*.

⁴ Fn. 1 (p. 77): A.D.E.G.K.C.H.M. *-tsūtrasthabhāṣya-*; B. *tsūtra eva bhāṣya-*.

⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 78): A.E.B.P. *paced ityādāv e-*; A.D.K.C.G.H.M. *pacerannityādāv e-*.

⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 78): P. reads *samjñāsāpekṣatvena*.

⁷ Fn. 3 (p. 78): A.B.D.E.K.M.H.G. *yaṇaci-*.

⁸ Fn. 1 (p. 80): C. *nityatvāt pūrvā-*; A.D.E.B.G.H.M. *nityatvād gunāt pūrvā-*.

⁹ Fn. 1 (p. 81): A.B.D.E.G.K. *-bhāṣyena pari-*; C. *-bhāṣye ca pari-*. P. *bhāṣyena ca pari-*.

¹⁰ Fn. 2 (p. 81): A.P. *saptamya dyantopāttam*; B.C.D.E.K.G.H.M. *saptam-yādyantatayopāttam*.

¹¹ Fn. 3 (p. 81): A.D.E.M.H.G. *tatsūtrabhāṣye eva*.

¹² Fn. 1 (p. 82): A.D.E.K.C.M. *nalopasya hi padasamjñāsāpeksa-*; B. *nalopasya padasamjñāsāpeksa-*; G.H.P. *nalope hi pada-*.

¹³ Fn. 2 (p. 82): A.D.E.K.C.G.H.M. *samjñākṛtabahira-*; B. *samjñākṛtasya bahira-*.

¹⁴ Fn. 1 (p. 83): B. *tatraiva pradipo-*.

¹⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 84): E.P. *vṛścatyādiṣu*; B.C.G. *vraścādiṣu*. M. *vraścatyādiṣu*. H. *vṛścatītyādiṣu*.

¹⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 84): A.D.E.K.C.G.M. *dvayor iti*; B. *dvayor api*.

¹⁷ Fn. 3 (p. 84): B. *paribhāṣāntaram apāstam*.

¹⁸ Fn. 4 (p. 84): G.E. *sūtrabhāṣye*.

¹⁹ Fn. 5 (p. 84): B.M. *tatpratyākhyānāc ca //*.

²⁰ Fn. 6 (p. 84): B. *antaraṅgaśāstram asyā* [?]

²¹ Fn. 1 (p. 85): P. *satyāṁ hy etasyāṁ*; A.B.C.D.G.H.M. *satyāṁ hi tasyāṁ*.

²² Fn. 1 (p. 86): A.D.C.G.M. *guṇavṛddhi ti-*; B. om. *iti*.

²³ Fn. 2 (p. 86): *vāryūhetiyādy ūhateḥ*. A.D. *vāryūha ityādi tu ūhateḥ*.

²⁴ Fn. 3 (p. 86): M.P. *tripādyāṁ etatpra-*; A.D.E.B.G.G. [?] H. *tripādyāṁ tatpra-*.

²⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 87): A.B.C.G.M. *-bhāvāt tayā tasyā-*; B. om. *tayā*. H. *bhāvād anayā tasyā-*.

²⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 87): C.H. *-siddhatvāt tadabhāvena*; B.G. om. *tad*. A.M. *antaraṅgatvābhāvena*.

²⁷ Fn. 3 (p. 87): B. *tripādyāṁ asyānupa-*.

²⁸ Fn. 4 (p. 87): B. *-sūtrabhāṣye*.

²⁹ Fn. 5 (p. 87): B. om. *tasya doṣa iti*.

³⁰ Fn. 6 (p. 87): C. *lakṣaṇaikacakṣurbhir nādaratavyā iti*; B.G.H.M. *lakṣaṇacakṣurbhir nādaranīyā iti*.

³¹ In agreement with the results of Chapter 7 above, we skip here PS 87.13–92.3 and continue at PS 92.4. Moreover, PS 92.4–13 has been modified as indicated in Chapter 8; the result is ll. 88–99.

³² Fn. 5 (p. 92): B. *viśeṣyasya*.

³³ Fn. 6 (p. 92): C.G.H. *kvāpy anullekhač ca*; B. *kvāpy anullekhanāč ca*.

³⁴ Fn. 3 (p. 92): B. *bahirāṅgāḥ syāyādaya*.

³⁵ Fn. 4 (p. 92): C.G. *iti parāstam*.

³⁶ Fn. 1 (p. 93): C.G. *matuprāptim āśaṅkyā*; B.H. *matup prāpnottīty āśarikya*.

³⁷ Fn. 2 (p. 93): C.G.H. *siddhāntinokte*; B. *siddhāntinoktaṁ*.

³⁸ Fn. 3 (p. 93): P. *pūrvapakṣyuktih*; B.C.G.H. *pūrvapakṣyuktir bhāṣye*.

³⁹ Fn. 4 (p. 93): P. *paratvād bādhah*; B.C.G.H. om. *paratvāt*.

⁴⁰ Fn. 5 (p. 93): C.H. *ityāśayena*; B.G. *ityāśayakena*.

⁴¹ Fn. 6 (p. 93): C.G.H. *tam avakāśam a-*; B. *tam evāvakāśam a-*.

⁴² Fn. 7 (p. 93): B.H. and Kaiyatā *samkhyāyās taddhitārthe*; C.G. *samkhyāyās taddhitārtheti*.

⁴³ Fn. 8 (p. 93): P. *kaiyatā iti*; B.C.G.H. om. *iti*.

⁴⁴ The word *na* is not found in Abhyankar's edition (*PŚ* 94.5), probably due to oversight. It is needed in order to make sense of the sentence. It is present in other editions, e.g., in the one that contains Vaidyanātha's *Gadā* (101.6).

⁴⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 94): B. *-dviśeṣāpekṣārthadvigu-*.

⁴⁶ Fn. 2 (p. 94): C. *-tvasyānāśraya-*; B.G.H. *-tvānāśraya-*.

⁴⁷ Fn. 1 (p. 95): B.H. and Bhāṣya *vaktavya*; C.G. *vācyā*.

⁴⁸ Fn. 2 (p. 95): B. *'nanyasya satve*.

⁴⁹ Fn. 1 (p. 96): P. *tatkramenaiva ca*; B.C.G.H. om. *ca*; G. *kramenaiva tattadbodhaka*.

⁵⁰ Fn. 2 (p. 96): H. *dity acāḥ*. P. *-dity anenācāḥ*; B.C.G. *dityādinācāḥ*.

⁵¹ Fn. 1 (p. 97): P. reads *vāritocāḥ parasmīnnity atra bhāsyakṛtā /*.

⁵² Fn. 2 (p. 97): C.G.H. *pūrvapravṛttikatvam apy antaraṅga*; B. *pūrvapravṛttinimittakatvam api antara-*.

⁵³ Fn. 3 (p. 97): B. *nimittatvābhā-*.

⁵⁴ Here the passage *PŚ* 87.13–92.3 is inserted, for reasons described in Chapter 7. The passage here covers ll. 146–179.

⁵⁵ Fn. 7 (p. 87): [?] *ata eva umāriōś ca-* M. *ata eva omā-*.

⁵⁶ Fn. 8 (p. 87): B.P.G. *-ṅgatvād gune kṛte*; C. om. *kṛte*. M.H. *-ṅgatvād ād gune*.

⁵⁷ Fn. 1 (p. 88): B.P. *sādhanabodhana-*; C.G.H. *sādhakabodhaka-*.

⁵⁸ Fn. 1 (p. 89): P. mentions the reading *sādhanākārikṣatvāt*.

⁵⁹ Fn. 1 (p. 90): P. *pūrvam hi*; B.C.G.H. and Bhāṣya om. *hi*.

⁶⁰ Fn. 2 (p. 90): C.G.H.P. and Bhāṣya *sādhanam hi*; B. om. *hi*.

⁶¹ Fn. 3 (p. 90): P. *tyādinā bhāṣye /*.

⁶² Fn. 4 (p. 90): G.H. *śrotṛbodhāya*.

⁶³ Fn. 1 (p. 91): C.G. *rūpāsiddhiḥ*; B.H. *rūpāsiddheḥ*.

⁶⁴ Fn. 2 (p. 91): C.G..H. -*rganimitta*;
B. -*rganimittam*.

⁶⁵ Fn. 3 (p. 91): C.G.H. -*nimittatvāt tad antaraṅgam*; B. om. *tad*.

⁶⁶ Fn. 1 (p. 92): C.G.H. *sāmānyāpeksakam*.

⁶⁷ Fn. 2 (p. 92): B.P. *pūrvam utpatteḥ*; C.G.H. *pūrvam utpattiḥ*.

⁶⁸ Here we turn back to *PS* 97.3.

⁶⁹ Fn. 4 (p. 97): C. om. *luki* . . . *vinmatoḥ*.

⁷⁰ Fn. 5 (p. 97): B. -*pravṛttiyarthaṁ jāti-*.

⁷¹ Fn. 1 (p. 98): C.G.H.P. *bahirāṅgāsiddha-*; B. *bahirāṅgatvāsiddha-*.

⁷² Fn. 2 (p. 98): C.G.H. *padādhikārasthabahi-*; B. -*padādhikārasya bahi-*.

⁷³ Fn. 3 (p. 98): G. [?] G.H. -*r iti nādartaḥyā*; B. om. *sā*.

⁷⁴ Fn. 1 (p. 99): C. om. *samānāśrayasya*.

⁷⁵ Fn. 1 (p. 100): B. *sici vrddhau yena-*.

APPENDIX II

¹ The two passages that are going to be studied now, and that are intended to show that indirect causes *can* make an operation *bahirāṅga*, lose some of their force owing to the fact that the examples they contain can also satisfactorily be accounted for with the help of BP₂₂. Those readers who wish to press this point and conclude that after all as far as Nāgeśa is concerned indirect causes cannot make an operation *bahirāṅga* will have to find another way to save the Jñāpaka of the BP (see above, p. 29f.), failing which they have to consider Nāgeśa's remarks concerning that Jñāpaka nonsensical thus sinning against the methodology adopted in this book. Moreover, the previous passage discussed in this appendix cannot be accounted for with the help of BP₂₂.

² Fn. 1: B. om. *api*.

³ The *Mahābhāṣya* (Kielhorns's edition, vol. III, p. 177, l. 2) reads: *iḥānya ācāryāś cau* *pratyarigasya pratiṣedham āhus* . . ., ascribing this statement to "other Ācāryas". The statement is not a Vārttika in the ordinary sense of the word, and indeed Kielhorn's edition does not print it as one.

⁴ Fn. 3: B.C.G. *bahirāṅgobha-*. H. *antaraṅgād ubhayo-*.

⁵ The explanation does not fit very well with the rest of the interpretation of Par. L. either, being rather *ad hoc*.

APPENDIX III

¹ Sitaram Shastri is of the opinion (which he expresses in the introduction to the *BSS*, p. 45, and repeats in the introduction to the *BSR*, p. 39) that Nāgeśa constantly made changes and improvements in his books. This would explain the fact that "almost all his grammatical books are mentioned in almost all those books." However, the mutual references lead us into difficulties in only one or two cases (viz. in the case of the *MPU* and perhaps that of the *LSS*; see below, p. 174f. and note 4). These difficulties, moreover, can much more satisfactorily be accounted for by assuming, not that those works were first completed and afterwards modified, but rather that Nāgeśa took much time in completing them; that is to say, he kept them as unfinished drafts for a long time. Sitaram Shastri's idea seems probable only in the case of the *BSS*, where the evidence of the manuscripts appears to support it (see p. 175 below). As long as it has not been shown that manuscripts of Nāgeśa's other grammatical works display the same peculiarities as those of the *BSS*, Sitaram's suggestions must be discarded.

² P. K. Gode (*Studies in Indian Literary History*, Vol. III, pp. 212–213) gives a list of titles of works ascribed to Nāgeśa, found in Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*. Sitaram Shastri (introduction to the *BSS*, pp. 59–60) gives a number of titles which is mainly based on that list. Among these titles there are some which cannot but belong to grammatical works, but which are not contained in the list of ten titles given above. Since I have not been able to find printed editions of any of those works, they are not discussed in this appendix.

³ That the *BSS* preceded the *LSS* is already clear from the fact that the former refers to itself in the colophons as *Śabdenduṣekhara*, the latter as *Laghuśabdenduṣekhara*. A similar line of reasoning applies to the *VSM* and the *LM*, this time with reference to the opening stanzas (see Kapil Deva Shastri's introduction to the *PLM*, p. 19). The *PLM* presents itself under this name both in its initial stanza and in its colophon, i.e., it presents itself as an abbreviation of the *LM*. Further arguments to show the temporal priority of the *BSS* over the *LSS* have been given by Sitaram Shastri in the introduction to the *BSS* (pp. 40–41).

⁴ Sitaram Shastri is of the opinion that the *Śabdenduṣekhara* referred to in the *LM* is the *LSS*. If this were true, the chronological scheme proposed in this appendix, as well as certain (tentative) conclusions arrived at in Chapter 11, would be jeopardized. However, the two arguments which he brings forward on pp. 42–44 of the introduction to the *BSS* are both weak. The first merely shows that Vaidyanātha Pāyagundā, in his commentary on the *LM*, explains a reference to the *Śabdenduṣekhara* by quoting the *LSS*. This may or may not show that according to Vaidyanātha the *LM* was written after the *LSS*. And even if we assume that it does show this, we are still far from attaining on this account any certainty regarding the relative chronology of these two works. Much of the present book is intended to show that Vaidyanātha is not such an 'infallible guide' regarding Nāgeśa's work as has often been supposed. Moreover, the *BSS* contains a passage (also quoted by Sitaram Shastri, p. 43)

which has the same meaning as the passage from the *LSS* quoted by Vaidyanātha; only the form differs somewhat.

The second argument shows that at one place where the *LM* contains the phrase *etac ca nirūpitam ... śabdendusēkhare* the *LSS* contains a more detailed discussion of the topic concerned than the *BSS*. Indeed, the *BSS* contains here no more than what is also found in the *LM*. However, the term *nirūpita*, as far as I know, does not promise a lengthy discussion. That role is reserved for words like *vistara* and *prapañcita*. I do not see what objection could be raised against the assumption that the *LM* here simply refers to a passage from the *BSS* where the same topic has been discussed in a similar manner.

Finally, even if it were certain that the *LM* refers to the *LSS*, one could still, on very reasonable grounds, maintain that the *LSS* was completed after the *LM*. Sitaram Shastri himself has attempted to show that the *BSS* underwent many revisions in the hands of Nāgeśa after its first appearance (see p. 175 below). Indeed, the *LSS* is supposed to be the final result of all these revisions (introduction to *BSS*, p. 35). But the final version of the *BSS* used in the edition was completed before the *LSR* (below, pp. 175 and 191). The *LSS*, on the other hand, refers to the *PS* and was completed after that work (below, p. 174). Sitaram's own theory therefore suggests that the *LSS* was worked upon by Nāgeśa during the whole period from the completion of the *BSS* until after the completion of the *PS*. We are forced to accept something similar regarding the *MPU* (below, p. 175). It follows that if the *LM* does indeed refer to the *LSS* (which is doubtful), all we can conclude from this is that the *LM* was written after the *BSS*.

⁵ Some of the passages in which the *Mañjuśā* is mentioned do not belong to the latest layer of the text: i.e., they do not belong only to manuscripts *ka.* and *ga.* (see below). This applies, for instance, to *BSS* 73.20 and 365.12.

⁶ For example, the reference to the *MPU* at *BSS* 198.11 occurs in a sentence that belongs to the relatively early manuscript *kha*, but not to the late manuscripts *ka* and *ga*. See *BSS* 198 fn. 4.

⁷ And in note 3 to that chapter some reasons were given to assume that the *SV* was composed after the *VSM*.

APPENDIX IV

¹ Fn. 3: '*na tisr' ity ārabhya 'spaṣṭaiva' ityantah ka. pāṭhah.*

² Fn. 4: *ka. ga. pāṭhah / kha. nāsti /*.

³ Fn. 3: '*evañ ca' ity ārabhya 'vidhānapadārīhatvāt' ityantah ka. kundalitah kha. pāṭhah / ga nāsti /* (*vidhānapadārīhatvāt* occurs at p. 679, 1. 2).

⁴ Fn. 4: '*iti vācyam / apavādatvād enadādeśasyaiva pūrvam pravṛtteh' iti kha. pāṭhah.*

⁵ Fn. 3: *ita ārabhya 'sthānivadbhāvāc ca' ityantah ka. kundalitah kha. pāṭhah / ga. nāsti /* (*sthānivadbhāvāc ca* occurs at *BSS* 216.5).

⁶ Fn. 4: 'sāmarthyena' ityantah kha. nāsti.

⁷ Fn. 5: 'parasparavirodhe' ity atogre 'vinigamakābhāvāc ca' ity ayam amśāḥ ka. pustake sthitopi tatraiva masilepena dūrikṛtah / 'dvayoh parasparavirodhe' iti tu kha. pāṭhah / (I cannot find the words vinigamakābhāvāc ca).

⁸ Fn. 6: 'pravṛttiāpatteś ca paratvād visargo' kha. pāṭhah.

⁹ Fn. 3: 'yatramānyadharmapekṣaśāstrapekṣayā' iti ga. pāṭhah.

¹⁰ Fn. 4: ka. ga. pāṭhah / kha. nāsti /.

¹¹ Sc. ānupūrvyā.

¹² Fn. 4 (p. 196): kha. pāṭhah. In the later MSS. ka. and ga. this position has been definitely abandoned, witness, BSS 129.23–130.2, which, as fn. 5 to p. 129 indicates, occurs only in MSS. ka. and ga.; the passage reads: antahkāryatvam cāntarbhūtanimittakatvam / pūrvopasthitanimittakatvam iti yāvat / antaraṅgaśabde ḡaśabdasya nimittaparativāt / na tu pūrvopasthitasthānikatvam api / aṅgaśabdāt tadalabhai /.

¹³ Fn. 5 (p. 129): 'kṛti tuggrahanād iti dik' (pr. 131) ityanto 'yam ka. ga. pāṭhah . . .

¹⁴ This passage also falls within the jurisdiction of fn. 5 to p. 129, partially reproduced in note 13 above.

¹⁵ Fn. 1: 'asyāsiddhatvam' ityanto 'yam ka. ga. pāṭhah kha. nāsti /.

¹⁶ Fn. 2: ka. ga. nāsti / kha. pāṭhah /

¹⁷ Fn. 3: 'bahirbhūtalyabapekṣayā' kha. pāṭhah

APPENDIX V

¹ The same point is made by Sitaram Shastri in the introduction to the BSR, pp. 21–22.

² George Cardona, in his *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*, p. 287, refers to Joshi's arguments, and further points out that K. V. Abhyankar defended the view that the LSR was written by Hari Diksita, whereas M. S. Bhat joined the camp of those who see Nāgeśa as its author. Neither Cardona, nor any of the authors he mentions, seem to have taken notice of Sitaram Shastri's introduction to the BSR, which, in my opinion, contains the best arguments.

³ Sitaram Shastri also maintains on pp. 46–47 of the introduction to the BSS that the BSS antedates the LSR. However, the opinion which this same author records on p. 41 of the introduction to the BSR and according to which the LSR is Nāgeśa's last grammatical work cannot be accepted because of the evidence contained in this appendix.

INDEX

SŪTRAS FROM THE *Aṣṭādhyāyī* REFERRED TO

P	page			
1.1.3	47	3.4.69	93, 95, 98, 100, 102	
1.1.4	122	3.4.78	74, 76, 82, 90	
1.1.39	168, 169, 170, 171	3.4.93	46, 56	
1.1.51	25, 122	3.4.100	76	
1.1.56	179	3.4.103	73, 76, 79	
1.1.57	22, 33	3.4.113	94	
1.1.62	53, 164	4.1.4	56, 57	
1.1.72	35, 180	4.1.63	133	
1.2.46	53	4.3.120	132	
1.2.47	26	5.3.71	169, 170	
1.3.9	30, 32, 164	6.1.1	16	
1.3.12	73, 79, 82, 197	6.1.8	69, 70, 184	
1.3.92	82, 83, 138	6.1.9	15, 16, 17	
1.4.7	26, 168	6.1.10	134	
1.4.17	164	6.1.11	55	
1.4.18	167	6.1.16	110	
1.4.59	68	6.1.31	19, 20	
1.4.100	137	6.1.66	6, 12, 18, 109, 110, 111, 179, 183	
2.1.4	53, 133	6.1.67	30, 32, 164	
2.2.18	133	6.1.68	52, 53	
2.2.19	133	6.1.71	50, 119, 123, 163, 164, 165, 166	
2.2.29	132	6.1.77	4, 12, 23, 27, 35, 36, 57, 117, 126, 148, 167	
2.2.32	26	6.1.78	19, 20, 195	
2.3.29	83	6.1.85	128	
2.4.71	26, 52, 53	6.1.86	49, 50, 51, 52, 120, 123, 124, 127, 128, 165, 186, 190	
2.4.75	134, 135	6.1.87	25, 27, 28, 56, 62, 63, 125, 126, 132	
2.4.82	168, 169, 171	6.1.88	29, 30, 62, 125, 149	
3.1.6	136	6.1.91	122	
3.1.33	74, 90, 94			
3.1.68	94, 95			
3.1.91	82			
3.2.123	92, 100			
3.2.186	25			
3.3.13	95, 98			

6.1.95	62, 66, 72, 81, 88, 125, 126, 127, 144, 152, 198	7.1.70	53
6.1.101	26, 27, 28, 50, 62, 63, 125, 126	7.2.1	47, 48
6.1.108	19, 29, 30, 31, 62, 149, 198	7.2.35	166
6.1.109	127	7.2.44	136, 137, 138
6.1.131	57	7.2.58	136
6.1.135	7.2.59	136, 137, 138	69, 183, 184
6.1.137	7.2.76	73, 76, 79	69, 70, 183
6.1.158	7.2.80	6, 18	198
6.2.1	7.2.99	178	57
6.3.27	7.2.102	56	130
6.3.61	7.2.114	15, 16	119
6.3.68	7.2.115	19, 20, 195	185
6.3.138	7.2.116	55	167
6.4.4	7.3.14	132	178, 179
6.4.19	7.3.21	131, 132	117, 125, 148
6.4.22	7.3.22	131	39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46
6.4.35	7.3.54	57	40, 41
6.4.51	7.3.84	21, 47, 48, 150	196
6.4.64	7.3.86	4, 9, 10, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 56, 149, 197	43, 45, 46
6.4.77	73, 76, 79		9, 21
6.4.101	73, 76, 79		40, 41
6.4.105	168, 170		17, 18
6.4.119	168		41
6.4.131	55, 197		43, 45, 46, 166, 167
6.4.132	56		29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 42, 43, 45, 56, 72, 87, 145, 149,
6.4.138	136		150, 152
7.1.2	38, 39		167, 168
7.1.3	52, 119, 121, 163, 165, 200		6, 109, 164, 179, 180
7.1.4	163, 164, 165		134
7.1.35	26		134
7.1.37	8.2.7		17, 18
7.1.53	8.2.80		50, 123
	8.3.15		178
	8.3.59		
	8.3.82		
	8.3.111		
	127, 128		
	130		
	128		

WORDS THE GRAMMATICAL DERIVATION OF WHICH IS DISCUSSED
IN THE TEXT

page

akşadyū	117, 125, 126, 128, 147, 148, 149	acīkarat	135
agnişomau	130, 131	atişlúpat	56, 58, 196
		adidípat	196, 197

<i>adhītya</i>	49, 50, 51, 52, 123	<i>papuṣah</i>	43, 45, 46, 47
<i>anubhūyate</i>	68, 69	<i>pūrvaiṣukāmaśama</i>	132
<i>anaīṣit</i>	47	<i>pratīcaḥ</i>	167, 168
<i>ayaje indram</i>	27, 28, 120, 126	<i>pratyaya</i>	184
<i>asūśavat</i>	19, 20, 55, 195, 196	<i>pratyeti</i>	184
<i>asusruvat</i>	8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 57, 58	<i>prādudruvat</i>	145, 146
* <i>ātītat</i>	55, 58, 196, 197	<i>prārcchati</i>	122
<i>ādhaye</i>	168, 169, 170	<i>pretya</i>	50
<i>u</i>	26	<i>preddha</i>	122
<i>edhi</i>	41	<i>bhavatāt</i>	17
<i>kacchapī</i>	132	<i>bhavati</i>	94, 95
<i>kumbhakārebhyah</i>	168, 169, 170, 171	<i>bhaviṣyatī</i>	74, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 108
<i>ko'sicat</i>	127	<i>mīmāṃsate</i>	135, 136
<i>khaṭvodhā</i>	62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 145, 146, 152	<i>mimārjiṣati</i>	15, 16, 17, 56, 58
<i>gomatpriyah</i>	52, 53	<i>rudyāt</i>	76, 78, 88
<i>gaudherah</i>	5, 6, 109, 164, 179, 180, 194	<i>vāyvoh</i>	12, 183
<i>gaur vāhīkaḥ</i>	130	<i>viśvauhah</i>	29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151
<i>grāmaṇiputra</i>	119, 120	<i>vṛtrahabhyām</i>	119, 121, 163, 164, 165
<i>carsi</i>	25	<i>vṛscati</i>	110, 111, 112, 113
<i>dadhati</i>	134	<i>vyāghrī</i>	132
<i>dyukāma</i>	57, 58	<i>sādhī</i>	40, 41
<i>dve</i>	56	<i>sīvehi</i>	125, 126
<i>dhiyati</i>	126	<i>samcaskāra</i>	69, 70, 183
<i>pacāvedam</i>	46, 56, 57, 58, 145, 146	<i>seduṣah</i>	166, 167
<i>pacet</i>	5, 6, 18, 109, 179, 198	<i>saumendra</i>	131, 132
<i>paceran</i>	194, 198	<i>syantsyati</i>	136, 137, 138
<i>pañcan</i>	163	<i>syona</i>	4, 35, 36, 55, 145, 146
<i>paṭvya</i>	11, 22, 23, 24, 57, 58, 66, 96, 145, 146, 151, 152, 202		

TEXTUAL PASSAGES REFERRED TO

<i>Bālamanoramā</i>	<i>page</i>	<i>Brhacchabdenduśekhara</i>	
IV p. 293	195	34.14	174
		53.1	174
		73.20	174, 208
<i>Bhairavī</i>		76.8	174
104.21	56	129.23–130.2	209
106.20–24	194	130.12–13	185

130.13–14	186	<i>Kalā</i>	
131.1	174	15.7–30	200
135.19–21	179, 194	432.11–14	200
135.22–136.1	183	432.17	200
154.1	174	433.3–6	200
163.9–13	125	442.24–25	200
182.6	174	443.3–7	200
191.10–11	181	495.16–17	200
191.12–18	181	495.17–18	200
192.3–19	128, 186	495.18–19	200
197.3–4	185	495.20	200
198.11	174, 208	497.6	200
216.3–4	180		
216.5	208	<i>Laghumañjūśā</i>	
365.12	208	1	105

426.22–427.9	178	9.2–8	105
542.12–14	179	13.8–10	200
666.1–2	180	17.1–9	200
678.11–14	180	429.13–25	200
1574.14	176	429.14–15	200
1736.4–5	184	430.5–7	200
1758.9	194	430.7–9	200
1759	77, 182	430.10–13	200
1794.1–5	184	430.14–16	200
2208.13–17	198	430.17–20	200

Bṛhatparibhāṣāvṛtti by Śīradeva
234.12 202
235.22–25 124

<i>Gadā</i>	
79.26–27	84
84.24–26	143
85.6–18	143
86.20–21	194
90.28–91.12	150
93.15	198
99.12	75
101.6	205
102.25f	146, 152, 198
103.17	202
178.12–13	198
179.19–23	84
180.28	198
181.13–14, 16–19	198
182.10, 15	198
182.16	171

Laghuparibhāṣāvṛtti by Puruṣottamadeva
129.19f 202

<i>Laghuśabdaratna</i>	
BHU-ed.	p. 122
	p. 138
	p. 164
	p. 419
	p. 504
Chowkhamba ed.	
II	p. 156
	p. 280
	p. 345–346
	p. 359

<i>Laghuśabdenduśekhara</i>	
Kumb. ed.	
I	p. 267
	p. 381
II	p. 877
	p. 1043

Var. ed.

II p. 447	17
p. 447–448	194
p. 453	179, 194
p. 526	138
p. 547	184
p. 571	15
p. 572	77, 174, 182
p. 587	181
p. 594–595	184
p. 618	20
p. 780	185
p. 917	198

Mahābhāṣya

I.28.8	194
I.51.8–9	122
I.310.4–9	126
III.83.25	198
III.93.22–26	184
III.167.12–14	185
III.177.2	206
III.187.8–9	41
III.190.22–23	40
III.191.8	43
III.344.22–345.3	55
III.345.3–7	196

Mahābhāṣyapradīpa

II.326	57
IV.687–688	41
IV.697	46
IV.697–698	42

Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddhyota

I.419	179
I.434	183, 185
I.543	180
II.236	197
IV.155	182, 183
IV.477–478	185
IV.640	186
IV.697	40
IV.698	42, 44, 187
V.245	197
V.360	180
V.439	181

Paribhāṣābhāskara by Haribhāskara

354.9–10	202
418.4–6	198
418.8–21	198
418.21–22	196
418.22–25	32, 198
418.25–419.3	198
419.1	36
419.12–16	198
419.25–420.1	198
420.2–5	198
420.5–8	198
420.12–15	85
420.16–17	86
420.17–18	86
421.6–12	198
422.5–17	198
423.9–10	202
14.5–6	16
31.14–16	130
31.21–23	130
72.1–4	82, 90
76.7–8	3
76.9	147
76.9–11	3, 198
76.12–13	5, 151, 197
76.13–77.2	198
77.1	197
78.1–3	6, 198
78.3–80.10	198
80.6–8	10, 86, 147
80.8	197
80.12–81.2	35, 198
81.1–2	5
81.4–82.3	109, 198
82.3–7	198
82.5–83.3	163
82.7	197
84.1	7
84.1–2	111
85.2–6	29, 198
86.4–7	198

86.8–87.6	37	180.1	15
86.8–87.12	198	190.11–13	136
87.6	197	193.13–194.2	18, 195
87.9	197		
87.13	66, 87, 147	App. I ll. 1–2	3
87.13–88.3	61	l. 3–5	3
87.13–92.3	65, 204, 205	l. 6–8	5
89.1–5	68	l. 8	199 n. 1 (ch. 10)
90.1, 6, 7	197	l. 8–10	178
90.3–6	69	l. 12	198 n. 5
91.1–3	70, 122	l. 12–14	6, 179
91.3	197	l. 14–18	35
92.4–13	73, 147, 204	l. 24–28	86
94.5	205	l. 26–28	10, 147, 180
94.6, 8	197	l. 33–35	35
95.2	197	l. 34–35	5
96.1–3	8, 86, 148, 195, 202	l. 37–41	109, 179
96.3–8	33	l. 43–49	163
96.5–8	22	l. 51–52	7
96.9	148, 202	l. 51–53	111
96.9–10	11, 202	l. 56–61	29
97.1	12	l. 71–78	37, 181
97.2–3	23, 66, 195, 202	l. 71–87	180
97.3–4	67	l. 88–99	78, 147, 181, 204
98.8–100.1	39		n. 31
100.1–2	47	l. 99–124	182
101.1	117	l. 114–120	182
101.3–8	49, 122, 124	l. 129f	8, 183
101.8–10	122	l. 130	86
101.10–102.6	127	l. 131	195 n. 14, 202 n. 6
102.6–103.4	124	l. 132–138	33
103.8–10	126	l. 134–138	22
104.2–10	119	l. 138–141	11, 202 n. 5
104.9–10	51	l. 138–146	183
110.1–2	131	l. 142–143	12
111.2–3	132	l. 144	195 n. 14
123.1–2	166	l. 144–146	23
132.5–133.1	167	l. 144–147	66
145.5–6	133	l. 146	147
148.6–11	27	l. 146–151	61
148.11	202	l. 146–179	205 n. 54
149.4–150.1	135	l. 148–149	183
156.9–10	132	l. 154–160	68
164.2–4	52, 165	l. 154–179	183
169.2–5	169	l. 163–167	69
171.4	16	l. 170–172	70
171.5–7	194	l. 170–173	122

1. 180	67	29.1–2	195
1. 180–186	185	29.2–30.3	200
1. 187f	185	30.3–4	200
1. 192f	186	30.6–31.2	200
1. 192–194	39	31.2–4	200
1. 193–195	47	31.4–35.7	200
		32.1–2	200
<i>Paramalaghumāñjūśā</i>		34.4–35.1	200
2	105	35.3–6	200
5	105	37.1–2	200
243	100	38.1–39.2	200
243–244	92	51.6–8	200
263	102	52.4–6	200
281	108	52.6–9	200
		55.12–13	199
<i>Pratyākhyānasamgraha</i>		60.1	200
colophon	176	61.4–62.2	200
		96.8–9	200
<i>Praudhamanoramā</i>		99.4–5	200
122.3	125	100.2–3	200
163.4–164.3	122	100.3	200
<i>Śabdakaustubha</i>		<i>Tattvadarśa</i>	
120.23–25	24	76.15	197
460	77	<i>Vijayā</i>	
<i>Siddhāntakaumudī</i>		207.12–17	197
on sutra	231	212.7–9	196
	150		
	236		
	329		
	416		
	435		
	2099		
	2186		
	2193		
	2348	137, 138	
	2399	184	
	2473	15	
	2476	76, 182	
	2553	184	
	2579	19	
<i>Sphoṭavāda</i>			
1	105		
5.1	200		
5.8–8.11	104		
8.4–5	199		