

A Comparative Study of the *Majjhima-nikāya*

Volume 1

(Introduction, Studies of Discourses 1 to 90)

Anālayo

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Dharma Drum Buddhist College Series

In 1994, Master Sheng Yen (1931–2009), the founder of Dharma Drum Buddhist College, began publishing the Series of the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies. The purposes of publishing this series were: to provide a venue for academic research in Buddhist Studies supported by scholarships from the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies; to encourage top-quality Buddhist research; and to cultivate an interest in Buddhist research among the readership of the series. Moreover, by encouraging co-operation with international research institutions, he hoped to promote the domestic status of the academic study of Buddhism.

In keeping with Master Sheng Yen's vision, in order to promote different aspects of exchange in academic research, we at Dharma Drum Buddhist College have begun to publish three educational series:

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The Research Series (DDBC-RS) is primarily intended as a venue for academic research in the field of Buddhist Studies in general and of Chinese Buddhism in particular. The Translation Series (DDBC-TS) will present English renditions of Chinese canonical works as well as other important works, or else Chinese translations of academic publications on Buddhism that have appeared in European languages or Japanese, etc. The Special Series (DDBC-SS) will accommodate works which require special publication formats.

Among our future goals is the extensive development of Buddhist digital publishing and information to adapt to the interactive and hyper-connective environment of the Web 2.0 age. This will allow research outcomes to be quickly shared and evaluated through the participation of individual users, through such media as blogs, shared tagging, wikis, social networks and so on. Our hope is to work towards developing an open environment for academic studies (perhaps called Science 2.0) on Buddhist culture that will be more collaborative and efficient than traditional academic studies. In this way, Dharma Drum Buddhist College will continue to help foster the availability of digital resources for Buddhist Studies.

Huimin Bhikṣu, President
Dharma Drum Buddhist College
July 26, 2010

Foreword

This book presents a comparative study of the discourses that make up the Pāli *Majjhima-nikāya*, alongside their known parallels transmitted in other reciter traditions and preserved in various languages, mainly in Chinese translations.

The field of comparative *Nikāya-Āgama* studies dates back a century to the groundbreaking work of Anesaki Masaharu.¹ It has recently entered a period of rapid growth, and in the present book the venerable Anālayo contributes substantially to this newly invigorated branch of Buddhist Studies. The only real forerunner to this study is *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya*, by Thich Minh Chau.² Whereas Minh Chau's book is organised according to the Chinese *Madhyama-āgama*, the present study is organised according to the Pāli *Majjhima-nikāya*. It differs further in dealing with all the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses and in taking account of a maximally wide range of known parallel discourses. These include not only discourses contained in the Chinese Āgamas, but also individual Chinese translations, Tibetan translations, fragmentary Sanskrit remains, and some quotations found in later texts - together with full or partial parallels from within the Pāli Tipiṭaka. Thus, the present work, despite having a broadly similar objective to Minh Chau's study, differs from it significantly in covering an entire *Nikāya* in light of all its known parallels.

The main bulk of the book is made up of chapters 1 to 15, which correspond to the fifteen *vaggas* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*. In these chapters, each of the discourses making up those *vaggas* is examined alongside its parallel(s), with regard to structure, contents, and other essential features. Generally, this comparison reveals broad agreement among the different versions, but often enough it brings to light significant differences in detail. Such differences are then discussed in terms of their possible historical causes: sectarian doctrinal slant, the vicissitudes of oral transmission, insertion of commentarial material, translation errors, and so on. Where possible, a judgement is then made on which of the versions is most likely to have accurately preserved this or that component of the message.

Such analytical procedures raise some crucial issues of methodology, which are duly discussed in the book's Preface. There the author draws attention to the traditional criterion of coherence and consistency, which is invoked repeatedly in the Buddha's discourses. With good reason he adopts this criterion as a basic methodological principle for the study. Any perceived instance of incoherence in the texts being studied (for example, mutually contradictory statements within a discourse or between versions of a discourse) is deemed to require explanation in terms of faulty oral transmission or some other historical process. At the same time, the author acknowledges the difficulty of deciding what constitutes an instance of incoherence or inconsistency; for example, statements that seem to contradict each other could instead be complementing each other.

¹ Anesaki 1908.

² Minh Chau 1964/1991.

Explanation in terms of transmission errors requires at least a preliminary concept of how the discourses might have been committed to memory and then passed on within the Sangha. The author provides the basis for such a concept by discussing characteristics of oral transmission within Buddhist traditions.

Having initiated this discussion of oral transmission in the Introduction, the author subsequently develops it in the Conclusion. He also brings into consideration outcomes of relevant psychological research. An example is the proposition that, whereas the Vedic style of memorization would have been conducive to accurate verbatim replication, the Buddhist style would have been conducive to inference-drawing and consequent restructuring of the memorized material. Such observations reveal a characteristic of the oral transmission that has not previously received due recognition: not all of the variations between different versions of a discourse can be attributed to conscious editing. By thus drawing attention to the role of the reciters, this section incidentally provides a welcome human context for the findings of the text-comparative side of the project.

Particularly instructive is the discussion of the probable role of commentary in modifying memorized discourses. Here the author examines how the distinction between discourse and commentary appears to have become blurred. The examples cited demonstrate how a discrepancy between a Pāli *sutta* and its Chinese parallel can be explained in terms of unconscious incorporation of commentarial material.

The Conclusion, and with it the entire work, finishes up with a simple but significant observation: the study has revealed no evidence that any particular line of transmission has preserved the discourses more faithfully than the others. An implication of this is that the researcher should not rely exclusively on any one version of the *Nikāyas/Āgamas*. In particular, study of the Pāli *Nikāyas* alone can yield only a partial and imperfect picture. For a maximally complete and clear picture, the Pāli *suttas* must be compared with their available Chinese and other parallels.

In carrying out this project, the venerable Anālayo has established a challenging precedent. It is to be hoped that this book will inspire the production of similarly comprehensive studies based on the remaining Pāli *Nikāyas* and their Chinese counterparts.

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August 2010

Preface: Research Scope and Purpose

The present work is a revised version of my habilitation research, conducted under Professor Michael Hahn at the University of Marburg, which had as its point of departure my wish to come to a better understanding of the discourses found in the *Majjhima-nikāya*. I had earlier undertaken a study of the *Satipatthāna-sutta* found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* for my PhD, during the course of which the significance of the parallels to this discourse preserved in Chinese had become increasingly evident to me. The successful conclusion of my PhD in 2000 afforded me the time to learn Chinese (and eventually Tibetan), equipped with which it was only natural to embark on a comparative study of the *Satipatthāna-sutta*, followed by extending this research and examining to the other discourses found in the same collection in the light of their parallels preserved by other reciter traditions, extant mainly in Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan.³ In what follows, I present the results of these studies in the sequence in which the respective discourses occur in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, thereby providing a kind of modern commentary to each of the Pāli discourses.⁴

My examination of differences between various versions of a discourse is undertaken not only from the perspective of textual transmission, but also from the viewpoint of their implications for doctrinal aspects of early Buddhism, thus combining a textual study with a study of the thought world of early Buddhism.⁵ However, my main focus

³ While my study is deeply indebted to Minh Chau 1964/1991, it differs in that I take into account all discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and examine them in the light not only of their *Madhyama-āgama* parallels, but also take into account parallels found in the other three Chinese Āgamas, in individual Chinese translations, in Sanskrit fragments and Tibetan texts, and in a few instances in parallels preserved in other languages. Although drawing mainly on the early discourses, I have at times taken into account relevant material from the *Vinayas*, and from works of the *jātaka* or *avadāna* type, whenever possible. With a few exceptions, I have not consulted discourse quotations found in later works and treatises. To attempt to do so in a comprehensive way would have stretched the scope of my research beyond the bounds of feasibility. In those instances where I have been able to include relevant instances, for works like the *Abhidharmaśābhāṣya* or the *Yogācārabhūmi* I usually add references to the Chinese version(s) alongside the Sanskrit text, but not to the Tibetan.

⁴ The decision to take a Pāli discourse collection as my starting point does not intend to present a value judgement of the Pāli *Nikāyas* as such. Instead, it simply reflects the fact that the Pāli *Nikāyas* have preserved the most complete body of texts representative of early Buddhist literature that has been transmitted by a single Buddhist school. Since my study is based on a Pāli discourse collection, I have decided to use Pāli terminology (except for anglicized terms like Dharma and the term Nirvāṇa) in my discussion and when translating from Chinese, etc. (without in each case marking such usage with a *), at times even when referring to sources that are originally in Sanskrit. With this I do not intend to present Pāli terminology as being in principle preferable. Rather, my decision is simply guided by the wish to make reading easier through introducing some degree of consistency in the use of proper names and to facilitate comparison with the Pāli discourses. By using Pāli terms, I also do not intend to take a position on the Indic original on which the Chinese or other translations were based. For transcribing Chinese characters I use the *pīn-yīn* (拼音) system, for Romanizing Tibetan the system devised by Wylie 1959. On my use of the notion of a “parallel” cf. below p. 1035.

⁵ When studying the discourses of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, I have tried to draw on secondary publications as

is on those formal differences and textual characteristics that can contribute to an understanding of the early discourses as testimonies of the early Buddhist oral tradition.

This focus on an understanding of the early Buddhist oral tradition naturally leads me to an emphasis on the Pāli *Nikāyas* and the Chinese Āgamas, since these are entire collections of texts transmitted by particular reciter traditions. In order to reach a maximum degree of comprehensiveness and to fully explore the potential of the discourse material preserved in Chinese,⁶ in addition to these collections I have also tried to take into account parallels to a particular *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse found outside of the Āgamas. Thus my comparative studies also cover a number of individual Chinese translations, discourses that have been translated “individually” or singly, in as much as I have been aware of their paralleling a *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse.

Some of these individual Chinese translations date back to the very beginnings of organized translation activity in the second century AD and are thus fascinating testimonies to the endeavour and the struggles of the Chinese translators, who stood at the beginning of a translation enterprise that produced one of the most extensive collections of translated material in the history of mankind. The gap they had to bridge could not have been wider, as they had to come to grips with the thoroughly structured grammar of Sanskrit and Middle Indic languages, even though their native language knew no equivalent to these.⁷ The difficulties involved in bridging this gap have inevitably influenced

much as these were known and available to me. The broad scope of my work has prevented me from undertaking a more exhaustive survey of relevant publications, hence my references are only meant to provide a starting point for further bibliographical research by those interested in following up a particular topic. I also need to mention that limitations of space and time have not made it possible for me to discuss various theories or propositions advanced in some of these secondary publications. Thus often I just refer to a comment or a proposition that seems to me significant and worthwhile quoting, without thereby necessarily agreeing with points made elsewhere in the same publication. Another shortcoming I would like to put on record is that my ignorance of Japanese has prevented me from taking into account research published in that language (except for editions of Sanskrit texts).

⁶ Regarding the potential and importance of the material preserved in Chinese, de Jong 1968: 15 comments that “no student of Buddhism, even if he is interested only in Indian Buddhism, can neglect the enormous corpus of Chinese translations”; cf. also de Jong 1974: 76–78. As Lancaster 1979: 224–226 points out, “in the Chinese canon we have an invaluable source of evidence ... with some assurance that those translators knew their craft and practiced it with vigour and accuracy”. He notes that “writing was of necessity the skill of a learned person ... important manuscripts were given to the most educated and skilled calligraphers for copying ... the result of the Chinese scribal procedure has been great accuracy in the transmission of the texts”. Carrithers 1983a: 8 sums up that “though the Pali texts are still the single most useful source ... in many respects they can be corrected and improved by readings from the Central Asian finds or from Tibetan and Chinese. Certainly the Tibetan and Chinese sources are indispensable for establishing what the oldest sources are”.

⁷ Link 1961: 283–284 notes that the early Chinese Buddhists lacked “both the terminology and even the conceptual framework for handling formal linguistic and grammatical problems”, in fact “the very notion of what constitutes a ‘word’ led to enormous difficulties”, as “Chinese has no inflectional morphology”, so that “a word was a logograph, a ‘character’” and “as such it was felt by the Chinese to be immutable”. Moreover, “gender (unknown in Chinese) seems to have impressed Chinese Buddhist philologists as something quite strange”. Besides, there were “the difficulties of grasping an alphabetic, as opposed to a

the quality of the translations undertaken during this period, so that the Chinese of such individual translations can at times be cryptic and difficult to understand, and translation errors have inevitably left their impact on the present shape of these discourses. Nevertheless, at times they offer interesting perspectives on a particular passage.⁸

My studies in the following pages are mainly based on reporting and examining differences that to me seem relevant from the viewpoint of the respective *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse.⁹ When comparing different versions of a discourse, one is inevitably

logographic, writing system". Nattier 1990: 208 explains that "it would be difficult to find two more dissimilar languages than Chinese and Sanskrit (or Prakrit). The language families to which they belong are totally unrelated, their grammars are a study in contrasts, and they shared (at least prior to the arrival of Buddhism in China) virtually no vocabulary in common"; cf. also von Humboldt 1836/2003: 138.

⁸ A proper understanding of such discourses requires a detailed study of and familiarity with the translation terminology of the respective translator(s), whose identity often needs first of all to be ascertained (cf., e.g., the survey in Nattier 2008). Since I lack such specialist knowledge, my studies of these individual translations remain to some degree provisional and I had to rest content with simply giving the identity of the translator as recorded in the Taishō edition, without attempting to ascertain the probability of such identifications or trying to determine the precise time of translation. The broad scope of my research has made such more detailed investigations impossible.

⁹ In regard to translation terminology, in general I just follow the established renderings. Thus while in Anālayo 2003a I used "cognition" for *saññā*, now I follow the example of Skilling 1997a: 477 note 31 and adopt the more frequently used rendering "perception", although perhaps "(conceptual) identification" (cf. Potter 1996: 128) would best convey the implications of the term. Key terms where I depart from the standard renderings are *bodhi*, *dukkha*, and *satipaṭṭhāna*. By rendering *bodhi* as "awakening", instead of "enlightenment", I follow suggestions made by Migot 1952: 450 and Norman 1990: 26, cf. also Collins 1998: 213. They point out that *√budh* means to "wake up" or "awaken", and does not bear a relation to light, cf., e.g., MN 54 at MN I 365,31, where *paṭibuddho* describes someone who wakes up from sleep. In fact, although MN 4 at MN I 23,26 presents the Buddha's awakening as the overcoming of the darkness of ignorance, *avijjā vihatā ... tamo vihato*, and AN 4:144 at AN II 140,2 speaks of wisdom as a supreme light, *paññobhāso*, AN 3:89 at AN I 236,17, AN 7:3 at AN IV 3,9, and Th 906 compare the experience of Nirvāṇa, equivalent to *bodhi*, to the extinction of a light, instead of the appearance of a light. Even the expression *āloko udapādi*, used in relation to the Buddha's awakening in SN 56:11 at SN V 422,5, does not seem to refer to the arising of "light", but rather to the arising of "clarity" (cf. also the definition of *ālokasaññī* in Vibh 254,13, and the point made by Gokhale 1989: 6 that any manifestation of the element fire, *teja*, would be absent from the *Nibbānic* experience, e.g., Ud 8:1 at Ud 80,11). Gimello 2004: 50 comments that "those who are attentive to the more literal meaning of the Indic original tend to translate *bodhi* in English as 'awakening', and this is to be recommended". In regard to *dukkha*, although this term at times stands for "pain" as a felt experience, in other contexts it covers all types of feeling, instances where a translation as "suffering" runs the risk of being misleading (cf. also, e.g., Collins 1998: 140, Gowans 2003: 120-121, Malalasekera 1968: 72, and Werner 2007: 13; on the different nuances covered by *dukkha* cf. Hoffman 1987/1992: 27-45 and Schmithausen 1977). Thus, for such contexts, it would be better to render *dukkha* as "unsatisfactory", although I generally tend to simply use the Pāli term, without translating it (in fact Bailey 2003: 32 concludes that "*dukkha* is an untranslatable word connoting unsatisfactoriness, disillusionment, anxiety, physical pain and insecurity in every possible modulation and dimension"). In regard to *satipaṭṭhāna*, I understand this term to refer to the "establishing of mindfulness", deriving it from *sati* + *upatti*hāna; for a more detailed discussion cf. Anālayo 2003a: 29; cf. also Klaus 1993: 78, who translates *satipaṭṭhāna* as "the standing near of attention", and AN 4:202 at AN II 218,29: *attanā ca upaṭhitasati hoti, parañ ca satipaṭṭhāne samādapeti*, which, as

confronted with the need to choose which details merit explicit treatment, in fact, nothing short of a complete translation of all versions could do full justice to all the similarities and variations found between the different versions of a discourse.

Ideally, a comparative study of the different versions of a discourse should proceed by establishing a critical edition of all texts involved, followed by preparing synoptic translations. In view of the broad scope of my study and the considerable number of texts taken into consideration, to provide such critical editions and synoptic translations would require a lifetime of work and result in a publication of a size exceeding a translation of the four Pāli *Nikāyas*.¹⁰ Due to the restrictions that naturally result from the compass of my research, the following pages can only give a first survey of the material, an overview that is in need of being supplemented by more detailed studies of each individual discourse.

Moreover, the original research on which the present publication is based was undertaken as an academic project that had to be completed within three years. This inevitably led to a number of errors and slips, caused by working on a large number of texts in various languages within a short period of time. In the years that have passed since the successful completion of this tour de force in 2007, I have revised my studies and hopefully been able to redress most of these errors, although time has not permitted me to redo the whole research completely from the outset, hence it is to be expected that some slips will have escaped me.

As part of the process of revision, I have also published a range of articles in which I provide translations of selected discourses that, during the course of my research, had attracted my attention.¹¹ Such studies provide a more precise picture of the particular discourse in question than possible within the context of my present survey of a whole collection in the light of its parallels.

Kuan 2008: 104 points out, provides a good basis for understanding the etymology of *satipatthāna*, as in this passage “*satipatthāna* is evidently rephrasing *upatthitasati*”; cf. also the Śrāvakabhūmi, ŠSG 2007: 180,13 (or Shukla 1973: 293,16): *yā sūpasthitasmṛtī, idam ucyate smṛter upasthānam*.

¹⁰ Although the scope of my research has made it impossible to establish a critical edition of each text, when quoting passages from the Pāli discourses in a footnote I have attempted to note some of the variations (except for such variations as, e.g., between *b* and *v*) that are found in the Burmese (B^e), Ceylonese (C^e), and Siamese (S^e) editions, in comparison with the PTS edition, on which I base myself. I did not consult the Nālandā edition, since according to Hamm 1962: 359 this mainly reproduces the Burmese edition, with some additional variant readings. In regard to Chinese texts, I base myself on the CBETA edition of the Taishō (大正). For Āgama discourses, I also consulted the Fó-guāng (佛光) edition, which, although being based on the Taishō, has the advantage of a superior punctuation and rich footnotes. In the case of Sanskrit texts such as the *Divyāvadāna* or the *Lalitavistara*, etc., I provide references to the early editions by Cowell, Lefmann, etc., and also to the new editions, in the hope that this will facilitate quick finding of the relevant passage in whichever edition is more easily available to the reader (for the same reason, for works of art I list several publications that at times have the same image). For Tibetan texts, I have consulted the Derge (D) and the Peking (Q) editions. When quoting various text editions, I have at times standardized, adjusted punctuation, etc., for the sake of conformity and better readability.

¹¹ Several of these articles can be downloaded at <http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/pdf/analayo/publications.htm>

In sum, I am afraid that my work will not be able to satisfy high standards of precision, as it is not based on the in-depth understanding that results from translating all of the consulted texts. Hence my study cannot replace, and is certainly not intended to replace, more detailed studies of each single discourse, which alone will be able to clarify the finer points and differences.

What my research does offer, however, could be compared to a picture taken with a wide-angle lens. A wide-angle lens picture provides a comprehensive vision, yet at the same time it has the inevitable drawback that smaller details do not stand out with the clarity and precision that would result from a close-up. To use yet another image, my present research is somewhat like fishing with a big meshed net. Even though smaller ‘fish’ will inevitably escape me, the big ‘fish’ that I bring home hopefully justify my approach.

My research falls into the field of textual studies in early canonical Buddhism, in the sense that it presents a comparative study of the legacy of discourse material preserved by the reciters, the *bhāṇakas*.¹² It is their presentation of the teachings that I am investigating,¹³ based on considering their legacy as source material for early Buddhist thought that deserves to be taken seriously.¹⁴

¹² In order to reflect the oral nature of the discourses that are the objects of my study, I employ the term “reciter” (*bhāṇaka*) to refer to those who were responsible for their production and transmission. It seems to me that, just as we would not refer to the *Majjhima-nikāya* as a “book” or to its discourses as “papers”, similarly it would be preferable to avoid terms like “editors” or “redactors”. The discourses of the *Majjhima-nikāya* are not the final product of an editorial process of the type we are familiar with, or of the activities of one or several redactors or authors, comparable to what we know from our modern day publishing or reading experiences. Instead, these discourses came into being orally, their subsequent function was within an entirely oral setting, and their transmission took place for centuries just by oral means; cf. also the discussion in chapter 16.

¹³ Thus when using expressions such as, for example, ‘the Buddha said to Brahmā’, I certainly do not intend to convey that the historical Buddha certainly said so, nor do I postulate the existence of Brahmā. Instead, I only intend to indicate that the reciters of the discourses report the Buddha to have spoken in a certain way to Brahmā. It would become cumbersome reading if in every such instance I were to mention explicitly that I only represent the point of view of the discourses.

¹⁴ Bronkhorst 1998a: 12 suggests that “rather than rejecting beforehand the whole canon … I propose … [that] in principle the canon preserves the teachings of the Buddha, but in practice certain ideas and practices presented in it have to be discarded for specifiable reasons”. De Jong 1993: 21 and 25 explains that “the fact that these texts were transmitted for centuries before being written down … makes them … unreliable witnesses to historical events … but they give us much information about the teachings of early Buddhism”. According to him, “it would be hypercritical to assert that nothing can be said about the doctrine of earliest Buddhism … the basic ideas of Buddhism as found in the canonical writings could very well have been proclaimed by him [the Buddha], transmitted and developed by his disciples and, finally, codified in fixed formulas”. Frauwallner 1953: 465 voices his disagreement with those who treat the canonical texts as totally unreliable, believing that nothing certain can be said about the teachings of the Buddha (“ebenso wenig kann ich mich aber auch der Auffassung anschließen, welche die kanonische Überlieferung des Buddhismus für vollkommen unglaubwürdig hält und … meint, daß es aussichtslos sei, über die Lehre des Buddha selbst irgendetwas Sicheres ermitteln zu wollen”). He suggests that the transmitted texts are not unreliable merely because they are not confirmed by external

In my attempt to comprehend early Buddhist thought, I approach the discourses on their own terms. Here a key aspect seems to me to be that, in the thought world of the early discourses, the principle of coherence is a central argument in debate situations.¹⁵ As soon as it can be shown that an earlier statement is not consistent with a later proposition, a position becomes untenable.¹⁶

Taking a lead from the principle of coherence evident in such contexts as a basic element of early Buddhist thought, my present exploration is based on applying this principle of coherence to the early discourses themselves. That is, inconsistencies between various discourses or between different versions of a discourse are in need of explanation, or else point to some problem in textual transmission.¹⁷

To approach the early discourses in this manner would be in accordance with the four great standards (*mahāpadesa*) that the discourses themselves present as a means for scriptural verification.¹⁸ According to these four great standards, the consistency of a particular text with other texts regarded as canonical is the criterion to be used to determine if this text can be considered as authentic.¹⁹

proofs (“überliefertes Quellenmaterial ist noch nicht unglaublich, wenn die äußere Bezeugung fehlt”). Those who nevertheless wish to reject the value of such material would according to him also have the duty to explain and establish how this material has come into being (“wer sie [die kanonischen Texte] aber trotzdem verwirft, darf sich nicht auf die bloße Verneinung beschränken, sondern hat die Pflicht, auch ihr Zustandekommen zu erklären und zu begründen”). A more detailed discussion of the historical value of the Pāli discourses will be forthcoming in Anālayo 2012e.

¹⁵ Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 334 points out that “in the Nikāyas, consistency is regarded as a criterion of truth”, and Vetter 1988: ix sees no “reason for accepting … inconsistency as a characteristic of” ancient Buddhism; cf. also Watanabe 1983/1996: 74-75.

¹⁶ E.g., MN 56 at MN I 377,10: “your earlier [statement] does not fit with your later [statement], nor does your later [statement] fit with your earlier [statement],” *na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchimam pacchimena vā purimam*, and its parallel MĀ 133 at T I 629b29: “[in regard to] what you said, the earlier deviates from the later, and the later deviates from the earlier, there is thus no correspondence,” 汝之所說, 前與後違, 後與前違, 則不相應.

¹⁷ This would be in line with the methodological observations by Bronkhorst 2000b: 32 (or id. 2009: 8), who suggests that contradictory positions need to be examined in order to see if one of them could be due to the influence of external or later developments (although my criteria for considering something as contradictory are not necessarily the same as his, cf. also the remark by Gethin 2004a: 209 that at times “focusing on the divergent and incompatible in the early Buddhist accounts of the path and goal is a classic instance of a failure to see the wood for the trees”). Reat 1996: 34 recommends that one should “assume that the historical Buddha’s teaching were coherent, if not perhaps rigidly systematic, when they were given. Therefore any reconstruction of these teachings should reveal a coherent framework of doctrine”. Therefore, according to Schmithausen 1981: 200, “when there are instances of incoherence, they will have to be taken seriously and will need to be explained (e.g., by reference to textual history ...)”.

¹⁸ In the Pāli discourses, these four great standards are described in DN 16 at DN II 123,30 and AN 4:180 at AN II 167,31; for a comparative study of these four cf. Lamotte 1947.

¹⁹ Tilakaratne 2000b: 14 explains that the delivery of the *mahāpadesas* is based on the premise “that what is called Dhamma and Vinaya is characterised by internal consistency and coherence”; on the significance of the *mahāpadesas* cf. also, e.g., An 2002/2003, Cousins 1983: 2-3, Nimanong 2006: 82, and Wynne 2004: 100-104, just to mention a few out of the range of publications on this topic.

Ideas of coherence or consistency are, however, time- and culture-bound. Here I think it is of relevance that ancient Indian thought knows a so-called ‘four-fold logic’, the tetralemma. The four alternatives of this tetralemma are a recurrent feature in the early Buddhist discourses, where they frequently occur in analytical expositions. Thus, for example, four types of person are distinguished into those that:

- torment themselves,
- torment others,
- torment both,
- torment neither.

Another example is when four modes of action are treated under the headings of being:

- dark action,
- bright action,
- dark-and-bright action,
- neither-dark-nor-bright action.²⁰

When applying ideas of coherence or consistency to early Buddhist thought, I think this four-fold approach needs to be kept in mind. Of particular relevance is the third possibility envisaged by the tetralemma, according to which differences need not always be contradictory, but can also be complementary. That is, propositions that at first sight seem to conflict with each other might on closer inspection turn out to tally.²¹

Another aspect of considerable importance for a proper assessment of the early discourses is the oral nature of their transmission. In order to provide some background to this oral nature, in what follows I survey oral aspects of the *Majjhima-nikāya* and of its discourses. I come back to the theme of oral transmission in the concluding chapter of my study, where based on the findings of modern psychological research on textual memory I attempt to develop a clearer idea of the dynamics of the early Buddhist oral tradition and of the processes that appear to have been responsible for the variations found between different versions of a discourse.

²⁰ MN 51 at MN I 341,2 and MN 57 at MN I 389,21, cf. below pp. 309 and 333; cf. also the discussion in, e.g., Hoffman 1982 and Sturm 1996: 53-63.

²¹ To allow for this possibility might offer a helpful perspective on some of the ‘problems’ of early Buddhist philosophy. A case in point would be the much-discussed variants to the twelve-link presentation of dependent arising, *paticca samuppāda*, that involve less than twelve links. Instead of considering these as problematic, perhaps such variants could just be seen as different applications of the same basic principle of dependent arising (cf. SN 12.20 at SN II 26,4), which can express itself ‘in terms of’ the twelve links and ‘not in terms of’ the twelve-links. The result of applying the third possibility from the tetralemma scheme in this way would be in line with a conclusion arrived at by Jones 2009a: 34 in his recent research on the early Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising, which according to him “may have been understood as consisting not in a definite number of dependently-arisen terms, but as a flexible mode of presentation using five, nine, ten or twelve links”. Therefore, “rather than asking how the twelve-fold formulation came to be constituted from smaller units, the historical problem should be reframed as that of explaining how it came to be regarded as standard”.

Introduction: The *Majjhima-nikāya*

The *Majjhima-nikāya*, the “middle [length] collection”, takes its name from the intermediate length of nearly all of the discourses collected in this second of the four Pāli *Nikāyas*.²² The *Majjhima-nikāya* assembles its one-hundred-fifty-two discourses in fifteen chapters, grouped into three main subdivisions, three sets of “fifty”. While fourteen out of these fifteen chapters have ten discourses each, one chapter has twelve discourses. Due to this chapter with twelve discourses, the last of these three main subdivisions has fifty-two discourses, even though its title is *uparipaññāsa*, “final fifty”.²³

Regarding these three “fifties”, although their contents cannot be neatly set apart from each other, a closer investigation reveals some differences among them.²⁴ Thus in the first set of fifty, a monk or a group of monks make up the audience in over seventy per cent of the discourses, and in the final fifty the same is the case for close to ninety per cent of the discourses (including one discourse spoken to nuns). In the middle fifty, only about twenty-five per cent of the discourses are addressed to a monk or a group of monks, even though one of the five subdivisions of this fifty is a “chapter on monks”, *Bhikkhu-vagga*, entirely spoken to monks.

In the first set of fifty, Sāriputta is the author of most of the discourses spoken by disciples, followed by Mahāmoggallāna.²⁵ In the middle fifty, Ānanda is the most prominent speaker of discourses spoken by disciples, followed by Sāriputta.²⁶ In the final fifty, Sāriputta and Ānanda are the speakers of the same number of discourses.²⁷ While in the first

²² Sv I 23,8: “What is the middle collection? The discourses of middle length, collected in fifteen chapters, beginning with the ‘discourse on the root instruction’, one-hundred-and-fifty-two discourses”, *katamo majjhimanikāyo? majjhimappamāṇāni pañcadasavaggasāṅgahāni mūlapariyāyasuttiādīni diyaḍḍhasatañ dve ca suttāni*. Horner 1954/1967: x interprets this definition to imply that “middle” could also refer to the number of discourses found in the present collection. However, the “long collection”, *Dīgha-nikāya*, counts only thirty-four discourses, so that on this interpretation the “long” collection should rather be called the “short” collection, as it has the least number of discourses. Moreover, the other two *Nikāyas* receive their name from the type of discourse they contain, this being either discourses collected according to topic (*samyutta*) or according to numerical principles (*anuttara*), titles not related to the quantity of discourses these collections contain.

²³ Norman 1983a: 48; for a more detailed discussion cf. below p. 765.

²⁴ Extracts of the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2010m. Several points made in the present introduction and in my subsequent studies have also appeared in Sujāto 2005, occasionally with explicit acknowledgement of their provenance from draft versions of my studies, which I had circulated among friends in 2003 and 2004, cf., e.g., Sujāto 2005: 72 note 115.

²⁵ MN 3, MN 5, MN 9, MN 28, and MN 43 are spoken by Sāriputta, whereas MN 15 and MN 50 are spoken by Mahāmoggallāna. To the last two, MN 37 could perhaps be added, since although my survey only takes into account discourses that are attributed as a whole to a particular monk, not discourses where a monk plays a secondary role by making a shorter remark or asking a question, etc., Mahāmoggallāna’s role in MN 37 seems to be rather central.

²⁶ MN 52, MN 53, MN 76, and MN 88 are spoken by Ānanda; MN 69 and MN 97 are spoken by Sāriputta.

²⁷ MN 108, MN 123, and MN 132 are spoken by Ānanda; MN 114, MN 141, and MN 143 are spoken by Sāriputta (I consider MN 144 as a discourse spoken by Channa).

set of fifty Ānanda never features as the author of a discourse, Mahāmoggallāna does not appear as the speaker of any of the discourses among the middle and final fifties.

A to some degree distinct character of each of the three fifties is also reflected in their respective settings. In the first set of fifty, the Jeta's Grove monologue given by the Buddha to an unspecified number of monks is by far the most frequent type of setting,²⁸ whereas the same is completely absent from the middle fifty, whose discourses almost entirely consist of dialogues.²⁹ In the final fifty the Jeta's Grove monologue given by the Buddha to the monks recurs again with almost the same frequency as in the first set of fifty.³⁰

The middle fifty also stands out for containing more verse material than the other two fifties.³¹ The chapter headings of the middle fifty further set it apart from the other two fifties, as in the middle fifty each chapter is consistently named after the type of audience to which its discourses are spoken. Thus the chapters of the middle fifty are on:

- householders,
- monks,
- wanderers,
- kings,
- Brahmins.³²

In contrast, the chapter headings in the first fifty and in the final fifty vary, being based on one of the following principles:

- the discourse that stands at the beginning of the chapter,³³
- a particular theme treated in this chapter,³⁴
- the grouping principle applied in the chapter.³⁵

²⁸ MN 2, MN 6, MN 11, MN 16, MN 17, MN 19, MN 20, MN 25, MN 33, MN 45, MN 46, MN 47, and MN 49.

²⁹ The only monologue is MN 69, given by Sāriputta at the Bamboo Grove.

³⁰ MN 102, MN 111, MN 112, MN 113, MN 117, MN 120, MN 130, MN 131, MN 137, MN 139, MN 148, and MN 149. For a survey of the locations associated with *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses cf. also Shiraishi 1996: 150-155.

³¹ Although the number of discourses in which verses are found is distributed in an ascending manner over the three fifties, with six discourses in the first fifty that contain verse (MN 7, MN 12, MN 26, MN 34, MN 49, and MN 50), eight discourses in the middle fifty (MN 53, MN 56, MN 75, MN 82, MN 86, MN 91, MN 92, and MN 98), and nine discourses in the final fifty (MN 116, MN 128, MN 130, MN 131, MN 132, MN 133, MN 134, MN 142, and MN 143), the verse sections in the middle fifty are rather long, so that in terms of overall percentage the middle fifty has about 53% of the verse material found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* as a whole, while the first fifty has about 14% and the final fifty about 33%. For a concordance of *Majjhima-nikāya* verses cf. Franke 1912.

³² These are the *Gahapati-vagga* (6th chapter), the *Bhikkhu-vagga* (7th), the *Paribbājaka-vagga* (8th), the *Rāja-vagga* (9th), and the *Brāhmaṇa-vagga* (10th).

³³ The *Mūlapariyāya-vagga* (1st chapter), the *Sīhanāda-vagga* (2nd), the *Devadaha-vagga* (11th), the *Anupada-vagga* (12th), and the *Suññata-vagga* (13th) appear to take their title from the first discourse found in each chapter. Von Hinüber 1998: 108 notes that the same principle is also found frequently in the *Jātaka* collection, where *vaggas* tend to be titled after the first tale that occurs in them.

³⁴ The *Salayatana-vagga* (15th chapter) appears to take its title from the theme treated in the discourses collected under this heading.

The different character of the three fifties can also be seen by surveying the way some themes are treated in them. While among the first set of fifty comprehensive instructions on mindfulness can be found in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*,³⁶ the final fifty takes up aspects of *satipaṭṭhāna* practice – mindfulness of breathing, mindfulness of the body, and the four noble truths – and dedicates a whole discourse to exploring each of these three aspects in additional detail.³⁷

Again, while discourses in the first set of fifty offer autobiographical information on the Buddha's pre-awakening experiences as a bodhisattva,³⁸ the second set of fifty takes up the same from a broader temporal perspective, as it includes canonical *Jātakas*, descriptions of the bodhisattva's previous lives.³⁹

A progression from basic instructions to a more detailed presentation can to some extent also be discerned in relation to teachings on insight.⁴⁰ Prominent among the range of insight-related instructions found in the first set of fifty are the treatments of the senses and of perceptual experience provided in the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and in the *Madhupiṇḍika-sutta*.⁴¹ The theme broached by these two discourses is examined in more detail in a set of ten discourses dedicated to the sense-spheres and found in the *Salāyatana-vagga*, the last chapter in the *Majjhima-nikāya*.

Another progression can be seen in the description of the conduct of a monk.⁴² Several discourses in the first set of fifty tackle this theme by indicating how a monk can become a true heir of the Dharma; how a monk should overcome blemishes or practise efface-

³⁵ A grouping principle appears to be responsible for the title of the *Opamma-vagga* (3rd chapter, adopting the chapter title found in the Burmese, Ceylonese, and Siamese editions, while the PTS edition reads *Tatiyu-vagga*), *Mahāyamaka-vagga* (4th), *Cūlāyamaka-vagga* (5th), and of the *Vibhaṅga-vagga* (14th).

³⁶ MN 10.

³⁷ MN 118, MN 119, and MN 141.

³⁸ MN 12, MN 26, and MN 36.

³⁹ MN 81 and MN 83.

⁴⁰ The importance of insight-related topics throughout the *Majjhima-nikāya* is reflected in Ps V 109,6, which in its concluding remark speaks of the whole collection as *mahāvipassanā nāmāyan ti vutto*.

⁴¹ MN 1 and MN 18.

⁴² The frequent discussions of the conduct of a monk seem to reflect an overall emphasis in the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection on monastic training. Bailey 2003: 131 notes that *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses “convey a highly didactic Buddhism ... these are teachings extending far beyond the understanding or interest of all but the most highly sophisticated devotee”. Franke 1915 draws attention to the considerably more frequent use of terminology related to *vi + vñī* or *vsikkh* in *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses, compared to *Dīgha-nikāya* discourses. Manné 1990: 79-81 explains that while the *Dīgha-nikāya* collection appears to serve the function of gaining converts and lay supporters (cf. also Franke 1913b: 201, who qualifies the *Dīgha-nikāya* as a propaganda text, “Propagandaschrift”), the purpose of the *Majjhima-nikāya* appears to be “the integration of new monks into the community and into the practice”, as “all of the technicalities of the Teaching appear here in detail” and a number of “sermons on problems connected with the practice and its difficulty” can be found. Thus, while the *Dīgha-nikāya* is more a “collection of publicity material” for the purpose of conversion, the *Majjhima-nikāya* provides the converts “with the fundamentals of the Teaching and the Practice”. Marasinghe 2002a: 565 also observes that “the majority of the discourses of this collection are ... either directly addressed to the ordained disciples ... or are otherwise intended for them”.

ment; what makes a monk easy to admonish; under what conditions a monk should remain in a particular place; and what makes a monk a true recluse.⁴³ The theme of the conduct of a monk recurs in the second and third sets of fifty from a more detailed and *Vinaya*-related perspective, with three discourses among the middle fifty dedicated to the regulation on eating only at the allowable time,⁴⁴ and two discourses among the final fifty laying down procedures to ensure communal harmony after the Buddha's demise.⁴⁵

In sum, the discourses collected in the first set of fifty appear to have a predominantly foundational role, those found in the middle fifty seem to be more narrative, and a number of discourses found in the final fifty are more analytical. Although these are mere tendencies and not organisational principles strictly carried out, the net result is that to some extent the three fifties seem to follow a pattern in which each subdivision builds upon the material that precedes it.⁴⁶

This pattern could be due to the exigencies of oral transmission. According to the *Visuddhimagga*, the three fifties were the three main units for memorization of the *Majjhima-nikāya* and were to be learnt by a prospective reciter one after the other in succession. That is, the reciters would at first memorize the first fifty, and only when this was accomplished would they turn to the middle fifty, and only when these had been successfully committed to memory would they learn the final fifty.⁴⁷ According to the commentary on the *Vinaya*, a monk who wants to become a reciter of the *Majjhima-nikāya* needs to memorize at the very least the first set of fifty.⁴⁸ From this it would follow that the first set of fifty is the minimum that needs to be learned, to which then the middle and the final fifty could be added. Although these descriptions stem from commentarial works, they may well reflect ancient patterns among reciters.

The subdivision into three fifties could then be understood to reflect differences in the memory skills of those who wish to become reciters of the *Majjhima-nikāya*. Reciters of limited talent in memorization may only learn the first fifty, as suggested in the *Vinaya* commentary. In view of this it would only be natural for the first set of fifty to collect discourses that cover the most essential themes required for a monk's training and practice, in order to ensure that even those who learn only the first fifty will be provided with expositions on the most important matters.

⁴³ MN 3, MN 5, MN 8, MN 15, MN 17, MN 39, and MN 40.

⁴⁴ MN 65, MN 66, and MN 70.

⁴⁵ MN 103 and MN 104, a theme that recurs also in MN 108.

⁴⁶ Neumann 1896/1995: xxxvii aptly compares the *mūlapaññāsa* to the foundation, the *majjhimapaññāsa* to the pillars, and the *uparipaññāsa* to the dome of the edifice of the *Majjhima-nikāya*.

⁴⁷ Vism 95,23 indicates that a prospective reciter of the *Majjhima-nikāya* needs to first memorize the first fifty, then the middle fifty, and then the final fifty, *mūlapaññāsaṃ sajjhāyatassa majjhimapaññāsako āgacchatī, tam sajjhāyatassa uparipaññāsako*.

⁴⁸ Sp IV 789,14: *sace majjhimabhāṇako hoti, mūlapaññāsako uggahetabbo*, which forms part of the medium amount of memorization to be undertaken by a monk who would act as a popular preacher. Less is required for just being considered a "learned" monk, but a monk who wishes to teach the nuns should know all three *piṭakas* together with their commentaries.

Reciters with more abilities might then continue and learn also the second fifty. Having learned two fifties would enable them to take up preaching on a broader scale. This might be the underlying rationale for the five chapters assembled in the second fifty, which collect discourses spoken to householders, monks, wanderers, kings, and Brahmins. These five groups are the types of audience that a reciter would address when preaching, so that learning this second set of fifty would provide a selection of discourses related to each of these groups, as occasion demands.

Reciters who train further and become full-fledged *Majjhima-nikāya-bhāṇakas*, in the sense of memorizing all one-hundred-and-fifty-two discourses, would also have at their disposal the more detailed treatments on meditation practice and insight provided in the discourses collected under the third fifty. This would enable such a reciter to be not only a popular preacher, but also to act as a teacher for more advanced disciples and guide them in their practice. In this way, the division into three fifties appears to be well suited to the exigencies of oral transmission.

The pattern that appears to underlie the division of the *Majjhima-nikāya* into three parts could have been the outcome of a gradual growth and shaping of this collection and need not have been the ground plan of the collection right from the outset. In fact, some degree of gradual evolution of the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection can be seen in the distribution of discourses over the various chapters.

Closer inspection shows that the principle of distribution into chapters according to topic has not been adopted throughout the *Majjhima-nikāya* in a consistent way. Even though the fourth and fifth chapters (the *Mahāyamaka-vagga* and the *Cūlāyamaka-vagga*) are devoted to “pairs”, the final part of the fifth chapter no longer contains pairs.⁴⁹ Yet, among the remaining discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* a considerable number of pairs can be found, so that there would have been enough material to fill this chapter with pairs and make its content agree with its title.⁵⁰

Concerning these pairs, it is also notable that they do not occur in a standard sequence, since out of seventeen pairs found in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, nine pairs have the *cūla*-version first,⁵¹ while the other eight pairs list first the respective *mahā*-version.⁵²

⁴⁹ The first two discourses, the *Sāleyyaka-sutta* (MN 41) and the *Verañjaka-sutta* (MN 42), are so similar in content that they can also be reckoned as a pair, but the final four discourses, the *Vīmamsaka-sutta* (MN 47), the *Kosambiya-sutta* (MN 48), the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta* (MN 49), and the *Māratajjanīya-sutta* (MN 50) do not constitute “pairs”.

⁵⁰ Other pairs in the *Majjhima-nikāya* are the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* (MN 11) and the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* (MN 12), the *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta* (MN 13) and the *Cūladukkakkhandha-sutta* (MN 14), the *Cūlāhatthipadopama-sutta* (MN 27) and the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* (MN 28), the *Mahāsāropama-sutta* (MN 29) and the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* (MN 30), the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* (MN 62) and the *Cūlarāhulovāda-sutta* (MN 147), the *Cūlamāluvika-sutta* (MN 63) and the *Mahāmāluvika-sutta* (MN 64), the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* (MN 77) and the *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* (MN 79), the *Mahāpuṇṇama-sutta* (MN 109) and the *Cūlapuṇṇama-sutta* (MN 110), the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* (MN 121) and the *Mahāsuññata-sutta* (MN 122), and the *Cūlakammavibhaṅga-sutta* (MN 135) and the *Mahākammavibhaṅga-sutta* (MN 136).

⁵¹ MN 11, MN 27, MN 31, MN 35, MN 37, MN 45, MN 63, MN 121, and MN 135.

The sixth chapter on householders (*Gahapati-vagga*) contains a discourse spoken to ascetics, the *Kukkuravatika-sutta*, which does not seem to bear any relation to householders.⁵³ The same discourse could have found a better placing in the chapter on wanderers (*Paribbājaka-vagga*), which at present contains a discourse spoken to a householder (who had just come from meeting a wanderer), the *Samayamañḍikā-sutta*.⁵⁴ Here a simple exchange of the two discourses would have done better justice to the respective chapter headings.

In the same sixth chapter on householders (*Gahapati-vagga*) one also finds a discourse spoken to a prince, the *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta*.⁵⁵ This discourse could have found a more suitable placing in the chapter on kings (*Rāja-vagga*), which already has another discourse addressed to a prince, the *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*.⁵⁶ The chapter on kings also has a discourse whose main protagonist is a householder, the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*.⁵⁷ Hence in this case, too, an exchange of the two discourses, by placing the *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta* in the chapter on kings and the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* in the chapter on householders, would have better suited the respective chapter headings.

Even the allocation of discourses to the *Majjhima-nikāya* does not seem to invariably follow a strict principle. Some discourses, such as the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* and the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*, are rather long and could well have found a suitable placing in the *Dīgha-nikāya*.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the discourses collected in the final chapter of the *Majjhima-nikāya* are quite brief when compared to the average length of a middle long discourse. As they all deal with the sense-spheres, it almost seems as if this chapter were an extract from the *Salāyatana-vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*.⁵⁹

The examples surveyed so far do not give the impression that the arrangement of discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* is the result of a preconceived fixed plan that was carried out with thorough precision. Instead, this arrangement appears more likely to be the outcome of a gradual process of development.

The impression of a gradual process of development becomes even more prominent when the *Majjhima-nikāya* is compared with its counterpart in the *Madhyama-āgama*.⁶⁰ This *Madhyama-āgama* collection was translated towards the end of the fourth century into Chinese by the Kashmirian monk Gautama Saṅghadeva,⁶¹ a translation based on a written Indic original read out by another Kashmirian monk and carried out in coopera-

⁵² MN 13, MN 29, MN 33, MN 39, MN 43, MN 62, MN 77, and MN 109.

⁵³ MN 57.

⁵⁴ MN 78.

⁵⁵ MN 58.

⁵⁶ MN 85.

⁵⁷ MN 81.

⁵⁸ MN 12 and MN 77.

⁵⁹ These are discourses MN 143 to MN 152. Their Chinese parallels are, in fact, found in the *Samyukta-āgama*, mostly located in the section on the six sense-spheres.

⁶⁰ An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2007b.

⁶¹ Willemen 1999/2000: 46, however, holds that “Saṅghadeva must have come from non-Kāśmīra Jibin”.

tion with three Chinese collaborators.⁶² The Indic original used for this translation appears to have been in a Prākrit,⁶³ and is generally held to be stemming from a Sarvāstivāda line of transmission.⁶⁴

The *Madhyama-āgama* contains more discourses than the *Majjhima-nikāya*, namely two-hundred-and-twenty-two, which are assigned to eighteen chapters. Each of these chapters includes a minimum of ten discourses, although a few chapters have considerably more. Regarding the chapter division in the two collections, the *Madhyama-āgama* and the *Majjhima-nikāya* have only the following four chapters in common:

- on kings,
- on Brahmins,
- on pairs,
- on analyses (*vibhaṅga*).

These chapters occur, however, at different places in the two collections.⁶⁵ The contents of these four chapters also differ considerably in the respective collections. As il-

⁶² The colophon to the *Madhyama-āgama* collection at T I 809b26 (cf. also Chen 2005: 612, T 2145 at T LV 64a13, and for Uighur fragments corresponding to this colophon Kudara 1990: 144–145) reports that the Kashmirian monk Saṅgharakṣa read out the original text, Saṅghadeva translated it, and the monk Dāocí acted as the scribe with the assistance of Lībǎo and Kānghuà from the Wú state, 請罽賓沙門僧伽羅叉令誦胡本, 請僧伽提和轉胡為晉, 豫州沙門道慈筆受, 吳國李寶, 康化共書 (with a 聖 variant reading for the last as 唐化). On the implications of the expression 筆受, literally “receiving with the pen”, cf. T 2131 at T LIV 1067c15, Fuchs 1930: 88, Shih 1968: 90: 167, and Zacchetti 2006: 166 note 41; regarding the reference to the original as 胡本, cf. the discussion by Boucher 2000. Zacchetti 1996: 352 notes that Chinese translations undertaken during this period were the outcome of a tripartite group effort that involved a principal translator, an interpreter, and redactor(s). Regarding the characteristics of such translation teams, Hrdličková 1958: 134 explains that “the translator – a foreigner – usually translated the original text into Chinese orally, while Chinese scribes corrected his Chinese and put down his translation into writing”.

⁶³ On the language of the *Madhyama-āgama* manuscript cf. Bapat 1969: 5, Enomoto 1986: 20, and von Hinüber 1982: 250; cf. also below p. 92 note 333, p. 150 note 25, p. 290 note 128, p. 452 note 59, p. 567 note 197, and p. 623 note 189.

⁶⁴ On the school affiliation of the *Madhyama-āgama* cf. Lü 1963: 242, Mayeda 1985: 98, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 27, Oberlies 2003: 48, Waldschmidt 1980a: 136, and Yinshùn 1971/1983: 703. Enomoto 1984: 198 explains that the *Madhyama-āgama* translated into Chinese probably represents the earliest of three versions of this collection, the second of the three being the version partly preserved in some Central Asian Sanskrit fragments, and the third version being reflected in discourse quotations in later works. For a survey of some features of the *Madhyama-āgama* cf. also Anālayo 2007b, id. 2008a, and id. 2009B.

⁶⁵ The “chapter on kings” (*Rāja-vagga*) forms the ninth chapter in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, while in the *Madhyama-āgama* it occurs as the sixth chapter (王相應品). The “chapter on Brahmins” (*Brāhmaṇa-vagga*) is the tenth chapter in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, while in the *Madhyama-āgama* it constitutes the twelfth chapter (梵志品). The *Majjhima-nikāya* has two “chapters on pairs” (*Mahā- and Cūlāyamaka-vagga*), which are its fourth and fifth chapters respectively, while the *Madhyama-āgama* has only one “chapter on pairs” (雙品), which occurs in this collection as the fifteenth chapter. The “chapter on analyses” (*Vibhaṅga-vagga*) is the fourteenth chapter in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, while in the *Madhyama-āgama* it occurs as the thirteenth (根本分別品); cf. also Yinshùn 1971/1983: 707. In addition to these, the third chapter of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, which in the Burmese, Ceylonese and Siamese editions is entitled “chapter on similes” (*Opamma-vagga*), has a title similar to the last chapter in the *Madhyama-āgama*, the chapter on “exam-

lustrated below in table 0.1, two Pāli discourses from the chapter on kings, four Pāli discourses from the chapter on Brahmins and from the greater chapter on pairs, and nine Pāli discourses from the chapter on analyses have a parallel in their Chinese equivalent chapter.

Table 0.1: Discourse Parallels in Similarly Entitled Chapters in MN and MĀ

Kings	Brahmins	Pairs	Analyses
MN 81 / MĀ 63	MN 91 / MĀ 161	MN 31 / MĀ 185	MN 132 / MĀ 167
MN 83 / MĀ 67	MN 93 / MĀ 151	MN 32 / MĀ 184	MN 133 / MĀ 165
	MN 96 / MĀ 150	MN 39 / MĀ 182	MN 134 / MĀ 166
	MN 99 / MĀ 152	MN 40 / MĀ 183	MN 135 / MĀ 170
			MN 136 / MĀ 171
			MN 137 / MĀ 163
			MN 138 / MĀ 164
			MN 139 / MĀ 169
			MN 140 / MĀ 162

In fact, most of the discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and in the *Madhyama-āgama* are arranged in rather different ways. These differences support the impression that the location of the discourses was the outcome of a process specific to each of the two collections, although the similarities shown in table 0.1 above could be the remnants of a common starting-point.⁶⁶

The same argument applies not only to the *Madhyama-āgama* parallels to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses, but also to the Chinese parallels to the *Majjhima-nikāya* found in the other Āgamas. A number of such parallels to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses occur in the *Samyukta-āgama*, which was translated in the fifth century into Chinese by Bǎoyún (寶雲), based on what seems to have been a (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda text recited by the Indian monk Guṇabhadra, a text that may have been brought to China from Sri Lanka by Fǎxiān (法顯).⁶⁷ An even more prominent source for parallels to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses is

ples” or “illustrations” (例), although the two do not share any discourse in common. Anesaki 1934a: 284 sums up that “the methods of division into chapters and the order of successive dialogues are quite different” in the two collections.

⁶⁶ In a similar vein, in regard to the *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Samyukta-āgama* collections Glass 2007: 27 comes to the conclusion that while the “shared principle of arrangement is likely to be very old, important differences between the content and arrangement of the extant versions show that they followed separate developments”. Norman 1984/1992: 40 explains that “the sects ... had the same names for the groups of texts, but were not yet in general agreement about their contents, or the order of the contents”.

⁶⁷ On Guṇabhadra’s translation activities cf. Bagchi 1927: 378; on the translation team cf., e.g., T 2145 at T LV 13a6 and on the *Samyukta-āgama* collection in general cf. Bucknell 2006 and Lü 1963: 242; on the original manuscript of the *Samyukta-āgama* cf. T 2085 at T LI 865c25, translated in Legge 1886/1998: 111, as well as Anālayo 2010e: 67-69, Anesaki 1905: 24, de Jong 1981: 105, Glass 2006: 20-25, and id.

the *Ekottarika-āgama*, a collection apparently translated by Zhú Fóniàn (竺佛念) from what seems to have been a Prākrit original of so far undetermined school affiliation transmitted by the Tocharian monk Dharmanandī.⁶⁸

Of these Āgamas, the majority of full parallels to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses are found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, which has ninety-six parallels and therewith more parallels than the other main Āgamas together.⁶⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* has thirty-six full parallels,⁷⁰ followed by the *Samyukta-āgama* (T 99) with twenty-five full parallels,⁷¹

2010. On the school affiliation of the *Samyukta-āgama* cf., e.g., Choong 2000: 6 note 18, Enomoto 1986: 23, Harrison 2002: 1, Hiraoka 2000, Mayeda 1985: 99, Oberlies 2003: 64, Schmithausen 1987: 306, Waldschmidt 1980a: 136, and Yìnshùn 1971/1983: 696. Regarding the possible presence of Sarvāstivādins in Ceylon cf. Bechert 1982, id. 1998: 3, Gunawardana 1966: 66, Kalupahana 1970: 190, and Witanachchi 2005c: 578. I use the somewhat cumbersome expression “(Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda” to reflect my uncertainty regarding this tradition’s relationship to, or perhaps identity with, the Sarvāstivāda tradition; for a recent contribution to this theme cf. Enomoto 2000, cf. also Skilling 2002: 374–376, with a reply in Wynne 2008.

⁶⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the somewhat complex issue of the translator and school affiliation of the *Ekottarika-āgama* cf. Anālayo 2009A; cf. also Nattier 2010 for a revealing study of Zhú Fóniàn (竺佛念), the probable translator of this collection (on this attribution cf. Matsumura 1989: 361–367; cf. also, e.g., Anālayo 2006e: 146, Legittimo 2010: 256, and Nattier 2007: 195 note 48). Regarding the title of this Āgama, Allon 2001: 11 lists several occurrences of the term *Ekottarika-āgama* in Sanskrit sources, cf. also Baums 2009: 513, whereas the alternative expression *Ekottara-āgama* does not seem to be attested, which makes me prefer the term “*Ekottarika-āgama*” for rendering 增壹阿含.

⁶⁹ MĀ 9, MĀ 10, MĀ 14, MĀ 19, MĀ 26, MĀ 27, MĀ 29, MĀ 30, MĀ 31, MĀ 32, MĀ 34, MĀ 63, MĀ 64, MĀ 67, MĀ 72, MĀ 75, MĀ 77, MĀ 78, MĀ 79, MĀ 81, MĀ 85, MĀ 87, MĀ 88, MĀ 89, MĀ 91, MĀ 93, MĀ 98, MĀ 99, MĀ 100, MĀ 101, MĀ 102, MĀ 103, MĀ 105, MĀ 107, MĀ 108, MĀ 115, MĀ 131, MĀ 132, MĀ 133, MĀ 144, MĀ 145, MĀ 146, MĀ 150, MĀ 151, MĀ 152, MĀ 153, MĀ 161, MĀ 162, MĀ 163, MĀ 164, MĀ 165, MĀ 166, MĀ 167, MĀ 169, MĀ 170, MĀ 171, MĀ 173, MĀ 174, MĀ 175, MĀ 178, MĀ 179, MĀ 180, MĀ 181, MĀ 182, MĀ 183, MĀ 184, MĀ 185, MĀ 186, MĀ 187, MĀ 189, MĀ 190, MĀ 191, MĀ 192, MĀ 193, MĀ 194, MĀ 195, MĀ 196, MĀ 198, MĀ 199, MĀ 200, MĀ 201, MĀ 203, MĀ 204, MĀ 205, MĀ 206, MĀ 207, MĀ 208, MĀ 209, MĀ 210, MĀ 211, MĀ 212, MĀ 213, MĀ 214, MĀ 216, MĀ 217, and MĀ 221 (a discussion of my reasons for not including MĀ 28, MĀ 86, MĀ 106, and MĀ 168 can be found below p. 821 note 1, p. 838 note 96, p. 23, and p. 679).

⁷⁰ EĀ 12.1, EĀ 13.3, EĀ 13.5, EĀ 17.1, EĀ 17.9, EĀ 18.3, EĀ 19.3, EĀ 21.9, EĀ 24.8, EĀ 25.6, EĀ 27.1, EĀ 27.2, EĀ 31.1, EĀ 32.4, EĀ 37.3, EĀ 37.5, EĀ 37.10, EĀ 38.6, EĀ 38.7, EĀ 38.10, EĀ 39.9, EĀ 39.10, EĀ 40.6, EĀ 40.10, EĀ 43.4, EĀ 43.6, EĀ 44.6, EĀ 45.2, EĀ 47.9, EĀ 49.1, EĀ 49.6, EĀ 49.8, EĀ 50.4, EĀ 50.8, EĀ 51.4, and EĀ 51.8 (counting EĀ 50.8 a full parallel, since though it is only a partial parallel to MN 21 and MN 22 respectively, as it combines elements of both it becomes a full parallel to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses in general. On my reasons for not reckoning EĀ 24.7, EĀ 41.1, EĀ 43.5, and EĀ 45.6 as full parallels cf. below p. 293 note 142, p. 122 note 120, p. 147 note 13, and p. 846 note 132.

⁷¹ SĀ 58, SĀ 110, SĀ 200, SĀ 236, SĀ 276, SĀ 280, SĀ 282, SĀ 304, SĀ 305, SĀ 311, SĀ 344, SĀ 485, SĀ 505, SĀ 548, SĀ 815, SĀ 962, SĀ 964, SĀ 969, SĀ 1042, SĀ 1043, SĀ 1077, SĀ 1079, SĀ 1248, SĀ 1249, and SĀ 1266 (on my reasons for not including SĀ 215, SĀ 251, and SĀ 973 cf. below p. 828 note 42, p. 268 note 19, and p. 413 note 114. Several parallels are also found in the partially preserved *Samyukta-āgama* (T 100), 別譯雜阿含經, cf. below p. 1037 the survey of parallels in the appendix. Although such parallels are as important as other Āgama discourses when it comes to studying a particular Pāli discourse in the light of its counterparts, the fact that this collection is not preserved in full makes it impossible to assess how many parallels it would have had to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses.

while the *Dīrgha-āgama* has only a single parallel.⁷² Among these one-hundred-fifty-eight full parallels to discourses of the *Majjhima-nikāya* found in the main Chinese Āgamas, a considerable degree of overlap occurs, in that at times two or even three Āgama parallels to a single Pāli discourse can be found, while some *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses do not have any full parallel in the Chinese Āgamas (though they may have partial parallels in a Chinese Āgamas discourses or counterparts in discourses that have been translated individually into Chinese).⁷³

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* has only a single parallel in the Chinese *Dīrgha-āgama*, a collection translated by Zhú Fóniàn (竺佛念) based on a text recited by Buddhayaśas during the early fifth century from what seems to have been a Prākrit original transmitted by the Dharmaguptaka tradition,⁷⁴ the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Dīrgha-āgama* preserved in Sanskrit fragments appears to have had ten parallels to the *Majjhima-nikāya*.⁷⁵ For such dif-

⁷² DĀ 30.4 (though the relevant portion is part of a larger discourse, from the perspective of the *Majjhima-nikāya* it is a full parallel to MN 130).

⁷³ For a survey of the parallels to each *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse and a brief discussion of the distinction between partial and full parallels cf. below p. 1037.

⁷⁴ On the school affiliation of the *Dīrgha-āgama* cf., eg., Bareau 1966: 50, Brough 1962/2001: 50, Demiéville 1951: 252–253, Enomoto 1986: 25, Lü 1963: 242, Mayeda 1985: 97, Oberlies 2003: 44, Prasad 1993: 50, Salomon 1999: 173, and Yinshùn 1971/1983: 720, cf. also Anālayo 2009o: 229 note 65; on its original language cf. Brough 1962/2001: 50–54, Karashima 1994, and Waldschmidt 1980a: 137. Regarding translation activities associated with Buddhayaśas cf. Bagchi 1927: 203; on his probable role during translation cf. Silk 2006: 81–82; on the translators cf., e.g., T I 1b10, T 2059 at T L 334b20 (translated in Shih 1968: 90), and T 2145 at T LV 11b1. Forte 1984: 316 comments that every translation was “registered under the name of a single person, usually the actual guarantor of the text, either because he had brought the Sanskrit text to China or else because he knew it by heart ... This need to make one person responsible often meant that the actual contribution of other members of the team tended to be unacknowledged”; cf. also Boucher 1998: 500 note 121. The need for a guarantor of the translated text is quite understandable in view of the fact that, as Lancaster 1999: 519 and 523 points out, “instead of a previously arranged canon, the Chinese received one text after another ... in a piecemeal fashion”, “there was no list of texts, universally recognized by the arriving missionary monks, which could be used by the early Chinese Buddhist community as a formal canon”. Thus, as summed up by Nattier 2008: 19 “in many cases a scripture is credited not to the actual translator, but to the foreign participant in the translation process, even if that person’s only role ... was to provide a written text and/or to recite the scripture aloud”.

⁷⁵ Besides what I have been able to consult of these recently discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* fragments, for my comparative studies I have also drawn on a number of other Sanskrit fragments that parallel at times smaller and at times large sections of *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses. In general, the school affiliation of such Sanskrit fragment parallels is uncertain, although the possibility that they stem from the Sarvāstivāda/(Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda traditions could be considered the most probable option, cf. also Hartmann 1999: 119. Another important source of parallels is Śamatadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (on this work cf. also Mejor 1991: 63–64 and Skilling 2005: 699), a discourse anthology extant in Tibetan translation and stemming from the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda tradition, this being the standard school affiliation of texts preserved in Tibetan, cf. Bu ston’s “History of Buddhism” in Obermiller 1932/1986: 197 and, e.g., Grönbold 1984: 14 or Ruegg 1985: 121. This work contains a number of partial and full parallels to *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses, where the relevant passages can conveniently be located thanks to Honjō 1984, with Pāśadika 1989a providing a survey of quotations in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

ferences to manifest, the distribution of discourses over different collections must have fluctuated for quite some time during oral transmission, so that various reciter traditions felt free to adapt it to their personal needs and preferences.⁷⁶

Thus the positioning of discourses (and of chapters) in the *Majjhima-nikāya* clearly differs from its Chinese parallel. Another aspect of the same collection is the order of its discourses, which at times appears to follow an underlying rationale that expresses the exigencies of oral transmission.

A closer inspection of the sequence of discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* reveals that a preceding discourse tends to have some aspect in common with the next discourse, thereby providing a link that makes it easy for the reciters to remember which discourse comes next. Such linking or “concatenation” can take various forms and involve content as well as form.⁷⁷

The working mechanics of such concatenation can be illustrated with the example of the first ten discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya*.⁷⁸ The first and second discourses, the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* (MN 1) and the *Sabbāsava-sutta* (MN 2), both begin their respective treatment by examining the case of the untaught ordinary worldling,⁷⁹ and proceed from this to the liberated monk who has gone beyond the influxes and fetters, a similarity in pattern that easily provides a relation between the two discourses.⁸⁰

The *Sabbāsava-sutta* (MN 2) instructs how to eradicate the influxes, a topic that recurs right away at the beginning of the third discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Dhamma-*

⁷⁶ Cf. also below p. 864.

⁷⁷ Von Hinüber 1999a: 20 (cf. also id. 1996/1997: 12) notes as an example for concatenation the sequence of *pācittiya* rules of the *pātimokkha*, where rule 4 refers to teaching recitation to someone who has not been fully ordained, *anupasampannañ*; rule 5 takes up the issue of lying down in the presence of someone who has not been fully ordained, *anupasampannena ... sahaseyyam kapeyya*; rule 6 then turns to lying down in the presence of a woman, *mātugāmena sahaseyyam kapeyya*; rule 7 then turns to teaching the Dharma to women, *mātugāmassa* (cf., e.g., Nāṇadassana 1993: 31). Thus in each case a particular expression found in the earlier rule is taken up in the subsequent rule. On concatenation between discourses cf. also Allon 2001: 18-22.

⁷⁸ My exposition takes its inspiration from a study of the interrelation between *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses in Franke 1914a, which covers the remaining discourses up to MN 76 (on MN 92 and MN 98 cf. Franke 1914c; for similar patterns in the *Dīgha-nikāya* cf. Franke 1913c). Extracts of the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2010m.

⁷⁹ MN 1 at MN I 1,9 = MN 2 at MN I 7,17: *assutavā puthujjano ariyānam adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovi-do ariyadhamme avinīto sappurisānam adassāvī sappurisadhammassa akovidō sappurisadhamme avinīto*.

⁸⁰ MN 1 at MN I 5,10: *bhikkhu ... khīpāsavo ... parikkhīñabhadavasamyojano*, and MN 2 at MN I 12,5: *bhikkhu sabbāsavasamvarasamvuto ... vāvattayi samyojanam* (B^e-MN I 15,7 and S^e-MN I 20,12: *vivattayi*). Another link between the two discourses could be that MN 1 at MN I 6,13 describes the penetrative vision of the Tathāgata that goes beyond a worldling’s conceivings by proclaiming *sabbaso tañhānañ khayā ... an-uttaram sammāsambodhiñ abhisambuddho*, thereby broaching the theme of the proper vision of phenomena that comes about with full awakening, a theme taken up at the beginning of MN 2 at MN I 7,4 in terms of the need to develop knowledge and vision for being able to reach full awakening, *jānato ... passato āsa-vānam khayam vadāmi*. To develop such knowledge and vision, MN 2 recommends *yoniso manasikāra*, the very opposite of the worldling’s conceivings mentioned in MN 1.

dāyāda-sutta (MN 3), which criticizes monks who do not eradicate those things that their teacher told them to eradicate.⁸¹

Another aspect of proper conduct highlighted in the *Dhammadāyāda-sutta* (MN 3) is the need to dwell in seclusion,⁸² a topic that forms the central theme of the next discourse, the *Bhayabherava-sutta* (MN 4), which expounds the difficulties of living in seclusion. The interrelation between the two discourses is further strengthened by the circumstance that in the *Dhammadāyāda-sutta* (MN 3) the monks who practise seclusion function as a shining example,⁸³ just as in the *Bhayabherava-sutta* (MN 4) the Buddha's practice of seclusion functions as a shining example for his disciples.⁸⁴

In the context of its examination of the difficulties of living in seclusion, the *Bhayabherava-sutta* (MN 4) describes the obstructive effect of various evil mental qualities, a theme continued in the next discourse, the *Anaṅgana-sutta* (MN 5), by examining various evil mental qualities of a monk. The relationship between the two discourses is further strengthened by the fact that several evil qualities mentioned in the *Bhayabherava-sutta* (MN 4) recur in the description of evil monks given at the conclusion of the *Anaṅgana-sutta* (MN 5).⁸⁵

The *Anaṅgana-sutta* (MN 5) examines unworthy wishes of a monk and highlights the importance of making an effort to overcome them. The next discourse, the *Ākankheyya-sutta* (MN 6), takes up the same theme from the complementary perspective of the worthy wishes of a monk, explaining how effort should be directed in order for such wishes to come to fulfilment. The two treatments even have a partial overlap, as both take up the case of a monk who wishes to obtain food and clothing, etc.⁸⁶

⁸¹ MN 2 at MN I 7,10 presents seven modes how the influxes should be eradicated, *āsavā pahātabbā*. MN 3 at MN I 14,14 then continues this theme with *yesañ ca dhammānam satthā pahānam āha, te ca dhamme nappajahanti*. MN 3 at MN I 15,25 develops the idea of eradication by describing that the noble eightfold path leads to the eradication of various mental defilements, *lobhassa ca pahānāya dosassa ca pahānāya atthi majjhima paṭipadā ... ayam eva ariyo utthaṅgiko maggo*. By referring to the noble eightfold path, MN 3 continues the theme of the path to the eradication of *dukkha* mentioned in MN 2 at MN I 9,19: *ayam dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā*, where this path is also related to eradication, as it occurs in the exposition of influxes to be eradicated through vision, *āsavā dassanā pahātabbā*.

⁸² MN 3 at MN I 14,2 contrasts disciples who do not follow their teacher's example and do not practise seclusion, *satthu pavivittassa viharato, sāvakā vivekañ nānusikkhanti*, with disciples who follow the example of their teacher, *sāvakā vivekañ anusikkhanti*.

⁸³ MN 3 at MN I 15,4: *paviveke pubbaṅgamā*.

⁸⁴ MN 4 at MN I 16,22: *gotamo pubbaṅgamo*. The two discourses also have in common that they mention the Buddha's compassion, MN 3 at MN I 12,15: *atthi me tumhesu anukampā*, and MN 4 at MN I 23,35: *pacchimañ ca janatañ anukampamāno*.

⁸⁵ MN 4 at MN I 19,30 = MN 5 at MN I 32,13: *kusītā hīnaviriyā* (B^e-MN I 23,28 and B^e-MN I 38,10: *hīnaviriyā*); MN 4 at MN I 20,10 = MN 5 at MN I 32,13: *asamāhitā vibbhantacittā*; MN 4 at MN I 20,19 = MN 5 at MN I 32,14: *duppaññā elamūgā* (C^e-MN I 46,29 and C^e-MN 72,9 as well as S^e-MN I 35,15 and S^e-MN 56,1: *elamūgā*).

⁸⁶ MN 5 at MN I 29,35: *lābhī assañ paññānam cīvarānam ... piṇḍapātānam ... senāsanānam ... gilānapaccā-*

The series of worthy wishes in the *Ākanikheyya-sutta* (MN 6) leads from going beyond unwholesome states of mind, via the attainment of stream-entry, to the attainment of full awakening. The next discourse, the *Vatthūpama-sutta* (MN 7), takes up the same topics, as it first treats a series of unwholesome mental states, then refers to the attainment of stream-entry, and finally culminates in the attainment of the destruction of the influxes.

The *Vatthūpama-sutta* (MN 7), moreover, completes the topic of requisites that was already a theme in the two preceding discourses. While the *Anarigana-sutta* (MN 5) describes a monk's wish for superior food and clothing, etc., and the *Ākanikheyya-sutta* (MN 6) shows how a monk's wish for food and clothing can be fulfilled, the *Vatthūpama-sutta* (MN 7) concludes this topic by indicating that for one who has developed the path, even superior type of food will not be an obstruction.⁸⁷

The *Vatthūpama-sutta* (MN 7) and the next discourse, the *Sallekha-sutta* (MN 8), base their respective expositions on what needs to be overcome in order to progress on the path. The relationship between these two discourses is so close in this respect that they both list the same mental defilements.⁸⁸

The *Sallekha-sutta* (MN 8) takes up the transcendence of views,⁸⁹ a theme the next discourse, the *Sammāditthi-sutta* (MN 9), develops from its complementary perspective by exploring various aspects of right view. This theme is already adumbrated in the *Sallekha-sutta*'s (MN 8) reference to right view as the way to overcome wrong view.⁹⁰

The *Sammāditthi-sutta*'s (MN 9) treatment revolves around various aspects that one should "know", *pajānāti*, in order to accomplish right view. The need to "know" is also the theme of the next discourse, the *Satipatthāna-sutta* (MN 10), where the same activity is mentioned again and again in the descriptions of how to develop the four *satipatthānas*. Both discourses thus share in common that they expound how one factor of the noble eightfold path can be developed with the help of various aspects that one should "know".⁹¹

These ways of interrelation show the degree to which the order of the discourses in this part of the *Majjhima-nikāya* suits the requirements of oral transmission, where discourses that have some aspect or other in common follow each other, thereby facilitating the reciter's task to recall the whole group in the proper sequence and without omissions.

In sum, then, the structure of the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the order in which its discourses are arranged appears to reflect the influence of oral transmission. The same can also be seen in several aspects of its discourses, which I now survey in more detail.

yabhesajjaparikkhārānañ; and MN 6 at MN I 33,12: *lābhī assaṃ cīvara-piṇḍapāta-senāsana-gilānapac-cayabhesajjaparikkhārānañ* (B^e-MN I 35,25 and B^e-MN I 39,19: *gilānappaccaya*^o).

⁸⁷ MN 7 at MN I 38,11.

⁸⁸ MN 7 at MN I 36,29 lists *kodha*, *upanāha*, *makkha*, *paṭāsa*, *issā*, *macchariya*, *māyā*, *sāt̄heyya*, and *atimāna*, which recur in MN 8 at MN I 42,35.

⁸⁹ MN 8 at MN I 40,15: *yā imā ... anekavihitā ditthiyō loke uppajjanti*, followed by querying how these views can be left behind.

⁹⁰ MN 8 at MN I 42,18: *pare micchāditthī bhavissanti*, *mayam ettha sammāditthī bhavissāmā ti* (S^e-MN I 75,17+18: *micchāditthikā* and *sammāditthikā*).

⁹¹ Each of the two discourses has well over a hundred occurrences of the term *pajānāti*.

The standard opening to a discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya* reads “thus I have heard, at one time”,⁹² followed by noting the whereabouts of the Buddha at the time of the particular event or teaching recorded in the discourse. The opening “I have heard” quite explicitly draws attention to the oral nature of what is to follow.⁹³ According to the traditional account, these words were spoken by Ānanda and stand for his oral reception and subsequent transmission of the teachings he had heard.⁹⁴ Not only the content, but also the form of this formulaic beginning testifies to oral transmission. Already these first few words, found at the beginning of each discourse, exhibit metrical and sound similarities that recur throughout the discourses (see table 0.2 below). Such sound similarities can involve ‘alliteration’, repetition of an initial sound, ‘assonance’, repetition of a sound found in the middle of a word, and ‘homoioteleuton’, repetition of the final sound.⁹⁵

The two parts of the Pāli version of this standard opening to a discourse, *evam me sutam* and *ekam samayam*, each consist of five syllables. The first word in each part, *evam* and *ekam*, is closely similar, differing only in respect to their second consonant. The words *evam*, *sutam*, *ekam* and *samayam* share the same -am ending,⁹⁶ while the words *sutam* and *samayam* share the same initial consonant.⁹⁷ Thus, even though these few words are merely a prose introduction to a discourse, a closer inspection reveals sound similarities that occur with considerable frequency in other prose sections of the early discourses, especially in listings of similar words or in formulaic expressions.⁹⁸

⁹² In regard to this standard opening of a discourse, Brough 1950: 416 adduces the Tibetan version of this opening, 'di skad bdag gis thos pa dus gcig na bcom ldan 'das, in support of taking *ekam samayam* to qualify *evam mayā śrutam*, i.e. “at one time I heard: the Blessed One was staying at ... ” (a similar proposal had earlier been made by von Staël-Holstein 1933: iv, cf. also Tatz 1997). Yet, as Tola 1999: 54 points out, to use the qualification “at one time” in regard to the Buddha’s whereabouts is more meaningful than using the same qualification to indicate that the oral transmission of the discourse took place “at one time”. Moreover, the phrase *tena samayena* that regularly introduces the next sentence in the standard beginning part of a discourse obviously refers to the time when the events recorded in the discourse took place, in view of which it would be more natural for the preceding *ekam samayam* to refer to the same. For critical remarks regarding Brough’s arguments cf. also, e.g., Galloway 1991, Klaus 2007, and Silk 1989 (for further references related to this topic cf. Bongard-Levin 1996: 90 note 1, to which now could be added Nattier (forthcoming) and Sander 2007: 174-176). According to von Hinüber 1968: 85-86, in as much as Pāli sources are concerned, no arguments can be found for assuming that *ekam samayam* qualifies *evam me sutam*. Samtani 1964: 49 notes that Jain sūtras have a similar opening: *suyam me*. On the standard Chinese rendering of this beginning phrase cf., e.g., Qingzhi 2010: 494.

⁹³ Cabezón 2004: 755 remarks that this standard opening signals “the oral/aural nature of the original transmission”. Levering 1989: 61 notes another function of this introductory formula, in that “teachings were authenticated by the fact that ... they had been heard by a specific hearer, that he had heard the Buddha teach them at a particular time and place”.

⁹⁴ Ps I 7,10.

⁹⁵ Extracts of the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2007e.

⁹⁶ The choice of the accusative *ekam samayam* instead of the locative *ekasmīm samaye* (cf. Wijesekera 1993: 56) might be related to the sound similarity this creates with the preceding *evam me sutam*.

⁹⁷ Allon 1997a: 195.

⁹⁸ For a study of these phenomena in Buddhist Sanskrit texts cf. von Simson 1965: 5-20.

Table 0.2: Sound Similarities in the Standard Opening of a Discourse

<i>evam me sutam</i>	<i>ekam samayam</i>
<i>e(v)am</i>	<i>e(k)am</i>
<i>(ev)am, (sut)am,</i>	<i>(ek)am (samay)am</i>
<i>s(utam)</i>	<i>s(amayam)</i>

Another oral feature of the early discourses can be found in the frequent use of strings of synonyms. Such a string of synonyms serves to safeguard against loss, since a whole set of similar words stands much greater chance of being remembered than a single word and also better impresses itself on the audience.⁹⁹ A closer look at such strings or clusters of words brings to light that its members tend to occur in a metrical sequence that follows the principle of “waxing syllables”.¹⁰⁰ Table 0.3 below gives a few examples of this principle, showing how a particular theme is treated by a series of terms, where the words with fewer syllables are followed by words with an equal or greater number of syllables.¹⁰¹ The same principle can also be applied to listings and enumerations whose members do not share the same meaning.

The crescendo effect that results from the application of this principle is a typical stylistic feature of the early discourses, further enhanced when word sequences arranged according to the waxing syllable principle also share sound similarities. If a sequence of words becomes relatively long, this principle is not applied to the sequence as a whole, but to subunits within the sequence.¹⁰² Such subunits can share a similar nuance of mean-

⁹⁹ Oldenberg 1917: 42 explains that the use of such strings of synonyms gives the impression of a childlike insistence that ensures that all aspects of a particular matter find expression (“so entsteht eine gewisse kindliche Nachdrücklichkeit, man sichert sich, daß keine Seite der Sache unausgedrückt bleibt”).

¹⁰⁰ A brief survey of this principle can be found in Anālayo 2009v.

¹⁰¹ Examples are from MN 12 at MN I 82,26, MN 16 at MN I 101,7, MN 35 at MN I 231,37, MN 50 at MN I 334,23, MN 53 at MN I 354,36, MN 66 at MN I 450,34 (C^e-MN II 196,7 reads *daliddo*, S^e-MN II 184,10: *daliddo* and *anāliyo*), and MN 66 at MN I 451,36 (S^e-MN II 186,6: *addho*), taking a lead from von Hinüber 1994b: 16-30 and Smith 1948: 35. Von Hinüber 1994b: 33 (cf. also id. 1999b: 152) draws attention to similar formulas in Jain texts, such as *naṭṭā*, *gīa*, *vāiya*, corresponding to *nacca*, *gīta*, *vādita* found, e.g., in MN 27 at MN I 180,6; cf. also Allon 1997a: 266 and Caillat 1965: 198.

¹⁰² Allon 1997b: 48 mentions the description of irrelevant talk as an example, found, e.g., in MN 76 at MN I 513,23: *rājakatham corakatham mahāmattakatham*, 4+4+6, *senākatham bhayakatham yuddhakatham*, *annakatham pānakatham vatthakatham sayanakatham*, 4+4+4+4+4+5, *mālākatham gandhakatham*, *ñātikatham yānakatham*, *gāmakatham nigamakatham nagarakatham janapadakatham*, 4+4+4+4+5+5+6, *itthikatham sūrakatham visikhākatham kumbhaṭṭhānakatham pubbapetakatham*, 4+4+5+6+6 (S^e-MN II 288,13+14+15 does not have *vatthakatham*, reads *itthikatham* and adds *kumbhadāsikatham*, C^e-MN II 308,10+11 has *yānakatham* earlier (after *vatthakatham*) and adds *purisakatham*). The division suggested by the principle of waxing syllables would result in several subunits in this passage (following E^e), each of which then can be seen to cover one or more topics: “kings, robbers, ministers”, then “armies, dangers, battles” together with the essential requisites of “food, drink, clothing, beds”, then various aspects of household life such as “garlands, perfumes, relatives, vehicles” together with a listing of localities “vil-

ing or belong to the same category. The division into subunits might have the function of setting a rhythm that allows the reciter to take a breath during recitation.

Table 0.3: The Principle of Waxing Syllables

Theme	Pāli terms	Syllable count
old	<i>jinno vuddho mahallako addhagato vayo-anuppatto</i>	2+2+4+4+6
growth	<i>vuddhim virūlhim ve pullam</i>	2+3+3
fear	<i>bhīto sañviggo lomahaṭṭhajāto</i>	2+3+6
to (mis)-meditate	<i>jhāyanti pajjhāyanti nijjhāyanti apajjhāyanti</i>	3+4+4+5
able to attain	<i>nikāmalābhī akicchalābhī akasiralābhī</i>	5+5+6
poor	<i>daliddo assako anālhiyo</i>	3+3+4
wealthy	<i>addho mahaddhano mahābhogo</i>	2+4+4

The oral nature of the early discourses also manifests in the frequent occurrence of repetition.¹⁰³ When treating a particular topic in its positive and negative manifestations, for example, it is a standard procedure in the discourses that the same passage is repeated with precisely the same words and formulations used for the positive case, making only the most minimal changes required to adjust these to the negative case. The same procedure becomes even more prominent when a series of different perspectives on a particular topic are explored. Thus an examination of four types of person or modes of acting, for example, can use four times nearly the same text in order to achieve its aim.

In addition to the frequent occurrence of repetition within a single discourse, the early discourses also make recurrent use of “pericopes”, formulaic expressions or standard phrases that depict a recurrent situation or event and whose purpose is to facilitate memorization.¹⁰⁴ Whether it is a description of how someone approaches the Buddha or of how

laces, towns, cities, counties”, and finally a set of topics for gossip that comprises “women, heroes, streets, wells, the dead”.

¹⁰³ Demiéville in Renou 1953/2001: 333 notes that the frequent use of stereotyped formulas is characteristic of the early discourses, “les *sutta* ont un style caractérisé pas l’emploi constant de formules stéréotypées”, cf. also Gethin 2007 for a case study of repetitions in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, and Weeratunge 2004 for a survey of various forms of repetition in Pāli discourses and of their predecessors in ancient Indian literature. Reat 1996: 17 comments that such “extensive verbatim repetition” indicates “that the *Sutta Piṭaka* is a sincere attempt to record memorized versions of individual sermons rather than an edited compilation of doctrine”; cf. also Yit 2004a, id. 2004b, and id. 2008.

¹⁰⁴ Griffiths 1983: 58 explains that the use of pericopes is “a direct result of the methods by which sacred material was preserved and handed on in the early Buddhist communities; the demands of mnemonic convenience ... meant that the units of tradition ... had to be ... reduced to an easily memorized standard form”. Von Simson 1965: 56 compares the function of such pericopes in Buddhist prose to the bones and tendons in the human body, in that both provide stability and support for the other parts. Smith 1987: 598, in an examination of modern oral literature in India, reports the finding that a Rajasthani epic that made frequent use of pericopes (which he describes to involve that “every battle ... is the same battle, every

someone attains liberation, pericopes will be employed with a fixed set of phrases and expressions, with only the most minimal changes introduced to adapt these pericopes to the individual occasion. These two features, the repetition of passages within a discourse and the use of pericopes throughout a discourse collection, are responsible for the highly repetitive nature of the early discourses.¹⁰⁵

These oral characteristics of the Pāli discourses testify to the importance of verbatim repetition in the early Buddhist oral tradition.¹⁰⁶ In this respect, the early Buddhist oral tradition differs from oral traditions in general, where improvisation can be a prominent feature. The performance of oral literature of an epic or narrative type demands innovation and improvisation from the performer, whose task is to present the main elements of a tale in such a way as to best entertain the audience. This type of oral literature is thus freely re-created every time it is told.¹⁰⁷ In contrast, the purpose of the early Buddhist oral tradition was the preservation of sacred material, for which free improvisation is inappropriate.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, recitation was often undertaken communally by the reciters, which leaves little scope for free improvisation.¹⁰⁹

The emphasis on verbatim transmission in the early Buddhist oral tradition can even be detected in some transmission errors, where in otherwise closely similar Pāli and Sanskrit passages the counterpart to a particular term shows close phonetic similarity but has a considerably different meaning.¹¹⁰ In such cases, the reciters' attempt at precise recall has apparently preserved formal aspects, even though the meaning was lost.

journey is the same journey, every meeting the same meeting") was transmitted with considerably greater accuracy than other comparable epics. Smith 1977: 151 explains that the reason for the employment of pericopes and the resulting greater accuracy "may lie in the fact that the epic is not merely sung for entertainment, but has a religious function", a reason that would hold true also for the use of pericopes in the oral transmission of the early Buddhist discourses. The employment of such formulaic expressions need not invariably be a later feature, but could have been used to some extent already at the time of the original delivery of a discourse, cf. in more detail below p. 855.

¹⁰⁵ In his detailed study of these features in a selected *Dīgha-nikāya* discourse, Allon 1997a: 359 comes to the conclusion that about 87% of the text of this discourse involves some form of repetition. He concludes (p. 360) that "repetition thus thoroughly permeates every dimension of this class of Buddhist literature".

¹⁰⁶ Allon 1997a: 252 explains that "it is surely easier to remember a sequence of words arranged ... according to syllable length", just as "it is easier to remember two different words when they share sound similarities and have the same metrical pattern".

¹⁰⁷ Lord 1987: 71 describes that such oral transmission involves "never merely memorizing a fixed entity, but ... ever re-creating a new version of older forms and stories".

¹⁰⁸ Bechert 1985: 21 points out that oral tradition in India had achieved a high degree of precision, so that, as pointed out by Graham 1987: 138, the "oral transmission of scripture should not be confused with folk oral tradition in which verbatim accuracy is not aspired to", cf. also Winternitz 1908: 34.

¹⁰⁹ Allon 1997b: 42 highlights that "communal or group recitation or performance requires fixed wording" and would not allow for improvisation. According to Coward 1988: 146, "group listening to check for errors is still an accepted method of verification in rural India today".

¹¹⁰ Von Simson 1965: 137-138 gives the following examples: *vivattacchaddo – vighuṣṭaśabdo, brahmujug-gatto – bṛhadjugātro, muducittam – muditacittam, aññataro – ājñātavān, sammodi sammodanīyam – sammukham sammodanīm*.

As is only to be expected of material that has been orally transmitted over longer periods of time, in spite of measures undertaken to ensure correct transmission, variations between different versions of a discourse occur fairly often.

Notably, such differences not only manifest between texts that have been transmitted by different Buddhist schools. They can even be found within the material handed on by a single school, such as within the corpus of texts transmitted in Pāli by the Theravāda tradition.

A difference in the use of pericopes can be seen, for example, between a discourse in the *Dīgha-nikāya* and a discourse in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, both of which report the same event, namely a visit paid by the minister Vassakāra to the Buddha.¹¹¹ While the *Dīgha-nikāya* version describes in detail how Vassakāra got his chariot ready, drove with the chariot and then descended from the chariot to proceed on foot,¹¹² its *Āṅguttara-nikāya* counterpart does not mention Vassakāra's mode of arrival at all, but simply notes that he approached the Buddha.¹¹³

Another case where the records of the same event differ in the detail in which they depict how someone approaches the Buddha can be found by comparing the four discourses that record the last meeting between Māra and the Buddha.¹¹⁴ While the *Dīgha-nikāya* and the *Udāna* versions report that Māra approached the Buddha, stood at one side and then addressed the Buddha,¹¹⁵ the *Samyutta-nikāya* version of the same event does not mention that he stood at one side, but only indicates that he approached the Buddha,¹¹⁶ and the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* version does not describe his approach at all.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Allon 1997a: 39.

¹¹² DN 16 at DN II 73,4: *vassakāro ... rañño māgadhassa ajātasattussa vedehiputtassa paṭissutvā, bhaddāni bhaddāni yānāni yojāpetvā, bhaddam yānam abhirūhitvā, bhaddehi bhaddehi yānehi rājagahamhā niyāsi, yena gjjjhakūto pabbato tena pāyāsi, yāvatikā yānassa bhūmi yānenā gantvā yānā paccorohitvā pat-tiko yena bhagavā ten' upasankami* (B^e-DN II 61,22 and S^e-DN II 85,20: *yojetvā, bhaddam bhaddam*).

¹¹³ AN 7:20 at AN IV 18,4: *vassakāro ... rañño māgadhassa ajātasattussa vedehiputtassa paṭissuṇītvā, yena bhagavā ten' upasankami* (B^e-AN II 409,19: *paṭissutvā*, C^e-AN IV 306,25: *paṭissutvā utthāyāsanā*). Allon 1997a: 39 notes that a description of how someone approaches by chariot can, however, be found elsewhere in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* collection, cf., e.g., AN 5:50 at AN III 59,27 (King Muṇḍa approaches the monk Nārada), AN 8:12 at AN IV 181,23 (General Sīha approaches the Buddha), and AN 10:30 at AN V 65,9 (King Pasenadi approaches the Buddha), although the description given in these discourses is shorter than the “chariot approach” pericope employed in the *Dīgha-nikāya*.

¹¹⁴ Allon 1997a: 62.

¹¹⁵ DN 16 at DN II 104,12 and Ud 6:1 at Ud 63,13: *māro pāpimā acirapakkante āyasmante ānande yena bhagavā ten' upasankami, upasankamitvā ekamantam aṭṭhāsi, ekamantam thito kho māro pāpimā bhagavantam etad avoca*.

¹¹⁶ SN 51:10 at SN V 260,25: *māro pāpimā acirapakkante āyasmante ānande yena bhagavā ten' upasankami, upasankamitvā etad avoca* (C^e-SN V.2 14,6 does not have *acirapakkante āyasmante ānande*, which S^e-SN V 334,17 has only in brackets, in addition to which S^e-SN V 334,18 adds *ekamantam aṭṭhāsi, ekamantam thito kho māro pāpima*, also in brackets, moreover B^e-SN III 228,10 and S^e-SN V 334,17 read *acirapakkante* and add *bhagavantam* before *etad avoca*).

¹¹⁷ AN 8:70 at AN IV 310,11: *māro pāpimā acirapakkante āyasmante ānande bhagavantam etad avoca*.

Pericopes also differ when it comes to describing the respectful attitude with which someone listens to a sermon given by the Buddha or a monk after a meal. For such occasions, the *Dīgha-nikāya*, the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Udāna*, and the *Sutta-nipāta* employ a pericope that describes how the listener(s) take(s) a low seat, an obvious expression of respect.¹¹⁸ Similar situations in the *Vinaya* and in the *Ārguttara-nikāya*, however, do not mention a low seat.¹¹⁹ This difference is particularly notable in the case of a meal given by Prince Bodhi, as the same meal is recorded in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and in the *Vinaya*, so that in this case the same event is described once with and once without the taking of the low seat.¹²⁰ Such differences suggest that during the process of oral transmission the specialisation of reciter groups in particular discourse collections led to variations even within the fold of a single school.

The relatively circumstantial differences noted so far may seem negligible, since they do not affect essential matters. Not all such errors, however, are of such circumstantial character. A somewhat more significant variation occurs in relation to the use of pericopes usually employed at the conclusion of a discourse, found between the *Samyutta-nikāya* and the *Sutta-nipāta* versions of the *Kasibhāradvāja-sutta*. These two discourses record the same event but differ in their conclusion, as according to the *Samyutta-nikāya* account Kasibhāradvāja took refuge and declared himself a lay follower, while according to the *Sutta-nipāta* version he requested ordination and became an arahant.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ The pericope of “taking of a low seat”, *aññataram nīcam āsanam gahetvā*, leads from the pericope that describes the giving of a meal, *papiṭtena khādanīyena bhojanīyena sahatthā santappesi sampavāresi*, to a sermon in DN 3 at DN I 109,36, DN 4 at DN I 125,25, DN 5 at DN I 149,4, DN 12 at DN I 227,4, DN 16 at DN II 88,25, DN 16 at DN II 97,32, MN 35 at MN I 236,31, MN 58 at MN I 393,31, MN 81 at MN II 50,21, MN 127 at MN III 145,25, SN 35:133 at SN IV 123,27 (preceded at SN IV 122,19 by the disrespectful behaviour of taking a high seat), Ud 4:3 at Ud 39,1, Ud 8:6 at Ud 89,16, and Sn 3:7 at Sn p. 111,9 (= MN 92 at MN II 146). The same pericope can also be found regularly in the *Madhyama-āgama*, cf., e.g., MĀ 132 at T I 625b17: 取一小床, in this particular case also occurring in the Tibetan counterpart at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 105b3 or Q (1030) ge 97b1: stan ches dma' ba zhig blangs te (Q reads *chem* instead of *ches*), whereas in the Pāli version, MN 82 at MN II 64,23, the whole episode is not found. Sanskrit occurrences are, e.g., *nīcataram āsanam gr̥hitvā* in Dutt 1984a: 265,15, being a counterpart to Sn 3:7 at Sn p. 111,9; *aññataram nīcam āsanam gahetvā*; or (*nīcata*)[r]/(a)/[k](a)m-āsanam gr̥hitvā in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* fragment S 360 folio 187V5 in Waldschmidt 1950: 26, counterpart to DN 16 at DN II 126,26, where the low seat is not mentioned; or *nīcataram āsanam gr̥hitvā* in the *Saighabhedavastu*, Gnoli 1977: 145,14, counterpart to Vin I 18,9, where the low seat is not mentioned.

¹¹⁹ Instead of the pericope of “taking a low seat” after the pericope that describes the giving of a meal, *papiṭtena ... sampavāresi*, only the pericope “sat down at one side”, *ekamantān nisidi*, leads over to a sermon in AN 4:57 at AN II 63,4, AN 5:33 at AN III 37,11, AN 7:50 at AN IV 64,23, AN 8:12 at AN IV 188,10, Vin I 18,31, Vin I 38,37, Vin I 213,11, Vin I 218,17, Vin I 223,2, Vin I 229,32, Vin I 233,4, Vin I 238,2, Vin I 243,22, Vin I 246,31, Vin I 292,4, Vin II 147,22, Vin II 158,8, Vin II 164,19, and Vin IV 19,7. Allon 1997a: 122-123 discusses this variation in regard to the pericope of the low seat and in notes 238 and 239 provides nearly all of the above references.

¹²⁰ MN 85 at MN II 93,10 and Vin II 128,37.

¹²¹ SN² 197 at SN² I 372,20: *esāhaṇi bhagavantān gotamān saraṇān gacchāmi dhammaṇi ca bhikkhusaṅghān ca, upāsakān mām bhavām gotamo dhāretu ajjatagge pāṇupetān saraṇān gatañ ti* (SN 7:11 at SN

Once variations in the use of pericopes are found between different Pāli collections, it is not surprising that such variations also occur between the *Majjhima-nikāya* and its counterpart in the *Madhyama-āgama* collection.

In regard to the use of pericopes, discourses found in the *Madhyama-āgama* regularly describe that a monk would fan the Buddha,¹²² a circumstance noted only rarely in *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses.¹²³ On frequent occasions, *Madhyama-āgama* discourses also mention the sitting mat,¹²⁴ one of the standard requisites of a monk, while their Pāli counterparts tend to refer to the same accessory only on very few occasions.¹²⁵

I 173,23 reads *dharetu*, C^e-SN I 310,6 reads *bhavantam*, instead of *bhagavantam*). Sn 1:4 at Sn p. 15,23: *esāham bhavantam gotamam saranam gacchāmi dhammañ ca bhikkhusaṅghañ ca, labheyyaḥaṇ bhotō gotamassa santike pabbajyaṇ labheyyaṇ upasampadan ti ... aññatato ca kho panāyasmā bhāradvājo arahataṇ ahosi* (S^e-Sn 343,6 adds: *upāsakan māṇ bhavaṇ gotamo dhāreto ajjatagge pāṇupetam saraṇam gataṇ* before *labheyyaṇ*, etc., B^e-Sn 293,14 does not have *kho*, S^e-Sn 343,15 does not have *ca*). The Chinese parallels SĀ 98 at T II 27b26, SĀ² 264 at T II 466c10, and SĀ³ 1 at T II 493b8 (translated in Yueh-Mei 2001: 77-79) agree with Sn 1:4, in that according to them he went forth and became an arahant. For a similar case cf. below p. 57. For a possible misapplication of a pericope cf. also Gombrich 1987.

¹²² MĀ 33 at T I 474a19, MĀ 75 at T I 543a10, MĀ 115 at T I 604c26, MĀ 180 at T I 722a5, MĀ 204 at T I 775c17, MĀ 205 at T I 779a11, MĀ 212 at T I 793a1, and MĀ 213 at T I 797b19 (listing only *Madhyama-āgama* discourses that have a parallel in the *Majjhima-nikāya*); cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 30.

¹²³ MN 12 at MN I 83,20 and MN 74 at MN I 501,1 report that a monk was fanning the Buddha. In the Jain tradition it was considered inappropriate for a monk to use a fan or let himself be fanned, cf. the *Dasa-veyāliya* in Lalwani 1973a: 42,31 (4.21) and 124,5 (6.37) or in Leumann 1932: 12,15 (4.10) and 38,1 (6.38), translated in Schubring 1932: 86 and 99.

¹²⁴ Cf., e.g., MĀ 9 at T I 430b10, MĀ 19 at T I 444b29, MĀ 28 at T I 460b19, MĀ 32 at T I 471a4, MĀ 72 at T I 536a4, MĀ 81 at T I 554c15, MĀ 115 at T I 603b14, MĀ 131 at T I 620b15, MĀ 132 at T I 625c5, MĀ 144 at T I 652c5, MĀ 146 at T I 657c16, MĀ 153 at T I 670b2, MĀ 161 at T I 687b24, MĀ 162 at T I 690b1, MĀ 166 at T I 698c9, MĀ 182 at T I 725b18, MĀ 184 at T I 729b19, MĀ 185 at T I 729c9, MĀ 187 at T I 734a3, MĀ 191 at T I 739a18, MĀ 192 at T I 740c19, MĀ 204 at T I 777a12, MĀ 207 at T I 781c3, MĀ 208 at T I 783c7, MĀ 212 at T I 793a6, and MĀ 214 at T I 798a6 (listing only discourses that have a parallel in the *Majjhima-nikāya*).

¹²⁵ MN 24 at MN I 147,5 (parallel to an occurrence of the sitting mat in MĀ 9 at T I 430b10) and MN 147 at MN III 277,30 (a discourse that has no counterpart in the *Madhyama-āgama*). Minh Chau 1964/1991: 29 assumes that differences in the degree to which the sitting mat is mentioned explicitly in *Majjhima-nikāya* or *Madhyama-āgama* discourses respectively reflect actual differences in its use in the southern and northern Buddhist traditions. Yet, the sitting mat is even nowadays in use among forest monks of the Theravāda tradition, in fact the different *Vinayas* consider the sitting mat as one of the basic requisites of a monk, cf. the regulations on its proper size in the *pācittiya* or *pātayantika* rule 87 in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 694b25 (translated in Wieger 1951: 249), rule 87 in the Kāśyapīya *Vinaya*, T 1460 at T XXIV 663c12, rule 87 in the Mahīśasaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 71a10, rule 86 in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 392c2, rule 87 in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 895c23, rule 89 in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 130a28 (translated Rosen 1959: 214), and rule 89 in the Theravāda *Vinaya* at Vin IV 170,29; cf. also a description of the use of the sitting mat in seventh century India, provided by Yījīng (義淨), T 2125 at T LIV 221a8, translated in Takakusu 1966: 110-111. Given this general agreement, the absence of references to the sitting mat in Pāli discourses may simply be due to the use of different pericopes and need not be taken as reflecting actual differences in its use.

Another standard pericope found in the *Madhyama-āgama* describes how a visitor or a monk will depart from the presence of the Buddha by performing three circumambulations, while *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses mention only a single circumambulation.¹²⁶

The two collections also differ in their descriptions of how listeners will express their appreciation of the teachings. Whereas in a *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse such a person will exclaim “excellent, excellent”, in a *Madhyama-āgama* discourse he (or she) will rather inform the Buddha: “I understood, I realized”.¹²⁷

Again, discourses in the *Madhyama-āgama* collection regularly describe that when someone asks the Buddha or a monk a question, the actual question will be preceded by a request for permission to put a question,¹²⁸ a pericope found only rarely in the *Majjhima-nikāya*.¹²⁹

Other pericopes are found only in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and are absent from the *Madhyama-āgama*. One example is the pericope employed regularly at the beginning of a *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, in which the Buddha addresses his disciples with “monks”, and the monks reply “venerable sir”, after which the Buddha announces his topic and proceeds to deliver the discourse.¹³⁰

A closer inspection shows that this pericope stands in contrast to the remainder of the discourses in which it occurs, in as much as the vocative “monks”, *bhikkhavo*, used in

¹²⁶ Cf., e.g., MĀ 132 at T I 623b23: 繞三匝, and its parallel MN 82 at MN II 56,22: *padakkhinam katvā*; cf. also MĀ 133 at T I 630c17 and MN 56 at MN I 380,16. The same pericope recurs in several *Madhyama-āgama* discourses in places where the corresponding *Majjhima-nikāya* version does not record any circumambulation at all, cf., e.g., MĀ 28 at T I 458c23, MĀ 63 at T I 500a12, MĀ 79 at T I 549b27, MĀ 105 at T I 596a28, MĀ 146 at T I 656a22, MĀ 151 at T I 666b28, MĀ 161 at T I 686a18, MĀ 165 at T I 696c18, MĀ 167 at T I 700a8, MĀ 193 at T I 744a20, MĀ 195 at T I 750b1, MĀ 201 at T I 767a4, MĀ 212 at T I 792c29, MĀ 213 at T I 796c4, and MĀ 216 at T I 801c7. A reference to three circumambulations can be found in DN 16 at DN II 163,27, according to which Mahākassapa performed three circumambulations of the Buddha’s funeral pyre, *tikkhattum citakam padakkhiṇam katvā*. Part of this pericope has also been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment parallel to MĀ 161 at T I 686a18, cf. SHT V 1148R4: *triprada(kṣiṇīkṛtvā)*. Three circumambulations are also mentioned in Jain texts, cf. Hoernle 1885/1989: 9 note 17.

¹²⁷ E.g., MN 7 at MN I 39,27: *abhiikkantum ... abhiikkantum*, and MĀ 93 at T I 576a10: 我已知 ... 我已解.

¹²⁸ Cf., e.g., MĀ 29 at T I 461b28, MĀ 34 at T I 475a17, MĀ 79 at T I 549c26, MĀ 144 at T I 652a12, MĀ 145 at T I 654a5, MĀ 150 at T I 661a4, MĀ 151 at T I 664a12, MĀ 152 at T I 667a17, MĀ 170 at T I 704c18, MĀ 171 at T I 706b18, MĀ 173 at T I 710a10, MĀ 198 at T I 757a9, MĀ 210 at T I 788a19, MĀ 211 at T I 790b14, MĀ 212 at T I 793b15, MĀ 214 at T I 798a9, and MĀ 217 at T I 802a28 (listing only *Madhyama-āgama* discourses that have a parallel in the *Majjhima-nikāya*).

¹²⁹ Cf., e.g., MN 35 at MN I 229,35, MN 109 at MN III 15,23, and MN 144 at MN III 264,30. Notably, although none of these three Pāli discourses has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, each has a parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*, where in each case this pericope is not found, cf. SĀ 58 at T II 14b17 (parallel to MN 109), SĀ 110 at T II 35c11 (parallel to MN 35), and SĀ 1266 at T II 347c23 (parallel to MN 144). A Tibetan version of this pericope can be found in the parallel to MN 90, D (1) ’dul ba, kha 88a1 or Q (1030) ge 81a6, in which case it also occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the same discourse, MĀ 212 at T I 793b15, but not in the Pāli version.

¹³⁰ E.g., in MN 1 at MN I 1,3: *bhikkhavo ti. bhadante ti te bhikkhū bhagavato paccassosum*; on the use of this pericope cf. also Manné 1990: 33 and Meisig 1987a: 225.

this passage, differs from the vocative address “monks”, *bhikkhave*, used in all remaining instances in the respective discourse.¹³¹ Similarly, the first vocative “venerable sir”, *bhadrante*, used by the monks, is not the same as the vocative “venerable sir”, *bhante*, found in the remainder of the discourse.¹³² While such different usages may be intended to convey a sense of emphasis, it could also be that this whole pericope was added at some point during the transmission of the discourses. In fact, such a pericope is not found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, although it does occur in an individual translation that stems from a (no longer extant) *Madhyama-āgama* collection.¹³³

To sum up, the standard opening of a discourse as “thus I have heard”, the occurrence of metrical and sound similarities, the application of the principle of waxing syllables and the recurrent use of repetition and pericopes testify to the emphasis on verbatim recall in the early Buddhist oral tradition. At the same time, the use of pericopes varies not only among discourses that belong to different reciter lineages, but also among reciters that belong to the same school. These two aspects, the attempt at precise recall and the variations in oral transmission, stand at the background of my comparative study of the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses in the following pages.

¹³¹ MN 1 at MN I 1,5 continues with *bhikkhave*. On the vocative *bhikkhave* cf. Bechert 1980: 29, id. 1988: 131, or id. 1991: 11, and Lüders 1954: 13. Pind 2004: 512 explains that in such introductory sentences “*bhikkhavo* is used as a marked emphatic voc. as opposed to *bhikkhave*, which is used as an enclitic unmarked vocative”; cf. also von Hinüber 1985/2001: 238, who notes that Sadd 190,6 offers an explanation for the use of *bhikkhave* alongside *bhikkhavo* in certain contexts.

¹³² MN 1 at MN I 1,7 continues with *bhante*.

¹³³ T 48 at T I 837c25: “the Buddha said: ‘monks!’, the monks replied: ‘yes, indeed!’, the monks listened to the Buddha, the Buddha said ... ”, 佛告: 諸比丘, 比丘應曰: 唯然, 比丘從佛聽, 佛說. According to the introductory remark in T 48 at T I 837c21, this discourse belongs to a *Madhyama-āgama* collection, 出中阿含.

Chapter 1 *Mūlapariyāya-vagga*

MN 1 *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*

The *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*, the “discourse on the root instruction”,¹ analyses the perceptual processes of different types of person.² This discourse has a Chinese parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.³ Besides this parallel, a discourse from the *Madhyama-āgama* and an individual Chinese translation found outside of the four *Āgamas* offer a similar presentation, although they differ to such an extent from the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions as to make it probable that these two discourses go back to a different original.⁴

The theme of the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel is the perceptual reaction to a variety of phenomena by four types of person: MN I 1

- a worldling,
- a disciple in higher training (*sekha*),
- an arahant,
- a Tathāgata.

The other two Chinese discourses differ, as their presentation is based on taking up three types of person:

- recluses and Brahmins that fall prey to conceivings in regard to phenomena,

¹ Premasiri 2003b: 52 explains the title *Mūlapariyāya* to imply that this discourse explores the “root of existence ... by a thorough analysis of the workings of the perceptual and cognitive processes of human beings with a view to unravelling the psychological sources of human bondage”.

² A somewhat similar exposition on penetrative knowledge in regard to the elements and various heavenly beings occurs in MN 49 at MN I 329,12 and its parallel MĀ 78 at T I 548a3. A description of stages of conceiving by way of the accusative, locative and ablative cases, although in this case in relation to the six senses, can also be found in SN 35:30 at SN IV 22,5.

³ The parallel is EĀ 44.6 at T II 766a-b. EĀ 44.6 at T II 766a7 gives the discourse’s title as “the root of all dharmas”, 一切諸法之本, while the summary verse (*uddāna*) at T II 769b6 just reads 法之本. EĀ 44.6 agrees with MN 1 in locating the discourse at Ukkatthā (優迦羅), a town in the district of Kosala, situated in the foothills of the Himālaya (cf. Malalasekera 1937/1995: 329). According to an account of the first council in the 撲集三藏及雜藏傳, T 2026 at T XLIX 3a16, however, the present discourse was spoken among the Sakyans. For a translation of EĀ 44.6 cf. Pāsādika 2008a: 142-145.

⁴ These two discourses are MĀ 106 at T I 596b-c and T 56 at T I 851a-b. Unlike MN 1 and EĀ 44.6, MĀ 106 and T 56 have Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī as their location. MĀ 106 has the title “discourse on perception”, 想經, while T 56 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on delighting in perception”, 佛說樂想經. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 56 was translated by Dharmarakṣa. MĀ 106 has been examined and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 34-35, 204, and 211-214. On the problem of categorizing these two discourses as ‘parallels’ to MN 1 cf. also Anālayo 2008d: 11. Regarding the qualification of T 56 as a discourse “spoken by the Buddha”, 佛說, this character couplet appears regularly in the titles of works in the Chinese canon, where in most cases it probably does not render an expression present in the original, but serves as a formula of authentication of the translated scripture.

- recluses and Brahmins that do not fall prey to such conceivings,
- the Buddha.

In regard to the worldling,⁵ the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* explains how perceiving earth leads to conceiving “earth” in various ways, such as “earth”, “in earth”, and “from earth”, followed by treating earth as “mine” and by delighting in earth. In this way, the Pāli discourse depicts a series of conceivings (*maññanā*),⁶ which establish a relationship between the perceiving subject and the perceived object by way of the accusative, locative, and ablative cases, a series of conceivings that culminates in the arising of delight.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse agrees with the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* that the worldling perceives earth as earth, which it follows up by indicating that the worldling then takes earth to be really earth.⁷

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse describes taking earth to be the self, or earth being part of the self, or the self being part of earth.⁸ The individual translation speaks of delighting in earth and identifying with it.⁹

The four discourses agree that such conceivings take place due to the absence of true understanding. From the first example of conceiving earth, the four discourses apply their respective treatments to various other phenomena, thereby demonstrating the comprehensive scope of such conceivings. The Pāli and Chinese versions differ on the phenomena covered in their respective expositions (see table 1.1). They agree, however, in mentioning:

- the four elements,
- various heavenly beings,
- the four immaterial spheres,
- what is seen, heard, sensed, and cognised,
- unity,
- diversity,
- all.

MN I 4 Of particular interest is that the *Majjhima-nikāya* version and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel include Nirvāṇa in their respective lists.¹⁰ The *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*’s presentation of

⁵ On the notion of a *puthujjana* cf., e.g., Kariyawasam 2005.

⁶ Nāṇavīra 1987/2001: 97 explains that “this tetrad of *maññanā*, of ‘conceivings’, represents four progressive levels of explicitness in the basic structure of appropriation. The first, ‘he conceives X’, is so subtle that the appropriation is simply implicit in the verb”.

⁷ EĀ44.6 at T II 766a13: “this is earth, certainly like this is earth, truly like this is earth”, 此是地, 如審是地, 如實是地. This passage on its own could also be taken to instruct how to properly contemplate earth, but the remark made a little later that this happens because such a person “is one without knowledge”, EĀ44.6 at T II 766a26: 非智者, shows that a form of misconceiving is intended, as is the case in the corresponding passage in MN 1.

⁸ MĀ 106 at T I 596b13: “in regard to earth he has the perception: ‘earth’, ‘earth now is the self’, ‘earth belongs to the self’, ‘the self belongs to earth’”, 於地有地想, 地即是神, 地是神所, 神是地所.

⁹ T 56 at T I 851a28: “in regard to earth he has the perception: ‘earth’, he delights in earth, he speculates that earth is for me, and he declares: ‘earth is the self!””, 於地有地想, 樂於地, 計於地為我, 彼言: 地是我.

Nirvāṇa as a phenomenon prone to lead to conceivings and to appropriation in terms of ‘mine’ should, according to the Pāli commentary, be understood to refer to wrong notions of Nirvāṇa, held by those who mistake sensual enjoyment or attainment of a *jhāna* to be the final goal.¹¹

Table 1.1: Objects of Conceivings in MN 1 and its Parallels¹²

MN 1	EĀ 44.6
4 elements (1-4) beings (5) various gods (6-12) immaterial spheres (13-16) sense experience (17-20) unity and diversity (21-22) all (23) Nirvāṇa (24)	4 elements (→ 1-4) human being(s) (→ 5) various gods (→ 6-12) immortal spheres (→ 13-16) sense experience (→ 17-20) unity and diversity (→ 21-22) all (→ 23) Nirvāṇa (→ 24)
MĀ 106	T 56
4 elements (→ 1-4) various gods (→ 6-12) purity immortal spheres (→ 13-16) unity, diversity, variety (→ 21-22) sense experience (→ 17-20) insight this world and that world all (→ 23) (≠ 5, 24)	4 elements (→ 1-4) various gods (→ 6-12) purity immortal spheres (→ 13-16) unity, diversity, variety (→ 21-22) sense experience (→ 17-20) insight this world and that world (≠ 5, 23-24)

The commentarial explanation is not entirely convincing, since the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* instructs the disciple in higher training (*sekha*), someone who already has experienced at least stream-entry and is ‘training’ for the attainment of full awakening, to avoid conceivings and delight in regard to Nirvāṇa.¹³ This instruction would make little sense if the Nirvāṇa the present discourse refers to were indeed a wrong notion of Nirvāṇa. There would be no need to advise a disciple in higher training, someone who has already experienced Nirvāṇa, to avoid conceivings and delighting in regard to a mistaken notion of

¹⁰ MN 1 at MN I 4,3 and EĀ 44.6 at T II 766a25. Nirvāṇa is not taken up in MĀ 106 or in T 56.

¹¹ Ps I 38,27, translated in Jayawickrama 2004: 18. These correspond to the five claims to “ultimate Nirvāṇa here and now”, *parama dīṭṭhadhamma nibbāna*, listed in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*, DN 1 at DN I 36,17, and found similarly in its Chinese parallel DĀ 21 at T I 93b15 and in its Tibetan parallel in Weller 1934: 56,36.

¹² Here and elsewhere, the use of → in the tables shows which sections in the parallel version(s) correspond to the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation. In case sections from the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse have no counterpart, I list these at the bottom of the table, marking them with ≠.

¹³ MN 1 at MN I 4,30.

Nirvāṇa, since such conceivings and delight would not occur in the first place.¹⁴ This suggests that the instructions in the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel have the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa in mind.¹⁵

The rationale behind the need to refrain from delighting, the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* explains, is that delight is a root cause for the arising of *dukkha*.¹⁶ In general, the expression “to delight”, *abhinandati*, need not carry negative connotations. It recurs, for example, as part of the standard conclusion to a discourse, according to which the monks “delight” in what the Buddha has said.

In the present instance in the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*, however, delight comes as the climax of a set of conceivings and imaginings, a climax immediately preceded by taking Nirvāṇa as “mine”. This indicates that the type of delight envisaged in this particular context is related to craving and grasping, which explains why a disciple in higher training should better avoid such delight.

The corresponding passage in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version speaks of not “having attachment” to Nirvāṇa, instead of not “delighting” in it, which indicates that, from its perspective, the attitude towards Nirvāṇa in the present context clearly has unwholesome connotations. Thus, the point made in both versions of the present discourse appears to be highlighting the need to avoid developing any form of conceivings and attachment even in relation to the final goal.

MN I 5 In regard to the stage of the arahant, the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions agree in clarifying that the perceptual mastery of arahants is due to their eradication of lust, anger, and delusion.¹⁷ When taking up the Buddha’s perceptual mastery, the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* version highlight his successful eradication of craving and his transcendence of the dependent arising of birth, old age, and death.

MN I 6 Several editions of the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* conclude by reporting that the monks were not delighted with this discourse.¹⁸ This rather unusual ending was also known to the Pāli

¹⁴ Nānananda 2005: 282.

¹⁵ Gethin 1997b: 222 (in the context of an examination of right and wrong view) points out that the “Buddhist tradition recognises that what is formally Buddhist theory can be grasped and held in a manner such that it constitutes wrong view”. From this perspective, even a concept like Nirvāṇa would have the potential of leading to misguided conceivings and appropriations. This appears to have been an understanding of the present passage held among the Pubbaseliyas, who according to Kv 404,15 referred to the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* in support of their opinion that the deathless (*amata*) as an object of the mind can become a fetter (*samyojana*).

¹⁶ MN 1 at MN I 6,11: *nandi dukkhassa mūlam* (C^e-M I 18,4 and S^e-M I 11,1: *nandi*).

¹⁷ MN 1 at MN I 5,4+16+28 and EĀ 44.6 at T II 766b10. Chaudhary 1994c: 71 notes that stanzas in the *Bhagavad-gīta* (cf. especially 2:56–58) offer a description of an accomplished saint that has several elements in common with the present passage.

¹⁸ B^e-MN I 8,19, C^e-MN I 18,9, and S^e-MN I 11,6 record that the monks did not delight in what the Buddha had said. Only E^e at MN I 6,24 reports that the monks delighted in the discourse. According to EĀ 44.6 at T II 766b15, “the monks did not accept that teaching”, 諸比丘不受其教. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2008a: 9–10.

commentators. They explain that the Buddha preached this discourse to humble a group of five hundred monks, who had developed conceit on account of their intellectual mastery of the Buddha's teaching.¹⁹ Their lack of delight, the commentary explains, was because they had been unable to understand what the Buddha had taught them.²⁰

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version agrees with the Pāli commentary in as much as it reports that the monks had been unable to grasp the teaching the Buddha had delivered to them. It attributes their inability in this respect to the fact that their minds had been obstructed by Māra.²¹

Looking back on the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel, the close similarity between these two discourses stands in marked contrast to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and the individual translation.²² These two discourses vary from the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions not only in regard to title and location, but also in regard to the basic pattern adopted in their treatments: instead of taking up the worldling, the disciple in higher training, the arahant and the Buddha, they discuss deluded recluses and Brahmins, their wiser counterparts, and the Buddha. These two versions, moreover, do not include Nirvāna in their treatment, nor do they mention the unusual reaction of the listening monks.

These differences and the contrast provided by the similarity between the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel give the impression, mentioned at the outset of the present study, in that the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and the individual translation may go back to a different original.

¹⁹ Ps I 56,8; cf. also the introduction to the *Mūlapariyāya-jātaka*, Jā 245 at Jā II 259,14. A similar episode recurs in the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, which reports how a group of five hundred monks, being unable to appreciate a teaching given by the Buddha, get up and leave, cf. the Sanskrit text in Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002: 48, folio 69v2-3 (§ 138), Chinese versions found in T 310.43 at T XI 637b13, T 350 at T XII 193b15, T 351 at T XII 199b26, T 352 at T XII 214c21, T 659 at T XVI 282a7, a Khotanese version in Skjærø 2003: 417 (§ 142), and a Tibetan version at D (87) *dkon brtsegs, cha* 146b6 or Q (760.43) 'i 132a3, with a synoptic edition in von Staël-Holstein 1926: 200-201, and translations in Chang 1983/1991: 406-407, Pāśādika 1980: 52, Weller 1966: 339, id. 1966/1967: 422, and id. 1970: 149.

²⁰ According to an alternative interpretation suggested by Bodhi 1980/1992: 20, Nāñananda 2005: 286, and Thanissaro 2002: 156, perhaps the very fact that the monks understood this discourse caused them to be unable to delight in it.

²¹ EĀ 44.6 at T II 766b15. EĀ 44.6 continues after this explanation with the Buddha instructing the monks to meditate and not be negligent, followed by the monks delighting in what the Buddha had said. According to the commentarial explanation at Ps I 59,5, the group of monks who had been the audience of MN 1 received a short discourse by the Buddha on a later occasion, the *Gotamaka-sutta*, a discourse whose conclusion reports that this time the monks did delight in what the Buddha had taught to them, cf. AN 3:123 at AN I 276,23. Ps I 59,18 explains that they all became arahants during the delivery of this discourse.

²² The suggestion by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 204, based on comparing MN 1 only with MĀ 106, that the Pāli reciters could have added the negation *na* to the conclusion "to earmark its expunging from the Pāli Tipiṭaka, but the later Pāli compilers forgot to do so", needs to be revised in the light of EĀ 44.6. Thus already the present study of the first discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya* shows the importance of taking into account all known parallels for a proper assessment of the Pāli version.

MN 2 *Sabbāsava-sutta*

The *Sabbāsava-sutta*, the “discourse on all the influxes”, presents seven methods for abandoning the influxes (*āsava*).²³ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, another parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, and a third parallel in an individual translation.²⁴ In addition to these parallels preserved in Chinese translation, a version of the present discourse can also be found as a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.²⁵ Another discourse relevant to a com-

²³ Concerning the significance of the term *āsava* or *āsrava* (which in the parallel versions has its Chinese and Tibetan equivalents in 漏, 流, and *zag pa*), according to Alsdorf 1965: 4 the use of this term by the Buddhists need not be a case of a borrowing from the Jains, but could rather be due to both traditions drawing on already existing ancient Indian notions. For a detailed discussion of the term cf. also Schmithausen 1992: 123-127. Hirakawa 1993/1998: 198 explains that “in Jainism the term is used with the sense of inflow because defilements are said to flow from the external world into the body, where they adhere to the *ātman*”, while “in Buddhist texts this term is used in the sense of outflow because the mind’s defilements move outward and affect other things”, presumably in the sense of verbal or physical behaviour that expresses itself outwardly. Norman 1997: 34, however, comments that while “the etymology of this word (the preposition *ā* ‘towards’ + the root *sru-* ‘to flow’) implies something flowing in, and this suits the Jain usage well, since there the *āsavas* are influences which flow into a person and discolour his soul”, in contrast, the same imagery “does not suit the Buddhist idea, where the *āsavas* are not attributes which are capable of flowing into a person”. The nuance of “outflow” is evident in AN 3:26 at AN I 124,8, where *āsava* stands for the discharge from a festering sore. AN 6:63 at AN III 414,16, however, distinguishes between *āsavas* that lead to rebirth in five different realms (cf. also MĀ 111 at T I 599c1 and T 57 at T I 852a6), where the sense of “outflow” would not fit the context too well. Similarly, in the present context the sense of the term *āsava* does not seem to be just about “outflow”, but at times describes how to avoid detrimental “influences”, e.g., by restraining the sense-doors, by enduring or avoiding difficulties. In fact, according to Schmithausen 1992: 125, “*ās(r)ava* may, in Buddhist texts ... also denote annoyances, trouble, suffering”, adding (p. 126) that “in the case of *ās(r)ava* the most archaic meaning is ‘dangers’ or ‘disturbances’ rushing in or intruding upon the ascetic”; cf. also Wayman 1991 and below p. 382-383 notes 217 and 218.

²⁴ The parallels are MĀ 10 at T I 431c-432c, entitled “discourse on the extinction of influxes”, 漏盡經; EĀ 40.6 at T II 740a-741b, entitled “a teaching on purification from the influxes”, 淨諸漏法 (cf. T II 740a27); and T 31 at T I 813a-814b, entitled “discourse spoken by the Buddha on restraining the causes of all influxes”, 佛說一切流攝守因經, a discourse that according to the information given in the Taishō edition was translated by the Parthian Ān Shīgāo (安世高), an attribution that according to Zucchetti 2010a: 253 is probably correct. Char 1991: 45 notes that translations by Ān Shīgāo tend to be quite literal, in contrast to the more polished and free renderings of later translators; on Ān Shīgāo cf. also, e.g., Forte 1995 and Harrison 2004. The *Saṅgītiparyāya*, T 1536 at T XXVI 394c3, refers to the present discourse as the “discourse [giving] an analysis of [how to] restrain the influxes”, 防諸漏記別經; cf. also the similar reference to the “discourse on [how to] restrain the influxes” 防諸漏經 in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 713b29. While MN 2 and EĀ 40.6 take place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī, MĀ 10, T 31, and the Tibetan version have the Kuru country as their location. MĀ 10 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 83-84 and 215-222. The **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 243b29, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1590, refers to a discourse in which seven ways of restraining the influxes are taught, evidently a reference to the present discourse, whose title it records as the “discourse on restraining all the influxes”, 一切漏障經. For a translation of the Pāli commentary on MN 2 cf. Jayawickrama 2009.

²⁵ Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 91b5-94b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 104b2-108a2, giving the title of the dis-

parative study of the *Sabbāsava-sutta* is the *Āsava-sutta* in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*, a Pāli discourse that takes up the same topic, although its exposition appears to stem from a different occasion.²⁶

The *Sabbāsava-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the individual translation and the Tibetan version begin by pointing out that the destruction of the influxes can be reached only by way of knowing and seeing, for which purpose wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) is of crucial importance.²⁷ MN I 7

The *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels describe an untaught worldling who does not understand that giving attention to unsuitable things and not giving attention to suitable things causes the arising and increase of the influxes.

For the purpose of abandoning the influxes,²⁸ the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels then list seven methods, with some variations in the sequence of their presentation (see table 1.2).²⁹ According to the *Sabbāsava-sutta*, these seven methods comprise:

- seeing (*dassana*),
- restraining (*samvara*),
- using (*patisevana*),
- enduring (*adhivāsana*),
- avoiding (*parivajjana*),
- removing (*vinodana*),
- developing (*bhāvanā*).

The other Pāli discourse from the *Ānguttara-nikāya*, the *Āsava-sutta*, begins instead by announcing that a monk endowed with six qualities is worthy of offerings and respect.³⁰ These six qualities are the successful implementation of six out of the seven methods mentioned in the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels for the purpose

course as *zag pa gang dag gi skye ba*, “the arising of all influxes”; cf. also the discourse quotation at Abhidh-k 2:49 in Pradhan 1967: 82,25, paralleling MN 2 at MN I 7,7, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 30a20 and T 1559 at T XXIX 188b1. For another quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 31.

²⁶ AN 6:58 at AN III 387-390.

²⁷ For a more detail examination of this term cf. Anālayo 2009y.

²⁸ The reference to “abandoning” (*pahāna*/斷/*spong ba*) the influxes in MN 2 at MN I 7,11, MĀ 10 at T I 432a10, EĀ 40.6 at T II 740b2, T 31 at T I 813b6, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 92b3 or Q (5595) *tu* 105b1 seems to be meant only as a temporary overcoming, since otherwise it would be difficult to understand how practices such as proper use of requisites and avoiding dangerous animals could in themselves suffice for a permanent “abandoning” of the three influxes of sensual desire, existence, and ignorance (to which in later times the influx of views was added as fourth; cf. below p. 382 note 217). For a discourse quotation of the reference to the seven methods in the context of a discussion on how these square with the notion of three influxes cf. also the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 246b14.

²⁹ Notably, the two methods concerned with developing positive qualities (proper vision and developing the factors of awakening) form the beginning and culmination point in all parallel versions, thus differences of sequence affect only the order of the remaining five methods, which are concerned with various aspects of restraint.

³⁰ AN 6:58 at AN III 387,16.

of abandoning the influxes. The method not found in the *Āsava-sutta* is “seeing”, which is the first method in the other versions (see table 1.2).

- MN I 8 The *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels explain the method of “seeing” with the example of speculations about oneself in relation to past, present and future times.³¹ Such speculations, according to the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese parallels, can lead to six types of view about the existence and nature of the self. A noble disciple, in contrast, avoids such speculations and by developing proper vision is able to eradicate the three fetters and thereby to attain stream-entry.³²

Table 1.2: Order of the Methods for Abandoning the Influxes

MN 2	MĀ 10 & T 31	EĀ 40.6	AN 6:58	Abhidh-k-t
seeing (1)	(→ 1)	(→ 1)	(→ 2)	(→ 1)
restraining (2)	(→ 2)	(→ 4)	(→ 3)	(→ 2)
using (3)	(→ 5)	(→ 3)	(→ 4)	(→ 5)
enduring (4)	(→ 3)	(→ 5)	(→ 5)	(→ 3)
avoiding (5)	(→ 4)	(→ 6)	(→ 6)	(→ 6)
removing (6)	(→ 6)	(→ 2)	(→ 7)	(→ 4)
developing (7)	(→ 7)	(→ 7)	(≠ 1)	(→ 7)

- MN I 9 The next method listed in the *Sabbāsava-sutta*, a method described in similar terms in the parallel versions, is to “restrain” the six senses in order to avoid the arising of unwholesome mental states.³³

³¹ MN 2 at MN I 8,4, MĀ 10 at T I 432a16, EĀ 40.6 at T II 740b21, T 31 at T I 813b11, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 92b5 or Q (5595) *tu* 105b5. A discourse quotation of the passage regarding speculation on a self can be found in Abhidh-k 3:25 in Pradhan 1967: 133,18, paralleling MN 2 at MN I 8,4, with the Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 49a6 and T 1559 at T XXIX 205c26; cf. also Abhidh-k 9 in Pradhan 1967: 471,18, paralleling MN 2 at MN I 8,18, with counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 156b25, T 1559 at T XXIX 307c27, and Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 94a4 or Q (5595) *thu* 142b4. Such speculations are also described in SN 12:20 at SN II 26,27, in its parallel SĀ 296 at T II 84b27, and in Sanskrit fragment S 474 folio 10V7-10 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 40, which agree in indicating that noble disciples are beyond such speculations due to their insight into dependent arising, while in MN 2 it is the noble disciple’s insight into the four noble truths that leads beyond such speculations. This difference in presentation does not imply a major difference in meaning, since a noble disciple’s insight into the second and third noble truths would be equivalent to his or her insight into dependent arising. A listing of such unwise speculations can also be found in the *Śravakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 102,22 or ŚSG 1998: 156,18, with the Chinese counterpart in T 1579 at T XXX 412b19.

³² MN 2 at MN I 9,21, MĀ 10 at T I 432b2, EĀ 40.6 at T II 740c22, and T 31 at T I 813b27. The section on the six views is found elsewhere in Abhidh-k-t, cf. D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 94a5 or Q (5595) *thu* 142b6 (cf. above note 31); for a discourse quotation of the exposition on the six views cf. also the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 713b29.

³³ A minor difference is that MĀ 10 at T I 432b7 relates sense-restraint to contemplating impurity, 不淨觀, cf. also T 31 at T I 813c5.

The *Sabbāsava-sutta* continues by taking up the theme of “using”, a method concerned with the proper use of the four requisites of a monk or a nun. According to all versions, proper use of robes means to employ them just to cover the body and to protect it from the impact of weather and insects. The *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions add that robes should not be used for the purpose of adornment, a point both versions also make in relation to dwelling places.³⁴ The *Sabbāsava-sutta* and the *Āsava-sutta*, however, speak of avoiding adornment in relation to the proper use of food.³⁵ This unexpected association of adornment to food invites further examination. MN I 10

In other Pāli discourses, “adornment” refers to external embellishment, such as wearing garlands, bracelets, decorated sandals, jewels, and long-fringed clothes, etc.³⁶ Similarly, the injunction to refrain from “adornment” as part of the eight precepts undertaken on full moon days by Buddhist lay followers is concerned with external forms of beautification.³⁷ In view of this, it would be more natural for the problem of “adornment” to arise in relation to robes. A discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama* provide an example of misuse of robes for the sake of adornment, as they describe the monk Nanda incurring the Buddha’s reproach for wearing ironed robes.³⁸

According to an explanation given in the *Visuddhimagga*, adornment in relation to food takes place when one partakes of food in order to become plump or to have a clear skin, such as harem women or actors might do.³⁹ This explanation appears somewhat contrived. In sum, it seems that the *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* parallels to the *Sabbāsava-sutta* offer a more natural presentation by relating the problem of adornment to robes instead.⁴⁰

³⁴ MĀ 10 at T I 432b23+29 and EĀ 40.6 at T II 741a2+7.

³⁵ MN 2 at MN I 10,9: “he uses alms-food ... not for ornament or adornment”, *pindapātam patisevati ... na mandanāya na vibhūsanāya*; cf. also AN 6:58 at AN III 388,18. T 31 at T I 813c21 similarly admonishes not to use food for the sake of attractive appearance, 不端正故. The Tibetan version speaks of adornment in relation to all four requisites, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 93a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 106a4. Adornment in relation to alms food is also mentioned in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 86,11 or ŠSG 1998: 132,8, reading: *na mandanārthan na vibhūṣanārthan iti*, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1579 at T XXX 409c6: 不為飾好, 不為端嚴, followed by a detailed explanation; cf. also below p. 539.

³⁶ DN 1 at DN I 7,20 lists, among others, *mālā*, *hatthabandha*, *citrupāhana*, *maṇi*, and *vattha dīghadasa* as instances of *mandanavibhūsanatthānānuyoga*. An example that further supports the impression that *manḍana* generally refers to external forms of “beautification” or “ornamentation” can be found in MN 91 at MN II 139,26, which notes that the Buddha was not concerned with *pādamandānānuyoga*, rendered by Horner 1957/1970: 325 as “the practice of beautifying his feet” and by Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 748 as “grooming his feet”. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 1-2.

³⁷ Khp 1,20: *mālāgandhavilepanadthāraṇamandānāvibhūsanatthānā veramanī*. Notably, a counterpart in the *Karmavācanā* fragment 226V8 and R1 in Härtel 1956: 29 only reads *gandhamā[l]yavilepa[nadh]jāraṇād*, without referring to *mandana* or *vibhūṣana*.

³⁸ SN 21:8 at SN II 281,3 and SĀ 1067 at T II 277a12.

³⁹ Vism 32,1.

⁴⁰ Minh Chau 1964/1991: 84 concludes that the reference to adornment in regard to food in the Pāli version “looks rather forced here. The Chinese version seems more plausible”.

While differing on the implications of adornment, the Chinese and Tibetan versions agree with the two Pāli versions that the proper use of alms food is for the sake of maintaining the body alive and healthy. In relation to the remaining two requisites, dwelling place and medicine, all versions agree that their proper purpose is for the protection and health of the body.

Next in the *Sabbāsava-sutta*'s list of methods for overcoming the influxes comes "enduring", which according to all versions is to calmly bear vicissitudes of climate, hunger, thirst, insect bites, insults, and bodily pains.⁴¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the individual translation, and the Tibetan version introduce this method by recommending the firm determination not to give up striving even if one's blood should dry up and one's body should fall apart,⁴² a mental attitude that would indeed enable patiently enduring any difficulty.

The fifth method in the *Sabbāsava-sutta* takes up the practice of "avoiding", which according to all versions refers to avoiding dangerous animals and places, bad friends, and unsuitable resorts.⁴³

MN I 11 The sixth method in the *Sabbāsava-sutta* is "removing", which in all versions refers to removing thoughts of sensual desire, ill will, and cruelty. The method listed last in all versions is to develop the seven factors of awakening (*bojjhaṅga*), which according to the Pāli account are to be combined with seclusion, fading away, and cessation, in order to give rise to relinquishment, a point made similarly in the *Madhyama-āgama*, *Ekottari-ka-āgama*, and Tibetan versions.⁴⁴

The *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its parallels conclude by stating that one who puts into practice these seven methods will be able to overcome the influxes and make an end of *dukkha*.

⁴¹ MN 2 at MN I 10,24, AN 6:58 at AN III 389,7, MĀ 10 at T I 432c8, EĀ 40.6 at T II 740c26, and T 31 at T I 814a7. The same vicissitudes of climate, etc., recur in a definition of the practice of "patience" in AN 4:165 at AN II 153,22 and in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 130,11 or ŠSG 1998: 216,8 and T 1579 at T XXX 417c6. Johansson 1983: 23 comments that the way to abandon the influxes in relation to these vicissitudes requires that "no emotional or defensive reaction be resorted to". Tatia 1980: 329 (cf. also id. 1993: 5) notes that such enduring was highly valued among the Jains, whose texts give similar listings of various vicissitudes that should be endured with patience; cf., e.g., the *Uttarājjhayāṇa* 2.1 in Charpentier 1922: 74,18.

⁴² MĀ 10 at T I 432c6, T 31 at T I 814a4, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 93b5 or Q (5595) *tu* 106b7. Although this determination does not occur in MN 2, it recurs in other Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., MN 70 at MN I 481,1, SN 12:22 at SN II 28,24, SN 21:3 at SN II 276,12, AN 2:1:5 at AN I 50,9, and AN 8:13 at AN IV 190,8.

⁴³ Premasiri 2005b: 569 comments that "while the fourth method proposes that one should cultivate the ability to endure certain conditions that are unavoidable, the fifth method proposes that whenever unnecessary trouble is avoidable, it is wise to avoid it". The Jain work *Dasaveyāliya* in a somewhat similar vein recommends avoiding various animals and places, cf. Lalwani 1973a: 62,13 (5.12) or Leumann 1932: 19,5 (5.12), translated in Schubring 1932: 89.

⁴⁴ MN 2 at MN I 11,23, AN 6:58 at AN III 390,17, MĀ 10 at T I 432c19, EĀ 40.6 at T II 741b1, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 94a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 107b1. The Tibetan version introduces the development of the awakening factors by describing contemplation of the impermanent nature of the five aggregates.

kha. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version additionally has an exhortation to meditate and not be negligent, lest one later regret it.⁴⁵

Looking back on the different versions, the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels show a close agreement in regard to the seven methods for abandoning the influxes, except for slightly different sequencing. The *Āsava-sutta* in the *Āguttarā-nikāya* differs from the other versions in that it does not include the method concerned with “seeing”. The exposition in the *Āsava-sutta* also starts on a different premise, as it examines the qualities that make a monk worthy of respect and offerings. This difference raises the question of how far the first method of “seeing” forms an integral part of the set of methods for overcoming the influxes.⁴⁶

According to other Pāli and Chinese discourses, the path to the eradication of the influxes is the noble eightfold path.⁴⁷ This provides a link between the seven methods for abandoning the influxes described in the present discourse and the noble eightfold path. In view of this affinity, the placement of “seeing” in the first position in the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels mirrors the primacy of right view in the noble eightfold path.⁴⁸ According to the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels, right view is in fact the forerunner of the noble eightfold path.⁴⁹ The position of right view as the first factor of the path is noteworthy, since in this way the sequence of the noble eightfold path places wisdom first,⁵⁰ followed by morality and concentration, whereas in other contexts one regularly finds the sequence: morality, concentration, wisdom. The noble eightfold path’s departure from this sequence highlights the function of right view as the all-important directional input for the practice of the path. The point made in this way is that without the guiding principle provided by right view, neither the noble eightfold path nor the methods for overcoming the influxes, listed in the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan versions, will lead to deliverance.

⁴⁵ EA 40.6 at T II 741b13. The same type of exhortation occurs frequently in the Pāli discourses, e.g., in the *Majjhima-nikāya* in MN 8 at MN I 46,9, MN 19 at MN I 118,23, MN 106 at MN II 266,2, and MN 152 at MN III 302,9.

⁴⁶ Van Zeyst 1965: 640, however, is of the opinion that the presentation in AN 6:58 “has been partly excised to make it fit into the Book of Sixes”.

⁴⁷ E.g., MN 9 at MN I 55,12, with its Chinese parallels MĀ 29 at T I 462a16 and SĀ 344 at T II 94c22.

⁴⁸ In addition to the relationship between “seeing” and right view, “restraining” the senses could be considered as belonging to the domain of right effort; “using” one’s requisites properly as representing right livelihood for a monk or a nun; successfully “removing” unwholesome thoughts would amount to right intention; and “developing” the factors of awakening, which forms one of the contemplations listed in the *Sati-paṭhāna-sutta*, would be an instance of right mindfulness.

⁴⁹ MN 117 at MN III 71,23: “right view comes first”, *sammāditthi pubbaṅgamā hoti*, a statement found similarly in its parallels MĀ 189 at T I 735c13: 正見最在其前 and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 44b6 or Q (5595) *thu* 84a8: *yang dag pa'i lta ba sngon du 'gro ba*. Bodhi 1984: 14 comments that “to attempt to enter the practice [of the noble eightfold path] without a foundation of right view is to risk getting lost in the futility of undirected movement”.

⁵⁰ MN 44 at MN I 301,9 and its parallels MĀ 210 at T I 788c12 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 7b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 8b5 identify right view as a factor that belongs to the aggregate of wisdom.

A closer examination of the *Sabbāsava-sutta* brings to light a noteworthy difference between its treatment of the method of “seeing” and its treatment of the other methods. While one who undertakes the six other methods is a “monk”, the one who undertakes the first method of “seeing” is a “noble disciple”.⁵¹ The expression “noble disciple” covers not only monastics, but also lay disciples. This presentation would thus agree with the *Āsava-sutta* in associating the remaining six methods more closely to monks. The implication could be that whereas “seeing” the four noble truths is mainly a matter of attaining stream-entry, the remaining methods are more closely related to undertaking mental training and practice towards achieving the higher stages of awakening, for which, from an early Buddhist perspective, going forth as a monk or a nun provides the best conditions. Understood in this way, the *Āsava-sutta* might be concerned with a monk who is already a disciple in higher training (*sekha*), whereas the *Sabbāsava-sutta* and its parallels would be broader in scope, since by including the method of “seeing” they also cover the method most closely related to becoming a disciple in higher training.

MN 3 *Dhammadāyāda-sutta*

The *Dhammadāyāda-sutta*, the “discourse on heirs in the Dharma”, reports a brief instruction by the Buddha, which is followed by an explanation given by Sāriputta. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁵²

- MN I 12 The *Dhammadāyāda-sutta* and its two Chinese parallels open with an exhortation given by the Buddha to the monks that they should accord priority to the Dharma and not to material things, since to seek after material things would bring reproach on them and also on their teacher.⁵³
- MN I 13 The three versions draw out the implication of this exhortation with the help of a hypothetical situation in which the Buddha would offer leftover food from his own meal to

⁵¹ MN 2 at MN I 8,32: *sutavā ... ariyasāvako*.

⁵² The parallels are MĀ 88 at T I 569c-571b, entitled “discourse on seeking the Dharma”, 求法經, and EĀ 18.3 at T II 587c-589a. While MN 3 and EĀ 18.3 take place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī, the capital of Kosala, MĀ 88 locates the discourse in a grove near the village Pañcasālā in the same district of Kosala. A village Pañcasālā is also mentioned in SN 4:18 at SN I 113,29 (or SN² 154 at SN² I 252,16), which is, however, situated in the district of Magadha. Comments on MĀ 88 can be found in Minh Chau 1964/1991: 30, 58, and 205. EĀ 18.3 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1995: 51-57.

⁵³ MN 3 at MN I 12,14 refers to being a “heir”, *dāyāda*, in the Dharma or in material things, MĀ 88 at T I 570a2 speaks of “seeking” for these two, 求, and EĀ 18.3 at T II 587c28 instructs to keep the gift of Dharma in mind instead of training for [the sake of] material gifts, 念法施, 勿學財施. While in MN 3 and MĀ 88 the Buddha just continues his exposition, according to EĀ 18.3 at T II 588a1 at this point the monks beg the Buddha to explain in more detail what he meant. The image of becoming a “heir”, *dāyāda*, to the Buddha’s teachings recurs in, e.g., SN 35:95 at SN IV 72,17, SN 47:3 at SN V 143,7, AN 4:254 at AN II 248,21, AN 8:63 at AN IV 299,18, Th 1058, Th 1168-1169, and Thī 63. MĀ 88 at T I 569c26 also differs from MN 3 and EĀ 18.3 in that it gives a listing of the names of chief disciples who were present on this occasion.

two hungry monks. In contrast to one of these monks, who takes the food, the more praiseworthy of the two monks does not accept the food in order to avoid succumbing to the attraction of material things.⁵⁴

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse next describes the detrimental situation of a teacher, who practises seclusion himself, but whose disciples do not follow their teacher's example. Having said that much, in the *Madhyama-āgama* account the Buddha indicates that he has back pain and asks Sāriputta to continue instructing the monks.⁵⁵

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, the Buddha had already retired into his dwelling after having described the behaviour of the two monks in regard to the leftover food, without broaching the topic of seclusion.⁵⁶ According to the Pāli discourse, it was Sāriputta who then addressed the monks by broaching the topic of a teacher who dwells in seclusion, while his disciples do not follow this example.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* account also reports that the Buddha left right after describing the two monks' behaviour in regard to his leftover food. In the *Ekottarika-āgama* version,

⁵⁴ Mahāsi 1982/2006a: 20-21 explains that "the monk who restrains his desire to the point of declining the Buddha's offer of food ... will be able to ... cultivate contentment ... [and] will not get disheartened in the face of hardships and privations".

⁵⁵ MĀ 88 at T I 570b22. Several Pāli discourses report a similar situation, with the Buddha taking a rest due to back pains and asking one of his eminent disciples to deliver a discourse in his stead, cf., e.g., DN 33 at DN III 209,17, MN 53 at MN I 354,24, SN 35:202 at SN IV 184,7, and AN 10:67 at AN V 123,1. These instances differ from MĀ 88 in as much as in each case it is late at night and the Buddha has already spent a considerable amount of time in giving a discourse. Another such instance can be found in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 6,10+20, according to which the Buddha told one of his disciples that he had back pains and wanted to rest, asking the disciple to answer a question about the origin of the Sakyans in his stead. According to the *Saṅghabhedavastu* account, the real reason for delegating the question to one of his disciples was that the Buddha wanted to avoid answering it himself, as he thought that if he were to disclose the origins of the Sakyans this might be misunderstood as self-praise on his part. Thus in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* account the Buddha refers to his back pain mainly as a polite excuse in order to be able to hand over the teaching duty to one of his disciples. A similar perspective on the Buddha's back pain can be found in some Pāli commentaries. The *Dīghanikāya* commentary on the above quoted passage simply explains the Buddha's back pain to be an after-effect of the ascetic practices undertaken before his awakening, Sv III 974,16: *bhagavato hi chabbassāni mahāpadhānaṇi padahantassa mahantaṇi kāyadukkhaṇi ahosi. athassa aparabhāge mahallakakāle piṭṭhibhāvā uppajji*, so that from its perspective the Buddha appears to have had real pain and needed to take a rest. The *Majjhima-nikāya* commentary and the *Samyuttanikāya* commentary, Ps III 28,13 and Spk III 52,14, however, record also an alternative explanation, according to which the Buddha wanted to make use of the new hall of the Sakyans in all four postures, *saṅthārasālaṇi pana catūhi iriyāpathehi paribhūjitatukāmo ahosi*. They explain that in speaking of back pain the Buddha only used the slight discomfort caused by the sitting posture as a polite excuse. A similar perspective can be found in the *Āriyuttara-nikāya* commentary, Mp V 44,18, with the difference that according to its presentation the Buddha mentioned his back pain because he wanted to give his disciple an occasion to deliver teachings, *therassa okāsakaranattham evam āha*. These commentarial explanations seem to reflect a tendency of glossing over physical afflictions of the Buddha, which would no longer have been compatible with the status accorded to him in later times. For a discussion of another manifestation of the same tendency, in relation to the Buddha's last meal, cf. An 2006.

⁵⁶ According to Ps I 99,1, the Buddha had left thinking that Sāriputta would continue his discourse.

the listening monks then wonder who could give a detailed explanation of this short instruction of the Buddha and finally decide to approach Sāriputta.⁵⁷

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, it is not obvious why Sāriputta should turn to the topic of seclusion right after the Buddha had brought up the example of the behaviour of the two monks towards his leftover food. Here the *Madhyama-āgama* version helps to bridge the two topics, since in its account it was the Buddha who had raised the subject of seclusion, so that here Sāriputta simply takes up a topic that had already been broached by the Buddha.

MN I 14 The *Madhyama-āgama* version continues with Sāriputta asking the other monks for their understanding of the Buddha's statement about living in seclusion. In reply, two monks expressed their opinion by describing the delight that other monks experience when a senior monk declares to have reached the final goal or when they witness a monk of middle standing or even a new monk who is intent on reaching awakening.⁵⁸ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, Sāriputta was not satisfied with these replies and presented his way of understanding the Buddha's statement. He did so by contrasting three grounds for blame incurred by those who do not train in seclusion with three grounds for praising monks who train in seclusion and thereby follow their teacher's example.

While in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* versions Sāriputta's exposition also begins by putting a question to the other monks, in these two versions this query appears to be merely a rhetorical question.⁵⁹ Instead of expressing their own opinion on the matter, the monks simply ask Sāriputta to explain, in reply to which he takes up the same three grounds for blame or praise as found in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse.

By examining the grounds for blame and praise, Sāriputta's exposition takes up the contrast between reproach and absence of reproach mentioned in the Buddha's initial statement at the outset of the discourse, according to which monks who seek after material things will bring reproach onto themselves and also onto their teacher.

The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation offers an additional rationale for Sāriputta's treatment of the contrast between the blameworthy neglect of seclusion and its praiseworthy opposite. Its account suggests that Sāriputta's exposition serves to counterbalance the one-sided interpretation of the two monks. By discussing the blameworthiness of neglecting seclusion, Sāriputta's exposition highlights that the important distinction is not whether one delights in the practice of others, but whether one avoids the blame incumbent on not dedicating oneself to the practice of seclusion.

MN I 15 The *Dhammadāyāda-sutta* and its two parallels agree that Sāriputta concluded his explanation by listing a standard set of mental defilements and by presenting the noble

⁵⁷ EĀ 18.3 at T II 588a26. This, too, is a common procedure in the Pāli discourses, thus one finds the monks asking Mahākaccāna to explain a brief saying made by the Buddha in MN 18 at MN I 110,22, MN 133 at MN III 194,9, MN 138 at MN III 224,3, and AN 10:172 at AN V 255,24; Ānanda is asked to do the same in SN 35:116 at SN IV 94,1, SN 35:117 at SN IV 98,28, and AN 10:115 at AN V 225,20.

⁵⁸ MĀ 88 at T I 570c14.

⁵⁹ MN 3 at MN I 14,2 and EĀ 18.3 at T II 588b5.

eightfold path as the path to their removal and to the attainment of awakening.⁶⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version concludes with the Buddha expressing his approval of Sāriputta's exposition,⁶¹ while the other two versions only report that the monks rejoiced in Sāriputta's exposition.⁶²

MN 4 *Bhayabherava-sutta*

The *Bhayabherava-sutta*, the “discourse on fear and dread”, expounds the difficulties of living in seclusion. This discourse has a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁶³ A few parts of a parallel to the *Bhayabherava-sutta* have also been preserved in the form of Sanskrit fragments.⁶⁴

The *Bhayabherava-sutta* and its Chinese parallel report a visit paid by the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi to the Buddha, during which Jāṇussoṇi takes up the Buddha's inspirational role as a leader for his disciples and the difficulties of living in seclusion and solitude.⁶⁵

MN I 16

⁶⁰ MN 3 at MN I 15,25, MĀ 88 at T I 571a29, and EĀ 18.3 at T II 588c25. In its treatment of these defilements, MĀ 88 seems to make the additional point that the task is not only to abandon mental defilements, but also to go beyond aversion to these mental defilements. Thus, in relation to thoughts of desires, MĀ 88 at T I 571a29 explains that “sensual thoughts are evil, aversion to sensual thoughts is also evil”, 慾念惡, 惡念欲亦惡, and describes how one “removes sensual thoughts and also removes the aversion towards sensual thoughts”, 彼斷念欲, 亦斷惡念欲 (my translation follows a suggestion in the 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition vol. 2 p. 775 note 2, according to which the first 惡 stands for *è*, “unwholesome” or “bad”, while the second 惡 stands for *wù*, “to loathe”, “to dislike”; on this polyphonic character cf. also Bucknell 1999a: 59).

⁶¹ MĀ 88 at T I 571b13.

⁶² MN 3 at MN I 16,11 and EĀ 18.3 at T II 589a7.

⁶³ The parallel is EĀ 31.1 at T II 665b-667a, parts of which have been translated by Bareau 1963: 37-39 and 68; for a full translation cf. Anālayo 2011c. EĀ 31.1 agrees with MN 4 in locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. The summary verse at T II 673c11 refers to EĀ 31.1 as “higher”, 增上, perhaps an abbreviation of 增上之心, the “higher mind”, which is found in EĀ 31.1 at T II 666b21 (in fact, this whole chapter of EĀ is called the “chapter [on what is] higher”, 增上品, a title presumably taken from its first discourse, EĀ 31.1).

⁶⁴ The Sanskrit fragments are SHT I 164c+g (p. 93, identified in Schlingloff 1967: 421), SHT IV 32 folios 33-41 (pp. 128-134), SHT IV 165 folios 15-16 (pp. 190-191, cf. also SHT VII p. 240), SHT IV 500 folio 4 (pp. 221-222), and SHT IX 2401 (p. 195). SHT IV 32 folio 33 agrees with MN 4 on the location of the discourse. SHT IV 500 folio 4 has a few words paralleling the Brahmin's first question at MN I 16,20; SHT IV 32 folios 34-36 correspond to the recurring reference to dwelling in lonely places in the forest, found, e.g., at MN I 17,12; SHT IV 32 folio 37 and 38, SHT IV 165 folio 15, and SHT IX 2401 describe the Buddha attaining the first and the fourth absorption, as well as turning the mind to recollection of past lives, paralleling MN I 21,34 and MN I 22,10. SHT IV 32 folio 41 corresponds to the concluding part of MN 4 at MN I 23,34 and MN I 24,8. A reference to the present discourse as the (*bhaya*)/*bh*/airavaparyāye can be found in SHT I 36A2 (p. 27) and in SHT IV 36V2 (p. 259). Hartmann 2004b: 126 notes another parallel among the newly discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* preserved in Sanskrit fragments.

⁶⁵ MN 4 at MN I 16,20 and EĀ 31.1 at T II 665b19. The difficulties of living in seclusion come up again in AN 10:99 at AN V 202,4.

The two versions differ in so far as they have these two topics in the opposite order (see table 1.3). According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Brahmin first spoke of the Buddha's role as a leader and then turned to the difficulties of a solitary life in the forest. On reading the Pāli account, these two statements seem like two separate ideas the Brahmin had on his mind.

According to the Chinese version, however, the Brahmin first spoke of the difficulty of living in seclusion and then turned to the Buddha's role as a guide and inspiration for his disciples. The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, moreover, explains that it is precisely due to seeing the Buddha that his disciples get a sufficiently strong sense of urgency that motivates them to retire into seclusion on mountains and in caves.⁶⁶

Table 1.3: Main Topics in MN 4 and EĀ 31.1

MN 4	EĀ 31.1
Brahmin notes Buddha's role as guide (1)	Brahmin refers to dwelling in solitude (→ 2)
Brahmin refers to dwelling in solitude (2)	Brahmin notes Buddha's role as guide (→ 1)
Buddha gives his autobiography (3)	Buddha gives his autobiography (→ 3)

With this additional information, a relation between these two statements emerges. Thus the main topic that, according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account, the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi had in mind was the difficulty of living in seclusion. That the disciples of the Buddha nevertheless engaged in such seclusion he then attributed to the inspirational role of the Buddha as their teacher.

This reasoning of the Brahmin finds its confirmation in both discourses in the Buddha's detailed account of his own practice of seclusion and consequent attainment of awakening, thereby filling out in detail what made him a guide and inspiration for his disciples. In this way, the *Ekottarika-āgama*'s presentation clarifies why the Brahmin would come out with these two statements and why the Buddha would dwell at length on his own practice of seclusion and attainment of awakening.

MN I 17 The two versions continue by turning to the case of recluses and Brahmins who practise impure bodily, verbal, or mental conduct, who are of impure livelihood or under the influence of a set of unwholesome qualities. In contrast to such recluses and Brahmins, the Buddha found solace in living in seclusion, due to his purified conduct and due to his freedom from unwholesome qualities.⁶⁷

Regarding the listing of these unwholesome qualities, the two versions show some variations (see table 1.4). Qualities mentioned in both versions are:

⁶⁶ EĀ 31.1 at T II 665c1 speaks of the disciples experiencing “embarrassment” or “shame”, 懈愧, on seeing the Buddha, which in the present context seems to convey a sense of “urgency”, *samvega*.

⁶⁷ While according to MN 4 at MN I 17,21 the Buddha “found even more solace” in forest seclusion, *bhiyoy pallomam āpādiṇ*, EĀ 31.1 at T II 665c9 indicates that he “delighted in seclusion, [experiencing] increasing joy”, 樂閑居之處, 倍復喜悅.

- the habit of disparaging others and lauding oneself,
- the presence of fear,
- desires for material gains,
- the absence of energy,
- the absence of mindfulness,
- the absence of concentration,
- the absence of wisdom.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version additionally lists manifestations of the five hindrances.⁶⁸ To mention the five hindrances as part of the unwholesome states to be overcome fits the present context well, as both versions later on turn to the attainment of the four *jhānas*.

Table 1.4: Unwholesome Qualities in MN 4 and EA 31.1

MN 4	EA 31.1
covetous (1)	fear (→ 7)
ill will (2)	disparaging others and self-praise (→ 6)
sloth-and-topor (3)	seeking for material benefits (→ 8)
restless (4)	lazy (→ 9)
doubting (5)	forgetful (→ 10)
self-praise and disparaging others (6)	not concentrated (→ 11)
fearful (7)	ignorant (→ 12)
desirous of gains and honour (8)	
lazy (9)	
lacking mindfulness (10)	
not concentrated (11)	
lacking wisdom (12)	(# 1-5)

The *Bhayabherava-sutta* and its Chinese parallel next describe how the Buddha – MN I 20 during the time when he was still a bodhisattva – confronted fear, which could arise because of external circumstances, such as noise caused by wild animals passing by, when being alone in the forest.⁶⁹ In this case, he would not change posture until the fear

⁶⁸ MN 4 at MN I 17,32 and MN I 18,4+14+23+32: *abhijjhālū ... byāpannacittā ... thīnamiddhapariyūttitā ... uddhatā avūpasanatacittā ... karikhī vecikicchī* (B^e-M I 22,20 and S^e-M I 32,9; *vicikicchī*, C^e-M I 42,21; *avupasanta*^o), which, although not employing exactly the same terminology as usually found in listings of the five hindrances, do correspond to the five hindrances in meaning.

⁶⁹ The point of the present passage appears to be in particular the arising of fear caused by such external factors as noise, etc., as the case of fear related to a lack of internal purity has already been taken up in both discourses earlier. The topic of the arising of fear when being alone in a forest recurs in SN 1:15 at SN I 7,3 (or SN² 15 at SN² I 14,2) and its parallels SĀ 1335 at T II 368b27 and SĀ² 355 at T II 490b8. While according to the commentary to SN 1:15, Spk I 35,1, fear had arisen to a *deva*, according to SĀ 1335 and SĀ² 355 it was a monk who had become afraid, and who was then told by a *deva* that there was nothing to be afraid of. For a survey of the arising of fear as described in MN 4 cf. also Weerasinghe 1997: 615-616; on fear in general cf., e.g., Brekke 1999b and Karunaratne 1991; for a listing of eight qualifications for dwelling in solitude according to the Jain tradition cf. *Thānaṅga* 8.594 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 243,1.

had subsided. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in reporting that he went to particular shrines on auspicious nights to encounter frightful situations.⁷⁰

MN I 21 The *Majjhima-nikāya* account continues with the Buddha referring to some recluses and Brahmins who mistake day for night, or night for day. In contrast to these, the Buddha recognized day as being day and night as being night. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version highlights that due to this ability he rightly deserves praise as a being free from delusion, who has appeared in the world for the benefit and welfare of gods and men.⁷¹

The Pāli commentary takes this statement in a literal sense and describes how someone attains *jhāna* with a white *kasiṇa* and emerges from this *jhāna* during the night. Due to the nature of the *kasiṇa*, he mistakes night for day. Or else some birds usually active only during the day may chirp at night and cause someone who hears them from inside a dwelling to mistake night for day.⁷² These commentarial explanations appear somewhat contrived and do not fit the presentation in the *Bhayabherava-sutta* too well, since the statement in the discourse does not seem to be concerned with only a momentary mistaking of night for day.

The Pāli commentary is evidently trying to find some way of making sense of this passage, since it is difficult to imagine someone mistaking day for night or night for day. It is also somewhat perplexing that, just because of being able to recognize day as day, one should be considered as a being free from delusion who has appeared in the world for the benefit of gods and men.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse has preserved this statement in a somewhat different manner. According to its report, the Buddha instead pointed out that some recluses and Brahmins, whether it be day or night, do not understand the path of Dharma. In contrast to these, the Buddha does understand the path of Dharma, whether it be day or night.⁷³

⁷⁰ MN 4 at MN I 20,27. On the auspicious dates listed in MN 4 cf. Dietz 1997. Perhaps the present instance in MN 4 intends to depict a pre-awakening belief the bodhisattva may have had in the auspiciousness of particular dates and places, since in general, as pointed out by von Simson 1995: 172, “the powers of nature and the sacredness of place and time are as unimportant in the Buddhist doctrine as are the year myths and fertility rites”. In fact, even the adoption of the ancient Indian custom of regularly convening the monks on *uposatha* days was, according to Vin I 101,20, because of a suggestion by King Bimbisāra, who had seen other ascetics gain lay support by this practice and wanted the Buddhist monks to do the same.

⁷¹ MN 4 at MN I 21,20. The same praise recurs in MN 12 at MN I 83,14. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 2-3.

⁷² Ps I 121,18. The commentary works out both examples in the opposite way as well by describing how someone attains a *jhāna* with a dark *kasiṇa* and emerges at daytime, and how someone hears the chirping of a night bird during daytime. Jayatilleke 1973: 30 takes the passage in a symbolic sense, in that the Buddha’s ability to recognize day as day and night as night implies that he “frankly accepts the existence of both good and evil in the world of conditioned existence”.

⁷³ EĀ 31.1 at T II 666b11:日夜之中解於道法. The expression 道法 regularly stands for the Buddha’s teaching, something other recluses and Brahmins might indeed not have fully understood, be it day or night. Hirakawa 1997: 1160 lists *dharma* and *mārga-dharma* as equivalents to 道法, which Soothill 1937/2000: 416 translates as “the way or methods to obtain *Nirvāṇa*”.

This way of presenting the Buddha's statement reads more straightforward than its Pāli counterpart.

Although the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation appears more straightforward, the Sanskrit fragment parallels support the Pāli reading.⁷⁴ Thus either a transmission error occurred early enough to affect the Pāli and Sanskrit versions, or else the Chinese translators rendered a knotty passage in such a way as to make it more easily comprehensible.

Be that as it may, the *Bhayabherava-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel continue with the Buddha's attainment of the four *jhānas*. The Chinese version links these to the joy experienced when retiring into seclusion, mentioned earlier in both versions, by reporting that the Buddha identified these *jhānas* to be his experience of happiness when living in secluded places.⁷⁵

The two versions continue with the Buddha's attainment of the three higher knowledges. In both versions, the Buddha explains that his secluded life style should not be misconceived as an indication that he still has to eradicate defilements, since his motivation for living in seclusion is simply the pleasure derived from such dwelling for himself, and his concern for others.⁷⁶

The second part of this statement, found in both versions, seems to imply that the Buddha's way of teaching is not confined to verbal communication. By retiring into meditative seclusion, he sets an example to be emulated by those walking the path he taught. This point comes out with additional clarity in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, since in its account the inspirational role of the Buddha's own practice of seclusion is a prominent theme throughout the whole discourse.

The two versions conclude by describing that the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi was sufficiently delighted by this discourse to take refuge.⁷⁷ In the Pāli discourses, this constitutes one out of numerous instances in which he takes refuge.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ SHT IV 32 folio 37V2: (*sam*)*jñ[o]* *divayse ca [d](i)vasa [sa]*, which would be a counterpart to MN 4 at MN I 21,24: *divā yeva samānaṃ divā ti sañjānāmi*; cf. also T 374 at T XII 521a29 or T 375 at T XII 765b29, where the same image recurs: 若以晝為夜是即顛倒.

⁷⁵ EĀ 31.1 at T II 666b14.

⁷⁶ While MN 4 at MN I 23,35 speaks of the Buddha "having compassion for future generations", *pacchimañ ca janatām anukampamāno*, EĀ 31.1 at T II 666c25 refers to the same in terms of his motivation "to deliver sentient beings", 度眾生. The Buddha's own comfort and his compassion for others as the two underlying reasons for his practice of seclusion recur in AN 2:3:9 at AN I 60,30.

⁷⁷ MN 4 at MN I 24,7 and EĀ 31.1 at T II 667a1.

⁷⁸ Other discourses that report the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi taking refuge are, e.g., MN 27 at MN I 184,16, SN 12:47 at SN II 77,1, AN 2:2:7 at AN I 57,15, AN 3:55 at AN I 159,21, AN 3:59 at AN I 168,7, AN 4:184 at AN II 176,5, AN 6:52 at AN III 364,3, AN 7:47 at AN IV 56,18, AN 10:119 at AN V 236,1, AN 10:167 at AN V 251,24, and AN 10:177 at AN V 273,13. Tsuchida 1991: 77 comments that this "warns us against using the canonical narratives as ... historical sources without due critical considerations". The beginning of what appears to be yet another meeting of Jāṇussoṇi with the Buddha can be found in SHT V 1343R3-6 (p. 232), for still another meeting of the two cf. Skilling 2011; on the notion of taking refuge cf., e.g., Carter 1979.

MN 5 *Anaṅgana-sutta*

The *Anaṅgana-sutta*, the “discourse on [being] without blemishes”, is an exposition by Sāriputta on what constitute blemishes for a monk. This discourse has three Chinese parallels, of which one is found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, one in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, and the third is an individual translation.⁷⁹

The four versions of this discourse agree that Sāriputta described four types of person:

- those who are aware of the presence of blemishes,
- those who are not aware of the presence of blemishes,
- those who are aware of the absence of blemishes,
- those who are not aware of the absence of blemishes.

In relation to these four, according to all versions those who are aware of their situation (the first and third), are superior to those who are not aware of their situation (the second and fourth).

MN I 25 The Pāli and Chinese versions introduce another monk at this point, who asks Sāriputta to explain his statement further. While the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation do not provide information about the identity of this monk, the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions identify him to be Mahāmoggallāna.⁸⁰

The four versions agree that one who is not aware of having a blemish will not make an effort to overcome it, with the result that he will pass away without having overcome that defilement. The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation add that one who passes away without having overcome the blemish will meet with an unfavourable rebirth.⁸¹

The *Anaṅgana-sutta* and its Chinese parallels compare this type of person to a dirty bronze dish which, due to not being cleaned, becomes even dirtier. In contrast, one who is aware of the presence of a blemish will strive to overcome it, comparable to a dirty bronze dish cleaned regularly.

MN I 26 The problem with one who is not aware of the absence of a blemish – according to the *Anaṅgana-sutta*, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and the individual translation – is that he might neglect sense-restraint, with the result that desire will invade his mind.⁸² The

⁷⁹ The parallels are MĀ 87 at T I 566a-569c, EĀ 25.6 at T II 632a-634a, and T 49 at T I 839a-842a. MĀ 87 has the title “discourse on blemishes”, 穢經 (following a 宋, 元, and 明 variant), while T 49 is entitled “discourse spoken by the Buddha on desires and wishes”, 佛說求欲經. The summary verse at T II 635b3 refers to EĀ 25.6 as “fetters”, 結. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 49 was translated by Fājù (法炬). While MN 5 has Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī as its location, MĀ 87 and T 49 take place at Bhesakalāvana, a grove situated near Sumsumāragiri in the Bhaggā country, and EĀ 25.6 has the Bamboo Grove at Rājagaha as its location. For remarks on MĀ 87 cf. Anesaki 1908: 48 and Minh Chau 1964/1991: 193-194, 198, and 205.

⁸⁰ MN 5 at MN I 25.8 and EĀ 25.6 at T II 632b6.

⁸¹ MĀ 87 at T I 566b8 and T 49 at T I 839b3.

⁸² While according to MN 5 at MN I 26.9 he “will give attention to the sign of beauty”, *subhanimittam manasikarissati*, MĀ 87 at T I 566c3 and T 49 at T I 839b25 express the same by describing that he will not guard the sense-doors.

Ekottarika-āgama version points out that such a person will not try to attain what still has to be attained.⁸³ Hence, while the *Ekottarika-āgama* version only envisages stagnation, the other three versions speak of outright decline as the dire result of not understanding when one is free from a particular blemish. The four versions illustrate this case with the example of a clean bronze dish that is not kept clean. The complementary case of one who is aware of the absence of a blemish then corresponds to the example of a dish that is kept clean.

Asked to explain the nature of blemishes,⁸⁴ according to all versions Sāriputta took up MN I 27 various wishes a monk may have (see table 1.5). The four versions agree that a monk who has committed an offence might wish that this does not become known, or he might wish that at least he will not be admonished in public, or by someone inferior to him.⁸⁵ The blemish surfaces once the opposite happens and the monk gets angry and upset.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions indicate that a monk might also wish to be the one of whom the Buddha asks a question.⁸⁶ The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation portray a similar wish, differing in so far as the monk would like to be the one to ask the Buddha a question.⁸⁷

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* accounts, a monk might also wish to receive the best food, water, and seat in the refectory.⁸⁸ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the individual translation instead speak of a monk wanting to be the first to receive food, water, and a seat.⁸⁹

Another wish mentioned in all versions is to be entrusted with giving teachings. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions and the individual translation also take up the wishes of a monk for requisites and respect, topics not covered in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version.⁹⁰

⁸³ EA 25.6 at T II 632c6.

⁸⁴ MN 5 at MN I 24,17 speaks in this context of “blemish”, *ariṇaya*, an expression that has its counterpart in MĀ 87 at T I 566a17 in “dirt”, 穢, in EA 25.6 at T II 632a23 in “fetter”, 結, and in T 49 at T I 839a11 in “desires and wishes”, 求欲.

⁸⁵ To these three wishes, EA 25.6 at T II 633b1 adds the wish not to be admonished at all.

⁸⁶ MN 5 at MN I 27,33 and EA 25.6 at T II 632c26.

⁸⁷ MĀ 87 at T I 567a23 and T 49 at T I 840a11.

⁸⁸ MN 5 at MN I 28,17: *aggāsanam aggodakam aggapindam* and MĀ 87 at T I 567b9: 得第一座, 第一澡水, 得第一食. In regard to another occurrence of the set *aggāsanam aggodakam aggapindam* in Vin II 161,6, the parallel passage in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya similarly speaks of the best seat, water, and food, T 1428 at T XXII 939c27: 第一坐, 第一水, 第一食. The Mahāsāṅghika and Sarvāstivāda Vinayas, however, distinguish between the “best” seat and being served “first” with water and food, T 1425 at T XXII 446a13: 最上坐, 先取水, 先受食, and T 1435 at T XXIII 242a24: 上座, 先受水, 先受飲食. The Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, T 1421 at T XXII 121a7, speaks of the best seat, best offerings, and best worship, 第一座, 第一施, 第一恭敬禮拜.

⁸⁹ EA 25.6 at T II 633a10: 先比丘坐, 先前受水, 先前得食 and T 49 at T I 840a24: 前坐, 前受水, 前受搏食.

⁹⁰ While MN 5 at MN I 29,26 describes that a monk might wish to be honoured by other monks, by the nuns, and by the laity, MĀ 87 at T I 567c5 and T 49 at T I 840b13 instead speak of a monk’s wish to be known to the king and his ministers, as well as to Brahmins and householders.

Table 1.5: Sources for the Arising of Blemishes in MN 5 and its Parallels

MN 5	MĀ 87 & T 49
offence not become known (1)	offence not become known (→ 1)
admonishment in private (2)	admonishment in private (→ 2)
admonishment by equal (3)	admonishment by equal ⁹¹ (→ 3)
Teacher asks me question (4)	ask Buddha a question (→ 4)
be put first among monks (5)	be put first among monks (→ 5)
best seat, water, food (6)	best/first seat, water, food (→ 6)
give blessing after meal (7)	give teaching after meal (→ 7)
teach monks (8)	teach laity (→ 10 & 11)
teach nuns (9)	be known to king, ministers, etc.
teach male laity (10)	respected by 4 assemblies (→ 12-15)
teach female laity (11)	receive 4 requisites ⁹² (→ 16-19)
respected by monks (12)	
respected by nuns (13)	
respected by male laity (14)	
respected by female laity (15)	
receive good robes (16)	
receive good food (17)	
receive good resting place (18)	
receive good medicine (19)	(≠ 8-9)

EĀ 25.6
Buddha asks me question (→ 4) be put first among monks (→ 5) first seat, water, food (→ 6) give teaching after meal (→ 7) teach laity (→ 10 & 11) offence not become known (→ 1) no admonishment admonishment by pure one (→ 3) admonishment in private (→ 2) (≠ 8-9, 12-19)

MN I 30 According to the *Anāgama-sutta* and its parallels, Sāriputta compared a monk who has such wishes and reacts with anger when they are not fulfilled to a closed container filled with something repulsive. Just as no one would wish to eat those repulsive contents, similarly other monks will not feel reverence towards a monk of this type. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* versions explain that this will be so even if such a monk undertakes any of the practices usually esteemed among monks, such as dwelling in se-

⁹¹ While T 49 at T I 840a7 agrees with MN 5 at MN I 27,26 on speaking of admonishment by an equal, *sapatiipuggala*/等已人 (perhaps rather 等己人?), according to MĀ 87 at T I 567a19 such admonishment should be done by someone who is superior, 勝人.

⁹² T 49 at T I 840b27 only mentions three requisites, omitting food.

clusion, subsisting only on alms, wearing rag robes, etc.⁹³ All versions compare the opposite case, when a monk does not have any of these unwholesome wishes, to a closed container full of delicious food.

The Pāli and Chinese versions report that Mahāmoggallāna illustrated his joy at hearing Sāriputta's admonition by relating a past event at Rājagaha, where someone had been overjoyed while watching a cartwright perform a feat of workmanship just as if the cartwright knew the onlooker's thought as to how this feat should be done.⁹⁴ The four versions conclude with Mahāmoggallāna declaring that monks seriously intent on the practice and possessed of good qualities will receive this instruction by Sāriputta with as much joy as a pretty young girl fond of ornaments would joyfully receive a flower garland.⁹⁵

MN 6 *Ākanikheyya-sutta*

The *Ākanikheyya-sutta*, the “discourse on [what] one may wish”, describes some essential aspects of a monk's life, the undertaking of which can lead to the fulfilment of a range of wishes. This discourse has a Pāli parallel among the tens of the *Āriguttara-nikāya*, and two Chinese parallels found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarikā-āgama*.⁹⁶

According to the four parallel versions, a monk may realize various wishes he may have if he observes the disciplinary rules, lives in an empty and secluded place, and develops tranquillity and insight.⁹⁷

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse records a prelude to this statement. According to its report, an unnamed monk had come to visit the Buddha to convey a reflection that had occurred to him while being in seclusion. This reflection was that the Buddha had taught

⁹³ MN 5 at MN I 31,5 and EĀ 25.6 at T II 633b15.

⁹⁴ MN 5 at MN I 31,25, MĀ 87 at T I 569b14, EĀ 25.6 at T II 633c17, and T 49 at T I 841c26. MĀ 87 and T 49 at this point explicitly identify the speaker to be Mahāmoggallāna, so that in their account it seems as if the monk who had put the earlier inquiry was a different person.

⁹⁵ MN 5 at MN I 32,26, MĀ 87 at T I 569c5, EĀ 25.6 at T II 634a6, and T 49 at T I 842a15. The same simile recurs in AN 8:51 at AN IV 278,5 and at Vin II 255,36.

⁹⁶ AN 10:71 at AN V 131-133, MĀ 105 at T I 595c-596b, and EĀ 37.5 at T II 712a-c. AN 10:71 and MĀ 105 have the title “discourse on wishes”, *Ākarikha-sutta*/願經. The three parallel versions agree with MN 6 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 105 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 63, 107, and 223-227. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t cf. below note 101.

⁹⁷ MN 6 at MN I 33,9, AN 10:71 at AN V 131,12, MĀ 105 at T I 595c22, and EĀ 37.5 at T II 712a14. A similar set of conditions leads, according to It 2:2:8 at It 39,15, to non-return or arahant-ship, notably with the difference that instead of mentioning the need to observe the disciplinary rules, It 2:2:8 at It 39,9 speaks of delight in seclusion, *patisallānārāmā ... viharatha, patisallānaratā*. MN 32 at MN I 213,16 and its parallels MĀ 184 at T I 727b3 and EĀ 37.3 at T II 710c24 in a similar vein begin a comparable set of conditions with delight in seclusion, instead of observance of the disciplinary rules. A passage similar to the present reference in MN 6 to not neglecting meditation, etc., can be found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 352,17 or ŚSG 2008: 14,7 and T 1579 at T XXX 449a4.

him the Dharma, and he was now fulfilling the precepts, staying in an empty place, not neglecting *jhāna*, and being endowed with insight. This reflection of the monk then motivated the Buddha to deliver a more detailed exposition of the same theme.⁹⁸

A prelude can also be found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, with the difference that here a monk who was seated in the assembly listening to the Buddha had the wish of being given a teaching by the Buddha.⁹⁹ The Buddha had become aware of this wish and thereon delivered the discourse.

Another difference between the parallel versions is that in the Pāli discourses the Buddha starts his exposition by admonishing the monks to observe the precepts scrupulously, seeing danger in the slightest fault, an admonition not found at this junction in their Chinese parallels.¹⁰⁰

Out of a range of possible benefits that a monk may expect when undertaking the way of practice described above, the parallels agree on two benefits, which are:

- the ability to attain the four *jhānas*,
- the ability to reach the destruction of the influxes.

Other wishes to be fulfilled through such practice vary amongst the four versions (see table 1.6), ranging from comparatively mundane aspirations, such as getting requisites, to various meditative attainments.¹⁰¹

On considering the listings of a monk's wishes in the four versions, it is noteworthy that of the seventeen benefits enumerated in the *Ākankheyya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, fifteen recur in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, while only eight of these seventeen benefits can be found in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions.¹⁰² Thus the two Pāli discourses differ to a greater extent in regard to the benefits they mention than the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.

MN I 36 According to the two Pāli versions, the Buddha concluded his exposition by repeating his earlier admonition to perfectly observe the precepts, thereby presenting the entire discourse as a detailed explanation of this statement.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ According to MĀ 105 at T I 595c18 the Buddha gave his exposition with regard to this particular monk, 因彼比丘故, 告諸比丘, a context also evident in EĀ 37.5 at T II 712a12: 世尊知比丘心中所念, 告諸比丘. According to the Pāli commentarial tradition, however, the *Ākankheyya-sutta* should be reckoned among discourses delivered by the Buddha of his own accord, Ps I 15,26: *attano ajjhāsayen' eva*, i.e. not spoken in relation to a particular situation or due to an external prompting.

⁹⁹ EĀ 37.5 at T II 712a11.

¹⁰⁰ MN 6 at MN I 33,5 and AN 10:71 at AN V 131,7. The same admonition recurs in AN 4:12 at AN II 14,12 and in It 4:12 at It 118,4.

¹⁰¹ A discourse quotation with the description of the peaceful liberations, mentioned as one of the aspirations at MN 6 at MN I 33,34, can be found in Abhidh-k 2:15 and 8:3 in Pradhan 1967: 48,8 and 435,8 (not necessarily stemming specifically from the present discourse); cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 17a1, T 1559 at T XXIX 176a28, and Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 57a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 62b3.

¹⁰² AN 10:71 lists ten benefits, in line with its placing among the tens of the *Ānguttara-nikāya*.

¹⁰³ MN 6 at MN I 36,4: *sampannasīlā ... viharatha ... iti yan tam vuttam, idam etam paticca vuttam*, cf. also AN 10:71 at AN V 133,5.

This admonition is absent from the *Madhyama-āgama* version, although a comparable injunction can be found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse.¹⁰⁴ Thus the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not place any extra emphasis on scrupulous observance of the rules, but rather presents observing the rules together with living in seclusion and developing tranquillity and insight as equally important aspects of a monk's training.

Table 1.6: List of Wishes in MN 6 and its Parallels

MN 6	AN 10.71
be dear to other monks (1)	be dear to other monks (→ 1)
receive requisites (2)	receive requisites (→ 2)
supporters gain merits (3)	supporters gain merits (→ 3)
relatives gain merits (4)	relatives gain merits (→ 4)
bear discontent (5) ¹⁰⁵	contentment with requisites
bear fear (6)	bear vicissitudes
4 <i>jhānas</i> (7)	bear discontent (→ 5)
immaterial attainments (8)	bear fear (→ 6)
stream-entry (9)	4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 7)
once-return (10)	destroy influxes (→ 17)
non-return (11)	
supernormal powers (12)	
divine ear (13)	
read others' minds (14)	
recollect past lives (15)	
divine eye (16)	
destroy influxes (17)	(≠ 8-16)

¹⁰⁴ EA 37.5 at T II 712b24 concludes its listing of benefits by referring to “being afraid of a small transgression, what to say of a major one”, 少過常恐, 何況大者.

¹⁰⁵ In relation to discontent, it is noteworthy that MN 6 at MN I 33,24 first speaks of discontent and delight, *aratiratisaho assam*, but then continues to mention only discontent, *na ca mām arati saheyya*. The corresponding passage in AN 10:71 at AN V 132,14 continues to speak of both, but has variant readings for all instances, including the first, which only refer to discontent. MĀ 105 at T I 596a1 mentions only discontent, 不樂, which in fact would fit the dynamics of the exposition better. The expression *aratirati* recurs in MN 119 at MN III 97,20, where again the Chinese parallel MĀ 81 at T I 557b13 only mentions discontent, 不樂, cf. also below p. 677 note 170. Neumann 1896/1995: 1133 note 414 suggests to read *arati-ratisaho* in the case of MN 119, which might then give the sense of “totally conquering discontent” (p. 897 he translates: “über Unmut hat man Gewalt”, although on p. 35 in relation to MN 6 he translates “der Unmutslust will ich Herr sein”, thereby evidently reading: *arati-ratisaho*). I am not aware of another occurrence of *ati* + *saḥ* in the Pāli discourses that would support Neumann’s suggestion. Hecker 1972: 38, commenting on Neumann’s suggestion, remarks that the next quality in MN 6 at MN I 33,27 only employs *°saho*, without *ati*. Araṭī is also the name of one of the daughters of Māra, where Bingenheimer 2007: 56-57 suggests it would better fit with the other two daughters Taṇhā and Rāga if she were to be named Ratī, a reading he also sees as underlying the way her name has been rendered into Chinese; on the three daughters of Māra cf. also Johnston 1936/1995b: 188 note 3.

MĀ 105	EĀ 37.5
be personally taught by Buddha relatives gain merits (→ 4) supporters gain merits (→ 3) bear vicissitudes bear discontent (→ 5) bear fear (→ 6) unaffected by evil thoughts 4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 7) stream-entry (→ 9) once-return (→ 10) non-return (→ 11) immaterial attainments (→ 8) ¹⁰⁶ supernormal powers, divine ear, read others' minds, recollect past lives, divine eye, destroy influxes (→ 12-17) (# 1-2)	be personally taught by Buddha receive requisites (→ 2) contentment be recognized by 4 assemblies etc. 4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 7) 4 <i>iddhipādas</i> 8 liberations divine ear (→ 13) read others' thoughts ¹⁰⁷ read others' minds (→ 14) supernormal powers (→ 12) recollect past lives (→ 15) divine eye (→ 16) destroy influxes (→ 17) (# 1, 3-6, 8-11)

In a similar vein, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version places its reference to beware of transgressions within a wider context, as its exposition continues with a listing of the five aggregates of morality, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and knowledge-and-vision of liberation.¹⁰⁸

According to the Pāli commentary, however, the entire *Ākankheyya-sutta* should be seen as an exposition of the benefits of moral conduct.¹⁰⁹ This explanation by the Pāli commentary seems to reflect a slight tendency to overrate strict observance of the rules. Although the importance of a sound foundation in moral conduct is certainly seen in the

¹⁰⁶ From the viewpoint of textual transmission it is noteworthy that MĀ 105 at T I 596a20 has a somewhat truncated reference to the destruction of the influxes in its description of the wish to reach the immaterial attainments. Next come the wishes to attain supernormal powers, the divine ear, the ability to read another's mind, recollection of one's past lives, the divine eye, and then again the destruction of the influxes, i.e. all these come together as one single wish. If MĀ 105 at an earlier stage should have proceeded from the immaterial attainments directly to the destruction of the influxes, as suggested by the truncated reference at that point, its list of wishes would have been similar to AN 10:71 in this respect, which proceeds directly from the four *jhānas* to the destruction of the influxes (though unlike MĀ 105, AN 10:71 also does not mention the immaterial attainments). However, the passage at T I 596a20 may rather reflect a general problem in the transmission or translation of the *Madhyama-āgama*, since similarly truncated references to the destruction of the influxes in the context of a description of the immaterial attainments recur elsewhere in the same collection, where they are also followed by a listing of supernormal powers that includes the destruction of the influxes, cf. MĀ 81 at T I 557c3 and MĀ 147 at T I 659a21.

¹⁰⁷ EĀ 37.5 at T II 712a26 first mentions knowing the thoughts in the mind of another, and then at T II 712a28 describes knowing the states of mind of living beings as its next quality, an ability illustrated with the help of a listing of states of mind comparable to what is found in MN 6 at MN I 34,26.

¹⁰⁸ EĀ 37.5 at T II 712b28: 比丘戒身, 定身, 慧身, 解脫身, 解脫知見身具足者 (adopting a 宋, 元, 明, and 聖 variant that adds 身 to 定).

¹⁰⁹ Ps I 165,10 speaks of MN 6 as a *sīlānisamsakathā*.

early discourses as an indispensable prerequisite for the gradual training of a monk and thus for all of the various benefits mentioned in the present discourse, the requirements the *Ākanikheyya-sutta* envisages for having one's wishes fulfilled do not seem to be just strict observance of the rules. Rather, what seems to be required is progressing from a sound foundation in moral conduct to the development of tranquillity and insight, for which purpose one should dwell in seclusion. This becomes particularly evident in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which does not have the admonition to observe the precepts perfectly and to see danger in the slightest fault at all, found at the beginning and end of the two Pāli discourses.

While the *Āriyuttara-nikāya* version does not have a formal conclusion, the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions report the delighted reaction of the monks.¹¹⁰ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the monks were so inspired by this exposition that they immediately went off into seclusion to practise diligently and soon became arahants.¹¹¹ In this way, the conclusion of the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse again highlights that the question at stake is not merely observance of the precepts, but rather an integral practice of all aspects of the path.

MN 7 *Vatthūpama-sutta*¹¹²

The *Vatthūpama-sutta*, the “discourse on the simile of the cloth”, features an exposition on the nature of mental defilements. This discourse has four Chinese parallels, one of which is found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, another parallel is found in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, while the remaining two are individual translations.¹¹³ Besides these four parallels, the final part of the *Vatthūpama-sutta*, which is concerned with ritual bathing in a

¹¹⁰ AN 10:71 at AN V 133,9, MN 6 at MN I 36,8, and EĀ 37.5 at T II 712c4.

¹¹¹ MĀ 105 at T I 596a27.

¹¹² The Burmese edition B^e-MN I 43,10 has the title *Vattha-sutta*, “the discourse on the cloth”, cf. also Ps I 165,26.

¹¹³ The parallels are MĀ 93 at T I 575a-576a, EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c-575a, T 51 at T I 843c-844b, and T 582 at T XIV 966b-967a (I am indebted to Jan Nattier for having drawn my attention to the parallelism between T 582 and MN 7 and for sharing a draft translation of T 582 with me). According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 51 was translated by an unknown translator, while T 582 was translated by Zhī Qiān (支謙). MĀ 93 has the title “discourse on a Brahmin [practising] purification [through ablutions in] water”, 水淨梵志經; T 51 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha to a Brahmin speculating about purification [through ablutions in] water”, 佛說梵志計水淨經; T 582 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha to Sundarika”, 佛說孫多耶致經. The summary verse at T II 576a6 refers to EĀ 13.5 with 孫陀利, which might intend the river Sundarikā, even though EĀ 13.5 at T II 574c10 instead refers to this river with 孫陀羅. As the expression 孫陀利 does not occur at all in EĀ 13.5, it seems as if the translator(s) employed a different rendering for the name of the river Sundarikā in the discourse and in the summary verses, a not uncommon type of irregularity in the *Ekottarika-āgama*. For remarks and a translation of MĀ 93 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 56, 60-61, 101-102, 186-187, and 228-232. EĀ 13.5 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1991: 131-139; a brief survey of MN 7 can be found in Anālayo 2009k.

river, has counterparts in two discourses found in the two Chinese *Samyukta-āgama* translations.¹¹⁴

MN I 36 According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version and one of the individual translations, the event described in the present discourse took place just after the Buddha had reached awakening.¹¹⁵

While the Pāli version starts with the Buddha addressing the monks on his own, the three Chinese versions report that the arrival of a Brahmin was the occasion for the delivery of the discourse.¹¹⁶ The same Brahmin appears again at the end of all versions, asking the Buddha about ritual bathing in holy rivers.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and one of the individual translations depict the arrival of this Brahmin with additional detail.¹¹⁷ According to their description, this Brahmin felt quite confident when comparing himself with the Buddha, as he supported himself with simple food, whereas the Buddha sometimes took rich food. According to both versions, the Buddha had become aware of this thought of the Brahmin, which apparently motivated him to deliver the discourse.

The *Vatthūpama-sutta* starts its exposition with the simile of the cloth, followed by listing sixteen mental defilements.¹¹⁸ The Chinese versions follow the reverse sequence by first listing the mental defilements, which in the Chinese versions count up to twenty-one types (see table 1.7), followed by then illustrating their effect with the simile of the cloth.¹¹⁹

The defilements found in the Pāli version are almost exclusively what could be reckoned as ‘societal’ defilements, in the sense of being states that negatively affect communal behaviour.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ The partial parallels are SĀ 1185 at T II 321a-b and SĀ² 98 at T II 408b-c. Anesaki 1908: 123 gives the title “Sundarika”, 孫陀利, for SĀ 1185. A reference to SĀ² 98 in an *uddāna* at T II 410a1 similarly employs the abbreviated 孫陀. A meeting of the Buddha with the Brahmin Sundarika on the bank of a river occurs also in SN 7:9 at SN I 167 (or SN² 195 at SN²I 358) and in Sn 3:4 at Sn 455-486, although the ensuing discourse is not related to purification through ablutions in water.

¹¹⁵ MĀ 93 at T I 575a22 and T 51 at T I 843c17 note that the Buddha had just reached awakening, 初得道時 or 初成等覺, corresponding to the Pāli expression *pāṭhamābhisambuddho*, to which T 51 at T I 843c17 adds that the Buddha was alone, 獨. This does not fit too well with the circumstance that both versions report the presence of monks listening to the discourse, cf. MĀ 93 at T I 575a24 and T 51 at T I 843c20, where both versions indicate that the Buddha addressed the monks when beginning his discourse, 告諸比丘; both versions also conclude by reporting the delight of these monks, cf. MĀ 93 at T I 576a13 and T 51 at T I 844b5. According to EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c2, the Buddha was in fact surrounded by a large number of listeners. Cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 56.

¹¹⁶ As in the case of MN 6, the Chinese discourses thus stand in contrast to the Pāli commentary, which includes the *Vatthūpama-sutta* among the discourses delivered by the Buddha on his own initiative, Ps I 15,26: *attano ajjhāsayen’ eva*.

¹¹⁷ EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c5 and T 582 at T XIV 966b8.

¹¹⁸ MN 7 at MN I 36,15; on this simile cf., e.g., Barua 1956: 104.

¹¹⁹ MĀ 93 at T I 575b3, EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c18, T 51 at T I 843c25, and T 582 at T XIV 966b23.

¹²⁰ Nāṇaponika 1964/1988: 1.

Although such qualities are likewise found in the Chinese versions, their respective lists additionally cover mental defilements more closely related to the practice of the path, such as the five hindrances.¹²¹

The Chinese versions also mention shamelessness and recklessness, two qualities often found in similar lists in other Pāli discourses, but absent from the list of defilements in the *Vatthūpama-sutta*.¹²² The *Madhyama-āgama* version and one of the individual translations, moreover, include wrong views in their lists, as well as unlawful desires.¹²³

Table 1.7: List of Defilements in MN 7 and its Parallels¹²⁴

MN 7	MĀ 93	T 51
greed (1)	wrong views	wrong views
ill will (2)	unlawful desires	unlawful desires
anger (3)	evil greed	deceit (→ 9)
malice (4)	wrong mental states	evil states
contempt (5)	greed (→ 1)	greed (→ 1)
domineering (6)	ill will (→ 2)	ill will (→ 2)
envy (7)	sloth-and-torpor	laziness
avarice (8)	restlessness-and-worry	sloth-and-torpor
deceit (9)	doubt	restlessness-and-worry
fraud (10)	anger (→ 3)	shamelessness
obstinacy (11)	silent sulking ¹²⁵	doubt
presumption (12)	avarice (→ 8)	anger (→ 3)
pride (13)	envy (→ 7)	malice (→ 4)
excessive pride (14)	deceit (→ 9)	avarice (→ 8)
vanity (15)	flattery	jealousy
negligence (16)	shamelessness	partiality
	recklessness	flattery
	pride (→ 13)	recklessness
	excessive pride (→ 14)	envy (→ 7)
	arrogance (→ 15)	excessive envy ¹²⁶
	negligence (→ 16)	negligence (→ 16)
	(# 4-6, 10-12)	(# 5-6, 10-15)

¹²¹ MĀ 93 at T I 575a27, EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c12, T 51 at T I 843c22, and T 582 at T XIV 966b12 (which lacks restlessness-and-worry).

¹²² MĀ 93 at T I 575b1, EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c14, T 51 at T I 843c24, and T 582 at T XIV 966b16.

¹²³ MĀ 93 at T I 575a26 and T 51 at T I 843c21.

¹²⁴ In relation to this survey I need to mention that the implications of certain Chinese characters can vary from translator to translator, thus for closely related terms – like, e.g., *vyāpāda*, *kodha* and *upanāha* in the Pāli listing – it is not easy to determine the precise correspondent among the various translations used in the Chinese versions. Hence with the above survey I merely intend to convey a general impression of the range of mental defilements listed.

¹²⁵ MĀ 93 at T I 575c7: 不語結, literally “the bondage of remaining silent”, presumably intending some kind of sulkiness.

¹²⁶ My rendering of this and the preceding quality are tentative, as the text appears to have suffered some corruption.

EĀ 13.5	T 582
anger (→ 3)	sensual desire (→ 1)
ill will (→ 2)	ill will (→ 2)
sloth-and-torpor	delusion
restlessness-and-worry	sloth-and-torpor
doubt	bondage of doubt ¹²⁷
hatred (→ 4)	pride (→ 13)
jealousy	arrogance (→ 14)
vexation	envy (→ 7)
disease	avarice (→ 8)
dislike	cruelty (→ 4)
shamelessness	deceit (→ 9)
recklessness	shamelessness
deceit (→ 9)	recklessness
debauchery	faultfinding
fraud (→ 10)	lustful
faultfinding	gossiping
arrogance (→ 15)	quarrelsome
pride (→ 13)	impolite
envy (→ 7)	difficult to admonish (→ 11?)
excessive pride (→ 14)	disobedient, no <i>mettā</i>
greed (→ 1)	delight in wrong ways
(≠ 5-6, 8, 11-12, 16)	(≠ 3, 5-6, 10, 12, 15-16)

The point made with the help of the simile of the cloth, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, is that a dirty and stained cloth will not take dye properly.¹²⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and one individual translation instead describe a dirty cloth that is still stained even after much washing.¹²⁹

The *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, as well as one of the individual translations, proceed from the removal of the twenty-one defilements they mention to the development of the four *brahmavihāras* in the form of a boundless radiation.¹³⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse instead proceeds from overcoming the sixteen defilements mentioned in its listing to perfect confidence in the three jewels (Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha), an implicit reference to stream-entry,¹³¹ and only turns to the *brahmavihāras* later on (see table 1.8).

The *Madhyama-āgama* version and one of the individual translations conclude their description of the radiation of the four *brahmavihāras* with the Buddha pointing out that in this way an internal ‘bathing’ of the mind can be undertaken, different from an outer

¹²⁷ Adopting the 宋, 元, 明, and 宮 variant reading 疑 instead of 凝.

¹²⁸ MN 7 at MN I 36,15 and EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c18; the simile in T 582 at T XIV 966b23 is rather cryptic, although it could be having a similar sense.

¹²⁹ MĀ 93 at T I 575b3 and T 51 at T I 843c25.

¹³⁰ MĀ 93 at T I 575c11, EĀ 13.5 at T II 574a7, and T 51 at T I 844a15.

¹³¹ MN 7 at MN I 37,15.

bathing of the body.¹³² The same two versions continue by reporting that the Brahmin who had been present during the delivery of the discourse asked the Buddha about purification by bathing in sacred rivers.

Table 1.8: Progression of Topics in MN 7 and its Parallels

MN 7	MĀ 93 & T 51
simile of cloth (1) list of defilements (2) confidence in 3 jewels (3) detachment with food (4) <i>brahmavihāras</i> (5) liberation (6) on water purification (7)	list of defilements (→ 2) simile of cloth (→ 1) <i>brahmavihāras</i> (→ 5) on water purification (→ 7) (≠ 3-4)
EĀ 13.5	T 582
list of defilements (→ 2) simile of cloth (→ 1) <i>brahmavihāras</i> (→ 5) confidence in 3 jewels (→ 3) liberation (→ 6) detachment with food (→ 4) on water purification (→ 7)	list of defilements (→ 2) simile of cloth (→ 1) liberation (→ 6) detachment with food (→ 4) on water purification (→ 7)

The same query occurs also in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, although in their accounts the Buddha's exposition continues further before this intervention happens. In the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, after having described the radiation of the four *brahmavihāras*, the Buddha speaks of perfect confidence in the three jewels,¹³³ a topic that already occurred earlier in the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse (see above table 1.8).

In regard to the qualities of the three jewels, while the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentations of the qualities of the Buddha are similar,¹³⁴ they differ in

MN I 37

¹³² MĀ 93 at T I 575c16 and T 51 at T I 844a19.

¹³³ EĀ 13.5 at T II 574ac24.

¹³⁴ The counterpart in EĀ 13.5 at T II 574a28 to the epithet in MN 7 at MN I 37,18, according to which the Buddha is the “unsurpassable leader of men to be tamed”, *anuttaro purisadammasārathi* (C^e-M I 86,26: *purisadammasārathī*), treats this as two qualities: the “unsurpassable man”, 無上士, and the “charioteer of the path of Dharma”, 道法御. Nattier 2003b: 227 notes that 無上士 “has been the standard Chinese rendition of the seventh of the Buddha’s epithets for many centuries” and explains that due to “having taken *anuttarapuruṣa* as a separate title, [the] ... translators were left to explain the epithet *damyaśārathi* on its own. In ... Prakrit languages ... *damya* would have been written *damma* ... Ignoring the unaspirated character of the initial *d*-, this word was apparently read as *dhamma*, and the resulting **dhammasārathi* interpreted as ‘charioteer of the Dharma’”. A separation of the two parts of this compound can also be found in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the Tibetan (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya in D (1) ’dul ba, kha 56a5: *skyes bu ’dul ba’i kha lo sgyur ba, bla na med pa*, where the use of the *shad* (here represented by a comma)

relation to the Dharma. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version highlights that the Dharma is well proclaimed, visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, leading onward, and to be experienced for oneself by the wise.¹³⁵ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instead describes the Dharma as very pure, unshakeable, respected and loved by the people.¹³⁶

In relation to the Saṅgha, the two versions agree on speaking of the four pairs and the eight persons. While the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse proclaims that the Saṅgha's members practise the good, straight, methodical, and proper way,¹³⁷ the *Ekottarika-āgama* version among others highlights that the members of the Saṅgha are accomplished in moral conduct, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and knowledge-and-vision-of-liberation.¹³⁸

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse continues its account with the acquisition of the three higher knowledges, explaining that even taking delicious food will not constitute an obstacle for someone accomplished in this way, since all desires have been eradicated.¹³⁹ A comparable remark can be found in one of the individual translations, where a detailed description of various aspects of proper conduct that make one a worthy recipient of offerings leads up to the indication that in such a case taking good food and fine robes is not blameworthy.¹⁴⁰

MN I 38 The *Vatthūpama-sutta* has a similar reference to taking delicious food before its treatment of the *brahmavihāras* (see above table 1.8).¹⁴¹ In the Pāli account, this passage is a little surprising, placed as it is in between perfect confidence in the three jewels and the development of the *brahmavihāras*,¹⁴² and its implications remain somewhat unclear.

The Pāli commentary explains this statement to imply that non-return has been attained, since taking delicious food will not obstruct a non-returner from progress to full awakening.¹⁴³ This explanation appears contrived. Although delicious food will indeed not affect a non-returner or an arahant, being beyond the attraction of delicious food does not

separates “unsurpassed” from the “charioteer of men to be tamed” and thus treats them as two separate epithets (though the same expression in Q (1030) ge 52a1 does not employ a *shad* at this point); cf. also Skilling 1997a: 413 note 35. The same can also be found regularly in *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, e.g., in MĀ 8 at T I 429c20 or MĀ 16 at T I 438b21, just two mention two examples, cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 326

¹³⁵ MN 7 at MN I 37,20: *svākkhāto ... sandīṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhīti* (B^e-M I 45,28: *opaneyyiko*).

¹³⁶ EĀ 13.5 at T II 574b1: 甚為清淨, 不可移動, 人所愛敬.

¹³⁷ MN 7 at MN I 37,22: *supatipanno ... ujupatipanno ... ñāyapatipanno ... sāmīcipatipanno* (B^e-M I 45,30: *supatipanno ... ujupatipanno ... ñāyappatipanno ... sāmīcipatipanno*).

¹³⁸ EĀ 13.5 at T II 574b4: 戒成就, 三昧成就, 智慧成就, 解脫成就, 解脫見慧成就.

¹³⁹ EĀ 13.5 at T II 574c5.

¹⁴⁰ T 582 at T XIV 966c6.

¹⁴¹ MN 7 at MN I 38,10. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 3-5.

¹⁴² Aronson 1984: 17 comments that “the continuity of this discourse is quite choppy”.

¹⁴³ Ps I 174,22, an explanation perhaps based on SN 12:63 at SN II 99,8, according to which penetrative insight into the nutriment of edible food can lead via penetrative insight into the nature of the five types of sensual pleasure to going beyond rebirth in this world.

imply that one is at least a non-returner, since to remain unaffected by delicious food is possible even if one has not yet reached such a lofty level of realization.

The *Vatthūpama-sutta* at this point speaks of aloofness from the attraction of food for one who is of “such virtue, such nature, and such wisdom”.¹⁴⁴ Since the preceding passage spoke of perfect confidence in the three jewels, representative of stream-entry, the introductory reference to “such virtue, such nature, and such wisdom” should refer to the same level of awakening. Hence the formulation in the *Vatthūpama-sutta* does not support identifying this passage as representative of non-return. Perhaps the puzzling placement of the reference to taking delicious food at a point between a reference to stream-entry and a reference to full awakening has led the commentary to give this explanation, in an attempt to make sense out of this placement.

In contrast, in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version the placement of this passage seems more natural, since by taking up this topic after full awakening it becomes clear that such aloofness is just one of the qualities that result from having eradicated all defilements. The same holds for the individual translation that has a comparable reference. Both versions also clarify the relation of this passage to the *Vatthūpama-sutta* as a whole, since it was just such taking of delicious food by the Buddha that had caused the Brahmin to underestimate the degree of purity the Buddha had reached. Thus, in these two discourses, the reference to the topic of delicious food forms a direct reply to this misconception of the Brahmin, a misconception that apparently motivated the Buddha to deliver the entire discourse.¹⁴⁵

Another difference between the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentations is that the *Vatthūpama-sutta* does not refer to all of the three higher knowledges, mentioned in its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel, but only to the destruction of the influxes.¹⁴⁶ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version precedes the destruction of the influxes with a brief description of the development of insight required for this lofty achievement, which speaks of understanding that there is what is inferior, what is superior, and what goes beyond all perceptions.¹⁴⁷ A counterpart to this passage is not found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel.

¹⁴⁴ MN 7 at MN I 38,10: *evam siło evam dhammo evam pañño*.

¹⁴⁵ The point conveyed in this way would be that the attitude to food is more important than the type of food taken. As Stevens 1985: 441 explains, in contrast to some of the ascetic practices in vogue in ancient India, for the Buddha “it was the intention, not the food, that was paramount for enlightened eating”.

¹⁴⁶ MN 7 at MN I 38,32.

¹⁴⁷ MN 7 at MN I 38,31: “there is this, there is [what is] low, there is [what is] excellent, there is a higher escape from what pertains to perception”, *atti idam, atti hinam, atti pañitaṁ, atti imassa saññāgatassa uttarīm nissaraṇan ti*. A similar statement recurs in AN 3:66 at AN I 196,32. A counterpart to this statement can be found in another discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama*, MĀ 183 at T I 726b27, in which case the corresponding Pāli parallel, MN 40 at MN I 283, does not have such a statement (cf. below p. 261 note 282). It is noteworthy that MN 7, AN 3:66, and MĀ 183 agree on placing this statement after the practice of the *brahmavihāras*, which suggests that the reference to what is “excellent”, *pañita*, intends the *brahmavihāras*. According to the commentary Ps I 176,26, however, *pañita* stands for the fourth noble truth.

The *Vatthūpama-sutta* and its parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama* continue by proclaiming that a monk who has destroyed the influxes is “bathed with an inner bathing”.¹⁴⁸ A similar proclamation can also be found in the other versions. This inner bathing represents full awakening only in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses, while in the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation the inner bathing stands for the degree of mental purity achieved through the development of the *brahma-vihāras*.

On hearing this proclamation, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse a Brahmin visitor asked the Buddha about purification by bathing in sacred rivers. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version up to this point has not mentioned the presence of this Brahmin and in its version the rationale for the Buddha’s remark on an inner bathing is not self-evident. The commentary explains that the Buddha had been aware of this Brahmin’s potential to reach awakening and had made this proclamation in order to arouse the Brahmin’s interest, as this Brahmin was engaging in the practice of purification through (ritual) bathing.¹⁴⁹

This part of the *Vatthūpama-sutta* occurs also in two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, so that this last section of the Pāli discourse has six Chinese parallels. Four of these six Chinese parallels have the bank of a river as their venue, thereby providing the fitting location for the present exchange about bathing in rivers.¹⁵⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and one of the individual translations, moreover, speak of the Buddha’s visitor as a Brahmin who practises water purification, while the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions and the *Ekottarika-āgama* account refer to him as a Brahmin from the bank of a river, a place where such purification through ablutions in water would take place.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ MN 7 at MN I 39,1: *sināto antarena sinānena*, EĀ 13.5 at T II 574c9: 內極沐浴已.

¹⁴⁹ Ps I 177,5 introduces him as a *nahānasuddhiko brāhmaṇo*, a “Brahmin [intent on] purification through bathing”.

¹⁵⁰ MĀ 93 at T I 575a21, T 51 at T I 843c16, SĀ 1185 at T II 321a24, and SĀ² 98 at T II 408b25. Only EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c1 agrees with MN 7 on the location being Jeta’s Grove at Sāvatthī.

¹⁵¹ MĀ 93 at T I 575a23 speaks of the Buddha’s visitor as a Brahmin who practised “purification [through ablutions in] water”, 水淨; T 51 at T I 843c17 refers to him as a Brahmin who “speculates about purification [through ablutions in] water”, 計水淨; SĀ 1185 at T II 321a25 speaks of a Brahmin “from the bank of the river Sundarikā”, 孫陀利河側; SĀ² 98 at T II 408b26 of a “Brahmin who at that time was standing on the bank of the river Sundarikā”, 孫陀利河岸, 時彼岸側有住婆羅門; and EĀ 13.5 at T II 573c3 refers to him simply as a “river side” Brahmin, 江側. While MN 7 speaks of this Brahmin throughout as Sundarika Bhāradvāja, EĀ 13.5 at T II 575a2 uses a proper name only once he has become a monk and an arahant, referring to him as the “venerable Sundarika”, 尊者孫陀羅. Spk I 233,7 explains that he was called Sundarika after the river where he used to offer oblations (Bhāradvāja is the name of a Brahmin clan, cf. Vin IV 6,23; on the Bhāradvājas cf. also Sarmah 1991). Enomoto 2002/2003: 241 points out that ablution in water was one of the main Brahmanical practices of expiation or atonement, *prāyaścitta*. According to Gampert 1939: 255, sin was perceived as a form of dirt, hence ablution in water, often combined with prayers to Varuṇa, the god of water, was held to be a particularly efficacious means for removing the stain of sin. The Jain tradition also took a critical stance towards purification through water, thus, e.g., the *Sūyagada* 1.7.14-16 in Vaidya 1928: 39 argues that if water can purify, animals living in it should also be purified, and if water can wash away evil, it should wash away merits as well.

According to all versions, the Buddha explained to this Brahmin that bathing in rivers will not lead to purification. Instead of such ritual bathing, the Buddha recommended observance of moral conduct as the proper way to purification.¹⁵² MN I 39

The parallel versions conclude with considerable variations:

MN I 40

- one of the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions concludes by reporting that the Brahmin approved of the Buddha's explanation,
- according to the other *Samyukta-āgama* version he was delighted by what he had heard,¹⁵³
- the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and one of the individual translations report that he took refuge as a lay follower,¹⁵⁴
- according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the *Ekottarika-āgama* account, and the other individual translation, he went forth and became an arahant.¹⁵⁵

The ending reported in the last mentioned three versions has a counterpart in a discourse found in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and in the *Sutta-nipāta*, according to which the same Brahmin on another occasion approached the Buddha in order to offer him the remains of an oblation.¹⁵⁶ During the ensuing discussion, the Buddha explained that to be a Brahmin does not make one necessarily worthy of offerings and presented his perspective of what leads to purity. The *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Sutta-nipāta* versions conclude by recording that the Brahmin took refuge, went forth and in due time became an arahant.¹⁵⁷

The meeting between this Brahmin and the Buddha narrated in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Sutta-nipāta* discourses would have to be considered as their first meeting, since the Brahmin did not recognize the Buddha.¹⁵⁸ As on this occasion the Buddha's explanations

¹⁵² MN 7 at MN I 39,13, MĀ 93 at T I 575c23, SĀ 1185 at T II 321b4, SĀ² 98 T II 408c3, EĀ 13.5 at T II 574c15, T 51 at T I 844a21, and T 582 at T XIV 966c15, where in the last two versions this reply comes in prose. McGaugh 1988: 210 sees the present use of verse, together with similar instances of teachings given to Brahmins in verse in MN 92 and MN 98, as exemplifying that the Buddha was "sensitive to an auditor's preference in rhetorical expression", as he replied to those who had mastery of the Vedas "in their own poetic argot". The fourth stanza found in MN 7 at MN I 39,19 recurs in the Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* stanza 327 in Brough 1962/2001: 170, in the Patna *Dharmapada* stanza 99 in Cone 1989: 129 or in Roth 1980b: 106, in the Sanskrit *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 16:15 in Bernhard 1965: 229, cf. also stanza 196 in Nakatani 1987: 47, and the Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 16:14 in Beckh 1911: 55 or in Zongtse 1990: 168. Rockhill 1883/1975: 72 note 1 indicates that the Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza is indeed related to the events depicted in the *Vatthūpama-sutta*. A reference to the belief that bathing in rivers like Sundarikā leads to purification can be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Bhattacharya 1957: 157,7 and T 1579 at T XXX 312b7.

¹⁵³ SĀ 1185 at T II 321b19 (delight) and SĀ² 98 T II 408c24 (approval).

¹⁵⁴ MĀ 93 at T I 576a10 and T 51 at T I 844b2.

¹⁵⁵ MN 7 at MN I 40,8, EĀ 13.5 at T II 575a3, and T 582 at T XIV 966c25.

¹⁵⁶ SN 7:9 at SN I 167,28 (or SN² 195 at SN² I 359,8) and Sn 3:4 at Sn p. 80,2.

¹⁵⁷ SN 7:9 at SN I 170,6 (or SN² 195 at SN² I 364,14) and Sn 3:4 at Sn p. 86,15 report that Sundarika Bhāradvāja became an arahant in the same terms as used in MN 7 at MN I 40,7; cf. also Franke 1908: 5.

¹⁵⁸ SN 7:9 at SN I 168,3 (or SN² 195 at SN² I 360,2) and Sn 3:4 at Sn p. 80,9 describe how once the Buddha had uncovered his head, Sundarika Bhāradvāja wondered whether the person he saw was a Brahmin or a

had put into question the Brahmin's belief in external forms of purification through offering oblations and his assumption of the superiority of being a Brahmin, it would make sense for him to ask the Buddha on the related topic of purification through ritual bathing in sacred waters on a later occasion, as reported in the *Vatthūpama-sutta*.

The introductory narration in the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to the *Vatthūpama-sutta* and in one of the individual translations, according to which this Brahmin had been trying to find fault with the Buddha for partaking of exquisite food, would also fit with such an earlier meeting. It would be natural to imagine how this Brahmin might try to find some faults after having been humbled by the Buddha's reply on an earlier occasion.

Thus the only conflict between the accounts of these two meetings is their concluding part, according to which the same Brahmin requested the going forth and eventually became an arahant on two different occasions. The *Samyukta-āgama* parallel to the earlier meeting of this Brahmin with the Buddha does not have this contradiction, as this version neither reports that the Brahmin became an arahant, nor indicates that he requested the going forth. According to its account, on this earlier occasion he did not even take refuge, but merely delighted in the Buddha's exposition and left.¹⁵⁹ This ending would not stand in any contrast to his going forth and becoming an arahant at the end of his later meeting with the Buddha, described in the *Vatthūpama-sutta* and its parallels.

Perhaps his eventual going forth and becoming an arahant, reported in the *Vatthūpama-sutta*, came to be part of the *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Sutta-nipāta* reports of the first meeting between Sundarika and the Buddha as the result of an error during the transmission of the discourses.

Looking back on the *Vatthūpama-sutta* and its parallels, the seven versions of this discourse can be assembled into three groups, each of which gives a somewhat different presentation of the Buddha's exposition and of its effect on the Brahmin.

The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions offer the shortest and most simple account. Here the Buddha meets a Brahmin on the bank of a river and the latter, apparently thinking that the Buddha has come to take a ritual bath, brings up the subject of water purification. In reply, the Buddha points out that real purification needs to be undertaken in the realm of moral conduct, a reply that satisfies the Brahmin.

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and one of the individual translations additionally offer an account of mental purification. This account contrasts a host of mental defilements with the development of the *brahmavihāras*. After presenting such development as an inner bathing, superior to a ritual bathing of the outer body, the topic of purification through bathing in water comes in its place. As a result of the exposition given in these two discourses, the Brahmin interlocutor becomes a lay disciple.

recluse. Thus from the perspective of the narration in these two discourses, if Sundarika had met the Buddha on an earlier occasion, he would have recognized the Buddha and would not have wondered whether the Buddha was a Brahmin.

¹⁵⁹ SĀ 1184 at T II 321a22. Another parallel, SĀ² 99 at T II 409c12, agrees with SN 7:9 (or SN² 195) and Sn 3:4, as it concludes with the Brahmin going forth and becoming an arahant.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses place a stronger emphasis on the threefold perfect confidence of a stream-enterer and the destruction of the influxes. According to their report, after the selfsame exchange with the Brahmin on water purification the Brahmin was so inspired that he went forth and became an arahant. The same outcome is also reported in the other individual translation, which in other respects, however, differs from these two discourses.

Thus, while in the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions the discourse is concerned merely with the inefficacy of water purification, in the *Madhyama-āgama* version and one of the individual translation the emphasis is on the contrast between mental defilements and the mental purity of the *brahmavihāras*, whereas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, and the other individual translation full awakening as the proper type of purification comes to the fore.

Regarding each of these three main modes of presentation, the Brahmin's reaction fits the depth of the discourse he has received.

MN 8 *Sallekha-sutta*

The *Sallekha-sutta*, the “discourse on effacement”, expounds what constitutes real effacement. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and another parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁶⁰

The *Sallekha-sutta* and its parallels begin with Mahācunda asking the Buddha how to go beyond speculative views.¹⁶¹ In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha replies by recommending insight into the not-self nature of the very place where such views arise (i.e., one's own mind).¹⁶² The Pāli commentary explains that this recommendation points

MN I 40

¹⁶⁰ The parallels are MĀ 91 at T I 573b-574b and EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a-c. MĀ 91 is entitled “discourse on Cunda’s inquiry [about] views”, 周那問見經. While MN 8 has Jeta’s Grove at Sāvatthī as its location, MĀ 91 takes place at the Ghositārāma, a monastery in Kosambī, and EĀ 47.9 is located in the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground at Rājagaha.

¹⁶¹ MN 8 at MN I 40,16 refers to such speculative views as “views related to doctrines about the self or the world”, *attavādapatiṣamnyuttā vā lokavādapatiṣamnyuttā vā*. MĀ 91 at T I 573b18 speaks of “views that keep on arising, namely speculations about the existence of a self, speculations about the existence of a being, about the existence of humans, about the existence of a person (*puggala*), about the existence of life (*jīvita*), about the existence of the world”, 諸見生而生, 謂計有神, 計有眾生, 有人, 有壽, 有命, 有世 (in my translation I follow a suggestion made by Zucchetti 2005: 1269, who explains that in early translations of the second to sixth century, if 壽 occurs in a passage together with 命, it probably renders *puggala* or *pudgala*). EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a11 simply mentions “all those views, related to past and future”, 此諸見, 前後相應.

¹⁶² MN 8 at MN I 40,21: “where those views arise, where they underlie, where they occur, when seeing that with proper wisdom and in accordance with reality as: ‘this is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self’ ... then those views are abandoned”, *yatha c’ etā diṭṭhiyo uppajjanti, yatha ca anusenti, yatha ca samudācaranti, tam n’ etam mama, n’ eso ’ham asmi, na me ’so attā ti evam etam yathābhūtañ sammapaññāya passato ... evam etasam diṭṭhīnam paṭinissaggo hoti* (C^e-MN I 94,3 c’ etā instead of *ca* for both instances). Ps I 182,22 explains that the expression “where they arise”, *yatha uppajjanti*, refers to the five aggregates.

to the attainment of stream-entry, with which such views will be left behind.¹⁶³ The commentarial understanding of the implication of the present passage receives confirmation from the *Madhyama-āgama* version, according to which the Buddha explained that the experience of the cessation of phenomena (viz. Nirvāṇa) leads beyond speculative views, an implicit reference to stream-entry.¹⁶⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instead recommends insight into the place where such views arise and cease as being impermanent, *dukkha*, and empty.¹⁶⁵

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version continues differently from the other two discourses, as it refers to the sixty-two types of view (presumably intending the listing of grounds for views given in the *Brahmajāla-sutta* and its parallels) and then recommends becoming established in the ten wholesome courses of action to go beyond such views.

According to the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the four *jhānas* or the four immaterial attainments do not qualify as “effacement”.¹⁶⁶ Rather, effacement requires refraining from what is unwholesome even when faced with others who are indulging in it.

MN I 42 The list of unwholesome qualities in regard to which such effacement should be practised differs in the parallel versions.¹⁶⁷ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version lists only the ten unwholesome courses of action.¹⁶⁸

Although the main part of its presentation is based on these ten, the final part of the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse nevertheless refers to several other qualities mentioned also in the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-agama* parallel.¹⁶⁹ This internal inconsistency, as well as the overall somewhat unclear progression of ideas in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, give the impression that this discourse has suffered from error(s) during its transmission and/or translation.

Although the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-agama* parallel resemble each other to a greater extent, they also show some differences. Thus, while the *Sallekha-sutta* includes wrong manifestations of the factors of the tenfold noble path, none of these form part of the listing in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. Nor is the last item in the *Sallekha-sutta*'s

¹⁶³ According to Ps I 183,16, the expression “seeing with proper wisdom”, *sammappaññāya passato*, is a reference to the wisdom of stream-entry.

¹⁶⁴ MĀ 91 at T I 573b23: “the complete and remainderless cessation of all phenomena, knowing like this and seeing like this brings those views to extinction”, 諸法滅盡無餘者，如是知，如是見，令此見得滅。

¹⁶⁵ EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a12: “the sphere where these views emerge and arise, and where they cease, all that is impermanent, *dukkha*, and empty”, 此見所出興所滅之處，皆是無常，苦，空 (adopting the 宋, 元, 明, and 聖 variant 興 instead of 輿).

¹⁶⁶ “Effacement”, *sallekha*, in MN 8 at MN I 40,30, has its counterpart in 漸損 in MĀ 91 at T I 573b25, literally “gradual reducing [faults]” (following the explanation in the 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition p. 787 note 8, which glosses 漸損 as 漸漸削減過失).

¹⁶⁷ The respective listings begin in MN 8 at MN I 42,3 and in MĀ 91 at T I 573c7.

¹⁶⁸ EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a16.

¹⁶⁹ EĀ 47.9 at T II 784c5 mentions praising oneself and disparaging others, not being of few wishes, breaches of morality, laziness, not developing concentration, and not developing wisdom.

list, dogmatic adherence to one's views, found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel (see table 1.9).

Thus the three discourses agree on including unwholesome conduct or attitudes in the form of:

- killing,
- stealing,
- breaches of celibacy,
- the four types of wrong speech,
- covetousness.

The *Sallekha-sutta* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* version agree on continuing their listing by also mentioning the remaining two unwholesome courses of action, namely:

- ill will,
- wrong view.

Unlike the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel list various mental defilements and unwholesome qualities, such as:

- anger,
- deceit,
- pride,
- faithlessness,
- shamelessness,
- little learning,
- laziness,
- lack of mindfulness,
- lack of wisdom.

To the last group, the *Madhyama-āgama* version adds being without concentration.¹⁷⁰

The *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* also agree on listing only three hindrances – sloth-and-torpor, restlessness, and doubt – out of the standard set of five hindrances.¹⁷¹

The Pāli commentary explains that the first two hindrances were not mentioned since they had already been mentioned earlier, although under a different name.¹⁷² Judging from this pattern, described in the commentary, one would expect that the *Sallekha-sutta*'s list of defilements is built up in an economical way, in the sense that it does not repeat any item that has already been mentioned. Closer inspection shows that, while this does hold for the case of wrong view, the same pattern has not been applied consistently throughout the listing.

¹⁷⁰ MĀ 91 at T I 573c20.

¹⁷¹ MN 8 at MN I 42,31 and MĀ 91 at T I 573c11.

¹⁷² Ps I 189,13, an explanation related to the occurrence of *abhijjhālu* and *byāpanna-citta* in MN 8 at MN I 42,15+16. The same argument would also hold true for MĀ 91 at T I 573c7+8, which begins its list by referring to “sensual thoughts”, 慾, followed by “anger”, 瞳, so that here equivalents to the first two hindrances have also been mentioned already.

Table 1.9: Unwholesome Qualities in MN 8 and MĀ 91

MN 8	MĀ 91
harmfulness (1)	evil desires and sensual thoughts
killing (2)	harmfulness and anger (→ 1)
stealing (3)	killing (→ 2)
breach of celibacy (4)	stealing (→ 3)
falsehood (5)	breach of celibacy (→ 4)
malicious speech (6)	covetousness (→ 9)
harsh speech (7)	fault finding
useless speech (8)	sloth-and-torpor (→ 21)
being covetous (9)	restlessness (→ 22)
ill will (10)	arrogance
wrong view (11)	doubt (→ 23)
wrong intention (12)	bondage of anger (→ 24)
wrong speech (13)	flattery
wrong action (14)	deceit (→ 31)
wrong livelihood (15)	shamelessness (→ 38)
wrong effort (16)	recklessness (→ 39)
wrong mindfulness (17)	pride
wrong concentration (18)	excessive pride (→ 33)
wrong knowledge (19)	lack of learning (→ 40)
wrong liberation (20)	not contemplating what is wholesome
sloth-and-torpor (21)	unlawful conduct
restless (22)	falsehood (→ 5)
doubt (23)	malicious speech (→ 6)
angry (24)	harsh speech (→ 7)
malicious (25)	useless speech (→ 8)
contemptuous (26)	evil habits
domineering (27)	lack of faith (→ 37)
envious (28)	laziness (→ 41)
avaricious (29)	lack of mindfulness (→ 42)
fraudulent (30)	lack of concentration (→ 18?)
deceitful (31)	lack of wisdom (→ 43)
obstinate (32)	
excessively proud (33)	
difficult to admonish (34)	
have bad friends (35)	
negligent (36)	
lack of faith (37)	
shamelessness (38)	
recklessness (39)	
lack of learning (40)	
laziness (41)	
lack of mindfulness (42)	
lack of wisdom (43)	
being dogmatic (44)	(≠ 10-17, 19-20, 25-30, 32, 34-36, 44)

EĀ 47.98
killing (→ 2)
stealing (→ 3)
breach of celibacy (→ 4)
falsehood (→ 5)
malicious speech (→ 6)
useless speech (→ 8)
harsh speech (→ 7)
being covetous (→ 9)
ill will (→ 10)
wrong view (→ 11)
self-praise, disparaging others (→ 26?)
not being of few wishes
breaches of morality
laziness (→ 41)
not developing concentration (→ 18?)
not developing wisdom (→ 43)
(≠ 1, 12-17, 19-25, 27-40, 42, 44)

Wrong view, which constitutes the eleventh item in the list (11), constitutes at the same time the last of the ten unwholesome courses of action and the first of the ten wrong path factors. Hence, in keeping with the pattern suggested by the commentary, wrong view is only mentioned once (see above table 1.9).¹⁷³

Yet, the same principle has not been consistently applied to the entire list of defilements, as an instance of overlap can be found, for example, between killing (2), stealing (3) and breach of celibacy (4) on the one hand and wrong action (14) on the other,¹⁷⁴ since wrong action covers precisely these three.¹⁷⁵

Another overlap exists between falsehood (5), malicious speech (6), harsh speech (7) and useless speech (8) on the one hand and the path factor of wrong speech (13) on the other,¹⁷⁶ since here, too, the standard definition of wrong speech lists precisely these four types of speech.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ MN 8 at MN I 42,18. An application of the same principle would also serve to explain why concentration does not occur in the list given in MN 8, since wrong concentration is mentioned as one of the wrong path factors, so that the list in MN 8 has in this way already covered this topic. In MĀ 91, however, an explicit mentioning of concentration is required, since this version does not include the wrong path factors in its exposition.

¹⁷⁴ MN 8 at MN I 42,5: *pāṇātipātī ... adinnādāyī ... abrahmacārī*, and then MN 8 at MN I 42,22: *micchākam-mantā*.

¹⁷⁵ MN 117 at MN III 74,23: *pāṇātipāto, adinnādānam, kāmesu micchācāro, ayām ... micchākammanto* (when applied to monks, as in MN 8, *kāmesu micchācāra* becomes *abrahmacariya*).

¹⁷⁶ MN 8 at MN I 42,10: *musāvādī ... pisuṇāvācā ... pharusāvācā ... samphappalāpī* (B^e-MN I 51,3, C^e-MN I 96,32, and S^e-MN I 75,10; *pisuṇavācā*, B^e-MN I 51,5 and S^e-MN I 75,11: *pharusavācā*), and then MN 8 at MN I 42,20: *micchāvāca*.

¹⁷⁷ MN 117 at MN III 73,29: *musāvādo, pisuṇā vācā, pharusā vācā, samphappalāpo, ayām ... micchāvācā* (C^e-MN III 216,1: *pisunā*).

Another at least partial overlap can be found between covetousness (9) and ill will (10) on the one side and wrong intention (12) on the other,¹⁷⁸ since according to the standard definition wrong intentions are intentions of sensuality, ill will and cruelty.¹⁷⁹ Without these three types of intention, these three unwholesome mental qualities would have no scope to arise. Moreover, the mentioning of wrong effort (16), wrong mindfulness (17) and wrong knowledge (19) would have much in common with the later mentioned qualities of being lazy (41), unmindful (42) and lacking wisdom (43).¹⁸⁰

Thus, on the basis of the commentarial suggestion, it seems as if several of the wrong path factors are redundant. As the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not mention any of the wrong path factors (nor are these found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version), perhaps the ten wrong path factors originally did not form part of the discourse. The occurrence of wrong view as the last of the ten unwholesome courses of action could easily have caused the reciter(s) to continue with wrong intention, wrong speech, etc., thereby, perhaps even unintentionally, adding a listing of then ten wrong path factors to the exposition.¹⁸¹

MN I 43 The *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by pointing out that even just to arouse the mind to train in wholesomeness is of much benefit, a maxim that depicts the type of repeated mental training that will enforce one's resolve to avoid any of the unwholesome qualities listed in the parallel versions.¹⁸² A later part of the *Ekottarika-āgama* version has a presentation that appears to form a counterpart to this part of the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.¹⁸³

As a third aspect, the *Sallekha-sutta* brings up the simple but effective point that just as one can avoid an uneven path by taking an even path (or a wrong path by taking a right path according to the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation), so too all these unwholesome qualities can be avoided by cultivating their wholesome counterparts.¹⁸⁴ This principle is also expounded in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version.¹⁸⁵

MN I 44 According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the fourth aspect to be contemplated in regard to these unwholesome qualities is that unwholesome things lead downward, while

¹⁷⁸ MN 8 at MN I 42,15: *abhijjhālū ... byāpannacittā*, and then MN 8 at MN I 42,19: *micchāsaṅkappā*.

¹⁷⁹ MN 117 at MN III 73,2: *kāmasaṅkappo, vyāpādasaṅkappo, vihiṇṇasaṅkappo, ayam ... micchāsaṅkappo*.

¹⁸⁰ MN 8 at MN I 42,24: *micchāvāyāmā ... micchāsaṭī ... micchāñāpi*, and then MN 8 at MN I 43,19: *kusītā ... muṭṭhassatī ... duppaññā*.

¹⁸¹ Von Hinüber 1996/1997: 31 explains that “pieces of texts known by heart may intrude into almost any context once there is a corresponding key word”.

¹⁸² MN 8 at MN I 43,26 and MĀ 91 at T I 573c21.

¹⁸³ EĀ 47.9 at T II 784b29 takes up the case of killing and stealing, recommending to be firm in one's mind, without wavering, regarding not engaging in such conduct, followed by turning to the remainder of the ten unwholesome courses of action. Although this presentation is considerably different from the section on inclination of the mind in MN 8 and MĀ 91, it nevertheless appears to be making the same basic point.

¹⁸⁴ MN 8 at MN I 43,35 and MĀ 91 at T I 574a8.

¹⁸⁵ EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a19, after which EĀ 47.9 continues directly with the simile about one who is drowning himself and thus unable to help others cross.

wholesome things lead upward.¹⁸⁶ While the *Ekottarika-āgama* version does not have a counterpart to this fourth aspect, the *Madhyama-āgama* version similarly contrasts dark things, which have dark results and lead to an evil destination, with bright things, which have bright results and which lead upward.¹⁸⁷ The *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel highlight the benefits that result from avoiding what is unwholesome.

A fifth point, made in all versions, is to extinguish any of these unwholesome qualities within oneself. This appears to form a warning against premature attempts to set oneself up as a guide for others.¹⁸⁸ The three versions illustrate the situation of someone, who attempts to discipline another while being himself or herself still undisciplined, with the example of drowning or sinking in the mud, yet attempting to pull out another who is in the same predicament.¹⁸⁹

The five stages of effacement in the *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel thus involve the following main points:

- refrain even if others indulge,
- incline the mind to wholesomeness,
- avoid uneven and wrong through what is even and right,
- develop what leads upward,
- extinguish own faults first.

The *Sallekha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel conclude with the Buddha proclaiming that he had done his task as a teacher, exhorting the monks to meditate and not be negligent.¹⁹⁰

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version proceeds differently, as here the Buddha takes up different speculative views, followed by a set of stanzas.¹⁹¹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* account concludes with Mahācunda withdrawing into seclusion and eventually becoming an arahant.¹⁹²

While the *Sallekha-sutta* only notes that Mahācunda rejoiced at the end of the discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version records that other monks also rejoiced in the Buddha's exposition.

¹⁸⁶ MN 8 at MN I 44,32.

¹⁸⁷ MĀ 91 at T I 574a19: 或有法黑, 有黑報, 趣至惡處, 或有法白, 有白報, 而得昇上.

¹⁸⁸ Nāṇaponika 1964/1988: 29.

¹⁸⁹ MN 8 at MN I 45,3, MĀ 91 at T I 574b3, and EĀ 47.9 at T II 784a20. A discourse quotation on the need to tame oneself before taming others, presumably from the present discourse, can be found in T 212 at T IV 712c9, which at T IV 723b16 also quotes the simile of pulling someone out of the mud. Mahāsi 1981/2006b: 34-35 explains that "only the man who has disciplined himself ... and extinguished the fires of defilements will be able to help another man in regard to discipline ... and extinction of defilements", "just as a fire cannot be used for putting out another fire, so also a defilement cannot neutralize another defilement".

¹⁹⁰ MN 8 at MN I 46,6 and MĀ 91 at T I 574b22.

¹⁹¹ The listing of these views in EĀ 47.9 at T II 784b2 proceeds from the existence of the self to a standard set of views (nature of the world as eternal or finite, identity of soul and body, destiny of a tathāgata after death), followed by also mentioning views on the creator of the world.

¹⁹² EĀ 47.9 at T II 784c10.

According to an opinion reported in the Pāli commentary, Mahācunda's initial question about views was aimed at some of his disciples, who had been overestimating themselves, believing that they had already gone beyond such views.¹⁹³ Judging from this explanation, a group of other monks should have been present during this discourse, as recorded explicitly in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse's conclusion.

In fact, the Buddha's final exhortation to meditate in the *Sallekha-sutta* is formulated in the plural, indicating that, although the conclusion only mentions Mahācunda explicitly, the presence of other monks is implicitly covered.¹⁹⁴ The same pattern recurs in other Pāli discourses, which indicates that, even though a conclusion may mention only the most prominent person rejoicing, the rejoicing of everyone else present should be understood to be implicit in the same statement.

MN 9 *Sammāditthi-sutta*

The *Sammāditthi-sutta*, the “discourse on right view”, features an exposition by Sāriputta on right view. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Samyukta-āgama*,¹⁹⁵ and a parallel in a Sanskrit fragment.¹⁹⁶

MN I 46 While the *Sammāditthi-sutta* begins with Sāriputta addressing the monks on his own initiative, the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse and the Sanskrit fragment version report that

¹⁹³ Ps I 182,16. This explanation fits well with the way other Pāli discourses present Mahācunda. In MN 144 at MN III 266,4 (= SN 35:87 at SN IV 59,7), he gives an instruction to the monk Channa, an instruction whose wording suggests that Mahācunda thought Channa was overestimating his level of attainment. In AN 6:46 at AN III 355,6, Mahācunda criticizes the conceited attitude of some monks, who because of their theoretical knowledge or else because of their meditation practice speak disparagingly of other monks. AN 10:24 at AN V 42,3 and AN 10:85 at AN V 157,25 report two occasions when Mahācunda examines the false claims made by monks who overestimate their achievements. These passages thus present the curbing of conceit and overestimation of other monks as a particular concern of Mahācunda.

¹⁹⁴ MN 8 at MN I 46,9: *jhāyatha, cunda, mā pamādattha, mā pacchā vippaṭisārino ahuvattha*.

¹⁹⁵ The parallels are MĀ 29 at T I 461b-464b, entitled “discourse on Mahākoṭṭhita”, 大拘絺羅經, and SĀ 344 at T II 94b-95b, for which Akanuma 1929/1990: 48 gives the tentative title “Koṭṭhita”, 拘絺羅。A translation of SĀ 344 is forthcoming in Anālayo 2012f. While MN 9 has Jeta's Grove at Sāvatthī as its location, MĀ 29 and SĀ 344 take place at Rājagaha. SĀ 344 at T II 94b2 further specifies that, while the Buddha was in Rājagaha itself, Sāriputta and Mahākoṭṭhita were staying at Mount Vulture Peak near Rājagaha. This specification explains why the Buddha does not take any part in the present discourse. Akanuma 1929/1990: 163 lists EĀ 49.5 at T II 797b as another parallel to the *Sammāditthi-sutta*. EĀ 49.5, however, reports the Buddha giving a detailed explanation of the twelve links of dependent arising and correcting Ānanda's lack of appreciation of its depth. Thus EĀ 49.5 finds a better parallel in SN 12:2 at SN II 2,12, in as much as its exposition of the links of dependent arising is concerned, and has Ānanda's underestimation of the depth of dependent arising in common with DN 15 at DN II 55,9 and SN 12:60 at SN II 92,8.

¹⁹⁶ S 474 folio 16V9 to folio 18V5 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 50-54. S 474 folio 16V9 agrees with MĀ 29 and SĀ 344 on the location of the discourse, while S 474 folio 16V10, similar to SĀ 344, specifies that the two protagonists were staying at Mount Vulture Peak.

Mahākoṭṭhita visited Sāriputta and asked about the implications of right view.¹⁹⁷ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, however, it was Sāriputta who had visited Mahākoṭṭhita in order to ask the same question.¹⁹⁸ In each case, the question that led to the delivery of the discourse was about the implications of being endowed with right view and of having achieved perfect confidence in the teaching, expressions that stand for the attainment of stream-entry.¹⁹⁹

The first reply to this question, according to all versions, is that to understand wholesomeness and unwholesomeness, together with their respective roots, is to have right view (see table 1.10).²⁰⁰ According to the Pāli account, unwholesomeness here stands for the ten unwholesome courses of action (*akusala kammapatha*).²⁰¹ The Chinese discourses and the Sanskrit fragment define the same in terms of the three unwholesome actions by way of body, speech, and mind, thereby differing in letter but not in meaning from the Pāli presentation.²⁰² All versions agree that greed, anger, and delusion are the roots of what is unwholesome, and their absence is the root of what is wholesome.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in concluding this presentation (and each of the following expositions of right view) by speaking of abandoning the underlying tendencies to lust, to irritation, and to the conceited view ‘I am’, together with overcoming ignorance and making an end of *dukkha*.²⁰³ This statement does not seem to fit its context, since to overcome ignorance and make an end of *dukkha* implies full awakening, whereas the question of having right view, found in all versions, is concerned with stream-entry.²⁰⁴

MN I 47

¹⁹⁷ SĀ 344 at T II 94b4 and S 474 folio 16V10 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 50.

¹⁹⁸ MĀ 29 at T I 461b25. For a similar reversal of roles between these two monks cf. below p. 268; cf. also AN 5:165 at AN III 192,7, according to which Sāriputta would ask others questions in order to draw out their knowledge.

¹⁹⁹ In the Jain tradition, the conception of right view appears to have a comparable function and related implications, as according to Jaini 1979/1998: 145 the attainment of “*samyak-dṛṣṭi* ... heralds ... irreversible entry onto the path that leads to *mokṣa*”, which will take place (ibid. p. 146) “within no more than four lifetimes”. Ibid. pp. 148-149 explains that “upon the attainment of *samyak-darśana* ... the body, the possessions, even the ever-changing psychological states ... are no longer identified with the self ... awareness of objects no longer generates a tendency to grasp or manipulate them”. “Gross forms of anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed ... have been rendered inoperative ... he is invariably ... ‘at peace’ with himself ... he no longer perceives things as ‘attractive’ or ‘desirable’, but rather he penetrates to the fact that every aspect of life is transitory and mortal”, leading to a “strong disenchantment with worldly things”.

²⁰⁰ MĀ 29 at T I 461c3 differs slightly from the other versions, since it presents knowing the unwholesome together with its root as one way of having right view, and at T I 461c14 then indicates that knowing the wholesome together with its root is yet another way of having right view. The parallel versions have both together as a single way of having right view. In fact, to understand the unwholesome would entail also understanding what is wholesome, these being but two sides of the same coin, so that such understanding does not seem to entail two separate ways of having right view.

²⁰¹ MN 9 at MN I 47,5.

²⁰² MĀ 29 at T I 461c4, SĀ 344 at T II 94b15, and S 474 folio 16R3 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 51.

²⁰³ MN 9 at MN I 47,22, MN I 48,14, MN I 49,10+34, MN I 50,14+29, MN I 51,8+23, MN I 52,3+21, MN I 53,2+21, MN I 54,1+16+33, and MN I 55,18.

²⁰⁴ MN 9 at MN I 46,22 speaks of being “endowed with perfect confidence in the Dharma”, *dhamme avec-*

Table 1.10: Insight Leading to Right View in MN 9 and its Parallels

MN 9	MĀ 29	SĀ 344 & S 474 (Skt frgm.)
wholesome/unwholesome (1)	unwholesome (→ 1)	wholesome/unwholesome (→ 1)
nutriment (2)	wholesome (→ 1)	nutriment (→ 2)
4 noble truths (3)	nutriment (→ 2)	influxes (→ 16)
old age and death (4)	influxes (→ 16)	4 noble truths (→ 3)
birth (5)	4 noble truths (→ 3)	old age and death (→ 4)
becoming (6)	old age and death (→ 4)	birth (→ 5)
clinging (7)	birth (→ 5)	becoming (→ 6)
craving (8)	becoming (→ 6)	clinging (→ 7)
feeling (9)	clinging (→ 7)	craving (→ 8)
contact (10)	craving (→ 8)	feeling (→ 9)
6 senses (11)	feeling (→ 9)	contact (→ 10)
name-and-form (12)	contact (→ 10)	6 senses (→ 11)
consciousness (13)	6 senses (→ 11)	name-and-form (→ 12)
formations (14)	name-and-form (→ 12)	consciousness (→ 13)
ignorance (15)	consciousness (→ 13)	formations (→ 14)
influxes (16)	formations (→ 14)	(≠ 15)
	(≠ 15)	

The Pāli discourse follows this passage on full awakening by declaring that “to that extent” the noble disciple is endowed with right view and has perfect confidence in the teaching.²⁰⁵ Yet, such right view and perfect confidence are the hallmarks of stream-entry, at which stage the underlying tendencies mentioned are not yet abandoned, ignorance has not yet been fully overcome, and the making an end of *dukkha* has still to be accomplished. Hence the expression “to that extent” does not seem to tally with the content of the passage to which it refers. In view of this it appears as if this particular passage, which is not found in the Chinese and Sanskrit parallels, may be the result of an error in the transmission of the Pāli discourse.

After the treatment of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness as a way of having right view, the next alternative way of having right view in the Pāli, Chinese, and Sanskrit versions is insight into nutriment.²⁰⁶ All versions apply the scheme of the four noble truths

cappasādena samannāgato, and of having “arrived at the true Dharma”, *āgato imam saddhammam*, expressions clearly referring to stream-entry. Ps I 197,24 in fact records a discussion between the rehearsing monks on whether the attainment of full awakening was already intended by the introductory statement on the noble disciple being endowed with right view, a discussion which indicates that the commentators also had difficulties reconciling the present passage with the main theme of the discourse. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 5-6.

²⁰⁵ E.g., MN 9 at MN I 47,25: *ettāvatā ... ariyasāvako sammādītthi hoti* (S^e-MN I 86,20: *sammādītthī*), adopting the translation of *ettāvatā* given in CPD II: 657 s.v. *ettāvatā* for the present passage.

²⁰⁶ MN 9 at MN I 47,33, MĀ 29 at T I 461c24, SĀ 344 at T II 94b27, and S 474 folio 16R9 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 51. Norman 1991/1993c: 273 highlights the historical background to the Buddhist use of *āhāra*, explaining that “in brahminical thought we find the idea that food is required to sustain the existence of the in-

to nutriment and to the other items discussed later on, speaking in each case of knowing the particular item in question, its arising, its cessation, and the noble eightfold path leading to its cessation.²⁰⁷ In relation to the origin and the cessation of nutriment, all versions point to craving as the crucial factor.

The Pāli discourse turns to the four noble truths as its next item,²⁰⁸ while the Chinese and the Sanskrit versions first take up the three influxes, after which they also turn to the four noble truths (see above table 1.10).²⁰⁹ The three influxes occur in the Pāli version only at the end of the entire exposition.²¹⁰ Although there is thus some disagreement in regard to the placing of the three influxes within the sequence of the overall presentation, the treatment given to them in the four versions is fairly similar.

MN I 48

A minor difference in relation to the four noble truths is that while the Pāli discourse lists sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in its definition of *dukkha*,²¹¹ the Chinese and Sanskrit versions instead take up being separated from what is liked and associating with what is disliked.²¹²

Some Pāli editions of the present discourse agree with the Chinese and Sanskrit versions in mentioning to be separated from what is liked and to associate with what is disliked as instances of *dukkha*.²¹³ The same reference recurs in the different Pāli editions of the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*, the discourse which, according to the traditional account, constitutes the Buddha's first exposition of the four noble truths and of the nature of *dukkha*.²¹⁴

The *Madhyama-āgama* version differs from the other three versions in tracing the arising of *dukkha* to old age and death instead of tracing it to craving.²¹⁵ Another difference,

habitants of other worlds or in the next life. The gods need sacrifices as their food, the *pitrīs* need offerings to continue their existence, and good deeds are seen as a sort of nourishment for the next life".

²⁰⁷ Cf. also Nāṇamoli 1991a: 5.

²⁰⁸ MN 9 at MN I 48,24.

²⁰⁹ MĀ 29 at T I 462a26, SĀ 344 at T II 94c29, and S 474 folio 17V11 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 52.

²¹⁰ MN 9 at MN I 55,3.

²¹¹ MN 9 at MN I 48,32.

²¹² MĀ 29 at T I 462a28, SĀ 344 at T II 95a2, and S 474 folio 17V12 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 52.

²¹³ B^e-MN I 59,27 and S^e-MN I 88,22 include being separated from what is liked and having to associate with what is disliked in their definition of *dukkha*. The same is absent from E^e-MN I 48,33 and C^e-MN I 114,21. B^e and S^e do not include sickness in their list of manifestations of *dukkha*, whereas E^e-MN I 48,32 and C^e-MN I 114,20 agree with the Chinese and Sanskrit versions on including the same; cf. MĀ 29 at T I 462a27, SĀ 344 at T II 95a2, and S 474 folio 17V12 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 52; cf. also Dayal 1932/1970: 242, the remark in Trenckner 1888/1993: 531, and the note in C^e-MN I 114,34. Oldenberg 1915: 120 notes a counterpart to the reference to not getting what one wants in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* stanza 8:3:2, cf. Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 495: *yac cānyad icchan na labhate*, although the context shows that the implications of this passage are quite different.

²¹⁴ SN 56:11 at SN V 421,21 and Vin I 10,27; for parallel versions cf. Chung 2006.

²¹⁵ MĀ 29 at T I 462b1: 因老死便有苦. The standard exposition of dependent arising presents old age and death as manifestations of *dukkha*, not as causes for its arising, cf., e.g., SN 12.1 at SN II 1,20. A passage similar to MĀ 29 can be found in MĀ 55 at T I 490c21, a discourse without a Pāli parallel, which also

which recurs frequently between expositions of the arising of *dukkha* preserved in Pāli and Chinese texts, is that the *Samyukta-āgama* version does not specify craving to be of three types, namely craving for sensual pleasures, for being and for non-being.²¹⁶

MN I 49 The *Samyukta-āgama* version and the Sanskrit fragment have preserved the treatment of the links intervening between old age and formations only in an abbreviated form, so that this part of the *Sammāditthi-sutta* can only be compared with the *Madhyama-āgama* exposition.

MN I 51 A difference between these two versions is that while the *Majjhima-nikāya* version analyzes craving, feelings, and contact by way of the six sense-doors,²¹⁷ the *Madhyama-āgama* version takes up each of these in a three-fold manner. In relation to craving, the *Madhyama-āgama* account distinguishes between craving related to sensuality, form, and formlessness.²¹⁸ In relation to feelings and contact the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse differentiates between pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral types.²¹⁹

MN I 53 While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version defines name (*nāma*) by listing feeling, perception, volition, contact, and attention, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version name stands for the four immaterial aggregates.²²⁰ Although the implications of “name” (*nāma*) under-

presents old age and death as what leads to the arising of *dukkha*: ““what is reckoned to be the arising of *dukkha*?”, the answer is: ‘old age and death are its arising’”, 何謂苦習, 答曰, 老死為習.

²¹⁶ SĀ 344 at T II 95a5. Choong 2000: 166 notes that the three types of craving are not found in other discourses in the *Samyukta-āgama*, pointing out (note 78) that they do, however, occur in EĀ 49.5 at T II 797c8: 欲愛, 有愛, 無有愛. Ibid. also draws attention to another variation found in three parallels to the *Mahānidāna-sutta* (MĀ 97 at T I 579b22, T 14 at T I 243a19, and T 52 at T I 845a9), which present craving as twofold: craving for sensual pleasures and for existence, 欲愛, 有愛. Such a presentation is also found in SHT III 822R7-8 (p. 40): *dve ānanda tṛṣṇe, kāmatṛṣṇājā bhavatṛṣṇā ca* (which according to SHT VII p. 268 is a parallel to MĀ 97). Another parallel to the *Mahānidāna-sutta*, DĀ 13 at T I 60c13, has the three types of craving for sensual pleasures, existence, and non-existence; a presentation also found in other discourses in this collection, cf., e.g., DĀ 9 at T I 50a21, DĀ 10 at T I 53a25, and DĀ 11 at T I 57c15. The three types of craving are absent from the version of the Buddha’s first discourse in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 198,11 or in Senart 1897: 332,5.

²¹⁷ MN 9 at MN I 51,16+31 and MN I 52,12.

²¹⁸ MĀ 29 at T I 463a22. Both versions apply the same threefold distinction to becoming (*bhava*), cf. MN 9 at MN I 50,22 and MĀ 29 at T I 462c21.

²¹⁹ MĀ 29 at T I 463b7+23.

²²⁰ MN 9 at MN I 53,11: *vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro, idam ... nāmam* (the same definition recurs in SN 12:2 at SN II 3,33), whereas MĀ 29 at T I 463c25 reads 四非色陰為名. A definition of *nāma* in EĀ 46.8 at T II 778c24 and EĀ 49.5 at T II 797b28, however, agrees with MN 9, listing 痛, 想, 念, 更樂, 思惟 (adopting a 元 and 明 variant that adds 樂 to 更). Skilling 1993: 158 notes a discourse quotation in Vasubandhu’s *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* that also defines name with the help of the factors listed in MN 9: *tshor ba, 'du shes, sems pa, reg pa, yid la byed pa*. Ibid. draws attention to Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabdhāya* (Abhidh-k-t), which agrees in this respect with MĀ 29, as it defines “name” to stand for the four immaterial aggregates, cf. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 140a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 160b8: *ming gang zhe na? gzugs can ma yin pa'i phung po bzhi ste*. Dharmaskandha fragment 4737 folio 5v4 in Dietz 1984: 33,2 and its Chinese counterpart, T 1537 at T XXVI 507b23, also list the four immaterial aggregates in a definition of *nāma*.

went changes during later developments of Buddhist philosophy and came to connote the entire set of the four mental aggregates, in the Pāli discourses “name” does not explicitly include the aggregate of consciousness.²²¹

The *Sammāditthi-sutta* and its parallels continue their exposition similarly by relating the three types of formation to the arising and cessation of ignorance, the first link of dependent arising.²²² The Pāli version at this point traces the arising of ignorance to the arising of the influxes, followed by relating the arising of the influxes in turn to the arising of ignorance.²²³ As one of the influxes is the influx of ignorance, this reciprocal conditioning of the influxes and ignorance involves some degree of circularity, as in this way the influx of ignorance becomes responsible for ignorance and ignorance becomes responsible for the influx of ignorance. The implication of this presentation could be to

MN I 54

²²¹ This has been pointed out by, e.g., Harvey 1993: 32, Nānamoli 1994: 56, Nāṇavīra 1987/2001: 76, and Reat 1996: 45; cf. also Del Toso 2007a: 215. This early meaning of “*nāma*” is still reflected in Vibh 136,8: *vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho sañkhārakkhandho, idam vuccati nāmaṃ*. Even the *Visuddhimagga* does not include consciousness under “*nāma*” in the context of dependent arising, Vism 558,23: *nāman ti ... vedanādayo tayo kandhā* (cf. also the discussion in Vibh-a 169,9, which explains that only the three mental aggregates are mentioned in the context of dependent arising because mentioning consciousness as well would result in the proposition that consciousness conditions consciousness). Only in relation to insight into the nature of mind and matter does the *Visuddhimagga* employ “*nāma*” as a covering term for all four immaterial aggregates, cf. Vism 589,6. Nānamoli 1962: 28 note 84/1 draws attention to another coexistence of different usages of *nāma* found in the *Nettipakaraṇa*, where Nett 15,20 defines *nāma* to be *phassapañcamakā dhammā*, thereby corresponding to the definition given at MN 9, but then Nett 78,2 adds *citta* to these five, thus counting six factors, and Nett 41,16 identifies *nāma* with the four immaterial aggregates: *nāmakāyo cattāro arūpiṇo kandhā*. Windisch 1908: 40 notes that a passage in the *Mundaka Upaniṣad* 3.2.8 speaks of rivers losing their *nāma-rūpa* when flowing into the ocean, aptly illustrating the sense of *nāma* as “name”, cf. Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 691: *yathā nadyas syandamānās samudre astam gacchanti nāma-rūpe vihāya*. For a discussion of the pre-Buddhist use of the concept *nāma-rūpa* cf. also Hamilton 1996: 121-137, Jurewicz 2000: 89-91, Karunaratne 2003b: 125-126, Oldenberg 1881/1961: 377 (note 21), and Wayman 1982/1984; on *nāma* alone cf. Werner 1977/1998: 56-57. Regarding the sense conveyed by the definition of *nāma* in MN 9 at MN I 53,11, Nāṇananda 2003: 5 provides the illustrative example of a small child still unable to understand language who, on getting a rubber ball for the first time, will smell it, feel it, perhaps try to bite it, then roll it around and finally understand that it is a toy. He explains that “the child has recognised the rubber ball ... by those factors included under ‘name’ in *nāma-rūpa*, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention. This shows that the definition of *nāma* ... takes us back to the most fundamental notion of ‘name’, to something like its prototype”. Reat 1987: 16-17 sums up that *nāma-rūpa*, as the “objective counterpart of *viññāna*”, stands for “the conceptual and apparitional aspects of any individual object”. Regarding *rūpa*, de Silva 2004: 56 comments that “*rūpa* is a mental image associated with *kāya*, but at the same time distinct from it”, that is, “*rūpa* is the image, like one’s photograph, *kāya* is the actual physical body”.

²²² MN 9 at MN I 54,10, MĀ 29 at T I 464b1, SĀ 344 at T II 95a27, and S 474 folio 17R11 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 53.

²²³ MN 9 at MN I 54,27: *āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo*, followed at MN I 55,11 by: *avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo*. A similar reciprocal conditional relationship obtains between consciousness and name-and-form according to DN 15 at DN II 56,23 and its Chinese parallels DĀ 13 at T I 61b13, MĀ 97 at T I 579c22, T 14 at T I 243b24, and T 52 at T I 845b11.

highlight the tendency of ignorance to perpetuate itself,²²⁴ in the sense that the influx of ignorance represents the worldling's habitual tendency to ignore the true nature of reality, a habit kept alive by its own effects, ignorant thought and action.

According to the Pāli commentary, the reciprocal conditioning relationship between ignorance and the influxes represents the cyclic nature of samsāric existence, where no beginning point can be discerned at which ignorance came into being.²²⁵ The impossibility of finding such a beginning point is mentioned in several other discourses.²²⁶ One of these discourses indicates that ignorance is conditionally dependent on the hindrances, a proposition similar in kind to the *Sammādīṭṭhi-sutta*'s tracing of the arising of ignorance to the arising of the influxes.²²⁷

At an earlier point of their exposition, the Chinese and the Sanskrit versions also relate the arising of the influxes to the arising of ignorance.²²⁸ Neither at that point, nor in the present passage, however, do they specify a cause for the arising of ignorance.

²²⁴ Nāṇavīra 1987/2001: 36 explains that “*avijjā* ... can have no anterior term that does not itself involve *avij-*
ja”; on *avijjā* in general cf. also Matilal 1980.

²²⁵ Ps I 224,13.

²²⁶ SN 15:1 at SN II 178,8, SN 22:99 at SN III 149,25, and AN 10:61 at AN V 113,1. A similar statement recurs also in Sanskrit fragments of two *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses in Tripāṭhī 1995: 143,5 and 144,8: *pūrvā koṭir na prajñāyate duḥkhasya*, and in the *Divyāvadāna*, cf. Cowell 1886: 197,17 or Vaidya 1999: 122,19; for a Jain parallel cf. Bollée 1974: 27-28.

²²⁷ AN 10:61 at AN V 113,3: “a specific condition of ignorance can be made known ... what is the nutriment for ignorance? The five hindrances”, *paññāyat idappaccayā avijjā ... ko cāhāro avijjāya? pañca nīvara-*
ṇā. SN 35:79 at SN IV 50,1 even goes so far as to propose that by eradicating ignorance, ignorance will be eradicated, *avijjā ... eko dhammo yassa pahānā ... avijjā pahiyati* (S^e-SN IV 62,14: *pahiyatti*); cf. also the comment in Net 79: *avijjā avijjāya hetu*, as well as in the ‘Path to Liberation’ (*Vimuttimaggā*/解脫道論), T 1648 at T XXXII 450c2: “just ignorance [itself] is the condition for ignorance”, 唯無明為 無明緣, a proposal then explained at T XXXII 450c4 by quoting the Buddha’s statement that ignorance arises due to the arising of the influxes, 如佛所說, 從漏集起無明集, which Ehara 1961/1995: 261 note 3 relates to the present passage in MN 9 (on T 1648 cf., e.g., Anālayo 2009s, Bapat 1934, id. 1936, id. 1937b, id. 1937c, id. 1938/1939, id. 1972, Bechert 1989, Crosby 1999, Endo 1983, Hayashi 2003, id. 2004, id. 2005, Nagai 1919, Norman 1991: 43-44, and Skilling 1994c).

²²⁸ MA 29 at T I 462a12, SĀ 344 at T II 94c17, and S 474 folio 17V6 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 52 agree on qualifying insight into the influxes as being “in accordance with reality”, 如真, *yathābhūta*, a qualification absent from the corresponding exposition in MN 9 at MN I 55,4. This absence could be significant, as the present exposition is only concerned with the right view of stream-entry. Other Pāli discourses use the qualification *yathābhūta* when describing the deeper degree of insight into the influxes that leads to full awakening, cf. DN 2 at DN I 84,4, DN 10 at DN I 209,12, MN 4 at MN I 23,17, MN 19 at MN I 117,18, MN 27 at MN I 183,30, MN 36 at MN I 249,10, MN 39 at MN I 279,25, MN 51 at MN I 348,27, MN 65 at MN I 442,14, MN 76 at MN I 522,24, MN 79 at MN II 38,37, MN 94 at MN II 162,9, MN 100 at MN II 212,17, MN 101 at MN II 227,1, MN 112 at MN III 36,21, MN 125 at MN III 136,31, AN 3:58 at AN I 165,13, AN 4:198 at AN II 211,14, AN 5:75 at AN III 93,11, and AN 8:11 at AN IV 178,32. Although knowledge that is *yathābhūta* is certainly also relevant to the attainment of stream-entry (cf., e.g., the exposition of *dassana suvisuddha* in SN 35:204 at SN IV 192,1, which Spk III 55,8 explains to stand for stream-entry; or the description of *dīṭṭipārisuddhi* in AN 4:194 at AN II 195,28, a description which AN 4:196 at AN II 202,22 employs for the *sammādīṭṭhi* of an *ariyasāvaka*), it seems that when this qualifica-

The *Madhyama-āgama* version concludes its series of questions and answers with a final inquiry into what still needs to be done once ignorance has been eradicated, which meets with the reply that nothing more needs to be done at that point.²²⁹ The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse and the Sanskrit version come to a similar conclusion, reporting that once Mahākōṭṭhita was told that formations arise due to ignorance, he kept on asking if there could still be another way of having right view.²³⁰ Sāriputta replied that since at this point ignorance has vanished and knowledge has arisen, Mahākōṭṭhita was pushing his line of questioning too far.

MN 10 *Satipatthāna-sutta*

The *Satipatthāna-sutta*, the “discourse on the establishing of mindfulness”, offers instructions on *satipatthāna*.²³¹ This discourse has a Pāli parallel in the *Dīgha-nikāya* and two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.²³²

The two Pāli and the two Chinese versions begin by proclaiming that *satipatthāna* constitutes the way for the purification of beings and for overcoming grief and sorrow. The Pāli versions mention “attaining the [true] method” as another benefit of *satipatthāna* practice, while the *Madhyama-āgama* version speaks of “attaining the right principle” and the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse of “attaining great wisdom”.²³³ According to the ex-

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tion is employed in relation to insight into the influxes its implications are full awakening. From this viewpoint, then, the absence of the qualification “in accordance with reality” in the present passage in MN 9 would fit the context better than its Chinese and Sanskrit counterparts.

²²⁹ MĀ 29 at T I 464b11.

²³⁰ SĀ 344 at T II 95b5 and S 474 folio 18V4 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 54.

²³¹ The counterpart to the expression *satipatthāna* in MĀ 98 at T I 582b11 is 念處 (according to Hirakawa 1997: 1032, one of the meanings rendered by 處 is *upasthāna*), whereas EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a4 speaks of “settling of the mind”, 意止. Yet another rendering of *satipatthāna* can be found in *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, cf., e.g., SĀ 614 at T II 172a18, which employs 念住 and thus give a stronger nuance of being “established in mindfulness”. Regarding the character 念, as a standard translation of *smṛti* in Āgama discourses, Yao 2008: 224 observes that its components 今 and 心 suggest a literal meaning of “present mind”, thus capturing important nuances of *smṛti* in its early Buddhist usage.

²³² The Pāli parallel is DN 22 at DN II 290-315, while the Chinese parallels are MĀ 98 at T I 582b-584b and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a-569b. MĀ 98 agrees with MN 10 on the title (念處經). MĀ 98 has been translated by Kuan 2008: 146-154, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 87-95, 199, Nhat Hanh 1990: 151-167, and Saddhāloka 1983: 9-15. EĀ 12.1 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1989: 39-45, Nhat Hanh 1990: 168-177, and Pāśādīka 1998: 495-502. In addition to these, a comparative study of different versions of the four *smṛtyupasthānas* can be found in Schmithausen 1976; cf. also Sujāto 2005; for translations of the Pāli commentary on the *Satipatthāna-sutta* cf. Nāṇaponika 1951/1973 and Soma 1941/1981. MĀ 98 agrees with MN 10 on locating the discourse near the town Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country, while EĀ 12.1 takes place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. Hartmann 1992: 40 notes that in the Hoernle collection an as yet unpublished fragment paralleling MN 10 at MN I 58 can be found. SHT V 1104 (p. 99) has fragments of a commentary on *smṛtyupasthāna*. For discourse quotations in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below notes 258, 281, and 310.

²³³ DN 22 at DN II 290,10 and MN 10 at MN I 56,2: *ñāyassa adhigamāya*, MĀ 98 at T I 582b10: 得正法, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a3: 得大智慧.

planation given in the Pāli commentary, “method” in the present context represents the noble eightfold path.²³⁴ From this perspective, the different formulations of this particular benefit in the Pāli and Chinese versions could be similar in their implications.

The descriptions of the benefits of *satipatṭhāna* practice in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* version culminate in the realization of Nirvāṇa,²³⁵ while the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not explicitly mention this as a benefit of *satipatṭhāna* practice.²³⁶ As realization of Nirvāṇa features prominently in the concluding part of the same discourse, this again is a difference that does not seem to imply a real disagreement.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version additionally proclaims that all Tathāgatas of past, present, and future times have, do, and will reach awakening by overcoming the five hindrances, practising the four *satipatṭhānas*, and developing the seven factors of awakening.²³⁷ A similar statement can be found in several Pāli discourses.²³⁸ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version also refers to the need to overcome the five hindrances at this point, without, however, bringing in the Tathāgatas or the seven factors of awakening.²³⁹

It is striking that both Chinese versions highlight the need to remove the five hindrances right at the outset of their exposition, a need also mentioned in the Pāli commentary to the *Satipatṭhāna-sutta*.²⁴⁰ Judging from the remainder of the exposition found in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* and the *Madhyama-āgama* version, this need should not be taken in an absolute sense, as according to these versions a task of mindfulness during contemplations of dharmas is to be aware of the five hindrances. Since the instructions given in this respect explicitly speak of being aware of the arising and the presence of any of these hindrances, it would follow that *satipatṭhāna* can be undertaken when they are present, so that the reference to their removal does not seem to intend stipulating their absence as a necessary condition to be fulfilled before being able to embark on *sati-paṭṭhāna* meditation at all.²⁴¹

In fact, according to a discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya* the four *satipatṭhānas* should be developed for the purpose of removing the five hindrances, a statement which would be meaningless if their removal were required for being able to undertake *satipatṭhāna*.

²³⁴ Ps I 236,6: *ñāyo vuccati ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*.

²³⁵ DN 22 at DN II 290,10 and MN 10 at MN I 56,2: *nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya*, EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a3: 成泥洹證.

²³⁶ The realization of Nirvāṇa is also absent from listings of the benefits of *satipatṭhāna* in SĀ 535 at T II 139a20, SĀ 607 at T II 171a10, and SĀ 1189 at T II 322b1.

²³⁷ MĀ 98 at T I 582b11.

²³⁸ DN 16 at DN II 83,18, DN 28 at DN III 101,10, and SN 47:12 at SN V 160,27.

²³⁹ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a4.

²⁴⁰ Ps I 244,9.

²⁴¹ MN 10 at MN I 60,12 (cf. also DN 22 at DN II 300,10): *santam vā aijhattam kāmacchandam, athi me aijjhattam kāmacchando ti pajānāti*, and *yathā ca anuppannassa kāmacchandassa uppādo hoti, tañ ca pajānāti* (S^e-MN I 111,6: *kāmacchandam, kamachando, kāmacchandassa*), with its counterpart in MĀ 98 at T I 584a24: 內實有欲知有欲如真 and 若未生欲而生者知如真.

practice.²⁴² The removal of the five hindrances would, however, constitute a prerequisite for advanced stages of practice, and thereby for attaining the range of benefits described in the Pāli and Chinese versions.²⁴³ This would fit with the Chinese versions' reference to the need of removing the five hindrances in close proximity to their highlighting of the benefits of *satipatthāna* practice.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse continues by explaining why *satipatthāna* can be reckoned a “one going way” for the purification of beings and for overcoming grief and sorrow. According to its explanation, “one” represents mental one-pointedness and “way” stands for the noble eightfold path.²⁴⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version’s explanation thereby highlights that the range of benefits of *satipatthāna*, from purification to realization of Nirvāṇa, require *satipatthāna* practice to be undertaken as part of an integral practice of the entire noble eightfold path and in such a way that mental one-pointedness is developed.

Similar to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version’s reference to the “one going way” of *satipatthāna*, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse speaks of *satipatthāna* as the “one way”, and the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* use the expression “one going way”.²⁴⁵

The Pāli commentary explains the expression “one going way” in five ways, suggesting that it could stand for a single way (in the sense of being straight or direct); a way to be undertaken alone; a way leading to the one goal of Nirvāṇa; a way taught by the “One” (the Buddha); and a way found only in Buddhism.²⁴⁶ The same Pāli expression recurs in another discourse, which describes a man walking along a “one going way” that leads to a pit, on seeing which one would anticipate him sooner or later to fall into that pit.²⁴⁷ This usage suggests straightness of direction as a main implication of this expression, an implication that would correspond to the first of the five commentarial explanations. Hence

²⁴² AN 9:64 at AN IV 458,12.

²⁴³ On the need to remove the five hindrances prior to being able to attain realization cf., e.g., AN 5:51 at AN III 63,22. A counterpart to AN 5:51, EĀ² 19 at T II 879a1 (a discourse in an *Ekottarika-āgama* whose translation the Taishō edition attributes to Ān Shìgāo (安世高)), similarly presents the five hindrances as what obstructs true vision (with the difference that the fourth hindrance in its listing speaks of the five [types of] delight, 五樂, instead of restlessness-and-worry).

²⁴⁴ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a5.

²⁴⁵ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a2: 一入道 (Hirakawa 1997: 157 lists वृगम्, *gamana*, and *gāmin* for 入), MĀ 98 at T I 582b9: 一道, DN 22 at DN II 290,8 and MN 10 at MN I 55,31: *ekāyano maggo*. EĀ 12.1 is the first discourse in a chapter entitled “one going way”, 壹入道, a title that differs in letter but is equivalent in meaning to 一入道. By using the expression “one going way” as the chapter heading, the *Ekottarika-āgama* appears to give additional emphasis to this qualification of *satipatthāna* practice. SA 535 at T II 139a20, SA 607 at T II 171a10, and SA 1189 at T II 322b1 employ the expression 一乘道, apparently confounding *ekāyana* with *ekayāna*, cf. also Nattier 2007: 188. A quotation of this introductory proclamation on the four *satipatthānas* as the ‘one going way’ for the purification of beings can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 943a18: 如契經說, 有一趣道能令有情清淨, 謂四念住.

²⁴⁶ Ps I 229,17; cf. also Anālayo 2003a: 27-29; for a counterpart to this commentarial gloss in the *Udānālāñikara*, preserved in Tocharian, cf. fragment 29b1-4 in Sieg 1949: 49.

²⁴⁷ MN 12 at MN I 75,1.

a central import of this Pāli expression would be that *satipaṭṭhāna* constitutes a “direct” way to purification and the realization of Nirvāṇa.²⁴⁸

Instead of referring to the five hindrances or to the noble eightfold path already in their introduction, the Pāli versions have a passage that recurs elsewhere in the Pāli discourses as the definition of right mindfulness.²⁴⁹ This passage relates mindfulness to being diligent, clearly comprehending, and free from desires or dejection in regard to the world.²⁵⁰ While the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not have such a passage, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version similarly speaks of discarding evil thoughts and being free from worry and dejection.²⁵¹

The same *Ekottarika-āgama* version further expands the topic of overcoming worry and dejection by mentioning that the contemplating monk experiences joy and delight.²⁵² Throughout its subsequent exposition, the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse keeps coming back to this presence of joy and delight while undertaking *satipaṭṭhāna*, indicating that even practices such as contemplating the anatomical constitution of the body, or the stages of decay of a corpse, can result in joy and delight.²⁵³

The stipulation found in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* on the need to combine mindfulness with being diligent, with clear comprehension, and with removing desires and dejection in regard to the world recurs in a discourse in the *Dīrgha-āgama*, in Sanskrit fragments that treat of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, as well as in Sanskrit fragments of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.²⁵⁴ The same can be found, moreover, in the *Dharmaskandha*

²⁴⁸ An alternative perspective on the term is provided by Kuan 2001: 164, who suggests that the expression “ekāyana-magga could imply that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* constitute the path which is a converging point for various types of practices”, noting that “this interpretation of *ekāyana-magga* can also explain why the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* ... only contain[s] general guidelines with very limited concrete descriptions of how to practise. As a guideline, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are to be applied to various sets of practices, or cover these practices”. A related understanding of the term is suggested by Nattier 2007: 199, who identifies ‘point of confluence’ as the earliest meaning of the term in Vedic literature and, based on noting that expositions of an *ekāyana* path are usually followed by listing several different items (as in the present case ‘four’ *satipaṭṭhānas*), suggests that “the fundamental meaning of the term is the conjunction of originally separate elements”. Hence “the best translation of *ekāyano maggo* might be ‘unified’ or ‘integrated’ path”, standing for “a path consisting of a combination of practices”.

²⁴⁹ E.g., at SN 45:8 at SN V 9,26.

²⁵⁰ MN 10 at MN I 56,4: *ātāpi sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassam*, cf. also DN 22 at DN II 290,13.

²⁵¹ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a11: 除去惡念, 無有愁憂.

²⁵² EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a14: 娛樂.

²⁵³ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a23 speaks of the arising of joy and delight, 娛樂, in relation to contemplation of the anatomical parts, and at T II 568b10 in relation to contemplating a decaying corpse. Cf. also SN 47:10 at SN V 157,4, which also speaks of the presence of happiness when undertaking body contemplation: *kāye kāyānupassī viharāmi ātāpi sampajāno satimā sukham asmī ti pajānāti* (C^o-SN V.1 284,5: *sukhitasmī ti*).

²⁵⁴ DĀ 4 at T I 35c27: 精勤不懈, 專念不忘, 除世貪憂. SHT I 614 folio aV1-3 (p. 272, cf. also SHT IV p. 338): *ātāpi smṛtimāṇi samprajāṇa viniyābhidhyā l[o]k[e daur]manasyaṇi*, cf. also Pischel 1904: 1143 and Hosoda 1989a: 544, parts of which have also been preserved in SHT III 862R (p. 111) and in SHT V 1180 A1 (p. 174, identified in SHT VII p. 286); cf. also SHT IX 3039 (p. 333). *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* frag-

and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma*,²⁵⁵ in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*,²⁵⁶ as well as in such works as the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, and the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*.²⁵⁷

These passages combine this stipulation with the need to contemplate body, feelings, mind, and dharmas internally, externally, and internally-and-externally. The need to undertake contemplation internally, externally, and internally-and-externally is also taken into account in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* and in their parallels in the *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama*.²⁵⁸ According to the explanation offered in another Pāli discourse, to undertake internal and external contemplation refers to developing mindfulness not only towards oneself (internally), but also towards others (externally).²⁵⁹

ment S 360 folio 167R2-3 and folio 173V2-3 in Waldschmidt 1950: 15 and 18, combine the same stipulation with the instruction to contemplate internally, externally and internally-and-externally, as does DĀ 4, thereby closely agreeing with the Pāli instructions. The corresponding passage in the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* version that can be found in the Chinese translation of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1451 at T XXIV 387b24, also speaks of contemplating internally, externally and internally-and-externally in order to “subdue desire and aversion, as well as dejection and vexation”, 降伏貪瞋及諸憂惱.

²⁵⁵ The corresponding passage in the *Dharmakandha*, T 1537 at T XXVI 475c28, reads “endowed with right energy, right comprehension, and right mindfulness, discarding worldly desire and dejection”, 若真正勤正知正念, 除世貪憂. The *Śāriputrābhidharma*, T 1548 at T XXVIII 613a11, reads “with effort and energy, conjoined with clear comprehension and mindfulness, discarding worldly desire and dejection”, 勤精進, 應正智念, 除世間貪憂.

²⁵⁶ The *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 299,18 or ŠSG 2007: 188,8 and T 1579 at T XXX 441a16 gives in fact a detailed exposition to this topic, examining several possible interpretation of the distinction between internal, external, and internal-and-external practice.

²⁵⁷ The *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* in Samtani 1971: 28,10, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* in Rahder 1926: 38,18, Vaidya 1967: 24,17, or Kondō 1983: 68,12, the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in Dutt 1934/2000: 204,4; and the corresponding passage in the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in Ghosa 1914: 1427, cf. also Lamotte 1970a: 1121-1123.

²⁵⁸ DN 22 at DN II 292,1, MN 10 at MN I 56,27, MĀ 98 at T I 582b27, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a11. MĀ 98 differs from the other versions in so far as it does not speak of contemplating “internally-and-externally”, in addition to contemplating “internally” and contemplating “externally”. A discourse quotation with the instructions on internal and external contemplation can be found in Abhidh-k 6.15 in Pradhan 1967: 342,7, paralleling MN 10 at MN I 56,27; cf. also Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 12b4 or Q (5595) *thu* 45b8.

²⁵⁹ DN 18 at DN II 216,15 speaks of practising *satipatthāna* “externally in relation to the bodies of others ... the dharmas of others”, *bahiddhā parakāye ... bahiddhā paradhammesu*, something to be undertaken based on having at first contemplated internally and thereby developed proficiency in concentration. The parallel DĀ 4 at T I 36a1 indicates that “having contemplated the body internally, one arouses knowledge of the bodies of others” (followed by listing feelings, mental states, and dharmas in the same way), 內身觀已, 生他身智. This passage is preceded by distinguishing between internal and external contemplation, so that its implications would be similar to DN 18. Another instance reflecting this understanding occurs in a recently discovered manuscript in Chinese, possibly containing a text by Ān Shīgāo (安世高), which explicitly speaks of undertaking *satipatthāna* contemplation in regard to oneself, 觀自, and in regard to others, 觀他人, cf. Zucchetti 2003: 255-256 and 271 note 88. EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a11, however, relates the qualification “oneself” to internal and to external contemplation, reading: 內自觀 and 外自觀.

A difference in sequence between the (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* and their Chinese parallels is that the *Ekottarika-āgama* version turns to such internal, external, and internal-and-external contemplation already in its introductory part, thereby treating this stipulation as one of the essential qualities of *satipatthāna* practice, while in the other three versions the same stipulation forms part of a passage repeated at the end of the individual mindfulness exercises. Although this difference in sequence is of less consequence from a practical viewpoint, it is noteworthy that the *Vibhaṅga*, a work representing early Theravāda Abhidharma thought, also directly combines the need to be diligent, etc., with the need to practise internally, externally, and internally-and-externally.²⁶⁰ In this respect, the presentation in the *Vibhaṅga* is thus closer to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version than to the Pāli discourses.

The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* conclude each mindfulness exercise with an instruction to contemplate arising, passing away, and arising-and-passing away, followed by indicating that mindfulness should be established merely for the sake of knowledge and for furthering the continuity of mindfulness.²⁶¹ The same instruction closes by indicating that the meditating monk should dwell independent and without clinging to anything in the world.²⁶²

The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead describes how mindfulness is established in its respective object, followed by mentioning the presence of knowledge, vision, understanding, and realization.²⁶³ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse concludes each of its expositions of an entire *satipatthāna* by proclaiming that practice undertaken according to the instructions given, even for a very short period, can be reckoned as proper *satipatthāna*. This proclamation mentions not only monks, but also explicitly refers to nuns as practitioners of proper *satipatthāna*.²⁶⁴

The absence of an explicit reference to contemplation of impermanence in the *Madhyama-āgama* version is significant, since according to another Pāli discourse such awareness of arising and passing away marks the difference between a mere establishment of mindfulness and the full development (*bhāvanā*) of *satipatthāna*.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁰ Vibh 193,2. For a discussion of the early parts of the *Vibhaṅga* in the light of the *Dharmaskandha* cf. Frauwallner 1964: 75-79 and id. 1971a: 107-112. Law 1930a: 189 sums up: “the Vibhaṅga ... is the first and the earliest of the Abhidhamma books”.

²⁶¹ I take the prefix *pāti-* in *pātissatimattāya* in MN 10 at MN I 56,33 in its temporal nuance of “again”, in the sense of pointing to the absence of lapses in mindfulness and therewith to its continuity.

²⁶² DN 22 at DN II 292,8 and MN 10 at MN I 56,33.

²⁶³ MĀ 98 at T I 582b23: 立念在身, 有知有見有明有達.

²⁶⁴ MĀ 98 at T I 583c22: 若比丘, 比丘尼, 如是少少觀身如身者, 是謂觀身如身念處, the same recurs for feelings, mind, and dharmas at T I 584a4, T I 584a13, and T I 584b14.

²⁶⁵ SN 47:40 at SN V 183,15. Schmithausen 1976: 256 note 33 draws attention to different forms of the locative used in this part of the *satipatthāna* instruction. Thus, e.g., MN 10 at MN I 56,30+31+32 (taking mindfulness of breathing as an example) employs *kāyasmiñ* (in the expression *samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiñ viharati*) instead of *kāye* used for the same exercise in MN 10 at MN I 56,11+28+29+35 (in the expression *kāye kāyānupassī*). Ibid. takes this to be an indication that contemplation of arising and pass-

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version, however, does cover the topic of impermanence by speaking of the body as being impermanent and subject to breaking up, and by instructing to contemplate arising, passing away, and arising-and-passing away in regard to each of the other three *satipatṭhānas*.²⁶⁶

Similar to the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas*, the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse also speaks of attaining knowledge and dwelling independently. Unlike the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas*, however, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version indicates that by dwelling independently the meditator experiences joy and delight, does not allow worldly perceptions to arise, is free from vacillation, and finally realizes Nirvāṇa.²⁶⁷ This presentation in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version parallels several other Pāli passages that relate the absence of clinging to anything – mentioned in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* together with dwelling independently – to the breakthrough to full awakening.²⁶⁸ In this way, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version makes explicit what seems to be implicit in the (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas*, namely that the expression “to dwell independently and be free from clinging to anything” points to a level of insight that borders on the decisive breakthrough to awakening.

The two Pāli versions expound the first *satipatṭhāna* – contemplation of the body – by describing the practice of:

- mindfulness of breathing,
- mindfulness of postures,
- mindfulness of bodily activities,
- reviewing the anatomical constitution of the body,
- reviewing the four elements as constituents of the body,
- viewing a dead body in nine stages of decay.

MN I 56

The two Chinese versions differ considerably from this pattern and from each other, since the *Madhyama-āgama* version has several additional exercises, while the *Ekottari-*

ing away did not form part of the original instruction. An alternative explanation could be that *kāyasmīm* is used as a more emphatic locative form when the term stands on its own, whereas *kāye* is used enclitically when the locative form directly precedes *kāyānupassī*.

²⁶⁶ EA 12.1 at T II 568b25 instructs to contemplate the impermanent nature of the body and at T II 568c13, T II 569a11, and T II 569b4 directs mindfulness to the impermanent nature of feelings, states of mind, and dharmas, in each instance speaking of 習法, 盡法, and 習盡法 (corresponding to *samudayadhamma*, *vaya-dhamma*, and *samudayavaya-dhamma*). The need to contemplate arising, passing away, and arising-and-passing away is also mentioned in the *satipatṭhāna* instructions in the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, T 1548 at T XXVIII 614b15.

²⁶⁷ EA 12.1 at T II 568c15 (in regard to contemplation of feelings): 無所依倚而自娛樂, 不起世間想, 於其中亦不驚怖, 以不驚怖, 便得泥洹. A similar instruction recurs for mind and dharmas in EA 12.1 at T II 569a13 and T II 569b7.

²⁶⁸ The expression *na (ca) kiñci loke upādiyati* occurs in such contexts in DN 15 at DN II 68,8, MN 37 at MN I 251,30, MN 140 at MN III 244,23, SN 12:51 at SN II 82,17, SN 35:30 at SN IV 23,7, SN 35:31 at SN IV 24,16, SN 35:90 at SN IV 65,34, SN 35:91 at SN IV 67,5, SN 35:193 at SN IV 168,6, and AN 7:58 at AN IV 88,21.

ka-āgama presents a comparatively short account of body contemplation, covering only four exercises (see table 1.11).

Table 1.11: Contemplation of the Body in MN 10 and its Parallels

MN 10	MĀ 98	EĀ 12.1
breathing (1)	postures (→ 2)	anatomical parts (→ 4)
postures (2)	activities (→ 3)	4 elements (→ 5)
activities (3)	counter unwholesome mental state	bodily orifices
anatomical parts (4)	forceful mind control	decaying corpse (→ 6)
4 elements (5)	breathing (→ 1)	
decaying corpse (6)	bodily experience of 4 <i>jhānas</i>	
	perception of light	
	grasp sign of contemplation	
	anatomical parts (→ 4)	
	6 elements (→ 5)	
	decaying corpse (→ 6)	(≠ 1-3)

Common ground between the Pāli and Chinese versions are the anatomical constitution of the body, the elements, and a corpse in different stages of decay as objects of contemplation of the body.²⁶⁹ Mindfulness of breathing, of the postures, and of activities are not found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* account. These exercises can be found in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, however, and also in the *Sāriputrabhīdharma*.²⁷⁰

Although the *Ekottarika-āgama* exposition of this first *satipatṭhāna* is rather brief, other works of the Theravāda tradition present mindfulness of the body in an even briefer fashion. The *Patisambhidhāmagga* has only the two exercises of contemplating the body's anatomy and the four elements, and the *Vibhaṅga*'s exposition of this *satipatṭhāna* mentions only a single exercise, which is contemplation of the body's anatomical parts.²⁷¹

Similar to the exposition found in the *Patisambhidhāmagga*, the *Dharmaskandha* lists only the anatomical parts and the elements for contemplation of the body.²⁷²

²⁶⁹ DN 22 at DN II 293,10, DN II 294,14, and DN II 295,6, MN 10 at MN I 57,13+35 and MN I 58,9, MĀ 98 at T I 583b5+17+24, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a18+24 and T II 568b4. Based on a comparative study of different versions of the first *satipatṭhāna*, Schmithausen 1976: 250 suggests that awareness of the body's postures may have been the most original version of mindfulness of the body, since, unlike some of the other body contemplations listed, its nature corresponds best to the type of mindful observation found in the other *satipatṭhānas*. Bronkhorst 1985: 311, based on the *Vibhaṅga*'s presentation, takes contemplation of the anatomical parts to be instead the most ancient form of this *satipatṭhāna*.

²⁷⁰ T 1548 at T XXVIII 613b3; cf. also the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in Dutt 1934/2000: 204,7.

²⁷¹ Patis II 232,9 and Vibh 193,17. Notably, this presentation forms part of the *Vibhaṅga*'s *suttantabhājanīya*, its "analysis according to the method of the discourses".

²⁷² T 1537 at T XXVI 476a8+29, a difference being that the *Dharmaskandha* speaks of six elements, instead of the four elements found in the *Patisambhidhāmagga* and in the two *Satipatṭhāna-suttas*, a presentation in accordance with MĀ 98 at T I 583b21, which also has six elements in its respective body contempla-

The first exercise taken up in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* is mindfulness of breathing, a form of practice found also in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, where, however, it does not stand at the beginning of the list of exercises, but rather comes after awareness of postures and bodily activities. The *Śāriputrābhidharma* agrees in this respect with the *Madhyama-āgama* version, as it also places mindfulness of postures and activities before mindfulness of breathing.²⁷³

The instructions for mindfulness of breathing given in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse correspond closely to the Pāli instructions, which speak at first of simply knowing in- and out-breath, and then instruct to know if in- and out-breath are long or short, followed by training in experiencing the whole body and in calming the bodily formations.²⁷⁴

A difference in relation to this exercise is that the *Madhyama-āgama* version does not have the simile of the turner, found in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas*. Another difference is that the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse also does not describe that the practitioner of mindfulness of breathing retires to a secluded spot, where he sits down cross-legged and establishes mindfulness in front.²⁷⁵

Regarding the exercise described next in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas*, mindfulness of the four postures, the *Madhyama-āgama* instructions additionally direct mindfulness to the activities of going to sleep and waking up.²⁷⁶

tion. The same can also be found in Sanskrit fragments of a text of uncertain authorship containing meditation instructions, the “Yogalehrbuch”, folio 128R6 in Schlingloff 1964: 86.

²⁷³ T 1548 at T XXVIII 613b3; the same is also the case for the *Pañcavīñśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in Dutt 1934/2000: 204,8; for a discussion of this sequential difference cf. Anālayo 2003a: 117-120.

²⁷⁴ In regard to the last of these steps, MĀ 98 at T I 582c17 agrees with DN 22 and MN 10 in instructing to calm the “bodily formations” when breathing in, 止身行息入, but in regard to breathing out it speaks of calming the “verbal formations”, 止口行息出, a pattern that can be found also in MĀ 81 at T I 555b14. This would be an error that occurred during textual transmission, as the pattern of the instructions in all other cases simply applies to the out-breath what has been done during the in-breath. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 89 comments that the Pāli version’s reference to bodily activities “offers [the] more correct reading”. Other expositions of these four steps of mindfulness of breathing, found in SĀ 803 at T II 206b1 or in SĀ 810 at T II 208a27, speak of calming the bodily formations on both occasions, when breathing in and when breathing out. Although the reference to verbal formations could be understood in line with the definition given in SĀ 568 at T II 150a24 as representing initial and sustained mental application, 有覺, 有觀, 名為口行, a reference to these two would not fit the present context too well.

²⁷⁵ MN 10 at MN I 56,12: *araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā nisīdati, pallaikam ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyam pañidhāya parimukham satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā*, cf. also DN 22 at DN II 291,3.

²⁷⁶ MĀ 98 at T I 582b21: 眼則知眠, 瘥則知寤, 眼寤則知眠寤. MN 10 at MN I 57,1 speaks of directing mindfulness to the body “in whatever way the body may be disposed”, *yathā yathā vā pan’ assa kāyo pañihito hoti*, cf. also DN 22 at DN II 292,14, an expression that enjoins continuity of awareness in any posture and thus would implicitly also cover the two additional activities mentioned in MĀ 98. Falling asleep and waking up recur in DN 22, MN 10, and MĀ 98 in relation to clear comprehension of activities, where, however, the task appears to be slightly different, since the additional presence of *sampajāna*/正知 requires not only being mindful, but also undertaking these activities in a proper and befitting way. A to some degree related form of practice among the Jains, quoted in Jaini 1979/1998: 66 note 56 as stemming from *Dasaveyāliya* 4,7, requires to be aware in any of the four postures and while eating or speaking, *ja-*

In the case of the subsequent exercise, concerned with bodily activities carried out with clear comprehension, the *Madhyama-āgama* version has fewer activities than the two (*Mahā-)**Satipatthāna-suttas*, since it does not mention such activities as looking ahead and looking away, eating and drinking, or defecating and urinating.²⁷⁷ The (*Mahā-)**Satipatthāna-suttas* and the *Madhyama-āgama* version agree on mentioning the bodily activities of wearing the robes and carrying the alms bowl, in regard to which the *Madhyama-āgama* instructions additionally indicate that this should be undertaken “skilfully” and “with orderly manner and appearance”.²⁷⁸ This additional qualification fits the commentarial explanation of clear comprehension of bodily activities, an explanation which highlights the need to be aware of purpose and suitability in regard to wearing one’s robes and carrying one’s alms bowl.²⁷⁹ In a similar vein, other Pāli discourses indicate that a monk or a nun should wear their robes and carry their alms bowl in an agreeable way.²⁸⁰

MN I 57 Having described mindfulness of breathing, postures, and bodily activities, the two (*Mahā-)**Satipatthāna-suttas* continue with mindfulness of the anatomical parts, of the four elements, and of a dead body in various stages of decay. These three exercises are found in both of their Chinese parallels.

The Pāli and Chinese versions present contemplation of the anatomical parts in similar ways,²⁸¹ qualifying this exercise as a contemplation of impurity (*asuci*).²⁸² The *Ekottari-*

yam care, jayam citthe, jayamāse, jayam sae, jayam bhūmajamto bhāsamto, a form of practice whose purpose is to avoid evil activities.

²⁷⁷ MĀ 98 at T I 582b25. The same activities appear to be also absent from a description of clear comprehension in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, as fragment S 360 folio 167V6 in Waldschmidt 1950: 15 continues after *sāṃghātīcīvaraṇapātradhāraṇe* straightaway with *gate sthite niṣāṇye śayite* (in contrast, MN 10 at MN I 57,7 follows *saṅghātipattacīvaraṇadhāraṇe* with *asite pīte khāyite sāyite* and *uccārapassāvakamme* before turning to *gate thite nisinne sutte*). The Chinese *Dirgha-āgama* version of the same discourse, DĀ 2 at T I 14a3, does speak of clear comprehension in regard to looking in different directions as well as in regard to eating and drinking (cf. the translation in Yit 2008: 273 note 17), as does the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 11,12 or ŠSG 1998: 20,5 and in T 1579 at T XXX 397b17 (for a detailed exposition of clear comprehension cf. the same work in Shukla 1973: 111,11 or ŠSG 1998: 172,1 and in T 1579 at T XXX 413c29). The set of activities described in DN 22 at DN II 292,25 and MN 10 at MN I 57,5 appears to be a standard pericope for proper conduct in the Pāli discourses. The importance of such proper conduct is reflected in MN 67 at MN I 460,9 and AN 4:122 at AN II 123,29, according to which a monk’s unwillingness to submit to instructions on how to undertake these activities can eventually lead him to disrobing. A description of proper conduct in the Jain tradition, cited in Deo 1956: 487, also covers defecating and urinating.

²⁷⁸ MĀ 98 at T I 582b25.

²⁷⁹ Ps I 253,15: *sātthakasampajañña* and *sappāyasampajañña*.

²⁸⁰ AN 4:103 at AN II 104,10 and AN 10:98 at AN V 201,15, which speak of doing these in a manner that is “pleasing” or “agreeable”, *pāsādika*.

²⁸¹ Unlike DN 22 at DN II 293,14 and MN 10 at MN I 57,17, MĀ 98 at T I 583b8 and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a20 explicitly mention the brain, 腦, in their lists of anatomical parts. Vism 240,24 explains that the brain is not explicitly mentioned in the (*Mahā-)**Satipatthāna-suttas* since it is implicitly covered by “bone marrow”, *atthimīnijā*. The brain occurs in a somewhat similar list of bodily parts in Sn 1:11 at Sn 199, cf. also

ka-āgama version additionally highlights the impossibility of having desire in regard to this body, doubtlessly as a result of undertaking this exercise.²⁸³

The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* and the *Madhyama-āgama* version illustrate this mindfulness practice with the example of looking at a bag full of grains.²⁸⁴ Such a “double-mouthed bag” full of grains appears to have been a tool for sowing, with an upper opening for receiving the seeds and a lower opening as an outlet for the grains when sowing.²⁸⁵

This simile could have suggested itself by analogy with the human body, which similarly has an “upper opening” for receiving food and a “lower opening” as the outlet for faeces. On this interpretation, the simile of the “double-mouthed bag” would also hint at the dependence of the body on a regular supply of nourishment, which soon enough will turn into faeces and urine in need of being discarded again.

The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* version take up contemplation of the body in terms of the four elements of earth, water, fire and wind in similar ways.²⁸⁶ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse adds the elements space and consciousness to these four, thereby covering six elements.²⁸⁷ To consider the set of six elements as an object of body contemplation is to some extent unexpected, since in this way body contemplation also covers the element of consciousness, an element that does not

Khp 2,9, in a Gāndhārī discourse fragment in Glass 2007: 135, Senior Kharosthī fragment 5 line 4, cf. also the Śrāvakabhūmi, Shukla 1973: 203,10 or ŠSG 2007: 60,5 and T 1579 at T XXX 428c27, the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, Hu-von Hinüber 1994: 260,16, and the Śikṣāsamuccaya in Bendall 1902/1970: 209,10. Hayashima 1958: 370 notes that Sanskrit sources usually enumerated thirty-six parts of the body. Hamilton 1996: 10 concludes that “the fact that the list is manifestly not comprehensive suggests that such descriptions are not intended to be understood as definite lists of what the body is made of; rather they indicate examples”. For various listings of anatomical parts cf. also Dhammadhoti 2009: 250-252. A discourse quotation of the listing of anatomical parts (not necessarily specific to the present instance) can be found in Abhidh-k 7:27 in Pradhan 1967: 411,5, paralleling MN 10 at MN I 57,15, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 140a14 and T 1559 at T XXIX 291a9, cf. also Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 58a4 or Q (5595) *thu* 100b1. In the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* in Samtani 1971: 41,7, the listing of anatomical parts is part of the definition of right mindfulness, used as an antidote to lust.

²⁸² Greene 2006: 34 notes that this qualification is specific to the *satipatthāna* context, not being employed when the same bodily parts are listed in other discourses for contemplation of the four elements, cf., e.g., MN 28 at MN I 185,16 and its parallel MĀ 30 at T I 464c7. On the tendency to view the body as impure among ancient Indian ascetic traditions in general cf. Olivelle 2002: 190. Shulman 2010: 402 comments that “even if we grant that the body is unclean, we must ask if the consideration of the body as unclean or impure is rightfully described as an instance of ‘mindfulness’”.

²⁸³ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a19: 無有可貪.

²⁸⁴ DN 22 at DN II 293,18, MN 10 at MN I 57,21, and MĀ 98 at T I 583b9; a simile also found in the Śikṣāsamuccaya in Bendall 1902/1970: 210,8; cf. also the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* in Samtani 1971: 24,4. The absence of this simile in EĀ 12.1 has a parallel in AN 6:29 at AN III 323,20, where the same exercise also occurs without simile.

²⁸⁵ Schlingloff 1964: 33 note 10.

²⁸⁶ DN 22 at DN II 294,14, MN 10 at MN I 57,35, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a24.

²⁸⁷ MĀ 98 at T I 583b18.

fit too well under the heading of “body”. The same six elements can be found in other Pāli discourses, although not in the context of body contemplation.²⁸⁸

The Pāli versions and their Chinese parallels illustrate mindfulness of the elements with the image of a butcher who has cut up a cow.²⁸⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version provides further information on this simile, as it describes how the butcher distinguishes between the different parts of the slaughtered cow in terms of “leg”, “heart”, “head”, etc.²⁹⁰ This presentation is to some degree similar to a gloss found in the Pāli commentary, which explains that this simile illustrates how the practice of this mindfulness exercise can lead to a change of perception. According to the Pāli commentary, once the cow has been cut up, the butcher will no longer think in terms of “cow”, but only in terms of “meat”.²⁹¹ Similarly, sustained practice of this particular mindfulness exercise will cause practitioners to think of their body no longer as “I” or “mine”, but perceive it merely as a manifestation of the four elements.

MN I 58 The last exercise for contemplation of the body in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* takes up a dead body in various stages of decay. In ancient India, dead bodies were apparently at times left out in the open in charnel grounds, where they either decayed or were devoured by wild animals.²⁹² Monks or nuns would go to such charnel grounds in order to develop this particular meditation practice.²⁹³ According to the *Sanīghabheda*-

²⁸⁸ DN 33 at DN III 247,18, MN 112 at MN III 31,16, MN 115 at MN III 62,22, MN 140 at MN III 239,19, SN 18,9 at SN II 248,26, SN 25,9 at SN III 227,23, and AN 3:61 at AN I 176,1.

²⁸⁹ DN 22 at DN II 294,17, MN 10 at MN I 57,20, MĀ 98 at T I 583b19, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a26; a simile found also in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 210,4. MĀ 98 at T I 583b20 differs from the other versions in as much as here the butcher separates the meat into six parts, in accordance with the instruction in MĀ 98 to contemplate six elements instead of the four elements mentioned in the other versions. The six element mode of this simile occurs also in fragment 160V2 of the so-called Yogalehrbuch in Schlingloff 1964: 165, where it is employed for an actual visualization practice, on the practice of which cf. also Bretfeld 2003, Kloppenborg 1987: 85, Ruegg 1967: 162, Yamabe 1999a: 37-40, id. 2002: 130, and id. 2006: 327. The *Bodhisattvapitaka* provides yet another perspective on this exercise, as it enjoins to use one’s body for the benefit of others just as the four elements are of benefit for sentient beings, T 310 at T XI 307b29, for a translation of the Tibetan version cf. Pagel 1995: 382. Horner 1945: 451 comments that this simile indicates “the cattle-butcher to have been a well known part of the existing social fabric, ministering to ... those who had no objection to eating beef”.

²⁹⁰ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a27.

²⁹¹ Ps I 272,1.

²⁹² Rhys Davids 1903/1997: 80. Xuánzàng (玄奘) in his travel records notes that corpses were left out in the open for wild beasts to be devoured, which he presents as one of three different method found in seventh century India for disposing of the dead, cf. T 2087 at T LI 877c27, translated in Beal 1884/2001a: 86 (regarding Xuánzàng’s travel records in general cf. also Deeg 2007, who warns against taking a too uncritical attitude in regard to the reliability of the information provided in this work). A *Vīradattapariprcchā* quotation in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 232,2 takes up the stage of the body eaten by animals in particular, instructing that one should regard one’s own body as being but food for animals.

²⁹³ Cf., e.g., Th 315-316 or Th 393-395. Cousins 2003: 4 comments that it seems as if “cemetery meditation on the stages of decomposition of a corpse is not recorded as a Jain practice and may well have been typically or even uniquely Buddhist at this time”. The formulation *seyyathāpi passeyya* in MN 10 at MN I

vastu of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, before his awakening the Buddha himself had been strongly affected on seeing the dead and decaying corpses in such a charnel ground.²⁹⁴

The *Madhyama-āgama* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* descriptions of this exercise are fairly similar to the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas*, proceeding in several stages from a recently dead and bloated body, via the body being eaten by various animals, to scattered bones here and there, finally reduced to dust.²⁹⁵

In its treatment of the different stages of a decaying body to be contemplated, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse also instructs to contemplate when a corpse is being cremated.²⁹⁶ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version concludes this exercise by describing how the meditating monk acquires insight into the body's impermanent and ultimately void nature, which well sums up the gist of this exercise.²⁹⁷

In addition to the exercises discussed so far, the Chinese versions describe several other body contemplations. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instructs to contemplate the different apertures of the body and the impure liquids that flow from them, a contemplation found also in other Pāli discourses.²⁹⁸

This exercise is one of only four body contemplations in this version, the other three being mindfulness of the anatomical parts, of the four elements, and of the decay of a dead body. Hence the *Ekottarika-āgama* version's rather succinct account of this *satipatthāna* places a particular emphasis on directing mindfulness to the unattractive nature of the body, revealed in its anatomical parts, in the liquids it discharges, and in its decomposition at death.

58,9, cf. also DN 22 at DN II 295,6, suggests that the actual practice of this meditation involves a form of recollection or even visualization; cf. also Gethin 2006: 97 and above note 289. Nāṇamoli 1991b: 760 note 27 comments that the different stages of decay of a corpse “are not necessarily intended as contemplations of actual corpses”, but “as mental images to be created”. The formulation in MĀ 98 at T I 583b24: 比丘者觀彼死屍, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b4: 比丘觀死屍, however, reads as if the meditator is actually contemplating a corpse. According to McMahan 1998: 253, although in early Buddhism in general “vocabulary was rife with visual metaphor, vision in a literal sense and visual imagery were not emphasized”.

²⁹⁴ Gnoli 1977: 77,22, with its Tibetan counterpart in D (1) 'dul ba, nga 7a4 or Q (1030) ce 6b1.

²⁹⁵ DN 22 at DN II 295,6, MN 10 at MN I 58,9, MĀ 98 at T I 583c1, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b4; cf. also the Śrāvakabhūmi, Shukla 1973: 205,21 or ŠSG 2007: 64,20 and T 1579 at T XXX 429b7, and the Śikṣāsamuccaya in Bendall 1902/1970: 210,15. T 602 at T XV 171c4, a treatise on mindfulness of breathing, takes up various aspects of the cemetery contemplation as an antidote to lust. T 602 instructs that if one feels attracted by the red lips or dark eyebrows of another person, one should recollect that the blood of a dead person is just as red and a decomposing corpse will become just as dark, and in case one feels attracted by the roundness of another's bodily form, one should contemplate the roundness of a bloated corpse; cf. also Zucchetti 2004: 896, and on the nature of this work id. 2010b.

²⁹⁶ MĀ 98 at T I 583b25; cf. also the Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548 at T XXVIII 614b7: 見死屍在火聚上; on funeral practices in ancient India cf., e.g., Caland 1896/1967 and de Marco 1987: 219-224.

²⁹⁷ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b25+27: “this body is impermanent, subject to dissolution”, 此身無常, 為分散法, and “he understands that there is nothing [that one could] own”, 解無所有.

²⁹⁸ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b1, with Pāli equivalents in AN 9:15 at AN IV 386 and Sn 1:11 at Sn 197, and a Chinese equivalent in EĀ² 29 a T II 880a30.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version has a number of additional body contemplations. Among these one finds that it also lists the physical experience of bliss, etc. due to attaining the *jhānas*.²⁹⁹ That the effect of the four *jhānas* on the body may indeed be counted as a contemplation of the body finds support in the *Kāyagatāsati-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, which similarly direct mindfulness to the effect these deep concentration experiences have on the body.³⁰⁰

Two other additional contemplations found in the *Madhyama-āgama* under the heading of mindfulness of the body are countering an unwholesome state of mind with wholesomeness and forcefully controlling the mind.³⁰¹ Similar exercises are found in a description of how to deal with unwholesome thoughts given in the *Vitakkasanṭhāna-sutta* and in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, where they fit the context better.³⁰²

Other ‘body’ contemplations in the *Madhyama-āgama* version are skill in the “perception of light” by day and night and to “properly grasp and attend to the sign of [reviewing] contemplation”.³⁰³ The idea of “contemplation” would not seem to be too far from *sati-paṭṭhāna* practice in general, and “perception of light” (*ālokasaññā*) occurs in the standard description of overcoming the hindrance of sloth-and-torpor, where such perception takes place together with mindfulness and clear comprehension.³⁰⁴ Yet, although some of these practices do bear a relation to mindfulness, their occurrence in a context concerned with contemplation of the body is puzzling. Mindfulness of the body constitutes an important foundation for the development of deeper degrees of concentration and thereby also counters unwholesome states of mind. Nevertheless, exercises concerned with the same aim do not seem to qualify for being body contemplations if they do not take the body as their object.

MN I 59 The second *satipatṭhāna* in the Pāli and Chinese versions directs mindfulness to feelings.³⁰⁵ The four versions agree that such mindfulness covers pleasant, painful, and neutral feelings, three types of feeling that should further be distinguished into worldly and unworldly occurrences.³⁰⁶ The *Madhyama-āgama* version, moreover, differentiates these

²⁹⁹ MĀ 98 at T I 582c20.

³⁰⁰ MN 119 at MN III 92,24 and MĀ 81 at T I 555b18.

³⁰¹ MĀ 98 at T I 582c1+7.

³⁰² MN 20 at MN I 119,5 and MN I 120,35, MĀ 101 at T I 588a10 and T I 588c17.

³⁰³ MĀ 98 at T I 583a22: 光明想, corresponding according to Saddhāloka 1983: 16 note 7 to *ālokasaññā*, and MĀ 98 at T I 583a29: 善受觀相, 善憶所念, probably a counterpart to *paccavekkhanānimittam sugahitam hoti sumanasikataṃ*, found, e.g., in AN 5:28 at AN III 27,13.

³⁰⁴ E.g., MN 27 at MN I 181,19: *ālokasaññī sato sampajāno*; cf. Kuan 2001: 177; on the *ālokasamjñā* in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* cf. also Abe 2004. Yet, in such descriptions *ālokasaññā* is not undertaken by day and night as in MĀ 98, except for an occurrence as an antidote to torpor only in AN 7:58 at AN IV 86,21. The *ālokasaññā* occurs also in DN 33 at DN III 223,4 and in AN 4:41 at AN II 45,9 as a *saṃādhi bhāvanā*, a form of “concentration development”, and in AN 6:29 at AN III 323,14 as an *anussati*, a “recollection”.

³⁰⁵ A quotation of the instruction on how to contemplate pleasant feeling can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 948b11.

³⁰⁶ The distinction between worldly and unworldly in DN 22 at DN II 298,15 and MN 10 at MN I 59,16 is

three into bodily and mental types, and into those related to sensuality and not related to sensuality.³⁰⁷ While to distinguish feelings into bodily and mental types introduces an additional perspective on mindfulness of feelings, to speak of feelings related to sensuality or not related to sensuality would be similar in meaning to worldly feelings and unworldly feelings, a category already found in all versions (see table 1.12).

Table 1.12: Contemplation of Feelings in MN 10 and its Parallels

MN 10	MĀ 98	EĀ 12.1
pleasant, painful, neutral (1) worldly, unworldly (2)	pleasant, painful, neutral (→ 1) bodily, mental worldly, unworldly (→ 2) sensual, non-sensual	pleasant, painful, neutral (→ 1) worldly, unworldly (→ 2)

The *Ekottarika-āgama* instruction lists the same types of feeling as found in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas*, differing in so far as it additionally directs mindfulness to the mutually exclusive nature of the three types of feeling, explaining that at the time of experiencing one of these feelings one will not experience the other two.³⁰⁸ A similar indication, although not as an instruction for mindfulness contemplation, occurs also in other Pāli discourses.³⁰⁹

The third *satipatthāna* – contemplation of states of mind – covers a set of ordinary states of mind and a set of higher states of mind (see table 1.13).³¹⁰ The four versions agree that this *satipatthāna* covers mindfulness of the presence or absence of lust, anger, and delusion, as well as of a state of mind that is qualified as contracted or as distracted. To this the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation adds the presence or absence of a defiled state of mind, while the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse additionally speaks of thoughts of craving.³¹¹

literally between being “with flesh” and “without flesh”, *sāmisa* and *nirāmisa*, a distinction which MĀ 98 at T I 583c28 and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568c1 render as “with food” and “without food”, 食 and 無食 or 不食, cf. also Pāśadika 1998: 499 note 27. Anderson 1999/2001: 38 renders *nirāmisa sukha* as “disinterested happiness”, de Silva 1987c: 20 understands *nirāmisa* to refer to feelings without “material stimulation”, and Schlingloff 1962b: 81 speaks of “profane” feelings; for yet another interpretation cf. Hamilton 1996: 43-44. The distinction between *sāmisa* and *nirāmisa* types of feeling is absent from the exposition at Paṭis II 233,15, which only takes up the three basic types of feeling and the six types of feeling that arise at the six sense-doors.

³⁰⁷ MĀ 98 at T I 583c27+29 distinguishes between feelings that are 身 or 心, and between feelings that are 欲 or 無欲.

³⁰⁸ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568c9.

³⁰⁹ DN 15 at DN II 66,18 and MN 74 at MN I 500,10.

³¹⁰ A discourse quotation listing states of mind for contemplation can be found in Abhidh-k 7:11 in Pradhan 1967: 396,10, paralleling MN 10 at MN I 59,30; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 135c15, T 1559 at T XXIX 287a3, and Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa*, *nyu* 49b2 or Q (5595) *thu* 89b4. A version of this discourse quotation can also be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 950a24.

³¹¹ MĀ 98 at T I 584a8: 穢汚 and EĀ 12.1 at T II 568c26: 愛念.

Table 1.13: Contemplation of the Mind in MN 10 and its Parallels

MN 10	MĀ 98	EĀ 12.1
lustful, not lustful (1) angry, not angry (2) deluded, undeluded (3) contracted, distracted (4) great, narrow (5) surpassable, unsurp. (6) concentrated, uncon. (7) liberated, unliberated (8)	lustful, not lustful (→ 1) angry, not angry (→ 2) deluded, undeluded (→ 3) defiled, undefiled contracted, distracted (→ 4) inferior, superior narrow, great (→ 5) cultivated, uncultivated concentrated, uncon. (→ 7) unliberated, liberated (→ 8) (≠ 6)	lustful, not lustful (→ 1) angry, not angry (→ 2) deluded, undeluded (→ 3) craving, no craving attainment, no attainment distracted, not distracted (→ 4) scattered, not scattered (→ 4) pervasive, not pervasive great, not great (→ 5) boundless, not boundless concentrated, uncon. (→ 7) unliberated, liberated (→ 8) (≠ 6)

In relation to the “contracted” or “distracted” state of mind, it is noteworthy that this pair in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* does not accord with the pattern found in the other cases of contemplation of mind, which in every case pairs a negative quality with a positive quality.³¹² In order to conform to this pattern, “contracted” (*sankhitta*) could be interpreted to represent a concentrated state of mind.³¹³ Such an interpretation could claim support from the introductory narration to the *Jātaka* collection, where the corresponding verb *sankhipati* describes the Buddha’s practice of *mettā*, an occurrence that indeed has the sense of “concentrating”.³¹⁴ In the Pāli discourses in general, however, the term *sankhitta* appears to have a predominantly negative sense and usually means “contracted”.³¹⁵ In fact, the “concentrated” mind is already taken into account among the remaining mental states mentioned for contemplation in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas*,³¹⁶ so that to understand *sankhitta* as standing for concentration would to some extent result in a redundancy.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version has as its counterpart to this particular category two pairs, as it first treats the mind that is “distracted” or “not distracted”, and then the mind

³¹² DN 22 at DN II 299,15 and MN 10 at MN I 59,33 list the mind that is *sankhitta* or *vikkhitta* as their fourth pair of states of mind to be contemplated in this *satipatthāna*.

³¹³ PED: 665 s.v. *sankhitta* lists “concentrated” as one of several meanings of *sankhitta*, and gives DN 2 at DN I 80,5 as a reference for this meaning, a passage which has the same set of mind states as in the present instance, although in a context related to telepathic powers (ibid. points out, however, that Vism 410,13 explains this occurrence of *sankhitta* to refer to sloth-and-torpor); cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which relates the contracted mind to mental tranquillity, Shukla 1973: 297,8 or ŠSG 2007: 184,9 and T 1579 at T XXX 440c12.

³¹⁴ Jā I 82,1.

³¹⁵ Cf., e.g., SN 51:20 at SN V 279,25, which uses *sankhitta* for a state of mind in which sloth-and-torpor are present.

³¹⁶ DN 22 at DN II 299,22 and MN 10 at MN I 59,34.

that is “scattered” or “not scattered”.³¹⁷ This presentation fits the pattern of pairing a positive with a negative quality, although the two pairs seem to be similar in meaning.

In regard to higher states of mind, the Pāli and Chinese versions agree on listing a mind that is great, concentrated, and liberated, together with their respective opposites. The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* speak additionally of a mind that is surpassable or unsurpassable.³¹⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse has the additional categories of a mind that is superior or inferior, and a mind that is developed or undeveloped.³¹⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version also mentions a mind that has reached attainment, a mind that has become all pervading, and a mind that has become boundless, together with their respective counterparts.³²⁰

In other Pāli discourses, the qualification “unsurpassable” occurs in relation to the fourth *jhāna* and in relation to full awakening.³²¹ Hence the “unsurpassable” state of mind listed in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas* could be similar in meaning to the “developed” mind mentioned in the *Madhyama-āgama*, and to the mind that has “reached attainment” found in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.

In the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatthāna-suttas*, the last of the four *satipatthānas*, contemplation of dharmas,³²² covers:

- the hindrances,
- the aggregates,
- the sense-spheres,
- the awakening factors,
- the four noble truths.

Of these exercises, only the awakening factors are found in both parallel versions of this *satipatthāna*.³²³ The hindrances are also taken up in both versions, although in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version they are mentioned at the beginning of the discourse and thus appear to be a condition for *satipatthāna* practice in general instead of being associated

³¹⁷ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568c29: 亂 and 無亂, and at T II 569a1: 散落 and 無散落; cf. also a listing of states of mind (in a description of knowing the minds of others) in the *Sanghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 248,22.

³¹⁸ DN 22 at DN II 299,21 and MN 10 at MN I 59,34: *sa-uttara* and *anuttara*. The exposition of contemplation of the mind in *Patis* II 234,11 also mentions the six types of consciousness that arise at the six sense-doors.

³¹⁹ MĀ 98 at T I 584a8+9: 有下, 有高 and 修, 不修.

³²⁰ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568c28: 有受入, at T II 569a3: 普遍, and at T II 569a6: 無量. For a survey of the states of mind listed in a range of works under the third *satipatthāna* cf. Schmithausen 1987: 318-337 and 390-393. He concludes (p. 329) that the categories lustful, angry, deluded, contracted/distracted, concentrated, and liberated constitute common ground among the different traditions. Cf. also Willemen 1998: 77 for a comparison of the listing of states of mind in MĀ 98 with other Sarvāstivāda and (Mūla-)sarvāstivāda texts.

³²¹ MN 53 at MN I 357,23 and MN I 357,22.

³²² As already pointed out by Franke 1915/1917: 488, in the present context the term dharma stands for ‘aspects of the teaching’, “Elemente der Lehre”; cf. in more detail Anālayo 2003a: 182-186.

³²³ MĀ 98 at T I 584b4 and EĀ 12.1 at T II 569a19.

with contemplation of dharmas.³²⁴ Contemplation of the sense-spheres occurs only in the *Madhyama-āgama* version.³²⁵ Contemplation of the aggregates and contemplation of the four noble truths are not found in either of the two Chinese parallels (see table 1.14).³²⁶

Table 1.14: Contemplation of Dharmas in MN 10 and its Parallels

MN 10	MA 98	EA 12.1
hindrances (1)	sense-spheres (→ 3)	awakening factors (→ 4)
aggregates (2)	hindrances (→ 1)	<i>jhānas</i>
sense-spheres (3)	awakening factors (→ 4)	
awakening factors (4)		
noble truths (5)	(≠ 2, 5)	(≠ 1-3, 5)

In relation to this difference, it is noteworthy that the *Vibhaṅga*, the second book in the Pāli canonical Abhidharma collection, also has only contemplation of the hindrances and of the awakening factors in its exposition of contemplation of dharmas. The *Vibhaṅga* presents this as its exposition following the methodology of the *suttas*, thereby giving the impression as if this is the original instruction found in the discourses.³²⁷ On the other hand, the *Śāriputrābhidharma* lists the hindrances, the sense-spheres, the awakening factors, and the four noble truths under its exposition of contemplation of dharmas.³²⁸ This

³²⁴ MA 98 at T I 584a24 and EA 12.1 at T II 568a9.

³²⁵ MA 98 at T I 584a14.

³²⁶ According to Bronkhorst 1985: 312, the seven awakening factors may have been the most ancient version of this *satipaṭṭhāna*, while Schneider 1980/1992: 82 considers the four noble truths as the original nucleus of contemplation of dharmas.

³²⁷ Vibh 199,13, a presentation found in the *Vibhaṅga*'s *suttantabhājanīya*, which differs from its subsequent analysis according to the method of the Abhidharma, the *abhidhammabhājanīya*.

³²⁸ T 1548 at T XXVIII 616a20, T XXVIII 616a25, T XXVIII 616b3, and T XXVIII 616b8. The presentation of contemplation of the four noble truths in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* is similar to the short version of this contemplation in the PTS and Ceylonese edition of the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, MN 10 at MN I 62,21 and CE-MN I 152,4. The *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, DN 22 at DN II 304-315, and the Burmese and Siamese editions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, B^e-MN I 82,10 and S^e-MN I 117,5, present the same contemplation in a more elaborate way, by commenting on each aspect of the first and fourth noble truth in detail and by applying the second and third noble truths to a series of stages of the perceptual process at each sense-door (notably, B^e-M I 70,1 gives the discourse's title as the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, which suggests that the *Majjhima-nikāya* version was quite explicitly replaced by its *Dīgha-nikāya* counterpart). Bapat 1926: 11 considers this part of DN 22 to be "an amplified version of an originally small *sutta* ... explaining, in a commentarial fashion, the details of the four noble truths"; cf. also Barua 1971/2003: 369. According to Thomas 1927/2003: 252, during the oral transmission of the early discourses "there would also be the danger of unwittingly including discourses or commentaries ... which were not an original part of the collection. An instance occurs in the case of the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* ... found in the *Dīgha* (No. 22) and *Majjhima* (No. 10), but in the former case a long passage of commentary on the Four Truths has been incorporated". Similarly, Winternitz 1920/1968: 51 refers to DN 22 as an example for *Dīgha-nikāya* discourses that give the impression of being enlarged versions of shorter texts through the addition of com-

results in an unexpected situation, in that a Theravāda Abhidharma text appears more closely related to the presentation found in a discourse from the Chinese Āgamas, while an Abhidharma work from a different Buddhist school is fairly close to the presentation found in the discourses preserved in the Theravāda tradition.

For the *Śāriputrābhidharma* to be close to the Pāli version of contemplation of dharmas is less surprising, since this work appears to belong to the *Dharmaguptaka* tradition,³²⁹ a tradition whose presentations are often fairly similar to the Theravāda tradition.³³⁰ Other works differ more decisively from the Pāli presentation of contemplation of dharmas, such as the *Jñānaprasthāna*, an Abhidharma work of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, which closely resembles the account found in the *Madhyama-āgama*.³³¹

What remains a puzzle, however, is that the account of contemplation of dharmas found in the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* should differ so much from the Pāli discourses. As already mentioned above, in regard to contemplation of the body the same work also differs from the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas*. When considering these differences, it is noteworthy that the *Vibhaṅga* treats any of its topics consistently by presenting first an examination from the perspective of the discourses, followed by examining the same topic from the perspective of the Abhidharma. Topics expounded in this way include, among others, the four noble truths, the four right efforts, the four ways to [psychic] power, the seven factors of awakening, and the four *jhānas*. In all these instances, the *Vibhaṅga*'s treatment from the perspective of the discourses, its *suttantabhājaniya*, corresponds to what can be found in the Pāli discourses.

Hence the *Vibhaṅga*'s treatment of the four *satipatṭhānas* stands out as an instance where substantial parts of the exposition found in the discourses are completely absent from the *Vibhaṅga*'s treatment of the same matter “according to the discourses”. This is all the more puzzling in the case of clear comprehension in regard to various bodily activities as one of the body contemplations. The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* include this practice under contemplation of the body, yet it is not found in the *Vibhaṅga*'s exposition of body contemplation according to the methodology of the discourses. Nevertheless, the same exercise is described in the *Vibhaṅga* in the context of its exposition of the *jhānas*.³³²

mentarial type of material. Trenckner 1888/1993: 534 notes that the long exposition on the four noble truths in MN 10 was in the Burmese manuscript from the India Office Library that he consulted. Since he published his edition in 1888, the “interpolation” of this passage, as he calls it, had already taken place by then. On the incorporation of commentarial material into the discourses in general cf. also below p. 883.

³²⁹ According to the detailed study by Bareau 1950, the *Śāriputrābhidharma* probably stems from the Dharmaguptaka tradition; cf. also Anālayo 2009a: 229 note 65.

³³⁰ Cf. Lamotte 1949/1981: 811 note 1, Przyluski 1926: 315, Waldschmidt 1926: 187, id. 1932: 229, and id. 1980a: 149.

³³¹ T 1544 at T XXVI 1023b29, cf. also Schmithausen 1987: 336.

³³² Vibh 244,7. In regard to the *Vibhaṅga*'s description of contemplation of dharmas, Nāṇatiloka 1938/1983: 39 comments that “only the sections on the hindrances and the enlightenment factors are selected here”, thereby suggesting the *Vibhaṅga*'s presentation to be a case of intentional selection. Thittila 1969: xlvi app-

Once clear comprehension of bodily activities is taken into account even in the context of preparatory exercises for *jhāna* attainment, one would certainly expect to find the same exercise in an exposition of body contemplation “according to the discourses”.

In this context it is noteworthy that the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* and the *Madhyama-āgama* discourses have Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country as their venue,³³³ a part of India located on the north-western borders of the region in which the Buddha lived and taught and thus an area reached by the Buddha’s teachings only at a relatively late stage of his ministry.³³⁴ In contrast, the locations that were in contact with the Buddha’s teaching from earliest times onwards are associated only with shorter expositions of *satipatṭhāna*, bare outlines of the four *satipatṭhānas* that do not fill in the details of how these four *satipatṭhānas* are to be put into practice.³³⁵

Hence, even from the perspective of the Pāli discourses themselves, the detailed exposition of *satipatṭhāna* given among the Kurus should be considered a comparatively later development, in contrast to the basic outline of the four *satipatṭhānas* as an earlier teaching, taught regularly by the Buddha wherever he went.³³⁶

pears to be of a similar opinion, as he comments that the “Vibhaṅga makes a bare statement of the four foundations of mindfulness”. Such an intentional selection would, however, not conform to the general procedure adopted in the *Vibhaṅga*, so that the briefness of the *Vibhaṅga*’s exposition of contemplation of the body and of dharmas may not be merely a case of intentional abbreviation.

³³³ DN 22 at DN II 290,3 and MN 10 at MN I 55,27: *bhagavā kurusu viharati kammāssadhammam nāma kurūnam nigamo* (B^e-MN I 70,2 and S^e-MN I 103,3: *kammāsadhamma*, C^e-MN I 134,2: *kammāssadamma*), MĀ 98 at T I 582b8: 佛遊拘樓瘦，在劍磨瑟曇拘樓都邑。From the rendering 拘樓瘦, which is standard in *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, it seems as if the translator(s) for some reason translated an equivalent to the locative *kurusu*, even though in the same sentence, when qualifying the city, the equivalent to the term Kuru is rendered just by 拘樓. A rendering of the locative *kurusu* recurs also in DĀ 13 at T I 60a29: 拘流沙國, while in contexts where the original would not have been in the locative, DĀ 4 at T I 34b21 uses 居樓國 and DĀ 22 at T I 147c19 拘樓國; cf. also Meisig 1987a: 223. The location 劍磨瑟曇 would according to Pulleyblank 1991: 148, 217, 273 and 300 correspond to *kīm^h ma sit dam* in Early Middle Chinese. Meisig 1987a: 221 comments that the double “m” (at the end of the first and the beginning of the second syllable of the transcription) shows that the original would not have had the Sanskrit reading Kalmāśadamy (found, e.g., in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 515,13 or in Vaidya 1999: 446,2).

³³⁴ According to Basak 1963b: 15, Law 1932/1979: 18, Malalasekera 1937/1995: 642, and Rhys Davids 1903/1997: 27, the Kuru country corresponds approximately to the area of modern Delhi (and perhaps Haryana), on the location cf. also Barua 1971/2003: 334 and Bharadwaj 1991: 197, for a survey of references to the Kuru country cf. Singh 1999.

³³⁵ Of the discourses that take up the four *satipatṭhānas*, collected in the *Satipatṭhāna-samyutta* at SN V 141-192, the majority take place at Sāvatthī, cf. SN 47:3, SN 47:5, SN 47:10-11, SN 47:13, SN 47:15-17, SN 47:24-25, SN 47:31-32, SN 47:34-37, SN 47:41, SN 47:43-44, and SN 47:48-49. The remaining discourses mention the following locations: SN 47:4 in Kosala, SN 47:21-23 at Pātaliputta, SN 47:29-30 at Rājagaha, SN 47:26-28 at Sāketa, SN 47:18 at Uruvela, SN 47:14 among the Vajjians, SN 47:1-2 and SN 47:9 at Vesāli. None of these discourses lists the practical applications of the four *satipatṭhānas* provided in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* located in the Kuru country.

³³⁶ That the bare outline of the four *satipatṭhānas* is not all that could be said on the topic of *satipatṭhāna* can

To consider the detailed exposition on *satipatṭhāna* as a later development of the bare outline of the four *satipatṭhānas* would also find support in the circumstance that not only the Pāli and Chinese discourses differ in regard to this detailed exposition, but even the Pāli discourses and the Pāli Abhidharma.

In evaluating the presentation of the fourth *satipatṭhāna* in the Pāli and Chinese discourse versions, the agreement among the different versions highlights the importance of overcoming the hindrances and developing the factors of awakening as central topics of contemplation of dharmas. This importance is further corroborated by the circumstance that both exercises are mentioned already in the introductory part of the *Madhyama-āgama* version.³³⁷

The close relation of the hindrances and the awakening factors to contemplation of dharmas can also be seen in the *Samudaya-sutta* and its Chinese parallel, according to which the arising of attention leads to the arising of dharmas.³³⁸ The Pāli commentary explains that the arising of attention leads to the arising of the awakening factors, while its absence leads to the arising of the hindrances.³³⁹ This explanation defines “dharmas” in a context related to attention, a term closely related in meaning to mindfulness,³⁴⁰ as standing for the hindrances and the awakening factors. This further corroborates that the hindrances and the awakening factors are central instances of contemplation of dharmas.

In fact, overcoming the hindrances, developing the awakening factors, and well-established *satipatṭhāna* are, according to several discourses, indispensable conditions for awakening.³⁴¹ This is the case to such an extent that the discourses reckon these three practices to be a common feature of the awakening of past, present, and future Buddhas.³⁴²

be seen as implicit in MN 12 at MN I 83,2, according to which the Buddha would have been able to speak on the topic of *satipatṭhāna* for a hundred years without running out of argument.

³³⁷ MĀ 98 at T I 582b12. Thanissaro 1996/1999: 74, based on the presentation in the *Vibhaṅga* and in the Chinese discourses, concludes that all forms of contemplation of dharmas “appear to be variations on the abandoning of the hindrances and the development of the factors of awakening”.

³³⁸ SN 47:42 at SN V 184,24: *manasiκārasamudayā dhammānam samudayo*, SĀ 609 at T II 171b8: 憶念集 則法集.

³³⁹ Spk III 229,23: *yonisomanasiκārasamudayā bojjhaṅgadhammānam samudayo, ayonisomanasiκārasamudayā nīvaraṇadhammānam*.

³⁴⁰ For a more detailed discussion cf. Anālayo 2003a: 59.

³⁴¹ AN 10:95 at AN V 195,11. A similar statement can be found in DĀ 17 at T I 75b10. The fact that these passages mention *satipatṭhāna* apart from the hindrances and the awakening factors is noteworthy. If contemplation of the hindrances and of the awakening factors should indeed constitute the ancient core of contemplation of dharmas, as suggested by the agreement between *satipatṭhāna* expositions found in various traditions, then it might seem unwarranted to mention them separately in a list that includes *satipatṭhāna*. However, perhaps the point of such listings of the indispensable conditions for awakening is to depict a temporal progression from overcoming the hindrances via development of *satipatṭhāna* to the unfolding of the awakening factors.

³⁴² SN 47:12 at SN V 160,27 and its parallel SĀ 498 at T II 131a11. A variant on this statement can be found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which combines overcoming the five hindrances and setting up the four establishments of mindfulness with developing the thirty-seven requisites to awakening, *saptatrimśadbodhipak-*

These passages clearly highlight the importance of overcoming the hindrances and of developing the awakening factors, making them prominent candidates for inclusion in the original core of contemplation of dharmas. Yet, a firm conclusion regarding the earliest version of contemplation of dharmas is not easily drawn, since other contemplations could make a similar claim in terms of importance, even though they are not found in all versions. This would, in fact, seem to be the case for contemplation of the five aggregates. Since this contemplation occurs only in the Pāli discourses and is absent from all parallel versions, as well as from the *Vibhaṅga*, mindfulness directed to the impermanent nature of the five aggregates would be an evident choice for exclusion from what should be considered as the original version of contemplation of dharmas.

Yet, such contemplation of the five aggregates has a rather prominent role in other discourses. These present mindfulness of the impermanent nature of the five aggregates as a crucially important form of contemplation for reaching liberating insight.³⁴³ This is apparently the case to such an extent that a discourse compares instructions on mindfulness of the five aggregates and their impermanent nature to a “lion’s roar”.³⁴⁴

Moreover, some discourses explicitly relate contemplation of the arising and passing away of feelings, perceptions, and thoughts – thereby covering some out of the five aggregates – to the development of mindfulness and clear comprehension.³⁴⁵ The close relationship between these instances and *satipaṭṭhāna* practice becomes particularly evident in a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*, which presents contemplation of the arising and passing away of feelings, perceptions, and thoughts right after referring to contemplation of the mind, both found in a list of factors that lead to analytical insight.³⁴⁶ According to the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* and its Chinese and Sanskrit parallels, even the former Buddha Vipassī reached awakening by mindful contemplation of the five aggregates.³⁴⁷

syān dharmān, Shukla 1973: 7,8 or ŠSG 1998: 12,21, with the Chinese parallel in T 1579 at T XXX 396c16: 三十七菩提分法.

³⁴³ Cf. DN 33 at DN III 223,17, SN 12:23 at SN II 29,26, SN 22:89 at SN III 131,24, AN 4:41 at AN II 45,24, and AN 8:2 at AN IV 153,13. Gethin 1986: 43 comments that the instructions (corresponding to the practice of mindfulness of the five aggregates described in DN 22 and MN 10) occur “especially in contexts where the process of the gaining of that insight that constitutes the destruction of the āsavas is being described”. Regarding the scheme of the five aggregates, Hamilton 2000: 29 clarifies that “the *khandhas* are not a comprehensive analysis of what a human being is comprised of ... rather, they are the factors of human experience (or, better, the experiencing factors) that one needs to understand in order to achieve the goal of Buddhist teachings”.

³⁴⁴ SN 22:78 at SN III 85,16.

³⁴⁵ DN 33 at DN III 223,11: “he knows feelings ... perceptions ... thoughts as they arise, remain and disappear. This ... development of concentration ... conduces to mindfulness and clear comprehension”, *viditā vedanā* ... *saññā* ... *vitakkā uppajjanti*, *viditā upaṭṭhahanti*, *viditā abhavatāni gacchanti*. *ayam* ... *samādhi-bhāvanā* ... *satisampajaññāya sanyattati*, cf. also AN 4:41 at AN II 45,17.

³⁴⁶ In AN 7:37 at AN IV 32,22 the *viditā vedanā*, etc. contemplation occurs after instructions on contemplating a state of mind that is *sañkhitta* or *vikkhitta*.

³⁴⁷ DN 14 at DN II 35,15, T 3 at T I 156b20, and the Sanskrit version in fragment S 462R5 and S 685V1-2 in Fukita 2003: 143 (122.5 and 123.2) or in Waldschmidt 1953: 50.

Thus contemplation of the five aggregates appears to be recognized in the thought world of the early discourses as a particularly powerful implementation of *satipaṭṭhāna* as the direct path to realization, even though from a comparative perspective it would appear to be a later addition to the instructions given in the discourses explicitly dedicated to this theme.

Whatever may be the final word on the ‘original’ version of contemplations of dharmas, MN I 60 the practical instruction for contemplation of the five hindrances in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* and in the *Madhyama-āgama* version resemble each other to a great extent.³⁴⁸ The *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation differs in that it merely lists the five hindrances,³⁴⁹ which would be due to the fact that in its presentation the hindrances do not come under contemplation of dharmas, but already occur at the outset of the discourse.

Regarding contemplation of the sense-spheres, the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* instruct that each sense and its respective object should be known, followed by knowing the fetter that arises in dependence on them.³⁵⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not direct mindfulness to the senses and their respective objects, but mentions both merely as conditions for the arising of a fetter.³⁵¹ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation, the task in this case is thus not to be mindful of the senses or their objects as such, but of the fetter that may arise at any sense-door. This suggests awareness of the fettering force of perceptual experience and its relation to the arising of unwholesome mental reactions and associations to be the central aspect of contemplation of the sense-spheres. The remainder of the instructions for contemplating the six sense-spheres in the *Madhyama-āgama* version is relatively similar to the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas*.³⁵²

The instructions for mindfulness of the awakening factors in the two Pāli discourses and their Chinese parallels resemble each other.³⁵³ The *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation

³⁴⁸ DN 22 at DN II 300,10, MN 10 at MN I 60,11, and MĀ 98 at T I 584a24; a quotation of the instruction on how to contemplate the hindrances can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 951b17; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 298,12 or ŠSG 2007: 186,7 and T 1579 at T XXX 440c29.

³⁴⁹ EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a9.

³⁵⁰ MN 10 at MN I 61,15: “he knows the eye, he knows forms, and he knows the fetter that arises in dependence on these two”, *cakkūñ ca pajānāti, rūpe ca pajānāti, yañ ca tad ubhayam paticca uppajjati sañyojanam tañ ca pajānāti* (S^e-M I 114,4: *saññojanam*); cf. also DN 22 at DN II 302,18.

³⁵¹ MĀ 98 at T I 584a14: “based on eye and form(s), an internal fetter arises. When there really is a fetter internally, a monk knows according to reality that internally there is a fetter”, 眼緣色, 生內結, 比丘者, 內實有結, 知內有結如真; a quotation of this instruction can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 951c13; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 298,16 or ŠSG 2007: 186,11 and T 1579 at T XXX 441a3.

³⁵² DN 22 at DN II 302,20 and MN 10 at MN I 61,16 speak of the monk knowing: 1) the fetter, 2) how the unarisen fetter arises, 3) how the arisen fetter is abandoned, 4) how the abandoned fetter will not arise again in the future. MĀ 98 at T I 584a15 presents the same exercise in terms of the meditator knowing: 1) if a fetter is present, 2) if no fetter is present, 3) if an unarisen fetter arises, 4) if an arisen fetter ceases and does not arise again. Another difference is that in MĀ 98 mindfulness of the sense-spheres precedes mindfulness of the hindrances, whereas the Pāli presentations follow the reverse sequence.

³⁵³ DN 22 at DN II 303,21, MN 10 at MN I 61,32, MĀ 98 at T I 584b4, and EĀ 12.1 at T II 569a19; a quota-

speaks additionally of developing the awakening factors “depending on contemplation, dispassion, and cessation, casting off evil things”.³⁵⁴ This brings to mind a qualification found frequently in the Pāli discourses, according to which the awakening factors are to be developed in dependence on seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, culminating in relinquishment.³⁵⁵

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version continues by describing the attainment of the four *jhānas*, a description that still is part of its version of contemplation of dharmas. Since the instructions cover contemplation of the arising, passing away, and arising-and-passing-away of the four *jhānas*, the point made by its presentation could be the presence of clear awareness when attaining and emerging from a *jhāna* attainment – something of practical use for attaining mastery of *jhānas* – and the development of insight into the impermanent nature of the *jhānas*.³⁵⁶

- MN I 62 The two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* and the *Madhyama-āgama* version make a prediction on the time required to reach full awakening or non-return through *satipatṭhāna* practice. While the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipatṭhāna-suttas* count down from seven years until they reach a minimum requirement of seven days of practice for reaching such lofty attainments,³⁵⁷ the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse similarly counts down from seven years until it arrives at the possibility of making progress within a single day.³⁵⁸

tion of the instruction on how to contemplate the awakening factors can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 952a1; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 299,6 or ŠSG 2007: 186,16 and T 1579 at T XXX 441a7. This part of EĀ 12.1 appears to have suffered from an error in textual transmission, since EĀ 12.1 at T II 569a21 mentions the awakening factor of mindfulness twice and does not have the awakening factor of joy (cf. also the remark in the 佛光 *Ekottarika-āgama* edition p. 171 note 10). Curiously enough, the same pattern recurs in EĀ 21.2 at T II 602c4.

³⁵⁴ EĀ 12.1 at T II 569a22: 依觀, 依無欲, 依滅盡, 捨諸惡法.

³⁵⁵ Cf., e.g., SN 46:1 at SN V 63,19: *vivekanissitam virāganissitam nirodhanissitam vossaggaparināmīm*.

³⁵⁶ Similar approaches to the development of insight can be found, e.g., in MN 52 at MN I 350,12 or in MN 64 at MN I 435,31. The version of contemplation of dharmas found in DN 22 at DN II 313,11 also mentions the four *jhānas* in its detailed exposition of the noble eightfold path, although without introducing an insight perspective in regard to them. These presentations thus serve as a reminder that the practice of insight cannot be totally separated from the development of deeper levels of concentration. In fact, according to a stanza found in the different versions of the *Dhammapada*, the development of *jhāna* and wisdom depend on each other, a presentation which makes it only natural to find the *jhānas* considered as part of *satipatṭhāna* practice, cf. Dhp 372: *n' atthi jhānam apaññassa, paññā n' atthi ajjhāyato*; and its parallel stanza 58 in the Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* in Brough 1962/2001: 127, stanza 62 in the Patna *Dharmapada* in Cone 1989: 119 or in Roth 1980b: 103; cf. also stanza 34:12 in a Chinese *Dharmapada* collection, T 210 at T IV 572a18 (translated in Dhammadhoti 1995: 254). The same recurs also as stanza 32:25 in the Sanskrit *Udāna-(varga)* in Bernhard 1965: 439, with its Chinese parallels T 212 at T IV 766b29 and T 213 at T IV 796c20 (translated in Willemen 1978: 160 stanza 17), and its Tibetan equivalent in stanza 32:30 in Beckh 1911: 135 or in Zongtse 1990: 388.

³⁵⁷ DN 22 at DN II 315,5 and MN 10 at MN I 63,12.

³⁵⁸ MĀ 98 at T I 584b26 indicates that one who “practices like this in the morning, will reach advancement in the evening”, 彼朝行如是, 暮必得昇進. For someone who possesses the five factors of striving, MN 85 at MN II 96,17 similarly envisages that within a day the practitioner will “reach distinction”, *visesam*

Another noteworthy circumstance is that the *Madhyama-āgama* version explicitly mentions the nuns in its prediction. This explicit reference to the nuns brings to mind another Pāli discourse, according to which several nuns were accomplished practitioners of *satipaṭṭhāna*.³⁵⁹

adhibgamissati, which could be similar to the “advancement” or “promotion”, 昇進 (Hirakawa 1997: 596 lists *parā-*√*kram* and *ā-*√*kram* as possible equivalents), mentioned in MĀ 98. To appreciate this prediction in MN 85, it needs to be kept in mind that the condition for reaching distinction it sets is to have a Tathāgata as one’s teacher, *tathāgataṇi vināyakaṇi labhamāno*.

³⁵⁹ SN 47:10 at SN V 154,27.

Chapter 2 *Sīhanāda-vagga*

MN 11 *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta*

The *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta*, “the lesser discourse on the lion’s roar”, presents insight into clinging to a self as a unique feature of the Buddha’s teaching. This discourse has two parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions begin with the Buddha encouraging his monks to roar the “lion’s roar” that the four grades of [true] recluses can be found only among them, whereas other teachings are devoid of [true] recluses.²

The rationale underlying this lion’s roar becomes clearer on consulting the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* and its Chinese and Sanskrit parallels, according to which the four grades of [true] recluses can only be found in a teaching that contains the noble eightfold path.³ The implication of the reference to “[true] recluses” can be gathered from another Pāli discourse, according to which the four grades of [true] recluses stand for the four stages of awakening.⁴ Thus this lion’s roar affirms that those who attain any of these stages of awakening can be found only among those who practice the noble eightfold path.

If, after making such a “lion’s roar”, the monks should be asked by other recluses the reason for such a proclamation, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions, in reply they should point out four qualities as a basis for their lion’s roar:

- they have confidence in their teacher,
- they have confidence in his teaching,
- they live fulfilling the precepts,
- they are affectionately inclined towards their lay and monastic co-disciples.

MN I 63

MN I 64

¹ The parallels are MĀ 103 at T I 590b-591b and EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c-644b. MĀ 103 agrees with MN 11 on the title “discourse on the lion’s roar”, 師子吼經, although it does not specify this discourse to be a “lesser” one. The **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 38a20, refers to the present discourse under the same title 師子吼經. While EĀ 27.2 and MN 11 take place at Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī, MĀ 103 has Kammāśadhamma in the Kuru country as its location. EĀ 27.2 has been translated in Anālayo 2009g.

² MN 11 at MN I 64,1: *sīhanādaṃ nadatha* and MĀ 103 at T I 590b10: 師子吼; for a quotation of this proclamation in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, cf. T 1545 at T XXVII 341c5. Manné 1996: 32, based on surveying various instances of “lion’s roars” in the Pāli discourses, explains them to be “utterances which the speaker is willing to defend in public”, in line with “the Vedic tradition of challenges in debate”. Another aspect is brought out by Brekke 1999b: 450, who explains that “the function of the Buddha in the simile of the lion is to create fear through his teaching ... and when this fear is effectively translated into religious motivation one will strive to attain *nirvāṇa*”. Similarly Heim 2003: 546 notes that “the Tathāgata delivering his teaching ... in exactly the same way that a lion’s roar causes brutes of the forest to quake in fear ... suggests that some fear is valuable, in that it can replace complacency with urgency”. On the lion in Buddhist texts cf. also Deleanu 2000: 105-112.

³ DN 16 at DN II 151,15, DĀ 2 at T I 25a26, T 6 at T I 187c7, T 7 at T I 204a5, and fragment 485 no. 216 Rb-c in Waldschmidt 1950: 75; cf. also Bareau 1971a: 104, Freiberger 2000a: 89-92, and Waldschmidt 1948: 230.

⁴ AN 4:239 at AN II 238,7.

The Pāli commentary explains this fourfold assertion to be an allusion to the four limbs of stream-entry.⁵ On this commentarial explanation, the basis for the above lion's roar would be personal verification through the attainment of stream-entry, whereby it would become a matter of personal experience that the stages of awakening can be attained through the teaching that one has followed.

After listing these four qualities, according to the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart the Buddha instructed his monks that, should other recluses claim to be endowed with the same four qualities (in relation to their own teaching), a set of counter-questions could be posed to them, beginning with the inquiry: 'is the final goal a single one or are there several final goals?'⁶

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version has a rather different beginning. According to its report, the monks had actually gone to visit other recluses and had been challenged by them. These other recluses had asked the monks to point out in what respect the Buddha's teaching differed from their own.⁷ Apparently unable to reply, the monks withdrew and reported this challenge to the Buddha, who instructed them how to meet such queries in the future with a set of counter-questions, beginning with the question if there is one final goal or if there are several final goals.

The set of questions to be posed to other recluses concerning the nature of the final goal is fairly similar in the Pāli and Chinese discourses (see table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Questions about the Final Goal in MN 11 and its Parallels

MN 11	MĀ 103	EA 27.2
many goals (1)	many goals (→ 1)	many goals (→ 1)
lust (2)	sensual desire (→ 2)	sensual desire (→ 2)
hatred (3)	hatred (→ 3)	hatred (→ 3)
delusion (4)	delusion (→ 4)	delusion (→ 4)
craving (5)	craving & clinging (→ 5, 6)	craving (→ 5)
clinging (6)	without wisdom (→ 7)	clinging (→ 6)
without vision (7)	dislike & fault finding (→ 8)	without wisdom (→ 7)
favouring and opposing (8)		quarrelling (→ 8)
conceptual proliferation (9)	(≠ 9)	(≠ 9)

⁵ Ps II 9,5. The standard description of the four limbs of stream-entry (e.g., SN 55:1 at SN V 343,1) lists full confidence in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, together with unblemished moral conduct. Instead of full confidence in the Saṅgha, MN 11 at MN I 64,13 only lists being affectionately inclined towards co-disciples. Ps II 8,35 matches these two by explaining that these co-disciples should be understood to be noble disciples, and therewith members of the Saṅgha of noble ones.

⁶ MN 11 at MN I 64,26: *ekā niṭṭhā udāhu puthū niṭṭhā ti* (B^e-MN I 93,9 and C^e-MN I 156,21: *puthu*)?; MĀ 103 at T I 590c3: 為一究竟, 為眾多究竟耶?; and EA 27.2 at T II 643c21: 為一究竟, 為眾多究竟乎?

⁷ Ps II 4,16 somewhat similarly reports the Buddha being informed by his disciples that other recluses claim to be of equal worth as the Buddha and his monks, which then prompted him to deliver the present discourse.

A noteworthy difference is that the two Chinese versions do not have a counterpart to the last question found in the Pāli version, which inquires whether someone who enjoys conceptual proliferation can reach the goal.⁸

The three versions next take up the two views of existence and non-existence.⁹ They explain that lack of understanding the true nature of these two views will cause one to be affected by those qualities that the previous series of questions had highlighted as obstructions to reaching the final goal.¹⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions also point out that those who adopt one of these two views will be opposed to those who adopt the other view.

The *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its two parallels next examine the claim made by other recluses and Brahmins that they also teach the full understanding and abandoning of all types of clinging (*upādāna*).¹¹ Other recluses and Brahmins, they explain, fail to take into account all four types of clinging, which the three versions list with a slight variation in sequence (see table 2.2).

Of these four, the teachings given by other recluses and Brahmins may cover only one, two, or at most three types of clinging:

- clinging to sensuality,
- clinging to views,
- clinging to rules.¹²

The Buddha's teaching, in contrast, also takes clinging to a self into account.¹³

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions declare that for this reason confidence in such a teacher and such a teaching, together with practice undertaken according to such a teaching and in harmony with other disciples, is properly directed.¹⁴

⁸ MN 11 at MN I 65,11: *sā ... niṭṭhā papañcārāmassa papañcaratino?*

⁹ A discourse quotation with the distinction between the two types of views can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 38a20 and again at T XXVII 1002b2.

¹⁰ MĀ 103 at T I 591a11 agrees with MN 11 at MN I 65,23 on the need to understand the arising, cessation, gratification, danger, and escape in relation to these two views, to which it adds the need to also understand the “cause”, 因, of these views. EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a7 differs from MN 11 and MĀ 103 in so far as it presents the aspects to be understood as the “origin and results”, 本末, of these two views.

¹¹ MN 11 at MN I 66,4 refers to *pariññā* in this context, while MĀ 103 at T I 591a20 speaks of “abandoning”, 斷, and EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a17 of “eradicating”, 罷. The Chinese versions thus bring out a sense of *pariññā* reflected in the commentarial explanation on the present passage, Ps II 16,10, which associates *pariññā* with “full understanding through abandoning”, *pahānapariññā*. The same sense can also be seen in SN 22:23 at SN III 26,29, which defines *pariññā* as the destruction of lust, anger, and delusion. For a detailed examination of *pariññā* and its Jain counterpart *parinṇā* cf. Tatia 1983.

¹² Regarding the term *upādāna*, Lovejoy 1898: 129 explains that “*upādāna* is specifically that result of desire which consists in the habitual identification of one's will and interests with the skandhas ... the existence of [such] *upādāna* is what leads directly to the formation of a new combination of skandhas in the next succeeding birth”.

¹³ A quotation of this part of the discourse can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 173c3. Karunadasa 2006: 4 comments that this passage in MN 11 (as well as in its parallels) highlights “the doctrine of non-self ... [as] the unique discovery of the Buddha and the crucial doctrine that separates his own teaching from all other religious and philosophical systems”.

Table 2.2: Four Types of Clinging in MN 11 and its Parallels¹⁵

MN 11	MĀ 103	EĀ 27.2
sensuality (1)	sensuality (→ 1)	sensuality (→ 1)
views (2)	rules (→ 3)	views (→ 2)
rules and vows (3)	views (→ 2)	rules (→ 3)
doctrine of self (4)	self (→ 4)	self (→ 4)

A minor but noteworthy difference is that while the Pāli version speaks of “clinging to a doctrine of self”, its Chinese parallels simply refer to “clinging to a self”.¹⁶

The notion of “clinging to a doctrine of self” results in fact in some degree of difficulty when attempting to correlate the overcoming of the four types of clinging with the four stages of awakening. Clinging to views, which according to the *Dhammasaṅgīti* of the Theravāda Abhidharma stands for clinging to wrong views,¹⁷ would be overcome with stream-entry. Since with stream-entry the fetters of personality view and dogmatic adherence to rules and vows are also removed, any clinging to a doctrine of a self and any clinging to rules and vows will also be left behind at this stage.

¹⁴ MĀ 103 at T I 591b16 differs from MN 11 at MN I 67,7 in that it has this statement at a later point, after describing the attainment of full realization.

¹⁵ Although at first EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a15 agrees with MN 11 at MN I 66,2 on the order of listing the four types of clinging, at a later point EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b6 exchanges the position of the last two. The different sequence adopted in MĀ 103 at T I 591b13 of listing rules before views is noteworthy, since the *Visuddhimagga* explains the order in which the four types of clinging are listed to be the reverse of the order of their arising during a particular form of existence. According to its explanation, the assumption of a self arises first and leads to the arising of views (especially of eternalism), which in turn engender clinging to rules and observances in order to purify this self, followed by clinging to sensuality whenever this self is threatened with destruction, Vism 570,15: *pathamāñcattavādūpādānam, tato dīthiśilabbatakāmupādānāni*. This explanation fits the sequence found in MĀ 103, but does not fit the sequence in MN 11. The sequence found in MĀ 103 recurs again in MĀ 29 at T I 463a7 and also in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, T 1543 at T XXVI 777b10. For Buddhaghosa’s comment to fit the order in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Jñānaprasthāna* better than the order found in the Pāli tradition might lend support to a suggestion by Kalupahana 1970: 171 and id. 1992/1994: 208 that Buddhaghosa’s commentaries were influenced by Sarvāstivāda thought. The sequence adopted in MN 11 and EĀ 27.2 recurs also in EĀ 49.5 at T II 797c9 and in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in Bhattacharya 1957: 169,7 and T 1579 at T XXX 314c19. *Dīrgha-āgama* discourses often follow the different order sensuality, self, rules, and views, cf. DĀ 9 at T I 50c5, DĀ 10 at T I 53b16 (which has a variant reading corresponding to the order in MN 11), and DĀ 11 at T I 57c25. DĀ 13 at T I 60c9, however, follows the order found in MN 11. In the *Saṃyukta-āgama*, SĀ 298 at T II 85b9 follows the order of MN 11, while SĀ 490 at T II 127a11 has the order sensuality, self, views, and rules.

¹⁶ MN 11 at MN I 66,7: *attavādūpādāna* (C°-MN I 160,9: *attavādūpādāna*), MĀ 103 at T I 591a22 and EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a16: 我受. The same difference can also be found in MN 9 at MN I 51,2 and its parallel MĀ 29 at T I 463a7. The corresponding expression *ātmopādāna* can be found in fragment S 474 folio 12R6 in Tripāṭhi 1962: 43 (the fragment apparently reads *atmopādāna*). Another variation can be found in the *Dharmaskandha*, fragment 4737 folio 13v3 in Dietz 1984: 59,20, which in one instance speaks of *ātmavratopādāna* instead of *ātmavādopādāna*.

¹⁷ Dhs 212,25: *sabbāpi micchadiṭṭhi dīthupādānam*.

That is, with stream-entry three of the above four types of clinging would already be overcome. What still remains would be clinging to sensuality, which will be overcome with the attainment of non-return. This would leave no more clinging to be eradicated during further progress from non-return to full awakening,¹⁸ a difficult conclusion since the Pāli discourses explicitly refer to the type of clinging still present in a non-returner.¹⁹

Such a problem would not arise with the expression used in the Chinese versions, since “clinging to a [sense of] self” is a form of clinging that will be completely removed only with full awakening. As the *Khemaka-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel clarify, although disciples in higher training know the truth of not-self (and thereby would have gone beyond any “doctrine of self”), they still have a subtle clinging to a sense of self that will only be overcome with full awakening.²⁰

The *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* continues by tracing the arising of the four types of clinging back to ignorance, via the intervening seven links of dependent arising (*paticca samuppāda*).²¹ The two Chinese versions do not cover the intervening links of dependent arising. The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse relates the arising of the four types of clinging directly to ignorance,²² while the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse just indicates that they arise due to craving.²³ All versions state that the four types of clinging are overcome with full awakening.

The Pāli discourse ends at this point, while the two Chinese versions conclude with the lion’s roar about the four grades of [true] recluses found in this teaching.²⁴ This lion’s roar occurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse at this point for the first time and is also worded somewhat differently than in the other two versions. In the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, the Buddha simply points out that the four grades of [true] recluses cannot be surpassed by anyone else,²⁵ without, however, proclaiming that the teachings of others are devoid of [true] recluses, as he does in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions.²⁶

MN I 68

¹⁸ Nāṇatiloka 1952/1988: 216 comments that the “traditional fourfold division of clinging is not quite satisfactory. Besides *kāmupādāna* we should expect either *rūpupādāna* and *arūpupādāna*, or simply *bhavupādāna*. Though the Anāgāmī is entirely free from the traditional 4 kinds of *upādāna*, he is not freed from rebirth”.

¹⁹ This is reflected in a recurrent passage that distinguishes between the attainment of full awakening and non-return, where the latter alternative is introduced with the specification that there still is a remainder of clinging, *sati vā upādisese*, cf., e.g., MN 10 at MN I 62,36.

²⁰ SN 22:89 at SN III 130,22 and its parallel SĀ 103 at T II 30a19.

²¹ MN 11 at MN I 67,17.

²² MĀ 103 at T I 591b10: 此四受因無明.

²³ EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b7: 此四受由何而生? 然此四受由愛而生.

²⁴ MĀ 103 at T I 591b20 and EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b15.

²⁵ EĀ 27.2 at T II 644b16: 更無復有沙門出此上者, 能勝此者. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 6-7.

²⁶ MN 11 at MN I 63,29: *suññā parappavādā saman̄ehi aññe ti* (B^e-M I 92,9: *saman̄ehi aññehi* and S^e-M I 128,8: *saman̄ehi aññebhi*), which Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 159 translates as: “the doctrines of others are devoid of recluses”. MĀ 103 at T I 590b13: “heterodox practitioners are all devoid of and without recluses and Brahmins”, 異道一切空無沙門, 梵志. The remark made in MN 11 recurs in DN 16 at DN II 151,21

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version of the lion's roar thus appears less belligerent than the other two versions, in spite of being based on an actual encounter with and a challenge by other recluses, whereas in the other two versions the adversaries are only imagined.²⁷ Moreover, the *Ekottarika-āgama*'s lion's roar comes as a natural climax at the end of the exposition, whereas the other two versions have their lion's roar right at the beginning, which conveys a more confrontational impression. Due to these particulars and the fact that the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse does not make a disparaging statement about other teachings, its version of the lion's roar seems to spring from a less competitive spirit.

This would concord with the way other discourses depict the Buddha, indicating that his attitude towards other contemporary teachers was not competitive or disputatious.²⁸ It would be more in harmony with the stance recommended in the *Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta* and its Chinese parallel, according to which one should teach the Dharma without disparaging others.²⁹ To disparage others instead of teaching the Dharma, according to the two versions of this discourse, occurs when a statement is made in such a way as to belittle others. Taking a lead from this explanation given in the *Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta* and its parallel, to proclaim that the four types of [true] recluse can only be found in a teaching endowed with the noble eightfold path would still fall under "teaching the Dharma", but to then declare that all other teachings are devoid of any [true] recluses seems to be moving towards what the *Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta*'s exposition considers as "disparagement".³⁰

According to a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*, the Buddha described his own attitude with the words: "I do not dispute with the world, it is the world that disputes with me".³¹

The *Upāli-sutta* and its Chinese parallel, as well as the *Sīha-sutta*, agree in describing this non-contentious attitude of the Buddha on the occasion when well-known and influential supporters of the Jains became followers of the Buddha. According to these discourses, Sīha and Upāli expressed their pleasant surprise when the Buddha, instead

and in AN 4:239 at AN II 238,8. While AN 4:239 appears to be without a Chinese parallel, one of the parallels to DN 16, T 6 at T I 187c8, does not proclaim that other teachings are devoid of true recluses, thereby being closer in spirit to the lion's roar in EĀ 27.2.

²⁷ That is, EĀ 27.2 records a real debate, where, as Manné 1990: 73 points out, "something is always at stake. Not only must the best question be asked, and the best answer be given, but converts must be won and lay support must be gained". In contrast, MN 139 and MĀ 169 are only concerned with a hypothetical situation and thus much less in need of the belligerent attitude they display.

²⁸ Wijebandara 1993: 98 notes that a "characteristic of the Buddha's attitude is its unpolemic nature".

²⁹ MN 139 at MN III 231,27 and MĀ 169 at T I 701c17.

³⁰ As Freiberger 2000b: 5 points out, to declare that the teachings of others are devoid of [true] recluses implies "that the ideal of 'what an ascetic ought to be' is realized only in the Buddhist saṅgha", which does seem to spring from a somewhat polemic attitude.

³¹ SN 22:94 at SN III 138,26: *nāhañ ... lokena vivadāmi, loko ca mayā vivadati* (B^e-SN II 113,6: *va* instead of *ca*, C^e-SN III 238,11 and S^c-SN III 169,8: *ca kho bhikkhave*), and its parallel SĀ 37 at T II 8b16: 我不與世間諍, 世間與我諍.

of using their conversion for propaganda purposes, advised them to carefully consider what they were about to do and even requested them to continue supporting the Jain monks with alms, as they had done earlier.³² Such a magnanimous attitude in regard to other contemporary recluses would fit the way the discourses present a fully awakened Buddha better than the competitive tone of the lion's roar the *Cūlasīhanāda-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel attribute to him.

MN 12 *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta*

The *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the lion’s roar”, describes the ten powers and the four intrepidities of a Tathāgata, followed by an account of the Buddha’s ascetic practices before his awakening. This discourse has a parallel in an individual Chinese translation.³³ In addition, a few parts of a version of this discourse have been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.³⁴

Compared to the type of discourses usually included in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* is relatively long. Due to its length and its coverage of a variety of topics whose theme is the greatness of the Buddha, this discourse would have suited the *Dīgha-nikāya* better than the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection.

In view of this it comes as no surprise that the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins apparently allocated their version of this discourse to their *Dīrgha-āgama* collection.³⁵ This *Dīrgha-*

³² AN 8:12 at AN IV 185,9 (= Vin I 236,19) and MN 56 at MN I 379,3. According to the Chinese parallel to MN 56, MĀ 133 at T I 630a25, the Buddha even advised Upāli that he should not proclaim his conversion at all, in addition to recommending him to continue supporting the Jain monks.

³³ T 757 at T XVII 591c-600a, the 身毛喜豎經, a translation that according to the information given in the Taishō edition was undertaken by Wéijing (惟淨). T 757 and the Sanskrit fragment SHT IV 32 folio 41 R5 agree with the Pāli version on locating the discourse at Vesālī. While according to MN 12 the Buddha was staying in a grove to the west of Vesālī, according to the Sanskrit fragment he was staying in the Kūṭāgārasālā “on the shore of the Monkey Pond”, *markatāhradatīre*, on which cf. also below p. 223 note 95. The Kūṭāgārasālā near Vesālī occurs in several other Pāli discourses (e.g., MN 105 at MN II 252,2), which indicate that it was located in the Mahāvana.

³⁴ The fragments are SHT IV 32 folios 41-57 (pp. 134-142), SHT IV 500 folio 5 (pp. 222-223), SHT V 1102 (pp. 96-97, cf. also SHT VII p. 280), fragments 149/68, 149/134, and an unnumbered fragment of the Hoernle collection, edited as no. 133-135 in Hartmann 1991: 238-242 (no. 133 corresponds to Or. 15009/144 in Kudo 2009: 193-194, no. 134 to Or. 15009/65 in Nagashima 2009: 139). Of these fragments, SHT IV 32 folio 41R5 has preserved the discourse’s location. SHT IV 32 folio 42B5 could be a parallel to the Buddha’s eighth power, recollection of past lives at MN I 70,19, while SHT IV 500 folio 5V1-4 has parts of the ninth and tenth power found at MN I 70,32 and MN I 71,10. SHT IV 32 folios 43-54 parallels parts of the description of the five destinations of beings (*gati*) at MN I 73-76. SHT V 1102 and Hoernle fragment 149/134 or Or. 15009/144 parallel parts of the Buddha’s account of his ascetic practices at MN I 77-78, such as being naked and not cleaning himself, etc. Hoernle fragment 149/68 or Or. 15009/65 parallel the Buddha’s examination of purification theories at MN I 81-82. SHT IV 32 folio 55V1-2 parallels the Buddha explanation that he never lived in the Pure Abodes, found at MN I 82,2; cf. perhaps also Hoernle fragment 149/68R8 or Or. 15009/65V8. In addition to these, Hartmann 2004b: 126 notes another Sanskrit fragment parallel in the newly discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* manuscript.

³⁵ Cf. the survey of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin *Dīrgha-āgama* collection in Hartmann 2000: 367.

āgama version seems to have had the title “hair-raising” discourse,³⁶ similar to the individual Chinese translation, which has the title “discourse that raises the bodily hairs out of joy”.³⁷

This title occurs also in the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta* itself, which concludes with the Buddha dubbing this discourse his “hair-raising instruction”.³⁸ The title “hair-raising” recurs again in a *Jātaka* tale that parallels the beginning part of the present discourse and in references found in several later Pāli works.³⁹ These occurrences suggest that the Pāli version of the present discourse was known for quite some time under this title, instead of being referred to as the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta*.⁴⁰

In fact, title variations occur with considerable frequency not only between Pāli and Chinese versions of a discourse,⁴¹ but even between Pāli versions of the same discourse found in different *Nikāyas*, or between different Pāli editions of the same discourse.⁴²

³⁶ *Ro(maharṣaya)-sūtra*, reconstructed title (from an *uddāna* preserved in a Hoernle fragment) in Hartmann 1991: 237, who notes that the same title recurs in a reference to the present discourse in the **Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* in Lévi 1932a: 158,11: *romaharṣapīṭya sūtra*.

³⁷ T 757 at T XVII 591c11: 身毛喜豎經.

³⁸ MN 12 at MN I 83,25: *lomahaṃsanapariyāya*. The title *Lomahaṃsa* occurs also in the summary verse (*uddāna*) of the Burmese and Siamese editions, B^e-MN I 172,6 and S^e-MN I 247,17, even though these editions use *Mahāsihanāda* as the title, given at B^e-MN I 97,14 and S^e-MN I 137,1.

³⁹ This is the *Lomahaṃsa-jātaka*, Jā 94 at Jā I 389,14. In the *Milindapañha*, Mil 396,2, Nāgasena quotes part of the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta*, to which he refers as the *Lomahamsanapariyāya*. Another reference to the *Lomahamsanapariyāya* occurs in B^e-Ppk-a 104. Several Pāli works speak of the same discourse as the *Lomahaṃsa(na)-sutta*: Sv I 179,3, It-a I 109,1, B^e-Mp-ṭ II 256, B^e-Sp-ṭ I 334, B^e-Abhidhān-ṭ 504, and B^e-Sīkkh-abh-ṭ II 74. The *Cariyāpiṭaka*, Cp 35,23, entitles a set of stanzas (359-362) concerned with the bodhisattva’s ascetic practices as *Mahālomahāṃsacariyā*, the “great hair raising conduct”, cf. also Charpentier 1910a: 400-403.

⁴⁰ Although according to the subcommentary, B^e-Ps-ṭ II 40, the title *Mahāsihanāda* was accorded to this discourse at the time of the so-called first council by the reciting elders, the *sāriṇītikāramahātheras*, the substantial number of references to this discourse under the title *Lomahaṃsana* in later Pāli literature shows that this alternative title would have been known and in use for a considerable time period after that.

⁴¹ Two examples from the *Majjhima-nikāya* are the *Bahuvedanīya-sutta*, MN 59 at MN I 396, which recurs under the title *Pañcakanīga-sutta* in SN 36:19 at SN IV 223, and the *Cātumā-sutta*, MN 67 at MN I 456, which (without its first part) recurs under the title *Umibhaya-sutta* in AN 4:122 at AN II 123.

⁴² Title variations between different Pāli editions of the same *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses are the *Vatthūpama-sutta*, MN 7, where B^e has the title *Vattha-sutta*; the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, MN 26, where B^e and S^e have the title *Pāsarāsi-sutta*; the *Sekha-sutta*, MN 53, where S^e has the title *Sekhapatiṭpadā-sutta*; the *Upāli-sutta*, MN 56, where S^e has the title *Upālivāda-sutta*; the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, MN 61, where S^e has the title *Cūlārahulovāda-sutta*; the *Cūlamālunkya-sutta*, MN 63, where S^e has the title *Cūlamālunkyovāda-sutta*; the *Tevijjavacchagotta-sutta*, MN 71, where B^e has the title *Tevijjavaccha-sutta* and S^e the title *Cūlavacchagotta-sutta*; the *Aggivacchagotta-sutta*, MN 72, where B^e has the title *Aggivaccha-sutta*; the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, MN 73, where B^e has the title *Mahāvaccha-sutta*; the *Bakkula-sutta*, MN 124, where S^e has the title *Bakkulattheracchariyabhbūta-sutta*; and the *Mahāsalāyanika-sutta*, MN 149, where S^e has the title *Salāyatana vibhāga-sutta*; I already drew attention to these variations in Anālayo 2010m: 53. On title variations in the case of *Jātaka* tales cf. Feer 1875: 367-377, Jones 1979: 12, Lüders 1941/1966: 136-137, and von Hinüber 1998: 7-16.

This suggests that the title of a discourse was relatively open to change at least during the early stages of transmission.⁴³

The *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese counterpart begin with Sāriputta informing the Buddha that Sunakkhatta, a former monk who had left the Buddhist monastic community, was publicly disparaging the Buddha and his teaching. A difference between the two versions is that while according to the Pāli account Sunakkhatta proclaimed that the Buddha's teaching leads to the destruction of *dukkha*,⁴⁴ according to the Chinese version Sunakkhatta's proclamation was that the Buddha's teaching was not capable of leading to the destruction of *dukkha*.⁴⁵ As an attempt at disparaging the Buddha, the Chinese version seems more to the point.⁴⁶ Freedom from *dukkha* appears to have been a goal aspired to among other ancient Indian recluses and ascetics in general,⁴⁷ so that to disparage a teacher it would make sense to proclaim that he was not able to lead his disciples to this goal.

In reply to this challenge, according to both versions the Buddha gave a detailed description of his qualities and powers, indicating that one who continues to uphold such slander will end up in hell.

⁴³ Skilling 2009b: 64 comments that “there was no standardization of titles”, noting that, although this gives the impression “that the titles were devised later”, it also needs to be take into account that “many titles are shared by Mahāvihāra and Sarvāstivāda collection”, showing that these drew on an already existing common heritage.

⁴⁴ MN 12 at MN I 68,8: *n' atti samanassa gotamassa uttarim manussadhammā ... yassa ca khvāssa atthāya dhammo desito so niyyāti takkarassa sammā dukkhakkhayāyā ti* (B^e-MN I 97,18, C^e-MN I 165,23, and S^e-MN I 137,5: *uttari*). The first part of this proclamation, according to which the recluse Gotama has not reached any superhuman state, recurs in a Sanskrit fragment related to the ten powers, SHT I 18 V2-3 (p.11): *n-ās[t]ji śramaṇasya (g)[au](tama)sy-ottaraṇmanuṣyadharmmād-iti*. On the expression *uttarimanussadhamma* cf. also Anālayo 2008n.

⁴⁵ In T 757 at T XVII 591c22, the later part of his proclamation is: “how could [this teaching lead to] release, to the destruction and making an end of *dukkha*”, 豈能出要盡苦邊際?

⁴⁶ In MN 12 at MN I 69,1, the Buddha humorously points out that this proclamation was praise rather than slander. The commentary, Ps II 23,7, explains that in his proclamation Sunakkhatta had admitted that the Buddha's teaching led to the destruction of *dukkha* because he was afraid that, if he were to proclaim the opposite, he would provoke contradiction by those in Vesālī who had attained different levels of awakening through the Buddha's teaching. This commentarial gloss is not particularly convincing, since the same inhabitants of Vesālī would quite probably feel similarly inclined to contradict Sunakkhatta's proclamation that the Buddha had not reached any extraordinary knowledge or vision, etc. What this gloss does indicate, however, is that as a disparaging remark this statement did not sit well with the commentators, inducing them to attempt an explanation.

⁴⁷ DN 2 at DN I 54,20 reports the proposal, which it associates with Makkhali Gosāla, that fools and wise alike will reach the end of *dukkha* through a succession of rebirths, *bāle ca paññite ca sandhāvityā saṃsārityā dukhass' antam karissanti*. According to MN 14 at MN I 93,6, Nigantha Nātaputta taught how an end to *dukkha* can be reached through asceticism, *tapasā ... sabbam dukkham nijjinñam bhavissati*. The last indication receives confirmation, e.g., in the *Thāraṅga* 1.45 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 9,2, according to which one of the epithets to describe Mahāvīra's liberation is that he had eradicated all *dukkha*. Hamilton 1997: 279 remarks that “in the religious milieu in which he lived ... the Buddha was not alone in such a quest”.

MN I 69 The list of the Buddha's qualities differs to some extent in the two versions (see table 2.3). Both agree in beginning their respective lists with the qualities mentioned in the standard formulation for recollecting the Buddha. The Pāli version continues with the Buddha's ability to exercise supernormal powers, the divine ear, and the telepathic ability to read the mind of others. The individual Chinese translation instead lists the Buddha's ability to live in seclusion and to develop the four *jhānas*, the four immaterial attainments, and the attainment of cessation.

Table 2.3: Qualities of the Buddha in MN 12 and its Parallel

MN 12	T 757
rightly awakened, etc. (1)	rightly awakened, etc. (→ 1)
supernormal powers (2)	lives in seclusion
divine ear (3)	1 st <i>jhāna</i>
mind reading (4)	2 nd <i>jhāna</i>
10 powers of a Tathāgata (5)	3 rd <i>jhāna</i>
	4 th <i>jhāna</i>
	immaterial attainments & cessation
	10 powers of a Tathāgata (→ 5) (≠ 2-4)

Both discourses then turn to the ten powers of a Tathāgata, which they describe in similar terms, although differing in the sequence of their presentation (see table 2.4).⁴⁸ The *Mahāsihanāda-sutta* explains that these ten powers are the grounds for the Buddha to roar his lion's roar in assemblies and set rolling the wheel of Brahmā.⁴⁹ The Chinese version has a similar statement only in regard to the four intrepidities of the Tathāgata, which both discourses describe next.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ T 757 at T XVII 593a4 presents the Tathāgata's knowledge concerning the karmic result of deeds as its sixth knowledge, whereas in MN 12 at MN I 70,4 the same occupies the second position. Another difference is that in T 757 at T XVII 593a16 the divine eye precedes the recollection of past lives, whereas the usual sequence found in Pāli discourses follows the opposite order (cf. also below p. 243). Similar to T 757, in T 416 at T XIII 893c2 and in T 220 at T VI 966b17 the divine eye precedes the recollection of past lives in an enumeration of the ten powers of a Tathāgata. While the Chinese version of the *Dharmasaṅgraha*, T 764 at T XVII 661a22, does not mention the divine eye in its presentation of the ten powers at all, the Sanskrit version in Kasawara 1885/1999: 16 includes all three higher knowledges in its list, presenting them in the sequence found in MN 12. The sequence of the other powers in these works does not correspond to MN 12 or to T 757, or to any of the other parallels discussed below in note 65. The sequence of the ten powers found in T 757 recurs, however, in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 189,1 or in Senart 1882a: 159,12, and in Basak 1968/2004: 191,23 or in Senart 1897: 320,13. It is noteworthy that the *Mahāvastu* lists the ten powers in the same sequence as T 757. Although this similarity is obviously far from being in any way conclusive, it leaves open the possibility that T 757 could be related to a Mahāsāṅghika reciter tradition. On the ten powers cf. also Dessein 2009: 27-29.

⁴⁹ MN 12 at MN I 70,1.

⁵⁰ T 757 at T XVII 593b18.

Table 2.4: Ten Powers in MN 12 and its Parallel

MN 12	T 757
possible and impossible (1)	possible and impossible (→ 1)
karma (2)	all paths (→ 3)
ways to all destinations (3)	various elements in the world (→ 4)
various elements in the world (4)	different inclinations of beings (→ 5)
different inclinations of beings (5)	faculties of beings (→ 6)
faculties of beings (6)	karma (→ 2)
defilement/purity of concentration (7)	defilement/purity of concentration (→ 7)
recollection of past lives (8)	divine eye (→ 9)
divine eye (9)	recollection of past lives (→ 8)
destruction of influxes (10)	destruction of influxes (→ 10)

A difference in regard to the first of these four intrepidities is that while the Pāli version indicates that there is nothing left in regard to which the Buddha still has to awaken,⁵¹ thereby highlighting the completeness of his attainment of awakening, the Chinese version goes further and attributes omniscience to the Buddha (see table 2.5).⁵²

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Table 2.5: Four Intrepidities in MN 12 and its Parallel

MN 12	T 757
fully awakened (1)	omniscience (→ 1)
all influxes destroyed (2)	all influxes destroyed (→ 2)
knows what are obstructions (3)	declares desire and lust to be obstructions (→ 3)
teaching leads to destruction of <i>dukkha</i> (4)	teaching leads to destruction of <i>dukkha</i> (→ 4)

Regarding the third of the Buddha's four intrepidities in the Pāli version, which is based on his insight into which states should be reckoned as "obstructive states",⁵³ the Chinese parallel offers additional information as it identifies these obstructive states as desire and lust.⁵⁴ This suggestion squares well with the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, where the same term recurs in a proclamation made by the monk Aritṭha that what the Buddha considered as 'obstructive states' were not really obstructions, a proclamation that thus stands in direct contrast to this intrepidity of the Buddha.⁵⁵ The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* re-

⁵¹ According to MN 12 at MN I 71,35, nobody could rightly challenge the Buddha in the following terms: "while you claim to be fully awakened, these things you have not fully awakened to", *sammāsambuddhassa te patijānato ime dhammā anabhisambuddhā ti*.

⁵² According to T 757 at T XVII 593b20 the Buddha "knows everything", 一切智, and there is "nothing he does not know", 無所不知 (一切智 is a standard translation of *sarvajña*, cf., e.g., Hirakawa 1997: 9, Karashima 2001: 323, or Soothill 1937/2000: 2). The commentary to MN 12, Ps II 25,18, also attributes omniscience to the Buddha; on the attribution of omniscience to the Buddha cf. also below p. 416.

⁵³ MN 12 at MN I 72,6: *antarāyikā dhammā*, on this expression cf. Horner 1942/1983: 21 note 5.

⁵⁴ T 757 at T XVII 593c2 reports the Buddha saying: "I say, lust and desire are an obstruction to the path of the Dharma", 我說貪欲是障道法.

⁵⁵ MN 22 at MN I 130,10.

ports how other monks attempted to dissuade him from his view by bringing forth various similes on the danger of indulging in sensual desires. For them to immediately address the topic of sensual desires indicates that ‘obstructive states’ should indeed be understood to represent indulgence in sensuality.

After describing the four intrepidities of the Tathāgata, the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallel turn to the eight assemblies. Before continuing with the comparative study of these two discourses, however, I briefly survey other discourses that also mention the ten powers and four intrepidities of a Tathāgata.

In the Pāli discourses, the ten powers of a Tathāgata recur in the *Sīhanāda-sutta* in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, which introduces them by comparing the roar of an actual lion to the Tathāgata’s “lion’s roar” by teaching the Dharma.⁵⁶ The tendency to throw into relief the Buddha’s lion-like quality becomes even more prominent in a Sanskrit fragment of the *Daśabala-sūtra*, which has the drawing of a winged lion after each of the Buddha’s powers.⁵⁷

The ten powers occur also in a set of short discourses in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which describes various qualities the monk Anuruddha had reached through his practice of *satipaṭṭhāna*.⁵⁸ In addition to this, six out of the ten powers of a Tathāgata recur in another discourse in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, where they also constitute the reason for the Buddha’s ability to roar his lion’s roar in assemblies.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ AN 10:21 at AN V 32,18; cf. also AN 10:22 at AN V 37,6, where the ten powers similarly form the basis for the Buddha’s lion’s roar.

⁵⁷ Waldschmidt 1958 table I (between p. 386 and p. 387).

⁵⁸ SN 52:15-24 at SN V 304-306, where these ten powers are preceded by the ability to exercise supernormal powers, the divine ear, and the telepathic ability to read the mind of others, similar to the case of MN 12. Although this set of discourses does not seem to have Chinese counterparts, EĀ 46.4 at T II 777a12 and EĀ 50.6 at T II 812b11 both end with the Buddha encouraging his monks to develop these ten powers, which suggests that from their perspective these ten powers could indeed be attained by a disciple. However, according to the Pāli commentary, Spk III 263,8, disciples can develop these ten powers merely to a partial degree, as only Buddhas are able to fully develop them, *sabbākāraparipūrī*. The *Kathāvatthu*, Kv 228,1, maintains the same position against the Andhakas, whom it quotes as proposing that a disciple is capable of fully developing these ten powers; cf. also the discussion in Dessein 2009. The attribution of the ten powers to Anuruddha stands to some extent in contrast to SN 37:5-24 at SN IV 240-245. This group of discourses reports that Anuruddha, who has seen with his divine eye how some women were reborn in hell and others in heaven, asks the Buddha to explain the qualities that had caused the type of rebirth of these women. If Anuruddha was held to be possessed of the ten powers of a Tathāgata – one of which is comprehensive knowledge of karma and its fruit – there would be no need for him to be shown as inquiring about this from the Buddha. Yet, the point behind this set of discourses could also be that Anuruddha is asking for the benefit of others, since proclamations on karma and its fruit made by a disciple would have been more open to disbelief than if they come from the Buddha, as can be deduced from the way Mahāmoggallāna is reported to have made proclamations on this theme according to SN 19:1-21 at SN II 254-262. EĀ 51.3 at T II 816c9, however, states that the ten powers are outside of the domain of disciples, 此十力者非聲聞. For a comparison of the ten powers with the abilities of an arahant cf. de Silva 1987a: 40-42.

⁵⁹ AN 6:64 at AN III 417,17. The six powers mentioned here are knowledge of the possible and the impossible, of the results of karma, of the development of concentration, and the three higher knowledges.

Concerning the contents of the Tathāgata's lion's roar, made with the ten powers as its basis, two discourses found in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, both entitled *Dasabala-sutta*, offer further information.⁶⁰ According to their explanation, the Tathāgata's lion's roar is concerned with the impermanent nature of the five aggregates and with dependent arising (*paticca samuppāda*), two central aspects of the Dharma.

The ten powers of the Tathāgata have also been preserved in several Chinese discourses. A discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama* and an individual translation contrast the five powers of a disciple in higher training (*sekha*) with the ten powers of a Tathāgata.⁶¹ The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse agrees with the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* on the nature of the ten powers and also presents them as the grounds for the Buddha to roar his lion's roar in assemblies and set rolling the wheel of Brahmā.⁶² It differs from it in regard to the sequence of listing the ten powers.⁶³

The *Samyukta-āgama* version's sequence of the ten powers recurs in Sanskrit fragments of the *Daśabala-sūtra* and in two individual Chinese discourses similarly entitled "on the ten powers".⁶⁴ The same sequence can also be found in several other works preserved in Chinese and Sanskrit.⁶⁵

Endo 1997/2002: 19-20 holds that "the concept of *dasabala* (ten powers) attributed to the Buddha is a later development in the Canon", a development which "seems to have had an intermediate phase where only six powers of the Buddha are mentioned", a phase still reflected in AN 6:64. Lateness of the ten powers is also assumed by Choong 2009b: 50. Another set of five powers of a Tathāgata occurs at AN 5:11 at AN III 9,15, which completely differs from the set of ten, since it lists confidence (*saddhā*), shame (*hiri*), fear of wrongdoing (*ottappa*), energy (*viriya*), and wisdom (*paññā*).

⁶⁰ SN 12:21-22 at SN II 27-29.

⁶¹ These are SA 684 at T II 186c14 (translated in Waldschmidt 1932: 208-224) and T 802 at T XVII 747b8. Both versions identify the five spiritual faculties (*indriya*) as the five powers of a disciple in higher training. SA 701 at T II 189a8 also presents the ten powers of a Tathāgata as the grounds for the Buddha to roar his lion's roar in assemblies and set rolling the wheel of Brahmā. SA 701 abbreviates the description of the ten powers, with only the first and the last spelled out, which correspond to SA 684, T 802, and MN 12. Five out of the ten powers of a Tathāgata, again as the grounds for the Buddha to roar his lion's roar in assemblies and set rolling the wheel of Brahmā, occur as part of a set of altogether six powers in SA 686 at T II 187b28 and in SA 687 at T II 187c15.

⁶² T 802 at T XVII 747c17 differs from the *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Samyukta-āgama* lists in regard to one power, since instead of knowledge of the way to all destinations it speaks of knowledge of the nature of the likings and desires of sentient beings, 於諸眾生所樂欲性.

⁶³ As shown in table 2.4, MN 12 lists the possible and impossible (1st), karma (2nd), the way to all destinations (3rd), the different elements in the world (4th), the different inclinations of beings (5th), the faculties of beings (6th), the development of concentration (7th), recollection of past lives (8th), the divine eye (9th), and the destruction of the influxes (10th). Compared with MN 12, SA 684 has the sequence 1, 2, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 8, 9, and 10, a sequence found also in T 802 (except for the difference that this version has knowledge of the nature of the desires of being as its seventh knowledge, cf. above note 62).

⁶⁴ Sanskrit fragments of *Daśabala-sūtras* have been published in Chung 2009, de La Vallée Poussin 1911: 1063-1064, Lévi 1910: 443-444, Sander 1987: 181-182 and 185-192, Waldschmidt 1932: 209-225 and id. 1958: 384; cf. also SHT VI 1543 (p. 183), SHT VI 1564 (p. 190), SHT IX 2018 (p. 41), SHT IX 2066 (p. 82), SHT IX 2162 (p. 119); for Uighur fragments of a *Daśabala-sūtra* cf. Shōgaito 2002. The individual Chinese versions are T 780 at T XVII 717c14 (translated in Waldschmidt 1932: 208-224) and

A discourse in the *Ekottarika-āgama* takes up both the ten powers and the four intrepidities of the Tathāgata, explaining that endowed with these the Buddha is able to roar his lion's roar in assemblies.⁶⁶ This discourse differs from the Pāli versions not only in sequence, but also in regard to the content of two out of the ten powers. The *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta* and the other versions discussed so far speak of knowledge of the different inclinations of beings (*nānādhimuttikatā*) and of the diversity of their faculties (*indriyaparopariyatta*). The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instead has knowledge of the degree of wisdom of other beings and knowledge of the thoughts in others' minds.⁶⁷

Its description of such telepathic knowledge lists different states of mind, such as a mind with lust or without lust, a mind with anger or without, etc. Similar lists of such different states of mind can be found in the Pāli discourses in the context of *satipatṭhāna* meditation and of telepathic powers.⁶⁸ The same telepathic knowledge occurs likewise in the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta*, where it, however, precedes the ten knowledges.⁶⁹

Although the presentation of the powers in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version differs in wording, it may not be too different from the Pāli version in meaning. According to the exposition of the ten powers of a Tathāgata given in the *Vibhaṅga*, knowledge of the different inclination of beings is concerned with their inferior or superior disposition.⁷⁰ The inferior or superior disposition of beings could be taken as an expression of their respective wisdom, and thereby would not be too different from differing degrees of wisdom of beings, referred to in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version. The *Vibhaṅga* explains the Tathāgata's knowledge of the diversity of faculties of beings by describing his insight into their good and bad qualities, and into the presence of mental defilements in their minds,⁷¹ which may not be too different from the telepathic knowledge of the thoughts in their minds mentioned in the *Ekottarika-āgama* list.

T 781 at T XVII 718c18, the former entitled “discourse spoken by the Buddha on the ten powers”, 佛說十力經, and the latter “discourse spoken by the Buddha on the ten powers of a Buddha”, 佛說佛十力經. The presentation of the ten powers in the Sanskrit *Daśottara-sūtra* corresponds to the exposition found in the *Daśabala-sūtras*, cf. Schlingloff 1962a: 29. The ten powers are, however, absent from the *Dasuttara-sutta*, DN 34, and its *Dīrgha-āgama* parallel, DĀ 10, occurring only in an individual Chinese translation of a version of this discourse, T 13 at T I 241b9. Skilling 1980: 29 notes that Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabdhāṣṭaka* attributes an exposition on the ten powers to a *Daśottara-sūtra*.

⁶⁵ The same sequence of the ten powers (i.e. 1, 2, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 8, 9, 10) recurs in a discourse quotation in the *Abhidharmaśavyākhyā*, cf. Pruden 1990: 1196 note 164, in the *Abhidharmaśamuccaya*, T 1606 at T XXXI 760b11, in the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, T 223 at T VIII 255a28, in the **Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 235c22, and in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, T 1579 at T XXX 569a4; cf. also T 1562 at T XXIX 746a22, T 1581 at T XXX 956a27, T 1602 at T XXXI 499a3, and T 2131 at T LIV 1120c13, although the Sanskrit version of the *Mahāvyutpatti* in Sakaki 1926: 9 instead has the sequence 1, 2, 5, 4, 6, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10).

⁶⁶ EĀ 46.4 at T II 776b15; cf. also EĀ 46.3 at T II 776a19.

⁶⁷ EĀ 46.4 at T II 776b21: 知他眾生智慧多少 and 知他眾生心中所念.

⁶⁸ Cf., e.g., MN 10 at MN I 59,30 and MN 73 at MN I 495,5.

⁶⁹ MN 12 at MN I 69,24.

⁷⁰ Vibh 339,25: *hīnādhimuttika* and *pāṇītādhimuttika*.

⁷¹ Vibh 341,22+25 speaks of beings with good and bad qualities (*svākāra* and *dvākāra*), and Vibh 341,9

Having covered the ten powers of a Tathāgata, this *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse continues with the four intrepidities, which it presents in similar ways as the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta*, although differing in the sequence in which it lists them.⁷² The four intrepidities recur, moreover, as a discourse on its own in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*,⁷³ and in another *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse.⁷⁴

Returning to the comparative study of the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallel, the two discourses follow their description of the ten powers of the Tathāgata and his four intrepidities by taking up the eight assemblies. According to the Pāli version, the Buddha was able to approach any of these eight assemblies without fear due to his being endowed with the four intrepidities.⁷⁵ The Chinese version, which does not relate the Buddha's approaching the eight assemblies to his four intrepidities, indicates that the Buddha would teach the Dharma to the members of an assembly in such a way that they were unable to know if he was a human or a divine being.⁷⁶

Both versions reckon the Buddha's visit to the eight assemblies as another example of his possession of supernormal powers, thereby providing a contrast to Sunakkhatta's false accusations.

Next, the *Mahāsihanāda-sutta* takes up four ways of being born (*yoni*), presenting the Buddha's knowledge of these as further evidence that he was endowed with supernormal powers.⁷⁷ The four ways of being born are not mentioned in its Chinese parallel.

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lists among others such defilements as greed (*lobha*), anger (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), sloth (*thīna*) and restlessness (*uddhacca*), which recur explicitly or implicitly in the standard list of mental states for the exercise of telepathic powers in the Pāli discourses.

⁷² While EĀ 46.4 at T II 776c28 has the capability of the Dharma to lead to the destruction of *dukkha* as its third intrepidity, MN 12 at MN I 72,8 has the same as its last. Conversely, the Buddha's ability to point out obstructions, which comes as the third intrepidity in MN 12, occurs as fourth in EĀ 46.4. For other references to the four intrepidities cf. BHSD: 512 s.v. *vaiśāradya*.

⁷³ AN 4:8 at AN II 9,3. Sanskrit fragments that have preserved parts of an exposition of the four intrepidities are SHT IV 623 folio 5 (p. 252), SHT VI 1504 (p. 166), and SHT IX 2323 (p. 173). Only three intrepidities occur in AN 3:64 at AN I 186,33, which records how the Buddha confronted the rumours spread by the ex-monk Sarabha. The intrepidity not mentioned in AN 3:64 is the Buddha's insight into what are obstructions.

⁷⁴ EĀ 27.6 at T II 645b28 also presents the four intrepidities as the grounds for the Buddha to roar his lion's roar in assemblies and set rolling the wheel of Brahmā. EĀ 27.6 at T II 645c7 differs from the versions discussed so far in regard to one intrepidity, as it proclaims that the Buddha has already left behind deluding states, 今已離愚闍法, instead of mentioning the Buddha's insight into what are obstructions.

⁷⁵ MN 12 at MN I 72,21.

⁷⁶ T 757 at T XVII 593c26. A similar passage can be found in DN 16 at DN II 109,10 (with a Sanskrit counterpart in S 360 folio 179R3 in Waldschmidt 1950: 22) and in AN 8:69 at AN IV 307,15.

⁷⁷ MN 12 at MN I 73,3. The four ways of being born recur in DN 33 at DN III 230,22: *catasso yoniyo* and its parallel DĀ 9 at T I 50c8: 四生, in fragment K 484 (53)Vd in Stache-Rosen 1968: 26, which has preserved (*a*)*ṇḍajā yonir*, and in EĀ 25.5 at T II 632a8; cf. also SN 29:1-2 at SN III 240-241, SN 30:1-2 at SN III 246-247, and the *Mahāvyutpatti* no. 2279-2282 in Sakaki 1926: 168. The more detailed explanation of each way of being born in MN 12 recurs with further details in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, T 1536 at T XXVI 403b20, translated in Stache-Rosen 1968: 110. Windisch 1908: 191 draws attention to a similar

MN I 74 The two versions also turn to the Buddha's knowledge of the different destinations of beings (*gati*). According to an explanation given in the *Vibhaṅga*, this knowledge is an exemplification of one of the ten powers of a Tathāgata, namely his knowledge of the paths to any destination,⁷⁸ so that this part of the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallel can be seen as drawing out in more detail an aspect of their previous description of the ten powers.

According to the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta*, this type of knowledge comprises knowing the path that leads to:

- rebirth in hell,
- rebirth as an animal,
- rebirth as a ghost (*peta*),
- rebirth as a human,
- rebirth as a god,
- Nirvāṇa.⁷⁹

The Chinese version mentions the same destinations, in addition to which it also mentions rebirth as a demon, *asura* (see table 2.6).⁸⁰

According to both versions, the Buddha's knowledge in regard to these different destinations manifests in his ability to predict that someone who has a certain mental inclination and who adopts a certain type of conduct will probably be reborn in a particular realm, followed by later on witnessing with his divine eye that this has indeed happened.

presentation of four *yonis* in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 3.1.3, which differs in so far as it has birth from a seed as fourth, instead of spontaneous birth; cf. also Schmithausen 1991: 79-80. The Jain *Thāraṅga* 7.543 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 221,19 lists seven *yonis*; *Thāraṅga* 8.595 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 243,6 lists eight *yonis*.

⁷⁸ Vibh 339,10.

⁷⁹ MN 12 at MN I 73,18. On representations of the different destinations in Indian art, especially the *bhavacakra*, cf., e.g., Leoshko 2000/2001: 72-74, Mejor 2010, Przyluski 1920, Schlingloff 1988a: 167-174, id. 2000b plate xvii, 20, von Simson 2010, Zin 2003a: 440-456, and id. 2007; on the same in China cf., e.g., Teiser 2004b.

⁸⁰ T 757 at T XVII 594b8. DN 33 at DN III 264,11 and It 3:5:4 at It 93,1 similarly mention the *asuras* among different types of rebirth, cf. also Th 1128 and Thī 475, while DN 33 at DN III 234,8 and AN 9:68 at AN IV 459,14 cover only the five types of rebirth mentioned in MN 12, without taking account of the *asuras*. The *Kathāvatthu* at Kv 360,1 and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* in T 1545 at T XXVII 868b2 reject the inclusion of a sixth type of *gati*. The commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* at Kv-a 104,2 identifies those who assert six *gatis* to be the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas, so that the occurrence of six *gatis* in T 757 could point to another affinity of this text with the Mahāsāṅghika tradition, cf. also above note 48. Alternatively, the tendency to add the *asuras* to various listings could also be a general pattern, cf. Przyłuski 1927: 118-119 for another instance; cf. also Bodhi 2005: 435 note 6 on the difficulties involved in considering the realm of the *asuras* as a fourth bad destination, and Lamotte 1958/1988: 629-630 and id. 1970/1976: 1956-1957 for a survey of references to five or six *gatis*. Jaini 1979/1998: 108 note 3 quotes the *Sarvārthaśiddhi* 265 to the effect that the Jain tradition took account of four *gatis*: the realms of hell-beings, of animals, of men, and of gods, *gatiś caturbhedā, narakagatis tiryaggatir manusyagatir devagatir iti*. On *petas* cf. also Law 1923/1997.

Table 2.6: Destinations of Beings in MN 12 and its Parallel

MN 12	T 757
hell (1)	hell (→ 1)
animals (2)	animals (→ 2)
ghosts (3)	ghosts (→ 3)
human beings (4)	demons
gods (5)	human beings (→ 4)
Nirvāṇa (6)	gods (→ 5)
	Nirvāṇa (→ 6)

The two versions illustrate the different destinations with the predicament of a tired and thirsty man who travels on a hot day. This simile establishes the following correspondences for the various types of rebirth:

- in hell: falling into a blazing pit,
- as an animal: falling into a cesspit,
- as a ghost: trying to rest under a tree with little foliage on a hot day,
- as a human being: resting under a shady tree with plenty of foliage,
- in heaven: resting in a beautiful mansion.

The Chinese version also covers rebirth as a demon, which it compares to trying to rest under a small tree covered with ants.⁸¹ Both versions then compare realization of Nirvāṇa to being able to drink and bathe in a beautiful pond, notably the only case in which the thirsty and tired man is really able to overcome his plight.⁸²

A parallel to the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta*'s account of the Buddha's knowledge of the different destinations, found in a discourse in the *Ekottarika-āgama*,⁸³ agrees closely with the *Majjhima-nikāya* version and also does not mention the *asuras*.⁸⁴

After the exposition on the different destinations, the *Mahāśīhanāda-sutta* continues with the Buddha's former practice of four types of asceticism.⁸⁵ An account of the Buddha's former practice of these four types of asceticism likewise appears in the Chinese parallel,⁸⁶ where it forms part of the Buddha's examination of different theories on purification held by contemporary recluses and Brahmins.

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According to both versions, the Buddha had engaged in various austerities in vogue in ancient India, such as accepting food only under specific circumstances and at specified intervals, not cleaning the body, living in extreme seclusion, and exposing the body to

⁸¹ T 757 at T XVII 595a16.

⁸² Cf. Hecker 2009: 12.

⁸³ EĀ 50.6 at T II 811b1.

⁸⁴ Another parallelism is that EĀ 50.6 at T II 812b11 also refers to the ten powers.

⁸⁵ MN 12 at MN I 77,23, the *caturaṅgasamannāgata brahmacariya*.

⁸⁶ T 757 at T XVII 597a7: 修四種之法. A partial parallel to the account of austerities given under this heading in MN 12 and T 757 can be found in EĀ 31.8 at T II 670c3, which reports that the Buddha exposed himself to the vicissitudes of climate, dwelled in a cemetery, and fed on cow dung. EĀ 31.8 continues with a description of the Buddha's austerities and awakening which parallels the account given in MN 36 at MN I 242,23.

the vicissitudes of the climate – austerities that recur in other discourses as examples of futile asceticism.⁸⁷

A solution to the contrast between the criticism of these practices voiced in other discourses and their occurrence in the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* and its parallel in an exposition of praiseworthy qualities of the Buddha can be found in the *Lomahamsa-jātaka*. This *Jātaka* tale indicates that the bodhisattva undertook these ascetic practices in a former life as a naked ascetic, ninety-one aeons ago.⁸⁸ In fact, some aspects of the austerities described in this part of the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* would not fit too well with the narrative of the present lifetime of the Buddha.⁸⁹ Thus the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta*'s treatment of these four types of asceticism appears to be part of the Buddha's account of his experiments with various ways and methods of purification during former lifetimes.

The same theme continues in the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* and its parallel, which mention several other experiences of the bodhisattva in former lives that had made him realize the futility of various other approaches to purification. In regard to the theory that purification can be obtained through a particular type of rebirth, for example, both versions state that he had already experienced all types of rebirth, except rebirth in the Pure Abodes, for had he been born in this realm, he would not have returned to this world.⁹⁰

Unlike the *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta*, the account in the Chinese discourse also covers:

- the Buddha's present life asceticism,
- his memory of a former experience of the first *jhāna*,
- his decision to give up asceticism and take nourishment, which caused his five companions to abandon him,
- his development of the four *jhānas* and his awakening.⁹¹

⁸⁷ MN 51 at MN I 342,25, MN 94 at MN II 161,26, AN 3:151 at AN I 295,8, and AN 4:198 at AN II 206,7; for an examination of the austerities described in such listings cf. Bollée 1971.

⁸⁸ Jā 94 at Jā I 390,16: *atīte ekanavutikappamathake bodhisatto ... ājīvikapabbajjam pabbajitvā acelako ahosi rajojalliko*, pointed out by Hecker 1972: 54. This *Jātaka* tale begins by referring to Sunakkhatta's disparagement of the Buddha, so that there can be no doubt that it refers to the same occasion as MN 12.

⁸⁹ Dutoit 1905: 50 notes that the description of the bodhisattva's solitary dwelling in a forest given in MN 12 at MN I 79,1, according to which he would hide as soon as he saw a cowherd or shepherd from afar, stands in contrast to the traditional account according to which the bodhisattva was in the company of the five monks during his ascetic practices. Dutoit also points out an inner contradiction, where MN 12 at MN I 78,19 describes the bodhisattva undertaking the practice of bathing in water three times a day, but then at MN I 78,23 depicts how dust and dirt had accumulated on his body over the years to the extent that it was falling off in pieces. Freiberger 2006: 238 notes another contradiction between the reference to nakedness at MN I 77,28 and the wearing of different types of ascetic garment described at MN I 78,10. All these practices would indeed only fit a description of a whole past life of asceticism, or even of several lives, where at one stage he might have undertaken the practice of bathing, and at a later stage completely stopped washing until the dirt fell off his body; or at one stage practiced nakedness and at another stage worn various ascetic garments. This further supports the conclusion that these descriptions do not refer to the accounts of the period of asceticism undertaken by the bodhisattva in his last lifetime.

⁹⁰ MN 12 at MN I 82,1 and T 757 at T XVII 596b20; cf. also EĀ 31.8 at T II 672a18.

⁹¹ T 757 at T XVII 599a14 (memory of first *jhāna*) and T 757 at T XVII 599c11 (destruction of the influxes).

This part of the Chinese discourse thus parallels the account of the Buddha's progress to awakening given in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.⁹²

The *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* continues with the Buddha's declaration that despite his advanced age he is still in full possession of his wisdom and lucidity, so much so that he would be able to discuss the four *satipatṭhānas* with four disciples during a period of a hundred years without running short of explanations.⁹³ Only parts of this declaration are found in the Chinese parallel.⁹⁴

The *Mahāsīhanāda-sutta* and its Chinese parallel conclude by reporting that a monk, who was fanning the Buddha,⁹⁵ proclaimed that on hearing this discourse his hair stood up, which led the Buddha to baptize this discourse as the “hair-raising” instruction.

MN 13 *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta*

The *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the aggregate of *dukkha*”, expounds the full understanding of:

- sensual pleasures,
- material form,
- feeling.

This discourse has four Chinese parallels, one of which is found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, another parallel occurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, while the remaining two parallels are individual translations.⁹⁶

⁹² MN 36 at MN I 246,31.

⁹³ MN 12 at MN I 82,32. Line R6 of an unnumbered Sanskrit fragment from the Hoernle collection, no. 135 in Hartmann 1991: 241, suggests that the Sanskrit version also followed an examination of the different purification theories with the theme of the wisdom of a young man that is lost with old age, paralleling MN 12 at MN I 82,22. The Buddha's ability to deliver teachings on the development of mindfulness for a period of a hundred years to four disciples, whose swiftness of wisdom is comparable to a skilled archer, can also be found as a discourse on its own in SĀ 612 at T II 171c7, translated in Hurvitz 1978: 220. Another relevant discourse is MĀ 163 at T I 693c7, which also illustrates the inexhaustibility of the Buddha's teaching with his ability to explain the Dharma to four disciples continuously for a period of hundred years (except for the time required to nourish, relieve and rest their bodies), although it does not specify his teaching to be concerned with the four *satipatṭhānas*, cf. also below p. 785.

⁹⁴ T 757 at T XVII 599c18 agrees with MN 12 on reporting that some recluses and Brahmins held the view that the wisdom of a young man will be lost with old age. T 757 at T XVII 600a7 also speaks of disciples endowed with a long life that put questions to the Buddha. Other parts of this account in T 757, however, differ considerably from MN 12, for instance T 757 at T XVII 600a21 does not bring in the topic of *satipatṭhāna*, but instead reports that the Buddha would teach on pleasure, pain, and neither-pleasure-nor-pain.

⁹⁵ MN 12 at MN I 83,19 and T 757 at T XVII 600a24.

⁹⁶ The parallels are MĀ 99 at T I 584c-586a, EĀ 21.9 at T II 604c-606b, T 53 at T I 846c-848a, and T 737 at T XVII 539b-541a. All of these parallels agree with MN 13 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove near Sāvatthī. MĀ 99 and T 53 agree with MN 13 on the title “discourse on the aggregate of *dukkha*”, 苦陰經 (which T 53 qualifies as a discourse “spoken by the Buddha”, 佛說苦陰經), although neither of them specifies this discourse as a “greater” one. EĀ 21.9 may have had the same title, as 苦陰 occurs in

MN I 84 The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, and one of the individual translations begin with a group of monks who, on their way to town to beg for alms, have a meeting with some other wanderers.⁹⁷ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the other individual translation, however, these other wanderers had come to visit the monks.⁹⁸

According to all versions, the monks were confronted with a challenge by these wanderers, being asked to point out the difference between their teaching and the Buddha's teaching regarding the full understanding of sensual pleasures, form, and feelings.⁹⁹ Apparently unable to reply to this challenge, the monks went to see the Buddha in order to learn from him how such a question should be answered.

MN I 85 According to the *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta* and its parallels, the Buddha told the monks that they should reply to such a challenge by querying those other wanderers about the gratification (*assāda*), danger (*ādīnava*), and release (*nissarana*) in relation to sensual pleasures, form, and feelings.¹⁰⁰ Wanderers of other traditions who are faced with such a question would be unable to reply, since only a Tathāgata or someone who has learned it from him will be able to satisfactorily expound these three aspects.

The *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta* and its parallels continue by providing the details of such an exposition, indicating that the gratification of sensual pleasures is the pleasure derived from the five senses. Regarding the dangers of sensual pleasures, the parallel versions show some variations (see table 2.7). They agree that the need to toil in order to obtain wealth should be reckoned as a danger inherent in the quest for sensual pleasures, and that another danger is to be found in the difficulties involved in protecting such wealth, once it has been acquired.

MN I 86 The *Majjhima-nikāya* version notes as another danger that, for the sake of gaining sensual pleasures, kings, Brahmins and warriors, as well as family members – such as mother and child, brother and sister – will dispute and quarrel. According to its presentation, these might go so far as to take up weapons and inflict harm or death on each other.¹⁰¹

the relevant section of the summary verse of the *Ekottarika-āgama* at T II 606c28 (following the 宋, 元, 明, and 聖 variant reading 苦陰 instead of 苦除). T 737 has the title “discourse on [how] objects of desire lead to dukkha”, 所欲致患經. For a remark on MĀ 99 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 61. EĀ 21.9 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 2004: 59-63 and 216-221. According to the information given in the Tai-shō edition, T 53 was translated by an unknown translator, while T 737 should be attributed to Dharmarakṣa. For counterparts to MN 13 at MN I 85,22-29 in *Vyākyāyukti* literature cf. Skilling 2000b: 342.

⁹⁷ MN 13 at MN I 84,4 and EĀ 21.9 at T II 604c11 indicate that the monks had gone to visit those wanderers, a detail not mentioned in T 737 at T XVII 539b15. Hartmann 1992: 41 notes that in the Hoernle collection a fragment that might be a parallel to MN 13 at MN I 83 can be found.

⁹⁸ MĀ 99 at T I 584c11 and T 53 at T I 846c10.

⁹⁹ T 737 at T XVII 539b16 differs, as here the wanderers' challenge does not explicitly refer to understanding these three.

¹⁰⁰ T 737 at T XVII 539b25 only mentions sensual pleasures at this point, although its later treatment does cover sensual pleasures, form, and feelings. A reference to the Buddha's teaching of the three types of full understanding can also be found in AN 10:29 at AN V 65,1, which adds his teaching on fully understanding Nirvāṇa as fourth.

¹⁰¹ MN 13 at MN I 86,18.

Table 2.7: Disadvantages of Sensual Pleasures in MN 13 and its Parallels

MN 13	MĀ 99 & T 53
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - suffer to earn living (1) - make no profit (2) - lose profit by theft, etc. (3) - relatives & kings quarrel & fight (4) - battle fighting (5) - bastion fighting (6) - punishment for crimes (7) - evil rebirth (8) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - suffer to earn living, no profit, lose it (→ 1, 2, 3) - relatives quarrel (→ 4) - kings quarrel & fight (→ 4) - battle fighting (→ 5) - bastion fighting (→ 6) - punishment for crimes (→ 7) - regret evil deeds - evil rebirth (→ 8)
EĀ 21.9	T 737
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - suffer to earn living (→ 1) - make no profit (→ 2) - worry about losing profit (→ 3) - lose profit by theft, etc. (→ 3) - battle fighting (→ 5) - bastion fighting (→ 6) - sensual pleasures are impermanent (≠ 4, 7-8) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - suffer to earn living, no profit, lose it (→ 1, 2, 3) - relatives quarrel (→ 4) - battle fighting (→ 5) - relatives are angry with each other (→ 4) - fighting (→ 6?) - punishment for crimes (→ 7) - evil rebirth (→ 8)

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse does not take up this theme at all, and one of the individual translations only mentions quarrel among family members.¹⁰² The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the other individual translation present this danger in two consecutive steps. First they describe how members of a family may get into dispute with each other, then they turn to the arising of quarrelling among kings, Brahmins and warriors. Only in relation to the second group do these two Chinese versions envisage the possibility that such quarrel could lead to taking up weapons or even to killing.¹⁰³

A presentation similar to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and this individual translation recurs in Sanskrit fragments of the *Mahalla-sūtra* (a discourse otherwise without a Pāli counterpart), which offers an examination of the gratification, danger, and release in relation to sensual pleasures that is similar to the *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta*. In its examination of the dangers of sensual pleasures, the *Mahalla-sūtra* only speaks of the taking up of weapons in relation to quarrels that have arisen among warriors and Brahmins, etc., whereas in relation to family members, it merely envisages verbal dispute.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² T 737 at T XVII 539c20.

¹⁰³ MĀ 99 at T I 585a19 and T 53 at T I 847a21. The parallels to MN 14, MĀ 100 at T I 586c12, T 54 at T I 848c18, and T 55 at T I 850a4 also depict family members quarrelling only verbally with each other, in contrast to kings, etc., who go so far as to inflict physical harm or even kill each other. An example for killing among family members would be the tale of Prince Ajātasattu, who is reported to have killed his own father out of desire for the throne, cf. DN 2 at DN I 85,16, DĀ 27 at T I 109c9, EĀ 43.7 at T II 764a16, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 251,22. However, this instance would still be in line with the depiction in MĀ 99 and T 53, as it also falls under the category of kings killing each other.

¹⁰⁴ According to the reconstruction of fragment 429r3 of the *Mahalla-sūtra* in Melzer 2006: 362, warriors,

The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and the two individual translations reckon the evils of warfare, the suffering caused by burglary and other unlawful acts, and the consequent brutal punishments apparently prevalent in ancient India for such deeds as other dangers of sensual pleasures.¹⁰⁵ The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse also takes up the danger of warfare,¹⁰⁶ although it does not describe the danger of being punished for burglary and similar acts.

MN I 87 The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and the two individual translations note as another danger that desire for sensual enjoyment often leads to evil conduct by way of body, speech, and mind.

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version and one of the individual translations only draw attention to the resulting unfavourable rebirth as a future danger,¹⁰⁷ the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the other individual translation also mention the worry and regret experienced by such an evildoer as a danger visible in the present life.¹⁰⁸ The *Ekottarika-āgama* account instead completes its exposition of the dangers of sensual pleasures by highlighting their impermanent nature.¹⁰⁹

The five versions agree that the eradication of desire is the way to go beyond sensual pleasures.¹¹⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and one of the individual translations conclude their exposition of sensual desires by declaring that only recluses and Brahmins who understand the gratification, danger, and release in relation to sensual desires will be able to go beyond sensual pleasures and lead others to achieving the same.¹¹¹

Brahmins, and householders will go so far as to attack each other physically in various ways, whereas in the case of family members fragment 429r1 only speaks of verbal dispute. The same also holds for a comparable exposition in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which envisages only verbal dispute among family members, cf. Shukla 1973: 79,6 or ŠSG 1998: 122,5 and T 1579 at T XXX 408c6.

¹⁰⁵ For an explanation of what these punishments actually entail cf. Barua 1971/2003: 482-483; cf. also the translations of extracts from commentarial explanations of these punishments, provided by Woodward 1932/1960: 42-43 in the footnotes to his translation of another occurrence of such descriptions.

¹⁰⁶ EĀ 21.9 at T II 605a28.

¹⁰⁷ MN 13 at MN I 87,23 and T 737 at T XVII 540a21.

¹⁰⁸ MĀ 99 at T I 585b29 and T 53 at T I 847b27 compare this regret to the shadow of a great mountain that covers the earth. The same metaphor can also be found in MN 129 at MN III 164,29 and its parallel MĀ 199 at T I 759b28, where it illustrates the regret experienced by an evil doer. The same image recurs, moreover, in two parallels to MN 14, MĀ 100 at T I 587a23 and T 55 at T I 850b12; for another occurrence cf. SĀ 1244 at T II 341a11 and the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 80,17 or ŠSG 1998: 124,12 and T 1579 at T XXX 408c27.

¹⁰⁹ EĀ 21.9 at T II 605b8.

¹¹⁰ MN 13 at MN I 87,29, MĀ 99 at T I 585c11, EĀ 21.9 at T II 605b10, T 53 at T I 847c9, and T 737 at T XVII 540a26. The same is also the way to go beyond form and feeling.

¹¹¹ MN 13 at MN I 87,32, MĀ 99 at T I 585c13, and T 53 at T I 847c11. EĀ 21.9 at T II 605b11 has a related statement, although it speaks only of the need to know the danger and the release in regard to sensual desires, thereby not mentioning the need to understand the gratification. T 737 at T XVII 540b3 also indicates that removal of lust is the condition for recluses and Brahmins to reach liberation themselves and liberate others, although the first part of its exposition on gratification and danger, etc., seems to have suffered from some textual corruption.

Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta and its parallels next turn to form, illustrating the gratification of form with the example of a beautiful young girl. The corresponding danger becomes evident once the same girl grows old, succumbs to disease, and finally passes away, at which time her formerly so beautiful body will undergo decay and decomposition.¹¹² MN I 88

In relation to feelings, the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and the two individual translations agree that the gratification of feelings is to be found in the four *jhānas*.¹¹³ All versions attribute the danger of feelings to their impermanent nature and propose detachment as the release in regard to them. MN I 89

While the other versions conclude with the delighted reaction of the listeners, the *Ekottarika-āgama* ends with an exhortation by the Buddha to meditate and not be negligent, lest later one regret it.¹¹⁴

MN 14 *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta*

The *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on the aggregate of *dukkha*”, examines the nature of sensual pleasures. This discourse has three Chinese parallels, one of which occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama*, while the other two are individual translations.¹¹⁵

¹¹² MN 13 at MN I 88,28, MĀ 99 at T I 585c27, EĀ 21.9 at T II 605c7, T 53 at T I 847c25, and T 737 at T XVII 540b14; a reference to this mode of exposing the ‘danger’ can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 117a14.

¹¹³ MN 13 at MN I 89,32, MĀ 99 at T I 586a18, T 53 at T I 848a17, and T 737 at T XVII 540c15. EĀ 21.9 at T II 606a23 differs considerably from the other versions, since it expounds the gratification in relation to feeling with the example of the practice of mindfulness of feeling (described in the same way as the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to MN 10, EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b27, describes contemplation of feeling as a *satipatthāna* practice). The subsequent passage on the danger of feeling in EĀ 21.9 at T II 606b8 has no formal introduction, unlike earlier passages of this type in EĀ 21.9, but instead begins with the conjunction “again”, 復次, the equivalent of *puna ca param*, even though it treats a different topic. This gives the impression that an error in textual transmission may have occurred, all the more probable since contemplation of feeling does not fit the present context; cf. also Huyen-Vi 2004: 220 note 11.

¹¹⁴ EĀ 21.9 at T II 606b27.

¹¹⁵ The parallels are MĀ 100 at T I 586b-587c, T 54 at T I 848b-849b, and T 55 at T I 849b-851a. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 54 was translated by Zhī Qīan (支謙) and T 55 by Fǎjù (法炬) (I am indebted to Jan Nattier for kindly sharing a draft translation of T 54 with me). All versions agree on locating the discourse in Nigrodha’s Grove at Kapilavatthu. MĀ 100 has the title “discourse on the aggregate of *dukkha*”, 苦陰經. T 54 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha to the Sakyan Mahānāma”, 佛說釋摩男經 (leaving out of count the additionally mentioned 本四子, on which Nattier 2008: 128 comments “what the characters ... 本四子 ‘original four sons’ (?) are doing here is not at all clear”, followed by noting that “the title given in the Taishō edition is apparently a recent development; at any rate, it does not appear in any of the medieval catalogues produced through the eighth century CE”). T 55 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on cases that cause the aggregate of *dukkha*”, 佛說苦陰因事經. For a counterpart to MN 14 at MN I 92,26 in *Vyākhyāyukti* literature cf. Skilling 2000b: 342. A reference to the present discourse in Jā 258 at Jā II 314,5 speaks of the *Dukkhakkhandhasuttapariyāya*, noted by von Hinüber 1998: 84.

MN I 91 According to the *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta* and its Chinese parallels, the Sakyan Mahānāma visited the Buddha and inquired after the reason why greed, anger, and delusion were still able to overpower him.¹¹⁶ The Buddha replied by turning to the topic of sensual pleasures. He explained that what caused Mahānāma to get overpowered by unwholesome states was also responsible for the fact that he still lived the life of a householder and indulged in sensual enjoyment.

According to the *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta*, the Buddha continued by describing his pre-awakening insight into the trifling enjoyment afforded by sensual pleasures and the great misery that results from them.¹¹⁷ Despite this insight, he could go beyond the attraction of sensual pleasures only after attaining a type of happiness that is aloof from sensuality. The commentary explains that this statement refers to the happiness of *jhāna* attainment.¹¹⁸ A to some degree related statement can be found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version and in one of the individual translations, occurring, however, only after the exposition of the various disadvantages caused by sensual pleasures and without being related to the Buddha's pre-awakening experiences.¹¹⁹

MN I 92 The Pāli and Chinese versions agree in describing the disadvantages of sensual pleasures in terms similar to the analogous exposition found in the *Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta* and its Chinese parallels.

With this exposition completed, the *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta* and its parallels turn to a previous encounter between the Buddha and Jain ascetics engaged in self-mortification.¹²⁰ The four versions agree that these Jains explained that their ascetic practices had the purpose of eradicating the retribution for evil deeds done in the past. The *Cūlādukkhakkhandha-sutta* reports that the Buddha questioned the Jains whether they knew about their past deeds to be eradicated and about the successful eradication undertaken so far,¹²¹ a query found in a more brief manner also in one of the individual translations.¹²² According to the Pāli account, the Buddha concluded his examination of the self-mortification undertaken by the Jains by humorously suggesting that those who have done evil deeds in the past will, if reborn as a human, go forth as Jain ascetics. A

¹¹⁶ MN 14 at MN I 91,13, MĀ 100 at T I 586b9, T 54 at T I 848b12, and T 55 at T I 849c4. Ps II 61,22 explains that at the time of asking this question Mahānāma had already progressed to the level of a once-returner.

¹¹⁷ MN 14 at MN I 92,2.

¹¹⁸ Ps II 63,2.

¹¹⁹ MĀ 100 at T I 587b11 and T 55 at T I 850b29.

¹²⁰ MN 14 at MN I 92,26, MĀ 100 at T I 587b13, T 54 at T I 849a12, and T 55 at T I 850c1. An encounter between the Buddha and Jain ascetics, their reasoning on the need to reach freedom from *dukkha* by way of self-mortification, and the subsequent comparison between the pleasure experienced by King Bimbisāra and the Buddha, are also recorded in EĀ 41.1 at T II 744a27. The first part of EĀ 41.1 at T II 744a2, however, parallels SN 55:21 at SN V 369, a discourse that records another encounter of the Buddha with the Sakyan Mahānāma, during which the Buddha assured Mahānāma that he would not meet an evil rebirth even in the event of a sudden death.

¹²¹ MN 14 at MN I 93,15.

¹²² T 54 at T I 849a20.

similar suggestion is also found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version and in one of the individual translations.¹²³

The same two Chinese versions agree with the Pāli discourse that the Jains replied by contrasting the greater pleasure experienced by the king of the country with the lesser pleasure experienced by the Buddha, thereby apparently emphasizing that indulging in pleasure will not lead to freedom from *dukkha*.¹²⁴ According to all versions, the Buddha countered this argument by proclaiming that he was able to remain motionless for a period of up to seven days, all the while experiencing pure happiness, thereby forcing the Jains to admit that in respect to dwelling in pleasure the Buddha was superior even to the king of the country.

The reference to the pleasures that can be experienced by someone gone forth suggests that the point of recounting this former meeting with Jain ascetics to Mahānāma was to show him that going forth, the step required of Mahānāma if he wanted to progress further, could yield an experience of happiness superior even to that available to the king of the country.

Looking back on the present and the previous discourse, a further comment on their respective titles may not be out of place. Both discourses examine the “aggregate of *dukkha*”, differing in their title in so far as the present discourse is the *cūla* (“lesser”) version of the two, while the previous discourse is its *mahā* (“greater”) counterpart.

In as much as their respective length is concerned, both appear to be roughly the same. The length of their introductory parts is about the same, both share the same long and detailed exposition on the disadvantages of sensual pleasures, and the exposition on bodily form and feelings in the “greater” version is approximately of the same length as the encounter of the Buddha with the Jain ascetics described in its “lesser” counterpart.

Apart from length, the qualifications “greater” and “lesser” could be related to the importance of the respective subject matter, or else one of the two discourses could serve as an introduction or a supplement to the other.¹²⁵ Concerning importance, whereas the “greater” of the two discourses gives a more detailed exposition on “the aggregate of *dukkha*” by examining material form and feeling, in addition to sensual pleasures, the “lesser” version has an exposition of the futility of self-mortification, a topic that also pertains to the “aggregate of *dukkha*”. Hence there would seem to be no self-evident reason for considering one exposition to be substantially more important than the other one. Both discourses also stand well on their own, none of them serving as an introduction or supplement to the other.

¹²³ MN 14 at MN I 93,34, MĀ 100 at T I 587b25, and T 55 at T I 850c14.

¹²⁴ Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 27 note 4 points out that the statement attributed to the Jains in MN 14 at MN I 94,12 that happiness cannot be reached through happiness (with a similar statement found in MĀ 100 at T I 587b28) has a counterpart in *Sūyagada* 1.3.4.6, which criticizes the view that pleasure can be gained through pleasure, cf. Bollée 1988: 19,11, translated ibid. p. 129; cf. also Jacobi 1895/1996: 269 note 4.

¹²⁵ Horner 1953/1980: 194 suggests three possible reasons for distinguishing between the *mahā* and the *cūla* version of a discourse: length, importance of the subject treated, or the possibility that the *cūla* version is supplementary or introductory to its *mahā* counterpart.

Although the textual material is of roughly equal length in the case of both discourses, once they are recited during actual oral transmission, the part common to both can be abbreviated in the discourse which is placed second. Thereby the second of the two becomes indeed “lesser” in length, because the entire exposition on the disadvantages of sensual pleasures can be covered with a simple *pe*, used in the Pāli textual tradition to mark abbreviations. Thus the decision to distinguish these two discourses as “lesser” and “greater” versions, a distinction not found in their Chinese parallels, would probably have been taken only at a time when these two discourses were already part of a formalized set of transmitted material.

MN 15 *Anumāna-sutta*

The *Anumāna-sutta*, the “discourse on inference”, presents an exposition by Mahāmoggallāna on the unwholesome qualities that will prevent a monk from being admonished and instructed by his fellow monks. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and another parallel in an individual translation.¹²⁶

MN I 95 While the *Anumāna-sutta* begins directly with Mahāmoggallāna addressing the monks, its two Chinese parallels provide some additional background to Mahāmoggallāna’s exposition, as they indicate that the present discourse took place at the end of the annual retreat period. According to monastic observances, at the conclusion of this period of three months the monks will invite each other to point out possible shortcomings at the *pavāraṇā* ceremony.¹²⁷ Although the *Anumāna-sutta* does not provide an explicit relation to the annual retreat or the *pavāraṇā* ceremony, Mahāmoggallāna’s exposition begins by describing how a monk “invites” (*pavāreti*) other monks to admonish him,¹²⁸ a verb that supports associating this discourse with the monastic observance of “inviting” (*pavāraṇā*) critique by other monks.

¹²⁶ The parallels are MĀ 89 at T I 571c-572c and T 50 at T I 842b-843b. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 50 was translated by Dharmarakṣa. MĀ 89 has the title “discourse on a monk’s invitation”, 比丘請經, while the title of T 50 is 佛說受歲經, “discourse spoken by the Buddha at the completion of the rains retreat” (受歲, which besides being part of the title occurs also in T 50 at T I 842b7, would correspond to 受夏坐 in the counterpart passage in MĀ 89 at T I 571c2). The term *vassa* or *varṣa* can mean “rain” and also “year”, which may have made the translator use 歲. While MN 15 has the Deer Park at Sumsumāragiri in the Bhaggā country as its location, the two Chinese versions take place at the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground near Rājagaha.

¹²⁷ The *pavāraṇā* regulations can be found at Vin I 160,23; for the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda versions cf. Chung 1998. An actual instance of such “inviting” is recorded in SN 8:7 at SN I 190,30 (or SN² 215 at SN² I 410,18), with its counterparts in MĀ 121 at T I 610b3, SĀ 1212 at T II 330a14, SĀ² 228 at T II 457b9, EĀ 32.5 at T II 677a8, T 61 at T I 858b22, T 62 at T I 859c7, and T 63 at T I 861b23, cf. also Zieme 1988 (on SĀ 1212 and SĀ² 228 cf. also Choong 2007: 39). A description of how this observance was carried out in India in the seventh century can be found in the travel records of Yījīng (義淨) in T 2125 at T LIV 217b20, translated in Takakusu 1966: 86-88; cf. also Hazra 1983/2002: 59-60; on the reliability of Yījīng’s descriptions cf. Barrett 2005.

¹²⁸ MN 15 at MN I 95,12: *pavāreti ce pi, āvuso, bhikkhu.*

The point of Mahāmoggallāna's exposition was that, even when invited, other monks will hold back with their advice and criticism if a monk exhibits certain unwholesome qualities, whereby such a monk will miss an important opportunity for improving himself. The listing of these unwholesome qualities shows some variations in the three versions (see table 2.8).

The *Anumāna-sutta* and its Chinese parallels agree that the following qualities will prevent a monk from receiving advice and criticism:

- having evil wishes,
- being prone to anger or angry speech,
- being of a deceitful nature.¹²⁹

The parallel versions also indicate that it would be detrimental if, in case of being admonished, a monk were to:

- react disrespectfully,
- counter accuse,
- lead the talk aside and display irritation.

The listing of detrimental qualities in the *Anumāna-sutta* has several qualities not taken into account in its parallels, such as, for example, dogmatic clinging to one's own views.¹³⁰ The two Chinese discourses also mention qualities that are absent from the listing given in the *Anumāna-sutta*, such as:

- being without a sense of shame,
- associating with evil friends,
- being without gratitude.¹³¹

From the viewpoint of the discourse's topic of what will make others hold back their advice, each of these unwholesome qualities fits the present context well, as dogmatic clinging to one's own views will have such an effect, just as lack of shame, evil friendship, or being ungrateful.

The two Chinese versions continue at this point by recommending the following type of reflection: as I do not like when someone else displays irritation (for example), if I were to show irritation, others will not like me. Reflecting in this way, one will train to overcome these detrimental qualities.¹³² The Pāli version has a similar reflection only at the end of its description of a monk who is free from unwholesome qualities.¹³³ The two Chinese discourses conclude their exposition of this positive case instead with a posi-

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¹²⁹ MN 15 at MN I 95,18, MĀ 89 at T I 571c9, and T 50 at T I 842b14. Horner 1938/1982: xxviii notes that the description of being difficult to admonish at MN I 95,13 recurs in relation to *saṅghādisesa* 12 at Vin III 178,19; on the significance of MN 15 for monastic training in medieval Sri Lanka cf. Blackburn 1999: 289.

¹³⁰ MN 15 at MN I 96,13: *sandīṭṭhiparāmāśī hoti ādhānagāhī dūppaṭinissaggī* (B°-MN I 134,24: *ādhānagāhī*).

¹³¹ MĀ 89 at T I 571c11+14 and T 50 at T I 842b17+20.

¹³² MĀ 89 at T I 571c18 and T 50 at T I 842b24.

¹³³ MN 15 at MN I 97,18. Schmithausen 2007: 796-797 refers to the present instance and to SN 55:7 at SN V 353,29 as cases in line with a general prevalence of negative formulations of the golden rule, expressive of a tendency to emphasize the avoidance of wrongdoing.

tive reflection: just as I like someone who does not display irritation (for example), so others will like me if I do not show irritation.¹³⁴ This second positive reflection does not occur in the Pāli discourse.

Table 2.8: Unwholesome Qualities in MN 15 and its Parallels

MN 15	MĀ 89
evil wishes (1)	evil wishes (→ 1)
self praise & disparage others (2)	impure conduct
angry (3)	silent sulking ¹³⁵
angry & malicious (4)	deceit & flattery (→ 14)
angry & stubborn (5)	avarice & envy (→ 13)
angry speech (6)	shameless & reckless
resists admonishment (7)	angry & malicious (→ 4)
denigrates admonisher (8)	angry speech (→ 6)
counter admonishes (9)	counter admonishes (→ 9)
evasive when admonished (10)	slights admonisher (→ 8)
does not explain his conduct (11)	reproves for revealing his fault
contemptuous & domineering (12)	evasive when admonished (→ 10)
envious & avaricious (13)	silent out of anger & resentment
deceitful & fraudulent (14)	evil friends
obstinate & excessively proud (15)	without gratitude
dogmatic (16)	(≠ 2-3, 5, 7, 11-12, 15-16)

T 50
evil wishes (→ 1)
lustful desires
angry (→ 3)
avarice & envy (→ 13)
no equanimity
deceit & flattery (→ 14)
shameless & reckless
angry speech (→ 6)
counter admonishes (→ 9)
tells others about admonishment
slights admonisher (→ 8)
evasive when admonished (→ 10)
evil friends
without gratitude
(≠ 2, 4-5, 7, 11-12, 15-16)

Thus, while the Chinese versions have two reflections, a reflection on negative qualities at the end of their exposition of negative qualities, and a reflection on positive qual-

¹³⁴ MĀ 89 at T I 572a16 and T 50 at T I 842c22.

¹³⁵ MĀ 89 at T I 571c11: 不語結住, literally “the bondage of [obstinately] remaining silent”, probably intending some kind of sulkiness, cf. also above p. 51 note 125.

ties at the end of their exposition of positive qualities, the Pāli version has only one reflection, namely on negative qualities at the end of its examination of positive qualities (see table 2.9).

Table 2.9: Progression of the Exposition in MN 15 and its Parallels

MN 15	MĀ 89 & T 50
negative qualities (1)	negative qualities (→ 1)
positive qualities (2)	negative reflection (→ 3)
negative reflection (3)	positive qualities (→ 2)
review oneself (4)	positive reflection review oneself (→ 4)

The Pāli and Chinese versions advise that a monk should regularly examine himself concerning the presence or absence of any of these unwholesome qualities. Just as someone who examines his face in a mirror would quickly remove any stain, in the same way a monk should endeavour to remove such unwholesome qualities.¹³⁶ Just as the same person would be glad on seeing his or her face free from any stain, so too a monk who realizes that none of these unwholesome qualities are found in him will joyfully continue to train in what is wholesome.

While the Pāli version concludes at this point, the two Chinese versions continue by describing that based on such joy tranquillity arises, which leads in a causal sequence via happiness and concentration to seeing things as they truly are, and via disenchantment and dispassion to liberation and knowledge of liberation.¹³⁷ The Pāli commentary accords a similar potential to the present instruction, as it explains that the reference to seeing all these unwholesome qualities “abandoned” (*pahīna*) should be understood to cover not only temporary abandoning, but also the final abandoning (*samucchchedappahāna*) through awakening.¹³⁸

MN 16 *Cetokhila-sutta*

The *Cetokhila-sutta*, the “discourse on mental barrenness”, lists five types of mental barrenness (*cetokhila*) and five mental bondages (*cetaso vinibandha*) that prevent one’s growth in the Dharma. This discourse has a Pāli parallel among the tens of the *Anguttara-nikāya* and two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ MN 15 at MN I 100,13, MĀ 89 at T I 572b3, and T 50 at T I 843a10.

¹³⁷ MĀ 89 at T I 572c5 and T 50 at T I 843b12. A similar conditioned sequence occurs regularly in other Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., AN 10:1-5 at AN V 1-6 or AN 11:2-5 at AN V 312-317.

¹³⁸ Ps II 67,10.

¹³⁹ The parallels are AN 10:14 at AN V 17-21, entitled *Cetokhila-sutta*; MĀ 206 at T I 780b-781b, entitled “discourse on mental defilements”, 心穢經; and EĀ 51.4 at T II 817a-c. MĀ 206 and EĀ 51.4 agree with MN 16 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. AN 10:14 does not specify a loca-

MN I 101 The *Majjhima-nikāya* version begins by pointing out that a monk who has not abandoned five types of mental barrenness and five types of mental bondage will not be able to develop in the Dharma.¹⁴⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions as well as the *Ānguttara-nikāya* discourse have a similar statement, with the difference that they explicitly include the nuns in their treatment.¹⁴¹ The same three versions also make it clear that these types of mental barrenness and mental bondage not only prevent growth, but spell actual decline.¹⁴²

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ānguttara-nikāya* versions, the five types of mental barrenness are:¹⁴³

- having doubts about the teacher,
- having doubts about the Dharma,
- having doubts about the Saṅgha,
- having doubts about the training,
- being angry with one's companions in the holy life.

The parallel versions show some variations in their listings of the five types of mental barrenness (see table 2.10), although they agree in as much as lack of confidence in regard to the Buddha and the Dharma are the first two types of mental barrenness in all versions.

Table 2.10: Five Types of Mental Barrenness in MN 16 and its Parallels

MN 16 & AN 10:14	MĀ 206	EĀ 51.4
doubt teacher (1)	doubt Buddha (→ 1)	doubt Buddha (→ 1)
doubt Dharma (2)	doubt Dharma (→ 2)	doubt Dharma (→ 2)
doubt Saṅgha (3)	doubt precepts (→ 4)	doubt noble Saṅgha (→ 3)
doubt training (4)	doubt instruction	break precepts, no confession
angry with companions (5)	doubt companions (→ 3?) (≠ 5)	wish for heavenly rebirth (≠ 4, 5)

Besides these two, the *Madhyama-āgama* version speaks of lack of confidence in the precepts, in the instructions, and in those fellow monks who have been praised by the Buddha.¹⁴⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* account agrees with the Pāli versions on lack of confidence in the Saṅgha as one type of mental barrenness,¹⁴⁵ after which it mentions the

tion. Notably, EĀ 51.4 is found among the elevens of the *Ekottarika-āgama*, even though it expounds only ten items. For remarks on MĀ 206 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 95 and 194.

¹⁴⁰ MN 16 at MN I 101,7: *imasmiñ dhammayinaye vuddhiñ virūlhiñ vepullam āpajjissatī ti, n' etam thānam vijjati* (S^e-MN I 205,7: *vuddhiñ*).

¹⁴¹ AN 10:14 at AN V 17,16, MĀ 206 at T I 780b17, and EĀ 51.4 at T II 817a17.

¹⁴² AN 10:14 at AN V 17,17 indicates that “decline in wholesome things is to be expected”, *hāni yeva pāti-karikhā kusalesu dhammesu*, MĀ 206 at T I 780b19 speaks of “certain deterioration in the Dharma”, 必退法, and EĀ 51.4 at T II 817a19 of “decrease in wholesome qualities”, 善法減.

¹⁴³ MN 16 at MN I 101,17 and AN 10:14 at AN V 18,4.

¹⁴⁴ MĀ 206 at T I 780b23.

¹⁴⁵ EĀ 51.4 at T II 817a25.

mental barrenness of breaking one's precepts and not confessing such a breach, and the mental barrenness of living the holy life with the aspiration of being reborn in a heavenly realm.

The aspiration to be reborn in a heavenly realm occurs also in the two Pāli versions, where it constitutes one of the five mental bondages.¹⁴⁶ Other discourses qualify this type of aspiration as a way of getting "caught",¹⁴⁷ or else of being "bound".¹⁴⁸ This terminology would fit a placing of this aspiration under the heading of a mental "bondage".

In addition to being found in the Pāli and Chinese versions of the present discourse, the five types of mental barrenness recur in the *Saṅgīti-sutta* and the *Dasuttara-sutta*, as well as in their parallels. The *Saṅgīti-* and *Dasuttara-suttas* correspond to the presentation found in the two *Cetokhila-suttas*.¹⁴⁹ Sanskrit fragments of the *Daśottara-sūtra* have only preserved the first and the fifth type of mental barrenness, which are doubt in the teacher and an angry attitude towards one's fellow monks, thereby agreeing with their Pāli counterparts.¹⁵⁰ The Chinese *Dīrgha-āgama* version of the *Daśottara-sūtra* has the same two types of mental barrenness as its first and fifth, in addition to which it speaks of lack of confidence in the Dharma, in the Saṅgha, and in the precepts.¹⁵¹ Thus the Chinese *Daśottara-sūtra* differs from the Pāli presentations only in that it speaks of confidence in the precepts, instead of confidence in the training.

In its exposition of such lack of confidence in the precepts, the Chinese *Daśottara-sūtra* refers to bad and defiled conduct and to having no respect for the precepts. This indicates that one who has no confidence in or respect for the precepts will quite probably not adhere to them and indulge in bad conduct. Understood in this way, this passage would offer a way of bringing together the mental barrenness found in the Pāli *Cetokhila-suttas* as lack of confidence in the training, in the *Madhyama-āgama* version as lack of confidence in the precepts, and in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version as breaking one's precepts and not confessing such a breach. Despite the differences in wording, the parallel versions could thus be seen to agree on the essential implications of this type of mental barrenness.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ MN 16 at MN I 102,9 and AN 10:14 at AN V 18,24; for a similar aspiration cf. the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 47,8 or ŚSG 1998: 76,16 and T 1579 at T XXX 404a6.

¹⁴⁷ SN 35:200 at SN IV 180,21 and its parallels SĀ 1174 at T II 315a2 and EĀ 43.3 at T II 759a18 consider the aspiration for a celestial rebirth to be a form of being "caught by non-humans", *amanussaggāhō*, 非人取者, 非人所捉者.

¹⁴⁸ AN 7:47 at AN IV 56,1 refers to this type of aspiration as being "bound by the bondage of sexuality", *samyutto methunena samyogena* (S^e-AN IV 57,15: *saññutto* and *saññogena*), the corresponding statement from a parallel found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 76,14 similarly reads *samyukto maithunena dharmeṇa*; cf. also Hahn 1977: 207.

¹⁴⁹ DN 33 at DN III 237,23 and DN 34 at DN III 278,12.

¹⁵⁰ Fragment S 362V7 and R2 in Mittal 1957: 34; cf. also Dietz 2000: 135.

¹⁵¹ DĀ 10 at T I 53c7.

¹⁵² Although it needs to be noted that lack of confidence in the "training", *sikkhā*, in MN 16 at MN I 101,17 may not refer only to training in the precepts. According to the commentarial gloss at Ps II 68,33, in the present context the reference to 'training' should in fact be understood to encompass the

The different presentations of the five types of mental barrenness could then be summed up as:

- lack of confidence in the three jewels,
- lack of confidence in the precepts together with its resulting bad conduct,
- a type of attitude towards one's fellow companions in the holy life that is dominated by anger and lack of confidence.

The first four of these types of mental barrenness would consequently be the direct opposites of the four limbs of stream-entry,¹⁵³ while the fifth mental barrenness would be a type of attitude that prevents a monk from being able to learn from other monks.¹⁵⁴ This makes it clear why these five qualities are collected together under the heading of "mental barrenness".

After their exposition of the five types of mental barrenness, the *Cetokhila-suttas* turn to the five mental bondages, which are:

- desire for sensual pleasures,
- desire for the body,
- desire for form,
- over-indulging in food and sleep,
- living the holy life with the aspiration to be reborn in a heavenly realm.¹⁵⁵

Being under the influence of desire for the body and for sensual pleasures recur as the first two mental bondages in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, although in the opposite sequence (see table 2.11). The same discourse continues its exposition of mental bondages by listing:

- lack of interest in instructions pertaining to concentration and wisdom (etc.),
- being confused, arrogant, and given to excessive socialization,
- being content with having attained little, making no effort to progress further.¹⁵⁶

The *Ekottarika-āgama* account of the five mental bondages differs considerably from its parallels. It agrees with the *Cetokhila-suttas* in regard to only one of the mental bond-

entire path, covering the training in higher moral conduct, *adhisīlasikkhā*, in higher mental development, *adhicittasikkhā*, and in higher wisdom, *adhipaññāsikkhā*.

¹⁵³ These are perfect confidence in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, together with unblemished moral conduct, found, e.g., in DN 33 at DN III 227,6.

¹⁵⁴ An illustrative instance can be found at SN 22:90 at SN III 134,21 and its parallel SĀ 262 at T II 66c20. These two discourses begin by describing that the monk Channa was unable to accept the instructions given to him by other monks. When he finally visited Ānanda and asked for help, Ānanda replied that Channa, by requesting instruction, had broken his mental barrenness, *khilam pabhindi* (B^e-SN II 110,6 and S^e-SN III 164,19; *khilam*, B^e moreover reads *chindi*, instead of *pabhindi*), 破虛偽刺, and thereby become fit to understand the Dharma. Bodhi 2000: 1084 note 182 comments that "Channa's problem seems to have been the fifth [mental barrenness], anger and contemptuousness towards his fellow monks". The same topic recurs also in Sn 4:16 at Sn 973, which instructs to "break the mental barrenness" towards one's companions in the holy life, *khilam pabhinde*.

¹⁵⁵ MN 16 at MN I 101,27 and AN 10:14 at AN V 18,14. The five mental bondages recur also in DN 33 at DN III 238,13.

¹⁵⁶ MĀ 206 at T I 780c8+15+20.

ages, namely the bondage of fondness for sleep. The other mental bondages in this version are:

- being lazy,
- being without concentration,
- not keeping one's sense-organs collected,
- preferring the market to quiet places.¹⁵⁷

In addition to being found in the *Cetokhila-sutta* and its parallels, the five types of mental barrenness occur twice as independent discourses in different parts of the *Ārigutara-nikāya*, notably each time immediately followed by another discourse that takes up the five mental bondages.¹⁵⁸ This need not be a matter of mere coincidence, but could point to an inner connection between these two sets of five.

Table 2.11: Five Mental Bondages in MN 16 and its Parallels

MN 16 & AN 10:14	MĀ 206
desire for sensual pleasures (1)	desire for body (→ 2)
desire for body (2)	desire for sensual pleasures (→ 1)
desire for form (3)	not interested in instructions
overeating & sleeping (4)	confused, arrogant, socializing
wish for heavenly rebirth (5)	no effort to progress further (≠ 3-5)

EĀ 51.4
lazy
enjoy sleeping (→ 4)
not concentrated
not restraining senses
prefer market to quiet places (≠ 1, 2-3, 5)

The five types of mental barrenness are concerned with the affective nature of the mind, exposing the type of attitude that will fail to generate the inspiration and enthusiasm required for progress.¹⁵⁹ The five mental bondages (in their Pāli version) are similarly concerned with the affective nature of the mind. Here the problem is, however, not a lack of development, but rather a development in the wrong direction, since the five

¹⁵⁷ EĀ 51.4 at T II 817b6+10+12+13.

¹⁵⁸ These are AN 5:205 at AN III 248 and AN 9:71 AN IV 460, followed immediately by AN 5:206 at AN III 249 and AN 9:72 at AN IV 461, respectively. The same two sets are also found together in DN 33 at DN III 237,24 and DN III 238,13, as well as in the *Śāriputraparyāya*, T 1536 at T XXVI 416b29 and 418a13. For a single occurrence of the five *cetokhilas* cf. DN 34 at DN III 278,12 (cf. also Sanskrit fragment S 362V7-R2 in Mittal 1957: 34); single occurrences of the five *cetasovinibandhas* can be found in AN 9:82 at AN IV 463,1 and in AN 9:92 at AN IV 464,8.

¹⁵⁹ To evoke this negative nuance the term *khila* appears particularly appropriate, as according to MW: 340 *khila* stands for a “piece of waste or uncultivated land situated between cultivated fields”.

mental bondages are desire for sensual pleasures, for the body, for forms, for food and sleep, and for the pleasures of a heavenly rebirth.

Consequently these two sets of five can be brought together as a set of ten types of affective obstruction, being either a lack of developing appropriate sentiments or else misdirected sentiments, each of which will undermine the inspiration and enthusiasm required for progress.

The *Āguttara-nikāya* version illustrates the detrimental effect of the five types of mental barrenness and of the five mental bondages with the image of the waning moon, which decreases every day in roundness, splendour, and beauty.¹⁶⁰ Freedom from these ten obstructions is then comparable to the waxing moon, which every day increases in roundness, splendour, and beauty.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse instead compares the detrimental effect of these ten obstructions to a hen that does not properly hatch her eggs, as a result of which the chicks will not come to growth and maturity.¹⁶¹ The case of a hen that properly hatches her eggs then illustrates the case of a monk or a nun who overcomes these obstructions. The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse concludes by predicting that a monk or a nun who has overcome the five types of mental barrenness can be sure of a favourable rebirth, either in a heavenly realm or as a human being.¹⁶²

MN I 103 While the two versions found in the respective numerical collections, the *Āguttara-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama*, come to a conclusion at this point, the two middle length versions, found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama*, continue further.

These two versions take up five more qualities to be developed: the four ways to [psychic] power (*iddhipāda*) and exertion.¹⁶³ It is at this point that these two versions also have the simile of the hen and her eggs, explaining that just as the chicks will come to growth when a hen has properly hatched her eggs, so a monk endowed with the four ways to [psychic] power and with exertion will be able to reach awakening.¹⁶⁴

MN 17 *Vanapattha-sutta*

The *Vanapattha-sutta*, the “discourse on [living in a] forest thicket”, sets out the conditions under which a monk should leave or else remain in the place where he is staying. This discourse has two parallels in consecutive discourses in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ AN 10:14 at AN V 19,8.

¹⁶¹ EĀ 51.4 at T II 817b17. This simile recurs in MN 53 at MN I 357,6. Another occurrence is SN 22:101 at SN III 153,14, with a Gāndhārī discourse parallel in Glass 2007: 137, Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 5 lines 40-41, and another parallel in SĀ 263 at T II 67b1. The simile is also found in AN 7:67 at AN IV 125,18. Yet another occurrence is AN 8:11 at AN IV 176,7, with a parallel in MĀ 157 at T I 679c4.

¹⁶² EĀ 51.4 at T II 817c13.

¹⁶³ MN 16 at MN I 103,36: *ussolhi* (B^e-MN I 149,2 here reads *ussojhī*, but later on twice: *ussolhi*, C^e also shows some variations between these two alternatives) and MĀ 206 at T I 781b8: 堪任.

¹⁶⁴ MN 16 at MN I 104,11 and MĀ 206 at T I 781b14.

¹⁶⁵ The parallels are MĀ 107 and MĀ 108 at T I 596c-598b, both entitled “discourse on the forest”, 林經. Both agree with MN 17 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī.

A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment.¹⁶⁶ Parts of the treatment given in the *Vanapatha-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallels recur, moreover, in a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and in its parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁶⁷

The *Vanapatha-sutta* and its two *Madhyama-āgama* parallels examine four situations a monk might face when living in a forest thicket: his meditation may either improve or not improve, and in each of these two cases requisites (such as food, robes, dwelling place, and medicine) may be easy or difficult to obtain.¹⁶⁸ The three versions present these four cases in different sequences (see table 2.12).

MN I 104

Table 2.12: Four Situations of a Meditating Monk in MN 17 and its Parallels

MN 17	MĀ 107 & MĀ 108
no improvement and scarce requisites (1)	no improvement and ample requisites (→ 2)
no improvement and ample requisites (2)	improvement and scarce requisites (→ 3)
improvement and scarce requisites (3)	no improvement and scarce requisites (→ 1)
improvement and ample requisites (4)	improvement and ample requisites (→ 4)

The parallel versions agree, however, about what should be done in each of these four cases. Thus they advise that when the meditation practice does not improve and requisites are difficult to obtain, the monk should leave immediately.

Even when requisites are easy to obtain, but the meditation practice does not improve, the monk should leave, reflecting that he did not go forth for the sake of requisites.¹⁶⁹ If the meditation practice improves, however, the monk should stay.

MN I 105

If, in addition to this, requisites are easy to obtain, according to all versions he may stay even for his whole life. The *Vanapatha-sutta* and its two *Madhyama-āgama* parallels apply the same pattern to living:

- in a village,
- in a township,
- in dependence on a person.¹⁷⁰

MN I 106

¹⁶⁶ SHT VI 1304 (p. 74), paralleling among others the expressions “forest thicket” at MN I 105,1, “requisites of life” at MN I 105,6, and “resting place” at MN I 105,7.

¹⁶⁷ AN 9:6 at AN IV 366,6 examines the case of living in dependence on a person from a fourfold perspective, similar to MN 17. EĀ 45.3 at T II 771c18 takes up the case of living in dependence on a village, which it considers from two perspectives: unwholesome states increase and requisites are easy to obtain (EĀ 45.3 at T II 771c22 actually speaks of 勞苦乃獲, which judging from the context should probably rather be 不勞苦乃獲), or else wholesome states increase and requisites are difficult to obtain. In relation to these two possibilities, its injunctions are similar to MN 17.

¹⁶⁸ While MN 17 at MN I 104,26 and MĀ 107 at T II 596c28 discuss progress in meditation in terms of developing mindfulness and concentration, eradicating the influxes, and gaining liberation, MĀ 108 at T I 597c14 refers to the same only in a summary form, as “gaining a recluse’s objectives”, 得沙門義.

¹⁶⁹ MN 17 at MN I 105,23, MĀ 107 at T I 597a9, and MĀ 108 at T I 597c20.

¹⁷⁰ MN 17 at MN I 106,22 speaks not only of living in a village, *gāma*, or a township, *nigama*, but also of living in a fortified city, *nagara*, or a country, *janapada*. Instead of a fortified city or a country, MĀ

While the Chinese versions do not work out these applications in detail, the Pāli discourse gives the case of living in dependence on another person in full, indicating that when requisites are scarce and meditation does not improve, the monk may leave even without informing his supporter.¹⁷¹ In case requisites are plenty and meditation improves, he should try to stay even if told to leave.¹⁷²

The last suggestion is somewhat surprising, since for a monk who lives in dependence on a lay supporter there seems to be little scope to stay if he is told to leave.

MN 18 *Madhupinḍika-sutta*

The *Madhupinḍika-sutta*, the “discourse on the honey ball”, records Mahākaccāna giving a detailed explanation of an enigmatic statement by the Buddha. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁷³

MN I 108 The *Madhupinḍika-sutta* and its parallels begin by reporting that the Sakyan Dandapāṇi visited the Buddha and inquired after the kind of a teaching the Buddha had proclaimed.¹⁷⁴ In the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions, the Buddha's

107 at T I 597c8 and MĀ 108 at T I 598b3 mention dwelling in a cemetery. Pande 1957: 120 considers this part of MN 17 to be a later addition, since the title and the introductory statement only announces an exposition on the forest thicket, MN 17 at MN I 104,21: *vanapathapariyāya*. Pande suggests that the part that applies the same pattern to villages, townships, and cities would have been added after the monks' life style had changed from forest life to town dwelling.

¹⁷¹ MN 17 at MN I 106,34: *anāpuccā pakkamitabbo* (B^e-MN I 152,19 and C^e-MN I 268,26: *pakkamitab-bam*).

¹⁷² MN 17 at MN I 108,8: *na pakkamitabbam, api panujjamānena* (S^e-MN I 219,13 : *api samujjamānena*). Neumann 1896/1995: 126, perhaps more guided by context than by the actual wording of the passage, translates: “nicht fortgehen, wenn er nicht fortgejagt wird”, conveying the sense that the monk should not leave unless he is sent away. Ps II 72,26, however, understands the instruction to mean that the monk should stay even if told to leave, in fact it holds that the monk should even stay if his host were to use a stick to drive him out.

¹⁷³ The parallels are MĀ 115 at T I 603b-605a, entitled “discourse on the simile of the honey ball”, 蜜丸喻經, and EĀ 40.10 at T II 743a-c, which concludes with the Buddha giving the discourse the title “the taste of the ambrosial Dharma”, T II 743c28: 甘露法味. The three versions agree on locating the discourse at Kapilavatthu in the Sakyan country. MĀ 115 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 29, 59 and 233-239.

¹⁷⁴ *Mahāvaṇsa* 2:19 at B^e-Mhv 9 indicates that Dandapāṇi was a brother of Suprabuddha, the Buddha's father-in-law. According to the *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 592,16 or Lefmann 1902: 157,3 or Vaidya 1958b: 108,19 (on the Chinese versions cf. Peri 1918: 11), and according to the *Sanghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 62,1, however, he was himself the Buddha's father-in-law. All versions depict Dandapāṇi holding onto his stick while questioning the Buddha, which conveys a somewhat arrogant or even provocative attitude; cf. the regulation at Vin IV 200,25 against teaching the Dharma to someone who is holding a stick. Rahula 1981: 160 remarks on the present passage that “the attitude of Dandapāṇi ... was surely haughty”, and Ireland 1992: 116 goes so far as to liken Dandapāṇi's attitude and behaviour to Māra. His arrogant or even provocative attitude could be an expression of his disapproval at the going forth of his son-in-law or nephew.

reply indicates his teaching to be of such a nature that it leads to the absence of quarrelling with anyone in the world and to freedom from sensual desires and craving.¹⁷⁵ Daṇḍapāṇi thereupon left, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version expressing his bewilderment by wagging his tongue and raising his eyebrows.¹⁷⁶

The Buddha then related his encounter with Daṇḍapāṇi to the monks. When one of the monks asked the Buddha to elucidate the statement made earlier to Daṇḍapāṇi, according to the Pāli account the Buddha made a somewhat enigmatic statement about not delighting in perceptions and notions that arise due to conceptual proliferation (*papañcasāññāsaṅkha*), explaining that in this way freedom from the underlying tendencies and from quarrels, false speech, and evil states can be reached.¹⁷⁷ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the Buddha spoke in praise of detachment in regard to past, present, and future phenomena, explaining that such detachment will lead to freedom from the underlying tendencies, from quarrelling, and from other evil states.¹⁷⁸

The *Madhupindika-sutta* and its parallels agree that the Buddha retired without further explanations, upon which the monks approached Mahākaccāna for a clarification of the Buddha's statement.¹⁷⁹ The three versions report in similar terms how Mahākaccāna rebuked the monks for approaching him instead of directly asking the Buddha, which he compared to someone in need of heartwood who takes only the branches and leaves of a tree.¹⁸⁰

MN I 109

MN I 110

¹⁷⁵ MN 18 at MN I 108,26 and MĀ 115 at T I 603b19. After pointing out that the Buddha's teaching is beyond the ken of *devas*, *nāgas*, and other spirits, EĀ 40.10 at T II 743a10 indicates that it leads to the absence of attachment to the world and to not being established in the world, 非著世, 復非住世.

¹⁷⁶ MN 18 at MN I 109,1.

¹⁷⁷ MN 18 at MN I 109,34.

¹⁷⁸ MĀ 115 at T I 603c12. According to EĀ 40.10 at T II 743a20, the Buddha's reply was concerned with the absence of attachment to the world, freedom from sensuality, and overcoming doubt. Part of this passage in EĀ 40.10 is a repetition of the Buddha's earlier statement to Daṇḍapāṇi at T II 743a10 (cf. above note 175), nevertheless the present repetition differs from the earlier statement found just a few lines before in EĀ 40.10. Moreover, when it comes to Mahākaccāna repeating the Buddha's statements before beginning his own exposition (T II 743b11 and T II 743c10), the statements quoted by him differ again from what is found in the present instance. Such irregularities seem to be a recurrent feature in *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses.

¹⁷⁹ According to Ps III 319,7, Mahākaccāna was the son of the chaplain of Ujjenī, the capital of Avanti. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 231,16+25 or in Senart 1897: 386,8+17 and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 57,3+7, however, identify him with Nālaka/Nālada (cf. the protagonist of the *Nālaka-sutta*, Sn 3:11 at Sn 679-723).

¹⁸⁰ MN 18 at MN I 111,6, MĀ 115 at T I 604a14, and EĀ 40.10 at T II 743a29. When speaking in praise of the Buddha during this reply, according to MN 18 at MN I 111,13 Mahākaccāna referred to the Buddha with the epithet *brahmabhūto*, literally “become Brahmā”, an expression without an equivalent in MĀ 115 or EĀ 40.10. The same epithet recurs in MN 133 at MN III 195,6 and in MN 138 at MN III 224,28, where in both cases it is also absent from their Chinese parallels MĀ 165 and MĀ 164. Pérez-remón 1980: 115 suggests that the epithet *brahmabhūto* and the preceding *dhammabhūto* could be later additions, “because what follows such dithyrambic epithets seems to be an anticlimax”, as “*dhammabhūto*, where the Buddha is shown as *dharma* personified” is followed by “*dhammassāmī*, where he appears merely as the lord of *dharma*”.

MN I 111 As an explanation of the Buddha's enigmatic statement, according to the Pāli version Mahākaccāna described how based on each sense-organ and its object the related type of consciousness arises. With the coming together of the three there is contact, which leads to feeling, perception, thought, and conceptual proliferation (*papañca*), followed in turn by the arising of notions and perceptions due to conceptual proliferation in regard to past, present, and future times.¹⁸¹ The explanations in the Chinese versions proceed similarly, although with the difference that their descriptions of the stages that follow the arising of thought employ different terminology.¹⁸² The basic import of the passage nevertheless appears to be alike in the three versions.

MN I 112 The *Madhupinḍika-sutta* and its parallels continue with Mahākaccāna explaining that this conditional sequence does not take place in the absence of the sense-organs, their objects, and the corresponding type of consciousness, but only happens when these are present.¹⁸³ They differ in the sequence in which they present these two cases (see table 2.13).

Table 2.13: Analysis of the Perceptual Process in MN 18 and its Parallels

MN 18	MĀ 115 & EĀ 40.10
presence of sense & object & consc. (1)	absence of sense & object & consc. (→ 2)
absence of sense & object & consc. (2)	presence of sense & object & consc. (→ 1)

In all versions, Mahākaccāna tells the monks that they may report his explanation to the Buddha. When the monks follow this suggestion, the Buddha expresses his approval of Mahākaccāna's exposition.¹⁸⁴

MN I 114 In the Pāli account, Ānanda comes out with a simile at this point, comparing the delight to be derived from examining this exposition to a hungry man who comes upon a ball of honey.¹⁸⁵ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version also attributes the simile to Ānanda,¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ MN 18 at MN I 111,35. For an insightful examination of this passage cf. Nānananda 1971/1986: 2-10. Regarding the arising of consciousness in dependence on sense and object cf. also the discussion in Wijesekera 1964: 254-255.

¹⁸² MĀ 115 at T I 604b4 refers in this context to "thoughts" and "discriminations", 念 and 分別, while EĀ 40.10 at T II 743b21 mentions "mental determinations" and "perceptions with attachment that lead to thoughts", 稱量 and 想著之念.

¹⁸³ MN 18 at MN I 112,14, MĀ 115 at T I 604b17, and EĀ 40.10 at T II 743b28. MĀ 115 at T I 604b17 agrees with MN 18 at MN I 112,15 on speaking of "designation", *paññatti*/施設, in regard to contact and the subsequent stages.

¹⁸⁴ MN 18 at MN I 114,3, MĀ 115 at T I 604c17, and EĀ 40.10 at T II 743c20.

¹⁸⁵ MN 18 at MN I 114,9. The same simile recurs in AN 5:194 at AN III 237,19. Regarding Ānanda's use of similes in general, a survey of the four Pāli *Nikāyas* brings to light that in most of the close to forty discourses attributed to him he does not use a simile at all. In ten discourses, Ānanda makes use of a simile that is, however, also found elsewhere: DN 10 at DN I 204-210 reports Ānanda giving an account of the gradual path together with the same similes used in the preceding DN discourses as part of the same type of exposition given by the Buddha. In MN 53 at MN I 357,6 Ānanda uses the simile of a hen hatching eggs, a simile delivered by the Buddha according to MN 16 at MN I 104,3, SN 22:101 at

while in the *Madhyama-āgama* version it is the Buddha himself who comes out with the simile.¹⁸⁷

Another difference is that while the *Majjhima-nikāya* version of the simile describes a man who is hungry and comes upon a ball of honey, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version the point made by this simile is that just as one will get a sweet taste from any morsel of a ball of honey, so too one can get the taste of this teaching by contemplating any of the six sense-doors, be it the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, or the mind.¹⁸⁸

When comparing these two versions of the simile of the honey ball, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version's simile does not appear to stand in a particular relation to the *Madhu-pindika-sutta*'s exposition, since it merely portrays how Mahākaccāna was able to assuage the 'hunger' of the monks for a more detailed exposition of a short saying by the Buddha. The *Madhu-pindika-sutta* is, however, not the only such case, since other discourses similarly report how Mahākaccāna delivered a more detailed exposition of an enigmatic statement by the Buddha.¹⁸⁹ Hence the simile of the hungry man who comes

SN III 154,10, AN 7:67 at AN IV 125,18, and AN 8:11 at AN IV 176,7. Four discourses, SN 35:116 at SN IV 94,24, SN 35:117 at SN IV 99,27, SN 35:193 at SN IV 167,29, and AN 10:115 at AN V 226,18 report Ānanda using the simile of someone in search for heartwood, a simile often associated with the Buddha and in some instances also with Mahākaccāna, cf., e.g., MN 18 at MN I 111,6, MN 133 at MN III 194,32, MN 138 at MN III 224,21, and AN 10:172 at AN V 256,22. In SN 35:192 at SN IV 166,1, Ānanda uses the simile of two oxen, a simile attributed to Sāriputta in SN 35:191 at SN IV 163,12 and to Citta in SN 41:1 at SN IV 282,32. In AN 10:5 at AN V 6,12 and AN 11:5 at AN V 316,4, Ānanda uses the simile of a tree without branches, found in similar terms as a simile delivered by the Buddha in AN 5:24 at AN III 19,29, AN 6:50 at AN III 360,9, AN 7:61 at AN IV 99,9, AN 8:81 at AN IV 336,13, AN 10:3 at AN V 4,14, and AN 11:3 at AN V 314,8, and also by Sāriputta in AN 5:168 at AN III 200,12, AN 10:4 at AN V 5,16, and AN 11:4 at AN V 315,16. AN 10:95 at AN V 194,23 reports Ānanda using the simile of a guarded city, used Sāriputta according to DN 16 at DN II 83,8, DN 28 at DN III 100,25, and SN 47:12 at SN V 160,17. Only two discourses depict Ānanda coming out with a simile unique to the respective occasion: MN 76 at MN I 523,20 and SN 51:15 at SN V 272,30. In sum, the Pāli discourses do not present the deliverance of impromptu similes as a typical trait of Ānanda, whereas the Buddha is shown to deliver an inexhaustible wealth of similes. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 7-8 and id. 2007i: 25-27.

¹⁸⁶ EĀ 40.10 at T II 743c24, which speaks of ambrosia, 甘露, instead of a honey ball.

¹⁸⁷ MĀ 115 at T I 604c22. A similar case can be found in relation to DN 4 at DN I 124,5, where a simile that illustrates the relationship between morality and wisdom with two hands washing each other is attributed in the Pāli version to a Brahmin visitor, whereas in the Chinese parallel, DĀ 22 at T I 96b18 (translated in Meisig 1991: 57), the Buddha himself comes out with the simile. Gombrich 1984a: 99 comments on this simile that its presentation of morality and wisdom as complementary factors stands "in stark contrast to the Hindu view that the disciplines of work and of gnosis are hierarchically related alternatives". This might make it more fitting for the simile to be attributed to the Buddha, instead of to a non-Buddhist Brahmin who had just attempted to uphold Brahminical views in front of the Buddha. Another statement attributed to the Buddha reflects in fact a similar interrelationship (although expressed in terms of Dharma and Vinaya), cf. AN 5:79 at AN III 106,13: *dhammasandosā vinayasandosō, vinayasandosā dhammasandosō*, cf. also SHT X 2272 (p. 274) Vc and Rb.

¹⁸⁸ MĀ 115 at T I 604c22.

¹⁸⁹ MN 133 at MN III 195,24, MN 138 at MN III 225,11, and AN 10:172 at AN V 257,19.

across a honey ball would fit those other instances just as well as the *Madhupinḍikasutta*.

The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation of the same simile suits the penetrative analysis of the perceptual process given by Mahākaccāna well and thus is more closely related to the actual content of the discourse. It also brings out the simile of the honey ball with increased clarity, indicating that the penetrative analysis of the perceptual process offered in this discourse can lead to realization when applied to any sense-door, just as a honey ball is sweet wherever one may bite it.

While the other two versions conclude at this point, the *Madhyama-āgama* version continues with an exhortation by the Buddha on the importance of this discourse and on the need to keep it in mind.¹⁹⁰

MN 19 *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta*

The *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta*, the “discourse on two kinds of thoughts”, records the Buddha’s pre-awakening division of thoughts into wholesome and unwholesome types.¹⁹¹ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁹²

MN I 114 The *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report in closely similar terms how the Buddha, during the time before his awakening, developed a clear distinction between the three types of unwholesome thought and their opposites. Realizing that unwholesome thoughts lead to one’s own harm and the harm of others, he made an effort to dispel such thoughts.¹⁹³

MN I 115 Both versions illustrate the bodhisattva’s ability to quickly dispel any unwholesome thought with the help of a simile. This simile describes a cowherd who has to guard the cows closely in order to prevent them from straying into ripe crops, since, if they were to do so, that would cause him to be punished. Similar to the cowherd’s fear of punish-

¹⁹⁰ MĀ 115 at T I 604c29. As a little postscript to Mahākaccāna’s depiction of how in the absence of contact the above described sequence of the perceptual process does not occur, SĀ 273 at T II 72c8 (translated in Choong 1999: 39) would be of interest, a discourse that does not have a parallel in the Pāli *Nikāyas*. SĀ 273 also presents contact as the coming together of sense-organ, object, and consciousness, which in turn leads to feeling, perception, and thought, followed by comparing such coming together of sense and object to the sound caused by clapping both hands. Applying this simile to the absence of contact described in Mahākaccāna’s exposition might provide a hint at the implications of the famous kōan (公案) that inquires after the sound of the clapping of a single hand, devised by the Japanese Zen master Hakuin Ekaku (1685-1768 or 1686-1769).

¹⁹¹ The same twofold distinction of thoughts recurs as a discourse on its own in It 3:4:8 at It 82,9+21.

¹⁹² The parallel is MĀ 102 at T I 589a-590a, entitled “discourse on thoughts”, 念經. MĀ 102 agrees with MN 19 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. Parts of MĀ 102 have been translated by Bareau 1963: 63-66. MĀ 102 has been studied and partially translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 33, 194-195.

¹⁹³ MN 19 at MN I 115,1 and MĀ 102 at T I 589a18, which specifies that this type of practice was undertaken while the Buddha was dwelling alone and in seclusion, 在遠離獨住. A quotation from this part of the discourse can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 226b11.

ment, apprehension of the unwholesome consequences of such thoughts is the means to dispel them.¹⁹⁴

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, after delivering this simile the Buddha explained that one's mind will take delight in whatever one frequently thinks about.¹⁹⁵ A similar statement occurs also in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, according to which the Buddha pointed out that whatever one frequently thinks about will cause a corresponding inclination of the mind.¹⁹⁶ The two versions differ, however, in the sequence of their presentation (see table 2.14).

Table 2.14: Analysis of Unwholesome Thought in MN 19 and MĀ 102

MN 19	MĀ 102
unwholesome thought is harmful (1) frequent thinking causes mental habit (2) simile of cowherd (3)	unwholesome thought is harmful (→ 1) simile of cowherd (→ 3) frequent thinking causes mental habit (→ 2)

Thus the *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta* first takes up the future Buddha's reflection on the danger inherent in unwholesome thought, next describes how the mind follows the course set by whatever one frequently thinks about, and then comes out with the simile of the cowherd. The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel version instead follows the topic of unwholesome thought with the simile of the cowherd, and only then turns to the general nature of the mind being influenced by what one often thinks about. In this way, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse offers a somewhat clearer progression of ideas, as the main purpose of the cowherd's simile would be to illustrate fear of unwanted consequences, not to exemplify that frequent thoughts of a particular type lead to a corresponding mental inclination.

The two versions continue by taking up the case of wholesome thoughts, which due to their harmless nature are allowed to continue. This is comparable to the cowherd being able to relax, once the harvest has been brought in. In regard to these wholesome thoughts, both versions report the Buddha reflecting that too much thinking, even of such a wholesome nature, will obstruct the development of concentration, a reflection that motivated him to steady his mind internally and let it become concentrated.¹⁹⁷

Becoming concentrated in this way leads in both versions to the attainment of the four *jhānas*. While in the *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta* the attainment of the *jhānas* is still part of the future Buddha's own pre-awakening development,¹⁹⁸ in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel

MN I 116

MN I 117

¹⁹⁴ MN 19 at MN I 115,35 and MĀ 102 at T I 589b2.

¹⁹⁵ MĀ 102 at T I 589b5.

¹⁹⁶ MN 19 at MN I 115,21; a similar statement can be found in the *Śiksāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 53,19, introduced as a quote from the *Candrapradīpa-sūtra*; cf. also the *Saundaranandakāvya* 15:18 in Johnston 1928: 105,1.

¹⁹⁷ MN 19 at MN I 116,14 and MĀ 102 at T I 589b21.

¹⁹⁸ MN 19 at MN I 117,6: *so kho aham ... pathamam jhānam ... catuttham jhānam upasampajja vihāsim*.

the subject of the sentence changes from the Buddha to a monk in general, who by overcoming wholesome thoughts will be able to attain the *jhānas*.¹⁹⁹ Another difference in relation to the same statement is that the Chinese version proceeds directly from leaving behind wholesome thoughts to the attainment of the second *jhāna*, while the Pāli version includes the first *jhāna* in its account.²⁰⁰ The *Dvedhāvitakka-sutta* continues after the four *jhānas* with the attainment of the three higher knowledges. The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, however, mentions only the third of these, the destruction of the influxes.²⁰¹

Both discourses continue with the simile of a man who tries to lure a deer herd into a false path by covering up the right path, in order to bring about their ruin.²⁰² Both versions contrast this with another man who reopens the right path, motivated by the wish to protect the deer herd. Similar to the second of these two men, the Buddha has opened up the right path for his disciples, namely the noble eightfold path.

The two versions close with the Buddha exhorting the monks that they should retire into seclusion and meditate, lest they later regret it.²⁰³

MN 20 *Vitakkasanthāna-sutta*

The *Vitakkasanthāna-sutta*, the “discourse on stilling thoughts”, describes five methods for overcoming unwholesome thoughts. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, entitled “discourse on the higher mind”.²⁰⁴ This title fits the contents of

¹⁹⁹ MĀ 102 at T I 589c7: 若比丘 … 得第二禪成就遊 … 得第四禪成就遊.

²⁰⁰ A similar absence of the first *jhāna* can be found in MN 125 at MN III 136,27, which proceeds directly from overcoming thoughts to the second *jhāna*. In this case, however, the parallel MĀ 198 at T I 758b26 does refer to the first *jhāna*. Notably, in the case of MN 125 and MĀ 198 as well as in the present case of MN 19 and MĀ 102, the *jhāna* treatments are preceded by a reference to leaving behind thinking. This suggests that the omission of the first *jhāna* in MN 125 and in MĀ 102 may be a transmission error that happened during oral recitation, where the circumstance that a leaving behind of “thought” (*vitakka*) has just been mentioned may have misled the reciter(s) to continue with the standard formulation of the second *jhāna*, which mentions such leaving behind of *vitakka*, thereby unintentionally omitting to recite the first *jhāna*; cf. also Anālayo 2012d.

²⁰¹ In regard to this difference, it needs to be kept in mind that MĀ 102 is no longer concerned with the Buddha’s own approach to awakening, but only with the practice of a monk in general. Barea 1963, possibly influenced by the Pāli parallel, translates this passage as if it were representing the Buddha’s own awakening (p. 76) and then discusses it as an account that differs from the standard descriptions of the Buddha’s awakening (p. 81). A close inspection of the present passage, however, shows that whereas the part concerned with the presence of wholesome thoughts still refers to the Buddha’s own experience, the development of the *jhānas* and the subsequent destruction of the influxes in MĀ 102 at T I 589c6 has a “monk” as its subject, 比丘, a change of subject already noted by Schmithausen 1981: 221 note 75.

²⁰² MN 19 at MN I 117,23 and MĀ 102 at T I 589c23.

²⁰³ MN 19 at MN I 118,20 and MĀ 102 at T I 590a18.

²⁰⁴ The parallel is MĀ 101 at T I 588a-589a, 增上心經, which agrees with MN 20 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 101 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991:

both discourses somewhat better than the Pāli title, since to “still thoughts”, or more precisely to “still thought-formations”, *vitakkasarikhārasaṇṭhāna*, is only one of the five methods described in both discourses. In contrast, all five methods are recommended in both versions for the purpose of developing the “higher mind”, *adhicitta*.²⁰⁵

According to the *Vitakkasaṇṭhāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the first MN I 119 method to counter the arising of unwholesome thoughts is to direct attention towards something wholesome instead. The two discourses explain that undertaking this method successfully will lead to one-pointedness of the mind and concentration,²⁰⁶ a qualification applied in both versions to each of the five methods.

The Pāli discourse illustrates the procedure of directing attention towards something wholesome in order to overcome unwholesome thoughts with the example of a carpenter who removes a coarse peg with the help of a finer peg.²⁰⁷ The Chinese version employs a different simile, which describes how a carpenter draws a straight line on a piece of wood and then cuts the wood straight.²⁰⁸

Both similes fit the context, since the task is as much one of straightening out the mind as it is one of replacing coarse types of thought with the help of finer ones. The Pāli simile additionally conveys the idea of a gradual procedure. Just as it is not possible to simply pull out the coarse peg, wherefore it has to be at first replaced with a finer peg, similarly with unwholesome thoughts it is at times not possible to just stop them and develop concentration right away. Instead, one proceeds through an intermediate stage by developing wholesome thoughts. These replace the unwholesome thoughts and serve as a stepping board for eventually being able to completely let go of all thoughts and develop concentration.

According to both versions, in case this first method should not be successful, the next method to be applied is to reflect on the danger in unwholesome thoughts. Such reflection is comparable to the disgust felt by someone who finds the corpse of a snake, or a dog, or even of a dead human has been hung around his or her neck.²⁰⁹

The *Vitakkasaṇṭhāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel agree that the third MN I 120 method is to shift attention away from the unwholesome thoughts, to forget about them,

²⁰⁰, 240-244; a brief survey of MN 20 can be found in Anālayo 2009u. A presentation of the five methods for settling thoughts can also be found in *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Delhey 2009a: 224,11 and T 1579 at T XXX 343c7; cf. also the *Saundaranandakāvya* 16:72-83 in Johnston 1928: 120-121.

²⁰⁵ MN 20 at MN I 119,3: *adhicittam anuyuttena*, MĀ 101 at T I 588a6: 得增上心者. MN 20 at MN I 119,3 and MĀ 101 at T I 588a8 also agree on referring to these five methods as “signs”, *nimitta*/相. The summary verse (*uddāna*) for the *Sīhanāda-vagga* in B^e-MN I 172,9, C^e-MN I 308,2, and S^e-MN I 247,18 refers to MN 20 as *pañcanimittakathā*, “the talk on the five signs”, which confirms the impression that all five methods are characteristic for this discourse, not only the fourth method. A comparison of these five methods with approaches employed in present-day psychology can be found in de Silva 2001.

²⁰⁶ MN 20 at MN I 119,13 and MĀ 101 at T I 588a13.

²⁰⁷ MN 20 at MN I 119,14.

²⁰⁸ MĀ 101 at T I 588a14. For an occurrence of this simile in a Tamil grammar cf. Scharfe 2002: 35.

²⁰⁹ MN 20 at MN I 119,36 and MĀ 101 at T I 588a28, for a somewhat different usage of the same image cf. the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 357,26 or Vaidya 1999: 222,32.

just as someone who does not want to see something might just close his or her eyes, or turn away.²¹⁰

The Pāli instructions for the fourth method are that attention should be given to “stilling the thought-formation”, an expression that perhaps refers to calming the volitional driving force active behind those thoughts.²¹¹ A similar nuance emerges in the Chinese parallel, which recommends employing volitional formations in order to gradually reduce such thoughts.²¹² The two versions agree in illustrating this with the simile of someone who, instead of walking fast might walk slower, or even stand, or sit, or finally lie down.²¹³

The fifth and final method in both versions is the use of force to restrain the mind, just as a strong person could use force to overpower a weaker person.²¹⁴

MN I 122 Both discourses proclaim that practising these five methods will lead to mastery over thoughts, in the sense of becoming able to have only the type of thoughts that one really wants to think.

The Pāli version continues by proclaiming that in this way an end of *dukkha* has been reached and craving has been eradicated, a proclamation not found in its Chinese counterpart. This proclamation comes somewhat unexpected, and on reading it one could almost have the impression as if mere control of thoughts automatically leads to full awakening.

A closer inspection of this passage in the *Vitakkasanthāna-sutta* reveals that the overcoming of craving, of the fetters, and of conceit, together with the making an end of *dukkha*, are formulated in the past tense, whereas the ability to think whatever thought one wants to think stands in the future tense.²¹⁵ For freedom from *dukkha* and craving to

²¹⁰ MN 20 at MN I 120,10 and MA 101 at T I 588b15. The same method recurs in AN 5:161 at AN III 186,1 as one out of five methods to overcome anger, *āghāta*.

²¹¹ MN 20 at MN I 120,18: *vitakkasarikhārasanthānam manasikātabbam*, literally “should give attention to thought-formation-stilling”, which Soma 1981: 3 translates as “removal of the (thought) source”.

²¹² MĀ 101 at T I 588b26 instructs that one “should through volitional formations gradually decrease these [unwholesome] thoughts”, 當以思行漸減其念.

²¹³ MN 20 at MN I 120,22 and MĀ 101 at T I 588b29.

²¹⁴ MN 20 at MN I 121,5 and MĀ 101 at T I 588c21. Hecker 1987: 526 remarks that although this method is merely a last resort, only too often it is the first that comes to mind when unwholesome thoughts arise. Bronkhorst 1993/2000: xii, id. 1999: 86, and King 1980/1992: 10 consider the instruction given in the present instance to stand in contrast to the inclusion of the same practice in MN 36 at MN I 242,26 among exercises that had not been able to lead the bodhisattva to awakening. Yet, MN 20 is not presenting this exercise as something that on its own results in awakening, but rather as a last resort in case all other attempts to deal with the arising of unwholesome thoughts have failed. Thus, even though to restrain the mind forcefully is not a method that will result in awakening, it does come into its place in order to stop unwholesome thoughts and thereby prevent their spilling over into unwholesome actions.

²¹⁵ MN 20 at MN I 122,3: “whatever thought he may not wish, that thought he will not think, he has cut craving, has done away the fetter and he has made an end of *dukkha* through rightly comprehending conceit”, *yam vitakkam nākāñkhissati na tam vitakkam vitakkessati, acchechchi tañham, vāvattayi sañyojanam, sammā mānābhisaṁyā antam akāsi dukkhassā ti* (B^e-MN I 171,28 and S^e-MN I 247,10: vivattayi saññojanam). An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 8-9.

stand in a meaningful relationship to mastery of thoughts, the usage of the tenses should be the opposite way. This suggests the reference to full awakening to be out of place in the *Vitakkasanythāna-sutta*, perhaps being the result of an error that occurred during the transmission of the discourse.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ The same passage occurs also at the end of the *Sabbāsava-sutta*. In this case, however, the actions leading to the overcoming of craving, of the fetters, and of conceit, and to the making an end of *dukkha* are also in the past tense, so that, from a grammatical viewpoint, the passage fits its context; cf. MN 2 at MN I 12,3, which speaks of *āsavā ... pahīnā honti* before coming to *acchechchi tañham*, etc. In MN 2 this passage also fits from the point of view of content and is, moreover, found in the two parallels, MĀ 10 at T I 432c26 and T 31 at T I 814b2.

Chapter 3 *Opamma-vagga*

MN 21 *Kakacūpama-sutta*

The *Kakacūpama-sutta*, the “discourse on the simile of the saw”, is the first discourse in the third chapter of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, which in the Asian editions has the title “chapter on similes”.¹ The *Kakacūpama-sutta* offers a detailed instruction on the importance of patience. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²

The *Kakacūpama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report that the monk Moliya Phagguna was living in too close association with the nuns, to the extent that he would get irritated and upset when someone criticized the nuns, just as they would get irritated and upset if someone criticized him.

According to both versions, the Buddha called Moliya Phagguna to his presence and told him that, since he had left behind the household life, he should also leave behind sensual thinking related to the household life.³ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in envisaging the possibility that the nuns or Moliya Phagguna might be abused or even physically attacked, in which case Moliya Phagguna should remain unaffected and full of compassion.⁴

The *Kakacūpama-sutta* and its parallel continue by illustrating the willing compliance of the monks of earlier times to the Buddha’s injunction to eat only once a day with the examples of a skilled charioteer,⁵ who is able to drive a chariot wherever he likes, and of a grove of *sāla* trees that is cared for and therefore grows well.⁶

¹ B^e-MN I 173,1, C^e-MN I 308,4, and S^e-MN I 248,1 (adopted also by Chalmers 1926: x and Neumann 1896/1995: 143). E^e speaks instead of the *Tatiya-vagga*, “Third Chapter”. As Norman 1983a: 45 comments, “since six of the ten *suttas* have the word *upama* in their title”, it would indeed be “appropriate to call it Opammavagga”; cf. also Horner 1954/1967: xi.

² The parallel is MĀ 193 at T I 744a-746b, has the title “discourse on Moliya Phagguna”, 卑犁破群那經, and agrees with MN 21 in locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. For an extract from MĀ 193 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 198-199. A partial parallel is EĀ 50.8 at T II 812c-813b, which begins with the same situation concerning Moliya Phagguna. In EĀ 50.8, however, he proclaims his conviction that sensuality is not an obstruction, similar to Arīṭṭha’s proclamation in MN 22 at MN I 130,5 and its parallel MĀ 200 at T I 763b4. The remainder of EĀ 50.8 describes how the Buddha rebuffs this mistaken belief and delivers the simile of the snake, so that this part of EĀ 50.8 is a partial parallel to MN 22. Anesaki 1934b: 290 notes a reference to the present discourse under the title “discourse to Phagguna”, 破群那經, in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 60a7; cf. also Lamotte 1944/1981: 32.

³ Elsewhere the discourses indicate that this admonition did not have a lasting effect on him, since according to SN 12:32 at SN II 50,19 and its parallel MĀ 23 at T I 451a3 he eventually disrobed.

⁴ MN 21 at MN I 123,30.

⁵ Regarding this reference to the readiness of the monks to follow the injunction to eat only once, it is noteworthy that MN 65 at MN I 437,25 and its parallels MĀ 194 at T I 746b27 and EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c2 (cf. also T 1425 at T XXII 359b14) report that the monk Bhaddāli, far from showing willing compliance, publicly refused to follow the Buddha’s injunction to eat only once a day at the very time when this injunc-

MN I 122

MN I 123

MN I 124

MN I 125 The *Kakacūpama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart next narrate the tale of the slave girl Kālī who successfully tested her mistress Vedehikā's reputation for being forbearing and gentle.⁷ Both versions use the moral of this tale to explain that a monk's patience can be seen when he is confronted with disagreeable speech, and that a monk should not be considered obedient if he is submissive only in order to get requisites.

MN I 126 The two versions next take up different types of speech, instructing that one should remain unaffected by them and avoid retaliation, keeping one's mind full of loving kindness.⁸ Cultivation of this attitude leads in both discourses to the meditative development of loving kindness as a boundless radiation in all directions, a radiation the *Madhyama-āgama* version presents also with the help of the other three *brahmavihāras* of compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity.⁹

MN I 127 Both versions compare the unshakeable nature of this attitude to the impossibility of trying to dig up the whole earth with a spade, of trying to paint on space, of trying to heat up and evaporate the Ganges river with a grass torch, and of trying to cause a soft leather bag to rustle. They differ in the sequence in which they present these images (see table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Similes to Illustrate Patience in MN 21 and its Parallel

MN 21	MĀ 193
dig up whole earth (1)	dig up whole earth (→ 1)
paint on space (2)	burn up Ganges (→ 3)
burn up Ganges (3)	paint on space (→ 2)
cause soft leather bag to rustle (4)	cause soft leather bag to rustle (→ 4)
simile of the saw (5)	simile of the saw (→ 5)

The exposition in the *Kakacūpama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel culminates by illustrating the need for patience with the famous simile of the saw, according to which even in the case of being cut into pieces by bandits, no aversion should arise in one's mind.¹⁰

tion appears to have been promulgated. According to MN 70 at MN I 474,2 and MĀ 195 at T I 749c27, what seems to be an earlier injunction to refrain from eating at night also met with open opposition by some monks.

⁶ MN 21 at MN I 124,18+28 and MĀ 193 at T I 744b17+20.

⁷ MN 21 at MN I 125,3 and MĀ 193 at T I 744c12.

⁸ MN 21 at MN I 126,30 and MĀ 193 at T I 745a29.

⁹ MN 21 at MN I 127,6 refers to this radiation in an abbreviated manner in terms of "having pervaded the whole world", *sabbāvantañ lokāñ ... pharitvā*. MĀ 193 at T I 745b6 presents the same in the more detailed way often employed in the discourses, which describes a meditative radiation applied to each of the four directions, above and below, pervading the whole world.

¹⁰ MN 21 at MN I 129,15 and MĀ 193 at T I 746a13. A reference to this simile occurs, e.g., in MN 28 at MN I 186,11 and its parallel MĀ 30 at T I 465a6, cf. also SĀ 497 at T II 130a23, and the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 190a28, instances indicating that it was a well-known simile in early Buddhist circles.

The two versions conclude by highlighting the benefit of keeping this simile in mind, MN I 129 to which the *Madhyama-āgama* version adds that those who regularly keep this simile in mind will attain either full awakening or non-return.¹¹

MN 22 *Alagaddūpama-sutta*

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, the “discourse on the simile of the snake”, records the monk Aritṭha’s mistaken belief that sensuality is not an obstacle to the path. In reply to this misunderstanding, in the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* the Buddha delivers the simile of the snake, the simile of the raft, and a detailed exposition on not-self.

This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹² The simile of the snake and the simile of the raft recur as discourses on their own in the *Ekottarika-āgama*,¹³ in addition to which parts of the discourse are also preserved in two discourse quotations in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*, extant in Tibetan.¹⁴ The introductory part of the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, which narrates the monk Aritṭha’s obstinate adherence to his misunderstanding, recurs in the *Vinayas* of the Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Theravāda traditions as an exemplary case for unwillingness to give up a wrong view.¹⁵

¹¹ MĀ 193 at T I 746b7.

¹² The parallel is MĀ 200 at T I 763b-766b, entitled “discourse on Arittha”, 阿梨吒經. For remarks on MĀ 200 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 22, 114-115, 147-148, 195-196, and 201. MĀ 200 agrees with MN 22 and the two partial parallels from the *Ekottarika-āgama* in locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. Lévi 1915: 421 notes that the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 174b21, refers to the present discourse as 阿羅伽度波摩, a transcription the same text explains to intend the “discourse on the simile of the snake”, 蛇譬經. Thus the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* agrees with MN 22 on the title of the discourse, thereby disagreeing with MĀ 200 in this respect. A reference to the present discourse in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 63c7, speaks of the “discourse on the simile of the raft”, 梱喻經, reconstructed by Lamotte 1944/1981: 64 as *Kolopamasūtra*; cf. also the slightly different title given in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 503b20: “Dharma exposition on the simile of the raft”, 策喻法門.

¹³ The simile of the raft occurs in EĀ 43.5 at T II 759c-760b, which is thus a partial parallel to MN 22. Another partial parallel is EĀ 50.8 at T II 812c-813b. While the beginning part of EĀ 50.8 parallels MN 21, its remainder parallels MN 22, as it records the Buddha’s examination of the mistaken view on sensuality and his delivery of the simile of the snake.

¹⁴ Cf. below notes 30 and 44.

¹⁵ These are the background narrations to the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya pāṭayantika* rule 68, T 1428 at T XXII 682a9, Kāśyapīya *Vinaya* rule 55, T 1460 at T XXIV 663a9 (although this is the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* of this tradition and usually only lists the rules, in the present case it gives a short account of what happened), Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya* rule 45, T 1425 at T XXII 367a3, Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* rule 48, T 1421 at T XXII 56c12, (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* rule 55, T 1442 at T XXIII 840b20, cf. also Dutt 1984c: 30,2 and Yamagiwa 2001: 86,7, Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* rule 55, T 1435 at T XXIII 106a3, and Theravāda *Vinaya* rule 68 at Vin IV 133,32 (with a minor difference compared to the account in MN 22, noted by Horner 1942/1983: 23 note 8), cf. also Vin II 25,10. Von Hinüber 1999a: 70 suggests that the Theravāda *Vinaya* account of events stems from MN 22, in line with a general tendency of narrative *Vinaya* material to derive from the *Suttapiṭaka* (with occasional exceptions, cf. von Hinüber 1996/1997: 13). An

MN I 130 The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* report in similar terms that the monk Ariṭṭha, although contradicted by other monks, obstinately adhered to his belief that to indulge in sensuality should not be considered an obstruction. The Pāli commentary and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* explain that he had mistaken the ability of lay people to reach stream-entry, once-return, and non-return to imply that indulgence in sensuality does not really hinder one's progress on the path.¹⁶

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel agree that the Buddha rebuked Ariṭṭha for this misunderstanding and consequent misrepresentation of the teaching. A minor difference is that according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the monks had attempted to convince Ariṭṭha of the falseness of his belief with the help of ten similes illustrative of the dangers in sensual pleasures, while the *Madhyama-āgama* account records only eight similes (see table 3.2).¹⁷ Another difference is that in the *Majjhima-nikāya* dis-

Ariṭṭha recurs in SN 54:6 at SN V 315,3, where he describes his practice of mindfulness of breathing based on abandoning sensual desires in regard to past and future, an abandoning that according to the commentarial explanation at Spk III 264,2 should be understood to refer to his attainment of non-return. The Chinese version of his statement in SĀ 805 at T II 206c3 differs slightly, as instead of referring to abandoning sensual desires, in this version he explains that he develops mindfulness of breathing without worrying about the past, yearning for the future, or being attached to the present. In spite of a different formulation, this also portrays an advanced stage of practice. A layman Ariṭṭha occurs also in AN 6:120 at AN III 451,16 in a list of lay stream-enterers. Since SN 54:6 and AN 6:120 simply speak of Ariṭṭha, whereas the *Vinaya* passages and MN 22 speak of Ariṭṭha *gaddhabādhipubba* (on this term cf. Shih 2000: 75 note 103), of whom Vin II 27,26 reports that he eventually decided to disrobe, these accounts seem to involve different persons. One of these would be the Ariṭṭha whose dogmatic clinging to his mistaken view caused the *Vinaya* regulations and the delivery of MN 22. The other could be the layman and stream-entrant Ariṭṭha who eventually entered the order and, as a monk, described his practice of mindfulness of breathing.

¹⁶ Ps II 103,3 and T 1421 at T XXII 56c16; cf. also Keown 1992/2001: 97.

¹⁷ Another difference is that, according to MĀ 200 at T I 763c17, the monks came out with the similes only when asked by the Buddha about their understanding of his position on sensual pleasures, while in MN 22 at MN I 130,25 they did the same already earlier, when trying on their own to convince Ariṭṭha of the falseness of his belief. The two similes not found in MĀ 200 are the slaughterhouse and the sword stake, MN 22 at MN I 130,28: *asisūnūpamā ... sattisūlūpamā*. The list of ten similes found in MN 22 recurs in AN 5:76 at AN III 97,2, Thī 488-491, Jā V 210,8, and in the two Pāli *Vinaya* passages that report the Ariṭṭha incident at Vin II 25,31 and Vin IV 134,20. Seven out of the eight similes shared by MN 22 and MĀ 200 recur with detailed explanations in MN 54 at MN I 364,12 and in its parallel MĀ 203 at T I 774a20; cf. also below p. 315 note 29. The eighth simile shared by MN 22 and MĀ 200, the simile of the snake, recurs on its own in Sn 4:1 at Sn 768 and in MĀ 203 at T I 774b29. The two similes not found in MĀ 200 recur elsewhere in the Pāli discourses: the slaughterhouse in MN 23 at MN I 144,31 and the sword stake in SN 5:1 at SN I 128,25 (or SN² 162 at SN² I 282,10), in Thī 58, and in Thī 141. Of the other *Vinayas* treating the Ariṭṭha case, the Dharmaguptaka and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinayas* also list similes. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* in T 1428 at T XXII 682a23 has twelve similes, which seem to incorporate the ten similes found in MN 22. The Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* in T 1421 at T XXII 56c23 (to be supplemented by T XXII 3b17) has only eight similes, some of which are not found in MN 22 and MĀ 200. The similes shared by these two discourses and the three *Vinaya* accounts are the bones, the dream, and the snake. Several of the images found in MN 22 recur also in other listings of similes illustrative of sensual pleasures, e.g., SĀ² 185 at T II 440a5 has the image of the bones, the piece of meat, the torch

course the Buddha clarifies that it is impossible to engage in sensual pleasures without having sensual desires, a statement not recorded in the *Madhyama-āgama* version.¹⁸

Table 3.2: Similes on the Dangers of Sensual Pleasures in MN 22 and MĀ 200

MN 22	MĀ 200
skeleton (1)	skeleton (→ 1)
piece of meat (2)	piece of meat (→ 2)
torch (3)	torch (→ 3)
pit of burning coals (4)	fiery pit (→ 4)
dream (5)	poisonous snake (→ 10)
borrowed goods (6)	dream (→ 5)
fruit tree (7)	borrowed goods (→ 6)
slaughterhouse (8)	fruit tree (→ 7)
sword stake (9)	
snake's head (10)	(≠ 8-9)

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its Chinese parallels turn to the case of someone who learns the Dharma but does not make an effort to understand it properly. While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version considers this case by listing the nine *anigas*,¹⁹ the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and the partial parallel found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* list twelve types.²⁰ These listings seem to present different textual types recognized at a comparatively early stage in the history of Buddhist literature.²¹ While the original meaning of

held against the wind, the coal pit, the dream, the borrowed goods, the tree fruit, and the sword; EĀ 16.1 at T II 578b21 has the motif of the bones, the piece of meat, and the borrowed goods; EĀ 46.10 at T II 780b12 has the snake and the bones, etc.; T 203.96 at T IV 486c13, translated in Willemen 1994: 195-196, has the bones, the piece of meat, the torch held against the wind, and the borrowed goods; the *Śrāvakabhūmi* has a listing that covers the skeleton, the piece of meat, the torch, the pit, the snake, the dream, the borrowed goods, and the tree fruit, cf. Deleanu 2006a: 320,8 or Shukla 1973: 440,17 and T 1579 at T XXX 465c25.

¹⁸ MN 22 at MN I 133,21.

¹⁹ MN 22 at MN I 133,24.

²⁰ MĀ 200 at T I 764a14 and EĀ 50.8 at T II 813a16. Lamotte 1956: 263 note 2 explains that the twelve-fold presentation prevails in the Chinese Āgamas, in the different Vinayas (except for the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya), in the main treatises of the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra schools, and in most Mahāyāna sūtras (for a detailed survey cf. the table in Mayeda 1964; for a discussion of occurrences of the twelve-fold listing in Chinese texts cf. Nattier 2004). Hirakawa 1963: 63 points out that the occurrence of the twelve-fold listing in the *Ekottarika-āgama* does not fit too well with the hypothesis that attributes this collection to a *Mahāsāṅghika* tradition, as the *Mahāsāṅghika* Vinaya employs the nine-fold listing, cf. T 1425 at T XXII 227b12, summed up at T XXII 227b25 as 九部經.

²¹ While the commentarial tradition takes these nine to represent actual collections, according to Kalupahana 1965: 616 “this classification of the buddhavacana is a mere description of literary types ... it does not refer to nine different groups of literature, but to nine types of composition”; cf. also, e.g., Dutt 1957: 89: “the list [of *anigas*]... rests on an analysis of different forms of composition found in the canon”, and Nāṇatiloka 1952/1988: 193 s.v. *sāsana*, who concludes that the *aniga* system “is a classification according to literary styles, and not according to given texts”; cf. also below p. 697 and p. 866 note 49.

the terminology employed in this passage in the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* is uncertain, the Pāli commentary offers the following explanations:

- *sutta* refers to discourses spoken by the Buddha in general,²²
- *geyya* stands for discourses with verses,²³
- *veyyākaraṇa* designates explanatory discourses without verse,²⁴
- *gāthā* are verses, such as found in the *Dhammapada*, the *Thera-* and *Therīgāthā*, and in parts of the *Sutta-nipāta*,
- *udāna* as an inspired utterance in a wider sense refers to discourses that combine prose with such an utterance, a typical example being the discourses found now in the *Udāna* of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*,
- *itivuttaka* stands for discourses that begin with the introductory “thus it was said”, *vuttam ... iti*, as is the case for the discourses found now in the *Itivuttaka*,²⁵

²² Ps II 106,8 includes also the *Vinaya* (the two *Vinayavibhaigas*, the *Khandhaka*, and the (rather late) *Parivāra*) under the heading of *sutta*, together with the following discourses from the *Sutta-nipāta*: *Mangala-sutta*, *Ratana-sutta*, *Nālaka-sutta*, and *Tuvaṭaka-sutta*. Von Hinüber 1994a: 127 notes that in the discourses the term used to refer to a particular discourse is usually *veyyākaraṇa* or *dhammapariyāya*, instead of *sutta*. He suggests (p. 129) that in the listing of *aṅgas* the term *sutta* could rather stand for the *Pātimokkhā-sutta*. Kalupahana 1965: 616 comments that “the explanation of *sutta* (*sūtra*) given by the Sanskrit schools of Buddhism seems to preserve the original sense denoted by the term. According to them, it denotes the word of the Buddha in prose (*gadhyabhāṣita*) which could be easily understood by the listeners”. According to Przyluski 1926: 341, the use of the expression *sutta* in the present context has the more specific sense of an exposition that begins with an enumeration of a particular item (e.g., “there are four things ... what are the four”, etc.), thereby retaining the original sense of *sutta* as “thread” or “string”. Nāṇaponika 1977: 13 explains that *sutta* in its Buddhist usage refers to a presentation of the Dharma that is internally connected by a thread, as it were (“eine zusammenhängende Lehrdarstellung ... durch die sich ein gemeinsamer Faden hindurchzieht”). The idea of a “thread” or a “string” underlies Dhp 44-45, which compares a well-taught *dhammapada* to a skilled florist who strings up flowers. The same idea can be found more explicitly in Vin III 9,10, which compares the nine-fold teachings of former Buddhas (i.e. the *sutta*, *geyya*, etc., delivered by them) to flowers strung on a string; cf. also Winteritz 1908: 229. Norman 1997: 104, however, derives *sutta* from *su + ukta*, “well spoken”; cf. also Gombrich 1990b: 23, Thomas 1933/2004: 269 note 2, Vetter 1988: viii, Walleser 1914: 4 note 1, and Wright 1966: 7 note 2, whereas Mayrhofer 1976: 492 and von Hinüber 1994a: 132 note 28 (after surveying the aforesaid publications) consider that such a derivation is not required to explain the term; cf. also Bronkhorst 2009: xi note 4 and Klaus 2010.

²³ Jayawickrama 1959: 12 explains that “*geyya* (from \sqrt{gai} *gāyati*, to sing), seems to represent the *ākhyāna*-type containing stanzas punctuated with narrative prose. Generally, in the old *ākhyānas*, the stanzas alone had a fixed form while the prose-narrative was given by the reciter in his own words”. According to Mayeda 1964: 24, *geyya* “is not, however, a simple juxtaposition of prose and verse. The prose section which comes first is repeated once again in the verse section which follows. This *repetition* of similar contents is the key point of *geyya*”; cf. also Burnouf 1844/1876: 47.

²⁴ Ps II 106,13 also includes discourses that have not been covered by the other eight types of text and the *Abhidhammapitaka* under this heading, an obvious anachronism. Von Hinüber 1994a: 126 points out that in canonical usage the expression *veyyākaraṇa* appears to be applicable to any type of discourse; cf. also Anālayo 2009i.

²⁵ MĀ 200 at T I 764a15 renders *Itivuttaka* as 此說 and EĀ 50.8 at T II 813a17 simply as 說. Bapat 1969: 3 explains that the translation found in the *Madhyama-āgama* indicates that the translator did not follow

- *jātakas* are records of former lives of the Buddha,
- *abbhutadhamma* describe marvellous events or qualities,²⁶
- *vedalla* refers to discourses that proceed in the form of a question and answer exchange.²⁷

The three additional categories included in the twelve-fold listing are:

- *nidāna*, historical narratives, such as the introduction to a discourse, which specifies the discourse's setting and circumstances,
- *apadāna*, mostly narrations of former lives of disciples that illustrate the working mechanism of karma,²⁸
- *upadesa*, perhaps best understood to refer to philosophical instructions and expositions.²⁹

the “Sanskritisation ... to *vṛttaka*”, found, e.g., in the *Mahāvyutpatti* no. 1274 in Sakaki 1926: 97 as *Itivṛttaka*, with its corresponding Chinese renderings as 本事 or 此說他事 and its Tibetan rendering as *de lta bu byung ba'i sde*; or in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Pradhan 1950: 78,3: *iti vṛttakam*, where the Chinese version T 1606 at T XXXI 743b9 also uses 本事 (as already noted by Hazra 1994: 146, this is then taken to refer to past life experiences of disciples, cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 138,9 or SSG 1998: 230,10 and T 1579 at T XXX 418c19); cf. also Ruegg 1999: 201-202. Bapat takes this as one of several arguments in support of the hypothesis that the *Madhyama-āgama* was translated from a Prākrit original.

²⁶ Ps II 106,22 mentions the marvellous qualities of Ānanda, listed in DN 16 at DN II 145,3 and AN 4:129 at AN II 132,17, as an example of this category. Another example would be the *Acchariya-abbhūta-sutta*, MN 123 at MN III 118-124, which is mentioned as an instance of the present category in a listing of *arīgas* in T 212 at T IV 643c10: 若尊者阿難以未曾有法歎如來德; cf. also the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 308a13 (translated in Lamotte 1980: 2301-2302), the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 660b2 (translated in Guang Xing 2002b: 19 note 80 or id. 2005: 191 note 71), on the *arīga* of marvels cf. also Anālayo 2010f: 37-39 note 65.

²⁷ Ps II 106,26 lists as examples the *Sakkapañha-sutta*, DN 21 at DN II 263-289, the *Sammāditthi-sutta*, MN 9 at MN I 46-55, the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, MN 43 at MN I 292-298, the *Cūlavedalla-sutta*, MN 44 at MN I 299-305, the *Mahāpuṇḍrama-sutta*, MN 109 at MN III 15-20, and the *Saṅkhārabhājaniya-sutta* (= *Saṅkhāruppatti-sutta*), MN 120 at MN III 99-103. Dhammadhoti 2005: 112 suggests that the fact that *vedalla* is listed last “could be an indication that *vedalla* came to be incorporated into the classificatory scheme at a relatively later stage”, so that this category could represent an evolving Abhidhammic approach (cf. also, however, below p. 699 note 70). Regarding the significance of the term, according to Jayawickrama 1959: 14 the word *vedalla* “comes from an older *vaidārya* form, *vi* + $\sqrt{dṛ}$ to tear apart, hence analyse or break down into fundamentals”, wherefore he concludes that *vedalla* probably means “subtle analysis”. Kalupahana 1965: 618 similarly takes *vedalla* to refer in particular to “subtle analyses, unintelligible to the ordinary man”. Nāṇapōṇika in Nāṇatiloka 1907/1984: 204 note 16-9 relates *vedalla* to \sqrt{dal} and speaks of discourses of an explanatory character, “Sutten von erläuterndem Charakter”. Cf. also AN 5:79 at AN III 107,4, which lists *vedallakathā* together with *abhidhammakathā*.

²⁸ Instances of this type of texts in the Pāli tradition would be the *Mahāpadāna-sutta*, DN 14 at DN II 1-54, and the texts containing narrations of the former lives of monks and nuns, collected in the *Apadāna* of the *Khuddhaka-nikāya*; on the *Apadāna* collection cf. also, e.g., Appleton 2010: 3-5, Barua 1946, Bechert 1958, Cutler 1994, Norman 1983a: 89-90, Perera 1966, Sharma 1985: 10-12, and von Hinüber 1996/1997: 60-61; on the stages of development of *apadāna/avadāna* material in *Vinaya* literature cf. Hirakawa 1960: 14.

²⁹ Cf. also Lamotte 1958/1988: 145 and Minh Chau 1964/1991: 22.

After listing these *ariyas*, the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallels continue by comparing wrong grasp of the Dharma to taking hold of a snake by its tail and consequently getting bitten, while proper grasp of the Dharma compares to skilfully catching a snake without getting bitten.

MN I 134 The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions continue with the famous parable of the raft, a parable also found in the other partial parallel from the *Ekottarika-āgama* and in an extract from a version of the present discourse preserved in Śamatha-deva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*.³⁰ The four versions agree in describing how someone constructs a raft in order to cross over a stretch of water. After successfully crossing over, the raft should be left behind, instead of being taken along. Similarly, the monks should leave (attachment to) the teachings behind, not to speak of leaving behind what is contrary to the teachings.³¹

Further information on this image can be gathered from a *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*, which similarly describe crossing a water expanse with the help of a raft in order to reach the other shore. In these two discourses, the raft stands for the noble eightfold path and the other shore represents Nirvāṇa.³²

The commentary to the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* explains the injunction to leave the teachings behind with the help of a passage from the *Mahātanhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*, in which the Buddha refers to the raft simile when instructing the monks on the need to steer clear of any attachment to their own view, however pure it may be.³³ The same commentary also brings up the *Latukikopama-sutta*, which highlights the importance of abandoning a lower level of concentration in order to be able to reach a higher level of concentration, in this way progressing on the path of mental development.³⁴ In sum, then, the injunction to leave the teachings behind appears to point to detachment. The same injunction would not imply discarding the path itself, however, as this would amount to discarding the very means that is to be used for developing detachment.³⁵

³⁰ MN 22 at MN I 134,30, MĀ 200 at T I 764b19, EĀ 43.5 at T II 760a13, and Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 74b6 or Q (5595) *thu* 119b7; cf. also the discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 8:25 in Pradhan 1967: 449,18, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 149c23 and T 1559 at T XXIX 301b12. The present passage occurs also as a discourse quotation in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 63c7, translated in Lamotte 1944/1981: 64. A reference to this simile can be found in MN 38 at MN I 260,35 and its parallel MĀ 201 at T I 767c7.

³¹ Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1209 note 255 comments that, even though the commentary takes *dhammā* here to mean ‘good states’, “it seems to me that *dhammā* here signifies ... the teachings, the correct attitude to which was delineated just above in the simile of the snake”.

³² SN 35:197 at SN IV 175,17 and its parallel SĀ 1172 at T II 313c22.

³³ Ps II 109,17, in reference to MN 38 at MN I 260,32, a point made also in its parallel MĀ 201 at T I 767c5.

³⁴ MN 66 at MN I 455,5, a teaching found similarly in its parallel MĀ 192 at T I 743b14.

³⁵ Nāṇaponika 1962/1974: 6 warns against misunderstanding this parable, referring to “those who wrongly believe that this parable justifies them in jettisoning the Raft *before* they have used it”, presuming “that it invites them to let go the good teachings along with the false ones, even before they have benefited by the former and fully discarded the latter”. Carrithers 1983a: 73 explains the simile to intend that “it is irrational to cling even to the profitable states of mind created by morality and meditation, still less to unprofitable states of mind”, adding that “this presupposes, of course, that through habituation and training

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* next examines six standpoints for views. Regarding these standpoints, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version differentiates between the unlearned worldling's tendency of falling prey to identifications and the noble disciple, who is free from such identifications.³⁶ The *Madhyama-āgama* version makes a similar point, differing in as much as it directly proceeds to the noble disciple, without taking up the case of an unlearned worldling.³⁷ The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* applies this treatment to:

- body,
- feeling,
- perception,
- mental formations,
- what is experienced and thought,
- the belief in the permanent existence of the self and the world.³⁸

The *Madhyama-āgama* version differs from this presentation in as much as it does not mention mental formations (*sankhāra*). Instead, the *Madhyama-āgama* version lists what appears to be an annihilationist viewpoint.³⁹ In a recapitulation of these six stand-

the profitable practices are now second nature to the monk". Kalupahana 1988: 302 notes that "the usefulness of the raft is contextual and concrete. Apart from the context, the raft has no meaning, and it is not possessed of absolute value". For a detailed discussion of the significance of the present passage cf. Keown 1992/2001: 92-105.

³⁶ In relation to the sixth of these views, MN 22 at MN I 135,36 actually speaks of taking the (eternalist) standpoint for views itself to be mine, I, or my self, *ditthithānam ... tam pi etam mama eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā ti samanupassati*. Although a standpoint for views, *ditthithāna*, can be appropriated as "mine", it seems difficult to conceive of it as being taken to be "I" or "my self". Perhaps the injunction should be understood to refer to the content of the view, not to the viewpoint itself.

³⁷ The passage in MĀ 200 at T I 764c15 begins with 復次, "and again" (corresponding to *puna ca param* in Pāli). Such a conjunction is not required at this point, since the discourse is broaching a new subject, the six standpoints for views. The occurrence of this conjunction at the outset of the present passage suggests the possibility that an exposition of the unlearned worldling formed part of the original account and was lost during the process of transmission.

³⁸ MN 22 at MN I 135,27. Norman 1981: 20 notes that the sixth view echoes the identification of the self with the world proposed in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3.14.4; Bhattacharya 1997: 25 relates the same view to a passage in the *Śātapatha Brāhmaṇa* (10.6.3); cf. also, however, Bronkhorst 2007: 216. Regarding the fifth view on identifying with what is seen, heard, etc., Gombrich 1990a: 15 draws attention to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.6, according to which the same activities should be recognized as manifestations of the self; cf. also Gombrich 2002/2003, Hosoda 2002/2003: 483, and Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 60. In relation to the catechism in MN 22 at MN I 138,11, Norman 1981: 22 remarks that the answers given by the monks "can only be given by those who know, in advance, that the term *attā* is by definition *nicca* and *sukha*, and therefore anything which is *anicca* and *dukkha* cannot be *attā* ... the Buddha's audience were aware of the Upaniṣadic view and realised that it could be refuted simply by pointing out that the world around us ... is obviously non-eternal and *dukkha*".

³⁹ MĀ 200 at T I 764c19: "[there is] nothing that I possess, I am not possessed by another, I will not be and I will not possess [anything]", 非我有, 我非彼有, 我當無, 我當不有. A similar formulation, coming at the end of a comparable progression of ideas, can be found in SĀ 133 at T II 42a8; cf. also SĀ 136 at T II 42b26 and SĀ 139 at T II 43a7. A proposition of a comparable type, although without being presented as an object for contemplation of not-self, occurs in SN 22:81 at SN III 99.4, SN 22:153 at SN III 183,26, SN 24:4 at SN III 206,17, and AN 10:29 at AN V 63,28. Bodhi 2000: 1060 note 75 explains that such

points for views, the *Madhyama-āgama* version does mention mental formations, thereby corresponding more closely to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version of the six stand-points for views.⁴⁰

MN I 136 The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* describe in similar terms the agitation experienced by those who long for things from the past, and the agitation experienced by those who believe in an eternal self and who, on hearing the Buddha's teaching, come to the conclusion that they will be annihilated. The two versions differ, however, in the way they introduce these two cases. Thus longing for the past is because of:

- what does not exist externally (according to the Pāli version),
- what does exist internally (according to the Chinese version).

Fear of annihilation arises because of:

- what does not exist internally (according to the Pāli version),⁴¹
- what does exist externally (according to the Chinese version).⁴²

The Pāli presentation uses "external" to refer to things one had in the past and has no longer,⁴³ while "internal" refers to the non-existent self. The Chinese version, however, seems to use the same two expressions to refer to the source for the agitation, as what exists "internally" stands for the person's own mental reflections, while what exists "externally" represents hearing the Buddha's teaching on not-self. Thus the *Majjhima-nikāya* version highlights the objects of the agitation – past possessions or a supposed self – while the *Madhyama-āgama* version places emphasis on the source of the mental agitation, which is either hearing or else thinking.

propositions occur in two modes, one used by annihilationists and framed in terms of "I" (e.g., "if I were not", *no c' assam*), while the Buddhist adoption of this proposition is framed in terms of "it" (e.g., "if it were not", *no c'assa*), found, e.g., in MN 106 at MN II 264,20, SN 22:55 at SN III 55,29, and AN 7:52 at AN IV 70,8. This shows that the annihilationist view bears a relation to contemplation of not-self, in that the annihilationist's position needs to be dissociated from a sense of "I". On this interpretation, the reference in MĀ 200 would become more easily understandable. However, the first part of the same formulation recurs in MĀ 200 at T I 765c7 as an instruction by the Buddha to the monks on contemplating not-self: 彼一切非我有, 我非彼有, 亦非是神, 如是慧觀. Since this passage also employs the personal pronoun "I", 我, it seems improbable that the earlier instance at T I 764c17 should be interpreted as intending a shift from a statement framed with the personal pronoun "I" to one that dispenses with it. On this type of contemplation cf. also de La Vallée Poussin 1931. Ps II 112,18, in its gloss on the present passage, quotes the statement *no c' assam no ca me siyā* (from SN 22:55 at SN III 57,28, which would correspond to part of the statement found in MĀ 200 at T I 764c19), explaining how an eternalist would be agitated on hearing the Buddha's teaching and believing it to imply annihilation.

⁴⁰ MĀ 200 at T I 765c9, although this is followed by another reference to the view of annihilationism. Moreover, the Chinese character for mental formations, 行, occurs out of sequence, as it is found between feeling and perception.

⁴¹ MN 22 at MN I 136,18+29: *bahiddhā asati paritassanā* and *ajjhattam asati paritassanā*; on this passage cf. also Steinkellner 2004.

⁴² MĀ 200 at T I 764c29: "can there be fear because of what exists internally", 頗有因內有恐怖耶?; MĀ 200 at T I 765a12: "can there be fear because of what exists externally", 頗有因外有恐怖耶?

⁴³ Cf. also the gloss in Ps II 111,23.

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel continue with the Buddha somewhat humorously inviting the monks to grasp or rely on what, if grasped or relied on, is not impermanent and will not lead to sorrow.⁴⁴ The two versions differ, however, on the possibilities they list for such grasping. The Pāli discourse proposes:

- a permanent acquisition (*pariggaha*),
- grasping a doctrine of a self that does not lead to sorrow,
- relying on a view that does not lead to sorrow.⁴⁵

The Chinese discourse lists:

- an acquisition that does not lead to sorrow,
- relying on a view that does not lead to sorrow,
- grasping a body that is beyond change and alteration.⁴⁶

In spite of such differences,⁴⁷ the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel can be seen to agree that attachment will inevitably lead to sorrow, whether such attachment is to any type of acquisition, including the body, or to any view, including a doctrine of a self.

The Pāli version continues with a question and answer catechism on the impermanent, MN I 138 unsatisfactory, and not-self nature of the five aggregates, instructing that any instance of each aggregate should be contemplated as “not I, not mine, not my self”.⁴⁸ The Chinese version applies a similar catechism to the six standpoints for views.⁴⁹ The two discourses agree that the successful undertaking of such contemplation of not-self can lead to full awakening.

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel next describe a monk who has reached full MN I 139 awakening with a set of five epithets, according to which such a monk has overcome:

- ignorance,
- the round of rebirths,
- craving,
- the five lower fetters,⁵⁰
- the conceit ‘I am’.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 94b5 or Q (5595) *thu* 143a8 parallels the discussion on not-self that begins in MN 22 at MN I 137,24; cf. also the discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 9 in Pradhan 1967: 472,7, paralleling MN 22 at MN I 138,3, with a Chinese counterpart in T 1558 at T XXIX 156c16.

⁴⁵ MN 22 at MN I 137,17.

⁴⁶ MĀ 200 at T I 765b15.

⁴⁷ Another difference between the two versions is that MN 22 at MN I 138,9 qualifies the view that affirms a permanent self as a completely and utterly foolish teaching, *kevalo paripūro bāladhammo*, a remark absent from MĀ 200.

⁴⁸ MN 22 at MN I 138,10.

⁴⁹ MĀ 200 at T I 765c6 (a similar contemplation can already be found at T I 764c15, on the occasion when the six standpoints for views are introduced for the first time). The discourse extract at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 94b7 or Q (5595) *thu* 143b4 differs from MĀ 200 in so far as it takes up form, feelings, perceptions and what is seen, heard, cognized, etc., without bringing in formations or either an annihilationist or eternalist view.

⁵⁰ Overcoming the five lower fetters is already achieved with non-return. Hence, on its own, this particular epithet would not yet mark off someone as being fully awakened.

The two versions agree that even gods will be unable to find the support of the consciousness of such a monk.⁵²

MN I 140 The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its parallel continue by turning to Brahmins and recluses who mistake the Buddha's teaching for annihilation. The Pāli version clarifies that the Buddha's teaching is only concerned with *dukkha* and its cessation, a statement not found in the Chinese parallel.⁵³

The two discourses continue with the Buddha's equanimous attitude when being either reviled or venerated. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, when venerated the Buddha would reflect that such honour was towards what had "previously been fully understood".⁵⁴

The commentary explains this somewhat cryptic statement to imply that when honour and veneration occurred, the Buddha did not have the slightest notion of thinking "I am being honoured, I am being venerated", but was clearly aware that such honour was only directed to the five aggregates. According to the commentary, the expression "previously fully understood" refers to the five aggregates, because with his awakening the Buddha had fully understood them.⁵⁵

The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel differs in as much as it reports that, when being venerated, the Buddha would reflect that this was due to his present knowledge and elimination [of defilements].⁵⁶

The *Madhyama-āgama* version also reports the Buddha's reflection when being reviled. According to its account, in such a case the Buddha would reflect that his present experience of being reviled was simply a result of his own deeds of the past.⁵⁷

⁵¹ MN 22 at MN I 139,16 and MĀ 200 at T I 765c22. These five epithets recur with an explanation in AN 5:71 at AN III 84,13.

⁵² Both versions refer to such a liberated monk as a *tathāgata* 如來, MN 22 at MN I 140,5 and MĀ 200 at T I 766a7. Trenckner 1888/1993: 542 comments that in the present context the term "retains the original sense of 'such a one' ... and the other significations of *tathāgata* may have proceeded from texts like these".

⁵³ MN 22 at MN I 140,14: *dukkhañ c' eva paññāpemi, dukkhassa ca nirodham*. The same statement recurs in SN 22:86 at SN III 119,5 and SN 44:2 at SN IV 384,14, but is absent from their Chinese parallel SĀ 106 at T II 33a4.

⁵⁴ MN 22 at MN I 140,23: *yañ kho idam pubbe pariññātām tattha me evarūpā kārā karīyantī ti.*

⁵⁵ Ps II 118,32 quotes the Buddha's statement as reading: *tattha 'me* (= *tattha + me*, with *ime* representing the five aggregates). An argument against this would be that according to the rules of *sandhi* (cf. Fahs 1989: 39 and Warder 1963/1991: 214) one would expect *tattha + ime* to result in *tatth'ime* rather than in *tattha 'me*. Horner 1954/1967: 180 note 10 points out that the commentarial interpretation "must be wrong, for just below when the monks are being told to comport themselves, we get *tattha no*". That is, the reading *tattha no* indicates that the Buddha's statement would analogously be *tattha me*, so that both reflections are formulated in terms of "to me" (*me*) or "to us" (*no*) such honour and veneration are being done, not in terms of being done "to these [aggregates]". Horner's argument holds for the PTS and Siamese editions, S^e-MN I 279,11, which read *tattha no*, while B^e-MN I 193,23 reads *tattha 'me* (in accordance with the commentarial gloss) and C^e-MN I 350,25 reads *tatr'ime*.

⁵⁶ MĀ 200 at T I 766a20: 我今所知所斷.

⁵⁷ MĀ 200 at T I 766a15: 我本所作.

Since a reflection in case of being reviled is not found at all in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, its description of how the Buddha would react to honour and praise by reflecting on what had “previously been fully understood” might be a conflation of what originally could have been two reflections, one on what had “previously been done” and the other on what “at present is fully understood”, the former appropriate for the case of blame and the latter for the case of praise, as in the *Madhyama-āgama* version.

In both discourses, the Buddha tells the monks that they should likewise develop equanimity in regard to praise and blame. To illustrate the attitude they should develop, the two versions give the example of how someone might carry away the dry grass and twigs in Jeta’s Grove and burn them.⁵⁸ The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* stands alone in preceding the simile of the grass and twigs with an instruction to the monks, according to which they should give up the five aggregates, since none of these five aggregates really belongs to them.⁵⁹

Another difference between the two versions is that, according to the Pāli report, the Buddha questioned the monks if, on seeing grass and twigs carried away and being burnt, they would think “we are being carried away and burnt”.⁶⁰ According to the Chinese version of the simile, however, the Buddha asked the monks if the grass and twigs would have such a thought.⁶¹ That is, in the Chinese discourse the point made with the simile is that just as dry grass and twigs do not have such thoughts, so too the monks should not have thoughts of “I” and “mine” when confronted with praise and blame.

Thus, whereas according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the monks should have the same attitude towards themselves as towards grass and twigs in a grove,⁶² according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version they should avoid reacting, just as dry grass and twigs do not react to whatever is done to them.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version’s presentation of the simile brings to mind the *Mahā-rāhulovāda-sutta*, where the Buddha somewhat similarly instructs Rāhula to develop a mind like the earth, which is not disgusted or humiliated when people spit on it or throw dirt on it.⁶³

The *Alagaddūpama-sutta*’s version of this simile receives support from a discourse in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* and its Chinese and Gāndhārī parallels, which present the sim-

⁵⁸ MN 22 at MN I 141,7 and MĀ 200 at T I 766a27.

⁵⁹ MN 22 at MN I 140,33: *yam na tumhākam, tam pajahatha, tam vo pahīnam dīgharattam hitāya sukhāya bhavissati*.

⁶⁰ MN 22 at MN I 141,8: *api nu tumhākam evam assa, amhe janō harati vā dahati vā yathāpaccayaṇ vā karotī ti* (C^e-MN I 352,6 and S^e-MN I 280,3: *dahati*, C^e also does not have the last *vā*)? Wynne 2010: 210 explains that this simile “is clearly a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Upaniṣadic concept of a world self”, in the sense that “if the grass, stick and so on in the Jetavana are not part of oneself, then the Upaniṣadic notion of personal identity with a world self is foolish”.

⁶¹ MĀ 200 at T I 766a29: 彼燥草枯木，頗作是念，他人持我去，火燒，隨意所用耶？

⁶² Nāṇaponika 1962/1974: 10 explains the simile to imply that “if viewed in the single-minded and passion-free detachment of Insight-meditation (*vipassanā*), these physical and mental processes, so long regarded as ‘I’ and ‘Mine’, will be seen to be as alien as the vegetation of the Jeta Grove”.

⁶³ MN 62 at MN I 423,21.

ile of the leaves and twigs in terms of the monks having the thought “we are being carried away” or “what belongs to us is being carried away”.⁶⁴

The same idea also underlies a stanza in the *Theragāthā* where the novice Adhimutta, who according to the commentarial account was about to be killed by bandits, explains that he is without fear since he considers the whole world as if it were mere grass and twigs.⁶⁵ The point made in this way corresponds to the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*’s version of the simile, in the sense that Adhimutta indicates to have as little attachment to himself as he would have towards dry grass and twigs.

- MN I 141 The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel agree in highlighting that in the Buddha’s teaching the four stages of awakening can be found, and that those who have faith in the Buddha will be heading for a good rebirth.⁶⁶ The Pāli version stands alone in also referring to the Dharma-follower (*dhammānusārī*) and the faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*).⁶⁷

MN 23 *Vammika-sutta*

The *Vammika-sutta*,⁶⁸ the “discourse on the termite mound”, presents a simile about a termite hill,⁶⁹ followed by recording the Buddha’s explanation of this simile. This discourse has four Chinese parallels, two of which can be found in two *Samyukta-āgama* translations, another parallel occurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, and the fourth parallel is an individual translation.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ SN 22:33 at SN III 34,7, which has a parallel in a Gāndhārī discourse fragment in Glass 2007: 136, Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 5 lines 18-19, and two Chinese parallels, SĀ 269 at T II 70b6 and SĀ 274 at T II 73a6. These four discourses also record the Buddha’s instruction: “give up what is not yours”, which SN 22:33, the Gāndhārī discourse fragment, and SĀ 269 apply to the five aggregates, while SĀ 274 applies the same instruction to the six senses.

⁶⁵ Th 717.

⁶⁶ Cruise 1983: 159 notes that in the Pāli version “monks are mentioned in all but the last group”, i.e. those who have faith and are thus destined to a good rebirth (in MĀ 200, however, the expression “monk”, 比丘, is not used in the description of any group). Norman 1991/1993b: 184 relates the present passage to a similar prospect to be expected for a devoted Jain disciple. Upadhyaya 1980: 352 sees the prediction in MN 22 on the potential of faith as one of the germs for a development that eventually changed an “atheistic doctrine of wisdom and self-reliance into a theistic religion of devotion and grace”; on this passage cf. also Ludowyk-Gyomroi 1947: 32. Yet, as noted by de La Vallée Poussin 1927/2001: 233, elsewhere in the Pāli discourses similar statements can be found, such as the promise that those who take refuge in the Buddha will be reborn in heaven, cf., e.g., DN 20 at DN II 255,3 and SN 1.37 at SN I 27,8 (or SN² 37 at SN² I 57,3) or the statement that the inspiration caused by visiting the *stūpa* of a Buddha has the same effect of ensuring a good rebirth, cf. DN 16 at DN II 142,21.

⁶⁷ MN 22 at MN I 142,4.

⁶⁸ E-MN I 145,11: *Vammika-sutta*.

⁶⁹ König 1984: 21 points out that *vammika* is best understood to stand for a “termite mound”; for a study of this simile cf. Hecker 2009: 110-115.

⁷⁰ The parallels are SĀ 1079 at T II 282a-c, SĀ² 18 at T II 379c-380a, EĀ 39.9 at T II 733b-c, and T 95 at T I 918b-919a. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 95 was translated by Dānapāla. While EĀ 39.9 agrees with MN 23 on locating the discourse at Sāvatthī, SĀ 1079 and SĀ² 18 take

The *Vammika-sutta* and its Āgama parallels begin by reporting that a *deva*, who had come to visit the monk Kumāra Kassapa,⁷¹ described a termite mound that smokes by night and burns by day, and which when dug into reveals a series of items.⁷² Each of these items needs to be taken out,⁷³ until finally a *nāga* will come to light. According to all versions, the *deva* told Kumāra Kassapa that he should approach the Buddha in order to get this simile explained.

The five versions of the discourse agree that, according to the explanation given by the Buddha, the termite mound represents a person's body.⁷⁴ Due to thinking and planning, the termite mound "smokes" by night, and due to carrying out actions, it "burns" by day. In a discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya*, these expressions represent imaginings based on the notion 'I am'.⁷⁵

Energetically digging with the "knife" of wisdom into this "termite mound", the noble disciple will unearth and discard a series of items. The Pāli and Chinese versions vary on the nature of the items unearthed in this way.⁷⁶ They agree, however, that the unearthing and discarding of these items represents the overcoming of ignorance, anger, doubt, and of the five types of sensual pleasure (see table 3.3).

The Pāli version stands alone in considering the five aggregates of clinging as an item to be "unearthed" and discarded.⁷⁷ When evaluating this difference, it is noteworthy that the other items mentioned in the *Vammika-sutta* are all unwholesome mental

place at the Squirrels' Feeding Ground by Rājagaha, and T 95 does not specify a location. T 95 has the title "discourse spoken by the Buddha on the simile of the ant", 佛說蟻喻經. Anesaki 1908: 117 gives the title 穢移 for SĀ 1079, which he translates as "digging out". The summary verse at T II 735b12 refers to EĀ 39.9 as 波蜜, with a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading as 婆蜜. A study of the different versions of this discourse can be found in Grohmann 1991; a brief survey of MN 23 can be found in Anālayo 2009j. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 74.

⁷¹ According to Jā 12 at Jā I 148,25, Kumāra Kassapa was the name that had been given to the son of a nun, who had become pregnant before she ordained. He was raised in the king's household, from where he went forth at the age of seven.

⁷² The introductory narration in T 95 differs.

⁷³ Coomaraswamy 1939: 154 note 2 comments, in relation to the present discourse, that "digging for buried treasure, in a spiritual sense, appears several times in RV" (*Rgveda*).

⁷⁴ MN 23 at MN I 144,1, SĀ 1079 at T II 282b22, SĀ² 18 at T II 379c25, EĀ 39.9 at T II 733c12, and T 95 at T I 918c18. A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 3:15 in Pradhan 1967: 127,7 parallels MN 23 at MN I 144,2, with counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 46c27, T 1559 at T XXIX 203c8, and Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 130a7 or Q (5595) *tu* 149b5. For a more extensive *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* quotation of the same statement cf. Enomoto 1994: 24. Mahāsi 1982/2006b: 41 explains that the choice of the simile reflects the similarity between a termite mound and the human body in that both have several openings.

⁷⁵ AN 4:200 at AN II 215,25 (which reads *dhūpāyati*, instead of *dhūmāyati*) and A II 216,5 (*pajjalati*).

⁷⁶ The translator of T 95, Dānapāla, appears to have been puzzled by the different items unearthed and finally decided to treat all of them as animals. Thus for example the "slaughterhouse", *asisūna*, in MN 23 at MN I 143,5, has become the "ā-xī-sū-nă insect", T 95 at T I 918c2: 阿西蘇那蟲; cf. also Grohmann 1991: 65. His difficulties are understandable, since one would not expect a slaughterhouse to be among the objects unearthed from a termite mound.

⁷⁷ MN 23 at MN I 144,30: *pajaha pañc' upādānakkhandhe ... ayam etassa attho.*

states or qualities, such as ignorance, anger, doubt, the hindrances, sensual pleasures, and lust. Although clinging to the five aggregates needs to be left behind as well, in other Pāli discourses the five aggregates usually do not form part of lists of unwholesome states or qualities, but tend to occur in contexts requiring an analysis of subjective experience. Hence the occurrence of the five aggregates in the present context is unusual and their absence in the Chinese versions is more in conformity with the overall nature of the items listed in this simile.

Table 3.3: Contents of the ‘Termite Mound’ in MN 23 and its Parallels

MN 23	SĀ 1079 & SĀ ² 18 & T 95	EĀ 39.9
ignorance (1)	5 hindrances (→ 4)	5 fetters
anger (2)	anger (→ 2)	conceit
doubt (3)	miserliness/jealousy	anger (→ 2)
5 hindrances (4)	5 sensual pleasures (→ 6)	covetousness
5 aggregates (5)	ignorance/delusion (→ 1)	5 sensual pleasures (→ 6)
5 sensual pleasures (6)	doubt (→ 3)	doubt (→ 3)
desire (7)	‘I am’ conceit	ignorance (→ 1)
arahant (8)	arahant (→ 8) (≠ 5, 7)	Tathāgata (→ 8?) (≠ 4-5, 7)

Another point worthy of note is that the Pāli discourse lists ignorance in the first place,⁷⁸ followed by anger, doubt, and eventually lust. As ignorance is abandoned with full awakening, doubt is overcome with stream-entry, while anger and lust are left behind with non-return, the Pāli version’s sequence of unearthing items does not reflect the sequence in which these unwholesome qualities are overcome through the practice of the path. The same holds true for the Chinese versions. Even though they differ from the Pāli account in regard to which item is mentioned first, none of them adopts a sequence that would correspond to the successive overcoming of these unwholesome qualities during progress along the gradual path to full awakening.

MN I 145 The Pāli discourse ends by identifying the final item unearthed, the *nāga*, as representing an arahant,⁷⁹ notably the only one of the various items unearthed that can indeed be found in a termite mound, and also the only item that need not be discarded.⁸⁰ The same identification recurs in the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions and in the individual translation.⁸¹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse differs from the other versions, as it identifies the *nāga* with the Tathāgata, while the Brahmin who gives the instructions about the unearthing represents an arahant.⁸² Judging from the image of the simile and

⁷⁸ MN 23 at MN I 144,13.

⁷⁹ MN 23 at MN I 145,5. On the role of *nāgas* in early Buddhism in general cf. also the observations in Bloss 1973, Rawlinson 1986, and the study by Vogel 1926: 93-165.

⁸⁰ On the symbolism of the snake inside the termite mound cf. König 1984: 210-235.

⁸¹ SĀ 1079 at T II 282c2, SĀ² 18 at T II 380a4, T 95 at T I 918c24 and at T I 919a7.

⁸² EĀ 39.9 at T II 733c20 and at T II 733c16.

the testimony of the other versions, the role of the Brahmin as an instructor would better fit the Tathāgata.

According to one of the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions and the individual translation, the Buddha told Kumāra Kassapa that he should retire to secluded spots and practise diligently.⁸³ While the *Ekottarika-āgama* account does not mention such an instruction, it does report that Kumāra Kassapa practised diligently and eventually became an arahant, an achievement recorded also in the Pāli commentary.⁸⁴

This suggests that this series of images were the appropriate means for Kumāra Kassapa's progress, instructing him to meditatively "dig" within himself in order to unearth and then discard what obstructs the attainment of awakening.⁸⁵ Kumāra Kassapa's propensity for the use of images recurs in the *Pāyāsi-sutta* and its Chinese parallels, according to which he employed a wealth of similes in a discussion with a sceptic Brahmin,⁸⁶ an ability which may have earned him the position of being an outstanding speaker in the early Buddhist monk community.⁸⁷

MN 24 *Rathaviniṭa-sutta*

The *Rathaviniṭa-sutta*, the "discourse on the relay of chariots", reports a conversation between Sāriputta and Puṇṇa Mantāniputta about seven stages of purification. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁸⁸ A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁸⁹

The *Rathaviniṭa-sutta* and its Chinese parallels begin with a group of monks who, having come to visit the Buddha, praise Puṇṇa Mantāniputta. The three versions differ to some extent in their listing of his qualities (see table 3.4). They agree that Puṇṇa had few wishes, was contented, lived in seclusion, and was endowed with concentration

MN I 145

⁸³ SĀ 1079 at T II 282c5 and T 95 at T I 919a12 (in T 95 the same injunction is addressed to all monks). SĀ 1079 at T II 282c8 and SĀ² 18 at T II 380a6 conclude by repeating the image given in the simile, together with its explanation, in verse form.

⁸⁴ EĀ 39.9 at T II 733c26 and Ps II 134,15; cf. also Jā 12 at Jā I 148,31. His full awakening is also implicit in his stanza at Th 202.

⁸⁵ This series of mental images to some extent brings to mind modern day katathym imaginative psychotherapy.

⁸⁶ DN 23 at DN II 319,15 and its parallels DĀ 7 at T I 43a2 (for a translation cf. Anālayo 2012c), MĀ 71 at T I 525c7, and T 45 at T I 831b28.

⁸⁷ AN 1:14 at AN I 24,28 and its counterpart EĀ 4.6 at T II 558a12.

⁸⁸ The parallels are MĀ 9 at T I 429c-431c, entitled "discourse on seven chariots", 七車經, and EĀ 39.10 at T II 733c-735b, to which the summary verse at T II 735b12 similarly refers to with the expression "seven chariots", 七車. MĀ 9 has been translated by Pāsādika 2000; cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 144-145, 180, 181, and 205. While MN 24 and MĀ 9 place the Buddha's initial exchange with the monks at Rājagaha, after which the Buddha left for Sāvatthī, according to EĀ 39.10 he had already come to Sāvatthī when the first meeting with the group of monks took place.

⁸⁹ SHT II 163b-d (pp. 16-19) and SHT VI 1329 (p. 84, identified in SHT VIII p. 201). SHT VI 1329 parallels part of the discussion at MN I 147, while SHT II 163 b-d parallels the concluding part of the discourse, cf. MN I 150,11.

and wisdom. They also make a point of indicating that, with regard to each of his positive qualities, Puṇṇa encouraged others to develop the same qualities.

Table 3.4: Puṇṇa's Qualities in MN 24 and its Parallels

MN 24	MĀ 9
few wishes (1)	few wishes & contented (→ 1, 2)
contented (2)	secluded (→ 3)
secluded (3)	energetic (→ 5)
not socializing (4)	right mindfulness
energetic (5)	concentrated (→ 7)
virtue (6)	wise (→ 8)
concentration (7)	influxes destroyed (→ 9)
wisdom (8)	teaches others (→ 11)
liberation (9)	
knowledge & vision of liberation (10)	
teaches others (11)	(≠ 4, 6, 10)

EĀ 39.10
dwells in forest
begs alms
wears rag robes
contented (→ 2)
few wishes (→ 1)
secluded (→ 3)
protects his practice
virtue (→ 6)
concentration (→ 7)
wisdom (→ 8)
liberation (→ 9)
knowledge & vision of liberation (→ 10)
teaches others (→ 11)
(≠ 4-5)

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions, Puṇṇa was energetic,⁹⁰ while the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse describes that he “protects his practice”.⁹¹ Another difference is that the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse lists right mindfulness as a quality of Puṇṇa,⁹² whereas the Pāli and the *Ekottarika-āgama* versions at this point in their sequence of qualities mention his virtue.⁹³ Consequently, the *Madhyama-āgama* version proceeds from being energetic via mindfulness to concentration and wisdom, while the other two versions proceed from virtue via concentration to wisdom. The *Madhyama-āgama* version thus follows a pattern found also in the thoughts of a

⁹⁰ MN 24 at MN I 145,23: *āraddhavirīyo* (B^e-MN I 199,10: *āraddhavīriyo*) and MĀ 9 at T I 430a17: 精進.

⁹¹ EĀ 39.10 at T II 734a14: 守其行.

⁹² MĀ 9 at T I 430a17: 正念.

⁹³ MN 24 at MN I 145,24: *sīlasampanno*, and EĀ 39.10 at T II 734a14: 戒具清淨.

great man, recorded in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, which similarly adopts the sequence energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom,⁹⁴ a sequence that also corresponds to the standard listing of the five faculties (*indriya*). The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions instead reflect the triad morality-concentration-wisdom, a set found frequently in the early discourses.

This particular difference is noteworthy in so far as it appears to constitute a pattern in the respective collections. The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*, in the context of a list of qualities of Mahākassapa, again has right mindfulness in the place where the corresponding *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions mention virtue.⁹⁵ Similarly, the *Madhyama-āgama* version of a list of qualities of the lay-follower Hatthaka mentions mindfulness, whereas its *Āṅguttara-nikāya* counterparts mention his virtue.⁹⁶

Another difference in regard to Puṇṇa's qualities is that the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to the *Rathaviniṭa-sutta* begins its listing with the ascetic practices of living in the forest, subsisting on alms food, and using rag robes, none of which is mentioned in the *Majjhima-nikāya* or *Madhyama-āgama* versions.⁹⁷

These ascetic practices recur again in the list of the qualities of Mahākassapa in the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*. Although the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* does not mention the ascetic practices, the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* does list them.⁹⁸ According to the list of outstanding disciples in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama*, the undertaking of the ascetic practices was indeed a characteristic quality of Mahākassapa,⁹⁹ so that their absence from the *Madhyama-āgama* description of this great disciple is unexpected.

The *Rathaviniṭa-sutta* and its parallels continue by relating that on a later occasion MN I 146 Puṇṇa came to visit the Buddha.¹⁰⁰ After meeting the Buddha, he went to a nearby grove.¹⁰¹ Sāriputta, who was keen to meet in person the monk whose praises he had heard earlier, followed him.¹⁰²

⁹⁴ AN 8:30 at AN IV 229,21.

⁹⁵ MĀ 184 at T I 728c23 lists right mindfulness and clear comprehension, 正念正智, where MN 32 at MN I 214,10 refers to *sīlasampanno*, and EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a11 has 戒德.

⁹⁶ MĀ 41 at T I 484c2 lists eight qualities of the lay disciple Hatthaka, which include mindfulness, 念, while virtue is not mentioned. Two discourses in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* offer similar sets of qualities of Hatthaka, with AN 8:23 at AN IV 217,4 listing seven qualities and AN 8:24 at AN IV 220,6 eight qualities. Both sets mention his virtue, but do not include mindfulness. In this case the differences are, however, not limited to mindfulness versus virtue. MĀ 41 also attributes the qualities of being energetic and concentrated to Hatthaka, two qualities not found in the Pāli versions, while his learnedness and generosity, mentioned in the two Pāli versions, do not occur in MĀ 41.

⁹⁷ EĀ 39.10 at T II 734a8.

⁹⁸ EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a9 and MN 32 at MN I 214,3.

⁹⁹ AN 1:14 at AN I 23,19 and EĀ 4.2 at T II 557b8.

¹⁰⁰ According to MĀ 9 at T I 430b13, another monk informed Sāriputta of the identity of Puṇṇa, indicating that he was the monk with a bright skin and a prominent nose who was sitting near the Buddha. Such details about Puṇṇa's appearance are not mentioned in the other versions.

¹⁰¹ Whereas according to MN 24 at MN I 146,32 and EĀ 39.10 at T II 734b8 Puṇṇa went to the nearby

MN I 147 Once the two monks had spent time in meditative seclusion, Sāriputta went to Puṇṇa to pose a set of questions, without revealing his identity. According to all versions, at the conclusion of their exchange Puṇṇa explicitly declared that, if he had known from the outset the identity of his interlocutor, he would not have answered in such detail.¹⁰³ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, he would in fact not have been able to come out with even a single sentence.¹⁰⁴ That is, Sāriputta apparently needed to conceal his identity in order to be able to elicit a detailed explanation by Puṇṇa.

The Pāli and Chinese versions agree that the set of questions asked by Sāriputta were concerned with seven stages of purification, inquiring from Puṇṇa if any of these was the aim of living the holy life under the Buddha. In each case he received a negative reply, as according to Puṇṇa's explanation the aim of the holy life is rather Nirvāṇa.¹⁰⁵

MN I 148 Despite some differences in the sequence of their presentation, the three versions agree that Nirvāṇa cannot be identified with any of these purifications, yet at the same time these purifications are required, since without developing them it will not be possible to reach Nirvāṇa.

MN I 149 For the sake of illustration, in all versions Puṇṇa introduced a simile. According to this simile, King Pasenadi had some urgent matter to settle at Sāketa, a town apparently over forty miles distant from Sāvatthī.¹⁰⁶ In order to quickly cover this distance, the king used a relay of seven chariots. Similar to these seven chariots, the seven stages of purification are the means to reach the final goal.¹⁰⁷

Regarding these seven stages of purification, it is to some extent puzzling that in all versions Sāriputta and Puṇṇa appear to be quite familiar with a set of stages of purification that recurs in only one other Pāli discourse.¹⁰⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* version

grove on the same day, according to MĀ 9 at T I 430b15 a night intervened, after which Puṇṇa and Sāriputta collected and partook of their alms food the next morning, before approaching the grove for meditative seclusion.

¹⁰² When describing these events, the three versions agree on specifying that Sāriputta took his sitting mat along when approaching the grove, MN 24 at MN I 147,5: *niśidhanam ādāya*, MĀ 9 at T I 430b20: 以尼師檀著於肩上, and EĀ 39.10 at T II 734b13: 以尼師檀著右肩上; cf. also above p. 20.

¹⁰³ MN 24 at MN I 150,29 and EĀ 39.10 at T II 735b3.

¹⁰⁴ MĀ 9 at T I 431c1: 不能答一句. SHT II 163bR6 reads (*pra*)*tibhāsyataḥ*, which suggests that the Sanskrit version may have had a similar statement.

¹⁰⁵ MN 24 at MN I 148,1: *anupādā parinibbāna*, MĀ 9 at T I 430c10 reads 無餘涅槃, and EĀ 39.10 at T II 734c10 speaks of 入涅槃.

¹⁰⁶ According to Vin I 253,10, the distance between Sāvatthī and Sāketa was six *yojanas*, according to Dhp-a I 387,1 seven *yojanas*, and according to the travel records by Fǎxiǎn (法顯) in T 2085 at T LI 860b8 eight *yojanas* (on the precision of Fǎxiǎn's measurements cf. Weller 1920). A *yojana* seems to correspond to the distance covered with one yoke of oxen in a day, which would indeed be about seven miles. On the measurement of the *yojana* in a range of different sources cf. Skilling 1998: 154–166.

¹⁰⁷ EĀ 39.10 at T II 735a13 illustrates the same with an additional simile: “just like a man who wants to ascend to the top of a staircase with seven steps, he has to use them in proper order to arrive”, 猶如有入欲上七重樓上, 要當以次而至 (adopting a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading that adds 人 to 猶如有).

¹⁰⁸ DN 34 at DN III 288,16 and its parallels DĀ 10 at T I 56a23 and T 13 at T I 238c25, where the seven stages of purification form part of a scheme of nine stages; for the relevant Sanskrit fragments of the

might hold a solution to this puzzle, a solution that suggests itself when undertaking a closer examination of the starting point of the discussion between Sāriputta and Puṇṇa Mantāniputta.

According to the Pāli account of their conversation, the first question, asked by Sāriputta, was if Puṇṇa was living the holy life under the Blessed One.¹⁰⁹ This question seems a little beside the point, since for a Buddhist monk there would be no reason to ask another Buddhist monk if he is living the holy life under the Buddha.¹¹⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version has the same question, with the difference that according to its presentation Sāriputta spoke consistently of the holy life being lived under the “recluse Gotama”.¹¹¹ Only at the end of the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, when asking for Puṇṇa’s name and about to reveal his own identity, does Sāriputta change expression, using the (for a Buddhist disciple more appropriate) term *Tathāgata* to refer to the Buddha.¹¹²

In the Pāli *Nikāyas* and the Chinese Āgamas, only those who do not belong to the Buddhist monastic or lay community employ the expression “recluse Gotama” to refer to the Buddha. In view of this usage it seems at first sight strange that a discourse would depict Sāriputta as using such an expression. The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation, therefore, presents the more difficult or unusual reading. It would be easier to imagine that the unusual expression “*samana Gotama*” in Sāriputta’s mouth was changed to a more appropriate mode of address during the process of oral transmission, than to envisage a change taking place in the opposite way.

The form of address used by Sāriputta in the *Madhyama-āgama* version receives support from the Sanskrit fragment parallel to the present discourse, which has preserved the same expression “recluse” in the context of a question on the purpose of purification.¹¹³ In order to ascertain if the *Madhyama-āgama* version’s more unusual reading makes any sense in the present context, a closer look at the situation that would stand at the background of Sāriputta’s question is required.

According to an account given in the *Vinaya*, the proper way of sewing up and dying robes was apparently decided only at a later stage of development of the monastic

Daśottara-sūtra cf. Schlingloff 1962a: 18; cf. also de Jong 1979a: 262 and 271. A comparative study of the seven stages of purification, with extracts from the present study, can be found in Anālayo 2005a.

¹⁰⁹ MN 24 at MN I 147,16: “friend, is the holy life lived under our Blessed One”, *bhagavati no, āvuso, brahmacariyam vussati?*

¹¹⁰ The commentary, Ps II 155,26, explains that Sāriputta asked this question in order for the conversation to get started. This commentarial gloss gives the impression as if the commentators were also puzzled by this question.

¹¹¹ MĀ 9 at T I 430b26: 沙門瞿曇. The version of this question in EĀ 39.10 at T II 734b18 is of little help. An obvious error is that it reports Sāriputta addressing Puṇṇa by name, even though at the conclusion of their discussion he asks him for his name, as reported in all versions, which would become meaningless if he earlier already used the name. Moreover, the version of the question asked by Sāriputta differs considerably from the version he is supposed to have repeated just a little later in EĀ 39.10 at T II 734c2, when repeating all his questions and the answers received from Puṇṇa.

¹¹² MĀ 9 at T I 431b15: 如來.

¹¹³ SHT VI 1329 B1: *[s]uddhyartham [śra]māne.*

order.¹¹⁴ This suggests that, during the early stages of the Buddhist monastic community, its members may not have been easily distinguishable by their outer appearance as Buddhist monks, since they would presumably have dressed in the way used in general among recluses and wanderers. This assumption finds support in the *Cīvaravastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, which reports that King Bimbisāra on one occasion mistook a heterodox wanderer for being a Buddhist monk. In order to avoid recurrence, according to the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* King Bimbisāra approached the Buddha and requested him to lay down a stipulation concerning robes that would make it easier to distinguish Buddhist monks from other wanderers.¹¹⁵

Puṇṇa and Sāriputta appear to have both been ordained soon after the Buddha's awakening, so that their first meeting recorded in the *Rathaviniṭa-sutta* could have taken place during the early stages of the Buddhist order.¹¹⁶ Thus it could be imagined that, when they met, Sāriputta was not immediately recognizable as a Buddhist monk. If Sāriputta was not recognizable as a Buddhist monk, and if he wanted to avoid being asked his name, which Puṇṇa might have done if he had known his visitor to be a Buddhist monk like himself, it would make sense for Sāriputta to act in such a way as to not be recognized. Acting in such a way, he would appear to Puṇṇa just like a heterodox wanderer who had chanced by and was curious to find out more about the Buddha's teaching.

In such a situation it would only be natural for Sāriputta to use the expression “recluse Gotama”, since by using the expression “Blessed One” he would prematurely give himself away as a follower of the Buddha. That he had been successful in this respect becomes evident at the conclusion of the *Madhyama-āgama* version, where Puṇṇa expresses his surprise when finding out that the person he had been conversing with was a disciple of the Buddha.¹¹⁷

This would also explain why Sāriputta, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions, continues to ask Puṇṇa if any of the seven purifications is complete Nirvāṇa without clinging. Such a question does not fit a knowledgeable Buddhist monk in conversation with another Buddhist monk. That moral conduct, for example, falls short of being the final goal of the Buddhist path should have been fairly well known even among recently ordained Buddhist monks. Yet, as a question asked by

¹¹⁴ Vin I 286,2 reports the Buddha laying down which colours are to be used to dye robes, and according to Vin I 287,12 he requested Ānanda to have robes sewn together conforming to the pattern of paddy fields (cf. also von Hinüber 2006: 7). As Ānanda became the Buddha's personal attendant only about twenty years after the Buddha's awakening (cf. Th 1041), the regulations concerning colour and cut of robes would presumably pertain to a period that is at least twenty years after the Buddha's awakening.

¹¹⁵ Dutt 1984b: 49,18; for references to the parallel versions cf. Frauwallner 1956: 98.

¹¹⁶ On Puṇṇa's early ordination cf. Malalasekera 1938/1998: 222. That Sāriputta's ordination took place at an early stage of the Buddhist order suggests itself from Vin I 42,37; cf. also T 200 at T IV 255b18, which explicitly places the meeting between Sāriputta and Assaji, which led to Sāriputta's going forth as a Buddhist monk, soon after the Buddha's awakening, 世尊初始成佛.

¹¹⁷ MĀ 9 at T I 431b27: “Now I have been discussing with a disciple of the Blessed One and did not know it”, 我今與世尊弟子共論而不知.

someone outside of the Buddhist order this query would make sense, since for an outsider the implications of the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa may not be clear, so that he might well continue asking if this Buddhist goal of complete Nirvāṇa without clinging can be understood in terms of any of the seven stages of purification.

If this much is granted, an intriguing perspective emerges concerning the seven stages of purification. With Sāriputta acting in such a way that Puṇṇa was not able to recognize him as a Buddhist monk, the type of terminology used by him would also not be specific Buddhist terminology, but rather be such terms and expressions as were in common use among recluses and wanderers in ancient India. To continue acting like an interested outsider, he would have worded his questions in a way that did not compromise the role he had assumed.

From this it would follow that the seven purifications might have been a list of purifications commonly discussed and aspired to among contemporaries in ancient India. That is, these seven stages of purification could have been (at least at that time) just types or stages of purification recognized in general among recluses and wanderers, instead of being a specific Buddhist doctrine.¹¹⁸

This would explain the dearth of material concerning these stages of purification in other discourses, which makes it so difficult to determine their precise implications. Such difficulties would only be natural if these stages of purification were not an original Buddhist scheme and therefore had not been given as much attention as other schemes and aspects of the Buddha's teaching in the discourses.

Granted this, what is specifically Buddhist about this scheme of purifications would then be the perspective taken in regard to them. Understood in this way, the central message of the *Rathaviniṭa-sutta* is not the list of individual purifications as such, but the fact that, while all of them are means to reach the goal, none of them constitutes the type of purification envisaged as the goal of the holy life: complete Nirvāṇa without clinging.¹¹⁹

MN 25 *Nivāpa-sutta*

The *Nivāpa-sutta*, the “discourse on the bait”, employs the simile of a deer herd that escapes a hunter to illustrate how a monk can escape from Māra. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Thanissaro 2002: 206 suggests that “perhaps the seven types of purity listed in this discourse were originally non-Buddhist teachings that ... the early Buddhist community ... adapted to their own purpose for showing that these seven forms of purity functioned, not as a goal of practice, but as stages along the path”.

¹¹⁹ On the way the seven stages of purification were nevertheless adopted in the *Visuddhimaggā* cf. Anālayo 2009i: 9-11.

¹²⁰ The parallel is MĀ 178 at T I 718b-720a, which is entitled “discourse on the master hunter”, 獵師經. MĀ 178 is located in the Squirrels' Feeding Ground at Rājagaha, while MN 25 takes place in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī.

MN I 151 The *Nivāpa-sutta* and its parallel describe in similar terms the behaviour of four deer herds in regard to a bait set out by a hunter.¹²¹ The first three herds fall prey to the hunter, whereas the fourth herd is able to escape by dwelling in an area out of the hunter's reach. The two versions agree that "bait" stands for the five types of sense pleasure, "hunter" for Māra, and "deer" for recluses and Brahmins.

MN I 155 In both versions, the first deer herd in the simile represents recluses and Brahmins who are heedless when partaking of food, while the second deer herd stands for recluses and Brahmins who live in forest wilds, subsisting on roots and fruits. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the problem with these recluses and Brahmins was that they lost their deliverance of mind, whereas according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account they lost their deliverance of mind and their deliverance through wisdom.¹²²

In other discourses, deliverance of the mind (*cetovimutti*) covers deep stages of concentration that can be lost again,¹²³ but deliverance through wisdom (*paññāvimutti*) stands for awakening,¹²⁴ something that according to the Theravāda tradition will not be lost again. The Sarvāstivāda tradition, however, took a different perspective on this issue, envisaging the possibility that arahants may fall away from the level of awakening or liberation they have achieved.¹²⁵ In view of these different positions, it is possible that the reference in the present *Madhyama-āgama* discourse to deliverance by wisdom being lost again is an expression of this Sarvāstivāda tenet.¹²⁶ Alternatively, the present instance could also be the result of a simple transmission error, where a refer-

¹²¹ For a study of this simile cf. Freiberger 2000a: 64–69.

¹²² MĀ 178 at T I 719b2: 便心解脱, 慧解脱衰退.

¹²³ This becomes evident from the expression "temporary mental liberation", *sāmāyika cetovimutti* (C^o-MN III 272,32: *sāmāyika*), in MN 122 at MN III 110,31, and the corresponding 時 ... 心解脫 in its Chinese parallel MĀ 191 at T I 738b7, and the corresponding *re shig dus ... sems rnam par grol ba* in its Tibetan parallel in Skilling 1994a: 198,7; cf. also Anālayo 2009r.

¹²⁴ MN 70 at MN I 477,33, and its parallel MĀ 195 at T I 751b20 indicate that *paññāvimutti*/慧解脱 stands for full awakening, something which according to MN 29 at MN I 197,27 cannot be lost again, *atthānam etam ... anavakāso yam so bhikkhu tāya asamayavimuttiyā pariḥāyetha*. For a detailed study of *cetovimutti* and *paññāvimutti* cf. de Silva 1978.

¹²⁵ This is the *parihāṇadharma arhat*, found in the *Abhidharmakośabhadra* at Abhidh-k 6:56 in Pradhan 1967: 372,19, cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 129a25 and T 1559 at T XXIX 280b15, or in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, Pradhan 1950: 86,14 and T 1606 at T XXXI 753b5, cf. also Rahula 1971: 145. On the same conception among the Pudgalavādins cf. Thiên Châu 1996/1999: 217, on it in general cf., e.g., Bareau 1957: 244–245.

¹²⁶ The same notion can in fact be found explicitly in another discourse in the same collection, MĀ 127 at T I 616a18, which in a listing of different noble disciples, distinguishes between an arahant liable to fall away and an arahant not liable to fall away, 過法 and 不過法. This discourse does not have a Pāli counterpart. The expression *parihāṇadhamma* occurs in Pp 11,29 in relation to *jhāna* practice, while in Pet 32,8 this expression qualifies "a person who is guidable, [but] who does not engage in development", *neyyo puggalo bhāvanānuyogam anuyutto*, where, even though the context is an examination of different types of arahant, according to Nāṇamoli 1994: 39 note 93/5 "it is clear that the term as used here is not applied to an Arahant".

ence to deliverance of the mind has been accidentally ‘completed’ by adding deliverance through wisdom, as these two terms often occur together.

Even to speak of these recluses and Brahmins to be losing their deliverance of mind, as done in both versions of the present discourse, is to some extent puzzling, because the fourth group of recluses and Brahmins were able to go beyond the range of Māra’s power through attaining the *jhānas*.

In the discourse, ‘deliverance of the mind’ is an umbrella term for the *jhānas*, yet according to the *Nivāpa-sutta* and its Chinese parallel deliverance of the mind was not sufficient to go beyond the range of Māra’s power, while the *jhānas* were sufficient to do so.¹²⁷ Hence, one may wonder what the difference could be between deliverance of the mind and the attainment of the *jhānas*.

According to the commentarial explanation, “deliverance of the mind” in the present context refers to the resolution of these recluses and Brahmins to live in the forest.¹²⁸ Although this explanation would yield a difference between the second and the fourth group of recluses and Brahmins, it constitutes an interpretation of the expression “deliverance of the mind” (*cetovimutti*) that differs considerably from the implication of this term in its general canonical usage.

The *Nivāpa-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by identifying the third deer herd with recluses and Brahmins who are under the influence of views. The two versions differ in regard to the views held by this third group of recluses and Brahmins. The Pāli version lists a standard set of ten views that belong to the category of questions not answered by the Buddha (*avyākata*), while the Chinese version instead lists the two views of existence and non-existence.¹²⁹

In both versions, to dwell beyond the range of Māra – corresponding to the fourth deer herd’s dwelling beyond the hunter’s reach – is reached by developing deeper stages of concentration, such as the four *jhānas*, the four immaterial attainments, and the attainment of cessation, together with the destruction of the influxes.¹³⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version also mentions the four *brahmavihāras* as concentrative attainments that are beyond the reach of Māra.¹³¹

¹²⁷ The theme of going beyond Māra’s power through deeper stages of concentration recurs in AN 9:39 at AN IV 434,16, according to which with the immaterial attainments a monk goes beyond the range of Māra, *antam akāsi mārām, apadam vadhitvā māracakkhum, adassanam gato pāpimato* (S^e-AN IV 452,17: *apadam bhanditvā*), a passage that uses the same expressions as found in MN 25 at MN I 159,14 (here for the first *jhāna*). AN 9:39 at AN IV 434,1 also takes up the four *jhānas*, although in this case it uses a somewhat different formulation, according to which with attainment of the *jhānas* a monk no longer has any dealings with Māra, *akarāṇīyo mārassa*.

¹²⁸ Ps II 162,19.

¹²⁹ MĀ 178 at T I 719b23: 有見及無見.

¹³⁰ MN 25 at MN I 160,12 indicates that with the attainment of cessation one has “gone beyond attachment in the world”, *tinno loke visattikam* (S^e-MN I 311,16: *loko*), a specification not explicitly made in MĀ 178.

¹³¹ MĀ 178 at T I 720a12. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 30 notes this as one of several instances where a Chinese discourse “lays more stress on this practice than its counterpart in Pali”.

MN 26 *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*¹³²

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, the “discourse on the noble quest”, presents an autobiographical account of the Buddha’s quest for awakening. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹³³ A few parts of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.¹³⁴

MN I 160 The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* begins by relating that a group of monks had approached Ānanda and expressed their wish to hear a discourse from the Buddha. In reply, Ānanda told them to go to Rammaka’s hermitage. The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* continues by reporting that the Buddha went with Ānanda to the Hall of Migāra’s Mother for the day’s abiding. The *Madhyama-āgama* version sets in only at this point of events, once the Buddha and Ānanda are already in the Hall of Migāra’s Mother.¹³⁵

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report that the Buddha spent the day’s abiding in the Hall of Migāra’s Mother and then went with Ānanda to take a bath, at the completion of which Ānanda invited the Buddha to come to Rammaka’s hermitage.¹³⁶

MN I 161 The two versions record the Buddha’s arrival at Rammaka’s hermitage and his initial conversation with the monks in similar terms,¹³⁷ after which both versions take up the two types of quest, the noble and the ignoble one.¹³⁸

¹³² B^e-MN I 216,1 and S^e-MN I 312,1 have the title *Pāsarāsi-sutta*, “the discourse on the heap of snares”; cf. also below note 235.

¹³³ The parallel is MĀ 204 at T I 775c-778c and has the title “discourse at Rammaka’s [hermitage]”, 罷摩經, employing as title the name of the Brahmin in whose hermitage the discourse is located. MĀ 204 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 33, 63, 153-159, and 245-250; cf. also Anālayo 2011a. An examination of the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* from different perspectives can be found in Walters 1999. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 184.

¹³⁴ The fragments are SHT I 769 (no. 97 and 98 in Waldschmidt 1952: 48; cf. also SHT X p. 414), SHT V 1332a (p. 227, cf. also SHT VI p. 225 and SHT VII p. 292), SHT V 1714 (pp. 266-267), SHT VI 1493 (p. 161, cf. also SHT VIII p. 206), SHT X 3917 (p. 217), and SHT X 3920 (p. 218). SHT V 1332a, SHT VI 1493, and SHT X 3917 have preserved counterparts to the introductory narration at MN I 161. SHT I 769, SHT V 1714, and SHT X 3920 correspond to the Buddha’s reflection whom he should teach and his meeting with a wanderer at MN I 169-171.

¹³⁵ MĀ 204 at T I 775c13 does report that Ānanda invited the other monks to Rammaka’s hermitage, without, however, giving any reason for this invitation.

¹³⁶ These events are also recorded in SHT V 1332a and SHT VI 1493. The same introductory narration – covering the Buddha’s stay at Jeta’s Grove, his begging alms in Sāvatthī, his going with Ānanda to the Hall of Migāra’s Mother for the day’s abiding, and his approaching the Eastern Bathing Place to take a bath in the evening – recurs as the introduction to another discourse, AN 6:43 at AN III 344,18. The remainder of this discourse proceeds differently, as it records how the Buddha explained to Udāyi what constitutes a real *nāga*.

¹³⁷ According to MĀ 204 at T I 775c28, the monks told the Buddha that they had been “discussing the Dharma”, 說法, while the corresponding passage in MN 26 at MN I 161,27 specifies that the topic of their discussion had been the Buddha, *bhagavantam eva ... ārabba dhammī kathā*. For the monks to be speaking about the Buddha would provide a good reason for him to give an autobiographical account of his own quest for awakening, thereby taking up a topic already broached by the monks.

In its exposition of the ignoble quest, the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* indicates that gold and silver are subject to birth, old age, and defilement.¹³⁹ Instead of gold and silver, the *Madhyama-āgama* version speaks of money and jewellery, which it considers to be subject to old age and defilement, and also subject to disease, death, and sorrow.¹⁴⁰ It is perhaps not self-evident how gold and silver, or else money and jewellery, could be subject to all these predicaments. An attempt at interpretation could be developed with the help of a simile in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel, which describes how removing impurities will lead to a gradual refinement of gold.¹⁴¹

This description would indicate in what way gold and silver can be considered subject to defilement. The successful production of pure gold and silver could then be considered as their ‘birth’, their loss of lustre through use as jewellery might be their respective ‘disease’ or ‘old age’, and their final breaking apart might be their respective ‘death’.¹⁴² Since inanimate things like gold and silver, or else jewellery and money, cannot be affected by sorrow, their reckoning as subject to sorrow should perhaps be understood to point to the sorrow their loss would cause to their owners.

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its parallel continue by presenting the corresponding noble quest as the rationale for the Buddha’s going forth.¹⁴³ Similar to the account

¹³⁸ Barua 1967: 205 relates the contrast between the noble quest through going forth and the ignoble quest for sons and wealth to a similar contrast that revolves around the same concept of *esanā* in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.22: *te ha sma putraisanāyāś ca vittaiśanāyāś ca lokaiśanāyāś ca vyutthāyā, atha bhiksā-caryam caranti*, translated by Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 279 as “they, having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds, led the life of a mendicant”.

¹³⁹ Unlike the B^e, C^e, and E^e, S^e-MN I 315,1+6+12 includes gold and silver also in its exposition of what is subject to disease, death, and sorrow.

¹⁴⁰ MĀ 204 at T I 776a7, which in its exposition does not take up the issue of being subject to birth at all. The distinction between these two quests recurs as a discourse of its own in AN 4:252 at AN II 247,17 and in T 765 at T XVII 679b23. AN 4:252 and T 765 agree with MĀ 204 on not including birth in their exposition of the ignoble quest, thereby differing from MN 26 at MN I 161,36, which does mention being subject to birth, *jātidhamma*. While AN 4:252 does not draw out the details of the two quests, such a detailed treatment can be found in T 765 at T XVII 679b28, which agrees with MĀ 204 on reckoning gold and silver to be subject to old age, disease, death, sorrow, and defilement. MĀ 204 at T I 776a16 also differs from MN 26 in that it concludes its exposition of the ignoble quest with the proclamation that in this way it will be impossible to reach Nirvāṇa.

¹⁴¹ The simile in AN 3:100 at AN I 253,17 and its parallel SĀ 1246 at T II 341b26 illustrates the gradual removal of impurities from the mind by describing how a goldsmith gradually removes impurities from gold, an image also found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, T 1579 at T XXX 343c17; cf. also Dhp 239.

¹⁴² Although the definitions of birth, old age, and death, given, e.g., in MN 9 at MN I 49,20 and MN I 50,5, clearly indicate that these three terms refer to three stages in the life of a living being, the present passage suggests that the same terms are also used in a more metaphorical way in the early discourses. Another instance of such a usage can be found in Vibh 144,10, which in the context of an application of dependent arising (*paticca samuppāda*) to mind moments speaks of the “birth”, *jāti*, and the “old age and death”, *jarāmarañña*, of a state of mind; cf. also Anālayo 2008c: 94.

¹⁴³ The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 276,7 or in Senart 1890: 197,16 provides an additional perspective on the bodhisattva’s noble quest, described in MN 26 and MĀ 204. It reports that, soon after going forth, the bodhisattva met a Brahmin *r̄si* who questioned the bodhisattva about the nature of his quest. The

given in the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* also indicates that the bodhisattva's reflection on birth, old age, disease, and death motivated him to go forth.¹⁴⁴ The *Mahīśāsaka Vinaya*, the *Mahāvastu* of the *Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda Vinaya*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* present the same motivation with the help of the well-known legend about the bodhisattva's four encounters with an old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a recluse.¹⁴⁵

Notably, this account shows some internal inconsistencies in each of these three *Vinayas*. The *Mahīśāsaka Vinaya* reports that the bodhisattva, when still young, already had a desire to go forth.¹⁴⁶ When reporting his fourth encounter with a recluse, according to the same *Mahīśāsaka Vinaya* the bodhisattva asked his coachman to explain what 'going forth' means,¹⁴⁷ a question that would make little sense if at an earlier point of his life he already had the wish to go forth himself.

The *Mahāvastu* precedes the bodhisattva's four encounters by reporting that at an earlier point of time, when informing his father of his wish to go forth, the bodhisattva expressed his insight into the inescapability of old age, disease, and death, a report that would render the episode of the four encounters redundant.¹⁴⁸

According to the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, in reply to the bodhisattva's inquiry after the implication of being old or sick during the first and second encounter, his coachman informed him that to be old or to be sick means that one might die soon.¹⁴⁹ The bodhisattva apparently understood this reply, since, instead of asking about the meaning of "death", he asked if he was also subject to the same predicament. When in his next encounter the bodhisattva saw a corpse, he asked his driver what "death" means, the not knowing of which would have rendered the replies he received during the previous outings meaningless.¹⁵⁰

The internal inconsistencies found in each of these three *Vinaya* texts reveal the composite nature of this legend. A starting point for the coming into being of this tale could perhaps be found in a discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁵¹ These two discourses record the bodhisattva's reflection that worldlings

bodhisattva replied: "where everything no [longer] comes to be, where everything ceases, where everything is appeased, that track I seek", *yatra sarvam na bhavate, yatra sarvam nirudhyate, yatropaśāmyate sarvam, tat padam prārthayāmy aham*.

¹⁴⁴ T 1428 at T XXII 779c12.

¹⁴⁵ An otherwise similar account in the Chinese *Udāna* collection differs in so far as it mentions only three encounters (old age, disease, and death), so that here the bodhisattva's decision to go forth comes without an external prompting by seeing a recluse, cf. T 212 at T IV 620b9.

¹⁴⁶ T 1421 at T XXII 101b20: 菩薩少有出家志.

¹⁴⁷ T 1421 at T XXII 101c17: 何謂出家? Bareau 1962: 20 notes this internal inconsistency and concludes that the bodhisattva's desire to go forth belongs to an older textual stratum that escaped editorial erasing when the later account of his four encounters was introduced.

¹⁴⁸ Basak 1965: 197,12 and 205,9 or Senart 1890: 141,7 and 146,12.

¹⁴⁹ Gnoli 1977: 65,25 and 68,12,

¹⁵⁰ Gnoli 1977: 70,21: *ka eṣa, sārathe, myto nāma?*

¹⁵¹ AN 3:38 at AN I 145,21 and its parallel MĀ 117 at T I 608a3. According to Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/

react with disgust and aversion when they see someone else subject to old age, disease, and death, even though they are themselves subject to the same predicaments. As the bodhisattva realized that he was himself subject to old age, disease, and death, whatever pride he had in being endowed with youth, health, and life completely disappeared. These two discourses thus cover the same themes that recur with considerable narrative embellishment in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu*.

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, together with the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* and the *Mahāvastu*,¹⁵² note that the bodhisattva went forth against the wish of his weeping parents.¹⁵³ The same is also reported in Sanskrit frag-

MN I 163

2005: 1342 note 1207, AN 3:38 could be the nucleus out of which the legendary account developed.

Weller 1928b: 169 suggests that the development of this account could have been inspired by early attempts to represent the bodhisattva's insight into these predicaments of life in art, which needed to create symbolic representations in order to render his insight into these predicaments visible.

¹⁵² MN 26 at MN I 163,29, MĀ 204 at T I 776b3, T 1428 at T XXII 779c15, and the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 165,8 (cf. also p. 96,10) or in Senart 1890: 117,19 (cf. also p. 68,20). This part of MN 26 recurs in MN 85 at MN II 93 and in MN 100 at MN II 212. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 224,7 or in Senart 1890: 159,3 also has the legendary account of the bodhisattva's secret flight in the middle of the night in what in this work forms an additional account of the great renunciation. This tale is also found in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 102a10. Bareau 1962: 23 draws attention to an inconsistency in the Mahīśāsaka account, which in T 1421 at T XXII 102a25 describes how the bodhisattva handed over his clothes to his attendant Chanda, but then in T 1421 at T XXII 102b9, once Chanda had left, narrates how the bodhisattva gave his costly clothing away again, this time to a hunter in exchange for the latter's dress.

¹⁵³ MN 26 at MN I 163,29 describes that the bodhisattva went forth even though his "mother and father were weeping with tearful faces", *mātāpitūnñam assumukhāñam rudantāñam* (B^e-MN I 219,30 and S^e-MN I 318,2; *mātāpitūñam*, S^e also reads *rodantāñam*), a description found similarly in DN 4 at DN I 115,17, DN 5 at DN I 131,29, MN 36 at MN I 240,26, MN 85 at MN II 93,19, MN 95 at MN II 166,30, and MN 100 at MN II 212,1 (on the contrast between the motif of the mother's crying when the bodhisattva went forth and her supposed death seven days after giving birth to him cf. also Anālayo 2012g and Bareau 1974a: 250). The same is recorded in DĀ 22 at T I 95b19 and DĀ 23 at T I 98a20 (parallels to DN 4 and DN 5): "[his] father and mother wept", 父母 ... 涕泣, and in MĀ 204 at T I 776b3 (parallel to MN 26): "[his] father and mother cried", 父母啼哭, a circumstance also reported in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 779c15, and in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 96,10 and 165,8 or in Senart 1890: 68,20 and 117,19. An exception to this pattern is fragment 331r6 in Liu 2009: 50, which refers to the relatives in general, reading *akāmakāññi jñātāññāñ sā[śruka]ññāñhāñāñ [ru]dantāñmukhāññāñ*. A minor but perhaps nevertheless noteworthy circumstance is that the above-mentioned Chinese versions mention the father first, whereas the Pāli passages and the *Mahāvastu* mention the mother first. Horner 1930/1990: 6 notes the general precedence of the mother in the Pāli compound for parents, *mātā-pitu*, and suggests that this could point to "some ancient forgotten social organisation, where mother-right and mother-rule were dominant features"; cf. also Günther 1944: 78 note 1, Karunaratna 2003a: 44, and Young 2004: 44, who suggests that this "grammatical precedence ... points to the prominence of the mother in South Asia" (on the eminent role of the mother in modern Sinhalese Buddhism cf. Gombrich 1972). Young 2004: 55 note 66 also points out that the same pattern can be seen in the listing of the five heinous crimes, cf., e.g., MN 115 at MN III 64,30, where matricide comes before patricide. The same difference in sequence between Pāli and Chinese discourses recurs in several other contexts, such as MN 93 at MN II 153,15: *mātū pi sadiso pitu pi sadiso* and its parallel MĀ 151 at T I 665a29: 或似父, 或似母, MN 115 at MN III 64,30: *mātarāñ jīvitā voropeyya ... pitaram jīvitā voropeyya* and its parallel

ments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, which contain a counterpart to this part of the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*.¹⁵⁴

While the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* next turns to the bodhisattva's meeting with Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta,¹⁵⁵ the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* precedes the same by describing that the bodhisattva developed self-restraint and purity, a point also made in the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-*

MĀ 181 at T I 724a2: 善父母, MN 117 at MN III 72,11: *atthi mātā atthi pitā* and its parallel MĀ 189 at T I 735c20: 有父有母, where the Tibetan parallel also mentions the father first, cf. D (4094) *mgong pa, nyu* 44b2 or Q (5595) *thu* 84a3: *pha yod do, ma yod do*, MN 130 at MN III 179,33: *n' eva mātarā katañ na pitarā katañ* and its parallel MĀ 64 at T I 504a10: 非父母為. Precedence to the mother is given also in a Tocharian fragment, THT 2375q.a2 in Peyrot 2008: 121, which reads *mātār pā(tār)*, counterpart to Dhp 294-295: *mātarām pitaram hantvā*, cf. also the *Udāna-(varga)* 33.61-62 in Bernhard 1965: 494-495. An exception to this pattern is MN 86 at MN II 102,8, where Āṅgulimāla mentions first his father and then his mother when describing his parentage, a sequence also found in the parallel EĀ 38.6 at T II 720c19, so that in this instance both versions appropriately reflect the patrilineal descent that characterized ancient Indian society. In fact, in other instances of descriptions of comparable pairs (with each member having the same syllable count) the male usually precedes the female, as can be seen in DN 14 at DN II 26,14: *devo vā devī vā*, DN 32 at DN III 203,7+9: *yakkhapotako vā yakkhapotikā vā ... gandhabbo vā gandhabbi vā*, MN 35 at MN I 234,9: *kumārakā vā kumārikā vā*, and in MN 73 at MN I 493,19: *upāsakā ca ... upāsikā ca*. Usually, it is only when the syllable count of such pairs differs and the law of waxing syllables makes itself felt that a term with less syllables takes precedence over a term with more syllables even though this involves putting the female before the male, as for example in MN 5 at MN I 32,26: *itthī vā puriso vā* (for examples of the same pattern in other ancient Indian texts cf. Caland 1931: 62). According to Warder 1963/1991: 97, in *dvanda* compounds “the more important or leading object, if any, sometimes occupies the second position, which is normally the dominant position in Pali”, for which he gives the examples *candima-suryī*, *samāna-brāhmaṇī*, *sāriputta-moggallānam* and *patta-cīvaraṇī*. While the case of *candima-suryī* is similar to *mātā-pitu*, in that here too the female (moon) precedes the male (sun), the other examples do not seem to illustrate his suggestion too well. In the case of *samāna-brāhmaṇī*, just as the discourses usually list the warriors before the Brahmins, so too they list recluses before Brahmins, the Buddha being a recluse and a warrior himself, so that in this instance the more important of the pair seems to come first. In regard to Sāriputta and (Ma-hā-)moggallāna, judging from Sn 3:7 at Sn 557, Ud 2.8 at Ud 17,29, and Th 1083 a case could be made for considering Sāriputta to be the more important one of the two chief disciples. In the case of *patta-cīvara*, the law of waxing syllables would be responsible for the sequence of these two words. Thus Warder's explanation does not seem to be backed up by the examples he selected. In fact, according to vārttika 3 on Pāṇini 2.2.34 in Vasu 1891/1997: 273, in *dvandva* compounds the first member holds the place of honour. Regarding the compound *mātā-pitu*, B^e-Sadd I 73 suggests that the sequence *mātā-pitu* is adopted due to an euphonic reason, since to adopt the sequence *pitā-mātā* would not be respecting or honouring the arrangement of sounds, *saddaracanā apūjanīyā*. In the case of the Chinese translations, perhaps this order was then reversed, in line with the observation by Paul 1980: 217 that in order “to accommodate the Confucian norms, Buddhist texts were changed to reflect the subordinate position of women in traditional Chinese society”, cf. also Guang Xing 2005: 98 note 12, who similarly suggests that the precedence given to the father in Chinese translations could reflect the influence of Confucian thought.

¹⁵⁴ Fragment 331r6-332v5 in Liu 2009: 50-52 (the Pāli parallel to these fragments, MN 36 at MN I 240,26, abbreviates, referring back to the full text given in MN 26).

¹⁵⁵ B^e-M I 221,19 spells the latter's name as Udaka.

sutta.¹⁵⁶ The *Divyāvadāna*, the *Lalitavistara*,¹⁵⁷ the *Mahāvastu*, the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, and the Pāli commentary to the *Therīgāthā* report that the bodhisattva visited other hermit(s) before meeting Ālāra Kālāma, thereby also indicating that he undertook some spiritual training before placing himself under Ālāra's tutelage.¹⁵⁸

According to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*'s account, the bodhisattva first learned theoretical aspects of Ālāra Kālāma's teaching. This much accomplished, he asked Ālāra Kālāma about the latter's practical experience, in reply to which Ālāra Kālāma described the sphere of nothingness.¹⁵⁹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not record that the bodhisattva learned theoretical aspects of Ālāra Kālāma's teaching. According to its presentation, Ālāra Kālāma straightaway informed the bodhisattva about the attainment of the sphere of nothingness, achieved by completely surmounting the sphere of [infinite] consciousness.¹⁶⁰ The same is the case for the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.¹⁶¹

MN I 164

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart, and the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* report that the bodhisattva set out to reach the same realization, reflecting that he had the same mental qualities as Ālāra Kālāma. While according to the Pāli and Sanskrit versions these mental qualities comprise the five faculties (*indriya*),¹⁶² the *Madhyama-āgama* version lists only confidence, energy,

¹⁵⁶ While MĀ 204 at T I 776b5 reads 護身命清淨, 護口 ...意命清淨, fragment 331r7 in Liu 2009: 50 reads *kāyena samyuto viharāmi vācā āj[i]va[m] ca pa[riś]jodha[yā]mi*.

¹⁵⁷ Oldenberg 1882: 115 draws attention to the fact that the *Lalitavistara* changes narrative voice when reporting the bodhisattva's training under Ālāra Kālāma. While other parts of the *Lalitavistara* refer to the bodhisattva in the third person, *iti hi bhikṣavo bodhisattvo*, cf., e.g., Lefmann 1902: 238,12 or Vaidya 1958b: 174,11, the present part is formulated in the first person singular, *tato 'ham bhikṣavo*, cf. Lefmann 1902: 238,19 or Vaidya 1958b: 174,16, a change already noticed by Weller 1915: 30. This shows that the *Lalitavistara* incorporates material from different textual layers, at times apparently preserving early passages in a fairly original form. The same holds for the *Mahāvastu*, whose composite nature has been examined by various scholars, cf., e.g., Barth 1899, Charpentier 1909: 33, de La Vallée Poussin 1915a, Hiraoka 2002/2003, Law 1930b: 15, Oldenberg 1912a, Rahula 1978: 13-16, Windisch 1909, Winternitz 1920/1968: 187-193, and Yuyama 2001: xvi-xxx; for a survey of publications related to the *Mahāvastu* in general cf. id. 1968.

¹⁵⁸ Cowell 1886: 391,27 or Vaidya 1999: 250,10, Lefmann 1902: 238,5 or Vaidya 1958b: 174,6, Basak 1965: 272,9 or Senart 1890: 195,12, Gnoli 1977: 96,18, Thī-a 2, and Bu ston's "History of Buddhism" in Obermiller 1932/1986: 31.

¹⁵⁹ MN 26 at MN I 164,15. The depth of Ālāra Kālāma's concentration is described in DN 16 at DN II 130,11; cf. also DĀ 2 at T I 19a11, T 5 at T I 168b3, T 6 at T I 183c15, T 7 at T I 197c12, Sanskrit fragment S 360 folio 189R6 to folio 190V4 in Waldschmidt 1950: 27, and the Tibetan version in Waldschmidt 1951: 271,1. AN 3:124 at AN I 277,9 mentions a fellow student of the bodhisattva, which the commentary Mp II 375,3 explains to be a reference to the time of the bodhisattva's discipleship under Ālāra Kālāma.

¹⁶⁰ MĀ 204 at T I 776b12. Thus MĀ 204 has no counterpart to the reference in MN 26 at MN I 164,5 to *theravāda* as an aspect of the theoretical teachings that the bodhisattva had learned; on this reference cf. also Guruge 2003: 340; on the term Theravāda in general cf., e.g., Skilling 2009c.

¹⁶¹ Fragment 331v1 in Liu 2009: 51.

¹⁶² MN 26 at MN I 164,16 and fragment 331v1-2 in Liu 2009: 51.

and wisdom, thereby not including mindfulness and concentration.¹⁶³ Since mindfulness and concentration are required to reach deeper levels of concentration, the Pāli and Sanskrit listings of mental qualities appear to offer a more complete presentation.

According to all three accounts, the bodhisattva soon was able to attain the sphere of nothingness, for which sake, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account and the Sanskrit fragments, he had diligently practised in solitude and seclusion.¹⁶⁴ When the bodhisattva informed Ālāra Kālāma of the realization he had attained, Ālāra Kālāma invited the bodhisattva to become the co-leader of their group. Since the attainment of the sphere of nothingness was not the final goal he was searching for, according to all versions the bodhisattva decided to leave Ālāra Kālāma.¹⁶⁵

The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, the *Lalitavistara*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* also do not report that the bodhisattva learned theoretical aspects of Ālāra Kālāma's teaching, thereby agreeing with the *Madhyama-āgama* account and the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.¹⁶⁶ An exception to this is the *Buddhacarita*, which reports the theory imparted by him in detail.¹⁶⁷

The *Lalitavistara* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* list all five mental faculties,¹⁶⁸ thereby agreeing with the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, however, mentions only the set of three

¹⁶³ MĀ 204 at T I 776b15; cf. also Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 75. Dutt 1940: 639 comments that the reference to *saddhā* in the present context stands for “confidence in his abilities to develop the powers necessary to achieve his object”. Tilakaratne 1997: 608 notes that the attribution of *saddhā* to Ālāra Kālāma and later on also to Uddaka Rāmaputra shows that the conception of *saddhā* was not confined to “belief in the Buddha, dhamma and the saṅgha”. On *śraddhā* in ancient Indian literature cf., e.g., Köhler 1948/1973.

¹⁶⁴ MĀ 204 at T I 776b19 and fragment 331v3-4 in Liu 2009: 51.

¹⁶⁵ MN 26 at MN I 165,13, MĀ 204 at T I 776c1, and fragment 331v8-332r1 in Liu 2009: 51.

¹⁶⁶ T 1428 at T XXII 780b10, Lefmann 1902: 238,21 or Vaidya 1958b: 174,17, Basak 1965: 166,5 or Senart 1890: 118,8, and Gnoli 1977: 97,6. The *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* indicate that Ārāda Kālāma was residing at Vaiśālī, while Uddaka Rāmaputra was staying at Rājagrha, cf. also Feer 1866: 99, although Wynne 2007: 13 suggests that Ālāra Kālāma may have lived in the vicinity of Kapilavatthu.

¹⁶⁷ *Buddhacarita* stanzas 12:16-42 in Johnston 1936/1995a: 130-133. Nakamura 1979: 275 comments that in these stanzas Ālāra “is found to voice Sāṃkhya philosophy”, for a detailed survey of relevant points cf. Johnston 1936/1995b: lvi-lxii; cf. also Strauß 1913: 258. According to Malalasekera 1937/1995: 296, although these stanzas have “some resemblance ... to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, ... in Ālāra’s teaching some of the salient characteristics of the Sāṃkhya system are absent”. On this topic cf. also Bhagat 1976: 156, Oldenberg 1898: 681-684, and Thomas 1933/2004: 80. Rüping 1977: 90 and Senart 1907: 153 hold that Ālāra and Uddaka were proponents of Yoga theories. Schumann 2006: 85-86 argues for Uddaka being a teacher of Upaniṣadic philosophy, based on the similarity between *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.12.1, cf. Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 462: “what do you see there? ‘Nothing at all’”, *kim atrā paśyasīti? na kim cana*, and the dictum associated with Uddaka in DN 29 at DN III 126,17: “seeing he does not see”. What ‘seeing does he not see?’”, *passam na passatīti, kiñ ca passam na passatīti?*; cf. also the similarly worded passage in the parallel DĀ 17 at T I 74a6: “there being seeing, [yet] he does not see. What is said to be ‘seeing he does not see?’”, 有見不見, 云何名見不見? Wynne 2007: 45-49 points out another parallel in *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.23, cf. Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 263: “he is, verily, seeing, though he does not see”, *paśyan vai tan na paśyati*.

¹⁶⁸ Lefmann 1902: 239,1 or Vaidya 1958b: 174,19, and Gnoli 1977: 97,11.

mental qualities found in the *Madhyama-āgama* account: confidence, energy, and wisdom.¹⁶⁹

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its parallels present the bodhisattva's meeting with Uddaka Rāmaputta and his subsequent attainment of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in accordance with their respective descriptions of his earlier meeting with Ālāra Kālāma. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* offers the additional information that Uddaka Rāmaputta had become the leader of the group of disciples after the death of their teacher Rāma.¹⁷⁰ MN I 165

While the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, and the *Mahāvastu* attribute the attainment of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception to Uddaka's father Rāma, the presentation in the Sanskrit fragments paralleling the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, the *Lalitavistara*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* reads as if Uddaka himself had reached this attainment.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ According to the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 780b11, the bodhisattva reflected that Ālāra was bereft of confidence, energy, and wisdom, a statement which, as Bareau 1963: 18 notes, must be a mistake by the translator who perhaps misunderstood the expression “not only (*na kho*) Ālāra Kālāma has confidence ... (etc.)”, to mean that Ālāra Kālāma had no confidence, 無有信, etc. A similar error can be found in a record of the same event in a Chinese *Udāna* translation, T 212 at T IV 644a19, which similarly indicates that Ālāra Kālāma had no confidence, 無信, a reading also found in its description of the bodhisattva's reflection regarding Uddaka Rāmaputta, T 212 at T IV 644b1. The same version also speaks of only two qualities, confidence and wisdom. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 166,7 or in Senart 1890: 118,10 has three, which in addition to the faculties of confidence and energy includes “strength”, *bala*.

¹⁷⁰ T 1428 at T XXII 780b29. From the account in MN 26 it is not clear if Uddaka was called Rāmaputta in the sense of being his biological or his spiritual son. In MĀ 204 at T I 776c12, Uddaka Rāmaputta refers to Rāma as “my father”, 我父, which suggests a biological relationship. In the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 780c3, however, he speaks of Rāma as “my teacher”, 我師. Perhaps Rāma was both his father and his teacher.

¹⁷¹ Fragment 332r2-8 in Liu 2009: 51-52, the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 244,13 or in Vaidya 1958b: 180,15, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 98,20; the same is also the case for T 212 at T IV 644a27. On these differences cf. Skilling 1981 and Wynne 2007: 14-15. Some degree of uncertainty concerning Uddaka and Rāma seems to have already existed at an early time, since even though in MĀ 204 it is throughout clear that the attainment should be attributed to Rāma, at one point in MĀ 204 at T I 776c9 the bodhisattva asks Uddaka after his own attainment, referring to what “you, Rāmaputta, know yourself”, 汝羅摩子自知, with a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading according to which he asked after the father's attainment, speaking of what “your father Rāma knew himself”, 汝父羅摩自知. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 168,12 or in Senart 1890: 120,6 has a similar uncertainty at the same junction of events, since the bodhisattva asks Udraka Rāmaputra after the attainment of Udraka Rāma, *ettako yan bho udrakena bhavatā rāmena dharmo adhigato*, continuing, however, by speaking of the attainment made by Rāma, cf. Basak 1965: 168,14 or Senart 1890: 120,9: *rāmena adhigato*. The similar mistake found in these two accounts from quite different reciter traditions confirms the suggestion by Wynne 2005: 61 that the information on the two teachers of the Buddha must be fairly early, since it would be “inconceivable that this correspondence was produced by a later levelling of texts”. According to SN 35:103 in SN IV 83,3 and its parallel MĀ 114 at T I 603a7, Uddaka Rāmaputta claimed to have reached accomplishment. Perhaps this should be understood to mean that during the six years period between his meeting with the bodhisattva and his death he eventually did reach what his father had attained. Be-

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel describe the Buddha's awakening only in brief. The *Madhyama-āgama* version reports that he sat down with the firm determination to not get up from his sitting posture unless full awakening has been reached.¹⁷² Although the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* does not mention this, other discourses associate the same determination with the Buddha's awakening.¹⁷³

MN I 167 The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* continues by recording that the Buddha felt disinclined to teach others.¹⁷⁴ According to the Pāli account, Brahmā Sahampati had become aware of this disinclination and approached the Buddha in order to convince him to teach.¹⁷⁵ This episode is not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse at all.

The Buddha's reluctance to teach, followed by Brahmā's request, recurs in two other Pāli discourses,¹⁷⁶ in an *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse,¹⁷⁷ and in several biographies of the Buddha preserved in Chinese.¹⁷⁸ The same is also found in Sanskrit fragments of the *Catusparisat-sūtra*,¹⁷⁹ and in the *Lalitavistara*.¹⁸⁰

sides a reference to his tenet "seeing one does not see" in DN 29 at DN III 126,17 and its parallel DĀ 17 at T I 74a6 (cf. above note 167), the esteem he received from a king is recorded in AN 4:187 at AN II 180,12.

¹⁷² MĀ 204 at T I 777a12. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 155 notes a translation error in MĀ 204 at T I 777a6, which indicates that the location to which the Buddha went to practise was near 象頂, where the translator apparently "mistook Gayāsīse for Gajasīse".

¹⁷³ MN 32 at MN I 219,31 and its parallels MĀ 184 at T I 729b21, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711c20, and T 154 at T III 82b6 report various monks speaking in praise of qualities they themselves possessed, an occasion on which the Buddha extolled the determination to not get up from the sitting posture until awakening has been attained. This implies that such determination was characteristic of his own striving for awakening. The same can be seen more explicitly in AN 2:1:5 at AN I 50,8, according to which the Buddha reached awakening by striving with the firm determination not to give up even if the flesh and blood of his body should dry up. This determination is also reported in the *Jātaka Nidānakathā* at Jā I 71,24.

¹⁷⁴ Franke 1914b: 342 notes that the introductory remark in MN 26 at MN I 168,4, according to which the stanzas expressing the Buddha's hesitation to teach were "unheard before", *pubbe assutapubbā*, stands to some degree in contrast to the report in DN 14 at DN II 36,14 that the previous Buddha Vipassī had the same reflection in the same words, similarly introduced as *pubbe assutapubbā*. Regarding the stanza in MN 26 at MN I 168,5 cf. also the discussion in Pind 1997: 529-536.

¹⁷⁵ MN 26 at MN I 168,20. Schmithausen 2005a: 172 note 19 explains that by inviting the Buddha to teach, Brahmā is "implicitly urging his own worshippers, the Brahmins, to acknowledge the superiority of the Buddha and his teaching". Gombrich 2009: 183 comments that "the Buddhist claim to supersede brahmin teaching could not be more blatant". The entreaty to teach has become a favourite topic for sculptural representations, cf., e.g., Bautze-Picron 2008: 166 plate 2, Dobbins 1971: 25, Huntington 2001: 120 and 134, Kurita 1988: 77-79 plates P2-vii to ix and pp. 125-136 plates 245-267, Foucher 1905: 425 figure 214, Karetzky 1992: 250 figure 55, Klamburg-Salter 1995: 277-278 and figure 168, Luczanits 2008a: 226 plate 165 and 237 plate 183, Rao 1956: 58-59 plate 12, Rhi 2008: 242 plate 1, Stoye 2008a: 190, Takata 1967: 36 figure 44, Tanabe 2007: 21 figure I-9.3, and Zwalf 1996: 118-120 plates 193-197; although it needs to be kept in mind, as pointed out by Rhi 1994: 220 note 60, that some cases identified as the entreaty to teach might simply depict a scene of worship in general.

¹⁷⁶ MN 85 at MN II 93,26 and SN 6:1 at SN I 137,15 (or SN² 172 at SN² I 300,13).

¹⁷⁷ EĀ 19.1 at T II 593b4, cf. also Bureau 1988a: 78 and id. 1980: 5.

¹⁷⁸ T 189 at T III 642c18, T 190 at T III 806a3, T 191 at T III 952c22; cf. also Waldschmidt 1951/1967: 173.

¹⁷⁹ Fragment S 362 (46)V4 in Waldschmidt 1952: 29.

The Buddha's disinclination to teach and Brahmā's intervention recur, moreover, in the *Mahāvastu*,¹⁸¹ in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*,¹⁸² in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*,¹⁸³ in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*,¹⁸⁴ and in the Theravāda *Vinaya*.¹⁸⁵

The agreement found among such a broad range of sources suggests this episode to be relatively early, although its absence from the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse could point to a still earlier stage when Brahmā had not yet become a protagonist in the account of the Buddha's awakening.¹⁸⁶ Be that as it may, the passage does present a problem not easy to solve:¹⁸⁷ How to combine the Buddha's reluctance to teach with the idea, common to all Buddhist traditions, that the Buddha had prepared himself over incalculable time periods for precisely this task?¹⁸⁸

Faced with the problem posed by this episode, the Pāli commentary attempts an explanation by suggesting that the Buddha only hesitated to teach because on examination he realized the degree to which people were under the influence of defilements.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, according to the commentary the Buddha wanted Brahmā to invite him, since this would make people in the world have respect for what the Buddha was going to teach.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁰ Lefmann 1902: 394,8 or Vaidya 1958b: 287,25; cf. also T 186 at T III 527c23 and T 187 at T III 603a10, and Bu ston's "History of Buddhism" in Obermiller 1932/1986: 41.

¹⁸¹ Basak 1968/2004: 188,14 or Senart 1897: 315,1. The *Mahāvastu* reports Brahmā's intervention also as part of the events preceding the teaching career of Dīpañkara Buddha, cf. Basak 1963a: 285,8 or Senart 1882a: 230,18.

¹⁸² T 1428 at T XXII 786c20.

¹⁸³ T 1421 at T XXII 103c19.

¹⁸⁴ The Chinese version can be found in T 1450 at T XXIV 126b16, the Sanskrit version in Gnoli 1977: 128,30, and the Tibetan version in Waldschmidt 1957a: 111,11. A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 2:9 in Pradhan 1967: 43,2 parallels the reference to beings with different faculties in MN 26 at MN I 169,8; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 15a27, T 1559 at T XXIX 174c7, and Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 52b7 or Q (5595) *tu* 57b3.

¹⁸⁵ Vin I 5,13. In this context it is perhaps also noteworthy that, whereas the other *Vinayas* cover the events leading up to the Buddha's awakening, the Theravāda *Vinaya* account sets in only once the awakening has already been accomplished. Zafiropulo 1993: 24 draws attention to Vin I 1,4, which starts with the expression *tena samayena*, an expression not used at the beginning of a chapter elsewhere in the *Vinaya* or in other discourse passages. Moreover, the first chapter of the *Mahāvagga* at Vin I 2,27 concludes with the remark that the account of the awakening is completed, *bodhikathā nijjhitā*, even though this chapter only reports events that took place after the awakening. Zafiropulo concludes that an account of the awakening itself may have preceded what at present is the beginning of the *Mahāvagga*, an account that was lost during the process of transmission.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Jones 2009b: 90 and Nakamura 2000a: 212.

¹⁸⁷ An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2010f: 22-24.

¹⁸⁸ Schmithausen 2000c: 120 note 5 draws attention to the way *Buddhacarita* 14.97 has ironed out the difficulty with this passage by reporting that the Buddha remembered his former vow and decided to teach even before Brahmā intervened.

¹⁸⁹ Ps II 176,21. The commentary at this point speaks of the Buddha surveying the world with his omniscient knowledge. Bareau 1963: 142 comments that, on the commentarial explanation, one may wonder why the Buddha nevertheless remained blind to the potential of beings to understand his teachings.

¹⁹⁰ Ps II 177,11. The *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 395,16 or in Vaidya 1958b: 289,9 similarly explains

These explanations by the Pāli commentators are not particularly convincing. The first explanation confuses the temporal sequence of events, since according to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* the Buddha's reluctance to teach occurred before he examined the degree to which beings in the world are defiled.¹⁹¹ Once he did survey their condition, after Brahmā's request, according to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* the Buddha realized that some beings would understand and thereon decided to teach. As made explicit in the *Catuspariṣat-sūtra*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, the result of the Buddha's survey of the world was not that he felt reluctant to teach, but rather that great compassion arose in him.¹⁹²

The second explanation is even less convincing, since it would imply that the Buddha's disinclination had the ulterior purpose of getting Brahmā to invite him in order to enhance his reputation. Such an act would not be easily compatible with the way the discourses portray the personal integrity of the Buddha. Besides, in the statement given to the monks present in Rammaka's hermitage, the Buddha explicitly informs them of his initial disinclination to teach.¹⁹³ This passage confirms that, from the perspective of the present discourse, the Buddha was indeed reluctant to spread the message of liberation.

The reason for his reluctance, according to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, was that it would be fatiguing (*kilamatha*) and vexing (*vihesā*) for him if others should fail to understand the profound and sublime truth he had realized.¹⁹⁴ The same reason becomes

that the Buddha showed hesitation to teach in order to instil respect for his teaching in the world, thereby getting the supreme Brahmā to request that the Buddha teach the Dharma.

¹⁹¹ MN 26 at MN I 168,1 reports the Buddha's reluctance to teach, and at MN I 169,7 describes how he surveyed the degree to which beings were defiled.

¹⁹² The *Catuspariṣat-sūtra* fragment M 480R3-4 in Waldschmidt 1952: 44, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 190,23 or in Senart 1897: 318,15 (on similarities in the formulation of this passage and its counterpart in the *Lalitavistara* cf. Skilling 2002/2003: 96 note 10), and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 130,6, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1450 at T XXIV 126c22 and its Tibetan counterpart in Waldschmidt 1957a: 119,3, agree that once the Buddha had surveyed the world, great compassion arose in him. As noted by Robinson 1970/1982: 22, "in the Buddhist myths Brahmā claims to see everything, so it is appropriate that he should tell the hesitant Gautama that there were living beings ready to recognize the Dharma. Then and only then did Gautama use his Buddha-eye to confirm this fact".

¹⁹³ MN 26 at MN I 168,9: "considering thus, monks, my mind inclined to inaction, not to teaching the Dharma", *iti ha me, bhikkhave, paṭisañcikkhato apposukkata�a cittam namati, no dhammadesanāya*.

¹⁹⁴ MN 26 at MN I 168,2. It is notable that the stronger of the two terms, *vihesā*, recurs in MN 26 at MN I 169,26 in the related form *vihimsa*, in a reference to the Buddha's disinclination to teach as *vihimsasaññī*, "perception of harm". The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 190,29 or in Senart 1897: 319,5 similarly speaks of *viheṭasamijñāṇī*, while the *Catuspariṣat-sūtra* fragment M 480R5 in Waldschmidt 1952: 44 reads *vihithaprekye*, and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 130,10 has *viheṭhaprekyī* (the Chinese counterpart in T 1450 at T XXIV 126b14 speaks of "weariness", 疲勞, and of "vexation", 憶, the Tibetan version in Waldschmidt 1957a: 111,2 of "fatigue", *dub pa*, and "weariness", *ngal ba*, followed by concluding that this is so "just because of a lack of enthusiasm in the mind", *sems la spro ba med par kho nar 'gyur bar zad pas*). In EĀ 19.1 at T II 593a29, the reason for the Buddha's disinclination to teach is 損, for which Hirakawa 1997: 556 lists among others the equivalents *upaghāta*, *upahata* and *vhiṃs*, a character translated by Soothill 1937/2000: 402 as "hurt", or "damage". The Dharmaguptaka and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 786c6 and T 1421 at T XXII 103c13, speak of the arising

even more evident in the Theravāda *Vinaya*, according to which a single request was not sufficient to overcome the Buddha's disinclination to teach, since Brahmā Sahampati had to repeat his request three times before the Buddha consented.¹⁹⁵ The *Mahāvastu* reports that Brahmā at first convinced Sakka, the king of gods, to request the Buddha to teach, a request which did not meet with success, followed by trying the same himself, again without success.¹⁹⁶

This reluctance to teach does not seem to stand in contrast to the Buddha's earlier motivation to seek awakening, recorded in the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. According to both versions, the Buddha described his motivation to go forth in search of awakening entirely in personal terms, indicating that he had realized to be "himself" subject to old age, disease, and death and therefore wanted to find a way out of this predicament for "himself".¹⁹⁷ These descriptions do not in any way allude to a wish to save or help others.

Additional perspectives on the Buddha's attitude after his awakening can be found in the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta* and in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*. The *Brahmanimantanika-sutta* records the Buddha explaining that his condition of inner freedom was independent of whether he taught or not.¹⁹⁸ The *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* and its parallels report that the Buddha renounced his life principle and thereby set an end to his teaching activities because Ānanda had failed to request the Buddha to stay alive.¹⁹⁹ Bringing these two discourses together, the point that would emerge from them could be summed up as follows:

From an early Buddhist perspective, when the Buddha was requested to teach, he did so; when, however, on a subsequent occasion he was not requested to continue teaching, he simply stopped. In other words, the discourses present his realization as some-

of "weariness", 勞疲, and *dukkha*, 苦. Thus the different sources agree that the Buddha anticipated that he might experience mental weariness or even vexation; cf. also Webster 2005b: 20.

¹⁹⁵ Vin I 6,20. The need for three requests before the Buddha agreed is also recorded in T 189 at T III 643a17. To grant a request after it has been made three times is a standard procedure in the discourses.

¹⁹⁶ Basak 1968/2004: 188,15 or Senart 1897: 315,2. Stanzas with which Sakka and then Brahmā respectively invite the Buddha to teach can be found in SN 11:17 at SN I 233,32 (or SN² 263 at SN² I 501,17), a discourse which, however, takes place at Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. A similar set of stanzas occurs in the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 397,1 or in Vaidya 1958b: 289,29. Stanzas spoken by two devas in order to invite the Buddha to teach, although at an earlier junction of events, can be found in the *Catus-pariṣat-sūtra* fragment S 362 (42)V2-3 in Waldschmidt 1952: 27 (cf. also Waldschmidt 1957a: 74 note 8), and in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 121,15. The *Jātaka Nidānakathā* at Jā I 81,10 also reports that Brahmā Sahampati was accompanied by Sakka when entreating the Buddha to teach.

¹⁹⁷ MN 26 at MN I 163,21: *yannūñāham attanā jarādhammo ... nibbānam partyeseyyam*. MĀ 204 at T I 776a19: 我自實老法 ... 我今寧可求 ... 涅槃; cf. also Schmithausen 2000c: 122.

¹⁹⁸ MN 49 at MN I 331,18: *desento pi ... tathāgato sāvakānam dhammam tādiso va, adesento pi ... tathāgato sāvakānam dhammam tādiso va*.

¹⁹⁹ DN 16 at DN II 103,1, fragment S 360 folio 173R3-5 in Waldschmidt 1950: 19, DĀ 2 at T I 15b24, T 5 at T I 165a14, T 6 at T I 180b20, and T 7 at T I 191b19; a translation of DĀ 2 can be found in Weller 1939: 78-79, of T 5 in Puini 1909: 36, and of T 6 and T 7 in Waldschmidt 1944: 98-99; on the probable translator(s) of T 5 and T 6 cf. Park 2010.

thing self-sufficient, without any need to proselytise in order to corroborate the truth he had discovered.²⁰⁰

Other discourses present Brahmā's intervention as a natural part of the sequence of events that lead up to the teaching activity of a Buddha, as the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* and its *Dirgha-āgama* parallel report that the same happened in the case of the previous Buddha Vipassī.²⁰¹ Although some discourses indicate that Gotama was destined to become a teacher,²⁰² Brahmā Sahampati's role at the present junction of events appears to have been necessary in order for the Buddha's teaching career to begin.²⁰³

MN I 170 After relating Brahmā's intervention, the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* continues by reporting that the Buddha first intended to share his discovery with his two former teachers, Ālāra Kālama and Uddaka Rāmaputta, an intention described in similar terms in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. Finding out that Ālāra Kālama and Uddaka Rāmaputta had recently passed away, the Buddha decided to approach his former five companions, who had been with him during the period when he had undertaken ascetic practices.

The Mahīśasaka *Vinaya* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* report that these five former companions had been sent by the Buddha's father to look after the bodhisattva.²⁰⁴ According to the *Lalitavistara*, however, the same five had been disciples of Uddaka Rāmaputta and had witnessed how the bodhisattva quickly achieved what they had not been able to achieve even after a long time.²⁰⁵ The fact that he then did not rest satisfied with this achievement had motivated them to leave Uddaka and follow the bodhisattva.

The *Lalitavistara*'s presentation fits the flow of the narration well, since if the five had been ordered to attend on the bodhisattva, one would not expect them to abandon their mission only because the bodhisattva decided to stop his self-mortifications. If, however, they had followed him on their own and in the hope to benefit from his realizations, it would be natural for them to leave him once he gave up his ascetic striving and thereby abandoned what they held to be the path required to reach awakening.

²⁰⁰ Keown 1992/2001: 42 comments: "the Buddha's hesitation suggests that although the Buddha was moved to teach, teaching is not entailed by the ... realisation [he had] attained".

²⁰¹ DN 14 at DN II 36,19 and DĀ 1 at T I 8b21. Notably, another parallel, T 3 at T I 156c14, and the Sanskrit fragments of the *Mahāvadāna-sūtra* (cf. the remark by Waldschmidt 1956: 148 note 2) do not mention such an intervention by Brahmā.

²⁰² AN 5:196 at AN III 242,1 and Sn 3:11 at Sn 693.

²⁰³ On the role of Brahmā in early Buddhism cf., e.g., Anālayo 2004, Bailey 1983: 12-17, Basu 1986: 113-123 (based mainly on the *Mahāvastu*), Gombrich 2001, id. 2009: 183-185, Haldar 1977: 96-99 and 183, Jayawardhana 1972, Ling 1973/1976: 89-91, Marasinghe 1974: 202-205, and Saibaba 2005: 26-28; on the name Sahampati cf. Przyluski 1924.

²⁰⁴ T 1421 at T XXII 104a19 and Gnoli 1977: 99,4, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1450 at T XXIV 119c15; cf. also Konḍañña's stanzas in T 1448 at T XXIV 91c15 (with their Tibetan counterpart in Hofinger 1954: 139,6), T 186 at T III 529a6, T 188 at T III 620b19, T 189 at T III 643b1, T 196 at T IV 147c26, and T 211 at T IV 594b6. A similar account can also be found in Xuánzàng's (玄奘) travel records in T 2087 at T LI 906b9, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 52. According to EĀ 24.5 at T II 618b14 (translated in Bareau 1988a: 79), the five had already followed the bodhisattva since the time of his birth, a presentation that would support associating them with the Buddha's family and home country.

²⁰⁵ Lefmann 1902: 245,17 or Vaidya 1958b: 181,6.

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, and a partial parallel from the *Ekottarika-āgama* report in similar terms that, on his way to Vārāṇasī, the Buddha met another wanderer, whom the Pāli version introduces as the Ājīvika Upaka.²⁰⁶ During this meeting, the Buddha proclaimed that he had reached full awakening. This proclamation apparently did not convince Upaka, since all versions report that he left the Buddha and took a different road.

The three discourses differ to some extent on the stanzas spoken during this meeting. They agree that Upaka inquired after the Buddha's teacher, to which the Buddha replied by proclaiming the superiority of his insight and stating that, since he had realized awakening on his own, he had no teacher.

While according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account the Buddha spoke the remaining stanzas without any further question being asked by Upaka, according to the *Majjhimanikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* accounts Upaka asked if the Buddha considered himself a "conqueror",²⁰⁷ in reply to which the Buddha affirmed to be a conqueror.

The expression "conqueror" is not an epithet used regularly in other discourses for the Buddha, but a term more typically associated with the Jains and perhaps other contemporary ascetics.²⁰⁸ For the Buddha's reply to use this type of terminology it would be more natural if such usage was prompted by a question that employs this term. When considered from this perspective, the question found in the Pāli and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions fits the context well as a way of eliciting the Buddha's affirmation that he is a conqueror.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, in addition to this question Upaka also inquired about the Buddha's future plans. Although the other two versions do not record such a question, the three discourses agree that the Buddha explained to be on his way to Vārāṇasī in order to set the wheel of Dharma in motion.²⁰⁹ While in the other two versions this statement is still part of the Buddha's reply about the identity of his teacher, in the *Madhyama-āgama*'s presentation the Buddha states his future plans in reply to Upaka's question after these future plans, which thus constitutes the last of the stanzas he speaks to Upaka.

²⁰⁶ While MĀ 204 at T I 777b11 qualifies Upaka as a "heterodox practitioner", 異學, EĀ 24.5 at T II 618c1 presents him as a Brahmin, 梵志 (as does a short extract from the present event in the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* and the Chinese *Udāna* collection, T 211 at T IV 594b10 and T 212 at T IV 717b18). The *Catuspariṣat-sūtra* fragment 484bV7 in Waldschmidt 1952: 50, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 194,14 or in Senart 1897: 325,12, and the *Sanighabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 131,23 agree with MN 26 and Vin I 8,11 in introducing him as an ājīvika.

²⁰⁷ MN 26 at MN I 171,13 and MĀ 204 at T I 777b20.

²⁰⁸ The present reply to Upaka seems to be the only instance in the discourses where the Buddha refers to himself as a *jina*; cf. also Jaini 1988/2001: 480. Von Hinüber 2009a: 145 notes that the expression employed by Upaka in his reply to the Buddha's proclamation points to the ancient nature of this episode.

²⁰⁹ MN 26 at MN I 171,11, MĀ 204 at T I 777b26, and EĀ 24.5 at T II 618c10. In relation to this stanza, Wagle 1966: 23 points out that the word *pura* in MN 26 at MN I 171,11 is a word of rare occurrence (cf. also Sn 5:1 at Sn 976 and Sn 991), explaining that passages in which it occurs can be considered to belong to the earliest material in the Pāli Canon (cf. also note 208 above).

The sequence found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version receives support from the Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan versions of the *Udāna-(varga)*,²¹⁰ where the Buddha's plan to go to Vārāṇasī also comes as the last in this series of stanzas.²¹¹ It also receives support from a fragment in Tocharian, which records that Upaka inquired about the Buddha's future plans and the Buddha replied to this question in verse form, indicating his plan to go to Vārāṇasī.²¹² Similar to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, in the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* collection the Buddha's proclamation of his future plans is preceded by a corresponding inquiry by Upaka.²¹³

On following these indications, the pattern that emerges would be like this: Upaka asks after the Buddha's teacher, in reply to which the Buddha declares the superiority of his insight and the fact that he has no teacher. Upaka then tries to ascertain if he has understood properly by inquiring if the Buddha considers himself a conqueror, which the Buddha affirms. This is followed by Upaka inquiring after the future plans of the Buddha, in reply to which the Buddha indicates that he is on his way to Vārāṇasī in order to start teaching.

This suggested pattern of events receives support from the *Lalitavistara*, from the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the corresponding passage in the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, and from the *Mahāvastu*, according to which the exchange between Upaka and the Buddha took place in accordance with this pattern.²¹⁴

MN I 171 The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and a partial parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama* next describe the Buddha's meeting with the five monks. The two Chinese versions additionally record a reflection by the Buddha on how confused the five monks were, since although they had earlier agreed not to receive him respectfully, they were unable to carry out their decision when he actually approached them.²¹⁵ The

²¹⁰ According to Bernhard 1969, the original title of this work would have been just *Udāna*, similar to its Pāli counterpart.

²¹¹ These are stanza 22:6 in T 212 at T IV 718a2 and stanza 21:7 in T 213 at T IV 787c5, translated in Willemen 1978: 90. In the Sanskrit version in Bernhard 1965: 278-280 the Buddha's proclamation about his future plans, *bārāṇasīñ gamiṣyāmi*, is similarly found in stanza 21:6, preceded by 21:1 (superiority), 21:3 (arahant), 21:4 (no teacher) and 21:5 (conqueror); cf. also stanzas 270-275 in Nakatani 1987: 60-61 and Chakravarti 1930: 262-265, who presents these *Udāna-(varga)* stanzas together with their counterparts in the *Lalitavistara*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the Theravāda *Vinaya*. The reference to the Buddha's future plans in the Tibetan version is stanza 21:7 in Beckh 1911: 69, which similarly begins with *ba ra ṇa ser song nas su* (Zongtse 1990: 209: *vā ra ṇā sir song nas su*).

²¹² Sieg 1933: 171.

²¹³ T 211 at T IV 594b18, translated in Willemen 1999: 128.

²¹⁴ The *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 405,20 or in Vaidya 1958b: 296,22; cf. also Bu ston's "History of Buddhism" in Obermiller 1932/1986: 43-44, the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 132,5, with its Tibetan counterpart in Waldschmidt 1957a: 129,1, and the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 194,25 or in Senart 1897: 326,5; cf. also Windisch 1909: 483-484. On the corresponding passages in other *Vinayas* cf. Waldschmidt 1951/1967: 175; on the conclusion of the encounter between the Buddha and Upaka cf. also von Hinüber 1979: 357.

²¹⁵ MĀ 204 at T I 777c9 and EĀ 24.5 at T II 618c27. The same recurs in the *Catuṣpariṣat-sūtra* fragment S 362 (48)V4-5 in Waldschmidt 1952: 29-30 and in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 133,13. Ac-

Jātakanidānakathā explains that the reason for their inability to carry out their previous determination was that the Buddha had been pervading them with *mettā* when he was approaching them.²¹⁶

According to the Chinese discourses, the five monks expressed their disbelief in the Buddha's awakening only once before being convinced,²¹⁷ whereas according to the Pāli version they gave vent to their disbelief for three times.²¹⁸ The three versions also differ on how the Buddha overcame their distrust.

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, he convinced them to listen to him by drawing their attention to the fact that he had never before spoken in such a way.²¹⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version reports that the Buddha asked the five if they had ever known him to be speaking a falsehood.²²⁰ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the Buddha overcame the distrust of the five monks by drawing their attention to the brightness of his faculties and his manner of bearing, which were unlike the way they had seen him before,²²¹ a remark also recorded in the *Catusparisat-sūtra*, in the *Lalitavistara*, and in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*.²²²

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse continues with the Buddha's first sermon, in which he presents the noble eightfold path as the middle path aloof from the two extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification.²²³

While the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* does not explicitly mention the Buddha's first sermon, the Theravāda *Vinaya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* version also record the Buddha's first sermon at this point of events.²²⁴ The same is the case for the *Catusparisat-sūtra*, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*.²²⁵ The commentary to the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* also indicates that the first sermon was delivered at this junction of events.²²⁶

The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* parallels describe in similar terms that some out of the group of five monks went collecting

cording to Burton's "History of Buddhism" in Obermiller 1932/1986: 44, Kaundinya anyway had mentally disapproved their decision not to treat the Buddha respectfully.

²¹⁶ Jā I 82,2, cf. also Jayawickrama 1990: 109.

²¹⁷ MĀ 204 at T I 777c19 and EĀ 24.5 at T II 619a3.

²¹⁸ MN 26 at MN I 172,26.

²¹⁹ MN 26 at MN I 172,30.

²²⁰ EĀ 24.5 at T II 619a5.

²²¹ MĀ 204 at T I 777c22.

²²² Fragment S 362 (49)R3 in Waldschmidt 1952: 30, Lefmann 1902: 409,2 or Vaidya 1958b: 298,16, and Gnoli 1977: 134,7.

²²³ MĀ 204 at T I 777c26, paralleling SN 56:11 at SN V 421,2. For a comparative study of different versions of this discourse cf. Dessein 2007 and Sastri 1938.

²²⁴ Vin I 10,10. EĀ 24.5 at T II 619a9 begins, however, right away with the four truths, without referring to the two extremes to be avoided (on the absence of the qualification "noble" in its treatment of the four truths cf. below p. 803). The two extremes to be avoided are instead taken up in EĀ 19.2 at T II 593b25.

²²⁵ Fragment S 362 (49)R4 in Waldschmidt 1952: 30, T 1428 at T XXII 788a6, T 1421 at T XXII 104b24, Basak 1968/2004: 197,21 or Senart 1897: 331,2, and Gnoli 1977: 134,10.

²²⁶ Ps II 192,10.

alms to support the others, who received instructions from the Buddha, with the final result that all five became arahants.

MN I 173 The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue with the Buddha taking up the five types of sensual pleasure, comparing the predicament of being infatuated with them to a deer caught in snares. In contrast, those who are aloof from sensual pleasures are, according to both versions, free from Māra's control, just as a deer not caught in snares is beyond the hunter's control.

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version it is not entirely clear if this passage is addressed to the five monks or to the group of monks assembled at Rammaka's hermitage. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation, the Buddha addressed this examination of sensual pleasures to the five monks.²²⁷ Such an instruction to the five monks would be out of place, however, since before this exposition the *Madhyama-āgama* version already reports that the five monks had reached full awakening.²²⁸ To warn them of the dangers of sensual pleasures after they had already eradicated all defilements and therewith gone forever beyond the attraction of sensual pleasures would be somewhat beside the point.

MN I 174 The *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel next take up the four *jhānas*. The two versions differ on the identity of the person who attains the four *jhānas*, which in the *Majjhima-nikāya* account is a monk in general, while in the *Madhyama-āgama* version it is the Buddha himself, so that here the attainment of the four *jhānas* forms part of an autobiographical account of the Buddha's awakening.²²⁹ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse continues by describing how, based on having attained the four *jhānas*, the Buddha reached the destruction of the influxes. Once he was fully emancipated in this way, he was able to walk, stand, sit, and lie down freely, comparable to a deer moving about freely in a place that is out of the hunter's range. The *Madhyama-āgama* explains that a monk who has reached the destruction of the influxes would similarly be able to walk, stand, sit, and lie down freely.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version instead continues from the four *jhānas* to the four immaterial attainments and the attainment of cessation, qualifying each of these attainments as a way of blindfolding Māra. The simile of the deer that roams around freely occurs in the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse already at the outset of its exposition of the *jhānas*, while a monk's ability to walk, stand, sit, and lie down freely comes after its description of the attainment of cessation.²³⁰

Comparing these two passages, to relate freedom from Māra to the four *jhānas* and the destruction of the influxes appears to be more straightforward than making the

²²⁷ MN 26 at MN I 173,21 reports the Buddha using the appellation "monks", *bhikkhave*, whereas in MĀ 204 at T I 778a11 he addresses the five monks, 五比丘.

²²⁸ MĀ 204 at T I 778a6.

²²⁹ In the description in MN 26 at MN I 174,12, the one who attains the *jhānas* is a *bhikkhu*, whereas in MĀ 204 at T I 778b14 the attainment of the four *jhānas* forms part of a description of the arising of a Tathā-gata, 如來, and of his mode of practice.

²³⁰ MN 26 at MN I 174,9 and MN I 175,7.

same incumbent on the immaterial attainments and cessation. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version's additional reference to the four immaterial attainments and the attainment of cessation as a way of blindfolding Māra occurs in similar terms in the preceding discourse, the *Nivāpa-sutta*, where this passage fits the context better than in the present instance.²³¹

Looking back on this last section of the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, it is noteworthy that in both versions this part does not fit too well with the flow of the narration, coming almost as an anti-climax after the account of the Buddha's noble quest and full awakening, his subsequent teaching of the five monks, and their full awakening.²³²

As my comparative study of *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses up to now has repeatedly documented, a recurrent feature of orally transmitted discourse material is that, although various passages of a text may be well remembered, at times they are not recalled in their proper sequence. Keeping this feature in mind, it might be worthwhile to again take up the *Madhyama-āgama* version's suggestion that the exposition on the dangers of sensuality and the subsequent description of the four *jhānas* was addressed to the five monks. Although the otherwise similar exposition in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version does not address the five monks, it also does not give any explicit indication to the contrary.

On the assumption that the sequence of the narration might have suffered from a misplacing of this passage during the process of transmission of the discourse, perhaps the Buddha's examination of the dangers of sensual pleasures and his subsequent exposition of the four *jhānas* originally came earlier in the narration, after the first sermon on the four noble truths, but before the five monks became arahants. If this should have been the case, then this passage would record what the Buddha taught his first five monks in order to prepare them for their eventual full awakening.²³³

The *Madhyama-āgama* version's indication that this instruction was addressed to the five monks fits well with the image of the deer caught in snares to illustrate the bondage of sensuality, found in both discourses. According to the *Mahāvastu*, deer were left to roam freely in the deer park where the Buddha and the monks were staying.²³⁴ Their

²³¹ MN 25 at MN I 159,30 and its parallel MĀ 178 at T I 720a19; cf. also AN 9:39 at AN IV 434,12.

²³² Pande 1957: 124 notes that "whereas the purpose of the whole *sutta* is to explain the 'Noble Quest' (*Ariyapariyesana*) ... the paragraph that begins on p. 173 (MN. I) treats abruptly of a different subject – how the Bhikkhu should avoid the five strands of sensuous desires (Kāmaguṇas)". Abeynayake 2005: 18 notes that "the concluding remarks of the Buddha here are so abrupt that one may come to the conclusion that they were also part and parcel of his address to the group of five monks at the deer park".

²³³ Their attainment of full awakening is recorded in SN 22:59 at SN III 68,26, which in agreement with its parallels SĀ 34 at T II 8a3, T 102 at T II 499c26, the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 789b2, the *Mahiśāsaka Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 105a24, and the *Theravāda Vinaya* at Vin I 14,34 reports that the first five monk disciples of the Buddha reached full awakening during a penetrative exposition of the five aggregates from the perspective of the three characteristics, with particular emphasis given to the not-self characteristic.

²³⁴ According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 480,11 or in Senart 1882a: 366,8, the Deer Park owed its

presence would thus have served as a handy illustration of the freedom to be won by abandoning sensuality. This makes it natural to locate the delivery of the simile of the deer caught in snares in the Deer Park by Vārāṇasī.

The importance of this image is also reflected in the circumstance that some Pāli editions have the alternative title “discourse on the heap of snares”, instead of “discourse on the noble quest”.²³⁵ The alternative title “heap of snares” refers to the deer simile in the passage under discussion at present, a simile apparently considered by the reciters to be of such significance in relation to the discourse as a whole that it was chosen as a title.

To place the Buddha’s instructions on sensuality and *jhāna* at this juncture in the development of the five monks would also fit well from a practical perspective, as the removal of sensuality and the development of deep concentration are important requirements for the progress from stream-entry to full awakening.²³⁶

An instruction that contrasts the pleasures of sensuality with the pleasures of deeper concentration would also have weaned the five monks away from their earlier belief in the need for asceticism in order to reach awakening, due to which they had found it difficult to accept that the Buddha could have reached the final goal after having given up asceticism.

This would also explain why some out of the group of five monks went begging to support the others who meanwhile received instructions from the Buddha. If the point had just been to give them a discourse, there would have been no need to split up the group.

However, if the five monks had to be taught how to develop *jhāna*, it would be sensible to divide the group and allow some of them, on alternating turns, the increased de-

existence to a grant of immunity given by the king of Vārāṇasī in former times to a deer herd whose leader was the bodhisattva; cf. also the *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 304,25, Lefmann 1902: 19,3 or Vaidya 1958b: 14,7, and the travelling records of Xuánzàng (玄奘) in T 2087 at T LI 906b3, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 51. An illustration of this tale can be found in Foucher 1955: 110. A similar tale occurs in Jā 12 at Jā I 145-153 and in T 212 at T IV 685b12; for further parallels cf. Hahn 1983: 1-2.

²³⁵ While MN I 175,12 and C^e-MN I 424,33 speak of the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, B^e-MN I 216,1 and S^e-MN I 312,1 have the title *Pāsarāsi-sutta*. Both titles were apparently well known in commentarial times, as the commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya* at Ps II 163,25 begins by speaking of the *Pāsarāsi-sutta*, whereas the *Atthasālinī* at As 35,25 refers to the same discourse as *Ariyapariyesanā*, a title mentioned at Ps II 193,34 only as an alternative to *Pāsarāsi-sutta*. This slight difference in presentation could be related to the circumstance that Buddhaghosa appears to have written a draft of the *Atthasālinī* while he was still in India, cf. *Mahāvanssa* 37.225 at B^e-Mhv 243 and Bechert 1955: 355, Law 1973: 407, Malalasekera 1928/1994: 98, Rhys Davids 1900/1922: xxvii, and Norman 1978: 42. Pind 1992: 136-137, however, argues against attributing this work to Buddhaghosa. For a critical review of arguments raised by Bapat 1942: xxxv-xxxix against identifying Buddhaghosa as the author of the *Atthasālinī* cf. also Hayashi 1999.

²³⁶ Several discourses indicate that the development of *jhāna* would be required in order to be able to reach full awakening, cf. MN 64 at MN I 434,25 and MN I 435,26, AN 9:12 at AN IV 380,2+17, and AN 9:36 at AN IV 422,7, although it needs to be mentioned that this need has been the topic of some controversy; for recent contributions relevant to this theme cf. Bodhi 2002, id. 2007, Brahmāli 2007, and Wen 2009.

gree of seclusion afforded by not having to go begging for alms, so that they could more easily develop concentrative mastery of the mind.²³⁷

These considerations would support the assumption that the sequence of the narration has been misplaced and that the Buddha's instructions on sensuality and *jhāna* were indeed given to the five monks. If this assumption should be correct, then the way the Buddha led his first five monks to full awakening would well exemplify what appears to be a central pattern underlying the early Buddhist path to liberation, which based on a penetrative insight into the four noble truths (acquired with stream-entry) requires overcoming sensuality, developing deeper levels of concentration, and deepening insight into the three characteristics, in order to issue in the attainment of full liberation.

MN 27 *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta*

The *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on the simile of the elephant’s footprint”, describes the gradual training of a monk.²³⁸ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²³⁹

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse opens by relating that the wanderer Pilotika visited MN I 175 the Buddha, received a discourse on the Dharma, and departed full of inspiration about what he had just heard. On his way back, he met the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi.

Unlike the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version does not report the earlier visit paid by the wanderer Pilotika to the Buddha. Thus the *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta* begins only with this wanderer meeting the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi.

Asked about his impression of the Buddha’s wisdom,²⁴⁰ according to both versions the wanderer Pilotika told the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi that he had witnessed how different

²³⁷ Bronkhorst 1999: 89 notes that the presentation in the *Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta* (SN 22:59) gives the impression as if “the mere fact of hearing this wisdom proclaimed is enough for the first disciples of the Buddha to reach Arhat-ship right there and then. No question of retiring into loneliness, of reaching subsequently the Four Dhyānas etc., which are elsewhere in the Buddhist texts presented as essential prerequisites for attaining to this exalted state”. Miyamoto 1965: 851 comments that “the five bhikkhus probably failed to grasp the full implication of the ... ‘Middle Path’ when it was first presented to them. Undoubtedly, strenuous effort had to be made before they could become awakened”. Vetter 1985: 74 notes that “the Buddha is so busy instructing the five ascetics that he no longer goes out begging himself ... this account only becomes meaningful to me if I assume that he was initiating these ascetics in the stages of dhyāna-meditation and was guiding them in a very practical way”. Vetter 1988: xxix further comments that the “middle way not only implied avoiding extremes ... but also the possibility of perceiving something in the middle that one normally does not observe, i.e. very likely the potential ... of practising dhyāna-meditation”.

²³⁸ According to *Mahāvansā*, stanza 14.22 at B^e-Mhv 76, the *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta* was the first discourse preached by Mahinda to the king of Ceylon, leading to the king’s conversion and to the spread of Buddhism in Ceylon.

²³⁹ The parallel is MĀ 146 at T I 656a-658a, which agrees with MN 27 on Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī as the location and has the title “discourse on the simile of the elephant’s footprint”, 象跡喻經, thereby differing from MN 27 only in that it does not qualify the discourse to be a “lesser” version. On some aspects of MĀ 146 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 99-100 and 206.

debaters had been unable to defeat the Buddha in discussion.²⁴¹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in reporting that these debaters also became the Buddha's disciples, and that some of them even went forth, practised diligently, and attained awakening.²⁴²

In both versions, the wanderer Pilotika compared his confidence in the Buddha to a hunter who, on seeing the big footprint of an elephant, is confident that the elephant in question must be a large one. Once their conversation was over, the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇī went to visit the Buddha and reported how the wanderer Pilotika had illustrated his confidence in the Buddha with the simile of the elephant's footprint.

MN I 178 According to both versions, the Buddha took up the simile of the elephant's footprint and delivered an account of the gradual training in his teaching as an illustration of the full implications of this simile. The descriptions of the main steps of this gradual training resemble each other in the Pāli and Chinese versions.²⁴³

A few minor differences are: In its description of abstention from killing, the *Madhyama-āgama* version explicitly indicates that this also covers killing insects.²⁴⁴ Moreover, in its account of other aspects of virtuous conduct, the *Madhyama-āgama* version mentions abstaining from alcohol, an aspect of conduct not explicitly taken into account in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version.²⁴⁵ Another difference is that, in its treatment of speech,

²⁴⁰ An introductory narration showing some similarities to the exchange between Pilotika and Jāṇussoṇī can be found in AN 5:194 at AN III 237,2, involving the Brahmins Piṅgiyānī and Kāraṇapālī.

²⁴¹ While in MN 27 at MN I 175,20 Pilotika refers to the Buddha as the “ascetic Gotama”, *samāṇa gotama*, MĀ 146 at T I 656a27 takes into account that by now he has gained confidence in the Buddha, as here Pilotika refers to the Buddha as 世尊, a standard way of rendering *bhagavā*, cf., e.g., Hirakawa 1997: 69, Nattier 2003b: 232, and Soothill 1937/2000: 164.

²⁴² MN 27 at MN I 177,12.

²⁴³ On the section of the gradual path that deals with mindfulness and clear comprehension cf. above p. 82; for the section on sense-restraint cf. below p. 619.

²⁴⁴ MĀ 146 at T I 657a16: “insects and bugs”, 蟻蟲, already noted by Prasad 1985: 136; cf. also Ramers 1996: 45, Schmithausen 2000a: 52, and id. 2002: 13 note 47. A reference to insects in definitions of killing can also be found in Vin I 97,2, in a discourse quotation in the *Dharmaskandha*, fragment 4737 folio 19v10 in Dietz 1984: 80,24 and T 1537 at T XXVI 455b2, and (noted by Dietz 1984: 80 note 358) in the *Bhiksūṇīkarmavācana* fragment 25b1 in Ridding 1919: 138,9 or in Schmidt 1993: 263,17, and in the *Karmavācanā* fragment 232R3 in Härtel 1956: 27, cf. also the Sarvāstivāda *Upasampadāvastu* in Chung 2004: 47,3.

²⁴⁵ MĀ 146 at T I 657b18: 離酒, 斷酒. The need to abstain from alcohol is taken into account in the Pāli discourses in the context of listings of the five precepts, e.g., DN 5 at DN I 146,20 (with its monastic counterpart in *pācittiya* 51 at Vin IV 110,13, on which cf. also Kieffer-Püllz 2005b). The dire consequences of such consumption are depicted in AN 8.40 at AN IV 248,9 to be rebirth in hell, as an animal, as a ghost, or as a mentally deranged human. Whereas a description of ethical restraint as part of the gradual path in the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, Gnoli 1978a: 233, also does not refer to the consumption of alcohol, the same is taken into account in a gradual path account in DĀ 20 at T I 83c27. Nattier 2003a: 109 note 11 points out that variations in regard to references to abstaining from alcohol can occur even within a single work, such as the *Mahāvastu*. In one passage in this work, a listing of the ten courses of action, *karmapatha*, includes the prohibition against alcohol, at the cost of omitting a reference to harsh speech; in another passage in the same work, the ten courses are listed without a reference to alcohol,

the *Madhyama-āgama* version provides a contrast to rough speech by depicting a type of speech that is soft and mild, whereas the *Majjhima-nikāya* version only portrays the nature of rough speech.²⁴⁶

Forms of conduct to be avoided that are mentioned only in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version are:

- accepting raw meat,
- going on messages,
- buying and selling,
- cheating with false weights and measures, etc.,
- deception and fraud, etc.,
- murder and robbery, etc.²⁴⁷

According to both versions, even the attainment of the four *jhānas*, although constituting a significant verification of the efficacy of the Buddha's teaching and thus being a "footprint of the Tathāgata",²⁴⁸ is not yet sufficient for acquiring firm confidence in the Buddha as a fully awakened teacher.

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version's account of the gradual training culminates in MN I 182 in the three higher knowledges, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse proceeds from the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* directly to the destruction of the influxes.²⁴⁹ This presentation is noteworthy, since standard descriptions of the gradual path in the Pāli discourses usually mention the whole set of three higher knowledges, or even the six higher knowledges.

From a practical perspective, however, to proceed from the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* directly to the destruction of the influxes would be possible, as the early discourses do not consider recollection of past lives and the ability to directly perceive the passing away and reappearing of beings according to their deeds as necessary require-

cf. Basak 1963a: 126,4 and id. 1965: 139,12 or Senart 1882a: 107,13 and id. 1890: 99,5 (on such combinations of the ten courses of action with the five precepts cf. also Nattier 2002). The importance of abstention from alcohol is highlighted in the *Abhidharmaśabhaśya*, according to which lack of restraint in this respect endangers keeping the other precepts as well, cf. Abhidh-k 4.34 in Pradhan 1967: 218,18, T 1558 at T XXIX 77b8, and T 1559 at T XXIX 234a22. Reat 1996: 49 comments that "though it is clear that the Buddha did not approve of alcohol and drugs, abstinence from intoxicants ... in the Pali *sūtras* ... is ... not nearly as prominent an ethical issue as it came to be in later Buddhism"; cf. also Schmithausen 1991: 8 note 42.

²⁴⁶ MĀ 146 at T I 657b1 also indicates that rough speech is a hindrance for the development of concentration; cf. also the similar reference in the context of a gradual path treatment in SHT III 808R5 (p. 15) to rough speech as *asamā/dhji/sa]m/va/r/dhan/jt*. Although in the Pāli discourses this particular consequence of rough speech is not mentioned in accounts of the gradual path, it is taken into account in expositions of the ten courses of action (*kammopatha*), cf., e.g., MN 41 at MN I 286,37.

²⁴⁷ MN 27 at MN I 180,10: *āmakamansapatiggahāñ paṭivirato hoti*, and MN I 180,15: *dūteyyapahiṇagamanānuyogā ... kayavikkayā ... tulākūṭakamṣakūṭamānakūṭā ... ukkotanavañcananikatisācīyogā ... cedanavadhabandhanaviparāmosa-ālopasahasākārā paṭivirato hoti* (S^e-MN I 343,18: *ukkotanavañcananikatisāvīyogā*); cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 31 and 82.

²⁴⁸ MN 27 at MN I 181,29 and MĀ 146 at T I 657c23: *tathāgatapadaññ/如來所行*.

²⁴⁹ MN 27 at MN I 182,19 and MĀ 146 at T I 658a11.

ments for the destruction of the influxes. Yet, in the present instance the Buddha is describing his teaching to a Brahmin visitor. In view of this, it would fit the context well if he were to bring in all of the three higher knowledges (*tevijjā*), thereby describing what constitutes the Buddhist counterpart to the three knowledges valued by contemporary Brahmins.²⁵⁰

Another difference between the two versions is that the *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta* presents insight into the four noble truths as the way to reach complete confidence, while the successful destruction of the influxes is the point at which complete confidence has been reached.²⁵¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not have such a distinction, but simply treats insight into the four noble truths and the destruction of the influxes together.²⁵²

According to the commentarial explanation, the finer distinction introduced at this point refers to the difference between path and fruition attainment, since at the path moment the noble disciple is about to reach complete confidence, whereas with the fruition moment of full awakening he has completely done so.²⁵³

Yet, according to the standard commentarial presentation already the path moment eradicates the defilements.²⁵⁴ Thus, the commentarial explanation does not seem to fit the passage it purports to explain so well, as in the *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta* the eradication of the influxes takes place only at the point that according to the commentary would represent the fruition moment of an arahant.

MN I 184 The *Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel conclude by reporting that the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi felt inspired enough by this discourse to take refuge with the Buddha.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁰ In AN 3:58 at AN I 163,8 a Brahmin proposes *tevijjā* to stand for knowledge of the three Vedas, in reply to which the Buddha describes what are the three knowledges in his dispensation, concluding that the attainment of these three higher knowledges makes one a “three-knowledge Brahmin”, AN 3:58 at AN I 165,31: *etāhi tīhi vijjāhi, tevijo hoti brāhmaṇo*. Cf. also Sv I 267,30, according to which the Brahmin Ambatṭha took even the expression “knowledge” on its own to represent knowledge of the three Vedas, *vijjā nāma tayo vedā*. For a modern interpretation of the three higher knowledges cf. Bucknell 1983.

²⁵¹ MN 27 at MN I 183,34 indicates that with insight into the four noble truths in relation to *dukkha* and in relation to the influxes, the noble disciple has not yet reached complete confidence, but is in the process of doing so, *na tveva tāva ariyasāvako nitt̄ham gato hoti, api ca kho nitt̄ham gacchati*, whereas once the three influxes are eradicated, he has reached complete confidence, MN 27 at MN I 184,6: *nitt̄ham gato hoti* (here and above S^e-MN I 348,3 reads *nitt̄hangato*).

²⁵² MĀ 146 at T I 658a19.

²⁵³ Ps II 217,24.

²⁵⁴ For the case of stream-entry cf. As 234,2 and Vism 675,4.

²⁵⁵ Instead of continuing to address the Buddha by his name Gotama, MĀ 146 at T I 658a22:瞿曇, when Jāṇussoṇi takes refuge as a lay disciple he changes to the honorific “Blessed One”, MĀ 146 at T I 658a23:世尊. In MN 27 at MN I 184,11, however, he keeps on using the Buddha’s name even after taking refuge. This is the usual pattern adopted by Brahmins in other discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, who continue to use *bho gotama* even when they take refuge as lay disciples, cf. e.g., MN 30 at MN I 205,4, MN 60 at MN I 413,21, MN 93 at MN II 157,18, MN 95 at MN II 177,11, MN 96 at MN II 184,21, MN 99 at MN II 208,10, MN 100 at MN II 213,9, MN 107 at MN III 7,2, and MN 135 at MN III 206,26.

MN 28 *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the simile of the elephant’s footprint”, presents a detailed investigation of the four noble truths, given by Sāriputta. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²⁵⁶

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart begin by comparing the role of the four noble truths in regard to all wholesome (or skilful) states to the footprint of an elephant, which due to its size comprises the footprints of all other animals.²⁵⁷

MN I 184

Wagle 1966: 46 explains that Brahmins “in addressing the Buddha ... invariably use the term *bho Gotama*”, adding that “*bho*, which is a term used among brāhmaṇas when addressing each other, denotes equality”. Another noteworthy example for the use of *bho gotama* is the case of the Brahmin Brahmā-yu, who according to MN 91 at MN II 145,19 used the address *bho gotama* even after he had prostrated in front of the Buddha and kissed the Buddha’s feet, an expression of humility that caused an uproar in the assembly that was witnessing this act. Similar to MN 27, MN 4 at MN I 24,2 reports that Jāṇussoṇi took refuge by using the address *bho gotama*, whereas in the Chinese parallel EĀ 31.1 at T II 666c27 he used the address “Blessed One”, followed, however, in EĀ 31.1 at T II 666c29 by Jāṇussoṇi reverting to the name Gotama. Perhaps the occurrences of the address “Blessed One” in EĀ 31.1 and in MĀ 146 could be due to the reciters or translators assuming that someone who takes refuge must be using a honorific form of address like “Blessed One”. Another difference is that MĀ 146 at T I 658a26 concludes with Jāṇussoṇi and Pilotika rejoicing in the Buddha’s exposition, whereas according to MN 27 at MN I 184,10 only Jāṇussoṇi rejoiced in the Buddha’s exposition. The course of the narration in both versions gives the impression that Jāṇussoṇi had come alone to visit the Buddha, whereas Pilotika had already received an inspiring discourse from the Buddha and was on his way back to Sāvatthī when he met Jāṇussoṇi. Thus the conclusion in MN 27 would fit the situation better. It seems to be a recurrent pattern in *Madhyama-āgama* discourses that the conclusion reports the delight of those who at this junction of events have already left, cf. also below p. 209 note 31 and p. 545 note 83.

²⁵⁶ The parallel is MĀ 30 at T I 464b-467a, which agrees with MN 28 on locating the discourse at Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī and also has the similar title “discourse on the simile of the elephant’s footprint”, 象跡喻經, thereby differing from MN 28 only in that it does not use the specification “greater”. A study and partial translation of MĀ 30 can be found in Minh Chau 1964/1991: 113-114. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 259. For a counterpart to MN I 191,18-19 in *Vyākhyāyukti* literature cf. Skilling 2000b: 343.

²⁵⁷ In regard to this simile, Cousins 1996a: 146 comments that “when ... Sāriputta tells us that all skilful *dhammas* are included in the four noble truths, we should ... interpret skilful *dhammas* here as referring to meditational states”. According to Nāṇaponika 1966/1981: 2, the image in MN 28 intends to convey that “the Four Noble Truths comprise ... all that is beneficial, i.e. all that is truly worth knowing and following after”. On the term *kusala* and its implications cf. also Adam 2005, Carter 1984, Collins 1998: 154, Del Toso 2007b, Nanayakkara 1999, and Premasiri 1976. Franke 1906: 368 notes that a counterpart to the simile of the elephant’s footprint can be found in the *Mahābhārata*, where it illustrates the importance of non-violence, *ahiṃsā*; cf. also Neumann 1896/1995: 1141 note 451. The simile of the elephant’s footprint recurs in SN 48:54 at SN V 231,2 to highlight the importance of the faculty of wisdom, *paññindriya*. Since insight into the four noble truths is reckoned a manifestation of the faculty of wisdom (cf. SN 48:10 at SN V 199,2), the use of this simile in SN 48:54 is similar to its implications in MN 28. The simile of the elephant’s footprint can also be found in SN 3:7 at SN I 86,29 (or SN² 128 at SN² I 195,16) and its parallel MĀ 141 at T I 647c6, SN 45:140 at SN V 43,13, AN 6:53 at AN III 364,21, AN 10:15 at AN V 21,18, SĀ 882 at T I 222a5, and SĀ² 66 at T II 396b27. In each of

MN I 185 The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel proceed from the topic of the four noble truths to the first noble truth, then to the five aggregates mentioned in the first noble truth, then to the aggregate of form, and then to the four elements as the basic constituents of form.²⁵⁸

Taking up the earth element, the parallel versions distinguish between its internal and external manifestations, followed by defining the internal earth element by way of the solid parts of the human body.²⁵⁹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version explains that the internal and the external earth element should be contemplated as “not mine, not I, not my self”, in order to develop disenchantment.²⁶⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not have such an instruction at this point, although the same theme is taken up later on in both versions (see table 3.5).

The two versions continue by turning to the destruction of the whole earth, which according to Indian cosmology occurs periodically. Both versions conclude that once even the great earth is impermanent, the physical body must be of the same nature.

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version highlights that it is meaningless to identify with the impermanent body,²⁶¹ the *Madhyama-āgama* version tackles the same theme by contrasting an unlearned worldling, who identifies with the body, with a learned disciple, who is aloof from such identification.²⁶²

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel continue by examining the case of a monk who meets with abuse, recommending the reflection that such unpleasant experiences arise in dependence on contact, which, just as the four immaterial aggregates, is impermanent. In both versions, such reflection leads to mental steadiness.²⁶³

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version only takes up the case of abuse, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse also examines the case of experiencing pleasant speech, recommend-

these cases, the simile illustrates the importance of diligence, *appamāda*. Another occurrence of the same simile is SĀ 270 at T II 70c15, where it illustrates the importance of perception of impermanence.

²⁵⁸ A minor difference in regard to the definition of the first noble truth is that “disease” and “association with what is disliked” together with “dissociation from what is liked” are only mentioned in MĀ 30 at T I 464b29, while “sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair” are only mentioned in MN 28 at MN I 185,4 (cf. also above p. 69).

²⁵⁹ A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 3:28 in Pradhan 1967: 136,19 and 137,2 parallels the listing of hair, etc., as manifestations of the earth element in MN 28 at MN I 185,15; with its counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 50a14, T 1559 at T XXIX 207a7, and Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 140b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 161b5, cf. also Mejor 1991: 73.

²⁶⁰ MN 28 at MN I 185,23.

²⁶¹ MN 28 at MN I 185,32: “how [could there] be [notions of] ‘I’, ‘mine’, or ‘I am’ in regard to this body”, *kim pan’ imassa ... kāyassa ... ahan ti vā maman ti vā asmi ti vā* (C^e-MN I 450,10: *kim*)?

²⁶² MĀ 30 at T I 464c15.

²⁶³ According to MN 28 at MN I 186,4, the mind “goes forward and become satisfied, steadied, and determined”, *pakkhandati pasīdati santithati adhimuccati* (S^e-M I 351,5 reads *vimuccati*, instead of *adhimuccati*, a reading that, as Nāṇaponika 1966/1981: 22 notes, is also found in the subcommentary B^e-Ps-pṭ II 169; on alternations between these two terms cf. Lévi 1929: 44 and Wynne 2007: 79; cf. also below p. 685 note 14). MĀ 30 at T I 465a3 instead speaks of the “tranquil, concentrated, and unified mind”, 安定一心.

ing the same type of reflection (see table 3.5).²⁶⁴ In this way, the *Madhyama-āgama* version commends mental steadiness not only when a monk is confronted with abuse, but also when he meets with pleasant words, in which case reflecting on their impermanent nature would prevent the arising of pride and conceit.

Both versions turn to the case of being physically attacked, recommending the reflection that to come into contact with physical harm is simply the nature of this body. The two versions continue by quoting the simile of the saw as a reminder for the need for patience in case one is physically attacked.²⁶⁵ The *Madhyama-āgama* version stands alone in following the simile with instructions on the development of loving kindness as a boundless radiation in all directions (see table 3.5).²⁶⁶ The *Kakacūpama-sutta* and its parallel, from which the simile originates, also follow their exposition of the simile with such instructions.²⁶⁷

MN I 186

Table 3.5: Reflections on the Elements in MN 28 and its Parallel

MN 28	MĀ 30
internal element (1)	internal element (→ 1)
reflection on not-self (2)	external element destroyed (→ 3)
external element destroyed (3)	body is not-self (→ 4)
body is not-self (4)	facing abusive speech (→ 5)
facing abusive speech (5)	facing pleasant speech
facing being attacked (6)	facing being attacked (→ 6)
simile of the saw (7)	simile of the saw (→ 7)
simile of daughter-in-law (8)	<i>brahmavihāra</i> practice simile of daughter-in-law (→ 8) (≠ 2)

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel agree that recollecting the simile of the saw is an instance of recollection of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha. By undertaking such recollection, a monk should be able to establish himself in equanimity, failing which he should arouse a sense of urgency. Such arousal is illustrated in both versions with the urgency experienced by a daughter-in-law in regard to her new family members, such as her father-in-law, or else her husband.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ MĀ 30 at T I 464c22.

²⁶⁵ MN 28 at MN I 186,11 and MĀ 30 at T I 465a6.

²⁶⁶ MĀ 30 at T I 465a12. MĀ 30 at T I 464c11, T I 465b1, T I 465c20, and T I 466b13 also appears to provide a relation between the practice of the four *brahmavihāras* and the earlier contemplation of the elements, since it qualifies each element to be “without hostility”, 不憎惡. This could be similar to an exposition found in MN 62 at MN I 423,20, where the way each element patiently bears with whatever dirt is put on or into it functions as an inspirational example for developing the *brahmavihāras*.

²⁶⁷ MN 21 at MN I 129,15 and MĀ 193 at T I 746a13.

²⁶⁸ Coomaraswamy 1943: 174 takes up this simile as one of the illustrations of *saṃvega*, which he explains to stand for a “state of shock, agitation, fear, awe, wonder or delight induced by some physically or mentally poignant experience” (p. 176).

MN I 187 Both versions apply the same treatment and reflections to the other three elements of water, fire, and wind. While the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel proceed along similar lines when depicting the internal manifestations of each element, they differ in regard to the external manifestations of the four elements (see table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Destruction of the Four Elements in MN 28 and its Parallel

MN 28	MA 30
water element disturbed, earth disappears (1)	water calamity destroys earth element (→ 1)
water element disturbed, destroys villages, etc., then dries up (2)	fire calamity destroys water element (→ 2)
fire element disturbed, destroys villages, etc., then runs out of fuel (3)	fire arises and destroys villages, etc., reaches road or water and runs out of fuel (→ 3)
wind element disturbed, destroys villages, etc., then disappears (4)	wind arises and destroys houses, trees, etc., reaches mountain and stops (→ 4)

When taking up the destruction of the external earth element, the Pāli version describes how the water element, on being disturbed, destroys the earth element.²⁶⁹ When turning to the external water element, however, the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* again speaks of the water element being disturbed, a disturbance that results in the destruction of villages and whole countries through floods.²⁷⁰ The Pāli account continues its treatment of the external water element by describing how the water of the great ocean dries up in stages until none is left.

When it comes to the external fire element and the external wind element, the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* describes the effects of a disturbance of the fire element and then of the wind element, so that in these two cases, just as in the case of water, it attributes the destruction of a particular element to a disturbance of the same element.²⁷¹

In this way, the Pāli presentation speaks twice of a disturbance of the water element and does not mention a disturbance of the earth element.²⁷² Its exposition of the earth

²⁶⁹ MN 28 at MN I 185,28: *bāhirā āpodhātu pakuppati*.

²⁷⁰ MN 28 at MN I 187,15: *bāhirā āpodhātu pakuppati*.

²⁷¹ MN 28 at MN I 188,16: *bāhirā tejodhātu pakuppati* and MN I 189,1: *bāhirā vāyodhātu pakuppati*.

²⁷² B^e-MN I 243,30 records a variant reading according to which the destruction of the earth is not due to a disturbance of the water element, but to a disturbance of the earth element (reading *pathavīdhātu pakuppati* instead of *āpodhātu pakuppati*). On this reading, the presentation would become more uniform, with a disturbance of each element being responsible for its own destruction. Horner 1954/1967: 232 note 1 suggests a similar emendation for this passage. The commentary, Ps II 224,8, however, glosses the destruction of the earth by describing how the earth is flooded and submerged in water, an explanation clearly based on the reading that the water element is disturbed. If the reading known to the commentators had been a disturbance of the earth element, one would expect the commentary to describe earthquakes, etc. That the commentarial tradition did not conceive of a disturbance of the earth element can also be seen in Vism 414,13, which explains that a world contraction can be due to water, fire, and wind, *āposaṃvatto*, *tejosaṃvatto*, *vāyoṣaṃvatto*, thereby not taking account the possibility that such a contraction might occur due to the earth element.

element is, moreover, rather brief and differs from the way the other three elements are treated, where in each case the Pāli version offers a detailed description of the destruction caused by the disturbance of this element, followed by depicting the disappearance of the respective element.

The Chinese version differs in as much as it attributes the destruction of each element to another element, although here, too, the exposition of the destruction of the first two elements is rather brief. It agrees with the Pāli presentation that the external earth element is destroyed by water, but then continues by describing that the external water element dries up due to a fire. The external fire element comes to an end when a fire conflagration reaches a road or water and runs out of fuel. A storm as a manifestation of the external wind element comes to an end on reaching the mountains, representative of the earth element.²⁷³

The Chinese version's attribution of the destruction of the external water element to the impact caused by fire reminds of a discourse from the *Ānguttara-nikāya* which, together with its parallels in the *Madhyama-āgama* and the *Ekottarika-āgama*, describes the gradual drying up of the great ocean in similar terms as the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*.²⁷⁴ According to these discourses, the cause for such a drying up of the ocean is the arising of several suns, an event which would be a manifestation of the fire element.

Yet another discourse from the *Ānguttara-nikāya* attributes even a drought to a disturbance of the fire element. This discourse lists five causes for drought, one of which is when the element of fire in the sky is disturbed, whereby the clouds are dispersed and there will be no rain.²⁷⁵ These passages accord with the attribution of the destruction of the external water element to the impact caused by fire, proposed in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*.

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* and its parallel continue by comparing the nature of the body to a house, explaining that both are merely space, the one enclosed by skin and bones and the other enclosed by timber and clay.²⁷⁶

MN I 190

The two versions next turn to the dependent nature of consciousness, which arises in dependence on a sense-base and its object. The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse takes up two cases, where either consciousness arises or, lacking the required conditions, does not arise.²⁷⁷ The *Majjhima-nikāya* account examines three cases by differentiating the

²⁷³ MĀ 30 at T I 464c12, T I 465b2, T I 465c20, and T I 466b14.

²⁷⁴ AN 7:62 at AN IV 101,19, MĀ 8 at T I 429a2, and EĀ 40.1 at T II 736b13; cf. also SHT VII 1678aR, a Schøyen fragment, and a Tibetan parallel (from Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*) in Dietz 2007. A similar description can also be found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 247,10.

²⁷⁵ AN 5:197 at AN III 243,4+8 uses the same verb *pakuppati*, “to disturb”, as MN 28 at MN I 185,28. The other four causes are a disturbance of the wind element, interference by the *asura* king, indolence of the *devas* responsible for rain, and evil conduct among humans.

²⁷⁶ MN 28 at MN I 190,15 and MĀ 30 at T I 466c29; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 386,13 or ŠSG 2009: 40,7 and T 1579 at T XXX 454c25.

²⁷⁷ MĀ 30 at T I 467a3. In its examination of the second case, MĀ 30 at T I 467a12+14 shows some internal inconsistencies, as in relation to the sense-objects (of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) it speaks

case that consciousness does not arise into two possibilities, where either no objects are present or else no contact is established.²⁷⁸ In both instances, lacking one of the required conditions, consciousness does not arise.

The two versions relate the dependent arising of consciousness to the five aggregates, followed by quoting a statement by the Buddha that one who sees dependent arising sees the Dharma, and one who sees the Dharma sees dependent arising.²⁷⁹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes by explaining that clinging to the aggregates corresponds to the origin of *dukkha*, while to remove desire for them equals the cessation of *dukkha*, thereby coming round to its point of departure, the four noble truths.²⁸⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead concludes by indicating that detachment from past, present, and future manifestations of the five aggregates will lead to awakening.²⁸¹

MN 29 *Mahāsāropama-sutta*

The *Mahāsāropama-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the simile of the heartwood”, examines the types of achievement that should not be mistaken for the final goal. This discourse has a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*,²⁸² which at the same time is also the parallel to the next discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Cūlasāropama-sutta*.

MN I 192 According to the opening section of the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha delivered the present discourse in relation to Devadatta.²⁸³ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version offers more details in this respect. It reports that Devadatta, who by the time of this discourse had lost all his supernormal powers, had gained such favour with King Ajātasattu that the latter was supplying Devadatta and his followers with five hundred meas-

of their being illuminated by light, 光明所照, thereby repeating the description used earlier in relation to visual forms, the only instance where this description seems appropriate. Another puzzling passage occurs in MĀ 30 at T I 467a15, where the internal mind-sphere, its objects, and mind-consciousness that is aware of forms are reckoned together as belonging to the aggregate of form, 內意處及法, 意識知外色法, 是屬色陰.

²⁷⁸ MN 28 at MN I 190,20.

²⁷⁹ MN 28 at MN I 190,37: *yo paticcasamuppādam passati so dhammam passati, yo dhammam passati so paticcasamuppādam passatī ti* and MĀ 30 at T I 467a9: 若見緣起便見法, 若見法便見緣起.

²⁸⁰ MN 28 at MN I 191,30.

²⁸¹ MĀ 30 at T I 467a21.

²⁸² The parallel is EĀ 43.4 at T II 759a-759c. While according to MN 29 the events took place at Mount Vulture Peak outside of Rājagaha, EĀ 43.4 has the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground in the Bamboo Grove, likewise at Rājagaha, as its venue. The summary verse at T II 764c11 refers to EĀ 43.4 as “Devadatta”, 提婆達.

²⁸³ MN 29 at MN I 192,3: *bhagavā devadattam ārabbha bhikkhū āmantesi*. Devadatta’s attempt at creating a schism is described in Vin II 199,1; for a comparative study of the accounts of this attempt in the different *Vinayas* cf. especially Bareau 1991 and Mukherjee 1966 (for a brief survey of the relevant *Vinaya* passages cf. Frauwallner 1956: 117-120); on Devadatta cf. also, e.g., Bareau 1988b: 538-547, Boucher 2008: 46-49, Deeg 1999, id. 2004, Dhirasekera 1988, Hocart 1923 (on which cf. Emeneau 1939 and Mitra 1924), Jing Yin 2009, Klimkeit 1990: 124-127, Lamotte 1949/1981: 868-878, id. 1970b, Ray 1994: 162-173, Sarao 1989: 63-65, id. 2004, Tinti 1997, and Waldschmidt 1964.

ures of food per day. When the monks informed the Buddha about this, according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account the Buddha declared that these material gains would prevent Devadatta from achieving the goal for the sake of which he had gone forth.²⁸⁴

The *Mahāsāropama-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel deliver a simile about mistaking various parts of a tree, such as its twigs or leaves, for heartwood.²⁸⁵ A similar mistake takes place when someone praises himself and disparages others, instead of making an effort to progress further. According to both versions, such praising oneself may take place because of:

- getting material gains, honour, and fame,
- being of virtuous conduct,
- having achieved concentration.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse considers knowledge and vision as another achievement on account of which a monk might become negligent, praise himself, and disparage others,²⁸⁶ after which it turns to permanent liberation, at which point the “heartwood” has been reached.²⁸⁷ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes by stating that the holy life has neither material gain, nor virtue, nor concentration, nor knowledge and vision as its ultimate aim, but only unshakeable deliverance of the mind (*akuppacetovimutti*).²⁸⁸

MN I 195

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version does not mention knowledge and vision, as its presentation proceeds from describing how a monk achieves concentration to his acquisition of wisdom, at which point the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse qualifies such a monk as first and foremost (see table 3.7).²⁸⁹

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse continues with the Buddha answering a question by one of the monks in relation to Devadatta, followed by stanzas spoken by the Buddha in praise of liberating wisdom. After these stanzas, according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account the Buddha summed up his exposition by relating greed for material gains to wrong views. Having wrong views will in turn lead to wrong manifestations of the other

²⁸⁴ EĀ 43.4 at T II 759b10. A similar introductory narration can be found, e.g., in SN 17:36 at SN II 242,2 and in its parallels SĀ 1064 at T II 276b21, SĀ² 3 at T II 374b21 (which precedes this with an account of how Devadatta won the king’s favour), EĀ 12.7 at T II 570b23, and EĀ 23.7 at T II 614a19.

²⁸⁵ MN 29 at MN I 192,15 and EĀ 43.4 at T II 759b11. This simile occurs frequently in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, cf. MN 18 at MN I 111,6, MN 30 at MN I 198,20, MN 133 at MN III 194,32, MN 138 at MN III 224,21, and with less frequency also in other *Nikāyas*, cf. SN 35:116 at SN IV 94,23, SN 35:117 at SN IV 99,27, AN 10:115 at AN V 226,17, and AN 10:172 at AN V 256,21; cf. also AN 5:24 at AN III 20,16, which illustrates the need for *sīla* with the necessity a tree has of possessing twigs and leaves in order to be able to grow.

²⁸⁶ MN 29 at MN I 195,23: *tena nāñadassanena attān’ ukkamseti paraṇi vambheti ... tena nāñadassanena mājjati pamājjati pamādañc āpajjati*.

²⁸⁷ MN 29 at MN I 196,29 reads *samayavimokha* and S^e-MN I 371,19 similarly *samayavimokha*, while B^e-MN I 256,15 and C^e-MN I 476,21 read *asamayavimokha*, which Bodhi in Nāñamoli 1995/2005: 1224 note 348 notes as the preferable reading, a reading also followed by the commentary, Ps II 232,3.

²⁸⁸ MN 29 at MN I 197,29; on the term *akuppacetovimutti* cf. also Hara 2005.

²⁸⁹ EĀ 43.4 at T II 759c1.

seven path factors. As a follow up to this exposition, the Buddha exhorts the monks to scorn material gains.

Table 3.7: Attainments in MN 29 and its Parallel

MN 29	EĀ 43.3
gains and honour (1)	gains and honour (→ 1)
virtue (2)	virtue (→ 2)
concentration (3)	concentration (→ 3)
knowledge and vision (4)	wisdom (→ 4?)
permanent liberation (5)	(≠ 5)

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse concludes by reporting that this exposition on the dangers of succumbing to the attraction of material gains had a strong effect on the monks, since it caused a group of over sixty monks to disrobe, while another group of a similar size became arahants.²⁹⁰ A discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and its counterparts in the *Madhyama-āgama* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* report a similar outcome for another discourse given by the Buddha, which vividly illustrates the dire consequences incurred by a monk who engages in evil conduct.²⁹¹

MN 30 *Cūlasāropama-sutta*

The main contents of the *Cūlasāropama-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on the simile of the heartwood”, are similar to the preceding *Mahāsāropama-sutta*. Both Pāli discourses have the same *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse as their parallel, so that much of what has been said above concerning the *Mahāsāropama-sutta* applies equally to the present discourse.

MN I 198 The *Cūlasāropama-sutta* takes its occasion from a visiting Brahmin who had asked the Buddha if the claim of any of the six heretical teachers to having realized direct knowledge was justified.²⁹² Putting aside this question without directly answering it, the Buddha employed the simile of the heartwood to illustrate that material gains, vir-

²⁹⁰ EĀ 43.4 at T II 759c26 reports that the second group of over sixty monks attained the extinction of the influxes (viz. they became arahants) and the Dharma-eye (viz. they became stream-enterers), 復有六十餘比丘, 漏盡意解, 諸塵垢盡, 得法眼淨. Perhaps this should be understood to indicate that the present discourse had so powerful an effect as to enable them to progress from the level of worldlings through stream-entry all the way up to full awakening.

²⁹¹ AN 7:68 at AN IV 135,5, MĀ 5 at T I 427a3, and EĀ 33.10 at T II 689c1 conclude with sixty monks disrobing and sixty monks becoming arahants, an outcome also reported at the conclusion of EĀ 43.5 at T II 761b11.

²⁹² MN 30 at MN I 198,7. The *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* and several of its Chinese parallels report that the wanderer Subhadda approached the Buddha with a similar inquiry regarding the six well-known contemporary teachers, cf. DN 16 at DN II 150,26, DĀ 2 at T I 25a19, T 6 at T I 187b21, T 7 at T I 203c24, and SĀ 979 at T II 254b2.

tuous conduct, concentration, and knowledge and vision should not be considered the final goal of the spiritual life.

A major difference between the two Pāli versions occurs at this point. Whereas the *Mahāsāropama-sutta* simply speaks of permanent liberation, the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* lists as superior and more sublime than knowledge and vision the following:

- the first *jhāna*,
- the second *jhāna*,
- the third *jhāna*,
- the fourth *jhāna*,
- the attainment of the sphere of infinite space,
- the attainment of the sphere of infinite consciousness,
- the attainment of the sphere of nothingness,
- the attainment of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception,
- the attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings.²⁹³

Except for the reference to the cessation of perceptions and feelings, with its explicit relation to the destruction of the influxes, this passage is puzzling. The four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments belong to the category of “concentration” and thus would have already been covered in the previously mentioned “accomplishment of concentration” (*samādhisampadā*).²⁹⁴ In fact, apart from the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments, it would be difficult to conceive of what else that could be reckoned an “accomplishment of concentration”.

Yet, at an earlier point of its exposition the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* considers this accomplishment of concentration as something to be left behind in order to proceed to knowledge and vision, and therefore as something inferior to knowledge and vision. Judging from other discourses, this is in fact the proper hierarchical position for concentration, which usually leads up to knowledge and vision, but is never superior to it.²⁹⁵ Thus, to speak of the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments as something superior to knowledge and vision is at odds with other discourses and also with the earlier part of the same *Cūlasāropama-sutta*.

The Pāli commentary explains that the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments are listed as superior to knowledge and vision in the present context because they lead up to the cessation of perceptions and feelings.²⁹⁶ This explanation does not solve the problem, as the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* explicitly qualifies each *jhāna* and immaterial attainment individually as “a state superior to and more sublime than knowledge and vision”,²⁹⁷ whereas for the commentarial explanation to hold true this qualifi-

²⁹³ MN 30 at MN I 203,25.

²⁹⁴ MN 30 at MN I 201,24.

²⁹⁵ E.g., in AN 5:24 at AN III 19,22 *samādhi* leads up to *ñānadassana*, which indicates *ñānadassana* to be superior to *samādhi*.

²⁹⁶ Ps II 234,25.

²⁹⁷ MN 30 at MN I 203,28 (referring to the first *jhāna*): *ayam pi ... dhammo ñāṇadassanena uttaritaro ca panītato ca*.

cation should be applied only to the culmination point of the series, the cessation of perceptions and feelings.

Another noteworthy point is that although the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* has the title of being the “lesser” (*cūla*) version of the two Pāli discourses, due to the long exposition on the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments it turns out to be longer than its *mahā* counterpart.²⁹⁸ In general the reasons for distinguishing between a “greater” (*mahā*) and a “lesser” (*cūla*) version of a discourse could be due to the importance of the respective subject. In the present instance, however the two discourses are so similar that to distinguish them into a greater and a lesser version should refer to their respective length.

In sum, the fact that the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments have already been covered in the previously mentioned “accomplishment of concentration”, plus the fact that other discourses do not consider the *jhānas* to be superior to knowledge and vision, and the circumstance that the *Cūlasāropama-sutta* in its present version is longer than its *Mahāsāropama* counterpart, suggest that the passage on the *jhānas* and the immaterial attainments as states superior to knowledge and vision may be a later addition to the discourse.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Cf. also Pande 1957: 122.

²⁹⁹ Norman 1997: 16 comments that “sometimes the small *sutta* is larger than the large *sutta*, and we must assume that further contraction or expansion has taken place since the *suttas* received their names”.

Chapter 4 *Mahāyamaka-vagga*

MN 31 *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta*

The *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta*, the “lesser discourse in the Gosiṅga [Grove]”,¹ reports a visit paid by the Buddha to a group of three monks that live together harmoniously. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and another parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*,² in addition to which another parallel has been preserved in a Gāndhārī fragment.³

The introductory narration of the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and part of the ensuing exchange between the Buddha and the monks Anuruddha, Nandiya, and Kimbila recurs in the *Upakkilesa-sutta* and in the *Mahāvagga* of the Theravāda Vinaya.⁴ The *Upakkilesa-sutta* and the Theravāda Vinaya account differ from the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* in regard to the location, as they take place at the Eastern Bamboo Grove,⁵ while the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* has the Gosiṅga Sāla Grove as its location.⁶ Another difference is that in the *Upakkilesa-sutta* the three monks have not yet reached the goal, while in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* they are already accomplished arahants.

MN I 205

Although this suggests that the events described in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and the *Upakkilesa-sutta* took place on different occasions, the introductory narration shared by these two discourses gives the impression that they might be reporting the same episode. According to this introductory narration, on arriving at the park, where the three monks were staying, the Buddha was stopped by the park keeper, who apparently did not realize that the person in front of him was the teacher of the monks that were dwelling inside the park.⁷ Although one may well imagine that the park keeper did not rec-

¹ Ps II 235,16 explains that the grove was called *Gosiṅga* after a tree with a branch that had the shape of the horns of a cow. According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 378,3 or in Senart 1882a: 295,15, however, a woman by the name of Gośrīṅgī donated a *śālavana* to the Buddha and the community, an account that suggests the grove to have been named after its donor.

² The parallels are MĀ 185 at T I 729b-731a and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a-630a (the relevant section is only part of a longer discourse), both of which agree with MN 31 on the location (EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a15 locates the meeting between the Buddha and the group of monks headed by Anuruddha in the Vajjian country, 跋耆國, which corresponds to the area where the Gosiṅga Grove was found). MĀ 185 has the title “discourse on the Cattle’s Horn Sāla Wood”, 牛角娑羅林經, thereby not using the specification “lesser”, found in the title of MN 31. A section of MĀ 185 has been translated in Minh Chau 1964/1991: 175-176.

³ Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 12, mentioned as a parallel to MN 31 in Salomon 2003: 79 or id. 2006: 140 (I am indebted to Mark Allon and Blair Silverlock for kindly providing me with a preliminary draft transliteration and translation of this fragment).

⁴ MN 128 at MN III 155,13 and Vin I 350,30.

⁵ MN 128 at MN III 155,15: *pācīnavamsadāya*, the same location where according to AN 8:30 at AN IV 235,9 Anuruddha, by dint of diligent practice, eventually became an arahant.

⁶ MN 31 at MN I 205,16: *gosīṅgasālavananadāya*.

⁷ MN 31 at MN I 205,20, MN 128 at MN III 155,15, Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 12r11, MĀ 72 at T I 536b8, MĀ 185 at T I 729c21, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b6. The different versions agree that Anuruddha inter-

ognize the Buddha on meeting him for the first time, it seems more difficult to imagine the same happening again. Thus, the narrative introductions to the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and the *Upakkilesa-sutta* give the impression as if both discourses are reporting the same visit paid by the Buddha to Anuruddha and his companions, even though the subsequent discourses differ from each other.

Further exploring this point, it is noteworthy that the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* begins with the Buddha asking Anuruddha and his companions if they were lacking anything and if they were living together in harmony.⁸ While in the discourses the first of these two questions is a standard way of beginning a conversation when the Buddha visits a monk or a group of monks, the inquiry into their harmonious cohabitation is unusual.

Notably, according to the *Upakkilesa-sutta*, the meeting between the Buddha and the three monks took place right after the Buddha had left the quarrelling monks of Kosambī. The monks of Kosambī had been in hot dispute over a minor matter of discipline to such an extent that they were unwilling to let the Buddha settle their conflict. Their obstinate attitude had made the Buddha leave them and set out wandering on his own. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta*, the Buddha's visit to Anuruddha and his companions took place right after he had left the quarrelling monks at Kosambī.⁹ This would explain the otherwise unusual inquiry about the harmonious living together of the three monks.

That the Kosambī events form the background of the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* also appears to be reflected in the use of certain terms and images. Thus in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* the Buddha inquires after the 'harmonious' living together of Anuruddha and his companions, a term that recurs in a description of a 'harmonious' company given in a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*.¹⁰ The same *Ānguttara-nikāya* discourse, together with a Sanskrit fragment parallel, defines a discordant company with the same terms that the *Upakkilesa-sutta* uses in relation to the monks of Kosambī.¹¹

Another parallelism is that according to some accounts of the Kosambī quarrel the Buddha told the quarrelling monks that they should live together blending like milk and water.¹² The image of blending like milk and water recurs in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to describe the harmonious cohabitation of Anurud-

vened and told the park keeper to let the Buddha enter the park. EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b5 refers to the park as 師子國, perhaps confusing whatever equivalent to *siṅga*, "horn", may have been found in the original text with *sīha*, "lion"; cf. also below note 32.

⁸ MN 31 at MN I 206,12: "are you ... living in harmony and concord, without quarrelling, blending like milk and water, looking on each other with kind eyes", *kacci pana vo ... samaggā sammodamānā avivadamānā khīrodakībhūtā aññamānāñam piyacakkhūhi sampassantā viharathā ti?*

⁹ EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a13 reports how the Buddha decided to leave the quarrelling Kosambī monks, after which he went to visit Anuruddha and his companions.

¹⁰ MN 31 at MN I 206,12 and AN 2:5 at AN I 70,22: *samaggā*.

¹¹ This is the *vaggā parisā* or *vyagrā parṣat*, described in AN 2:5 at AN I 70,18 and in Tripāṭhī 1995: 188, a description corresponding to MN 128 at MN III 153,3.

¹² T 1428 at T XXII 880a24: 如水乳合, T 1421 at T XXII 160a7: 如水乳合, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 626b16: 同一水乳.

dha and his companions.¹³ These parallelisms support the explicit indication given in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse that the visit to Anuruddha and his companions, described in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its parallels, should be placed soon after the Buddha's unsuccessful attempt to settle the Kosambī quarrel.

The visit to the same group of monks described in the *Upakkilesa-sutta* would then have to be placed at an earlier occasion, when these three monks had not yet reached the level of meditative proficiency attributed to them in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta*. On this assumption, perhaps, due to an error in the transmission of the *Cūlagosīṅga-* and *Upakkilesa-suttas*, the Buddha's encounter with the park keeper was doubled and came to be part of the introductory narration to both meetings. As this doubling is found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and in the *Madhyama-āgama*, it would presumably have taken place at some time before the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda reciter traditions separated from each other, but already after what became the *Ekottarika-āgama* reciter tradition had begun to transmit its version of the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* independently.

Be that as it may, the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report that, in reply to the inquiry after their communal harmony, Anuruddha informed the Buddha that they were living together with loving kindness, willing to act in accordance with the wishes of their companions, so that they were as if of one mind.¹⁴

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha next inquired if the three monks were living diligently.¹⁵ In reply, Anuruddha described their daily routine. The *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses have a similar description of the daily routine of the monks as part of their introductory narration (see table 4.1).¹⁶

MN I 207

When examining this difference in sequence, a description of the monks' daily routine seems to be an unexpected reply to a question that is concerned with living diligently (*appamatta*), ardently (*ātāpi*), and resolute (*pahitatta*). When these terms occur together in other Pāli discourses, they usually refer to intensive practice of meditation.¹⁷

¹³ MN 31 at MN I 206,13+15+18 and MN I 207,7: *khīrodakibhūta*, MĀ 185 at T I 730a25+28 and T I 730b3: 合一水乳.

¹⁴ MN 31 at MN I 206,19 and MĀ 185 at T I 730a6. Engelmajer 2003: 42 identifies three main themes in the description given of the monks: "loving kindness towards others, putting others' needs before one's own, and taking responsibility" (for things that need to be done); cf. also Aronson 1980/1986: 32-34.

¹⁵ MN 31 at MN I 207,8: *kacci pana vo ... appamattā ātāpino pahitattā viharathā ti?*

¹⁶ MĀ 185 at T I 729c5 and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a15; a similar daily routine is described in the context of the *pavāraṇā* regulation in Vin I 157,10, for the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya counterpart cf. Heirman 2009: 64-66. In Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 12, however, such a description is not found at all.

¹⁷ The three terms occur frequently when someone requests a short teaching from the Buddha in order to withdraw into solitary seclusion for intensive practice, cf., e.g., MN 145 at MN III 267,9, SN 13:1 at SN II 244,20, SN 22:159 at SN III 187,12, SN 23:23-34 at SN III 198,17, SN 35:76 at SN IV 48,21, SN 35:86 at SN IV 54,21, SN 35:88 at SN IV 60,12, SN 35:161 at SN IV 145,11, AN 7:79 at AN IV 143,19, and AN 8.53 at AN IV 280,15. The same terms form part of the standard description of reaching the destruction of the influxes through such solitary intensive practice, cf., e.g., DN 8 at DN I 177,2, DN 9 at DN I 202,33, DN 16 at DN II 153,3, DN 26 at DN III 76,28, MN 7 at MN I 40,2, MN 27 at MN I 177,15, MN 57 at MN I 392,1, MN 73 at MN I 496,26, MN 75 at MN I 513,3, MN 82 at MN II 61,3, MN 86 at MN II 103,28, MN 89 at MN II 123,14, MN 124 at MN III 127,18, SN 6:3 at SN I 140,22 (or SN² 174 at SN²

In contrast to this usage, the present discourse relates this set of terms to activities like preparing seats, setting out water, or cleaning up after a meal. This usage to some extent introduces a subtle shift of emphasis from meditation practice to aspects of external conduct.

Table 4.1: Progression of Topics in MN 31 and its Parallels

MN 31	Senior Kharosthī fragment 12
Buddha arrives at park (1)	Buddha arrives at park (→ 1)
monks live in harmony (2)	monks live in harmony (→ 2)
monks' daily routine (3)	monks' attainments (→ 4)
monks' attainments (4)	Buddha leaves (→ 5)
Buddha leaves (5)	praise of monks (→ 6)
praise of monks (6)	(≠ 3)

MA 185	EA 24.8
monks' daily routine (→ 3)	monks' daily routine (→ 3)
Buddha arrives at park (→ 1)	monks' attainments (→ 4)
monks live in harmony (→ 2)	Buddha arrives at park (→ 1)
monks' attainments (→ 4)	monks' attainments (→ 4)
Buddha leaves (→ 5)	praise of monks (→ 6)
praise of monks (→ 6)	(≠ 2, 5)

Although the *Madhyama-āgama* account does not relate the monk's daily routine to living diligently, ardently, and resolute, it nevertheless describes how each monk, once he has eaten and cleaned up, will take his sitting mat and retire for meditation, a circumstance not mentioned in the *Majjhima-nikāya* account.¹⁸ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version somewhat similarly reports that the monks would sit in a secluded spot with straight body and mind, set up mindfulness, and contemplate the sublime Dharma.¹⁹

I 307,4), SN 7:1 at SN I 161,20 (or SN² 187 at SN² I 346,17), SN 7:2 at SN I 163,9 (or SN² 188 at SN² I 349,24), SN 7:10 at SN I 171,24 (or SN² 196 at SN² I 368,21), SN 12:17 at SN II 21,28, SN 22:35 at SN III 36,3, SN 22:36 at SN III 37,22, SN 22:63 at SN III 74,22, SN 22:64 at SN III 75,22, SN 22:65 at SN III 76,11, SN 22:66 at SN III 77,1, SN 35:64 at SN IV 38,20, SN 35:89 at SN IV 64,24, SN 35:95 at SN IV 76,13, SN 41:9 at SN IV 302,11, SN 47:3 at SN V 144,3, SN 47:15 at SN V 166,4, SN 47:16 at SN V 166,16, SN 47:46 at SN V 188,1, SN 47:47 at SN V 188,23, AN 3:128 at AN I 282,21, AN 4:254 at AN II 249,9, AN 5:56 at AN III 70,17, AN 5:180 at AN III 217,20, AN 6:55 at AN III 376,4, AN 6:60 at AN III 399,9, AN 8:30 at AN IV 235,11, AN 8:63 at AN IV 301,24, Ud 3:2 at Ud 23,21, Ud 3:3 at Ud 25,24, and Sn 3:7 at Sn p. 111,23 (several of these discourses begin with a request for a short teaching, which I have not included above, in order to avoid duplication). Other passages relate these three terms to gaining one-pointedness of the mind, MN 125 at MN III 128,17; to developing the divine eye, DN 23 at DN II 329,18; to acquiring (meditative) vision of lights, MN 128 at MN III 158,8 and AN 8:64 at AN IV 302,14; and to achieving temporary liberation of the mind, SN 4:23 at SN I 120,22 (or SN² 159 at SN² I 264,17).

¹⁸ MA 185 at T I 729c9: 入室燕坐.

¹⁹ EA 24.8 at T II 629a23: 正身正意, 繫念在前, 思惟妙法.

In relation to the regular meeting of the three monks every five days, the *Madhyama-āgama* version records that they will either converse on the Dharma or else spend this time together in noble silence.²⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* account does not envisage the possibility that they might spend this time in silence and only describes that they pass their time in conversation on the Dharma.²¹

This in itself minor divergence further reinforces the impression that a subtle difference in emphasis between the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its parallels can be discerned, namely:

- the Pāli version presents a description of external conduct as the answer to a question that appears to be concerned with meditation,
- the Pāli version does not mention the actual practice of meditation in its description of the daily life of the three monks,
- the Pāli version does not record that the regular meetings held every five days might be spent in noble silence.

Due to these differences, the presentation in the *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* seems to place more emphasis on external conduct, whereas in the Chinese parallels meditation plays a more central role.²²

In contrast, the description of the daily routine of the three monks in the Chinese versions is permeated by a stronger meditative flavour. This stronger meditative flavour suits the context well, as all versions attribute a range of meditative attainments to these three monks.

The *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its parallels continue with Anuruddha reporting the progress of their meditation practice to the Buddha. According to the Pāli and Chinese versions, the three monks had attained the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments (see table 4.2).²³ The two Chinese versions add to this that they also had developed the four *brahmavihāras*.²⁴ In view of their living together in a spirit of loving kindness (described in detail in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions), this suggestion fits the context well.

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, the three monks had also attained the cessation of perceptions and feelings,²⁵ to which the *Madhyama-*

²⁰ MĀ 185 at T I 729c21: 或共說法, 或聖默然. The account in EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a24 is relatively brief and does not mention the regular meeting of the monks, although it does record that they live together without breaking out into speech.

²¹ MN 31 at MN I 207,24: *pañcāhikam* ... *mayaṁ* ... *sabbarattiyā dhammiyā kathāya sannisidhāma* (B^e-MN I 268,8, C^e-MN I 498,11, and S^e-MN I 389,10: *sabbarattikam*).

²² This reminds of a similar difference in emphasis between MN 6 and its parallel, cf. above p. 47.

²³ Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 12r31-43 covers the first three *jhānas*, but then continues with the first immaterial attainment, without mentioning the fourth *jhāna*. The subsequent description of the immaterial attainments appears to be abbreviated, although the circumstance that the first and the fourth are explicitly mentioned indicates that all four should be understood as implicit in the description.

²⁴ MĀ 185 at T I 730b8 and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629c1.

²⁵ MN 31 at MN I 209,22 and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b25. The same appears to be the case for the Senior Kharoṣṭhī fragment 12r50, although the reference is not fully preserved.

āgama version adds that they had achieved the six supernormal knowledges (*abhiññā*) as well.²⁶

Table 4.2: Attainments of the Monks in MN 31 and its Parallels

MN 31	Senior Kharoṣṭī fragment 12
4 <i>jhānas</i> (1)	3 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 1)
4 immaterial attainments (2)	4 immaterial attainments (→ 2)
cessation (3)	cessation (→ 3)

MĀ 185	EĀ 24.8
4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 1)	4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 1)
4 <i>brahmavihāras</i>	4 immaterial attainments (→ 2)
4 immaterial attainments (→ 2)	cessation (→ 3)
6 supernormal knowledges (≠ 3)	4 <i>brahmavihāras</i>

MN I 210 Once the Buddha had left, according to all versions Nandiya and Kimbila asked Anuruddha how it was that he had declared them to have such lofty attainments even though they had never told him about these. In reply to this inquiry, Anuruddha explained to his companions that he had come to know about their attainments through his telepathic powers. The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, and the Gāndhārī fragment add to this indication that he had also been informed of their attainments by *devas*.²⁷

The *Cūlagosīṅga-sutta* and its parallels report that a *yakkha* approached the Buddha and proclaimed that the Vajjians were very fortunate to have the Buddha and these three monks living among them.²⁸ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, as well as the Gāndhārī fragment, the inhabitants of the different celestial realms of the sensuous sphere up to the Brahmā world repeated this proclamation.²⁹ In

²⁶ MĀ 185 at T I 730b28. The three discourses qualify the attainments in their respective lists as “superhuman states”, MN 31 at MN I 209,19: *uttarimanussadhamma*, MĀ 185 at T I 730c6: 人上之法, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b27: 上人法; on this term cf. also Anālayo 2008n. In relation to this notion it is noteworthy that Vin III 87,24 (cf. also Vin III 92,32) and Vin IV 24,1 include the four *jhānas* and the six supernormal knowledges in a list of such superhuman states, but do not mention the attainment of cessation or the immaterial attainments, even though these attainments would certainly qualify for being reckoned “superhuman states”. In fact, the attainment of cessation does not appear to be mentioned at all in the Theravāda *Vinaya*. In regard to the attainment of cessation, Schmithausen 1981: 249 notes a suggestion made by Nagasaki, according to which “*nirodhasamāpatti* originally was nothing but a (metaphorical) designation for Nirvāṇa in terms of meditative concentration”.

²⁷ MN 31 at MN I 210,9, Senior Kharoṣṭī fragment 12v10, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629c9.

²⁸ This *yakkha* by the name of Dīgha recurs in a listing of eminent *yakkhas* in DN 32 at DN III 205,7. A reference to his exchange with the Buddha, reported in MN 31 and its parallels, can be found in the **Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 225c2, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1405.

²⁹ MN 31 at MN I 210,20, Senior Kharoṣṭī fragment 12v23, and MĀ 185 at T I 731a1.

all versions, the Buddha highlighted the great benefit to be gained by recollecting these three monks.³⁰

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses conclude with the *yakkha*'s delight in the Buddha's words. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the three monks also rejoiced in the Buddha's words.³¹

MN 32 *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*

The *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*, the “greater discourse in the Gosiṅga [Grove]”, records a meeting of eminent disciples during which each of them described praiseworthy qualities reflecting his own outstanding traits. This discourse has three Chinese parallels, two of which are found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, while the third parallel is an individual translation.³² Besides these three parallels, a few lines of a version of the present discourse have also been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment.³³

The *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* and its Chinese parallels report how several eminent monks visited Sāriputta, who welcomed them and asked their opinion about what kind of a monk would be able to enhance the beauty of the moonlit Gosiṅga Grove.

MN I 212

The four versions agree that Mahāmoggallāna, Mahākassapa, Anuruddha, Revata, and Ānanda were present on this occasion.³⁴ In addition to these, the *Madhyama-āga-*

³⁰ While MN 31 at MN I 210,35, Senior Kharosthī fragment 12v17, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629c21 speak only of recollecting the monks, MĀ 185 at T I 731a20 also refers to recollecting their way of practice, 所行者. Another difference worthy of note recurs in relation to the Buddha's praise of the monks, where EĀ 24.8 at T II 630a2 has a reference to the three incalculable aeons of diligent and difficult practice undertaken by the Buddha-to-be in order to reach unsurpassable awakening, 如我於三阿僧祇劫所行勤苦, 成無上道 (adopting the 宋, 元, 明, and 聖 variant 勤 instead of 懈), one of several instances where the *Ekottarika-āgama* seems to have incorporated later elements, for further examples cf. Anālayo 2009A.

³¹ MĀ 185 at T I 731a26. Since according to MĀ 185 at T I 730c14 the Buddha had already left the three monks, by the time of meeting the *yakkha* the Buddha would no longer have been in their company. Although the concluding statement in MĀ 185 could be due to a transmission error, it might also be that it intends to cover the delight experienced earlier by the monks together with the delight experienced subsequently by the *yakkha*. In fact, in the *Madhyama-āgama* such references are not unusual and thus need not be cases of inconsistency, cf. also above p. 193 note 255 and below and p. 545 note 83.

³² The parallels are MĀ 184 at T I 726c-729b, EĀ 37.3 at T II 710c-711c, and T 154.16 at T III 80c-82c, a discourse that according to the information given in the Taishō edition was translated by Dharmarakṣa; cf. also Boucher 1996: 269. MĀ 184 and EĀ 37.3 agree with MN 32 on the location of the discourse. Similar to EĀ 24.8 (parallel to MN 31, cf. above p. 203 note 7), EĀ 37.3 at T II 710c5 gives the location as the “Lion's Park”, 師子國, although later on EĀ 37.3 uses the expression “Cow-lion's Park”, 牛師子園, e.g., at T II 710c15, counterpart to a reference to the *Gosīṅgasālavana* in MN 32 at MN I 216,3. MĀ 184 has the title “discourse on the Cattle's Horn Sāla Wood”, 牛角娑羅林經, thereby not employing the qualification “greater” used in the title of MN 32. MĀ 184 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 21, 73, and 251-257.

³³ SHT V 1346 (pp. 232-233, cf. also SHT VII p. 293) parallels MN 32 at MN I 218-219. Hartmann 1992: 39 notes another as yet unpublished fragment of the Hoernle collection that parallels MN 32. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t cf. below p. 215 note 62.

³⁴ EĀ 37.3 at T II 710c6 omits Anuruddha when listing the disciples present in the Gosiṅga Wood, but

ma version and the individual translation also mention the presence of Mahākaccāna (see table 4.3).³⁵

Table 4.3: Qualities of the Monks in MN 32 and its Parallels

MN 32	MĀ 185
Ānanda (a): learned & teaching (1) Revata (b): meditate in seclusion (2) Anuruddha (c): divine eye (3) Mahākassapa (d): exemplary conduct (4) Mahāmoggallāna (e): Abhidharma talk (5) Sāriputta (f): mental mastery (6)	Ānanda (a): learned & teaching (→ 1) Revata (b): meditate in seclusion (→ 2) Anuruddha (c): divine eye (→ 3) Mahākaccāna (≠): Abhidharma talk (→ 5) Mahākassapa (d): exemplary conduct (→ 4) Mahāmoggallāna (e): supernormal powers Sāriputta (f): mental mastery (→ 6)
EĀ 37.3	T 154.16
Ānanda (a): learned & teaching (1) Revata (b): meditate in seclusion (→ 2) Anuruddha (c): divine eye (→ 3) Mahākassapa (d): exemplary conduct (→ 4) Mahāmoggallāna (e): supernormal powers Sāriputta (f): mental mastery (→ 6) (≠ 5)	Ānanda (a): various qualities & teaching (→ 1) Revata (b): meditate in seclusion (→ 2) Anuruddha (c): divine eye (→ 3) Mahākassapa (d): exemplary conduct (→ 4) Mahāmoggallāna (e): supernormal powers Sāriputta (f): mental mastery (→ 6) (≠ 5)

MN I 213 Each of the monks described qualities that mirror his own personal traits. Thus Ānanda spoke in praise of a learned monk who is able to teach the Dharma, Revata commended a monk who retires into seclusion for intensive meditation, and Anuruddha extolled the ability to exercise the divine eye.

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, Anuruddha illustrated his ability to survey a thousand worlds with the divine eye with the example of surveying a thousand “wheel-rims” from an upper storey.³⁶ In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, he instead describes surveying a thousand “clay bricks” on the ground below.³⁷ Although the idea of a wheel-rim may fit as an illustration of a world system, it is a little difficult to imagine

then at T II 710c8 mentions him in its description of the monks that approached Sāriputta. The fact that EĀ 37.3 reports the presence of six eminent disciples could be why this discourse was included among the sixes of the *Ekottarika-āgama*.

³⁵ MĀ 184 at T I 727a1 and T 154.16 at T III 81a2, which in addition to Mahākaccāna also lists several other eminent disciples not mentioned in MN 32. The Pāli commentary, Ps II 248,9, similarly reports the presence of other eminent disciples, without, however, giving their names.

³⁶ MN 32 at MN I 213,29: *nemimāṇḍala*, adopting the translation by Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 308, in accordance with the commentarial gloss at Ps II 254,24. Chalmers 1926: 154 translates *nemimāṇḍala* as “concentric distances girdling him round”, and Horner 1954/1967: 265 as “concentric circles”.

³⁷ MĀ 184 at T I 727b14: 於下露地有千土墼; cf. also MĀ 80 at T I 554a12: 觀下露地, 見千土墩 (adopting the 宋, 元, and 明 variant 墩 instead of 塹). An illustration of Anuruddha’s ability to survey a thousand worlds in another discourse, SĀ 537 at T II 140a2, speaks of seeing “many things”, 種種之物, on the ground below.

why someone should spread a thousand wheel-rims on the ground. In contrast, the production of clay bricks requires them to be laid out on the ground for drying in the air, so that to see a thousand clay bricks spread out on the ground could easily have happened in ancient India.³⁸

The other *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the individual translation also differ in regard to the simile used to illustrate the ability to survey a thousand worlds. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version compares this ability to looking at the sky, while the individual translation speaks of looking down from a high building and seeing people come and go.³⁹ The image used in the individual translation thereby closely resembles the standard illustration for the exercise of the divine eye in the Pāli discourses, which speaks of standing on a high building and seeing people below who walk on the road and enter or leave a house.⁴⁰ However, since the present context emphasizes the spatial extent of Anuruddha's exceptional ability,⁴¹ the similes found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions seem more adequate to the occasion, as they compare Anuruddha's ability to survey a thousand worlds with the divine eye to the ability to survey a thousand objects.

The *Mahāgosīnga-sutta* next turns to Mahākassapa. According to all versions, he extolled a monk who has certain exemplary qualities and also encourages others to develop these qualities. The Pāli and Chinese versions differ to some extent on the qualities mentioned by Mahākassapa (see table 4.4).

According to all versions, Mahākassapa spoke in praise of contentment and of achieving concentration, wisdom, and liberation. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the individual translation agree with the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation that Mahākassapa mentioned the wearing of rag robes as well as being endowed with virtue and with knowledge and vision of liberation.⁴² The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation agree with the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse that Mahākassapa also mentioned being energetic and having few wishes.⁴³

³⁸ According to Härtel 1995: 142, during this period “burnt bricks were not yet in regular use for buildings in India”, although their use is attested for the Mauryan period, cf. Verardi 2007: 115.

³⁹ EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a3: 觀空中 and T 154.16 at T III 81b9: 從上視下, 悉見所有人民行來, 出入, 進退. According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 108,23 or in Senart 1897: 177,6, already before going forth Anuruddha had been endowed with superior sight. On one occasion, when he was enjoying himself in female company, he immediately noticed that, instead of the usual thousand lamps, only nine-hundred-ninety-nine lamps had been lit.

⁴⁰ E.g., in DN 2 at DN I 83,4.

⁴¹ According to AN 1:14 at AN I 23,20 and EĀ 4.2 at T II 557b9, Anuruddha was outstanding among the Buddha's disciples in regard to this quality; cf. also T 1509 at T XXV 247b23, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1630.

⁴² MN 32 at MN I 214,4+10+15, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a9+11+12, and T 154.16 at T III 81b17+21+22.

⁴³ MN 32 at MN I 214,6+9, MĀ 184 at T I 727c3+5, and T 154.16 at T III 81b18+19. Just as in the case of the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to MN 24 (cf. above p. 162), MĀ 184 at T I 726b21 includes right mindfulness in its list, a quality not mentioned in MN 32 or in EĀ 37.3. T 154.16 at T III 81b20 lists 定意. Although according to Brough 1977: 90 Dharmarakṣa elsewhere uses the character 意 to render “mind-

Table 4.4: Mahākassapa's Qualities in MN 32 and its Parallels

MN 32	MĀ 185
forest dwelling (1)	forest dwelling (→ 1)
alms food (2)	few wishes (→ 5)
rag robes (3)	contented (→ 6)
3 robes (4)	secluded (→ 7)
few wishes (5)	energetic (→ 9)
contented (6)	right mindfulness & clear comprehension
secluded (7)	concentration (→ 11)
not socializing (8)	wisdom (→ 12)
energetic (9)	influxes destroyed (→ 13)
virtue (10)	inspires others
concentration (11)	
wisdom (12)	
liberation (13)	
knowledge & vision of liberation (14)	(≠ 2-4, 8, 10, 14)

EĀ 37.3	T 154.16
forest dwelling (→ 1)	secluded (→ 7)
rag robes (→ 3)	wise ⁴⁴
contented & secluded (→ 6, 7)	rag robes (→ 3)
virtue (→ 10)	contented (→ 6)
concentration (→ 11)	few wishes (→ 5)
wisdom (→ 12)	peaceful
liberation (→ 13)	energetic (→ 9)
knowledge & vision of liberation (→ 14)	controlled mind
teaches others	concentration (→ 11)
	devoted to development
	virtue (→ 10)
	concentration (→ 11)
	wisdom (→ 12)
	liberation (→ 13)
(≠ 2, 4-5, 8-9)	knowledge & vision of liberation (→ 14)
	teaches others
	(≠ 1-2, 4, 8)

In regard to Mahākassapa, it is noteworthy that according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version Sāriputta addressed Mahākassapa with “venerable sir”, and Mahākassapa replied with “friend”.⁴⁵ This would be an anachronism, since according to a passage in the *Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta* and its Chinese and Sanskrit counterparts these ways of addressing

fulness”, in the present context the expression 定意 seems to stand just for “concentration”, cf. also Karashima 1998: 103.

⁴⁴ T 154.16 at T III 81b17: 賢聖; cf. also Karashima 1998: 487 on the use of this expression by Dharmarakṣa in the sense of “sagacious and saintly”.

⁴⁵ In MĀ 184 at T I 727c1 Sāriputta addressed Mahākassapa with 尊者, “venerable sir”, corresponding to *bhante*, to which Mahākassapa replied with 賢者, “friend”, corresponding to *āvuso*.

each other in accordance with seniority were instituted by the Buddha immediately before his passing away, at a time when Sāriputta was presumably no longer alive.⁴⁶ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*, all of the other monks addressed Sāriputta with “venerable sir”, to which he replied by using the address “friend”, so that the *Madhyama-āgama* account presents Mahākassapa as the most senior of all eminent disciples.

Yet, it appears as if Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna would have ordained earlier than Mahākassapa.⁴⁷ That is, had this mode of address already been in use before the Buddha’s injunction, it should be the reverse of what is found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. The role of being the eldest monk would only seem to suit Mahākassapa at the time of the so-called first council, when several of the monks mentioned in the present discourse had apparently passed away and Mahākassapa could indeed have become the most senior monk.⁴⁸ Thus, the use of this mode of address in the *Madhyama-āgama* version appears to be the outcome of a later change of wording.⁴⁹

The *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* next reports that Mahāmoggallāna spoke in praise of the MN I 214 ability of two monks to reply to each other on questions related to the Dharma, literally “talk about Abhidharma”, without faltering.⁵⁰ Judging from the way other discourses

⁴⁶ DN 16 at DN II 154,8, EĀ 42.3 at T II 752c17, and fragment 501V3 in Waldschmidt 1950: 75.

⁴⁷ Cf., e.g., T 1425 at T XXII 412c26.

⁴⁸ Vin II 286,17 reports that Mahākassapa addressed the assembled monks as *āvuso saṅgho* and was addressed by them as *bhante*.

⁴⁹ According to Minh Chau 1964/1991: 21, the present passage in MĀ 184 reflects the attitude of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, which “accepts Mahākassapa as the foremost and highest patriarch ... while the Theravāda tradition ... considers Sāriputta as the foremost and highest Ācariya”.

⁵⁰ MN 32 at MN I 214,24 speaks of *abhidhammakathā*. The corresponding statement (although attributed to a different disciple) in MĀ 184 at T I 727b24 similarly refers to “Abhidharma”, 阿毘曇. Anderson 1999/2001: 157 suggests that *abhidhammakathā* stands for “a question-and-answer exchange, a form of debate among equals which has the capacity to clarify one’s understanding and teaching of *dhamma*”. Bodhi in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 1226 note 362 points out that even “though the word cannot refer here to the Piṭaka of that name – obviously the product of a phase of Buddhist thought later than the Nikāyas – it may well indicate a systematic and analytical approach to the doctrine that served as the original nucleus of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka”. Muck 1980: 19 understands *abhidhamma* as representing the “essence of the teaching”, in the sense of “basic essential truths”. Von Hinüber 1996/1997: 64 explains that “the word *abhidhamma* occurs in earlier parts of the canon, but without any technical connotation, simply meaning ‘things relating to the teaching’”; cf. also Geiger 1920: 118, Gethin 2005: 10020, Horner 1941, Sujāto 2009: 228-230, van Zeyst 1959, and Watanabe 1983/1996: 18-36. Hirakawa 1980: 173 (cf. also Sung 1999: 174) notes that in the Mahāsāṅghika tradition the entire “nine-fold canon of the word of the Buddha ... is referred to as *abhidharma*”, cf. Roth 1970: 248,17: *abhidharmo nāma nava-vidhah sūtrāntah* and T 1425 at T XXII 536b21: 阿毘曇者九部修多羅, with T 1425 at T XXII 281c18 explaining that the expression “nine types of discourse” stands for the nine *āṅgas*. Watanabe 1983/1996: 27 draws attention to the qualification “profound” or “deep”, 莖深, used in MĀ 184 at T I 727b24 to qualify 阿毘曇, a qualification which he takes to indicate that the present context intends “talk on *dhammas* (they may be specific doctrines) in the form of question and answers”, in order to reveal “the intrinsic value or the profound theory” of these dharmas. As 29,1 takes up the reference to *abhidhammakathā* in MN 32 as an argument in support of the authenticity of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* as original Buddha-word.

portray Mahāmoggallāna, this type of ability would not be one of his typical traits. According to the list of eminent disciples found in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and in its parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, Mahāmoggallāna was rather outstanding for his exercise of supernormal powers.⁵¹ This ability appears to have been considered such a characteristic trait of this great disciple that the *Catusparisat-sūtra* and the *Mahāvastu* report that the Buddha already predicted this disciple's pre-eminence in supernormal powers at the time of their first meeting, when Mahāmoggallāna approached the Buddha to request the going forth.⁵² Hence it comes as no surprise that in the three Chinese parallels and in the Sanskrit fragment parallel Mahāmoggallāna extols such supernormal powers instead, describing the ability to magically multiply oneself, to fly through the air, to pass through solid earth, etc. (see above table 4.3).⁵³

That to associate Mahāmoggallāna with such supernormal powers would be a more fitting version of his pronouncement on this occasion can also be seen in a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which similarly takes the characteristic qualities of several eminent disciples as its theme. This discourse agrees with the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* on associating Ānanda with extensive learning, Anuruddha with the exercise of the divine eye, and Kassapa with the ascetic practices.⁵⁴ Unlike the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*, however, this *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse associates Mahāmoggallāna with the exercise of supernormal powers, thereby agreeing in this respect with the Chinese and Sanskrit parallels to the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta*.

Regarding the statement in the *Mahāgosīṅga-sutta* that extols the ability to answer questions about deeper aspects of the Dharma without faltering, the *Madhyama-āgama* version attributes a similar statement to Mahākaccāna (see above table 4.3).⁵⁵ Accord-

⁵¹ AN 1:14 at AN I 23,17: *iddhimanta*, EĀ 4.2 at T II 557b6: 神足; cf. also the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 395,9 or Vaidya 1999: 252,28, according to which he was *rddhimatām agro nirdiṣṭo bhagavatā*. Horner 1941: 309 comments: "Moggallāna is chiefly famed for his psychic powers, and there is little reason to suppose him to have had gifts of an *abhidhamma* nature or we should have heard more about them"; cf. also Gifford 2003 on the importance of psychic powers for the role Mahāmoggallāna assumes in the Theravāda tradition. Abhidharmic abilities are, however, associated with him in the Sarvāstivāda tradition. As already noted by Hirakawa 1993/1998: 132, the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* attributes one of the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* treatises, the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, to Mahāmoggallāna, cf. Wogihara 1971b: 11,28.

⁵² Fragment S 360 (32)R6 in Waldschmidt 1952: 24 and Basak 1968/2004: 38,17 or Senart 1897: 63,18.

⁵³ MĀ 184 at T I 727c16, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a18, T 154.16 at T III 81b29, and SHT V 1346 V2-6. Extracts from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 9 and id. 2007i: 27.

⁵⁴ SN 14:15 at SN II 155,9, after depicting how each of the eminent disciples practises walking meditation surrounded by a group of disciples, explains that those of similar inclination tend to associate with each other. SN 14:15 at SN II 156,18 then describes that the monks associating with Ānanda were all of much learning, while the monks that associated with Anuruddha were, according to SN II 156,6, endowed with the divine eye, those who associated with Mahākassapa were, according to SN II 156,2, practitioners of the ascetic practices, and the monks who were associating with Mahāmoggallāna were, according to SN 14:15 at SN II 155,31, all of great [supernormal] power, *mahiddhika*.

⁵⁵ MĀ 184 at T I 727b24. T 154.16 does not record Mahākaccāna being questioned by Sāriputta. Once, however, all disciples gather in the presence of the Buddha, T 154.16 at T III 82a12 associates Mahākaccāna

ing to the list of eminent disciples found in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*, Mahākaccāna was outstanding for his skill in explaining short sayings in detail, while the listing of outstanding disciples in the *Ekottarika-āgama* extols his ability in analysis and teaching.⁵⁶

The most frequent role assumed by Mahākaccāna in the Pāli discourses is as an elucidator of brief sayings, a role in which he figures more as a teacher than as a participant in a discussion. However, at least in one instance Mahākaccāna does feature as a participant in a discussion with other monks.⁵⁷ To speak in praise of two monks engaged in a talk on the Dharma would also fit Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, who according to the *Ānguttara-nikāya*'s list of eminent disciples was outstanding as one who delivers talks on the Dharma,⁵⁸ or else Mahākoṭṭhita, who was apparently a frequent participant in Dharma discussions with other monks.

Although to reply to questions about the Dharma would fit Mahākoṭṭhita even better than Mahākaccāna, the same statement does fit both of them much better than Mahāmoggallāna. Perhaps, during the process of transmission of the Pāli discourse, the presence of Mahākaccāna was lost, as a consequence of which what was originally his reply ended up in the mouth of Mahāmoggallāna.⁵⁹

According to all versions, Mahāmoggallāna in turn questioned Sāriputta, who spoke in praise of a monk who has mastery over his own mind, being able to attain whatever he wishes at any time of the day, comparable to the ability to choose any garment from a full wardrobe.⁶⁰

The monks then approached the Buddha, who approved each monk's declaration, followed by offering his own description of a monk able to enhance the beauty of the moonlit Gosiṅga Wood. This was a monk who sits down cross-legged with the determination not to change posture until the destruction of the influxes has been attained.⁶¹ Other discourses indicate that this type of strong determination had been a characteristic trait of the Buddha.⁶²

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and several other disciples (such as Upāli, Subhūti, Rāhula, etc.) with short statements, which in the case of Mahākaccāna is concerned with his vision of the four truths, 四諦 (notably not using the qualification “noble”, cf. also below p. 803).

⁵⁶ AN 1:14 at AN I 23,25: *sankhitena bhāsitassa vitthārena athā vibhajantānam*, EĀ 4.2 at T II 557b14: 善分別義, 敷演道教, translated by Huyen-Vi 1986: 133 as: “capable d'analyser de façon très subtile le sens profond du Dharma et de l'expliquer par la suite”.

⁵⁷ AN 6:28 at AN III 321,20.

⁵⁸ AN 1:14 at AN I 23,24: *dhammakathikānam* (cf. also SN 14:15 at SN II 156,10), an expression that brings to mind the *abhidhammakathā* mentioned in MN 32 at MN I 214,24.

⁵⁹ Cf. also Anesaki 1901: 899, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 76, and Prasad 1998: 417.

⁶⁰ MN 32 at MN I 214,36, MĀ 184 at T I 727c29, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a28, and T 154.16 at T III 81c14. The description of mastery over the mind (*cittan̄ vasam vatteti, no ca cittassa vasena vattati*) receives a more detailed explanation in AN 7:38 at AN IV 34,1; a reference to such mastery of the mind can also be found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in Bendall 1902/1970: 122,1.

⁶¹ MN 32 at MN I 219,31, MĀ 184 at T I 729b21, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711c20, and T 154.16 at T III 82b8, which at T III 82b7 specifies that the practice undertaken at this point is to contemplate the whole world as impermanent, 觀於世一切無常.

⁶² MĀ 204 at T I 777a12 (for a translation cf. Bareau 1963: 72), reports that on the eve of his awakening

A minor difference in relation to this passage is that while according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse and the individual translation the Buddha spoke only of the determination to attain the destruction of the influxes, according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account he included the successful carrying through of this determination in his description of what qualifies a monk for being able to enhance the beauty of the moonlit Gosiṅga Wood.⁶³ Due to this minor difference, the Buddha's reply not only describes one of his outstanding personal qualities, but also highlights the supremacy of the destruction of the influxes over all other achievements, thereby rounding off the different achievements extolled by his disciples.

MN 33 *Mahāgopālaka-sutta*

The *Mahāgopālaka-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the cowherd”, compares qualities needed by a cowherd to the qualities required for progress in the Dharma. This discourse has four parallels: one of these is a Pāli parallel among the elevens of the *Ānguttara-nikāya*,⁶⁴ while the other three are Chinese parallels, found in the *Saṃyukta-āgama*, among the elevens of the *Ekottarika-āgama*, and in the form of an individual translation.⁶⁵ Besides these full parallels, a few sections of a version of the present discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁶⁶ Moreover, a passage similar to the

the Buddha formed the same determination; cf. also MĀ 157 at T I 679c11 and T 212 at T IV 644c14. The Buddha's unwavering commitment to keep striving, even if his body should dry up, is also recorded in AN 2:1:5 at AN I 50,9, in Sn 3:2 at Sn 434, in the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 262,3 or Vaidya 1958b: 192,1, in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 332,13 or in Senart 1890: 239,3, in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 113,23, and in Bu ston's “History of Buddhism” in Obermiller 1932/1986: 35. A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 2:44 in Pradhan 1967: 71,12 parallels the description of the determination to remain seated until the influxes are destroyed (not necessarily specific to the present instance) found in MN 32 at MN I 219,31, with counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 25b12, T 1559 at T XXIX 183c15, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 68b1 or Q (5595) *tu* 76b3.

⁶³ EĀ 37.3 at T II 711c21. MĀ 184 at T I 729b22 could be indicating the same, since after referring to the monk's determination not to change posture, it reports that the monk did indeed not change posture (cf. the similar pattern in the *Mahāvadāna-sūtra* fragment S 360 folio 137R4-5 in Fukita 2003: 18 or in Waldschmidt 1953: 27, which also first records the bodhisattva Vipassī's determination to refrain from changing posture, followed by reporting that he did indeed not change posture, thereby implicitly indicating that he stood up from this sitting as a fully awakened Buddha).

⁶⁴ The Pāli parallel is AN 11:18 at AN V 347-353, entitled “the cowherd”, *gopāla*, according to B^e-AN III 546,19 and C^e-AN VI 674,31, as well as according to the summary verses (*uddāna*) in E^c-AN V 358,31 and S^e-AN V 390,19.

⁶⁵ SĀ 1249 at T II 342c-343b, EĀ 49.1 at T II 794a-795a, and T 123 at T II 546a-547b. A translation of SĀ 1249 can be found in Anālayo 2010d. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 123 was translated by Kumārajīva. Akanuma 1929/1990: 111 suggests “cowherd”, 牧牛者, as a tentative title for SĀ 1249. T 123 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on the cowherd”, 佛說放牛經. The three Chinese versions agree with the *Mahāgopālaka-sutta* on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove near Sāvatthī; AN 11:18 does not specify a location.

⁶⁶ These are the so far unpublished fragments no. 2380/50b, 2380/51a, and 2380/51b of the Schøyen collection, identified by Klaus Wille, cf. also Chung 2008: 205 (I am indebted to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for

exposition in the *Mahāgopālaka-sutta* can also be found in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*.⁶⁷

The *Mahāgopālaka-sutta* and its parallels enumerate eleven qualities of a cowherd MN I 220 and then apply these eleven qualities to a monk, first presenting the whole set from the perspective of detrimental qualities and then from the complementary perspective of the corresponding beneficial counterparts (see table 4.5).⁶⁸

The Pāli and Chinese versions agree that the first five of these qualities stand for:

- knowing that the material body is made up of the four elements,
- knowing the difference between foolishness and wisdom,
- overcoming unwholesome thoughts,
- practising sense-restraint,
- teaching or explaining the Dharma.⁶⁹

Another quality in the Pāli versions is the need to approach learned monks. A difference in this case is that while in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ānguttara-nikāya* versions the learned monks to be approached are well versed in the discourses, the *Vinaya* and the “summaries” (*mātikā*),⁷⁰ the *Samyukta-āgama* version speaks of being knowledgeable oneself, and that in regard to the discourses, the *Vinaya*, and the *Abhidharma*.⁷¹ This is not an isolated instance, as Chinese Āgama discourses tend to speak of Abhidharma on instances where Pāli discourses refer to “summaries” (*mātikā*).⁷²

MN I 223

kindly providing me with a preliminary draft transliteration of these fragments). The fragments parallel the exposition of the bad qualities of a monk found at MN I 220-222.

⁶⁷ T 1509 at T XXV 74a-b, translated in Lamotte 1944/1981: 149-152. The setting of this version differs from the Pāli and Chinese discourses, as it depicts cowherds approaching the Buddha for advice on how to properly carry out their work. While Lamotte reconstructs 大智度論 as *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, Demiéville 1950/1973: 470 note 1 points out that *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-śāstra* might be more appropriate, hence I refer to the work as **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*.

⁶⁸ The image of a cowherd is of course a familiar one in Indian thought, on its relation to the Kṛṣṇa legend cf., e.g., Vaudeville 1975. For another listing of eleven qualities of a cowherd cf. T 201.61 at T IV 317b21 and Lévi 1908: 140-144.

⁶⁹ Fragment no. 2380/50bc of the Schøyen collection differs from the other versions in as much as it lists evil friendship as one of the bad qualities of a monk: *bhikṣuh pāpamitro bhavati pāpasahāyo*. Fragment no. 2380/51ac-d of the Schøyen collection does, however, agree with the other versions on the overall count of eleven qualities.

⁷⁰ MN 33 at MN I 221,22 and AN 11:18 at AN V 349,16. T 1509 at T XXV 74a28 only refers to these elder monks as “expounders of the Dharma”, 說法者.

⁷¹ SĀ 1249 at T II 343a11: 阿毘曇. EĀ 37.3 at T II 794b14 instead lists the twelve *āṅgas*. Notably, the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra* has a version of this quality that is close to the presentation in the Pāli discourses, T 1509 at T XXV 74a28: “[he] is able to approach learned monks to inquire about the Dharma”, 能至多聞比丘所問法.

⁷² Other occurrences of the term *mātikā* can be found in DN 16 at DN II 125,7, AN 3:20 at AN I 117,29, AN 4:160 at AN II 147,29, AN 4:180 at AN II 169,18, AN 5:156 at AN III 179,2, AN 6:51 at AN III 361,24, AN 10:11 at AN V 16,1, and AN 11:18 at AN V 349,16. In regard to these occurrences, if there are Chinese parallels at all, these do not mention the term *mātikā*. This finding may at first sight seem to corroborate the remark made by Anesaki 1901: 898 that “we find no mention of this term in the Chinese Āgamas”. This does, however, not appear to be entirely the case, as the parallels to MN 104, MĀ 196 at

Table 4.5: Qualities of a Monk in MN 33 and its Parallels

MN 33 & AN 11:18	SĀ 1249
knows 4 elements (1) knows actions of fool and wise (2) removes unwholesome states (3) restrains senses (4) teaches Dharma to others (5) questions others (6) is inspired by the Dharma (7) knows eightfold path (8) knows 4 <i>satipatṭhānas</i> (9) is moderate with requisites (10) practises <i>mettā</i> towards elders (11)	knows 4 elements (→ 1) knows actions of fool and wise (→ 2) removes unwholesome states (→ 3) restrains senses (→ 4) explains Dharma to others (→ 5) knows eightfold path (→ 8) is inspired by the Dharma (→ 7) questions others (→ 6) knows 4 <i>satipatṭhānas</i> (→ 9) is moderate with requisites (→ 10) is respectful towards elders (→ 11)
EĀ 49.1 ⁷³	T 123
knows 4 elements (→ 1) knows actions of fool and wise (→ 2) removes unwholesome states (→ 3) restrains senses (→ 4) teaches Dharma to others (→ 5) knows eightfold path (→ 8) is inspired by the Dharma (→ 7) knows 12 <i>aigas</i> knows 4 <i>satipatṭhānas</i> (→ 9) is moderate with requisites (10) is respectful towards elders (→ 11) (≠ 6)	knows 4 elements (→ 1) knows conditions of fool and wise (→ 2) removes unwholesome states (→ 3) restrains senses (→ 4) teaches Dharma (→ 5) practises eightfold path (→ 8) is inspired by the Dharma (→ 7) knows 4 noble truths knows 4 <i>satipatṭhānas</i> (→ 9) is moderate with requisites (10) is respectful towards elders (→ 11) (≠ 6)

This difference in terminology need not imply a major difference in meaning, since the development of the Abhidharma might be related to such “summaries”, in the sense

T I 755a17 and T 85 at T I 906a18, do refer to the *mātikās* as 母者 and 摩怛里迦, although in this case *mātikās* are not mentioned in the Pali version. It would be easily understandable if Anesaki should have overlooked this instance, since on coming across the expression 母者, literally “mother”, one would hardly expect it to render whatever equivalent to *mātika* was found in the original text; cf. also Bapat 1968: 364. Apart from the *Āgamas*, the *mātikās* or *mātrikās* occur regularly in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, cf. Dutt 1984b: 173,8, id. 1984c: 122,4, id. 1984d: 97,13, Gnoli 1978b: 3,19, 44,16, and 71,6, translated in Schopen 2000: 101 as “summary”, T 1451 at T XXIV 408b6: 摩室里迦, and its Tibetan counterpart *ma lta bu* in Waldschmidt 1951: 243,5, as is also the case for the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 18,15 and 333,7 or Vaidya 1999: 11,17 and 206,10 (notably, a reference to the eight *mātrkāpadāni* in the *Kathinavastu* in Chang 1957: 58,8 has as its Chinese counterpart in T 1449 at T XXIV 98c11 just 相, while the Tibetan translation reads *ma mo'i gzhi*; cf. Chang 1957: 114,21). Hirakawa 1993/1998: 142 explains that “the term ‘*mātrka*’ is still preserved in the treatises of the Theravāda *Abhidhammapitaka*, but it has been expunged from the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharmapitaka* and the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, and [has been] replaced with the term ‘*abhidharma*’”.

⁷³ In the case of EĀ 49.1, the sequence of enumerating the negative qualities differs from the present listing of positive qualities.

of collections of key terminology for the purpose of memorizing and deepening one's understanding of the Dharma.⁷⁴ The nucleus of such summaries could have been the mental qualities and practices that were later on known under the heading of the “thirty-seven requisites to awakening” (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*), to which other categories were added over the course of time.⁷⁵ According to the Pāli commentaries, however, the expression *mātikā* stands for two *mātikās*, namely the code of rules for monks and nuns, the two *pātimokkhas*.⁷⁶ In a way, the *pātimokkha* is a “summary” of proper monastic conduct, just as the requisites to awakening are a “summary” of the path of meditative practice, hence these two senses of *mātikā* seem not to be too different from each other.

Be that as it may, the Pāli and Chinese versions also highlight the importance of the MN I 224 following qualities:

- feeling inspired when the Buddha teaches the Dharma,⁷⁷

⁷⁴ On the relation of the *mātikās* to the Abhidharma cf., e.g., Anacker 1975: 59-60, Bronkhorst 1985, Buswell 1996: 84-89, Cox 1995: 8, Frauwallner 1971b: 116-117, Gethin 1992b: 158-162, Gómez 1987/2005: 1270, Hofinger 1946: 230, Horner 1941: 292, Hirakawa 1993/1998: 140-142, Jaini 1977: 45, Migot 1952: 524-530, Muck 1980: 15-16, Norman 1997: 51, Przyluski 1926: 334-335, Ronkin 2005: 27-30, Warder 1961a, Watanabe 1983/1996: 42-45, and Yīnshùn 1971/1983: 252.

⁷⁵ This seems to be suggested by MN 103 at MN II 238,26, which lists the thirty-seven *bodhipakkhiyā dharmas* and then at MN II 239,4 continues to speak, in apparent reference to this list, of ‘abhidharma’. Cf. also the definition of *mātika* found in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in T 1451 at T XXIV 408b6, which begins with the set of thirty-seven dharmas and then lists such items as, e.g., the four types of fearlessness, the four fruits of recluse-ship, the three *saṃādhis*, tranquillity and insight, etc.; cf. also Cox 2004a: 2, who explains that “the need to memorize the teaching obviously promoted the use of categorizing lists as a mnemonic device”.

⁷⁶ This is the gloss given at Mp II 189,23 on the expression *mātikādharā* in AN 3:20 at AN I 117,29 as *dve mātikādharā*, the implication of which become clear in Mp III 382,11 (which comments on another occurrence of the same expression in AN 6:51 at AN III 361,24): *mātikādharā ti dve pātimokkhadharā*; cf. also B^e-Sp-ṭ III 39: *dve mātikā ti bhikkhumātikā bhikkhunīmātikā ca* and B^e-Kkh-ṭ 126: *ubhayāni pātimokkhāni, dve mātikā ti attho*. According to von Hinüber 1994c: 115-117, the term *mātikā* may have originally referred to the *pātimokkha* and the *Vinaya* methodology implicit in this term, in the sense of listings of terms or sentences, and would then have been applied to the nascent Abhidharma literature (ibid. pp. 120-121); cf. also Hu-von Hinüber 1994: 230-231. On the *Vinaya mātrikās* (using the term in a more general sense) cf. also Sung 1999, on their importance for understanding the structural development of the different *Vinayas* cf. Clarke 2004.

⁷⁷ A minor difference in terminology is that while MN 33 at MN I 221,29 speaks of the *dhamma-vinaya*, the Chinese parallels mention only the Dharma, cf. SĀ 1249 at T II 343a8, which speaks of the “Dharma known to the Tathāgata”, 如來所知法; EĀ 49.1 at T II 794c26, which refers to the “Dharma treasure proclaimed by the Tathāgata”, 如來所說法寶; T 123 at T II 547a11, which mentions the “proclamation of the Dharma treasure”, 說法寶; and T 1509 at T XXV 74a26, which has the “proclamation of the Buddha-Dharma”, 說佛法. In other Pāli discourses, the compound *dhamma-vinaya* often stands for a system of teaching in its entirety and is used as such in relation to other teachers, such as the *dhammadvinaya* of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta in MN 26 at MN I 163,35 and MN I 165,18, or the *dhammadvinaya* of each of the six heretical teachers in MN 77 at MN II 3,24; cf. also Geiger 1920: 56. Carter 1978: 69 suggests that “in the early period ... this compound was probably a *tappurisa* in locative relation, meaning ‘training in *dhamma*’ and ... later, as the training became more thoroughly formulated, the compound

- understanding the noble eightfold path,
- being skilled in the four *satipatthānas*,
- being moderate when accepting requisites.

The quality mentioned last in all versions is to accord proper respect to elder monks of long standing. While the Chinese versions only mention the need for respectful behaviour in regard to these elders,⁷⁸ the Pāli versions highlight the importance of developing loving kindness by way of body, speech, and mind towards them.⁷⁹

This emphasis on the need to develop *mettā* in the Pāli versions and the absence of such a treatment in the Chinese versions is noteworthy.⁸⁰ At an earlier point the two Pāli versions, in agreement with their Chinese parallels, also reckoned teaching the Dharma to others as an important aspect of a monk's progress.⁸¹

Such concern for others is not an exceptional case, since a passage in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* shows a similar attitude. This passage contrasts those who are only concerned with their own welfare with those who are concerned with their own welfare and the welfare of others. According to this discourse, those who are only concerned with their own welfare are “blameworthy” on that account, whereas those who are concerned with their own and others' welfare are “praiseworthy” by comparison.⁸²

In line with this stipulation on being intent on one's own and others' welfare, the *Mahāgopālaka-sutta* and its *Ānguttara-nikāya* parallel make it clear that concern for others, represented by the quality of loving kindness towards elders and by the willingness to teach the Dharma, should not be neglected. At the same time, by presenting

might have lent itself to being interpreted as *dhamma* and discipline”; on the compound *dhamma-vinaya* cf. also Bechert 1997: 61.

⁷⁸ SĀ 1249 at T II 343a21, EĀ 49.1 at T II 794b21, T 123 at T II 546c3, and T 1509 at T XXV 74b13.

⁷⁹ MN 33 at MN I 222,9 and AN 11:18 at AN V 350,13.

⁸⁰ MN 33 and AN 11:18 are thus instances where Pāli discourses lay more stress on the practice of the *brahmavihāras* than their Chinese parallels, in contrast to the opposite tendency noticed in relation to MN 25, cf. above p. 169.

⁸¹ According to MN 33 at MN I 222,17, a monk who does not develop these eleven qualities, one of which is to teach others, will be “unable to come to growth, increase, and fulfilment in this Dharma and discipline”, *abhabbo imasmiṃ dhammadvinaye vuddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vepullanī āpajjituṇ* (S^e-MN I 413,17: *vud-*
dhīṇ), cf. also AN 11:8 at AN V 350,22. SĀ 1249 at T II 342c19 indicates that such a monk will “not be able to pacify himself, nor [be able] to pacify others”, 不能自安, 亦不安他; according to EĀ 49.1 at T II 794b24 he will be “unable to get much benefit in this Dharma”, 不能於此法中多所饒益; and according to T 123 at T II 546a27 such a monk will not only be unable to grow in the Dharma, but will even “fall into the three evil paths after death”, 死墮三惡道. T 1509 examines only the positive case of a monk who is endowed with all eleven qualities and therefore does not describe the result of being without them.

⁸² AN 7:64 at AN IV 116,22+23, using the terms *gārayha* and *pāsaṇsa*. It is noteworthy that the Chinese parallels to this discourse treat the case of one who acts only for his or her own benefit with much softer criticism, as MĀ 1 at T I 422a6 and T 27 at T I 810b22 merely indicate that those who also benefit others are superior and more excellent than those who are only concerned with their own benefit (a third parallel, EĀ 39.1 at T II 728b-729b, does not cover this case at all). A study of the different versions of this discourse can be found in Schmithausen 2004.

these qualities within a context of other qualities aimed at one's own meditative development, such concern for others is put within proper perspective, suggesting that it should not be allowed to overshadow the other qualities, but should be subordinated to the principal task of progress towards liberation.

MN 34 *Cūlagopālaka-sutta*

The *Cūlagopālaka-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on the cowherd”, compares cattle that cross the river Ganges to Buddhist disciples who go beyond the range of Māra. This discourse has two parallels, found in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁸³ A few parts of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁸⁴

The *Cūlagopālaka-sutta* and its parallels begin by depicting a foolish cowherd who drives his cattle across the river Ganges in a wrong way, causing all of them to meet with disaster.⁸⁵ The three versions agree that the cowherd had not properly examined both shores to find a good fording place, to which the *Ekottarika-āgama* version adds that he first drove the weaker cattle across.⁸⁶

MN I 225

The three versions contrast this foolish cowherd with a wise cowherd, who takes the cattle safely across the river Ganges by first driving the strong cattle across, after having carefully examined both shores and having found a good fording place.

A minor difference between the three versions is a matter of sequence, as the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions follow the simile of the foolish cowherd by explaining to whom this cowherd corresponds, before turning to describe the wise cowherd. The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse instead continues from the foolish cowherd directly with the wise cowherd, and only after that explains their significance (see table 4.6).

When explaining this simile, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version identifies the foolish cowherd with recluses and Brahmins who are unskilled in this world and what lies beyond

⁸³ The parallels are SĀ 1248 at T II 342a-c and EĀ 43.6 at T II 761b-762a. Akanuma 1929/1990: 111 gives “cowherd”, 牧牛者, as a tentative title for SĀ 1248. The summary verse at T II 764c12 similarly refers to EĀ 43.6 with 牧牛. While MN 34 takes place on the banks of the Ganges in the Vajjian country, EĀ 43.6 takes place on the banks of the same river, but in the district of Magadha, and SĀ 1248 has the Squirrels' Feeding Ground at Rājagaha as its location.

⁸⁴ SHT VI 1381 folio 174R2-5 and folio 175 (p. 107). SHT VI 1381 folio 174R2 locates the discourse at Rājagṛha.

⁸⁵ MN 34 at MN I 225,5, SĀ 1248 at T II 342a23, and EĀ 43.6 at T II 761b16. Parts of this narration have also been preserved in SHT VI 1381 folio 174R3-5 and folio 175V1-R2. While MN 34, SĀ 1248, and SHT 1381 folio 175V3 present this narration as an account of what happened in the past, EĀ 43.6 introduces the same narration as a parable.

⁸⁶ EĀ 43.6 at T II 761b18: 先渡瘦者. This additional detail helps to clarify the situation, since the problem with driving cattle across a river would be that they tend to follow whichever of them is in the leading position, hence if the first one is carried off and misses the ford, the remainder of the group will be led astray as well, cf. also, e.g., AN 4:70 at AN II 75,33 or T 203.95 at T IV 485c7, translated in Willemen 1994: 191.

it. According to the *Samyukta-āgama* version, the foolish cowherd stands for the six heretical teachers (Pūraṇa Kassapa, etc.).⁸⁷ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version offers still another perspective, as here the foolish cowherd represents foolish monks who think they can go beyond birth and death without practising the precepts, as a result of which they perform bad deeds and lead others astray.⁸⁸ At a later point of its exposition, the same *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse identifies the foolish cowherd with heterodox Brahmins instead.⁸⁹

Table 4.6: Progression of Topics in MN 34 and its Parallels

MN 34	SĀ 1248	EĀ 43.6
foolish cowherd (1)	foolish cowherd (→ 1)	foolish cowherd (→ 1)
unskilled recluses & Brahmins (2)	wise cowherd (→ 3)	foolish monks (→ 2)
wise cowherd (3)	6 heretical teachers (→ 2)	wise cowherd (→ 3)
skilled recluses & Brahmins (4)	Tathāgata (→ 4, 10)	Tathāgata (→ 4)
arahants (5)	arahants (→ 5)	arahants (→ 5)
non-returners (6)	non-returners (→ 6)	non-returners (→ 6)
once-returners (7)	once-returners (→ 7)	once-returners (→ 7)
stream-enterers (8)	stream-enterers (→ 8)	stream-enterers (→ 8)
Dharma- & faith-followers (9)	verses (→ 11)	faith in teaching (→ 9?)
Tathāgata is skilled (10)		verses (→ 11)
verses (11)	(≠ 9)	heterodox Brahmins (→ 2)
		Tathāgata (→ 10)

The differences between the three versions in regard to the implications of the foolish cowherd give each of the three discourses a distinct flavour:

- the image of the cowherd in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version serves to confirm that confidence in the Buddha and his teaching are well directed,
- in the *Samyukta-āgama* version this image throws into relief the contrast between the Buddha's teaching and the teachings of other contemporary teachers,
- in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version the simile of the cowherd highlights the importance of maintaining a firm foundation in morality.

MN I 226 The three versions agree, however, that the wise cowherd represents the Tathāgata,⁹⁰ and the different types of cattle led by the wise cowherd across the Ganges stand for an arahant, a non-returner, a once-returner, and a stream-enterer.⁹¹ The *Majjhima-nikāya*

⁸⁷ SĀ 1248 at T II 342b7: 六師富蘭那. The Pāli commentary similarly explains that the reference to unskilled recluses and Brahmins intends the six contemporary teachers, Ps II 266,28: *cha satthāro dassitāti veditabbā* (intending the six teachers described in DN 2 at DN I 52,2).

⁸⁸ EĀ 43.6 at T II 761b22+24: 我眾中比丘 … 欲渡生死之流, 不習於禁戒之法.

⁸⁹ EĀ 43.6 at T II 762a1: 外道梵志.

⁹⁰ MN 34 at MN I 226,4 first identifies the wise cowherd with recluses and Brahmins skilled in this world and what goes beyond it, and then at MN I 226,37 indicates that the Buddha is skilled in this world and what goes beyond it.

⁹¹ MN 34 at MN I 226,12, SĀ 1248 at T II 342b18, and EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c7.

version also includes monks who are Dharma-followers or faith-followers in this listing.⁹² Although Dharma-followers or faith-followers are not mentioned in either of the Chinese versions, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version refers to those who have faith and regard for the Dharma.⁹³

The three versions conclude by summing up the gist of the discourse in three stanzas, MN I 227 which highlight the Buddha's ability to lead his disciples beyond Māra's realm.⁹⁴

MN 35 *Cūlasaccaka-sutta*

The *Cūlasaccaka-sutta*, the “lesser discourse to Saccaka”, reports how the Buddha expounded the absence of a self in reply to a challenge by the debater Saccaka. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁹⁵ In addition to these two parallels, a few words of the present discourse have been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁹⁶

⁹² MN 34 at MN I 226,35: *bhikkhū dhammānusārino saddhānusārino*.

⁹³ EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c19: 信奉法. In its concluding stanzas, EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c25 speaks of five types of person, 五種人, which corroborates that the reference to 信奉法 corresponds to a single type of person, in addition to the four types who have reached the four stages of awakening. EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c4+28 also identifies the path by which the Tathāgata leads disciples beyond Māra's realm with the noble eightfold path, an explanation which appears to be the reason why this discourse was included among the eights of the *Ekottarika-āgama*. After the stanzas, EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c27 continues with an injunction to the monks that they should develop this path.

⁹⁴ MN 34 at MN I 227,8, SĀ 1248 at T II 342c4, and EĀ 43.6 at T II 761c21.

⁹⁵ The parallels are SĀ 110 at T II 35a-37b and EĀ 37.10 at T II 715a-717b. SĀ 110 has the title “Saccaka”, 薩遮, a title found in the *uddāna* at T II 37b27. MN 35, SĀ 110, and EĀ 37.10 agree on locating the discourse at Vesālī. SĀ 110 has been translated in Anālayo 2010k, excerpts from SĀ 110 and EĀ 37.10 have been translated in Kuan 2009: 157-161. While MN 35 further specifies that the Buddha was in the Kūtagārasālā in the Great Wood (*mahāvana*), SĀ 110 at T II 35a17 reports that he was on the bank of the Monkey Pond, 猴池側. A Monkey Pond occurs also in a Sanskrit fragment parallel to MN 12 and in Sanskrit fragments of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, according to which the Kūtagārasālā was situated on the bank of this pond, cf. SHT IV 32 folio 41R5 (p. 137): (*ma*)*r* [*ka*] *ṭahradatīre kūṭā-[g]āraśālā* [*y*] (*ā*)*m* and S 360 folio 173V5-6 in Waldschmidt 1950: 19: *markkaṭa* [*hrud*] (*atīre kū*) *tagāraśālāyām*. EĀ 37.10 at T II 715a28 speaks of the Buddha's location simply as a wood outside of Vesālī. References to the Monkey Pond recur frequently in the *Dīrgha-āgama*, in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*. DĀ 15 at T I 66a23 and EĀ 40.5 at T II 739b10 similarly locate this pond near Vesālī, to which DĀ 15 adds that this pond had a Dharma hall, 法堂, at its side. Numerous occurrences in the *Samyukta-āgama* identify this hall on the bank of the Monkey Pond as the Kūtagārasālā, 重閣講堂, cf. SĀ 81 at T II 20b28, SĀ 83 at T II 21b14, SĀ 237 at T II 57b28, SĀ 238 at T II 57c14, SĀ 239 at T II 57c24, SĀ 240 at T II 58a1, SĀ 241 at T II 58a7, SĀ 242 at T II 58b21, SĀ 243 at T II 58b27, SĀ 244 at T II 58c9, SĀ 405 at T II 108b13, SĀ 406 at T II 108c6, SĀ 563 at T II 147c2, SĀ 833 at T II 213c24, SĀ 834 at T II 214a14, SĀ 937 at T II 240b12, SĀ 980 at T II 254c3, SĀ 1083 at T II 284a5, SĀ 1105 at T II 290c4, SĀ 1106 at T II 290c20, SĀ 1107 at T II 291a27, SĀ 1252 at T II 344b6, SĀ 1257 at T II 345a12, and SĀ 1274 at T II 350a26. The same Monkey Pond recurs also in the *Avadānaśataka*, Speyer 1906/1970: 8,5 or Vaidya 1958a: 4,19, in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, Dutt 1984a: 224,14, in the *Divyāvadāna*, Cowell 1886: 136,7 and 200,21 or Vaidya 1999: 85,6 and 125,2, and in the *Mahāvastu*, Basak 1963a: 384,9 or Senart 1882a: 300,11. Xuánzàng's (玄奘) travel records also mention the

MN I 227 The *Cūlasaccaka-sutta* and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama* begin by narrating that Saccaka, who was known as a skilled debater, thought that nobody could engage him in debate without trembling and sweating.⁹⁷ Such an indication is not made in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse. The three versions agree that Saccaka met the monk Assaji and inquired how the Buddha instructed his disciples.

MN I 228 According to all versions, the answer given by Assaji did not please Saccaka. The parallel versions differ, however, on the content of the answer given by Assaji:

- In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, Assaji's answer is that the Buddha instructed his disciples to contemplate the five aggregates as impermanent and not-self.⁹⁸
- In the *Samyukta-āgama* version, he answers that the Buddha taught his disciples that the five aggregates are devoid of self and should be contemplated as a disease, a boil, a thorn, murderous, impermanent, *dukkha*, empty, and not-self.⁹⁹
- In the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, Assaji replies that the Buddha taught that the five aggregates are impermanent, what is impermanent is *dukkha*, what is *dukkha* is not-self, what is not-self is empty and thus is neither mine nor 'I'.¹⁰⁰

When evaluating these different presentations, it is conspicuous that, unlike the two Chinese versions, the Pāli version lacks the characteristic of *dukkha*. This is unusual, since the early discourses found in the *Nikāyas* and *Āgamas* regularly include *dukkha* in such contexts. The commentary to the *Cūlasaccaka-sutta* explains that Assaji did not mention the characteristic of *dukkha* in order to avoid being contradicted by Saccaka, since Saccaka might have assumed this to imply that path and fruit are also *dukkha* and therefore be led to despise the Buddha's teaching.¹⁰¹

An instance where the characteristic of *dukkha* is likewise absent occurs in a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and in its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*. The two versions agree in presenting a contemplation of the five aggregates only in terms of impermanence and not-self.¹⁰² The Pāli commentary to this *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse gives an explanation similar to the one offered in the commentary to the *Cūlasaccaka-sutta*:

location, cf. T 2087 at T LI 908b17, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 68. Skilling 1997a: 295 remarks that "the Markatahrada is well known in (Mūla)Sarvāstivādin texts, but unknown in Pāli", cf. also ibid. pp. 406-407, Bingenheimer 2008: 159 note 31, and Lamotte 1958/1988: 155; on the *kūṭagāra* cf. also Bollée 1986.

⁹⁶ SHT III 997A (p. 258), fragment IA in Bongard-Levin 1989: 509, and the so far unpublished fragment no. 2372/1/1 of the Schøyen collection, identified by Siglinde Dietz (I am indebted to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for kindly providing me with a preliminary draft transliteration of this fragment).

⁹⁷ While according to MN 35 at MN I 227,19 Saccaka made this claim publicly, SĀ 110 at T II 35a20 records the same claim as a mental presumption held by him.

⁹⁸ MN 35 at MN I 228,10: *rūpam ... viññānam aniccam, rūpam ... viññānam anattā; sabbe sankhārā anicca, sabbe dhammā anattā* (S^o-MN I 423,5 reads *sabbe saṅkhārā anattā, sabbe dhammā anattā*).

⁹⁹ SĀ 110 at T II 35b4: 方便觀、如病、如癱、如刺、如殺、無常、苦、空、非我。

¹⁰⁰ EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b4: 無常、無常者即是苦、苦者即是無我、無我者即是空也、空者彼不我有、我非彼有。

¹⁰¹ Ps II 271,7.

¹⁰² SN 22:90 at SN III 132,23 and its parallel SĀ 262 at T II 66b14. Another such instance can be found in EĀ 24.4 at T II 618a3.

*ta.*¹⁰³ The decisive difference in this instance, however, is that this instruction was given to the monk Channa, who had difficulties finding inspiration in the goal of Nirvāṇa. Thus in this case the commentarial explanation makes sense, since Channa's lack of inspiration would indeed have been aggravated if he had come to consider path and fruit in a negative light.

In relation to Saccaka, however, the commentarial explanation seems less convincing, since one would not expect Assaji to be worried about the possibility that Saccaka might consider path and fruit in a negative light. In fact, the reply given by Assaji does not seem to be formulated in such a way as to avoid contradiction, as all versions report that Saccaka expressed his displeasure and disagreement immediately. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account, Saccaka even went so far as to cover his ears and tell Assaji to stop speaking.¹⁰⁴ Thus the commentarial explanation could be just a mechanical repetition of the commentarial gloss given in regard to the *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse.

If Assaji had wanted to avoid contradiction, one would also expect him to omit rather the characteristic of not-self, since a teaching on the absence of a self would have been a more provocative proposition. In contrast, a teaching on *dukkha* would be a less extraordinary proposal, as other contemporary recluses were also delivering teachings on how to make an end of *dukkha*.¹⁰⁵ Thus, if Assaji had indeed wanted to avoid contradiction, it would have been more sensible for him to avoid referring to not-self instead of omitting *dukkha*. According to the ensuing discussion between Saccaka and the Buddha, the characteristic of not-self was in fact what really provoked Saccaka, while the other two characteristics appear to play only a subsidiary role in their discussion.

Another point that does not fit too well with the commentarial explanation is that Assaji explicitly presents his succinct statement as the way the Buddha usually instructs his disciples.¹⁰⁶ It would to some extent become a case of attributing conscious misrepresentation to Assaji, if he were to be shown as giving only a partial account of the Buddha's instruction and then pretend this to correspond to the way the Buddha usually instructs his disciples.

Moreover, in the *Cūlasaccaka-sutta* the Buddha repeats the statement made by Assaji, so that in the Pāli account the Buddha himself explicitly endorses that his standard teaching is concerned only with impermanence and not-self, not with *dukkha*.¹⁰⁷

In sum, it seems as if the omission of the *dukkha* characteristic in the Pāli version of Assaji's statement, although certainly constituting the more unusual reading, does not fit the context too well. The absence of *dukkha* in the present passage is all the more remarkable as the Pāli discourses generally place a consistent emphasis on this charac-

¹⁰³ Spk II 318,12.

¹⁰⁴ EĀ 37,10 at T II 715b11.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. above p. 107 note 47.

¹⁰⁶ MN 35 at MN I 228,15: *evambhāgā ca pana bhagavato sāvakesu anusāsanī bahulā pavattatī ti* (C^e-MN I 542,14: *evambhāgā*).

¹⁰⁷ MN 35 at MN I 230,4+10: *evambhāgā ca pana me ... anusāsanī bahulā pavattati* (C^e-MN I 546,3: *evam*^o).

teristic, whereas the same does not appear to be always the case for works that belong to the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda tradition. The (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, for example, speaks repeatedly of three Dharma ‘seals’, which are: “all formations are impermanent, all dharmas are not-self, Nirvāṇa is quiescence”, thereby not mentioning the characteristic of *dukkha*.¹⁰⁸ The absence of *dukkha* in a similar context recurs also in another discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹⁰⁹ Hence it would have been less surprising if the *Cūla-saccaka-sutta* had included *dukkha* in its presentation and the *Samyukta-āgama* had not mentioned it.

Thus, even though it seems improbable that a reference to *dukkha* could have been lost during the transmission of the Pāli version, it seems also improbable that a reference to *dukkha* was added in the *Samyukta-āgama* version, as within the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda tradition in general a tendency to omit *dukkha* can be discerned.

Whatever may be the final word on this particular passage, the *Cūlasaccaka-sutta* and its parallels continue with Saccaka publicly boasting how he was going to defeat the Buddha in debate. The three versions differ in regard to the similes used by Saccaka to illustrate his impending victory (see table 4.7).

Out of a set of four similes found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version,¹¹⁰ a simile that describes catching a long haired sheep recurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version,¹¹¹ while a simile of a brewer who holds a sieve can be found in the *Samyukta-āgama* version (although in its presentation the point made with this simile is to use it to press wine, not to drag it here and there).¹¹²

The Pāli version’s imagery of an elephant that plunges into deep water recurs in both Chinese versions.¹¹³ While in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version this elephant plays a game of hemp washing, the *Samyukta-āgama* version describes how the elephant trainer washes

¹⁰⁸ The 三法印 are 一切行無常, 一切法無我, and 涅槃寂滅, references to which, in varying formulations, can be found in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in T 1442 at T XXIII 670c1, T 1442 at T XXIII 836b12, T 1442 at T XXIII 863c29, T 1448 at T XXIV 50b18, and T 1450 at T XXIV 198a24. Another instance can be found in the *Sanighabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 254,24, which reports that the nun Utpalavarṇā, after she had been hit by Devadatta (cf. also below p. 286 note 112) and was about to pass away, reflected: *sarvasaṃskārāanityāḥ, sarvadharmaṇāanātmānah, sāntam nirvāṇam*; cf. also the survey in Lamotte 1970a: 1369.

¹⁰⁹ SĀ 262 at T II 66b14+16 and T II 66c7+9+22. Other discourses in the *Samyukta-āgama*, however, do include *dukkha* in such contexts. The same holds true for *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses, which regularly speak of four Dharma seals, thereby including *dukkha* in their presentations, cf., e.g., EĀ 26.8 at T II 639a5, EĀ 31.4 at T II 668c3, and EĀ 42.3 at T II 749a9; a presentation that recurs also in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 949b8.

¹¹⁰ MN 35 at MN I 228,29. This set of images recurs in a similar context in MN 56 at MN I 374,26, where a lay follower of the Jains uses them to describe how he is going to defeat the Buddha.

¹¹¹ EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b21. At this point, according to EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b29 Saccaka also claimed to be able to make even an insentient post shake, similar to the claim he made in the introductory narration of the Pāli version, MN 35 at MN I 227,24, an introductory account otherwise not found in EĀ 37.10.

¹¹² SĀ 110 at T II 35b16.

¹¹³ MN 35 at MN I 229,3, SĀ 110 at T II 35b22, and EĀ 37.10 at T II 715b23.

this elephant. After delivering these similes, Saccaka went to the presence of the Buddha, followed by a group of householders wondering who of the two will refute the other.

Table 4.7: Similes Illustrating Saccaka's Victory in MN 35 and its Parallels

MN 35	SĀ 110
drag sheep by its hair (1) drag brewer's sieve around (2) shake brewer's strainer (3) elephant plays in water (4)	shake grass in air to remove dirt use sieve to press out wine (→ 2) wash a dirty mat wash elephant in water (→ 4?) (≠ 1, 3)
EĀ 37.10	
drag sheep by its hair (→ 1) elephant plays in water (→ 4) two men roast a man on a fire (≠ 2, 3)	

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Samyukta-āgama* versions report in similar ways that Saccaka proclaimed the five aggregates to be a person's self, comparing this selfhood to the way the earth supports the growth of plants. In the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation, however, the point at stake was rather impermanence, since here Saccaka proposed that form is permanent.¹¹⁴

MN I 230

According to all versions, in reply the Buddha brought up the example of a king who exercises power in his domain. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Samyukta-āgama* versions use this example to explain that, whereas such a king can exercise power in his domain, human beings cannot exercise such power over the five aggregates, ordering them to be according to their likes and wishes.¹¹⁵ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instead points out that even though a king is able to exercise power in his domain, he will eventually become old, with white hair and a wrinkled face.¹¹⁶

MN I 231

¹¹⁴ EĀ 37.10 at T II 715c18: 色者是常.

¹¹⁵ MN 35 at MN I 231,17 and SĀ 110 at T II 36a11. Wynne 2009: 106 comments that the “example of a king's ability to exert control in his own kingdom ... no doubt ... was designed to appeal to the Licchavis witnessing the debate”.

¹¹⁶ EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a4 also differs from the other versions by presenting this king as a wheel-turning king, 轉輪聖王. After the intervention of a thunderbolt-wielding *yakkha* (mentioned in all versions), EĀ 37.10 continues by reporting that Saccaka again affirmed the body to be permanent, in spite of the Buddha's example of how even a wheel-turning king grows old. The Buddha then questioned Saccaka why the wheel-turning king could not order old age, disease, and death to disappear, whereon Saccaka was unable to reply. This whole presentation does not seem to fit the context particularly well, since one would not expect a clever debater like Saccaka to be so easily refuted by a simple illustration of impermanence.

The three versions record that when Saccaka remained silent instead of replying to the question posed by the Buddha, a thunderbolt wielding *yakkha* intervened, threatening to split Saccaka's head into seven pieces should he not reply.¹¹⁷ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Samyukta-āgama* versions report in similar terms that, once Saccaka finally replied, the Buddha engaged him in a question and answer catechism on the impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self nature of the five aggregates. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes this catechism by pointing out that someone, who regards as self what in reality is *dukkha*, will not be able to transcend *dukkha*.¹¹⁸ The *Samyukta-āgama* version explains that attachment to the five aggregates will cause dejection and sorrow when these aggregates undergo change, whereas through detachment from the five aggregates one will be unaffected by their change.¹¹⁹

MN I 233 The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Samyukta-āgama* versions employ the simile of a man in search of heartwood, who cuts down a large plantain tree and discovers no essence in it, to illustrate the vanity of Saccaka's earlier claim that nobody could engage him in debate without trembling and sweating. Both versions report that the Buddha uncovered his body to show that he had remained unaffected by their discussion.¹²⁰

Although the *Ekottarika-āgama* does not have the simile of a man in search of heartwood, it does, however, report that the Buddha uncovered his body, reminding Saccaka of his earlier boast.

A difference between the three versions is that according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* account, the Buddha uncovered his body in order to demonstrate that he was not sweating,¹²¹ while according to the *Samyukta-āgama* version he uncovered his body in order to demonstrate that not even a single hair on his body had been stirred.¹²² The Pāli version's description of this act by the Buddha speaks of him un-

¹¹⁷ While in MN 35 at MN I 231,30 the *yakkha* Vajirapāṇi appears before a third repetition of the question, in SĀ 110 at T II 36a15 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a7 he appears only once the third repetition of the question meets with no reply. The same Vajirapāṇi intervenes in a similar situation in DN 3 at DN I 95,8. The commentaries to DN 3 and MN 35, Sv I 264,13 and Ps II 277,35, identify him with Sakka; cf. also Godage 1945: 51-52. In Gandhāran art, however, Vajirapāṇi and Indra are distinct from each other, cf. Coomaraswamy 1971: 31, Foucher 1905: 564, Konow 1930: 317, Santoro 1979: 301, id. 1991: 295, Senart 1906: 122, and Vogel 1909: 525, as is the case for Amarāvati iconography, cf. Sivaramamurti 1942/1956: 89 (on the significance of the *vajra* in relation to Indra in general cf., e.g., Chakravarti 1997/2006: 96-99). As noted by Lamotte 1966: 115, cf. also Flood 1989: 23, a characteristic feature of such interventions by Vajirapāṇi is that he will only be visible to the Buddha and his adversaries, but not to other spectators witnessing the scene. On the threat that an opponent's head will split to pieces in ancient Indian literature cf., e.g., de La Vallée Poussin 1932, Hopkins 1932: 316, Insler 1989/1990, and Witzel 1987; on debating practices in the Pāli discourses cf. also Manné 1992; on ancient Indian debate cf., e.g., Matilal 1987 and Solomon 1978: 833-875.

¹¹⁸ MN 35 at MN I 233,9.

¹¹⁹ SĀ 110 at T II 36b1.

¹²⁰ This episode is also recorded in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 251c10, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1666.

¹²¹ MN 35 at MN I 233,35 and EĀ 37.10 at T II 716b5.

¹²² SĀ 110 at T II 36b23.

covering his “golden coloured” body, a qualification not used in the two Chinese versions.¹²³

The three versions agree that a spectator intervened at this point and compared Saccaka to a crab with all its legs cut off, unable to return to its pond.¹²⁴ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Samyukta-āgama* versions continue by reporting that Saccaka questioned the Buddha how a disciple progresses beyond doubt,¹²⁵ an inquiry not found in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse. In reply, the Buddha described how to contemplate the five aggregates as devoid of a self.

MN I 234

When Saccaka asked what makes a disciple an arahant, the Buddha replied that an arahant has reached unsurpassable liberation and knows the five aggregates to be devoid of a self. Such a monk is endowed with unsurpassable vision (or unsurpassable knowledge according to the *Samyukta-āgama* version), unsurpassable path and unsurpassable deliverance.¹²⁶ Having reached the final goal, such a monk is one who respects

¹²³ MN 35 at MN I 233,36: *svavannavannam kāyam*. Ps II 280,5 takes this qualification in a literal sense and describes how on opening his robes for just four fingers’ width, rays of golden light emanated from the Buddha’s body. The golden hue of the Buddha’s skin constitutes one of the thirty-two marks of a superior being, cf. also DN 14 at DN II 17,30, DN 30 at DN III 143,24, MN 91 at MN II 136,18, and below p. 532.

¹²⁴ SĀ 110 at T II 36c1 reports that this spectator came out with additional similes to illustrate Saccaka’s utter defeat. EĀ 37,10 at T II 716b10 has only the simile of the crab found in MN 35 at MN I 234,7, after which EĀ 37,10 continues with the question and answer catechism on the impermanent and not-self nature of the five aggregates found already at an earlier point in the other two versions. The simile of the crab recurs in SN 4,24 at SN I 123,19 (or SN² 160 at SN² I 271,8) to illustrate Māra’s defeat.

¹²⁵ MN 35 at MN I 234,31: *tipnavicikiccho vigatakathampatho vesārajjappatto aparappaccayo satthusāsane*, a standard reference to stream-entry in the discourses. It is noteworthy that MN 35 depicts Saccaka using such typically Buddhist expressions even though he is supposedly an outsider unfamiliar with the Buddhist teachings and according to MN 35 at MN I 228,6 does not even know that the Buddha taught impermanence and not-self. In MN 35 at MN I 235,10 Saccaka then again uses such standard phrases when he describes an arahant to be *khīnāsavo vusitavā katakaraṇīyo ohitabhāro anuppattasadattho parikkhīṇabhavasānyojano sammadaññā vimutto* (C°-MN I 556,14 and S°-MN I 434,7: *parikkhīṇabhava-sāñyojano*), in which case SĀ 110 at T II 36c23 reports a similarly detailed inquiry, reading: 得盡諸漏, 無漏, 心解脫, 慧解脫, 現法自知作證, 我生已盡, 梵行已立, 所作已作, 自知不受後有. Evidently standard pericopes were applied to the present discourse in the course of oral tradition, even though these would not fit a speaker like Saccaka.

¹²⁶ MN 35 at MN I 235,28 lists *dassanānuttariya, patipadānuttariya, vimuttānuttariya*. SĀ 110 at T II 37a1 actually reads “unsurpassable knowledge, unsurpassable liberation, and unsurpassable knowledge and vision of liberation”, 智無上, 解脫無上, 解脫知見無上, but has “unsurpassable path”, 道無上, as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading for the second quality, and “unsurpassable liberation” (i.e. without “knowledge and vision”) as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading for the third quality, so that on adopting the variant readings the two versions would be fairly close to each other in regard to the second and third qualities. The three unsurpassable qualities found in MN 35 recur in the *Sanigīti-sutta* in DN 33 at DN III 219,16, where a Sanskrit fragment parallel from the *Sanigīti-sūtra* has preserved (*jñānā*)/*nutta*/*ryam prati*(*padānuttaryam*), cf. K 484 (37)V8 in Stache-Rosen 1968: 23. The *Sanigītiparyāya* reads “unsurpassable practice, unsurpassable knowledge, and unsurpassable liberation”, T 1536 at T XXVI 390c29: 行無上, 智無上, 解脫無上, thereby being similar to the presentation in SĀ 110 (if the variant readings are adopted).

and venerates the Buddha as one who has reached awakening and who teaches it to others.¹²⁷

MN I 236 All versions report that Saccaka admitted his foolishness in attempting to challenge the Buddha. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, he illustrated the futility of his attempt by proclaiming that it would be easier to get away with attacking a mad elephant, a fire, or a poisonous snake than getting away with challenging the Buddha (see table 4.8).¹²⁸

In addition to these three similes, the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse employs the images of safely getting away from the edge of the sword of a strong man and from a hungry lion. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version only describes the fearlessness of a lion, followed by reporting that Saccaka took refuge as a lay disciple.¹²⁹

Table 4.8: Similes Illustrating Saccaka's Defeat in MN 35 and its Parallels

MN 35	SĀ 110	EĀ 37.10
safe after attacking elephant (1)	escape strong man's sword	fearless lion
safe after attacking fire (2)	escape poisonous snake (→ 3)	
safe after attacking snake (3)	escape swamp or fire (→ 2) escape drunken ¹³⁰ elephant (→ 1) escape hungry lion	(≠ 1-3)

The Pāli and Chinese accounts agree that Saccaka invited the Buddha and the monks for a meal. According to the Pāli version, once the meal was finished Saccaka made an aspiration, dedicating the merit of this food offering to the Licchavis who had supplied him with the food to be given to the Buddha and the community of monks. In reply to this dedication of merit, the Buddha clarified that the Licchavis will receive the merit to be gained by giving to one like Saccaka, who is not free from lust, anger, and delusion. In contrast, Saccaka himself will reap the merit gained by giving food to the Buddha, who is free from lust, anger, and delusion.¹³¹

¹²⁷ On the significance of this passage in relation to the development of the bodhisattva ideal cf. Nattier 2003a: 147-151.

¹²⁸ MN 35 at MN II 236,3 and SĀ 110 at T II 37a9.

¹²⁹ EĀ 37.10 at T II 716c10. SĀ 110 at T II 37a18 also shows some signs of Saccaka's conversion, since he changes his mode of address from the earlier used Gotama, 龍曇, to 世尊, corresponding to *bhagavā*.

¹³⁰ SĀ 110 at T II 37a12: 駁惡醉象. Bloomfield 1920: 337 notes that "the practice of giving strong drink to animals, in order to make them mettlesome, is sufficiently attested" in Buddhist texts, which might provide a background to the present reference to a ferocious and drunken elephant.

¹³¹ MN 35 at MN I 236,35. Egge 2002: 58 comments that "the Buddha rejects Saccaka's attempt to dedicate the merit resulting from his gift, and asserts that merit accrues automatically to the donor and cannot be transferred to another", cf. also Witanachchi 1987: 155. On the transfer of merit in early Buddhism cf. also, e.g., Agasse 1978: 313-314 and 329, Amore 1971: 148-150, Anālayo 2010k: 58-62, Bechert 1992a: 105-106, Gombrich 1971, Herrman-Pfandt 1996: 82-92, Holt 1981: 10-19, Keyes 1983: 281, Malalasekera 1967: 87, Marasinghe 2005: 469, McDermott 1974, id. 1984/2003: 35-47, Ogui-bénine 1982: 404, Schalk 1976: 88, Schmithausen 1986: 210-216, Schopen 1985/1997: 34-43, Weera-

The *Samyukta-āgama* records a similar statement, although in a different context. According to its presentation, at the completion of the meal the Buddha spoke a set of stanzas and also delivered a discourse to Saccaka. Once the Buddha and the monks had left Saccaka and were on their way back to the monastery, the monks deliberated among themselves about the merit obtained by Saccaka and the Licchavis respectively. Back at the monastery, the monks posed this question to the Buddha, who replied by explaining that the Licchavis will earn the merit to be obtained by giving to one who is not free from lust, anger, and delusion, whereas Saccaka will receive the merit of giving to one who is free from these three root defilements.¹³²

Since according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account Saccaka was considered by many of his contemporaries to be a saint,¹³³ the Buddha's declaration made in the Pāli version would have appeared to Saccaka as insulting and offensive. Therefore it is rather unexpected when the Buddha makes such a statement after Saccaka had publicly admitted the foolishness of his earlier attempt to challenge the Buddha, had just provided the Buddha and the monks with a meal, and was formulating an aspiration to share the merit acquired by this food offering. The *Samyukta-āgama*, in contrast, does not present the Buddha in the almost resentful attitude attributed to him in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, as according to its presentation the Buddha made this statement to the monks when Saccaka was no longer present.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse differs considerably from the other two versions, as it reports that the Buddha delivered a gradual discourse at the completion of the meal, which caused Saccaka's attainment of stream-entry.¹³⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version continues by relating that on a later occasion Saccaka's disciples, who had found out that their teacher had been converted by the Buddha, intercepted him when he was coming back from another visit to the Buddha and killed him.¹³⁵

This tale is surprising, since none of the discourses mention that Saccaka had disciples,¹³⁶ which would have been present during such an important encounter of their teacher with the Buddha, all the more since according to all versions Saccaka had made a public announcement of his intention to challenge the Buddha and had invited a substantial number of people to join him and witness the discussion.

Even if Saccaka did have disciples, which due to some circumstances could not be present during his meeting with the Buddha, it would be rather extreme for them to kill

ratne 1965: 748, and Woodward 1914: 46-47 and 50. On the ancient Indian conception of merit cf., e.g., Filliozat 1980, Hara 1994, and Wezler 1997.

¹³² SĀ 110 at T II 37b22. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 10.

¹³³ MN 35 at MN I 227,18: *sādhusammato bahujanassa*.

¹³⁴ EĀ 37.10 at T II 717a5.

¹³⁵ EĀ 37.10 at T II 717a25 continues by reporting that the Buddha, on being informed of the murder and asked about the victim's level of rebirth, declared that Saccaka had been reborn as a stream-enterer in the heaven of the Thirty-three and will make an end of *dukkha* in the presence of Buddha Maitreya.

¹³⁶ An otherwise different story involving Saccaka in a *Dharmapada Avadāna* collection preserved in Chinese, however, does mention that he had a following of five hundred disciples, cf. T 211 at T IV 597a5, translated in Willemen 1999: 151.

their teacher, just because he had become a follower of the Buddha. In ancient India, a group of disciples would probably rather follow their teacher's example, as the disciples of Uruvela Kassapa did according to the Pāli *Vinaya* and the *Catuṣpariṣat-sūtra* when their teacher decided to become a disciple of the Buddha.¹³⁷ Alternatively, Saccaka's disciples might have left him and continued on their own, as did the five monks when the Buddha had given up his ascetic practices. To go so far as to kill their teacher seems an improbable act in view of the ancient Indian respect for a teacher.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* report of Saccaka's death also stands in opposition to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, according to which Saccaka visited the Buddha on what appears to be a subsequent occasion.¹³⁸ Although this other visit could be taken to be a visit that took place between the present discourse and his murder, according to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* his attitude during this visit was somewhat provocative and his intention was to challenge the Buddha again.¹³⁹ Such an attitude would not be compatible with his attainment of stream-entry, which according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version he achieved right after the meal following what according to all versions of the present discourse was his first encounter with the Buddha.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* account of the present events thus seems to offer the least probable account of what took place after the meal offered by Saccaka. In contrast, the most natural version seems to be found in the *Samyukta-āgama* presentation, according to which the Buddha gave a discourse, as he usually would do after a meal offering, and only when being back at the monastery made a statement on the merit incurred by Saccaka.

MN 36 *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, the “greater discourse to Saccaka”, reports another discussion between the Buddha and the debater Saccaka. This discourse has a parallel preserved in Sanskrit fragments,¹⁴⁰ entitled “development of the body” (*kāyabhāvanā*).¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Vin I 33,2 and S 362 (59)R8 in Waldschmidt 1952: 35 (cf. also Gnoli 1977: 228,26). Solomon 1978: 848 explains that according to debating customs in ancient India “from the times of the Buddha and Mahāvīra this practice was in vogue of a teacher entering into an intellectual contest with another and he who was defeated became along with his disciples a follower of the one who was victorious or could convince the other”.

¹³⁸ MN 36 at MN I 237,18.

¹³⁹ This can be seen from the circumstance that MN 36 at MN I 240,7 qualifies a statement made by Saccaka during this encounter as offensive, and from its report at MN I 249,37 that Saccaka insinuated that the afternoon nap taken by the Buddha during the hot season was a manifestation of delusion. In fact, as noted by Jaini 1979/1998: 192, in the Jain tradition an accomplished saint was held to be beyond sleeping; cf., e.g., the Āyāraṅga 1.3.1.1 in Schubring 1910/1966: 13,8: *suttā amuṇī, muṇino sayayam jāgaranti* (Jacobi 1882: 14,1 reads *jāgarāmī*), translated in Jacobi 1884/1996: 28: “the unwise sleep, the sages always wake”, cf. also Bollée 2004: 94 note 103.

¹⁴⁰ A counterpart to the whole discourse can be found in the fragments 329r4-340r2 of the newly found *Dīrgha-āgama* manuscript, edited in Liu 2009: 48-63. Other relevant fragments are SHT III 931 (pp.

The undertaking of such “development of the body” forms the topic of the first part of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and its Sanskrit parallel report that on his alms round the Buddha happened to see Saccaka, to whom the Sanskrit version refers to as Sātyaki, and on a recommendation by Ānanda sat down to give Saccaka an opportunity for an exchange. MN I 237

Saccaka approached the Buddha and broached the theme of development of the body in contrast to development of the mind, concluding that the Buddhist monks were practising the latter, but not the former. Asked about development of the body, Saccaka mentioned several Ājīvikas and described their practice,¹⁴² whereas on being asked about development of the mind he was unable to give a proper explanation.

The Buddha thereon began his explanation by depicting how a worldling is overwhelmed by pleasant or painful feelings. A difference between the two versions at this point is that the Sanskrit fragments distinguish between bodily and mental feelings, indicating that the worldling is overwhelmed by these because he has neither developed the body nor the mind.¹⁴³

Judging from this presentation, development of the body stands for the ability to maintain balance with feelings originating from bodily discomfort or pain, while development of the mind refers to the same ability in regard to feelings that arise due to mentally stressful or unpleasant experiences.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version instead relates pleasant feelings to the development of the body and painful feelings to the development of the mind.¹⁴⁴ The commentary then glosses development of the body as representing insight and development of the mind as standing for concentration.¹⁴⁵ This explanation seems less straightforward than the

186-187), SHT III 997A (pp. 258-259, identified SHT VII p. 273), fragment bleu 18,4 + 81 of the Pelliot collection, edited as no. 148 in Hartmann 1991: 262, fragment SI B/14I in Bongard-Levin 1989: 509, and fragment Or. 15003/24 from the Hoernle collection, edited in Wille 2006: 72. SHT III 931 parallels the third simile on the dry wood found at MN I 242,1 and the bodhisattva’s realization that the pleasure of *jhāna* should not be feared, followed by his decision to give up ascetic practices and take nourishment at MN I 247,1; the Hoernle and Pelliot fragments parallel parts of the Buddha’s exposition on the implication of development of body and mind found at MN I 239,12; SHT III 997A and fragment SI B/14I correspond to the final section of MN 36 at MN I 251.

¹⁴¹ Hartmann 2000: 366.

¹⁴² While the Sanskrit fragment 330r1-2 in Liu 2009: 49 only describes their fasts, MN 36 at MN I 238,14 lists a whole range of ascetic observances.

¹⁴³ Fragment 330r8-v2 in Liu 2009: 49: *yasya kasyacid agnivesyāya evam ubhayāmgenotpannā kāyika d[ū]jhkhā vedanā cittam paryādāya tiṣṭhati, utpannā kāyikū sukhaṃ vedanā, utpannā caitasikī duḥkhā vedanā, utpannā caitasikī su[khā] vedanā cittam paryādāya tiṣṭhati, tam aham abhāvitakayam vadāmy abhāvitacittam ca.*

¹⁴⁴ MN 36 at MN I 239,21: *yassa kassaci, aggivessana, evam ubhatopakkham uppānā pi sukhaṃ vedanā cittam paryādāya tiṣṭhati abhāvitattā kāyassa, uppānā pi dukkhā vedanā cittam paryādāya tiṣṭhati abhāvitattā cittassa, evam kho aggivessana abhāvitakāyo ca hoti abhāvitacitto ca.*

¹⁴⁵ Ps II 286,20: *ettha kāyabhāvanā vipassanā, cittabhāvanā ca samādhi*. References to these two modes of development occur in a listing of four terms found, e.g., in SN 35:127 at SN IV 111,24, AN 3:99 at

presentation in the Sanskrit fragment and could be attempting to make sense of what may be a transmission error.¹⁴⁶

Judging from the Sanskrit version, the sense of the passage would be that some degree of physical hardening through asceticism or observance of restraint, enabling one to bear bodily pain, constitutes “development of the body”. “Development of the mind”, however, would stand for a type of mental cultivation that enables one to remain balanced with disagreeable experiences such as being insulted, defamed, or treated unjustly, etc.

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, Saccaka at this point proclaimed that he believed the Buddha to be developed in body as well as in mind. The Buddha’s reply to this proclamation indicates that it must have been made in a somewhat ironic manner, as he notes that Saccaka’s words are offensive.¹⁴⁷

In the corresponding passage in the Sanskrit version, Saccaka simply inquires if the Buddhist monks develop both body and mind. On receiving an affirmative reply, he asks if the Buddha himself also develops both body and mind. The Buddha replies that if of anyone it could rightly be said that he has developed body and mind, then of him this can rightly be said.

The two versions agree that Saccaka inquired if the Buddha had never experienced pleasant or painful feelings that overwhelmed his mind, in reply to which the Buddha delivered an account of his pre-awakening ascetic practices.¹⁴⁸

This part of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* recurs in two Pāli discourses in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and has two Chinese parallels, one of which occurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, while the other is an individual translation.¹⁴⁹ A description of the same events can also be found in the *Lalitavistara*, in the *Mahāvastu* of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda Vi-

AN I 249,30, and AN 10:24 at AN V 42,16, where the expression *bhāvitakāya* is followed by *bhāvitā-sīla*, and *bhāvitacitta* is followed by *bhāvitapaññā*. These listings do not give the impression as if the two terms were meant to refer to insight and tranquillity.

¹⁴⁶ The expression *yassa kassaci* at the beginning of the passage in question in MN 36 at MN I 239,21 hangs a little in the air, as it does not lead on to a corresponding *tassa* or *tam aham vadāmi*, unlike the Sanskrit version, where *yasya kasyacid* is followed by *tam aham ... vadāmy*. This gives the impression that a transmission error occurred at this junction of the Pāli discourse, whereby the references to the “development of the body” and the “development of the mind” were associated with one type of feeling only.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. also below p. 730 note 222.

¹⁴⁸ MN 36 at MN I 240,26 abbreviates the part recording the meetings with Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, as these had already been given in MN 26, while the Sanskrit fragment reports these in full, cf. above p. 175.

¹⁴⁹ The Pāli parallels are MN 85 at MN II 93 and MN 100 at MN II 212 (in E^e the relevant section is in each case abbreviated); the Chinese parallels are EĀ 31.8 at T II 670c-672b, part of which has been translated in Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 12-14, and T 757 at T XVII 598a-599c. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 757 was translated by Wéijìng (惟淨). T 757 has the title “discourse that raises the bodily hairs out of joy”, 身毛喜豎經. The first parts of EĀ 31.8 and T 757 parallel MN 12, cf. above p. 115 note 86 and p. 105 note 33; for comparative remarks on MN 36 cf. also Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 1-25.

naya, and in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*.¹⁵⁰ The part of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* that records the Buddha's awakening after he had given up his ascetic practices has also a parallel in a passage from the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*.¹⁵¹

According to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, the Buddha preceded an account of his ascetic practices by delivering three similes. These similes compare an attempt to reach awakening without being bodily and mentally withdrawn from sensuality to trying to light a fire with wood that is immersed in water or else taken out of water but still wet.¹⁵²

MN I 240

In contrast, just as lighting a fire will only be possible with dry wood, similarly only someone who is bodily and mentally withdrawn from sensuality will be able to reach awakening, an ability that is, however, independent of whether he practises austerities or not.¹⁵³ In the Sanskrit fragment version, these similes occur after the description of the ascetic practices and thus lead over to the bodhisattva recollecting an earlier experience of the first *jhāna* (see table 4.9).¹⁵⁴

While the *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* agree with the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* on placing these three similes before the bodhisattva's ascetic practices,¹⁵⁵ the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* first describes most of the ascetic practices and only then comes to the three similes.¹⁵⁶

As the three similes in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* imply that awakening does not necessarily require austerities, it is puzzling that the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* places them before the bodhisattva's ascetic practices. If the bodhisattva had already realized that austerities are not necessary for awakening before undertaking them, there would have

¹⁵⁰ The relevant parts of the *Lalitavistara* can be found in Lefmann 1902: 246-264 and 343-350 or in Vaidya 1958b: 181-193 and 250-253, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 169-186 or in Senart 1890: 121-133, and the corresponding parts of the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 100-106 and 116-119.

¹⁵¹ T 1428 at T XXII 780c-781a.

¹⁵² In the case of the second simile, while E^e-MN I 241,26 reads *kāyena c' eva kāmehi avūpakaṭṭhā*, B^e-M I 308,22, C^e-M I 574, and S^e-M I 449,6 read *vūpakaṭṭhā*, which, given the context, is the preferable reading, as also noted by Trenckner 1888/1993: 550 (B^e-M I 308,21 also reads *kāyena c' eva cittena ca*, which would not fit the case described in the second simile); cf. also Dutoit 1905: 32. The corresponding passage in fragment 336r5 in Liu 2009: 57 in fact reads *kāyena vyapakṛṣṭā viharanti [na] ci[tt](e)[n](a)*, cf. also Liu 2009: 110 note 1 and 3, although then fragment 336v1 in Liu 2009: 58 repeats the same formulation for the third simile, where, judging from the context, one would rather expect the reading *kāyena vyapakṛṣṭā viharanti cittena ca*.

¹⁵³ MN 36 at MN I 242,14 follows the third simile with the conclusion "if they feel racking ... painful feeling ... if they do not feel racking ... painful feelings – they are capable of knowledge, vision and supreme awakening", *opakkamikā ce pi te ... dukkhā ... vedanā vediyanti ... no ce pi te ... opakkamikā dukkhā ... vedanā vediyanti, bhabbā va te nānāya dassanāya anuttarāya sambodhāya* (B^e-MN I 308,26: *vedayanti*).

¹⁵⁴ Fragment 335v7 in Liu 2009: 57.

¹⁵⁵ Lefmann 1902: 246,9 or Vaidya 1958b: 181,17 and Basak 1965: 169,10 or Senart 1890: 121,1. Another occurrence of these three similes can be found in T 190 at T III 764c12.

¹⁵⁶ Gnoli 1977: 104,20. Although at this point the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* has described most of the ascetic practices, it nevertheless follows the three similes with a short description of how the bodhisattva subsisted on a single fruit per day, cf. Gnoli 1977: 105,29, so that in its account, too, the similes do not really mark the end of his ascetic practices.

been little reason for him to engage in them at all.¹⁵⁷ In this respect, the Sanskrit fragment version's presentation seems to fit the context better.

Table 4.9: Buddha's Autobiographical Report in MN 36 and its Parallel

MN 36	DĀ Sanskrit fragments
going forth (1)	going forth (→ 1)
meeting Ālāra and Uddaka (abbreviated) (2)	meeting Ālāra and Uddaka (full) (→ 2)
three similes (3)	forceful mind control (→ 4)
forceful mind control (4)	various forms of breath control (→ 5)
various forms of breath control (5)	decision to fast completely (→ 7)
<i>devas</i> think him dead (6)	<i>devas</i> propose divine nourishment (→ 8)
decision to fast completely (7)	taking only minimal food (→ 9)
<i>devas</i> propose divine nourishment (8)	body extremely emaciated (→ 10)
taking only minimal food (9)	<i>devas</i> comment on his skin colour (→ 11)
body extremely emaciated (10)	three similes (→ 3)
people comment on his skin colour (11)	recollection of 1 st <i>jhāna</i> experience (→ 12)
recollection of 1 st <i>jhāna</i> experience (12)	4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 13)
4 <i>jhānas</i> (13)	recollection of past lives (→ 14)
recollection of past lives (14)	divine eye (→ 15)
divine eye (15)	destruction of influxes (→ 16)
destruction of influxes (16)	(≠ 6)

The same argument does not apply to the account given in the *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu*, since their version of the three similes only highlights the need to stay aloof from sensuality in body and mind, without drawing the conclusion that awakening can be reached independent of the practice of austerities.¹⁵⁸ Hence in these versions,

¹⁵⁷ Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1229 note 387 comments: “it is puzzling that ... the Bodhisatta is shown engaging in self-mortification *after* he had here come to the conclusion that such practices are useless for the attainment of enlightenment. This dissonant juxtaposition of ideas raises a suspicion that the narrative sequence of the sutta has become jumbled. The appropriate place for the simile ... would be at the end of the Bodhisatta’s period of ascetic experimentation, when he has acquired a sound basis for rejecting self-mortification”. The commentary, Ps II 288,17, however, explains that even though the practice of austerities was not required for the bodhisattva to reach awakening, he nevertheless undertook these practices to set an example of his energetic striving to others. In a similar vein, the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 250,21 or Vaidya 1958b: 184,3 suggests that the bodhisattva undertook austerities in order to humble other ascetics and to confound his adversaries.

¹⁵⁸ After the third simile, the *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* conclude that one who thus stays aloof from sensuality will be able to reach awakening with whatever painful feelings he experiences, without considering the alternative possibility, envisaged in the Pāli version, that such a one may also reach awakening without undergoing painful feelings, cf. Lefmann 1902: 247,14 or Vaidya 1958b: 182,7: *kim cāpi te ātmopakramikām ... duḥkhām ... vedayante, atha khalu punarbhavyā eva te uttari-manusyadharmaḍ-alamāryajñāna-darśana-viśeṣam sāksātkartum*, and Basak 1965: 172,11 or Senart 1890: 123,5: *kim cāpi te ... ātmopakramikām ... duḥkhām ... vedayanti, atha khalu bhavyā ca te uttari-manuṣya-dharmaḍ-masya jñānāye darśanāye saṃbodhāye*. The *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 105,25 also takes up only one possibility, in its case, however, the possibility that awakening can be gained without under-

the import of the three similes is only that for asceticism to bear fruit, bodily and mental withdrawal from sensuality is required. The *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* continue in fact by reporting how the bodhisattva reflected that he would be able to reach awakening by undertaking austerities while staying aloof from sensuality in body and mind.¹⁵⁹

Thus what causes the similes in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* to be off sequence in the overall account is the statement made after each of them, which relates the ability to reach awakening to two alternatives: one might engage in austerities or one might not engage in austerities (the *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* consider only the first option of these two).

In the case of the first and second simile, this double statement just conveys the sense that, unless sensuality is overcome, it is irrelevant if one engages in austerities or not, since one will anyway be able to reach awakening. In the case of the third simile, however, the implication is that awakening is possible with austerities as well as without austerities.

Were it not for this last part of the statement made after the third simile, the whole set of three similes would fit its present position, being simply an illustration of the need to overcome sensuality as a necessary condition for asceticism to bear its fruit.

Whatever may be the final word on this passage, the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, the Sanskrit fragment version, their *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel, the *Lalitavistara*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* agree in reporting that the bodhisattva practised breath control. According to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and its Sanskrit fragment parallel, the Buddha explained to Saccaka that the painful feelings that arose during this practice did not affect his mind.

MN I 242

The *Saṅghabheda-vastu* also refers to the bodhisattva remaining unaffected and explains that this was because the bodhisattva had “developed the body”,¹⁶⁰ a point also made in the Sanskrit fragment parallel to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.¹⁶¹

This remark relates the exposition to the introductory topic of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and gives the impression that the account found in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* might have originated from a version of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, since otherwise there would be little reason for the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* to refer to development of the body in the present context.

going painful experiences: *kimcāpi te na imām evaṇrūpām ātmopakramikām duḥkhām ... vedayante, atha ca punas te alām jñānāya, alām darśanāya, alām anuttarāyai samyaksam̄bodhaye*. Fragment 336v2 in Liu 2009: 58 reads *kim cāpi te nemām evaṇrūpām ātmopakramikām [d](u)hkhām [tī]vrām kharām kātukām amānāpām vedanām vedayante, atha ca punas te [nā]lam jñānāya nālām darsā[n]jāya [n]ālam anuttarāyai samyaksa(m)vodhaye*. Liu 2009: 114 emends the negations *nālām* to *alām*, noting (p. 28) that the Chinese version of the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, T 1450 at T XXIV 121a14, also reads 非正智, 非正見, 不能得於無上正道.

¹⁵⁹ Lefmann 1902: 248,1 or Vaidya 1958b: 182,14 and Basak 1965: 173,4 or Senart 1890: 123,11.

¹⁶⁰ Gnoli 1977: 100,15: *yathāpitad bhāvitatvāt kāyasya*.

¹⁶¹ E.g., fragment 333r2 in Liu 2009: 53 explains that the painful feeling did not overwhelm the bodhisattva’s mind because he had developed the body, *yathāpi tad bhāvitakāyasya*.

MN I 245 The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* reports that *devas* commented on the condition of the striving bodhisattva, wondering whether he was already dead or about to pass away.¹⁶² At first sight this passage seems to come out of order, since even though breath control must have been an exhausting practice, a description of the appearance of the bodhisattva's body as if he were close to death may seem to find a better placing after the prolonged fasting described later on in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*.¹⁶³

A passage in the *Mahāvastu*, however, offers a perspective that would help to render the sequence in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* understandable. According to this *Mahāvastu* passage, the bodhisattva's father had sent some of his men to follow the bodhisattva and keep the king informed of his son's undertakings and welfare. When the bodhisattva undertook the practice of breath control, these men had come to the conclusion that he must be dead, since his breathing had stopped.¹⁶⁴

The same interpretation would also fit the comment made by the *devas* in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, who may have thought him to be dead or dying for the same reason. That is, although the fasting practices would certainly have brought the bodhisattva to a condition close to death, breath control might have resulted in a condition that outsiders could mistake for death.

According to the *Mahāvastu*, the bodhisattva's father did not believe his messengers, since he was convinced that the bodhisattva had not passed away but was rather in deep concentration.¹⁶⁵ This would fit the reaction of some *devas* in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, since unlike those *devas* who thought that the bodhisattva was dead or dying, other *devas* believed that his condition was in conformity with the abiding of an arahant.¹⁶⁶ This type of comment could stem from a line of reasoning similar to that of the bodhisattva's father in the *Mahāvastu*.

¹⁶² MN 36 at MN I 245,1. Such a comment is not reported in the Sanskrit fragment parallel.

¹⁶³ This suggestion would find support in EĀ 31.8 at T II 671a7, according to which the *devas* made their comment on the bodhisattva's death-like condition after he had undertaken his prolonged fast and reached a state of extreme weakness. The same EĀ 31.8 at T II 671a12, however, takes up the practice of breath control only after the *devas* comment on the bodhisattva's state of extreme emaciation and therewith also after his fasting. Thus the account in EĀ 31.8 is also not without difficulties, as with a body weakened due to prolonged fasting it would have been difficult to undertake the practice of breath control. Another support for associating the fasting practices with a condition near death can be gathered from the *Mahāvastu*, which after describing the pitiable condition of the bodhisattva due to his fasting practices records how *devas* commented that he must be dead, as there was no strength left in him, cf. Basak 1965: 324,7 or Senart 1890: 232,17: "when the *devas* had seen the weak body of the hero, they said: 'the sage is dead'", *devatā dṛṣṭvā kāyam vīrasya durbalam, āhansu muni kālagato*.

¹⁶⁴ Basak 1965: 291,2 or Senart 1890: 208,4: "the prince is dead, he does not exhale or inhale", *kālagato kumāro ti, no pi uśvasati na praśvasati*.

¹⁶⁵ According to the *Mahāvastu*, Senart 1890: 208,19, the king replied: "the prince is not dead, he has attained a peaceful concentration", *na kumāro kālagato, śāntam samādhiṁ samāpanno* (Basak 1965: 292,3 reads *śāntim*). In a somewhat similar vein, Ps II 289,17 reports that, when the bodhisattva engaged in ascetic practices, *devas* told his father that the prince had died, but King Suddhodana did not believe them.

¹⁶⁶ MN 36 at MN I 245,3: "the recluse Gotama is not dead, nor is he dying, the recluse Gotama is an ar-

Support for this suggestion could be gathered from one of the two extant Chinese translations of the *Udāna-(varga)*, which contains a brief report of the future Buddha's ascetic practices and his subsequent awakening. This report indicates that *devas* came to the conclusion that the bodhisattva was dead or else had reached the final goal on seeing that he no longer breathed.¹⁶⁷

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, its Sanskrit fragment parallel, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* record that the bodhisattva also thought of going on a complete fast, but then decided to take only extremely small quantities of particular types of food. According to these versions, the bodhisattva decided against complete fasting because *devas* had offered to nourish him with divine food, if he should decide to completely abstain from food.¹⁶⁸ This offer prompted the bodhisattva to give up the plan of undertaking a complete fast, as to allow *devas* to provide him with divine nourishment would turn his claim to be fasting into a falsehood.¹⁶⁹

The *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* also report that the bodhisattva declined to be fed by *devas*, although in their account this offer comes once the bodhisattva has decided to give up asceticism and to take nourishment.¹⁷⁰

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and its parallels agree in describing the physical condition of the bodhisattva in similar terms, reporting his extreme state of emaciation and weakness.¹⁷¹ After taking asceticism to its extremes, the bodhisattva reflected that he had nevertheless not been able to reach awakening, a point at which he recalled a past *jhāna* experience.

hant, because the way of abiding of an arahant is like this”, *na kālakato samano gotamo na pi kālam karoti, arahām samāno gotamo, vihāro tveva so arahato evarūpo hoti* (B^e-MN I 311,24: *kālankato*, C^e-MN I 580,17: *trev’ eso*).

¹⁶⁷ T 212 at T IV 644b13: 觀見菩薩無出入息, 或言命終, 或言滅度. A similar situation is also described in SĀ 807 at T II 207a26.

¹⁶⁸ MN 36 at MN I 245,8, fragment 334v2 in Liu 2009: 55, EĀ 31.8 at T II 670c19, and Gnoli 1977: 102.

The suggestion by Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 15 that according to EĀ 31.8 “the future Buddha intends to fast to death” need not be the case, as the passage reads more naturally if one assumes the idea to be simply to employ fasting as a way to reach awakening, without intending to fast to death.

¹⁶⁹ The notion of receiving divine nourishment is a well-known motif in the Digambara Jain tradition, according to which an accomplished saint no longer partakes of ordinary human food, cf. Jaini 1979/1998: 36 and Schubring 1962/2000: 61.

¹⁷⁰ The *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 264,4 or in Vaidya 1958b: 193,13 and the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 183,4 or in Senart 1890: 131,2, cf. also Basak 1965: 286,3 and 335,1 or Senart 1890: 204,14 and 240,18. Dutoit 1905: 68 comments that this passage in the *Mahāvastu* and in the *Lalitavistara* would be a later invention, caused by a shift of the idea of completely cutting off food to the end of the account of the ascetic practices. The same *Mahāvastu* at a later point of its narration in Basak 1965: 322,11 or in Senart 1890: 231,10 differs from its own earlier account, as it reports that the bodhisattva did go on a complete fast for eighteen months, *astādaśā māsā sarvaśo anāharatāye pratipannah*, a fast undertaken after having lived for eighteen months on a single jujube fruit per day, for another eighteen months on a single sesame seed per day, and for yet another eighteen months on a single grain of rice per day.

¹⁷¹ Cf. also Bapat 1923. For a comparable description of the condition of a Jain monk after prolonged fasting cf. the *Anuttarovavāiyadasā* in Barnett 1907/1973: 130-133 (translated ibid. pp. 115-118).

According to the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, its Sanskrit fragment parallel, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, the bodhisattva remembered a first *jhāna* he had experienced before going forth.¹⁷² The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the *Lalitavistara* differ in so far as according to them the bodhisattva on that former occasion attained not only the first, but all four *jhānas*, a suggestion made also in the *Milindapañha*.¹⁷³ Discourses in the *Madhyama-āgama*, the *Buddhacarita*, the *Divyāvadāna*, and several Chinese biographies of the Buddha agree with the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* that the bodhisattva only attained the first *jhāna* on that former occasion.¹⁷⁴

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and its Sanskrit fragment parallel report that this took place when his father was engaged in work and the bodhisattva was seated under a Jambu tree,¹⁷⁵ without specifying his age. The Pāli commentaries indicate that at this time the bodhisattva was still an infant, with the *Milindapañha* suggesting that he was only one month old.¹⁷⁶ In the *Mahāvastu* account of this former *jhāna* experience, however, the bodhisattva is already a young man.¹⁷⁷ According to the sequence of events in the *Buddhacarita* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, this first *jhāna* experience happened just before he went forth.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷² MN 36 at MN I 246,31, fragment 336v6 in Liu 2009: 58, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* in T 1428 at T XXII 781a5 (translated in Bareau 1963: 48), the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 182,12 or Senart 1890: 130,16 (cf. also Basak 1965: 64,13 or Senart 1890: 45,14), and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 108,1 (cf. also p. 190,17).

¹⁷³ EĀ 31.8 at T II 671b11, Lefmann 1902: 263,17 or Vaidya 1958b: 193,7, cf. also T 187 at T III 560b17, Mil 290,1, cf. also T 189 at T III 629a27, T 193 at T IV 66b18, and Bu ston's "History of Buddhism" in Obermiller 1932/1986: 15. Durt 1982: 116 considers this to be an absurd exaggeration that causes the event to lose part of its premonitory sense ("exagération absurde, qui fait perdre à l'événement une partie de son sens préfiguratif"); cf. also Foucher 1949: 93. To attribute the attainment of all four *jhānas* to the bodhisattva already at this point would indeed seem somewhat exaggerated and would already equip him with the meditational proficiency required for developing the three higher knowledges in the night of his awakening.

¹⁷⁴ MĀ 32 at T I 470c19 and MĀ 117 at T I 608a3, *Buddhacarita* stanza 5:10 in Johnston 1936/1995a: 46 (cf. also T 192 at T IV 8c16), the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 391,16 or in Vaidya 1999: 250,1, T 184 at T III 467b24, T 186 at T III 499b9, and T 190 at T III 706a20.

¹⁷⁵ On the significance of the Jambu tree in the recurrent reference to Jambudipa cf. Wujastyk 2004.

¹⁷⁶ Ps II 290,25 narrates that his father went to the ploughing festival "taking hold of" his son, *puttam ghetvā agamāsi*, and indicates that a "bed", *sayana*, was prepared for him and then his "wet nurses", *dhātī*, left him alone under the Jambu tree. This suggests that he must have been an infant, needing nurses to look after him and being unable to walk on his own to the festival. According to Mil 289,26, he was one month old, *ekamāsiko samāno*.

¹⁷⁷ According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 64,4 or in Senart 1890: 45,4, before this experience of absorption the bodhisattva took a stroll, *bodhisatvo udyānabhūmiye anucānakramanto*, and then sat down under the Jambu tree on his own. Moreover, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 202,4 or in Senart 1890: 144,6 reports that the bodhisattva's *jhāna* experience under the Jambu tree made his father anxious that the bodhisattva might want to go forth. In order to prevent this, the father sent women to the bodhisattva, instructing them to entertain the bodhisattva with song and dance. These details indicate that in the *Mahāvastu* account he is a young man already, otherwise the idea to entertain him with women who sing and dance would not have occurred to the father.

¹⁷⁸ The description of the bodhisattva's experience of the first absorption in *Buddhacarita* stanza 5:10 in

Thus, according to most versions, the bodhisattva's experience of the first *jhāna* took place when he had already grown up. Representations of this first *jhāna* experience in ancient Indian art also depict the bodhisattva as an adult, not as a small child.¹⁷⁹ This would better fit the general sequence of events, since a *jhāna* experience just before going forth could be seen as a powerful incentive for the bodhisattva to take the decisive step and embark on a spiritual life.¹⁸⁰ In contrast, a *jhāna* experienced as an infant would not stand in such a direct relation to his decision to go forth. To decrease the age at which this first *jhāna* was attained, however, clearly enhances the marvel of this experience.¹⁸¹ Thus, perhaps the tendency of enhancing the marvels and wondrous feats of the bodhisattva was responsible for the way the Pāli commentaries and the *Milindapañha* present the first *jhāna* experience of the bodhisattva.¹⁸²

The individual Chinese translation that parallels part of the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* differs from the other sources, as it places this first *jhāna* experience after the bodhisattva had gone forth.¹⁸³ Notably, this placing would fit with the main thrust of the autobiographical account given by the Buddha in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, whose purpose is to illustrate that from the time of his going forth pleasant or painful feelings had not overwhelmed him.¹⁸⁴ From this perspective, it would be more natural for the Buddha to bring up a *jhāna* experience he had after going forth, instead of a *jhāna* experience that happened before he went forth. The great majority of sources, however, agree that this *jhāna* experience happened before he went forth.

Johnston 1936/1995a: 46 and in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 76,24, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1450 at T XXIV 114a19 (cf. also T 191 at T III 944b26) and its Tibetan counterpart in D (1) 'dul ba, nga 6b5 or Q (1030) ce 6a3, locate this experience after his four encounters with an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a monk.

¹⁷⁹ This has already been noted by, e.g., Foucher 1903: 279 and Schlingloff 1987: 123; for representations of this event cf., e.g., Foucher 1905: 340-348, figures 175 and 176, id. 1918: 217, figure 413, Huntington 2001: 141, Karetzky 1992: 236, figures 27 and 28, Pal 1986: 205, Luczanits 2008b: 25 plate 8, Quagliotti 2000: 1128-1139, Sivaramamurti 1942/1956: 249-250, Stache-Weiske 1990: 110, Takata 1967: 33 figure 41; on the cultic significance of such images cf. also Schopen 2002: 367 and id. 2005: 128-137.

¹⁸⁰ Durt 1982: 115 concludes that a central element of this episode is the transforming effect this experience had on the bodhisattva.

¹⁸¹ Horsch 1964: 152 notes that to increase the age at which this experience took place would diminish the marvel of the experience; cf. also, however, Foucher 1905: 346-347, who supposes that representations of the meditation under the Jambu tree may have stimulated a tendency to increase the bodhisattva's age in the textual traditions.

¹⁸² Klimkeit 1990: 73 suggests that another contributing factor could have been the idea that for the bodhisattva as a young man to be meditating when his father is engaged in a ceremonial ploughing seemed unacceptable behaviour, a problem that disappears once he is held to have been too young to be able to aid his father.

¹⁸³ T 757 at T XVII 599a14: 初出家後.

¹⁸⁴ MN 36 at MN I 240,8: "since I ... went forth, for arisen pleasant feeling to overcome my mind and remain, or for arisen painful feeling to overcome my mind and remain, that has not been possible", *yato kho ahañ ... pabbajito, tam vata me uppānā vā sukhā vedanā cittāñ pariyyādāya thassati, uppānā vā dukkhā vedanā cittāñ pariyyādāya thassatī ti, n' etañ thānam vijjati* (C^e-MN I 566,7: *n' etañ kho thānam*).

The bodhisattva's memory of this first *jhāna* experience is also noteworthy since according to the traditional account, found for example in the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, he attained the sphere of nothingness and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception under his two teachers Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta.¹⁸⁵

According to other discourses, mastery of the four *jhānas* is a precondition for being able to reach any of the immaterial attainments.¹⁸⁶ This in turn implies that, for the bodhisattva to be able to attain these two immaterial spheres, he must have developed the ability to attain all four *jhānas* at some earlier point during his quest for awakening or while being with Ālāra Kālāma, in which case one might wonder why he should now recall only a first *jhāna* experience.¹⁸⁷

A closer inspection of the formulation in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* makes it clear that the point at stake is not the first *jhāna* as such. The decisive insight obtained by the bodhisattva at this point rather appears to be that the happiness experienced during *jhāna* need not be feared, as this happiness is aloof from sensual attraction.¹⁸⁸ From this perspective, it would be less important whether the *jhāna* he remembered took place before or after he went forth, in fact a *jhāna* experienced before his going forth would be a fitting starting point for developing a new approach to awakening, as this experience happened spontaneously and without a teacher.

In contrast, any *jhāna* practice undertaken under the tuition of Ālāra Kālāma would presumably have been experienced with a particular perspective on the nature and significance of the experience of *jhāna*, perhaps considering *jhāna* as merely a stepping-stone to the immaterial attainments. From such a perspective, the happiness of the first *jhāna* may have been perceived as something coarse that one needs to leave behind, since to indulge in such happiness could become a hindrance for further progress towards the immaterial attainments.

The bodhisattva's insight into the nature of the happiness of *jhāna* would stand in contrast to such an attitude and also in contrast to his earlier belief that freedom from

¹⁸⁵ The bodhisattva's reflection in MN 26 at MN I 165,12 indicates that what Ālāra Kālāma taught was the full-fledged attainment of the sphere of nothingness, as this attainment is specified to lead to rebirth in the sphere of nothingness, *ākiñcaññāyatānūpapatti*. The ability of Ālāra Kālāma to attain profound levels of concentration is confirmed in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, according to which he was able to enter such deep concentration that he did not even notice five hundred carts passing by close to him, cf. DN 16 at DN II 130,11 and its parallels DĀ 2 at T I 19a12, T 5 at T I 168b3, T 6 at T I 183c15, T 7 at T I 197c13 (only fifty chariots), and the Sanskrit version in S 360 folio 190V2 in Waldschmidt 1950: 27 (not all Chinese versions explicitly identify him as Ālāra Kalāma).

¹⁸⁶ Cf., e.g., DN 33 at DN III 265,18, which presents the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments as part of a set of *nava anupubbavihārā*, an expression that indicates that these levels of concentration are to be attained in progressive succession.

¹⁸⁷ This problem is raised by Ireland 1998: 195.

¹⁸⁸ MN 36 at MN I 247,3: "I am not afraid of this happiness, as this happiness is apart from sensuality and unwholesome states", *na kho aham tassa sukhassa bhāyāmi, yam tam sukhām aññatr' eva kāmehi aññatram akusalehi dhammehi* (C^e-MN I 584,4 and S^e-MN I 458,5: *yantam*, after which S^e continues directly with *aññatr' eva*, without mentioning *sukham*).

dukkha cannot be reached through something that involves the experience of happiness.¹⁸⁹ The decisive insight at the present junction of events thus appears to be that happiness per se is not a problem, as wholesome types of happiness can be conducive to awakening.¹⁹⁰

This shift of perspective throws into relief the all-important distinction between what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, a distinction that runs like a red thread through the early discourses. Based on this shift of perspective, the bodhisattva would then have used the same *jhānas* that earlier led him to the immaterial attainments as a basis for developing the three higher knowledges.

His attainment of the four *jhānas* and the three higher knowledges is described in MN I 247 similar terms in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, its Sanskrit fragment parallel, their *Ekottari-ka-āgama* parallel, and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*.¹⁹¹

The individual Chinese translation, the *Lalitavistara*, and the *Mahāvastu* differ in that they present the first and second higher knowledges in the opposite sequence. Thus ac-

¹⁸⁹ MN 85 at MN II 93,15: “before my awakening ... it occurred to me: ‘happiness will not be reached through [a practice that involves] happiness, happiness will be reached [only] through [a practice that involves] pain”, *mayham ... pubbe va sambodhā ... etad ahosi, na kho sukhena sukham adhigantabbam, dukkhenā kho sukham adhigantabban ti*.

¹⁹⁰ Cf., e.g., MN 66 at MN I 454,23 and its parallel MĀ 192 at T I 743a15, which qualify the happiness of the *jhānas* to be the “happiness of complete awakening”, *sambodhasukha* (S^e-MN II 190,7: *sambodhi-sukha*), or more precisely the “happiness that leads to complete awakening”, 正覺之樂.

¹⁹¹ MN 36 at MN I 247,17, fragment 337r4 in Liu 2009: 59, EĀ 31.8 at T II 671c27, and T 1428 at T XXII 781a23. Vetter 1996: 62 notes that the specification which in MN 36 at MN I 247,33 is applied to each *jhāna*, according to which such kind of pleasant feeling, *sukhā vedanā*, did not affect the bodhisattva’s mind, would not fit the case of the fourth *jhāna*. The corresponding passage in fragment 337v7 in Liu 2009: 60 instead qualifies the feelings experienced (in relation to each of the four absorptions) as peaceful and agreeable, *sāntāñ śubhāñ*. Another problem is highlighted by Schmithausen 1981: 222 note 75, who draws attention to a grammatical peculiarity in the presentation of these three higher knowledges, where MN 36 at MN I 248,1+21 and MN I 249,6 introduces each of the higher knowledges with an aorist form, *abhininnāmesīñ*, but then continues in the case of the first two knowledges in the present tense, MN I 248,2+13: *anussarāmi*, MN I 248,22+24+34: *passāmi* and *pajānāmi*. Only in relation to the third knowledge does MN 36 proceed with aorist forms, cf. MN I 249,7+8+9+10+11+12+13+18: *abhaññāsiñ*. The *Mahāvastu* similarly introduce the first higher knowledge with *abhinirnāmaye* (in Basak 1965: 389,12 or in Senart 1890: 283,14), but then continue with present tense forms, such as *pas-yati* (Basak 1965: 389,13 and 390,8 or Senart 1890: 283,15 and 284,4), *prajānati* (Basak 1965: 389,14 or Senart 1890: 283,16), and *jānāti* (Basak 1965: 390,9 or Senart 1890: 284,5). In relation to the second higher knowledge, the *Mahāvastu* employs *abhinirnāmavesi* (Basak 1965: 390,11 or Senart 1890: 284,7) and *samanusmare* (Basak 1965: 390,12 or Senart 1890: 284,8), but then reads *anusmarati* (Basak 1965: 391,5 or Senart 1890: 284,14). The occurrence of the same pattern in MN 36 and the *Mahāvastu* suggests this aspect of the description of the first two higher knowledges to be fairly ancient. A possible explanation could be that these different forms are the outcome of a reciter’s error, who might have unintentionally applied the formula used in descriptions of the gradual path, found, e.g., in MN 27 at MN I 182,19, to the present account of past events. Another explanation could be that the use of the present tense stands for the historical present and expresses the fact that, whereas the destruction of the influxes is a historically unique event that takes place only once, the other two higher knowledges are experiences that can be attained again and again.

cording to these versions, the bodhisattva first attained the divine eye and only after that did he develop recollection of his own past lives.¹⁹²

The *Saṅghabheda-vastu*'s account agrees with the sequence of the higher knowledges found in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*. It differs, however, in so far as it reports that the bodhisattva acquired all six supernormal knowledges (*abhiñña*), which in addition to the three higher knowledges comprise the exercise of supernormal powers, the divine ear, and telepathic knowledge of others' minds.¹⁹³

¹⁹² T 757 at T XVII 599b20, Lefmann 1902: 344,9 or Vaidya 1958b: 250,12, Basak 1965: 184,12 and 389,13 or Senart 1890: 132,6 and 283,15. The same sequence recurs in the *Mahāvastu* account of the awakening of the previous Buddha Dīpañkara, cf. Basak 1963a: 282,1 or Senart 1882a: 228,13. The *Buddhacarita* stanza 14:2+7 in Johnston 1936/1995a: 157-158, however, agrees with the sequence in MN 36, as it first mentions recollection of past lives and only then the divine eye. For variations in the sequence of the three higher knowledges in the context of listings of the six *abhiññas* cf. Dayal 1932/1970: 107-108.

¹⁹³ Gnoli 1977: 116,20. A similar presentation recurs in a Sanskrit fragment in Waldschmidt 1960/1967: 406-408. Yet another perspective can be found in AN 9:41 at AN IV 448,13, according to which the Buddha only claimed to be fully awakened after being able to attain the four *jhānas*, the four immaterial attainments, and the attainment of cessation. After his apprenticeship under Uddaka Rāmaputra, the Buddha would have been able to enter the eight attainments, which thus leaves only the attainment of cessation for the night of his awakening. Notably, the description of his attainment of cessation in AN 9:41 at AN IV 448,7 reads *āsavā parikkhayam agamamṣu*, thereby using an aorist form that differs from the standard formulation *parikkhīṇā honti*. According to Somaratne 2003: 214, in the standard description “the past participle (*parikkhīṇā*) + the historical present *honti* may express the pluperfect in *Pāli*: what had happened at that time, what had been done. Taking *parikkhīṇā honti* as a pluperfect, we might interpret the stock passage to mean [that] when the person attained cessation, he had already destroyed the mental corruptions”; for a criticism of this suggestion cf. Schmithausen 2000a: 39 note 69. Somaratne 2003: 216 explains that the reading *āsavā parikkhayam agamamṣu* in AN 9:41 implies that here “the Buddha is talking about a past experience where he achieved the cessation for the first time”. This past experience would then have coincided with his attainment of full liberation, whereas in the standard descriptions of the attainment of cessation in other discourses this need not be the case, as the destruction of the influxes might also precede such attainment. Wynne 2002: 31 concludes that the description in AN 9.41 “means that the Buddha attained liberation whilst in the state of cessation”. As Somaratne 2006b: 750 points out, cessation is simply a particularly thorough mode of experiencing Nirvāṇa. Thus, for the Buddha's awakening to take place through the experience of cessation would entail that his insight into the four noble truths (SN 56:11 at SN V 423,4), and in particular his realization of the third noble truth, namely his experience of Nirvāṇa, took place by way of attaining cessation. This would at the same time have been his insight into the dependent cessation of *dukkha* and therewith the completion of his knowledge of the principle of *paticca samuppāda* (described in detail in Vin I 1,7 or Ud 1:1 at Ud 1,8). Out of this experience of Nirvāṇa in the night of his awakening, all the other insights related to his awakening would have arisen as by-products of the same experience, be these insight into the elements (SN 14:31 at SN II 170,28 and SN 14:32 at SN II 172,5), into the aggregates (SN 22:26 at SN III 28,26, SN 22:27 at SN III 29,25 and SN 22:56 at SN III 59,8), into the sense-spheres (SN 35:13 at SN IV 7,28, SN 35:14 at SN IV 8,24, SN 35:15 at SN IV 9,29, SN 35:16 at SN IV 10,20, and SN 48:28 at SN V 206,1), into the faculties (SN 48:21 at SN V 204,5), into the world (AN 3:101 at AN I 259,5+26), or into heavenly realms (AN 8:64 at AN IV 304,22). De Silva 1987a: 49 compares the Buddha's awakening to a “circular vision, as when one is at the top of a mountain ... however different the sceneries may be from the different directions, all the scenes constitute one integrated ex-

When evaluating the variations found in regard to the sequence of these three higher knowledges, it could be noted that according to all versions the starting point for the development of the three higher knowledges was the bodhisattva's realization of the futility of his ascetic practices. This realization appears to have come as a result of reviewing what he had done so far. That is, reviewing what he had undertaken so far and searching for an alternative approach to liberation, he would eventually have remembered his former first *jhāna* experience. Once he had come to the point of recalling an event that according to the majority of sources would have taken place previous to his going forth, it would be natural to extend the same line of investigation further into the past by recollecting his past lives. Due to the mastery of the four *jhāna* acquired earlier, this would, according to early Buddhist meditation theory, have been within relatively easy reach and thus a natural option to continue his inquiry.

This would fit the sequence proposed in the *Mahāsaccaka-sutta*, its Sanskrit fragment parallel, the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel, and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, according to which recollection of past lives was the first of the three higher knowledges developed in the night of the Buddha's awakening.

Once he had in this way gained insight into his own samsāric past, to develop the divine eye as a way of ascertaining the same causes and conditions operative in the lives of others would come in its proper place.¹⁹⁴

This sequence finds support in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, which offers additional details on the relationship between the three higher knowledges. According to its report, once the bodhisattva had recollected his past lives, he wanted to ascertain the underlying cause of this samsāric process.¹⁹⁵ Developing the higher knowledge of the arising and passing away of beings provided an answer to this, since it revealed to him that beings migrate through samsāra in accordance with their karmic deeds. Based on this comprehensive vision of the continuous passing away and being reborn of beings in samsā-

perience of a person standing on a vantage point". Taken together, then, these various facets would have been the basis for the Buddha's claim that he had indeed accomplished full awakening, a certainty that would have arisen on retrospective review of the implications of the actual event of awakening.

¹⁹⁴ Ergardt 1977: 86 draws attention to a crescendo effect involved in the verbs used in this description, which proceed from *anussarati* used at MN I 248,2+13 for recollection of past lives to *pajānāti* used at MN I 248,24+36 for the divine eye, and then culminates in MN I 249,7+8+9+10+11+12+13+18 in *abhijā-nāti* used in relation to the destruction of the influxes. He comments that these verbs "denote a series of intensified knowledges related to release", a detail that fits well with the sequence of the three higher knowledges found in MN 36, EĀ 31.8, and T 1428.

¹⁹⁵ Gnoli 1977: 118,11. The reference to *cyutyupapādajñāna* as something the bodhisattva developed in the night of his awakening needs to be considered together with the suggestion in the same *Saṅghabheda-vastu* that already at his birth the bodhisattva had been endowed with the divine eye, cf. Gnoli 1977: 52,7: *sāmpratajāto bodhisattva ... divyena cakṣuṣā samavāgato*; cf. also its Chinese counterpart in T 191 at T III 940c18 and DN 14 at DN II 20,12, which makes a similar statement for the former Buddha Vipassī. Thus, from the perspective of the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* account, it seems that the bodhisattva did not develop this knowledge in the night of his awakening anew, but instead deepened an ability he already had and directed it to a particular object, namely to the arising and passing away of beings in accordance with their deeds.

ra,¹⁹⁶ according to the *Saṅghabhedavastu* the bodhisattva understood that the operating mechanism behind samsāric migration are the three influxes of sensuality, of [desire for] existence, and of ignorance.¹⁹⁷ The *Saṅghabhedavastu* continues by indicating that once the bodhisattva knew that these three influxes need to be eradicated, he developed insight into the four noble truths, eradicated the influxes, and reached full liberation, thereby going beyond any future transmigration in samsāra.¹⁹⁸

The *Mahāsaccaka-sutta* and its Sanskrit fragment parallel report that at the conclusion of the Buddha's autobiographical report of his progress to awakening, Saccaka asked if the Buddha would sometimes take a nap during the day, which the Buddha admitted. When Saccaka commented that this was considered by some as a sign of delusion, the Buddha clarified that one who has abandoned the influxes has gone beyond delusion. Saccaka noted with approval that the Buddha had not displayed any irritation on being challenged in this way,¹⁹⁹ delighted in the Buddha's words and left.²⁰⁰

MN 37 *Cūlatañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*

The *Cūlatañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on the destruction of craving”, records a visit paid by Mahāmoggallāna to Sakka, the king of gods.²⁰¹ This discourse

¹⁹⁶ Bronkhorst 2007: 144, however, holds that “the first and second knowledge ... have no obvious and intrinsic connection with liberation”, assuming that their purpose is only to attribute to the Buddha “a confirmation that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is true”.

¹⁹⁷ Gnoli 1977: 118,27. A complementary perspective on this insight can be found in the same *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 158,10, according to which the Buddha affirmed that his insight into the conditioning force of volitional formations as the factor responsible for rebirth was based on his knowledge of the arising and passing away of beings. That is, the second knowledge achieved in the night of his awakening appears to have been the basis for the Buddha's proclamation of the dependent arising of samsāric existence (while the dependent cessation of samsāric existence would have become clear to him with the attainment of the third higher knowledge). A complementary facet of the same insight is highlighted by Jayatilleke 1968: 316, who comments that “the awareness of the nature of the operations of karma is said to be the second ... knowledge (dutiyā vijjā) obtained by the Buddha on the night of his enlightenment”. Lopez 1992: 32 comments that with the divine eye “the bodhisattva sees, rather than infers, the fact of suffering ... and its immediate origin in the functioning of the karma of all beings in the universe”.

¹⁹⁸ Gnoli 1977: 118,30. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 186,12 and 391,13 or in Senart 1890: 133,11 and 285,2 additionally specifies that the Buddha's awakening took place within a single mind moment, *eka-cittakṣaya*, a specification found also in the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann: 350,14 or in Vaidya 1958b: 253,19.

¹⁹⁹ While MN 36 at MN I 250,27 contrasts such composure with the irritation displayed by the six contemporary teachers on being challenged by Saccaka (Pūraṇa Kassapa, etc.), the Sanskrit fragment 339v1 in Liu 2009: 62 appears to have referred to recluses and Brahmins in general.

²⁰⁰ In the Sanskrit fragment, Saccaka delivers a set of similes to illustrate his defeat, found at the conclusion of MN 35 and its parallels (cf. above p. 230). The fragment also records that he had gained faith in the Buddha, 339v7 in Liu 2009: 62: *tasmin khalu dharmaparyājye bhāsyamāne sātyakir nirgranthī-putro buddhe 'bhiprasanno dharma sanghe 'bhiprasannah*.

²⁰¹ On the role of Sakka in early Buddhism cf., e.g., Arunasiri 2006, Barua 1967: 183-184, Bingenheimer

has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.²⁰²

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions begin by narrating that Sakka paid a visit to the Buddha and asked how a monk can reach the destruction of craving.²⁰³ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha replied that a monk, who has heard that nothing is worth adhering to, develops direct understanding and contemplates the three types of feeling in terms of impermanence, fading away, cessation, and relinquishment. Contemplating in this way he goes beyond clinging as well as agitation and attains Nirvāṇa.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* account similarly instructs to avoid clinging to anything and to contemplate the three feelings as impermanent and subject to cessation, a contemplation that leads beyond agitation and issues in realizing Nirvāṇa.²⁰⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version provides an additional perspective on how to avoid clinging to any dharma, as it indicates that freedom from clinging comes about through insight into the empty nature of dharmas.²⁰⁵ Another difference is that in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version avoiding worldly perceptions leads from contemplating the three feelings to the transcendence of agitation required for realising Nirvāṇa.²⁰⁶

The *Samyukta-āgama* version does not record the instruction given by the Buddha at all. Instead, this version begins by relating that Mahāmoggallāna, who was in solitary seclusion on Mount Vulture Peak, remembered that on a former occasion Sakka had approached the Buddha and inquired about the destruction of craving.²⁰⁷ The three ver-

2008: 153, Godage 1945, Gokuldas 1951: 77-79, Jones 1979: 174-177, Kinnard 2004a, Marasinghe 1974: 146, Masson 1942: 45-52, Rahula 1978: 164-165, and Verpoorten 2010: 178-180.

²⁰² The parallels are SĀ 505 at T II 133b-134a and EĀ 19.3 at T II 593c-594c. While MN 37 locates the discourse in the Hall of Migāra’s Mother by Sāvatthī, SĀ 505 takes place in Rājagaha and EĀ 19.3 has Jeta’s Grove as its location. SĀ 505 has been translated in Anālayo 2011f, EĀ 19.3 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1998: 65-70. Akanuma 1929/1990: 58 gives “craving’s destruction”, 愛盡, as a tentative title for SĀ 505. The summary verse at T II 596c13 refers to EĀ 19.3 as “the abandoning of craving”, 斷愛.

²⁰³ Sakka’s reference to the destruction of craving at the outset of MN 37 at MN I 251,17 takes up a theme already broached towards the end of a discussion that according to DN 21 at DN II 283,9 took place during his first meeting with the Buddha. This suggests the present discourse to be a follow up of their earlier discussion, cf. in more detail Anālayo 2011f. For depictions of this earlier visit in art cf., e.g., the survey in Coomaraswamy 1928b.

²⁰⁴ My presentation of the *Ekottarika-āgama* instruction is based on a comparison of the three instances of this instruction in EĀ 19.3 at T II 593c18, T II 594b12, and T II 594c3, which record the instruction given by the Buddha to Sakka, the repetition of these instructions by Sakka to Mahāmoggallāna, and another repetition of these instructions by the Buddha to Mahāmoggallāna. These three instances differ considerably from each other, even though they are records of the same statement. A comparison of all three instances shows that the remark in Huyen-Vi 1998: 65 note 4 that the instruction in EĀ 19.3 “substantially differs from the Pāli” applies especially to the first instance in EĀ 19.3 at T II 593c18; on the version of the present passage found at T II 594c3 cf. also Pāsādika 2010: 88.

²⁰⁵ EĀ 19.3 at T II 594c4: 一切諸法空無所有.

²⁰⁶ EĀ 19.3 at T II 594b16+c7: 不起世間想.

²⁰⁷ SĀ 505 at T II 133b26.

sions agree that Mahāmoggallāna decided to visit the heaven of the Thirty-three to find out if Sakka had taken the Buddha's instruction to heart.

MN I 252 The *Cūlatañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta* and its parallels report that Sakka welcomed Mahāmoggallāna, the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse specifying that Sakka took a lower seat to sit down,²⁰⁸ after having offered a seat to Mahāmoggallāna.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version also describes that, when Mahāmoggallāna arrived, Sakka was surrounded by “five hundred [types of] heavenly instruments”.²⁰⁹ The counterpart to this description in the *Samyukta-āgama* clarifies that Sakka was bathing in a pond together with five hundred celestial maidens, who were entertaining him with song.²¹⁰

According to all versions, Mahāmoggallāna asked Sakka to repeat the Buddha's instruction on the destruction of craving. Sakka, however, evaded rehearsing the instruction he had received by indicating that he was busy.²¹¹ The *Samyukta-āgama* version

²⁰⁸ MN 37 at MN I 252,28: *sakko ... aññataram nīcam āsanam gahetvā ekamantam nisīdi*. Wagle 1985: 60 explains that in “encounters involving the Buddha and the gods, the ... standard description ... is that the gods ... stand on one side”. A departure from this pattern can be found in *Catuspariśat-sūtra* fragment S 360 folio 90V2 in Waldschmidt 1952: 13, which reports that Śakra once sat down when visiting the Buddha. Wagle 1985: 61 notes another such case in DN 32 at DN III 194,10+14+15+16+17, where the four Heavenly Kings and a following of various spirits sit down in the presence of the Buddha, which Wagle considers to be a “later interpolation by the compilers”. While the corresponding Sanskrit fragment 531,11V3 in Hoffmann 1939: 13 and the Tibetan version in Skilling 1994a: 462,9 also report that a Heavenly King sat down, *[e]kānta nyaṣ(i)dat* and *phyogs gcig tu 'dug go*, according to the Chinese version in T 1245 at T XXI 217a10 he stood at one side, 住立一面. Similar variations occur when the meeting takes place in a heavenly realm and not on earth. Thus in DN 14 at DN II 50,16 and in SN 55:20 at SN V 368,2 a group of *devas* remain standing in the presence of the Buddha who has come to visit them, as is the case for DĀ 1 at T I 10b14 (parallel to DN 14), whereas SĀ 1135 at T II 299b18 (parallel to SN 55:20) reports that the *devas* sat down. In the Pāli version of the same encounter at Vin I 26,24, however, Sakka remains standing. Variations can also be observed in the case of encounters that do not involve the Buddha, where *devas* tend to remain standing when visiting humans. Thus, for example, in SN 11:9 at SN I 226,22 (or SN² 255 at SN² I 488,2), Sakka remains standing when conversing with humans. Sakka and his following also remain standing on the occasions of other visits of Mahāmoggallāna to their realm, described in SN 40:10 at SN IV 270,2, SN 55:18 at SN V 366,18, and SN 55:19 at SN V 367,19. In SĀ 507 at T II 134c26 (parallel to SN 55:18) four *devas* visit Mahāmoggallāna and sit down to converse with him. In AN 6:34 at AN III 332,16 and AN 7:53 at AN IV 76,7, Mahāmoggallāna visits a Brahmā and in both instances the latter sits down. If it was indeed considered customary for *devas* to remain standing on the occasion of meeting humans, departures from such a pattern could be the result of transmission errors, where during the process of transmission of the discourses the pericope “he sat down”, used so frequently when describing human visitors who come to see the Buddha or his disciples, may have been applied to passages that originally spoke of remaining in the standing posture.

²⁰⁹ MN 37 at MN I 252,18: *dibbehi pañcahi turiyasatehi samappito* (B^e-MN I 319,6; *tūriyasatehi*).

²¹⁰ SĀ 505 at T II 133c2: 五百嬌女遊戲浴池. That these five hundred maidens were singing becomes clear when Sakka, on seeing Mahāmoggallāna approach, tells them to stop singing, SĀ 505 at T II 133c4: 莫歌.

²¹¹ According to MN 37 at MN I 252,37, Sakka explained that “what has been well heard ... that does not quickly disappear”, *sussutam yeva hoti ... yan no khippam eva antaradhāyati* (B^e-MN I 319,22 and C^e-

reports that he even somewhat wittily suggested that Mahāmoggallāna might best approach the Buddha with this question, so that, after having heard it from the Buddha, Mahāmoggallāna could remember it accordingly.²¹²

The three versions report that Sakka invited Mahāmoggallāna for a tour of the heavenly palace.²¹³ In the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, Sakka explained that a former victory over the *asuras* had been the occasion for constructing this palace, an explanation not given in the *Samyukta-āgama* version.²¹⁴

MN I 253

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version reports that when Sakka's celestial maidens saw Mahāmoggallāna approaching the palace, they felt ashamed and retired into their room.²¹⁵ The *Samyukta-āgama* account offers additional details that explain their embarrassment. According to its report, these celestial maidens had seen Sakka approaching the palace from afar and had come forward dancing and singing.²¹⁶ On coming closer they realized that Sakka was in the company of a monk, which caused them to withdraw in embarrassment. That is, their embarrassment was due to having acted in the presence of a monk in a way considered improper.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Samyukta-āgama* versions agree in comparing the embarrassment of Sakka's maiden to the embarrassment a woman experiences on seeing her father-in-law.

The same simile occurs also in a discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama* (not otherwise related to the *Cūlatanhnāsañkhaya-sutta*), which specifies that the woman who is embarrassed on meeting her father-in-law is “newly married”.²¹⁷ A discourse in the *Aniguttara-nikāya* explains that a newly married woman – who according to traditional customs goes to live with her husband – will be abashed and ashamed in the presence of

MN I 594,28: *yam*). In SĀ 505 at T II 133c11, however, he indicated that “sometimes [I] recall a previous matter, sometimes [I] do not remember [it]” 或憶先事, 或時不憶, and according to EĀ 19.3 at T II 594a10 he explained that “what has been heard by me is quickly forgotten”, 我所聞者, 即時而忘. The Chinese renderings could be due to a misunderstanding of the negation *no* for being the first person plural of the personal pronoun, as it is not unusual for kings and *devas* to refer to themselves in this way. That the proper sense should be that Sakka had not forgotten, however, suggests itself from the later part of MN 37 and EĀ 19.3, which make it clear that he did remember the Buddha's instruction.

²¹² SĀ 505 at T II 133c12.

²¹³ Arunasiri 2006: 633 comments that this invitation for a tour of the palace appears to have been “to divert the attention of the elder elsewhere”, i.e., away from the question he had asked and thereby away from the topic of the destruction of craving.

²¹⁴ MN 37 at MN I 253,2 and EĀ 19.3 at T II 594a12.

²¹⁵ MN 37 at MN I 253,16. An extract from the present study already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 11-12.

²¹⁶ SĀ 505 at T II 133c16. Sakka's maidens coming forward dancing and then withdrawing in embarrassment on realizing that they are in the presence of a monk is also mentioned in a set of stanzas by Mahāmoggallāna in MĀ 131 at T I 622b14. A stone carving on a pillar of the stūpa of Bharhut vividly depicts the Vejayanta palace as a three-storied building with beautiful maidens looking out of its windows and other beautiful maidens in front of the building dancing to the accompaniment of music; cf. Cunningham 1879: 109 and 118 and plate 16. Although this stone carving does not bear any explicit relation to the present discourse, its charming representation would fit the present scene only too well.

²¹⁷ MĀ 30 at T I 465a18: 初迎新婦.

her in-laws.²¹⁸ These passages help clarifying the import of the comparison drawn in the *Cūlatanhāsankhaya-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel between the embarrassment of Sakka's celestial maidens and the embarrassment of a – presumably 'newly' – married woman.

According to the *Cūlatanhāsankhaya-sutta* and its parallels, Mahāmoggallāna acknowledged that the beauty of the palace was a fruit of Sakka's merits. In the Pāli version, he remarks that whenever humans see anything lovely, they associate this with the splendour of the gods of the Thirty-three.²¹⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse reports him comparing Sakka's behaviour to human beings who for any small fortune start congratulating each other, followed by explaining that Sakka's palace and those small fortunes are just the outcome of previous good deeds.²²⁰ In this way, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version makes explicit what seems to be implicit in the Pāli version, namely that instead of bragging about his present fortune and possessions, Sakka should be more concerned with the type of wholesome action that results in such fortune.

MN I 254 As this first attempt to arouse Sakka from his smugness did not have an effect, according to all versions Mahāmoggallāna decided to use stronger means to shake Sakka's complacency by undertaking a supernormal feat and shaking the heavenly palace with his toe. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions report that after this

²¹⁸ AN 4:74 at AN II 78,20. Wagle 1966: 93 explains that "a bride on marriage goes to the family of her husband which is alien to her" (although Jain 1947: 160 notes exceptions to this general pattern). While "she sees her husband and his parents as a single category to whom she owes respect and obedience", they in turn "see her as an alien coming to seek membership". Hence, a newly married woman may indeed feel embarrassed and ashamed in the presence of her in-laws. Von Hinüber 1993: 102 draws attention to Vin IV 21,3, where a mother-in-law addresses her daughter-in-law with *je*, an expression elsewhere used to address a female slave, cf., e.g., MN 21 at MN I 125,18. Norman 1994/1996: 58 adds that the same *je* is also used to address a courtesan, cf., e.g., DN 14 at DN II 96,14+19 (on prostitution in ancient India cf., e.g., Bhattacharji 1987). This form of address reflects the low social position of a daughter-in-law in the household of her in-laws. Horner 1930/1990: 1 explains: "since performance of the funeral rites was thought to be essential to a man's future happiness, he usually married chiefly in order to gain this end", i.e., to have a son who could perform the funeral rites. "He regarded his wife simply as a child-bearer", as a consequence of which "her life was spent in complete subservience to her husband and his parents. She was allowed little authority at home and no part in public activities". On feelings of embarrassment or shame by a newly married woman in ancient India society cf. also Hara 2006: 146.

²¹⁹ MN 37 at MN I 253,28: *manussā pi kiñcid eva rāmaṇeyyakam ditthā evam āhamsu, sobhati vata bho devānam tāvatiṁśānan ti*, which Chalmers 1926: 182 translates as: "mortals, too, jubilantly exclaim, at sight of anything delightful, that it is as splendid as the Thirty-Three", Horner 1954/1967: 309 renders this passage as: "people seeing anything delightful speak thus: 'Indeed it shines forth from the *devas* of the Thirty-three'", while Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 346 translates it as: "whenever human beings see anything lovely, they say: 'Sirs, it does credit to the gods of the Thirty-three!'". My résumé of this sentence is oriented on the readings found in B^e-MN I 320,16 and S^e-MN I 467,19: *sobhati vata bho yathā devānam tāvatiṁśānan ti*, cf. also Neumann 1896/1995: 282, who translates: "die Menschen sagen ja, wenn sie irgend etwas Entzückendes sehn: 'Ach das glänzt wie bei den Dreihunddreißig Göttern!'"

²²⁰ EĀ 19.3 at T II 594a22: "just like among men, on the occasion of any small happiness, they congratulate each other, the divine palace is not different, all are due to the results of one's own formerly done meritorious deeds", 猶如人間小有樂處, 各自慶賀, 如天宮無異, 皆由前身作福所致.

supernormal feat Mahāmoggallāna asked again for the instruction delivered by the Buddha. Stirred by the feat performed by Mahāmoggallāna, Sakka right away repeated the instruction he had received earlier from the Buddha.²²¹

The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse differs in so far as it already concludes after the supernormal feat, reporting only that Sakka explained to his celestial maidens that Mahāmoggallāna was not his teacher but a co-disciple,²²² a clarification made also in the *Cūlatañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*.²²³

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions continue by reporting how MN I 255 Mahāmoggallāna approached the Buddha and requested another repetition of the instruction on the destruction of craving.²²⁴ This request is puzzling, since according to both versions he had been sitting close to the Buddha when Sakka came and received this instruction in the first place.²²⁵ Thus, Mahāmoggallāna's intention to find out if Sakka had rightly understood and remembered this instruction would have been fulfilled once Sakka had properly repeated it, without any further need to check with the Buddha. Moreover, according to a discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and its parallels this particular instruction should have been quite familiar to Mahāmoggallāna, as in these discourses it forms the culmination point of a teaching he received from the Buddha previous to his own attainment of awakening and therewith previous to the events recorded in the present discourse.²²⁶

MN 38 *Mahātañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*

The *Mahātañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the destruction of craving”, gives a detailed exposition of dependent arising (*paṭicca samuppāda*). This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²²⁷ A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.²²⁸

²²¹ MN 37 at MN I 254,11 and EĀ 19.3 at T II 594b8.

²²² SĀ 505 at T II 134a3.

²²³ MN 37 at MN I 255,7.

²²⁴ MN 37 at MN I 255,15 and EĀ 19.3 at T II 594b27.

²²⁵ MN 37 and EĀ 19.3 report that, when visiting Sakka, Mahāmoggallāna referred to the contents of the instruction given by the Buddha, cf. MN 37 at MN I 252,32: “the Blessed One spoke in brief [concerning] liberation through the destruction of craving”, *bhagavā saikhittena tañhāsaṅkhayavimuttiṁ abhāsi*, and EĀ 19.3 at T II 594a7: “the Blessed One gave you the teaching on eradicating craving and desires”, 世尊與汝說斷愛欲之法. This suggests that, when he was sitting close by while the Buddha instructed Sakka, Mahāmoggallāna had already heard what the Buddha said.

²²⁶ AN 7:58 at AN IV 88,12 and its parallels MĀ 83 at T I 560b4 and T 47 at T I 837c5.

²²⁷ The parallel is MĀ 201 at T I 766b-770a, which agrees with MN 38 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 201 is entitled after the monk Sāti, who in both versions is the cause for the delivery of the discourse (嚩帝經 according to a 宋, 元, and 明 variant). A discourse quotation in the *Dharmaskandha* also entitles the discourse after this monk, T 1537 at T XXVI 507c8: 教誨莎底經, the corresponding Sanskrit fragment 4737 folio 5v10 in Dietz 1984: 34,1 reads *uktam bhagavatā svātiṇī / bhājikṣuṇī kaivarttappūrvviṇam ārabhya*. On MĀ 201 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 57-58, 127, and 165. Lévi 1915: 421 notes that the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya includes the present discourse in a list of *sūtras*.

MN I 256 The *Mahātañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* report in similar ways that the monk Sāti,²²⁹ who thought that according to the Buddha the same consciousness transmigrates through the round of rebirths,²³⁰ upheld his view even when told by other monks that this was in contradiction to the Buddha's teaching. According to both versions, the monks presented the matter to the Buddha, who called Sāti to his presence and rebuked him for his obstinate adhering to such a misrepresentation of the teachings.²³¹

MN I 259 The two discourses continue with the Buddha explaining that consciousness is a dependently arisen phenomenon, reckoned according to the sense in dependence on which it arises, just as fire is reckoned according to its fuel.²³²

MN I 260 According to the *Mahātañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta* and its parallel, the Buddha next engaged the other monks, present on this occasion, in a catechism on the dependent nature of what has “come to be”.²³³ The commentary explains that the Buddha used this expres-

known among well instructed lay disciples, T 1435 at T XXIII 174b21: 室喉兜那都叉耶時月提, glossed as 索滅解脫經. The Chinese *Udāna* collection, T 212 at T IV 734c16, has a discourse quotation from the 大愛之本末所說, a formulation that reminds of the title of MN 38, which it allocates to a *Madhyama-āgama*, although the quote itself takes up different types of rebirth.

²²⁸ SHT V 1114 (pp. 108-109) and SHT V 1166 (pp. 162-163; cf. also SHT VII p. 284 and SHT VIII p. 197). SHT V 1114 and SHT V 1166 parallel the discussion at MN I 256,31; SHT V 1114 also has parts of the exchange at MN I 258,14. For a discourse quote in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 242.

²²⁹ MN 38 at MN I 256,12 qualifies Sāti as a “fisherman's son”, *kevattaputta*, which MĀ 201 at T I 766c2 renders as 雞和哆子. Rhys Davids 1901: 866 explains that in ancient India “trades and crafts were very largely hereditary ... families are frequently referred to in terms of their traditional calling, just as a man is often described ... in terms of his father's trade: ‘Sāti the fisherman's son' for ‘Sāti the fisherman’”.

²³⁰ MN 38 at MN I 256,14: *tad ev idam viññānam sandhāvati samsarati, anaññan ti* and MĀ 201 at T I 766c3: 今此識往生、不更異. Norman 1991/1993a: 256 draws attention to passages that reflect ideas similar to Sāti's view, found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.2 and 4.4.22, according to which when life ends and the senses cease, the ‘being’ departs as consciousness, *sa viññāno bhavati, sa viññānam evānvavakrāmati*, followed by identifying consciousness as the great unborn self, *sa vā esa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yanviññānamayaḥ prāneśu*, cf. Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 270 and 278.

²³¹ The formulation used in MN 38 at MN I 258,16 by Sāti to explain his view of consciousness, *vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānam kamnānam vipākam paṭisanyvedeti ti*, recurs in MN 2 at MN I 8,23 as a view that obstructs progress to liberation from *dukkha*, further specified to imply the assumption that this self is eternal.

²³² A minor difference in sequence is that MĀ 201 at T I 767b7 describes Sāti's dismay only after this exposition, whereas MN 38 at MN I 258,28 has the same before it. That the Buddha in reply to Sāti's misunderstanding turns right away to the topic of dependent arising shows, as pointed out by Buddhadāsa 1979/1992: 25, that Sāti's view was due to his lack of understanding *paticca samuppāda*.

²³³ MN 38 at MN I 260,7: *bhūtam idan ti* (S^e-MN I 478,1: *bhūtam idam* without *ti*), whose equivalent in MĀ 201 at T I 767b12 reads “truly said”, 真說, apparently following a secondary meaning of *bhūta* as “truth” in opposition to *abhūta* as “falsehood”. Another occurrence of the expression *bhūtam idam*, found in SN 12:31 at SN II 48,4, has its counterpart in “truth”, 真實, in SĀ 345 at T II 95b17, which thus seems to follow the same shade of meaning as MĀ 201. Regarding the expression “this originates with nutriment”, *tad āhārasambhavan ti*, found in MN 38 at MN I 260,8, the corresponding passage in MĀ 201 at T I 767b17 has the somewhat puzzling reading “the Tathāgata's true words”, 如來真說. Watanabe 1972: 981 and the 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition p. 1845 note 3 suggest that this may be a

sion in order to broaden the scope of his exposition from consciousness to all five aggregates.²³⁴ In both versions this catechism culminates in warning the monks that they should not grasp or cling to their own view, reminding them of the simile of the raft.²³⁵ In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the Buddha at this point also asks the monks how they would answer if they were to be questioned by an outsider on the purpose and benefit of their view. The monks reply that the purpose of their view is disenchantment and dispassion.²³⁶

Both versions next turn to the four types of nutriment and trace their conditioned arising from craving all the way back to ignorance, followed by tracking the same dependent sequence forwards from ignorance up to old age and death. The Pāli version concludes this examination with a summary statement on specific conditionality (“when this exists, that exists; with the arising of this, that arises”),²³⁷ a statement not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. Both versions follow with the same catechism on the cessation aspect of dependent arising, again with the difference that the *Madhyama-āgama* version does not have a summary statement on specific conditionality in the cessation mode.

The *Mahātañhāsaṅkhaya-sutta* and its parallel continue by reporting the monks’ affirmation that they were aloof from speculations about the self in relation to past, future, and present times.²³⁸ According to both versions, the monks also declared that they did not speak like this out of respect for their teacher, but out of personal knowledge,²³⁹ proclaiming that it was out of the question for them to change teacher, or to be concerned with auspicious signs and similar externals held in esteem among other recluses and Brahmins.

The *Madhyama-āgama* account reports that the monks made several additional assertions, such as that they would be incapable of committing any of the five heinous crimes, or would never go so far as to forsake their precepts and give up their practice of the path.²⁴⁰ Although the details differ, the basic point made in both versions is the same, in

mistaking of “nutriment”, *āhāra*, for “worthy”, *araha*, which the translator then took to refer to the Tathāgata.

²³⁴ Ps II 307,10.

²³⁵ MN 38 at MN I 260,35 and MĀ 201 at T I 767c7, spoken in reference to a simile delivered in MN 22 at MN I 134,30, MĀ 200 at T I 764b19, and EĀ 43.5 at T II 760a13.

²³⁶ MĀ 201 at T I 767c17: 為厭義, 為無欲義.

²³⁷ MN 38 at MN I 262,37: *imasmiñ sati idam hoti, imass' uppādā idam uppajjati.*

²³⁸ MN 38 at MN I 264,37 and MĀ 201 at T I 769a10. In a similar vein, SN 12:20 at SN II 26,24 and its parallels SĀ 296 at T II 84b27 and fragment S 474 folio 11V6-R2 in Tripāṭhī 1962: 40 relate insight into dependent arising to going beyond such speculations.

²³⁹ Lamotte 1983: 92 comments on the present passage that the Buddha “réclame de ses disciples une conviction spontanée sur quelques points précis de doctrine”.

²⁴⁰ MĀ 201 at T I 769a21+24. The five heinous crimes are killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arahant, creating a schism in the monastic community, and causing injury to a Buddha (with malicious intent). The same five feature as impossibilities for a noble disciple in MN 115 at MN III 64,30 and AN 1:15 at AN I 27,13.

that the monks were endowed with the personal knowledge of a disciple in higher training (*sekha*).

The two versions next turn to the three conditions for the conception of a foetus. The same topic recurs as a discourse on its own in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.²⁴¹ While the *Madhyama-āgama* version simply enumerates the three conditions,²⁴² the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse also mentions the possibility that the mother is not in season or that the being to be reborn is not present, both of which would prevent conception from taking place.²⁴³ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version takes up the different possibilities that could prevent conception in more detail, listing various possible afflictions of the mother or the father.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ EĀ 21.3 at T II 602c-603a.

²⁴² MĀ 201 at T I 769b23. MN 93 at MN II 157,1 also merely enumerates the three conditions. A discourse quotation (not specific to the present discourse) in Abhidh-k 3:12 in Pradhan 1967: 121,22 parallels the reference to the three conditions for conceptions in MN 38 at MN I 265,35; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 44c26, T 1559 at T XXIX 201c22, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 110a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 126a1. Versions of this discourse quotation can also be found in *Dharmaskandha* fragment 4737 folio 6r1 in Dietz 1984: 34,3 and in its Chinese counterpart T 1537 at T XXVI 507c8, as well as in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 309a12 or 356c27. The same three conditions recur also in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 1,14 and 440,12 or Vaidya 1999: 1,9 and 286,11, in the *Pravrajyāvastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in Dutt 1984d: 25,11 and fragment folio 6v10 in Vogel 1992: 81, and in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya 1957: 21,17 and T 1579 at T XXX 282b25; cf. also Hara 2009: 220-221. A complementary perspective on the *ghabbassāvakkanti* can be found in AN 3:61:9 at AN I 176,30.

²⁴³ MN 38 at MN I 265,37 refers to this being to be reborn as a *gandhabba*. DN 15 at DN II 63,2 refers to the same in terms of the “consciousness”, *viññāṇa*, that descends into the mother’s womb. According to Böhtlingk 1883/1998b: 150, one of the meanings of the term *gandharva* is the soul after death, before it enters a new body (“die Seele nach dem Tode, bevor sie in einen neuen Körper einzieht”). MW: 346 s.v. *gandharva* similarly speaks of “the soul after death and previous to its being born again”. The implications of this term are reflected in the Chinese translations: MĀ 201 at T I 769b24 reads 香陰, corresponding to *gandhabba*, and has “birth aggregate”, 生陰, as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading. EĀ 21.3 at T II 602c19+20 speaks of the “external consciousness”, 外識, and then of the “consciousness that wishes [to be reborn]”, 欲識. On the *gandhabba* or *gandharva* cf. also Anālayo 2008c, Blum 2004: 204, Harvey 1995a: 105-108, Hoffman 1987/1992: 67-69, Karunaratne 2003b: 132-133, Langer 2000: 9-17, MacDonell 1897/2000: 136-137, Malalasekera 1937/1995: 746, Masson 1942: 121-123, McDermott 1980: 170-171, Oldenberg 1894/1983: 249-254, Pischel 1889: 77-81 (who suggests the meaning “foetus”), Premasiri 2005a: 525, Przyluski 1938: 45, Somaratne 2005: 176-177, Upadhyaya 1971: 374-375, Wayman 1974: 231-234, Wijesekera 1994: 175-212, and Windisch 1908: 14-27. Another shade of meaning of the term can be seen in Ud 5:5 at Ud 54,16, which includes *gandhabbas* in a list of beings that inhabit the ocean. Hecker 1972: 198 notes that the *gandhabbas* as celestial musicians are the type of celestial beings most closely similar in nature to humans and may for this reason have been chosen as pars pro toto to represent a being to be reborn. Oberlies 2005: 98 explains that in Vedic literature “the function of the *Gandharvá* is ... to escort things from ‘outside’ into *this* world”, adding that “seemingly the *Gandharvá* was identified now and then with the item he is guarding”. Ibid (p. 108) then suggests that its function in the context of the early Buddhist listing of three conditions required for conception could similarly be that of escorting the *viññāṇa* from one existence to the next, a role which would, in analogy to its Vedic predecessor, also allow for an identification of the *gandhabba* with the *viññāṇa*.

²⁴⁴ EĀ 21.3 at T II 603a13 then concludes by instructing the monks to train themselves in order to elimi-

The *Mahātañhāsankhaya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report how, after successful conception,²⁴⁵ following the period of the mother's pregnancy a child is born, grows up, and develops a liking for pleasant experiences and a dislike for unpleasant ones.²⁴⁶ The grown-up thereby delights in feeling, which in turn leads to the remaining links of dependent arising.²⁴⁷ In both versions, the present passage thus forms a practical application of the previous treatment of dependent arising by way of its twelve links in forward and backward order, illustrating how delight in feeling leads to clinging and therewith to the conditioned arising of *dukkha*. MN I 266

The two versions next take up the arising of a Tathāgata, which the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse treats in detail by giving a full account of the gradual path of training.²⁴⁸ Its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel does not have such a full account of the gradual path of training. Instead, it only briefly notes that a Tathāgata arises in the world, after which it straightaway turns to detachment in relation to feelings, thereby providing a contrast to the child described earlier.²⁴⁹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version has a similar statement at the end of its detailed exposition of the gradual path of training.

A problem with this part of the *Majjhima-nikāya* version is that it refers to the need to stay aloof from likes and dislikes in regard to sensory experience twice. The first instance occurs as part of the gradual path under the heading of sense-restraint, the second is part of the final passage found in both versions on being unattached in regard to whatever feelings arise at any sense-door.²⁵⁰

As a result of this repeated treatment, the *Mahātañhāsankhaya-sutta* turns to mindfulness of the body and aloofness from likes and dislikes only after the attainment of the four *jhānas*. This way of presentation goes against the usual sequence of practice depicted in the *Nikāyas* and *Āgamas*, where mindfulness of the body and aloofness from sensory attraction are preconditions for developing the *jhānas*.

nate these three conditions, 斷三因緣如是, 諸比丘, 當作是學, which perhaps intends that they should practise until they transcend future rebirth.

²⁴⁵ For a treatment of the development of a foetus, once conception has occurred, in the *Garbhavākrāntisūtra* cf. Kritzer 2008, for the same in Kṣemendra's *Garbhavākrāntyavadāna* cf. Hahn 1997.

²⁴⁶ Both versions describe that the child is without mindfulness in regard to the body and with a narrow state of mind, cf. MN 38 at MN I 266,24: *anupat̄hitakāyasati ca viharati parittacetaso* and MĀ 201 at T I 769b29: 不立身念少心. Regarding the children games described in MN 38 at MN I 266,14 cf. the study of various such games in Ramers 1996: 183-200.

²⁴⁷ According to MĀ 201 at T I 769c10, at this point the Buddha also explained that Sāti was under the influence of craving, a point made in MN 38 at MN I 271,1 towards the end of the discourse.

²⁴⁸ MN 38 at MN I 267,13.

²⁴⁹ The subject of the description of detachment in regard to feelings in MĀ 201 at T I 769c14 is “he”, 彼. Judging from the corresponding passage in MN 38 at MN I 270,9, the subject should be a disciple in general, not the Tathāgata. In fact, the point made in both versions is to depict the path to freedom from likes and dislikes and therewith to freedom from the dependent arising of *dukkha*. To exemplify this, the example of a disciple who undertakes the gradual path would be a more straightforward illustration.

²⁵⁰ MN 38 at MN I 269,2 and at MN I 270,9. The two instances are, however, not identical, as in the first case the description is part of a process of training, whereas in the second case the context suggests some degree of accomplishment.

It could also be questioned how far a full account of the gradual path of training fits the present context, since in other discourses such an account is usually given to newcomers or outsiders, or else when the context requires such a detailed treatment. The present discourse's main concern, however, is dependent arising, which would not require a full account of the gradual path of training. The audience of the Buddha in this particular instance are monks who are already disciples in higher training. Thus the members of his audience would have been well acquainted with the gradual path of training from their own experience and would therefore not need to be given a detailed account of it.²⁵¹ These points would support the presentation in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which does not have a full account of the gradual path.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse concludes with the monks rejoicing, to which the *Madhyama-āgama* version adds a triple shaking of numerous world systems.²⁵²

MN 39 *Mahā-assapura*

The *Mahā-assapura-sutta*, the “greater discourse at Assapura”, explains what makes a monk a true “recluse”. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.²⁵³ A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.²⁵⁴

MN I 271 The three parallel versions agree in listing the qualities that make monks true recluses, although with some differences (see table 4.10). The *Mahā-assapura-sutta* begins by stipulating a sense of shame and fear of wrongdoing,²⁵⁵ a quality not mentioned in its parallels.²⁵⁶ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by highlighting the need to

²⁵¹ Manné 1995: 16 notes that especially in the *Silakkhandha-vagga* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* a full treatment of the gradual path often functions as a “coup de grâce ... in the Buddha's answer to the challenges made by his opponents”, a role that supports the impression that a full account of the gradual path is usually part of a discourse given to outsiders or new converts, not to disciples in higher training.

²⁵² MĀ 201 at T I 769c28 speaks of a “a triple shaking of the three-thousand great thousand[-fold] world elements”, 三千大千世界三反震動.

²⁵³ The parallels are MĀ 182 at T I 724c-725c and EĀ 49.8 at T II 801c-802b. MĀ 182 and EĀ 49.8 agree with MN 39 on the location where the discourse was spoken. MĀ 182 has the title “discourse at Horse City”, 馬邑經, and thus agrees with MN 39, although without qualifying this discourse to be a “greater” one. A counterpart to the first section of MN 39 can be found in a discourse quotation in the Chinese *Udāna* collection, T 212 at T IV 681a22. Skilling 1997a: 339 notes a reference to a version of the present discourse by the title *dge sbryong*, “recluse”, found in an *uddāna* preserved in Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabhaṣya* at D (4094) *mngon pa*, ju 235b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 269a4.

²⁵⁴ SHT I 562 (p. 250, identified in Schlingloff 1967: 422; cf. also SHT VIII p. 176), and SHT VI 1392 (p. 113; cf. also SHT VIII p. 204). SHT I 562 parallels the assumption that nothing more needs to be done, found at MN I 271,26; SHT VI 1392 parallels the instruction to purify mental conduct at MN I 272,20; SHT I 562 and SHT VI 1392 also parallel part of the description of sense-restraint at MN I 273,3. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t cf. below note 274.

²⁵⁵ MN 39 at MN I 271,22: *hirottappena samannāgatā bhavissāmā ti*.

²⁵⁶ Another difference is that while in MN 39 at MN I 271,13 and MĀ 182 at T I 724c23 the Buddha approaches this topic directly by telling the monks how their claim to being a recluse will not be in vain

develop pure physical, verbal, and mental conduct, as well as pure livelihood. These four qualities recur also in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.²⁵⁷ The next quality in the Pāli version is the need to develop restraint of the sense-doors,²⁵⁸ a need also taken into account in the Chinese versions.

Table 4.10: Qualities of a True Recluse in MN 39 and its Parallels

MN 39	MĀ 182	EĀ 49.8
sense of shame (1)	pure bodily conduct (→ 2)	sense-restraint (→ 6)
pure bodily conduct (2)	pure verbal conduct (→ 3)	moderation with food (→ 7)
pure verbal conduct (3)	pure mental conduct (→ 4)	wakefulness (→ 8)
pure mental conduct (4)	pure livelihood (→ 5)	destroy influxes (→ 17)
pure livelihood (5)	sense-restraint (→ 6)	
sense-restraint (6)	clear comprehension (→ 9)	
moderation with food (7)	remove 5 hindrances (→ 10)	
wakefulness (8)	attain 4 <i>jhānas</i> (→ 11-14)	
clear comprehension (9)	destroy influxes (→ 17)	
remove 5 hindrances (10)	(# 1, 7-8, 15-16)	(# 1-5, 9-16)
attain 1 st <i>jhāna</i> (11)		
attain 2 nd <i>jhāna</i> (12)		
attain 3 rd <i>jhāna</i> (13)		
attain 4 th <i>jhāna</i> (14)		
recollect past lives (15)		
divine eye (16)		
destroy influxes (17)		

The *Mahā-assapura-sutta* continues by turning to moderation with food.²⁵⁹ The same quality recurs only in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, which compares food to grease, used to treat a sore or to smear the axle of a chariot.²⁶⁰ The same image recurs in discourses in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and the Chinese *Dīrgha-āgama* to illustrate moderation with food.²⁶¹ The *Mahā-assapura-sutta* next takes up the development of wakefulness,²⁶² a quality found only in its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version's

MN I 273

and offerings given to them will be fruitful, in EĀ 49.8 at T II 801c19 he instead differentiates between two types of recluse, the “practising recluse”, 習行沙門, and the “confirmed recluse”, 誓願沙門 (I follow the indication by Hirakawa 1997: 1077 that 誓願 can render *pratijñā*, which seems to fit the present case, as this recluse represents an arahant), after which Ānanda requests that the Buddha gives further explanations.

²⁵⁷ MĀ 182 at T I 724c28. For a discussion of the reference to pure mental conduct in this context cf. below p. 427 note 173.

²⁵⁸ MN 39 at MN I 273,3.

²⁵⁹ MN 39 at MN I 273,22: *bhojane mattaññuno bhavissāma* (S^e-MN I 500,4: *mattaññū*).

²⁶⁰ EĀ 49.8 at T II 802a10.

²⁶¹ SN 35:198 at SN IV 177,1 and DĀ 20 at T I 84c23; cf. also EĀ 21.6 at T II 604a3+8, Vism 32,16, and the *Saundaranandakāvya* 14:11-12 in Johnston 1928: 97,7. A counterpart to this simile can be found in the Jain *Viyāhapaṇṇatti* 7.1.23 in Lalwani 1980: 15,14.

²⁶² MN 39 at MN I 273,35: *jāgariyam anuyuttā bhavissāma* (S^e-MN I 500,18: *jāgariyamanuyutī*).

description of wakefulness resembles the *Majjhima-nikāya* instructions, in addition to which it also speaks of giving attention to the thirty-seven requisites to awakening (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*) by day and by night.²⁶³

In relation to this difference, it could be noted that, although the various mental qualities and activities subsumed under the heading of ‘thirty-seven requisites to awakening’ occur frequently in the discourses, the heading itself appears to belong to a later period.²⁶⁴

MN I 274 After describing the development of wakefulness, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version turns to the practice of clear comprehension of activities.²⁶⁵ This practice recurs also in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, but is absent from the *Ekottarika-āgama* account.²⁶⁶ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions also agree that the next thing to be done is to retreat into seclusion, followed by overcoming the five hindrances and attaining the four *jhānas*, a progress of practice not taken into account in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version. The Pāli discourse offers a set of illustrative similes for each hindrance and for each of the *jhānas*, similes not found in the Chinese parallels.²⁶⁷

In regard to the considerable difference between the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation and the other two versions, it is noteworthy that even though this discourse occurs among the elevens of the *Ekottarika-āgama*, it presents only four qualities that make up a true recluse. This gives the impression that its presentation could be due to a loss of seven qualities from an earlier list of eleven qualities.²⁶⁸

²⁶³ EĀ 49.8 at T II 802a16: 思惟三十七道之法.

²⁶⁴ Gethin 1992a: 14.

²⁶⁵ MN 39 at MN I 274,13: *satisampaṭaññena samannāgatā bhavissāma*.

²⁶⁶ MĀ 182 at T I 725b8: 當學正知出入，善觀分別。

²⁶⁷ MN 39 at MN I 275,8. Both sets of similes recur as part of the standard expositions of the gradual path in nearly every discourse of the *Silakkhandha-vagga* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*: DN 2 at DN I 71,30, DN 3 at DN I 100,6, DN 4 at DN I 124,24, DN 5 at DN I 147,8, DN 6 at DN I 157,21, DN 7 at DN I 159,16, DN 8 at DN I 172,26, DN 9 at DN I 182,12, DN 10 at DN I 207,15, DN 11 at DN I 214,23, DN 12 at DN I 232,13, and DN 13 at DN I 250,29 (all occurrences abbreviated except for DN 2). While the similes for the *jhānas* recur also in MN 77 at MN II 15,11 and MN 119 at MN III 92,28, the similes for the hindrances are not found elsewhere in the *Majjhima-nikāya*. Yit 2004b: 262 note 461 highlights that MN 39 refers to not incurring a loss of wealth not only in relation to being released from prison (MN I 275,27), but also in relation to crossing a desert (MN I 276,5). The corresponding set of similes in DN 2 at DN I 72,17, however, only mentions loss of wealth in the case of the first of these two similes. The set of similes for the hindrances has a counterpart in DĀ 20 at T I 85a25, although occurring in a different sequence, which proceeds from release from servitude (4th in MN 39), via repayment of a loan (1st in MN 39), recovery from disease (2nd in MN 39), release from prison (3rd in MN 39), to safely crossing a desert with wealth (5th in MN 39). Another occurrence can be found in T 21 at T I 265c17, which lists repayment of a loan (1st in MN 39), release from slavery (4th in MN 39), release from prison (3rd in MN 39), recovery from disease (2nd in MN 39), and safely travelling an evil path with wealth (5th in MN 39). The same DĀ 20 at T I 85b14 continues with the four *jhāna* similes, similes also found in MĀ 81 at T I 555b20 and MĀ 98 at T I 582c22. For a more detailed examination of the *jhāna* similes cf. below p. 674.

²⁶⁸ Judging from the overall dynamics, these seven missing qualities might have covered the development of fourfold purity by way of body, speech, mind, and livelihood, the practice of clear comprehension of activities, the removal of the five hindrances, and the development of the four *jhānas*. Although this re-

The Pāli version continues at this point with recollection of past lives and the ability MN I 278 to directly perceive the passing away and reappearing of beings according to their deeds, two higher knowledges not mentioned in its two Chinese parallels.²⁶⁹ The three versions agree, however, on insight into the four noble truths and the destruction of the influxes as the culmination point of the practice.²⁷⁰

In relation to this difference, it would seem that, since the two higher knowledges are not required for the destruction of the influxes, they may also not be absolutely necessary for becoming a true recluse. Other Pāli discourses similarly proceed directly from the four *jhānas* to the destruction of the influxes, without bringing in the other two higher knowledges.²⁷¹ In the end, it is the third of these higher knowledges that, according to all versions of the present discourse, definitely turns a monk into a true recluse.

The *Mahā-assapura-sutta* employs the image of a mountain lake to illustrate the MN I 279 destruction of the influxes, a simile not found in the two parallel versions.²⁷² In its stead, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version presents a stanza spoken by the Buddha, according to which one becomes a recluse by eradicating evil and a pure Brahmin by leaving behind all delusion.²⁷³

The three versions conclude by giving a deeper meaning to terms like “recluse” and MN I 280 “Brahmin”, explaining them to stand for qualities of a fully awakened one.²⁷⁴

mains entirely hypothetical, at least the practice of clear comprehension of bodily activities is not totally absent from EĀ 49.8, since its initial exposition of the two types of recluse at T II 801c21 characterizes the “practising recluse” as one who undertakes bodily activities – such as going and coming, looking up and down, wearing robes and bowl – in accordance with the Dharma, a description similar to the standard expositions of clear comprehension of activities, cf., e.g., MN 10 at MN I 57,5 and its parallel MĀ 98 at T I 582b25.

²⁶⁹ Demiéville 1927: 284 remarks that out of the three higher knowledges, MĀ 182 mentions only the knowledge that is properly Buddhist, “des trois *vidyā* est seule mentionnée celle qui est proprement bouddhique”.

²⁷⁰ MN 39 at MN I 279,20, MĀ 182 at T I 725b26, and EĀ 49.8 at T II 802a22.

²⁷¹ Cf., e.g., MN 112 at MN III 36,14, AN 4:198 at AN II 211,10, AN 5:75 at AN III 93,4, and AN 5:76 at AN III 100,14.

²⁷² MN 39 at MN I 279,32. This simile recurs in DN 2 at DN I 84,13, in the Chinese parallel DĀ 27 at T I 109b9 (here abbreviated, to be supplied with the full version found at T I 86c8), and in a parallel passage in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, Gnoli 1978a: 251,1. The same simile occurs in MN 77 at MN II 22,4, in which case the simile is not found in the parallel version MĀ 207 at T I 783b16.

²⁷³ EĀ 49.8 at T II 802a29.

²⁷⁴ MN 39 at MN I 280,9 gives a deeper meaning to the terms “recluse”, *samāṇa*, “Brahmin”, *brāhmaṇa*, “one who has been washed”, *nahātaka* (B^c-MN I 347,27 and S^c-MN I 510,4: *nhātaka*), “one who has attained to knowledge”, *vedagū*, “learned one”, *sotiyā*, “noble one”, *ariya*, and arahant. A similar listing can be found in AN 7:81 at AN IV 144,22, several of these terms are also explained on their own in Dhp 265 and Sn 3:6 at Sn 520 (recluse), Sn 3:6 at Sn 519 (Brahmin), Sn 3:6 at Sn 521 (one who has been washed), and Dhp 270 (noble one). MĀ 182 at T I 725c4 takes up the terms “recluse”, 沙門, “Brahmin”, 梵志, “noble one”, 聖, and “one purified [through] bathing”, 淨浴. EĀ 49.8 at T II 802b4 mentions “recluse”, 沙門, “Brahmin”, 梵志, “warrior”, 剎利, “one who has been washed”, 沐浴, “awakened one”, 覺, and “one gone beyond”, 彼岸. This part of the present discourse has also been preserved in Śamatadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya*, D (4094) *mngon pa*, *nyu*

MN 40 *Cūla-assapura-sutta*

The *Cūla-assapura-sutta*, the “lesser discourse at Assapura”, explains that to be a true recluse does not depend on outer observances, but requires purification of the mind. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²⁷⁵

MN I 281 The *Cūla-assapura-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel open with the Buddha exhorting the monks that they should train themselves in such a way that their claim to being a recluse will not be in vain and offerings given to them will be fruitful. Both versions compare the presence of defiled states of mind in a recluse to a sharp weapon wrapped in a robe.²⁷⁶ The two discourses explain that someone who has not overcome mental defilements falls short of being a recluse, even if he should be wearing robes, or observe nudity, have matted hair, not sit down, or undertake (presumably ritual) bathing.²⁷⁷

According to the *Cūla-assapura-sutta*, the Buddha wittily pointed out that if such observances were in themselves productive of mental purity, one’s friends and relatives would make one undertake them right after birth.²⁷⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* version similarly describes how one’s friends and relatives would try to make one undertake such observances, without, however, specifying that they would do so right after one’s birth.²⁷⁹ Without this specification, however, the illustration loses some of its force.

MN I 283 The *Cūla-assapura-sutta* and its parallel agree that the proper way to true recluse-ship is to overcome defiled states of mind. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in describing how joy arises in a monk once his mind is free from defilements, a joy

²⁷⁵b2 or Q (5595) *thu* 63b1, which provides definitions for the terms “recluse”, *dge sbyong*, “Brahmin”, *bram ze*, “noble one”, *'phags pa*, and “one who has been washed”, *khrus byed pa ba*; cf. Abhidh-k 6:51 in Pradhan 1967: 369,9, which parallels the definition of a recluse in MN 39 at MN I 280,12; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 128a14 and T 1559 at T XXIX 279b15. Norman 1991/1993c: 276 and 278 draws attention to the historical background to the Buddhist use of the terms *nahātaka* and *vedagū*. He explains that “in its brahmanical sense *snātaka* is used of a brahman who has carried out the ceremonial bathing at the end of the *brahma-cārin* stage of his life. The Buddha rejected the efficacy of ritual bathing, and used the term metaphorically [in the sense] of washing away evil by means of the eightfold path”. “The word *vedagu*, which in its brahmanical sense meant one who had gained competence in the Vedas, was interpreted as one who had gained knowledge of release from *samsāra*”.

²⁷⁵ The parallel is MĀ 183 at T I 725c-726c, which agrees with the Pāli version on the location where the discourse was given and on its title (“discourse at Horse City”, 馬邑經), although without qualifying this discourse as a “lesser” one. Just as in the case of MN 39, a reference to a version of MN 40 by the title *dge sbyong*, “recluse”, can be found in an *uddāna* in Śamatadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabhaśya* at D (4094) *mngon pa*, ju 235b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 269a4 (noted by Skilling 1997a: 339).

²⁷⁶ MN 40 at MN I 281,27 and MĀ 183 at T I 726a6. A similar usage of the image of a sword in its sheath can be found in the Jain *Isibhāsiyāīm* 45.45 in Schubring 1969: 551.

²⁷⁷ Bronkhorst 1998b: 84 notes that some of these are practices of Brahmin ascetics, even though the topic of the passage is the *samana*. Shiraishi 1996: 198 explains that, judging from “the records of ascetics found in the Buddhist canon”, “the difference between the *vānaprastha* and the *parivrājaka* might not have been so distinct”.

²⁷⁸ MN 40 at MN I 282,14: *jātam eva*.

²⁷⁹ MĀ 183 at T I 726a18.

which in turn leads to tranquillity and concentration.²⁸⁰ In its place, the *Madhyama-āgama* version speaks of overcoming the five hindrances, based on having developed pure bodily, verbal, and mental conduct.²⁸¹

Both versions next turn to the development of the four *brahmavihāras* as a boundless radiation in all directions. The *Madhyama-āgama* version follows this with a reflection aimed at the development of insight,²⁸² whereby the influxes will be destroyed and full liberation will be achieved. This reflection is not found in the *Cūla-assapura-sutta*.

According to both discourses, the Buddha delivered the simile of a delightful pond in which a thirsty and tired man can quench his thirst and take a bath, no matter from which of the four directions he approaches the pond.²⁸³ Similarly, regardless of which of the four social classes a man may belong to, if he goes forth, develops the *brahmavihāras*, and achieves tranquillity of the mind, he becomes a true recluse.

The Pāli version introduces a finer distinction at this point, since it reckons one who has gone forth and achieved tranquillity of the mind as one who practises the proper way of a true recluse,²⁸⁴ but once the influxes are destroyed, such a one is a true recluse.²⁸⁵ This distinction is not found in the Chinese version. The Pāli version thus explicitly reckons the achievement of internal tranquillity through developing the *brahmavihāras* as the proper way to true recluse-ship. In this way the *brahmavihāras*, although not yet constituting the consummation of recluse-ship, figure in the Pāli version more explicitly as an important factor leading up to the final goal.

MN I 284

While the *Cūla-assapura-sutta* concludes at this point, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse continues by defining the four terms “recluse”, “Brahmin”, “noble one” and “one purified through bathing”, similar to the final part of the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahā-assapura-sutta*.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁰ MN 40 at MN I 283,23: *pāmujjan jāyati, pamuditassa pūti jāyati, pītīmanassa kāyo passambhati, pas-saddhakāyo sukhaṇi vedeti, sukhino cittam samādhiyati* (B^e-MN I 352,1: *pāmojjan*).

²⁸¹ MĀ 183 at T I 726b19.

²⁸² MĀ 183 at T I 726b27: “there is what exists, there is what is gross, there is what is subtle, and there is a going beyond and an escape from perception”, 有有, 有靄, 有妙, 有想來上出要 (adopting the 宋, 元, and 明 variant which adds 有有 at the beginning). This appears to correspond to a passage found in MN 7 at MN I 38,31: *atthi idam, atthi hīnam, atthi paññam, atthi imassa saññāgatassa uttarīṇi nissaranām*, cf. also above p. 55 note 147.

²⁸³ MN 40 at MN I 283,36 and MĀ 183 at T I 726c2. MN 12 at MN I 76,27 uses this image (although without relating it to the four directions) to illustrate the path to Nirvāṇa.

²⁸⁴ MN 40 at MN I 284,13: *samaṇasāmīcīpatipadā patipanno* (B^e-MN I 352,25: *samaṇasāmīcippatipa-dam*).

²⁸⁵ MN 40 at MN I 284,22: *āśavāṇam khayā samaṇo hoti*.

²⁸⁶ MĀ 183 at T I 726c13, corresponding to the explanation of the same four terms found in MĀ 182 at T I 725c4 (cf. above p. 259 note 274).

Chapter 5 *Cūlāyamaka-vagga*

MN 41 *Sāleyyaka-sutta* & MN 42 *Verañjaka-sutta*

The *Sāleyyaka-sutta*, the “discourse to those from Sālā”, and the *Verañjaka-sutta*, the “discourse to those from Verañjā”, are two versions of the same discourse, addressed to the Brahmins of Sālā and Verañjā respectively. These two discourses have their counterpart in two consecutive discourses in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹

A minor difference between the Pāli and Chinese versions is that the *Sāleyyaka-sutta* and the *Verañjaka-sutta* begin by describing in detail the favourable report about the recluse Gotama heard by the Brahmins of Sālā or by the Brahmins of Verañjā that motivated them to visit the Buddha, while the Chinese versions simply mention that the Brahmins had come to know about the Buddha’s presence and so went to pay him a visit.

MN I 285

The Pāli versions also report that on coming into the Buddha’s presence some Brahmins expressed more respect than others, while some silently sat down at one side.² The Chinese versions do not mention such differences.

The four discourses agree that the Brahmins asked the Buddha what causes rebirth in hell and in heaven. The Buddha replied that conduct not in accordance with the Dharma results in rebirth in hell, whereas conduct in accordance with the Dharma leads to a heavenly rebirth.³ On being requested by the Brahmins to explain both types of conduct,⁴ the Buddha expounded the ten unwholesome courses of actions and their ten wholesome counterparts.

¹ The parallels are SĀ 1042 and SĀ 1043 at T II 272c-273b. Both are located in the country of Kosala, thereby agreeing with MN 41 on the location, while MN 42 takes place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. Akanuma 1929/1990: 93 employs the location of the discourse, 韶聞摩, as a tentative title for SĀ 1042 and SĀ 1043. A translation of SĀ 1042, together with extracts from the present study, can be found in Anālayo 2006g.

² MN 41 at MN I 285,18 and MN 42 at MN I 290,29. The Brahmins from Verañjā as a group do not seem to take part in any other discourse in the Pāli *Nikāyas*, although a single Brahmin from Verañjā occurs in AN 8:11 at AN IV 172,17 (= Vin III 1,7). The Brahmins from Sālā recur in MN 60 at MN I 400,29, according to which the Buddha delivered a detailed examination of various types of view to them. Although MN 60 does not stand in an explicit temporal relation to MN 41, the relatively more basic exposition given to these Brahmins in MN 41 gives the impression as if the present discourse could be reporting the earlier of these two meetings between the Brahmins from Sālā and the Buddha.

³ A difference is that while in MN 41 at MN I 285,26 and MN 42 at MN I 291,6 the Brahmins present their inquiry about rebirth in hell and heaven as a single question, in SĀ 1042 at T II 272c22+29 and SĀ 1043 at T II 273b6 (where the second question is abbreviated) they first ask about rebirth in hell. After having received a reply to their inquiry about rebirth in hell, they ask about rebirth in heaven.

⁴ A minor difference is that while according to MN 41 at MN I 286,1 and MN 42 at MN I 291,16 the Brahmins indicate that they have been unable to grasp in detail what the Buddha had stated in brief, so that it would be good if the Buddha were to elaborate, according to SĀ 1042 at T II 272c25 and T II 273a3 they simply ask him to explain the two types of conduct (in SĀ 1043 this passage is abbreviated).

MN I 286 The Pāli versions stand alone in introducing this exposition of the ten unwholesome courses of action by distinguishing them into three bodily, four verbal, and three mental types of conduct.⁵

Another difference is that the Chinese versions simply enumerate the ten unwholesome courses of action, whereas the Pāli versions offer a detailed exposition of each of the ten course of action (see table 5.1).⁶ When evaluating this difference, it seems that such a detailed exposition of the ten courses of action would fit the present context well. Since the Brahmins were requesting practical instructions about the path to heaven and hell, it would have been opportune to explain to them in detail what the ten courses of action refer to.

Table 5.1: Progression of Topics in MN 41 & MN 42 and their Parallels

MN 41 & MN 42	SĀ 1042 & SĀ 1043
good report about Buddha (1)	Brahmins visit Buddha (→ 2)
Brahmins visit Buddha (2)	inquiry about rebirth in hell (→ 3)
inquiry about rebirth in heaven and hell (3)	brief reply on conduct (→ 4)
brief reply on conduct (4)	10 unwholesome actions in brief (→ 6?)
3-fold analysis of unwholesome conduct (5)	inquiry about rebirth in heaven (→ 3)
10 unwholesome actions in detail (6)	brief reply on conduct (→ 4)
3-fold analysis of wholesome conduct (7)	10 wholesome actions in brief (→ 8?)
10 wholesome actions in detail (8)	rebirth in good family (→ 9)
rebirth in good family (9)	rebirth in sense-sphere heaven (→ 10)
rebirth in sense-sphere heaven (10)	rebirth in Brahmā world (→ 11)
rebirth in Brahmā world (11)	rebirth in Pure Abodes (→ 12)
rebirth in Pure Abodes (12)	4 <i>jhānas</i>
rebirth in immaterial realms (13)	4 <i>brahmavihāras</i> , 4 immaterial spheres (→ 13?)
destruction of influxes (14)	3 lower stages of awakening, 5 supernormal knowledges, destruction of influxes (→ 14) (≠ 1, 5, 7)

MN I 289 The Pāli and Chinese versions agree in indicating that someone who observes such conduct in accordance with the Dharma may expect his aspiration to rebirth in a good family or in one of the various heavenly realms to be fulfilled. The Pāli versions apply this prospective not only to rebirth in good families and rebirth in celestial realms of the sense-sphere, but also to:

- rebirth in the Brahmā realms,⁷

⁵ MN 41 at MN I 286,10.

⁶ This detailed treatment recurs in MN 114 at MN III 46,24 and in AN 10:176 at AN V 264,12. While MN 114 does not appear to have a Chinese counterpart, the parallel to AN 10:176, SĀ 1039 at T II 271b20, offers a similar detailed exposition of the ten courses of action. On the expression *mālāguṇaparikkhitta* (B^e-MN I 355,21 and S^e-MN I 521,10: *mālāguṇaparikkhitta*), found in the description of the third type of bodily misconduct in MN 41 at MN I 286,21, cf. Silk 2007a: 7.

⁷ A noteworthy aspect of this exposition is that, while proceeding through the Brahmā realms, MN 41 at MN I 289,17 (this part is abbreviated in MN 42) at first refers to Brahmā's retinue, the *brahmakāyika*

- rebirth in the Pure Abodes,
- rebirth in the immaterial realms,
- the destruction of the influxes.

The Chinese versions work through a similar range of possible rebirths, although they differ in as much as they give additional details on what is required for each kind of rebirth. While they agree with the Pāli versions that rebirth in good families requires conduct in accordance with the Dharma, for rebirth in the different celestial realms of the sense-sphere they additionally speak of practising pure morality.⁸ Although pure morality is to some extent already implicit in the stipulation to observe conduct in accordance with the Dharma, this additional qualification highlights that a celestial rebirth requires higher ethical standards than rebirth in a human family of good standing.

For rebirth in the Brahmā realms, the Chinese versions stipulate conduct in accordance with the Dharma, pure morality, and freedom from sensual desires.⁹ This additional stipulation regarding freedom from sensual desires goes beyond the absence of covetousness mentioned as part of the ten wholesome courses of action and thus highlights the qualitative difference between rebirth in the celestial realms of the sense-sphere and rebirth in the Brahmā realms.¹⁰

devas; then refers to the realm corresponding to the second *jhāna* under a single title, the *ābhā devas*; then lists three sub-realms corresponding to the second *jhāna*, the *parittābhā*, *appamāṇābhā*, and *ābhassara devas*; then refers to the realm corresponding to the third *jhāna* under a single title, the *subha devas*; again followed by listing the three corresponding sub-realms, the *parittasubha*, *appamāṇasubha*, and *subhakīṇa devas* (the *subha devas* are absent from the Burmese and Siamese editions of MN 41 and MN 42, B^e-MN I 359,29 and B^e-MN I 364,27 as well as S^e-MN I 526,17 and S^e-MN I 533,20; for an examination of the relationship of the realms of Buddhist cosmology to mental experiences cf. also, e.g., Gethin 1997a). Unfortunately, in the Chinese versions this whole part is abbreviated, making a comparison impossible. The same type of listing recurs in MN 120 at MN III 102,26+31 and in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 471,5 or in Senart 1890: 348,19 (although without including the *parittasubha devas*, which are, however, mentioned in another listing in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 487,7 or in Senart 1890: 360,19). The pattern found in MN 41 reminds of a tendency in Jain literature, described by Bruhn 1983: 59 as involving a “multiplication of segments in cosmography”, where the “emphasis is on series-cum-subseries (subdivision as a form-element) rather than on long and coherent series”. Nattier 2009: 101 explains that the “complex cosmological vision” reflected in Buddhist texts “was clearly not formulated all at once”; whereas the sources reflect an “early standardization of the list of *kāmadhātu* heavens”, “the same cannot be said of the heavens belonging to the *rūpadhātu*” (p. 105); cf. also Masson 1942: 22-26.

⁸ SĀ 1042 at T II 273a11: 行淨戒. In a similar vein, according to the *Karmavibhaṅga* in Kudo 2004: 76,12 or in Lévi 1932a: 47,10, to undertake the ten wholesome courses of action “well [yet] weakly”, *subhāvitā mandabhāvitāś ca*, is the condition for rebirth as a human, whereas rebirth in a sensual heavenly world requires having undertaken the same ten courses of action in a way that is “well completed”, *susamāptā*, a difference that also highlights the higher ethical standards required for such rebirth. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* also stipulates purified moral conduct for rebirth in the heavenly spheres of the sensual realm, cf. Shukla 1973: 62,12 or ŚSG 1998: 96,19 and T 1579 at T XXX 406a27.

⁹ SĀ 1042 at T II 273a13: “keeping morality fully pure and separating the mind from craving and sensual desire”, 持戒清淨, 心離愛欲.

¹⁰ In a similar vein, DN 33 at DN III 260,1 and AN 8:35 at AN IV 241,7 indicate that for rebirth in the Brahmā world, morality (*sīla*) and freedom from sensuality (*vitārāga*) are required, as does the *Śrāvakabhū-*

Having described rebirth in the Brahmā realms up to the highest realm of the Pure Abodes, the Chinese versions indicate that the same conditions (namely conduct in accordance with the Dharma, moral purity, and freedom from sensual desires) also serve as conditions for attaining the four *jhānas* in one's present life. In this way, according to their presentation the Buddha led the discussion from the otherworldly benefits, about which his Brahmin visitors had inquired, to the benefits that can be achieved in the present life.

The Chinese versions continue by indicating that the same conditions also serve as a basis for developing:

- the four *brahmavihāras*,
- the four immaterial attainments,
- the three lower stages of awakening,
- supernormal powers,
- the divine ear,
- telepathic knowledge,
- recollection of past lives,
- the divine eye,
- the destruction of the influxes.

Only the last of these, the destruction of the influxes, is mentioned in the Pāli versions.

MN I 290 The Pāli versions conclude with the Brahmins taking refuge and declaring themselves to be lay followers for life. The Chinese versions, however, report only that the Brahmins rejoiced in the Buddha's exposition, not that they became lay followers.

Looking back on the *Sāleyyaka-sutta* and the *Verañjaka-sutta*, these two discourses are so similar that the question could be asked if they go back to a single original. That is, was the same discourse delivered twice, or was it delivered only once and some confusion about the name of its auditors led to a doubling of the discourse?

The differences between these two, as well as the differences between their Chinese parallels, are of a rather minor nature. While the two Pāli versions are situated in different places, the two Chinese versions even share the same location. Except for the names of the Brahmins, the two Pāli versions differ from each other only in that one of them mentions the number of monks present, while the other does not record their number.¹¹ The two Chinese versions are also nearly identical, as they differ from each other

^{mi}, cf. Shukla 1973: 62,16 or ŠSG 1998: 98,3 and T 1579 at T XXX 406a29. The *Karmavibhaṅga* in Kudo 2004: 78,7 and 79,5 or in Lévi 1932a: 47,17 does not mention the need for freedom from sensuality for rebirth in the Brahmā worlds, but only speaks of undertaking the ten courses of action to a degree superior to the degree required for rebirth in a sensual heavenly world. The *Dharmaskandha*, fragment 4737 folio 14r9 in Dietz 1984: 62,20 and T 1537 at T XXVI 512c22, also stipulates the need for absorption attainment.

¹¹ MN 41 at MN I 285,2: *mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṁ*, a specification not made in MN 42. Another minor difference is a matter of formulation, where the introductory part of the exposition of the ten types of action in MN 41 at MN I 286,10 reads *adhammacariyā visamacariyā hoti*, while the corre-

only in the way they describe how the Brahmins (which also have different names) came to the Buddha's presence.¹²

A relatively clear instance of a doubling of discourses can be found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, which has preserved two parallels to the *Vanapattha-sutta*.¹³ These two *Madhyama-āgama* discourses are so similar to each other that they do seem to go back to what originally was only a single discourse, an impression confirmed by the fact that they have only a single Pāli counterpart.

Another instance of doubling of discourses can be found in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which records two instances in which Ānanda received instructions on mindfulness of breathing.¹⁴ These two discourses are identical in content and differ only on whether the Buddha gave these instructions after an inquiry by Ānanda or without his prompting. Of these two discourses, only the one in which Ānanda inquired about the subject of mindfulness of breathing has a counterpart in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹⁵

Since according to the traditional account Ānanda had such mental retention that he had memorized all the discourses spoken by the Buddha,¹⁶ it seems improbable that he would be depicted as needing to be given the same instruction again, or else that the Buddha would have forgotten that he had already taught Ānanda on this subject.

That is, the more probable account appears to be given in the *Samyukta-āgama* version, according to which Ānanda received this particular instruction only once. If this

sponding part in MN 42 at MN I 291,25 reads *adhammacārī visamacārī hoti*, i.e., MN 41 speaks of "conduct", while MN 42 of "one who undertakes conduct".

¹² SĀ 1042 at T II 272c21 simply mentions that the Brahmins approached the place where the Buddha was staying, whereas SĀ 1043 at T II 273b2 describes how they travelled by vehicle until they reached the vicinity of the Buddha's place of residence, where they got down and proceeded on foot. This passage in SĀ 1043 thus parallels a standard pericope used also in other Pāli discourses to depict how someone approaches the Buddha by vehicle, cf., e.g., MN 89 at MN II 119,13.

¹³ MN 17 at MN I 104-108, which has two consecutive Chinese parallels: MĀ 107 and MĀ 108 at T I 596c-598b, cf. above page 132.

¹⁴ SN 54:13-14 at SN V 328-334.

¹⁵ SĀ 810 at T II 208a-c.

¹⁶ Ānanda's recital of the discourses from memory is recorded in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 968b15, in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at XXII 491c2, in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 191a19, in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1451 at T XXIV 407a3, in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 449a20, and in the Theravāda *Vinaya* at Vin II 287,12 (for translations of the passages in T 1428, T 1425, T 1421, T 1435, and Vin cf. Anuruddha 2008: 68, 26, 75, 47, and 7). Cf. also Th 1024, where Ānanda proclaims to have mastered eighty-four-thousand teachings, *caturāśṭī sahassāni ye me dhammā pavattino* (counterparts to this statement, noted by Lamotte 1958/1988: 148, are: T 1425 at T XXII 491c23 and T 1545 at T XXVII 385c11; cf. also the *Avadānaśataka*, Speyer 1909/1970: 155,7 or Vaidya 1958a: 242,24). According to AN 1:14 at AN I 24,32, the Buddha had designated Ānanda as outstanding for his learnedness and memory, *etad aggam mama sāvakānam bhikkhūnam bahussutānam ... satimantānam, yadidam ānando*, qualities of Ānanda similarly highlighted in its counterpart EĀ 4.7 at T II 558a26: 所憶不忘, 多聞廣遠; cf. also the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 396,18 or Vaidya 1999: 253,31. According to the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 54,18, his eminency in remembering had already been predicted before he went forth, *anena kumāreṇa śrutidharāṇām agreṇa bhavitavyam iti*, an ability to which he had aspired in a former life, cf. Gnoli 1978a: 66,15, and 67,14.

should indeed be the original version, then the two discourses in the *Samyutta-nikāya* would be a doubling of what should be considered a single instance.

Another such case can be found in the *Anguttara-nikāya*, where Ānanda on two occasions inquired after the significance of “becoming” (*bhava*), and the Buddha replied by delivering two nearly identical discourses.¹⁷ Here, too, once Ānanda had received a reply to such an inquiry, there would have been no need for him to ask the same question a second time, so that these two discourses might also go back to a single occasion.

In the case of the *Sāleyyaka-sutta* and the *Verañjaka-sutta*, however, the *Samyukta-āgama* agrees in presenting this exposition by the Buddha in a pair-wise fashion. Hence the evidence that can be gathered through a comparative study would rather suggest that the *Sāleyyaka-sutta* and the *Verañjaka-sutta*, as well as their two Chinese parallels, might go back to two individual occasions. After all, an exposition of the ways leading to heaven and hell must have been a topic of such common interest in ancient India that it would not be extraordinary for different Brahmins to pose the same question to a religious teacher like the Buddha.¹⁸

MN 43 *Mahāvedalla-sutta*

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, the “greater discourse of the question-and-answer type”, records a discussion on various topics between Mahākotṭhita and Sāriputta. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁹ Several sections of this discourse have also been preserved as discourse quotations in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.²⁰

MN I 292 The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* begins by describing that Mahākotṭhita visited Sāriputta and asked him a series of questions. The Tibetan version agrees with the Pāli account in this respect,²¹ whereas according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version it was rather Sāriputta who asked questions of Mahākotṭhita.²² The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āga-*

¹⁷ AN 3:76-77 at AN I 223-224, which differ from each other in that AN 3:76 at AN I 223,23 reads *viññānam patitīthitam*, whereas AN 3:77 at AN I 224,17 reads *cetanā patitīthitā patthanā patitīthitā*.

¹⁸ Cf., e.g., AN 2:2:7 at AN I 56,16, which reports that the Brahmin Jāṇussoṇi similarly inquired after the causes for rebirth in hell or in heaven.

¹⁹ The parallel is MĀ 211 at T I 790b-792b and has the title “Mahākotṭhita’s discourse”, 大拘絺羅經; cf. also Abhidh-k-t, which similarly gives the title of the discourse as *gsus po che’i mdo*, “Mahākotṭhita’s discourse”, e.g., at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 81a4 or Q (5595) *thu* 127a3. MĀ 211 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 73, 104-105, 145-146, 205, and 258-268. While MN 43 takes place at Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī, MĀ 211 has the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground by Rājagaha as its location. Akanuma 1929/1990: 165 lists SĀ 251 at T II 60b-c as another parallel. Yet, similar to the discourses SN 22:127-132 at SN III 172-174, SĀ 251 only reports that Mahākotṭhita asked Sāriputta about the implications of ignorance and its opposite, not on a whole range of different topics as in MN 43. Thus SĀ 251 is not a parallel to MN 43.

²⁰ Cf. below notes 24, 31, and 45.

²¹ D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 81a4 or Q (5595) *thu* 127a4.

²² MN 43 at MN I 292,7 and MĀ 211 at T I 790b13; cf. in more detail Anālayo 2007i: 29-32.

ma parallel also differ on the subject matter of the ensuing discussion. Although both versions record a similar number of questions, several of these questions differ in content (see below table 5.2).²³

Table 5.2: Main Topics Examined in MN 43 and MĀ 211

MN 43	MĀ 211
wisdom (1)	wholesome and unwholesome
consciousness (2)	wisdom (→ 1)
feeling (3)	consciousness (→ 2)
perception (4)	right view (→ 6)
mind-consciousness (5)	becoming (→ 7)
right view (6)	feeling (→ 3)
becoming (7)	counterpart to cessation
1 st <i>jhāna</i> (8)	5 faculties (→ 9)
5 faculties (9)	cessation (→ 10)
cessation (10)	deliverance of the mind (→ 11)
deliverance of the mind (11)	(≠ 4-5, 8)

In regard to some of these questions, an exchange between the versions of the present discourse and the versions of the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* appears to have taken place, since some topics taken up in the Chinese parallel to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* occur in the Pāli *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, just as some topics treated in the Chinese parallel to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* form part of the Pāli *Cūlavedalla-sutta*.

The two discourses also exchange places within the respective collections as well as exchanging the geographical locations where they took place. Thus, while the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* precedes the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the Chinese parallel to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* follows the Chinese parallel to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* in the *Madhyama-āgama*. While the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* takes place at Sāvatthī and the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* takes place at Rājagaha, the Chinese parallel to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* takes place at Rājagaha and the Chinese parallel to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* takes place at Sāvatthī. Perhaps due to the relatively similar nature of these two discourses, an exchange of material between the two could easily happen during the process of transmission.

The first topic taken up for discussion in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* is wisdom. In agreement with its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* defines wisdom to be insight into the four noble truths.²⁴ The Tibetan version, however, defines wisdom in

²³ Minh Chau 1964/1991: 259 counts thirty-two questions in each version, out of which only seventeen are common to both.

²⁴ MĀ 211 at T I 790b16 precedes this with a question and answer exchange on the nature of what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. Two discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ parallel the present section: D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 95a3 or Q (5595) *thu* 143b8 parallels the discussion of the nature of wisdom and consciousness, leading up to the definition of consciousness in MN 43 at MN I 292,25; cf. also Abhidh-k 9 in Lee 2005: 134,1 or Pradhan 1967: 473,23, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 157b20

terms of knowing as it really is what is wholesome and what is unwholesome, as well as knowing dependent arising as it really is.²⁵

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next turns to the nature of consciousness. The Pāli discourse defines consciousness as the act of cognising the three types of feeling,²⁶ while the Chinese account and the Tibetan version speak instead of cognising the six sense objects.²⁷

Still another perspective on the same matter can be found in a discourse in the *Sam-yutta-nikāya*, which defines consciousness in terms of cognising different tastes, while its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama* defines consciousness in terms of cognising the objects of the six senses.²⁸ In each of these two instances, the Chinese and Tibetan versions are closer to the standard presentation of consciousness by way of the six sense bases, while the Pāli versions offer complementary perspectives on consciousness, defining its function with the help of different examples by way of feeling or taste.

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its two parallels agree that wisdom and consciousness are conjoined states, since to (wisely) know is to cognise. The Pāli version stands alone in explaining that the difference between wisdom and consciousness is that wisdom should be developed, while consciousness should be understood.²⁹

MN I 293 The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next inquires into the nature of feeling, explaining that feelings “feel”,³⁰ followed by listing the three types of feeling (pleasant, painful, and neutral). The same topic occurs at a later point in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which, however, does not explain that feelings “feel”. Instead, it introduces its listing of the three types of feeling by inquiring how many feelings can be found, followed by indicating that the three feelings arise in dependence on contact.³¹

and T 1559 at T XXIX 308c19. D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 81a5 or Q (5595) *thu* 127a3 parallels the discussion on the nature of wisdom and consciousness in MN 43 at MN I 292,32; cf. also Abhidh-k 9 in Lee 2005: 66,7 or Pradhan 1967: 465,7, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 154a21 and T 1559 at T XXIX 305c11.

²⁵ D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 81a5 or Q (5595) *thu* 127a5: *dge ba dang mi dge ba'i chos rnams ji lta ba bzhin rab tu shes ... rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba rab tu dbye ba dang bcas pa ji lta ba bzhin rab tu shes te.*

²⁶ MN 43 at MN I 292,25; a similar definition of consciousness can be found in MN 140 at MN III 242,11.

²⁷ MĀ 211 at T I 790c7 and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 81a7 or Q (5595) *thu* 127a7.

²⁸ SN 22:79 at SN III 87,16 and SĀ 46 at T II 11c10.

²⁹ MN 43 at MN I 293,7: *paññā bhāvetabbā viññāṇam pariññeyyam*. Hamilton 1996: 94 comments that “the difference between *paññā* and *viññāṇa* is that *viññāṇa* functions as the faculty which provides awareness of ... [what] is to be known (*jñeyyam*), and this contributes to the development of wisdom, which is developed (*bhāvita*) and eventually culminates in liberating insight”. According to Kalupahana 1999: 39, “*paññā* is ... the perception of the objective world with wisdom, while *viññāṇa* is simply the ordinary awareness of the same objective world”. Premasiri 2004: 294 explains that “what is cognized in the way of *paññā* is the same as what is cognized in the way of *viññāṇa*”, “the difference pertains to the way the objective existence is cognized”, to which Premasiri 1987: 63 adds that “*paññā* is different from *viññāṇa* in the sense that it ... involves cognizing the nature of things on the basis of a ... systematic training of the mind”.

³⁰ MN 43 at MN I 293,10: *vedeti vedetī ti ... tasmā vedanā ti vuccati.*

³¹ MĀ 211 at T I 791a27: 更樂, a frequently used rendering in the *Madhyama-āgama* for “contact”, *phassa* or *sparsa*, cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 372. A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon*

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by defining perception,³² a definition not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. According to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, consciousness cannot be separated from perception and feeling, since one cognises what one feels and perceives.

The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation has a similar statement, differing in so far as instead of consciousness it speaks of “intention”, explaining that one forms intentions in regard to what one feels and perceives.³³

A discourse quotation in the *Abhidharmaśabdhāṣya* combines the indications given in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. According to this discourse quotation, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness cannot be separated from each other, since what one feels that one intends, what one intends that one perceives, and what one perceives that one cognises.³⁴

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next takes up mind-consciousness that is released from the five faculties, a topic not covered in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by taking up the purpose of wisdom, which it explains to be “direct knowledge”, “penetrative knowledge”, and “abandoning”.³⁵ The *Madhyama-āgama* version’s treatment of the same topic explains that wisdom has the purpose of leading to “disenchantment”, to “dispassion”, and to a “vision in accordance with reality”.³⁶ The two explanations thus complement each other, each presenting a succinct definition of the purpose of wisdom in early Buddhism.

The next question in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* concerns the conditions for the arising of right view, a question the *Madhyama-āgama* version precedes by defining right view as insight into the four noble truths.³⁷ Both versions agree in listing two conditions for the arising of right view:

- listening to someone else,
- giving thorough attention.³⁸

pa, ju 165a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 190b6 parallels the examination of the interrelatedness of feeling, perception, and consciousness in MN 43 at MN I 293,22; cf. also Abhidh-k 3:32 in Pradhan 1967: 146,14+16, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 53b20 and T 1559 at T XXIX 210b10.

³² MN 43 at MN I 293,15: *sañjānāti sañjānāti ti ... tasmat saññāti tuuccati*.

³³ MĀ 211 at T I 791b1: 思, a character for which Hirakawa 1997: 473 lists *cetanā*, *cintā*, *manas-kāra*, etc.

³⁴ Abhidh-k 3:32 in Pradhan 1967: 146,14: *yā ca vedanā yā ca samjñā yā ca cetanā yac ca vijñānam, sam-sṛṣṭā ime dharmā*, followed by explaining that *yad vedayate tac cetayate, yac cetayate tat samprajānīte yat samprajānīte tad vijānātīti*; cf. also above note 31.

³⁵ MN 43 at MN I 293,36: *paññā ... abhiññatthā pariññatthā pahānatthā*. Cf. also It 2:9 at It 29,11+14, according to which the purpose of the holy life is *abhiññattha* and *pariññattha*.

³⁶ MĀ 211 at T I 790c22: 智慧者有厭義, 無欲義, 見如真義.

³⁷ The same definition occurs frequently in the Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., SN 45:8 at SN V 8,30.

³⁸ MN 43 at MN I 294,3 stipulates “thorough attention”, *yoniso manasikāra*, which has its counterpart in MĀ 211 at T I 791a2 in “attention within oneself”, 内自思惟. A similar mode of rendering is found, e.g., in SĀ 843 at T II 215b21, which employs the expression “internal right attention”, 内正思惟 as its counterpart to *yoniso manasikāra* in its parallel SN 55:5 at SN V 347,20. *Yoni* literally means “womb”, so that the expression *yoniso* conveys a sense of directing attention “down to its origin”, which in such contexts would indeed be “internal” or “within oneself”; cf. also Anālayo 2009y. The two conditions for

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel next take up the conditions required for right view to lead to deliverance. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, these conditions are:

- moral conduct,
- learning,
- conversation,
- tranquillity,
- insight.³⁹

The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation agrees on four of these five factors, differing in so far as it speaks of “truth” instead of “conversation”.⁴⁰

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next lists the three types of existence, a listing not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. Both versions agree, however, on relating the continuity of existence to craving and ignorance.⁴¹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by examining the first *jhāna*. Although this topic is absent from its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, it occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta*. This *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, together with a Tibetan parallel, agree with the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* on the five factors present in the first *jhāna*.⁴² The same Chinese and Tibetan parallels do not, however, contrast these five factors with the five hindrances, as is the case in the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*.⁴³

MN I 295 The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel take up the five faculties in similar terms, explaining that the mind is the common resort of these five faculties.⁴⁴

the arising of right view are also mentioned in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Delhey 2009a: 223,18 and T 1579 at T XXX 343b22.

³⁹ MN 43 at MN I 294,10 lists *sīla*, *suta*, *sākacchā*, *samatha*, and *vipassanā*, a listing found similarly in AN 5:25 at AN III 21,2.

⁴⁰ MĀ 211 at T I 791a10 lists truth, morality, learning, tranquillity, and insight, 真諦, 戒, 博聞, 止, and 觀. The reference to “truth” might be a misreading of *sākacchā* (or more precisely of whatever equivalent to this term would have been found in the Indic original of the *Madhyama-āgama*) for *sacca*.

⁴¹ MN 43 at MN I 294,18 and MĀ 211 at T I 791a16. AN 3:76 at AN I 223,22+29 records a similar statement.

⁴² MĀ 210 at T I 788c20 and D (4094) *mngon pa*, *ju* 8a1 or Q (5595) *tu* 8b8. A discourse quotation from the present exposition in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 814a2, also associates this topic with the discourse given by Dhhammadinnā. Given that this exposition is found in MĀ 210 and Abhidh-k-t, its absence from MĀ 211 is thus not necessarily a sign of the five factor analysis being a later development, pace Deleanu 2006b: 516.

⁴³ MN 43 at MN I 294,36. This contrasting of the five factors of absorption with the five hindrances in MN 43 appears to be the only such instance in the Pāli discourses. While MN 43 merely lists these two sets of factors one after the other, Vism 141,11 works out a one-to-one correspondence, explaining that concentration (*samādhi*) counters the first hindrance of sensual desire, joy (*pīti*) counters the hindrance of ill will, initial mental application (*vitakka*) counters sloth-and-torpor, happiness (*sukha*) counters restlessness-and-worry, and sustained mental application (*vicāra*) counters doubt. For a critical examination of this one-to-one correspondence cf. Stuart-Fox 1989: 100.

⁴⁴ A discourse quotation on the relationship between mind and the five faculties can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 903a9. Before turning to this topic, MĀ 211 at T I 791b8 inquires about cessation, a topic not taken up in MN 43. Another Pāli discourse, SN 48:42 at SN V 218,5, has a se-

The two versions agree that the five faculties and the mind depend on vitality, and vitality in turn depends on heat.⁴⁵ Both illustrate the interrelation between vitality and heat with the example of the light and the flame of a lamp.⁴⁶

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next inquires whether there is a difference between vital formations and felt experience,⁴⁷ a question not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. The two versions agree, however, that a body bereft of vitality, heat, and consciousness is dead.⁴⁸ The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel contrast the case of being dead with the attainment of cessation, with which vitality has not come to an end, heat has not become dissipated, and the faculties are not broken up. A quotation of this passage in Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabdhāya* adds that during the attainment of cessation consciousness has also not ceased.⁴⁹

The *Madhyama-āgama* version continues investigating the attainment of cessation, a discussion whose corresponding Pāli treatment occurs in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta*.

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* next takes up the neither-pleasant-nor-painful deliverance of the mind,⁵⁰ a topic covered in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel under the heading “imper-

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quence of topics similar to MĀ 211, as it explains that the mind is the common resort of the five faculties, followed by an inquiry into counterparts that leads from the mind via mindfulness and liberation to Nirvāṇa.

⁴⁵ Four discourse quotations in Abhidh-k-t have preserved parts of the discussion on life and heat in MN 43 at MN I 295-296: D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 73b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 83a2 (attributed to the discourse by Dharmadinnā, i.e., to the parallel to MN 44), cf. also Abhidh-k 2:45 in Pradhan 1967: 73,19, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 26a28 and T 1559 at T XXIX 184c10. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 165b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 191a3, cf. also Abhidh-k 3:32 in Pradhan 1967: 146,18, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 53b23 and T 1559 at T XXIX 210b12. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 239a2 or Q (5595) *tu* 273a3, cf. also Abhidh-k 4.73 in Pradhan 1967: 243,21, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 86c15 and T 1559 at T XXIX 242a23. D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 68a6 or Q (5595) *thu* 112a7, cf. also Abhidh-k 8.3 in or Pradhan 1967: 434,19, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 145c29 and T 1559 at T XXIX 297a25.

⁴⁶ A minor difference is that MN 43 at MN I 295,25 simply explains that vitality depends on heat and heat on vitality, and then illustrates this with the simile of the lamp, while MĀ 211 at T I 791b27 leads over to the same topic with the question of whether vitality and heat are conjoined or disjoined phenomena, followed by explaining that they are conjoined and interdependent phenomena, which MĀ 211 then illustrates with the lamp simile, a passage also found in D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 165b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 191a4.

⁴⁷ MN 43 at MN I 295,36, Jaini 1959: 540 notes that the present passage “recognizes āyu as a factor which stabilizes the five *indriyas*, but does not include it in any of the *nāma-khandhas*”. Such an inclusion, he points out, would in fact be difficult, since to place āyu among the mental aggregates would conflict with the continuity of life in the *asañña-bhava*, whereas to allocate it to the aggregate of form would not suit the continuity of life in the *arūpa-loka*.

⁴⁸ MN 43 at MN I 296,16 and MĀ 211 at T I 791c12. The same conditions recur in the concluding verses of SN 22:95 at SN III 143,4 and of its parallel SĀ 265 at T II 69a25.

⁴⁹ D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 8b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 9b6: *rnam par shes pa lus las 'da' bar mi 'gyur ro* (this discussion forms part of the parallel to MN 44); cf. also the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, T 1609 at T XXXI 784a5 and the Tibetan version in Lamotte 1936: 194,5, Schmithausen 1987/2007: 19-20, id. 1987: 339, and (on the present passage in MN 43) Pieris 2003.

⁵⁰ MN 43 at MN I 296,24.

turbable concentration”.⁵¹ This difference appears to be merely a matter of formulation, since both the “neither-pleasant-nor-painful deliverance of the mind” and the “imper-turbable concentration” refer to the degree of concentration reached with the fourth *jhāna*. The two versions stipulate four conditions for reaching this attainment.⁵²

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* and its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* also examine the signless deliverance of the mind. They agree on the two conditions required for its at-tainment,⁵³ but disagree on the conditions for its persistence, and for emerging from its attainment.⁵⁴ According to the Pāli version, to remain in the signless deliverance re-quires three conditions:

⁵¹ MĀ 211 at T I 792a28: 不移動定.

⁵² Judging from the context, in MN 43 at MN I 296,27 these four conditions appear to be the “overcoming of happiness”, *sukhassa ca pahānā*, the “overcoming of pain”, *dukkhassa ca pahānā*, and the “previous leaving behind of joy and sadness”, *pubbe va somanassadomanassānam atthagamā* (B^e-MN I 370,16 and C^e-MN I 696,3: *attharigamā*, S^e-MN I 543,12: *attharigamā*), four factors that form part of the stan-dard description of the fourth *jhāna* (for a comparative study of the point at which *domanassa* is left be-hind during the *jhānas* according to different Pāli and Chinese sources cf. Kuan 2005). MĀ 211 at T I 792b1, however, begins by mentioning the overcoming of sensuality and evil things, a formulation that corresponds to the standard description of the first *jhāna*, and then indicates that the standard treatment of the *jhānas* should be continued up to the attainment of the fourth *jhāna*, 若比丘離欲，離惡不善之法，至得第四禪成就遊. Thus in its presentation, the four conditions required for being able to attain imper-turbability appear to be the removal of sensuality and the development of the lower three *jhānas*.

⁵³ The same two conditions are also listed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Delhey 2009a: 186,3 and T 1579 at T XXX 337b20.

⁵⁴ MĀ 211 at T I 792b12 speaks of the 無想定, which literally translated would be “unconscious (*asaññā*) con-centration”. Such a concentration, however, would not fit the treatment in the present discourse, so that it seems probable that “perception”, 想, in the present context should be read “sign”, 相, instead, a suggestion which can claim for support a 聖 variant reading at T I 792b14. That the proper reading in MĀ 211 should indeed be 無相 finds confirmation in the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, which quotes the *Ma-hākausthila-sūtra* on the two conditions required for entering “signless” concentration or attainment, cf. T 1609 at T XXXI 784b18: 入無相界定 and the Tibetan version in Lamotte 1936: 196,22: *mtshan ma med pa'i dbyings*. Choong 1999: 116 note 220 draws attention to another similar instance in SĀ 272 at T II 72a26, where a counterpart to *animitta* in SN 22:80 at SN III 93,23 reads 無相, “signless”, but has a 明 variant reading as 無想, “unconscious”. The reverse case occurs in MĀ 146 at T I 657c4 as part of a description of sense-restraint, which in the parallel MN 27 at MN I 180,27 is concerned with the “sign”, *nimitta*, but in MĀ 146 reads 想, “perception”, with a 聖 variant reading 相, “sign”. A complementary case is MĀ 187 at T I 733c19, which uses the character 相, “sign”, to describe the practice of sense-re-straint, but then has 想, “perception”, as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading for the same context. Again, in MĀ 169 at T I 701c1 the expression “not connected with benefit”, 無義相應, has 想 as a 德 variant in-stead of 相. MĀ 34 at T I 475b8+16 takes up the absence of pride with the phrase 貢高者, 都無是相, while the same discourse refers to the same absence of pride at T I 475b2 with the expression 貢高者, 都無是想, yet another instance where the characters 相 and 想 appear to have been confused with each other. Another case is T 92 at T I 916c8, where the character 相 occurs in a description of overcom-ing all perceptions of form in order to reach the immaterial attainments, with the better fitting 想, “percep-tion”, as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading. Again, EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b1 refers to the fourth immaterial attainment as 有想無相, with the better fitting 有想無想 as a 聖 variant reading, a reading confirmed in EĀ 24.8 at T II 629b3+22+24. Another example occurs in a description of a meditation practice under-taken regularly by the Buddha in T 76 at T I 884b17, according to which he practised “unconscious”

- not giving attention to any sign,
- giving attention to the signless element,
- prior determination.⁵⁵

The *Madhyama-āgama* version agrees on the first two, but does not mention the need for prior determination. In order to emerge from the same attainment, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account two conditions are required:

- giving attention to signs,
- not giving attention to the signless element.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version agrees on these two, to which it adds as a third condition the body together with the six sense-spheres conditioned by the life faculty.⁵⁶

The *Mahāvedalla-sutta* at this point also examines the immeasurable deliverance of the mind, the deliverance through nothingness, the deliverance through emptiness, and the signless deliverance of the mind from the viewpoint of similarity or difference. This discussion does not occur in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.⁵⁷

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concentration, 無想之定, with the better fitting “signless concentration”, 無相之定, as a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading. Yet another case can be found in T 6 at T I 180a16, which speaks of the *samādhi* used by the Buddha to overcome an illness as 不念眾想之定, “concentration by not giving attention to numerous perceptions”, while the corresponding Sanskrit fragment S 360 folio 171V4 in Waldschmidt 1950: 18 and the Tibetan version in Waldschmidt 1951: 195,1 speak instead of “not giving attention to any signs”, *sarvanimi(tānām amanasikārād)* and *mtshan ma thams cad yid la mi bya bar*. The idea to not give attention to “signs”, *sabbanimittānam amanasikārā*, occurs also in the corresponding passage in DN 16 at DN II 100,16, although not explicitly as the means used by the Buddha to overcome his illness. The Chinese (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya similarly speaks of the “signless concentration” at this point, T 1451 at T XXIV 387a22: 無相三昧. These instances indicate that the two characters 相 and 想 were prone to being confused with each other, so that the correct reading needs to be established in each case based on the context; cf. also Bapat 1937c: 30-31, Harrison 1990: 35, and Nattier 2003a: 300 note 619 for other instances where these two characters seem to have been confused with each other. A confusion of 相 and 想 could be due to the circumstances of translation, especially in such cases when a foreign translator would render an Indic original orally into Chinese, which in turn was written down by his Chinese collaborators (cf. Zucchetti 1996: 350). The two characters 想 and 相 are not only fairly similar in writing, differing only on the presence or absence of the heart radical 心, but also apparently had a rather similar pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese (cf. Pulleyblank 1991: 337 and 338 or Unger 1989: 89). Thus a misunderstanding between a foreign translator and a Chinese scribe could easily occur. Due to the related meaning of the two characters, such a misunderstanding would then stand good chances of not being noticed during a later checking of the translation. Yìnshùn 1985/1986: 61, based on his extensive readings in the Chinese canon, comes to the conclusion that the ‘unconscious concentration of the mind’ should simply be considered as an alternative rendering for ‘signless concentration of the mind’, (無想定是無相心定的異譯).

⁵⁵ MN 43 at MN I 297,1.

⁵⁶ MĀ 211 at T I 792b26. The relation of the body and the six sense-spheres conditioned by life to signless concentration is also mentioned in MN 121 at MN III 107,35.

⁵⁷ MĀ 211 at T I 792b7 briefly takes up the conditions required for the attainment of nothingness, a topic also found in MN 43 at MN I 297,32 as part of the discussion of the four types of deliverance. Since MĀ 211 does not refer to the immeasurable deliverance of the mind at all, the present instance is a case where the Chinese version does not mention the *brahmavihāras*, while the Pāli version includes them in its presentation (cf. also above p. 220 and 261). According to SN 41:7 at SN IV 296,5 and SA 567 at T II

Instead of discussing the similarity or difference between various types of deliverance of the mind, the *Madhyama-āgama* version inquires into the similarity or difference between emptiness, desirelessness, and signlessness, explaining that these three are different in meaning and different in letter.⁵⁸

This suggestion seems to stand in contrast to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, according to which unshakeable deliverance of the mind is a form of emptiness (due to being empty of lust, anger, and delusion) and at the same time also constitutes the peak of signlessness.⁵⁹ Thus according to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, emptiness and signlessness can refer to the same thing, in the sense that in this instance the two terms differ only in letter, but not in meaning. According to the commentary to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, this passage is concerned with the concentration on the fruit of arahant-ship, an explanation that would allow extending the similarity to desirelessness as well.⁶⁰ Hence from the perspective of the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, it seems that, although there is a way according to which emptiness, desirelessness, and signlessness are different in meaning, there is a way according to which they only differ in letter.

MN 44 *Cūlavedalla-sutta*

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta*, the “lesser discourse of the question-and answer type”, records the answers given by the nun Dhammadinnā to a series of questions. This discourse has a Chinese parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*,⁶¹ in addition to which a complete version of this discourse has been preserved as a discourse quotation in Śamatha-deva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.⁶²

149c13, a discussion similar to the present part of MN 43 took place on another occasion between the householder Citta and a monk.

⁵⁸ MĀ 211 at T I 792a25: 空, 無願, 無相, 此三法異義, 異文.

⁵⁹ MN 43 at MN I 298,22: “as far as there are signless deliverances of the mind, unshakeable deliverance of the mind constitutes the peak of them, this unshakeable deliverance of the mind is empty of lust, empty of anger, and empty of delusion”, *yāvatā ... animittā cetovimuttiyo akuppā tāsañ cetovimutti aggam akkhāyati, sā kho panākuppā cetovimutti suññā rāgena suññā dosena suññā mohena*.

⁶⁰ Ps II 353,25: *arahattaphalasamāpattim sandhāy’ āha*.

⁶¹ The parallel is MĀ 210 at T I 788a-790b and has the title “discourse by the nun [called] Delight in the Dharma”, 法樂比丘尼經 (where, as noted by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 24, the rendering of the proper name could be based on Dharmanandī, or perhaps Dharmanandā). While MN 44 takes place in the Bamboo Grove by Rājagaha, MĀ 210 and Abhidh-k-ṭ take place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 210 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 56, 75, 76, 98, 105-106, 113, and 269-278; MN 44 has been studied by Foley 1894 and Krey 2010.

⁶² Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 6b2-11a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 7a7-12b1, cf. also Abhidh-k 1:6 in Pradhan 1967: 4,7, paralleling MN 44 at MN I 304,19, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 1c23 and T 1559 at T XXIX 162b21. Abhidh-k-ṭ gives the title of the discourse as *chos shbyin gyi mdo*, “the discourse by Dharmadinnā”, on the Tibetan version cf. Schmithausen 1987: 338-343, Skilling 2001a:148, and Vetter 2000: 121-127, for a translation cf. Anālayo 2011b. For discourse quotations in Abhidh-k-ṭ that parallel parts of MN 44 (not all of them necessarily specific to the present discourse), cf. below notes 68, 72, 75, 86, 106, and 107).

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* begins by describing how the male lay follower Visākha visited the nun Dhammadinnā.⁶³ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* report, however, the person who came to put questions to Dhammadinnā was the female lay follower Vi-sākhā, also known as “Migāra’s Mother”.⁶⁴ In accordance with the different identity of their protagonists, the Pāli version is situated in Rājagaha, the hometown of Dhammadinnā’s husband, the merchant Visākha, while the *Madhyama-āgama* version takes place at Sāvatthī, the town where lady Visākhā was living. Although the Tibetan version is also located at Sāvatthī, it agrees with the Pāli version in as much as here Dhammadinnā’s visitor is the male Visākha.⁶⁵

The series of questions and answers taking place between the nun Dhammadinnā and her interlocutor differ in the three versions, with some questions from the Pāli discourse not found in its Chinese and Tibetan parallels, and other questions from the Chinese and Tibetan discourse not occurring in the Pāli version. In fact, even the Chinese and Tibetan versions, although presumably stemming from closely related lines of transmission, differ from each other (see table 5.3).⁶⁶

⁶³ Ps II 355,29 offers some additional background to this meeting. According to its account, the merchant Visākha was the former husband of Dhammadinnā and as a lay disciple of the Buddha had progressed to the level of non-return. Since he was no longer able to continue his marital relationship as before, he offered Dhammadinnā his wealth and the freedom to do whatever she felt appropriate, upon which she decided to go forth as a nun. Once gone forth, she left Rājagaha for seclusion and intensive practice and within a short time became an arahant, after which she returned to Rājagaha. On hearing that she had returned so soon from seclusion, her former husband decided to visit her in order to find out the reasons for her return. Thus according to the commentarial account, the questions posed by the non-returner Vi-sākha in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* had the purpose of testing out Dhammadinnā’s wisdom, in order to find out if she had reached realization, or if she had just been unable to adapt to the living conditions of being in seclusion. The same tale recurs with some variations in Mp I 360,17, translated by Bode 1893: 562-566 and summarized by Talim 1972: 117-118; and in Thī-a 15,15, translated or summarized by Rhys Davids 1909/1989: 12, Murcott 1991: 62, and Pruitt 1998/1999: 26-30. Another occurrence of the tale is Dhp-a IV 229,1, translated in Burlingame 1921c: 226-227. For an account of her past and present experiences cf. *Therī-apadāna*, Ap 23.1-36 at Ap 567-569. A different account of Dhammadinnā’s going forth can be found in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, cf. Finnegan 2009: 157-160 and 202-207.

⁶⁴ MĀ 210 at T I 788a17: 毘舍佉優婆夷. The **Mahāvibhāṣū* translation by Xuánzàng (玄奘) quotes part of this discourse and agrees with MN 44 on speaking of the male lay follower Visākha, T 1545 at T XXVII 780c7: 毘舍佉鄖波索迦. The *Vibhāṣā* translation by Buddharavman, however, agrees with MĀ 210 on speaking of the female lay follower Visākhā, T 1546 at T XXVIII 337b7: 毘舍佉優婆夷. For a more detailed discussion of this difference on the identity of Dhammadinnā’s visitor cf. Anālayo 2007i: 32-34.

⁶⁵ Abhidh-k-ṭ introduces “[Vi-]śākha” by qualifying him with the Tibetan equivalent to *āyuṣmān*, D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 6b3 or Q (5595) *tu* 7b1: *tshe dang ldan pa sa ga*, but then classifies him as a layman, D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 6b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 7b2: *dge bsnyen sa ga*, although then Dharmadinnā addresses him again as *āyuṣmān*, D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 6b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 7b2: *tshe dang ldan pa*, a form of address she continues using throughout; cf. also the discussion below p. 517 on the use of *āyasma* or *āyuṣmān* to address laity.

⁶⁶ Minh Chau 1964/1991: 270 counts thirty questions in the Chinese and thirty-four in the Pāli version, out of which twenty-two are common to both. Where the Chinese and the Tibetan versions differ, the Tibetan presentation tends to be closer to the Pāli discourse. Thus the present case does not fully conform

Table 5.3: Main Topics Examined in MN 44 and its Parallels⁶⁷

MN 44	MĀ 210
personality (1)	personality (→ 1)
personality view (2)	personality view (→ 2)
noble eightfold path (3)	noble eightfold path (→ 3)
concentration (4)	cessation
3 formations (5)	factors of 1 st <i>jhāna</i> (cf. MN 43)
cessation attainment (6)	concentration (→ 4)
feelings (7)	difference death/cessation (cf. MN 43)
underlying tendencies (8)	difference cessation/no perception
counterparts (9)	cessation attainment (→ 6)
	feelings (→ 7)
	underlying tendencies (→ 8)
	counterparts (→ 9)
	(≠ 5)

Abhidh-k-t
personality (→ 1) personality view (→ 2) noble eightfold path (→ 3) cessation factors of 1 st <i>jhāna</i> (cf. MN 43) concentration (→ 4) 3 formations (→ 5) difference death/cessation (cf. MN 43) cessation attainment (→ 6) feelings (→ 7) underlying tendencies (→ 8) counterparts (→ 9)

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels begin with an inquiry into “personality” or “identity” (*sakkāya*).⁶⁸ The three versions define personality in terms of the five aggre-

to a general tendency of *Madhyama-āgama* quotations in Śamathadeva’s commentary to be similar to their Chinese *Madhyama-āgama* counterparts, noted by Skilling 2004: 6. For another exception to this pattern cf. Schmithausen 1987: 338.

⁶⁷ For ease of reference I follow the division of topics adopted in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 396-403. This does not fully reflect the differences between the three versions, as sometimes such differences affect only part of the treatment of a particular topic. Also, some topics take up more space than others in the actual discussion, thus, e.g., the inquiry in MĀ 210 and Abhidh-k-t regarding cessation is rather brief. Yet, to try to reflect all such variations within the limited space of a table would not be feasible.

⁶⁸ As its counterpart to *sakkāya*, mentioned in MN 44 at MN I 299,7, MĀ 210 at T I 788a26 speaks of “own body”, 自身, which, as already noted by Vetter 2000: 120 note 39, renders *svakāya* instead of *sat-kāya* (although for “personality view”, MĀ 210 at times just uses 身見, cf. the quote in note 69 below). An additional discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 268b1 or Q (5595) *thu* 11b4 parallels the definition of *sakkāya* in MN 44 at MN I 299,8; cf. also Abhidh-k 5:6 in Pradhan 1967: 281,20, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 100a3 and T 1559 at T XXIX 253c28.

gates [affected by] clinging. The Pāli discourse continues by tracing the arising of personality to craving and its cessation to the cessation of craving, highlighting that the noble eightfold path is the way to the cessation of personality. Such a question and answer exchange does not occur in the Chinese version,⁶⁹ although an inquiry regarding the arising and cessation of personality can be found in the Tibetan parallel.

The three versions agree that clinging is neither identical with the five aggregates [affected by] clinging nor different from them. While the Pāli version indicates that the expression “clinging” stands for desire and lust in relation to the five aggregates [affected by] clinging,⁷⁰ the Chinese and Tibetan version instead differentiate between the “five aggregates [affected by] clinging” and the “five aggregates”, the difference being whether the influxes and attachment are present or else absent.⁷¹

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels agree in tracing personality view to self-notions in regard to any of the five aggregates.⁷² Such self-notions can, according to all versions, take four forms:

- taking the aggregate to be the self,
- postulating the self as the owner of the aggregate,
- assuming the aggregate to exist within the self,
- locating the self within the aggregate.⁷³

The next topic is the noble eightfold path, which according to all versions should be reckoned a conditioned phenomenon.⁷⁴ The three versions also agree that the noble eightfold path can be subsumed under the three aggregates of morality, concentration, and wisdom.⁷⁵ They differ, however, on the implications of these three aggregates. Ac-

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⁶⁹ Perhaps an examination of the arising and cessation of personality was also found earlier in MĀ 210, since its analysis of personality view proceeds from inquiring after the non-existence of “personality view”, MĀ 210 at T I 788b4: 云何無身見耶?, to inquiring about the cessation of “personality”, MĀ 210 at T I 788b12, 云何滅自身耶? This stands a little out of context and may be a remnant of an earlier examination of the arising and cessation of personality. A presentation corresponding to this section of MN 44 can be found in SN 22:105 at SN III 159,9 and its parallels SĀ 71 at T II 18c2 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 268b1 or Q (5595) *thu* 11b4, which agree with SN 22:105 in mentioning the arising, cessation, and path to the cessation of personality.

⁷⁰ MN 44 at MN I 300,2.

⁷¹ MĀ 210 at T I 788b19 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 7a7 or Q (5595) *tu* 8a5; cf. also D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 12a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 13a7. The distinction between the five aggregates [affected by] clinging and the five aggregates recurs in SN 22:48 at SN III 47,9; for a discussion of which cf. Bodhi 1976, Boisvert 1995/1997: 20-30, and Anālayo 2008k: 405-406.

⁷² An additional discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 12a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 13a7 parallels the discussion of the five aggregates in MN 44 at MN I 300,1; cf. also Abhidh-k 1:8 in Pradhan 1967: 5,8, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 2a22 and T 1559 at T XXIX 162c20.

⁷³ For an examination of how a sense of identity can manifest in regard to each of the five aggregates cf. de Silva 1984; for a survey of the twenty modes of such self-notions in various texts cf. Wayman 1979.

⁷⁴ A difference in sequence is that in Abhidh-k-t, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 7b7 or Q (5595) *tu* 8b6, the inquiry about the conditioned nature of the path comes after the discussion on the three aggregates.

⁷⁵ An additional discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 62a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 69a1 parallels the exposition of the relation between the factors of the noble eightfold path and the three aggre-

cording to the Pāli version, right effort belongs to the aggregate of concentration, while the Chinese and Tibetan versions include right effort in the aggregate of wisdom.⁷⁶

According to the standard definition given in the discourses, right effort stands for making an effort to prevent and overcome unwholesome qualities, and to arouse and develop their wholesome counterparts.⁷⁷ Keeping in mind this basic definition, in order to further investigate the above difference the *Mahācattarīsaka-sutta* and its parallels can be taken into account. The three versions of this discourse indicate that right view and right effort, together with right mindfulness, are needed to develop the other factors of the noble eightfold path.⁷⁸ Here to discriminate between right and wrong manifestations of each path factor is the task of right view, while right effort stands for the actual overcoming of what is wrong and the establishing of what is right. Thus the wise distinction between what is wholesome and what is unwholesome should be attributed to right view, which the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels do indeed place in the aggregate of wisdom.

Hence right effort as the actual implementation of the wise distinction engendered by right view is what keeps the mind on the proper track, and thereby in turn leads to concentration, so that the concentration aggregate does seem to be the most appropriate placing for right effort.

This conclusion receives further support from two discourses in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*. One of these two discourses identifies the activities described in the standard formulation of the four right efforts to be efforts at “restraining”, “removing”, “developing”, and “protecting”.⁷⁹ The other *Ānguttara-nikāya* discourse explains these four terms to refer to sense-restraint, to removing unwholesome thoughts, to developing the factors

gates (of morality, concentration, and wisdom), a theme discussed at MN I 301,9; cf. also Abhidh-k 2:26 in Pradhan 1967: 55,14, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 19b13 and T 1559 at T XXIX 178c6.

⁷⁶ MN 44 at MN I 301,8 as against MĀ 210 at T I 788c12 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 7b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 8b5. The placing of right effort into the aggregate of wisdom in MĀ 210 recurs as a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 2:26 in Pradhan 1967: 55,14 (cf. also above note 75); cf. also the Śrāvakabhūmi, Shukla 1973: 327,4 or ŠSG 2007: 230,6 and T 1579 at T XXX 445a11, and the *Saundaranandakāvya* 16:32 in Johnston 1928: 115,17. The same could perhaps also be implicit in a sequential difference in the listing of the factors of the noble eightfold path in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 197,32 or in Senart 1897: 331,13, which places right effort in third position, after right view and right intention, and thus before right action, right livelihood, right speech, right mindfulness, and right concentration. This mode of listing would provide a closer relationship between right effort and the two factors that according to all traditions are part of the aggregate of wisdom, right view and right intention. The **Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra* in T 1509 at T XXV 203a24, however, agrees in this respect with MN 44, as it counts only two members in the aggregate of wisdom.

⁷⁷ Cf., e.g., SN 49:1 at SN V 244,2.

⁷⁸ MN 117 at MN III 72,24, MĀ 189 at T I 735c22, and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 44b5 or Q (5595) *thu* 84a7. On the role of right view in regard to the noble eightfold path cf. also Anālayo 2006f: 677.

⁷⁹ AN 4:69 at AN II 74,3 lists *saṃvaraṇapadhāna, pahāṇappadhāna, bhāvanappadhāna*, and *anurakkhanapadhāna* (B^e-AN I 385,25: *anurakkhaṇāppadhāna*, C^e-AN II 138,16: *pahāṇappadhāna* and *anurakkhaṇappadhāna*, S^e-AN II 96,8: *bhāvanāppadhāna* and *anurakkhanāppadhāna*).

of awakening (*bojjhaṅga*), and to protecting the sign of concentration (*samādhinimitta*).⁸⁰ These explanations further support the close relationship between right effort and concentration.⁸¹

The same conclusion suggests itself also from the continuation of the series of questions and answers in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels, where the Pāli version reckons the four right efforts to be the “requisites” of concentration.⁸² The Chinese and Tibetan versions present them similarly as the “strength” or perhaps “power” of concentration.⁸³ Hence all versions, although using different terminology, agree on the close relation of right effort to concentration, which would support the *Cūlavedalla-sutta*’s placing of right effort into the aggregate of concentration.

MN I 301

The three parallel versions continue by explaining concentration to be one-pointedness of mind, followed by identifying the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as the “sign” of concentration (*samādhinimitta*).⁸⁴ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, moreover, explains that the four ways to [psychic] power (*iddhipāda*) are the “achievement” of concentration.⁸⁵ The three versions conclude this topic by indicating that the development of concentration consists in the cultivation of these practices.

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* next takes up the three types of formation (*saṅkhāra*), a topic not covered in its Chinese parallel, although the same is taken up in the Tibetan version. The otherwise similar treatment in the Pāli and Tibetan versions varies on the nature of mental formations, which according to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* are perception and feeling, whereas the Tibetan version speaks of perception and intention.⁸⁶

The same difference recurs in regard to a reference to the three formations in a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and in its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel,⁸⁷ where the *Samyut-*

⁸⁰ AN 4:14 at AN II 16,5.

⁸¹ Ps II 362,7 illustrates the supportive role of right effort for the development of concentration, which according to its explanation provides the rationale for placing right effort in the aggregate of concentration, with the example of a man who climbs on another man’s back to pluck a flower high up on a tree.

⁸² MN 44 at MN I 301,14: *cattāro sammappadhāna samādhiparikkhārā*.

⁸³ MĀ 210 at T I 788c26: 四正斷, 是謂定力也, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 8a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 9a2: *yang dag par spong ba bzhi ni ting nge 'dzin gyi stobs so*. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 327 notes that the translation 正斷 in MĀ 210 follows the Sanskrit *samyakprahāna*, “right eradication”, as is also the case for the *yang dag par spong ba* in Abhidh-k-t, as against the “right striving” mentioned in MN 44.

⁸⁴ Swearer 1973: 442 comments that the present “passage points to the close relationship between *sati* and *samādhi*. That is, concentration appears to presuppose the four objects of mindfulness”.

⁸⁵ MĀ 210 at T I 788c26: 定功.

⁸⁶ MN 44 at MN I 301,21: *saññā ca vedanā ca*, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 8a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 9a5: *'du shes dang sems pa*. Additional discourses quotation in Abhidh-k-t parallel the present section: D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 66a7 or Q (5595) *tu* 73b8 parallels the definition of verbal formations given in MN 44 at MN I 301,21; cf. also Abhidh-k 2:33 in Pradhan 1967: 61,5, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 21b27 and T 1559 at T XXIX 180b16. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 43a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 46b5 parallels the definition of perception and feeling as mental phenomena in MN 44 at MN I 301,28; cf. also Abhidh-k 1:35 in Pradhan 1967: 24,12, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 8c24 and T 1559 at T XXIX 168c18.

⁸⁷ SN 41:6 at SN IV 293,8 and SĀ 568 at T II 150a22. SN 41:6 and SĀ 568 continue, similar to MN 43 at

ta-nikāya discourse defines mental formation by way of perception and feeling,⁸⁸ while the *Samyukta-āgama* version instead speaks of perception and intention.⁸⁹ The definition by way of perception and intention recurs also in other works, such as the **Mahāvibhāṣā* and the *Śāriputrābhidharma*.⁹⁰

The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* next examines the cessation of perceptions and feelings (*saññāvedayitanirodha*).⁹¹ The three versions agree that to attain cessation depends on having previously developed the mind accordingly.⁹² While the Pāli and Tibetan versions give the same reason for emerging from cessation, according to the Chinese account emergence from cessation is due to the body and the six sense-spheres conditioned by the life faculty.⁹³ The three versions agree that the mind of one who emerges from cessation inclines to seclusion.⁹⁴

When discussing different aspects in relation to the attainment of cessation, the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* states that:

- first the verbal formation ceases (i.e., initial and sustained mental application),
- next the bodily formation (i.e., breathing in and out),
- then the mental formation ceases (i.e., perception and feeling).⁹⁵

The Tibetan version also stipulates that the verbal formation ceases first, followed by the bodily and mental formations.⁹⁶ Although the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* does not cover this topic, a counterpart to this discussion can be found in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāvedalla-sutta*, whose presentation is as follows:

- first the bodily formation ceases,
- next the verbal formation,

MN I 296,11, by examining the difference between someone who has attained cessation and someone who is dead.

⁸⁸ SN 41:6 at SN IV 293,16: *saññā ca vedanā ca*.

⁸⁹ SĀ 568 at T II 150a25: 想, 思. Another instance of 思, found in the same *Samyukta-āgama* collection in SĀ 214 at T II 54a28, corresponds to *ceteti* in its Pāli counterpart SN 35:93 at SN IV 68,15.

⁹⁰ T 1545 at T XXVII 127a17 and T 1548 at T XXVIII 694b14, which have 思 as their counterpart to *vedanā* in the Pāli definition of mental formation, cf. also Schmithausen 1987: 396-397. The same 思 also stands instead of *viññāṇa* in the parallel to MN 43, MĀ 211 at T I 791b1, cf. above p. 271 note 33.

⁹¹ Mahāśī 1981/2006a: 118 explains that “this question was asked [by Visākha] to find out whether Dhammadinnā had ever achieved attainment of cessation ... whether she was able to accomplish it”.

⁹² MN 44 at MN I 301,35, MĀ 210 at T I 789a29, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 8b7 or Q (5595) *tu* 9b8; the same indication can also be found in a discourse quotation in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 780c7.

⁹³ MĀ 210 at T I 789b6: 因此身及六處緣命根.

⁹⁴ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 9a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 10a6 adds that the mind also inclines towards liberation, *thar pa*, and towards Nirvāṇa, *mya ngan las 'das pa*. For an examination of the difficulties involved in explaining emergence from the attainment of cessation and how different Buddhist schools attempted to tackle this problem cf. Griffiths 1986/1991.

⁹⁵ MN 44 at MN I 302,4: *pathamāñ nirujjhati vacīsañkhāro, tato kāyasāñkhāro, tato cittasañkhāro*.

⁹⁶ D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 9a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 10a3: *dang po nyid du ngag gi 'du byed 'gag par 'gyur ro, de nas ni lus dang yid kyi 'du byed do*.

- then the mental formation.⁹⁷

In the case of emergence from cessation, the same difference recurs, although obviously in the reverse order.

That is, according to the Pāli and Tibetan versions the verbal formation is the last to arise,⁹⁸ while according to the Chinese presentation the bodily formation arises last.⁹⁹

In relation to the sequence in which the three formations cease, other Pāli discourses indicate that during progress through the *jhānas* (required in order to be able to attain cessation), the verbal formation of initial and sustained mental application would be left behind on attaining the second *jhāna*, while the bodily formation of in- and out-breathing would only cease with the attainment of the fourth *jhāna*.¹⁰⁰ This corresponds to the sequence proposed in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its Tibetan parallel. This sequence receives further support from a discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama* and its Pāli parallel. According to these two discourses, on attaining cessation the first formation to cease is indeed the verbal formation of initial and sustained mental application.¹⁰¹ The **Mahāvibhāṣā* also agrees with the sequence proposed in the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its Tibetan parallel.¹⁰²

Another disagreement between the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels concerns the three contacts experienced by one who emerges from cessation. According to the Pāli presentation, these three contacts are:

- empty contact,
- signless contact,
- desireless contact.¹⁰³

The Chinese and Tibetan versions list:

- imperturbable contact,
- nothingness contact,
- signless contact.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ MĀ 211 at T I 792a9: 先滅身行, 次滅口行, 後滅意行.

⁹⁸ MN 44 at MN I 302,17: *pathamani uppajjati cittasaṅkhāro, tato kāyasāṅkhāro, tato vacīsaṅkhāro*, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 9a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 10a5: *dang po nyid du yid kyi 'du byed skye bar 'gyur ro, de nas ni lus dang ngag gi 'du byed do*.

⁹⁹ MĀ 211 at T I 792a14: 先生意行, 次生口行, 後生身行.

¹⁰⁰ DN 33 at DN III 270,18 and AN 10:20 at AN V 31,25 indicate that with the fourth *jhāna*, the bodily formation will be tranquillized, an attainment with which, according to SN 36:11 at SN IV 217,8, breathing ceases, a point also made in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 136b12.

¹⁰¹ SĀ 568 at T II 150b20, parallel to SN 41:6 at SN IV 294,8.

¹⁰² T 1545 at T XXVII 780c25. The **Mahāvibhāṣā* not only agrees in this respect with MN 44, but also quotes this whole discussion on the topic of cessation as part of a discourse spoken by the nun Dharmadinnā, unlike MĀ 211, which assigns this topic to a discussion between Mahākotthita and Sāriputta.

¹⁰³ MN 44 at MN I 302,22 lists *suññato phasso, animitto phasso, and appaññito phasso*.

¹⁰⁴ MĀ 211 at T I 792a19: 不移動觸, 無所有觸, 無相觸, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 9a6 or Q (5595) *tu* 10a8: *mi g.yo ba, cung zad med pa, and mtshan ma med pa*; on this difference between MN 44 and MĀ 211 cf. also Choong 1999: 62-63. A discourse quotation of this statement in the *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, T 1609 at T XXXI 784b6, similarly reads 不動觸, 無所有觸, 及無相觸, cf. also the Tibetan version in Lamotte 1936: 195,33: *mi g.yo ba dang, ci yang med pa dang, mtshan ma me pa la'o*. The quotation

The presentation in the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the three types of contact experienced when emerging from cessation recurs in a discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in other works.¹⁰⁵ These agree with the Chinese and Tibetan parallels to the *Cūlavedalla-sutta* that these three contacts are indeed imperturbable contact, nothingness contact, and signless contact.

MN I 302 The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels next take up the three types of feeling. They agree that:

- pleasant feeling is pleasant while it lasts, but unpleasant when it changes,
- painful feeling is unpleasant while it lasts, but pleasant when it changes,
- neutral feeling is pleasant when known, but unpleasant when not known.¹⁰⁶

MN I 303 The three versions also concur that:

- the tendency to lust does not underlie pleasant feelings that arise during the first *jhāna*,¹⁰⁷
- the tendency to aversion does not underlie unpleasant feelings that arise due to the wish for liberation,
- the tendency to delusion does not underlie neutral feelings that are experienced in the fourth *jhāna*.

MN I 304 The *Cūlavedalla-sutta* and its parallels continue by delineating a series of counterparts. These proceed from pleasant feeling to Nirvāṇa. The three versions begin this series of counterparts by presenting pleasant feeling and painful feeling as mutual counterparts. The Pāli version next turns to the counterpart to neutral feeling. Before taking

presents itself as belonging to the *Mahākausṭhila-sūtra*, thereby following MĀ 211 in presenting this topic as part of a discussion between Sāriputta and Mahākoṭhitā. These three contacts are also mentioned (as part of a discussion on the attainment of cessation that touches on several points made in the present discourse) in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Delhey 2009a: 208,3 and T 1579 at T XXX 341a8.

¹⁰⁵ SĀ 568 at T II 150c3, the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 781b8, the **Tattvasiddhi*, T 1646 at T XXXII 346a24, and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, T 1579 at T XXX 341a8; cf. also Schmithausen 1987: 396–397.

¹⁰⁶ MĀ 210 at T I 789c4 actually indicates that neutral feeling is unpleasant when not known and pleasant when not known, 不知苦, 不知樂, which I take to be a textual error. Another point worthy of note is that MN 44 at MN I 303,4 speaks of each feeling as being either “present” or else “changing”, *thiti* or *viparināma*, whereas MĀ 210 at T I 789c1 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 10b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 11b7 deal with the same topic in a threefold manner by additionally also mentioning the “arising” of feeling, 生 ... 住 ... 變易, *skye ba, gnas pa, yongs su 'gyur ba*. Thus in the case of pleasant feelings, for example, according to MĀ 210 their arising is pleasant, their presence is pleasant, but their change is unpleasant. Such a three-fold mode of presentation is also found in the *Abhidharmakośabhadra*, Abhidh-k 6:3 in Pradhan 1967: 329,5: *utpāda ... sthiti ... vipariṇāma*, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 114b15 and T 1559 at T XXIX 266c1, and a more extensive discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 4b2 or Q (5595) *thu* 36a1, which thus parallels the examination of the nature of pleasant feeling in MN 44 at MN I 303,3.

¹⁰⁷ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 10a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 11a5 makes the same statement also for the second and the third absorption. An additional discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 51b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 56a5 refers to the relationship between feelings and underlying tendencies, described in MN 44 at MN I 303,20; cf. also Abhidh-k 2:3 in Pradhan 1967: 39,19, with its Chinese counterparts T 1558 at T XXIX 14a12 and T 1559 at T XXIX 173c2.

up the counterpart to neutral feeling, the Chinese and Tibetan versions inquire after the counterpart to pleasant and painful feelings together, which they explain to be neutral feeling.¹⁰⁸ In this way, they provide a transition from pleasant and painful feelings to neutral feelings, so that their series of questions consistently proceeds by inquiring into the counterpart of the item mentioned in the preceding answer (see table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Listing of Counterparts in MN 44 and its Parallels

MN 44	MĀ 210 & Abhidh-k-t
pleasant feeling - painful feeling (1)	pleasant feeling - painful feeling (→ 1)
painful feeling - pleasant feeling (2)	painful feeling - pleasant feeling (→ 2)
neutral feeling - ignorance (3)	pleasant & painful feeling - neutral feeling
ignorance - knowledge (4)	neutral feeling - ignorance (→ 3)
knowledge - deliverance (5)	ignorance - knowledge (→ 4)
deliverance - Nirvāṇa (6)	knowledge - Nirvāṇa (→ 6) (≠ 5)

The three versions agree that the counterpart to neutral feeling is ignorance, and that the counterpart to ignorance is knowledge. The Pāli version continues by indicating that liberation is the counterpart to knowledge, and Nirvāṇa is the counterpart to liberation.¹⁰⁹ The Chinese and Tibetan versions proceed directly from knowledge to Nirvāṇa, without mentioning liberation as an intermediate step.

The examination of counterparts culminates in an inquiry about the counterpart to Nirvāṇa. In all versions, Dhammadinnā explains that such a question cannot be answered, for Nirvāṇa is the final goal of the holy life.¹¹⁰

This completes the series of questions and answers in both versions. According to the Pāli version, the layman Visākha reported the whole conversation to the Buddha, who approved of the answers given and indicated that he would have answered in just the same way. According to the Chinese and Tibetan versions, however, the nun Dhammadinnā was the one to inform the Buddha about the conversation, which led to the same approval. Although the three versions disagree on the identity of who gave an account of this discussion to the Buddha, they agree that the Buddha authenticated and praised Dhammadinnā's exposition.¹¹¹ Her wisdom is also highlighted in the *Anguttara-nikāya*

¹⁰⁸ MĀ 210 at T I 790a1 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 10b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 12a2.

¹⁰⁹ Similarly, a series of questions in SN 48:42 at SN V 218,11, which proceeds along the same lines of finding a counterpart, also precedes Nirvāṇa with liberation. However, this series does not include knowledge, and instead presents liberation as the counterpart to mindfulness. Another example is SN 23:1 at SN III 189,24, which also proceeds along a similar series of topics, although it does not treat these in terms of counterparts, a series where again liberation precedes Nirvāṇa.

¹¹⁰ MĀ 210 at T I 790a16 adds that Nirvāṇa has no counterpart, a statement also made in Ps II 370,18 and Mil 316,1. Another exchange that similarly culminates in a query after Nirvāṇa, which cannot be given a proper reply, can be found in MĀ 159 at T I 682a29, a discourse without a Pāli parallel.

¹¹¹ The three versions of the present discourse thus corroborate that from an early Buddhist perspective gender is not relevant when it comes to realization and the development of wisdom, which is in fact

and *Ekottarika-āgama* lists of outstanding disciples, both of which mention her as foremost in the ability to expound the Dharma.¹¹²

MN 45 *Cūlādhammasamādāna-sutta*

The *Cūlādhammasamādāna-sutta*, the “lesser discourse on undertaking things”, distinguishes between four ways of undertaking things. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹¹³

MN I 305 The two versions begin by enumerating four ways of undertaking things, which are either pleasant or else painful now, and each of these two may result in future pleasure or in future pain.

The *Cūlādhammasamādāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel agree in presenting what is pleasant now and painful in future as their first and what is pleasant both now and in future as their last alternative. They differ in as much as the Pāli version takes up the way that is painful now and ripens in pain as its second alternative, and the way that is painful now and ripens in pleasure as its third alternative, while in the Chinese version these two occur in the opposite sequence (see table 5.5).

Such sequential variations are a recurring feature between Pāli and Chinese discourses. What makes this particular case noteworthy is that neither sequence corresponds to the pattern to be expected, since in the discourses such enumerations usually

explicitly stated in AN 8:51 at AN IV 276,10 and its parallel MĀ 116 at T I 605b28; cf. also SN 1:46 at SN I 33,11 (or SN² 46 at SN² I 70,1) and its parallels SĀ 587 at T II 156a22 and SĀ² 171 at T II 437a24.

¹¹² AN 1:14 at AN I 25,21 qualifies her as a *dhammakathikā*, “speaker on the Dharma”, while EĀ 5.2 at T II 559a13 speaks of her ability to “discriminate the meaning” and to “widely discourse on divisions and parts” [of the teaching]. 分別義趣, 廣說分部. Dhammadinnā’s wisdom is also reflected in the Pāli commentaries: According to Thī-a 55,25, Dhammadinnā was the teacher under whom the nun Sukkā went forth, learnt meditation, and became an arahant, a nun who then became an outstanding teacher herself. Thī-a 74,27 reports that another nun, who had been unable to gain concentration for twenty-five years, was able to develop her practice and eventually attain the six supernormal knowledges (*abhiññās*) after hearing a discourse spoken by Dhammadinnā. According to a discourse in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, on one occasion Dhammadinnā also lectured Devadatta on the need to repent his evil deeds. EĀ 49.9 at T II 803c25 reports that Devadatta got so infuriated by this reprimand that he hit Dhammadinnā until she passed away. Devadatta’s killing of a nun is also reported in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, Gnoli 1978a: 254,20, and in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 165a4, cf. also T 1464 at T XXIV 857c20, although in these texts the nun in question is Utpalavarṇā. According to Deeg 1999: 197 and Lamotte 1949/1981: 875 note 1, this tale is a late development whose function is to arrive at a triad of heinous crimes committed by Devadatta (in addition to his creating a schism and wounding the Buddha).

¹¹³ The parallel is MĀ 174 at T I 711b-712c, which agrees with MN 45 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī and on the title “discourse on undertaking things”, 受法經 (Hirakawa 1997: 228 indicates that 受 can also render *sam-ā-√dā*), although without the qualification “lesser”. The qualification “lesser” would in fact not have suited MĀ 174, as the counts of Chinese characters given at T I 712c3 and T I 713c16 indicate that MĀ 174 is longer than MĀ 175, the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the “greater discourse on undertaking things”, MN 46. On MĀ 174 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 196-197.

proceed from the most negative case to the most positive. This is in fact the sequence followed in the *Saṅgīti-sutta*'s treatment of the same topic, which begins with the way of undertaking things that is painful in both respects, followed by what is painful only now, what is painful only in the future, and then what is pleasant both now and in the future.¹¹⁴

The next discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta*, conforms to the same general pattern, as it also places what is painful in both respects first and turns to what is pleasant in both respects as its last, although it differs from the *Saṅgīti-sutta* in as much as it has what is pleasant now and painful in future as its second and what is painful now and pleasant in future as its third (see table 5.5).¹¹⁵

Table 5.5: Four Ways of Undertaking Things in MN 45 and Other Discourses

MN 45	MN 46
pleasant - painful (1)	painful - painful (→ 2)
painful - painful (2)	pleasant - painful (→ 1)
painful - pleasant (3)	painful - pleasant (→ 3)
pleasant - pleasant (4)	pleasant - pleasant (→ 4)

DN 33, DĀ 9	MĀ 174, MĀ 175, T 83
painful - painful (→ 2)	pleasant - painful (→ 1)
painful - pleasant (→ 3)	painful - pleasant (→ 3)
pleasant - painful (→ 1)	painful - painful (→ 2)
pleasant - pleasant (→ 4)	pleasant - pleasant (→ 4)

Thus, in spite of a strong tendency of oral transmission in general to standardize enumerations, the above Pāli discourses differ in the sequence of their presentation of the same topic. This is particularly remarkable in the case of the *Cūlādhammasamādāna-sutta* and the *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta*, two discourses that immediately follow each other within the same textual corpus transmitted by *Majjhima-nikāya bhāṇakas*, where one might have expected to find the same sequence in these two consecutive discourses.

This goes to show that even within a single reciter tradition, such as among the *Majjhima-nikāya bhāṇakas* or among the reciters of the four *Nikāyas* of the Theravāda tradition, standardization has not invariably been the norm. Instead, even discourses passed on side-by-side can exhibit variations that would presumably have come into being either at the time of their delivery or at an early stage in their transmission, being

¹¹⁴ DN 33 at DN III 229,6. The reconstruction of the relevant passage from the Sanskrit fragments of the *Saṅgīti-sūtra* in Stache-Rosen 1968: 115 may have suffered from a misprint, since its restoration presents the way that is pleasant in both respects twice. The parallel to the *Saṅgīti-sūtra* in the Chinese *Dīrgha-āgama*, DĀ 9 at T I 50c2, agrees with DN 33, while another translation of the *Saṅgīti-sūtra*, T 12 at T I 229a18, follows the sequence found in MN 45.

¹¹⁵ MN 46 at MN I 310,35.

simply sequential variations that in themselves do not appear to result in a significant difference in regard to the import of the teaching given.

In contrast to the variations found in this case among Theravāda reciters, the Sarvāstivāda tradition presents the four ways of undertaking things in a more uniform manner, since the Chinese parallels to the *Cūladhammasamādāna-sutta* and the *Mahā-dhammasamādāna-sutta* agree with each other and with the *Saṅgītiparyāya* on the sequence of presenting these four ways of undertaking things.¹¹⁶

MN I 307 The *Cūladhammasamādāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel explain in similar ways that the way of undertaking things that is pleasant now but ripens in future pain stands for recluses and Brahmins who indulge in sensual pleasures with women,¹¹⁷ as a result of which they will experience rebirth in hell.¹¹⁸ Both versions compare this predicament to the fate of a *sāla* tree gradually overgrown by a creeper.¹¹⁹

The *Cūladhammasamādāna-sutta* and its parallel illustrate the way of undertaking things that is painful now and painful in future with the example of various ascetic practices and self-mortifications in vogue in ancient India, practices that according to both versions tend to lead to a lower rebirth. The *Madhyama-āgama* version's list of such practices takes up not only the observance of pulling out the hair and beard, mentioned in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, but also the practice of shaving them.¹²⁰ Since Buddhist monks regularly shave their hair and beard, it is somewhat unexpected to find such shaving included among practices that lead to a lower rebirth.

MN I 308 The two versions present the way of undertaking things that is painful now and pleasant in the future in similar ways, indicating that those who live the holy life in purity, even though they suffer due to being under the strong influence of lust, anger, or delu-

¹¹⁶ MĀ 175 at T I 712c13 agrees with the sequence found in MĀ 174 at T I 711b21. The same sequence recurs also in another parallel to MN 46, T 83 at T I 902b15. The *Saṅgītiparyāya*, T 1536 at T XXVI 398c6, translated in Stache-Rosen 1968: 115, also has the same sequence as MĀ 174 (on the probable (Mūla-) Sarvāstivāda affiliation of the *Saṅgītiparyāya* cf. Tripāṭhī 1985: 198-199), as does the *Mahāvyutpatti* no. 1560 in Sakaki 1926: 125.

¹¹⁷ MN 45 at MN I 305,22 stands alone in referring to these women as female wanderers, *paribbājikā*; on this term cf. also Jyväsjärvi 2007.

¹¹⁸ Judging from A 3:111 at AN I 266,3, the prospect of rebirth in hell awaits not only those who actually engage in sex while pretending to be living a celibate life, but is also to be expected for simply having the view that there is no harm in sensual indulgence and then acting accordingly, even if this is done without feigning celibacy.

¹¹⁹ In the context of this simile, MN 45 at MN I 306,12 indicates that the seed of such a creeper might become a “no-seed”, *abijam vā pan’ assa*. MĀ 174 at T I 711c11 helps to clarify the implication of this expression, as it describes how this seed might rot and thus no longer be a seed capable [of sprouting], 或敗壞不成種子. The expression ‘no-seed’ occurs also in the Jain *Viyāhapaṇṇatti* 6.7.111 in Lalwani 1974: 290,6, according to which by losing the ability to sprout a seed becomes a ‘no-seed’.

¹²⁰ MĀ 174 at T I 712b15: 或剃鬚髮 (followed by mentioning the practice of pulling out hair and beard). The same reference to shaving the hair and beard recurs in listings of ascetic practices found in MĀ 18 at T I 442a6 and MĀ 104 at T I 592b26, and also in a similar listing in DĀ 8 at T I 47c29. MN 45 at MN I 308,6 and MĀ 174 at T I 712b12 agree, however, on including another practice undertaken by Buddhist monks in their listing, namely the wearing of rag robes.

sion, will be reborn in heaven.¹²¹ The way of undertaking things pleasant both now and in future then stands for the complementary case of someone who lives the holy life without being under the strong influence of lust, anger, or delusion.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version illustrates the present and future pleasure experienced by this person by describing the attainment of the four *jhānas* and rebirth in heaven.¹²² Its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel instead depicts how this person lives the holy life happily and eradicates the five lower fetters, thereby becoming a non-returner.¹²³ In this way, the *Madhyama-āgama* version's presentation of the fourth way of undertaking things shows an orientation more typical for early Buddhist texts, in the sense that, as a discourse addressed to a group of monks, it takes up the attainment of non-return instead of rebirth in heaven.

MN 46 *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta*

The *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta*, the “greater discourse on the way of undertaking things”, distinguishes between four ways of undertaking things, thereby taking up the same topic as the *Cūladhammasamādāna-sutta*. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, one of which occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama* while the other is an individual translation.¹²⁴

The *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta* and its parallels begin by pointing out that even though beings wish for an increase in pleasure and a decrease in disagreeable experiences, the very opposite takes place.¹²⁵ To explain this predicament, the Pāli version distinguishes between an untaught worldling, who does not know what is to be cultivated, and a noble disciple, who knows what is to be cultivated. This distinction is not found in its two Chinese parallels. The Pāli version continues by taking up the four ways of undertaking things, listed also in the Chinese versions.¹²⁶

MN I 309

¹²¹ MN 45 at MN I 308,21 and MĀ 174 at T I 712a20. AN 4:162 at AN II 149,18 refers to the same situation under the heading *dukkhā paṭipadā*, a painful mode of practice.

¹²² MN 45 at MN I 309,2.

¹²³ MĀ 174 at T I 712b27.

¹²⁴ The parallels are MĀ 175 at T I 712c-713c and T 83 at T I 902b-903b. MĀ 175 agrees with MN 46 on the title, 受法經, without, however, using the qualification “greater”, while T 83 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on proper things”, 佛說應法經. According to the information provided in the Taishō edition, T 83 was translated by Dharmarakṣa. While MN 46 takes place in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī, MĀ 175 and T 83 have the Kuru country as their location.

¹²⁵ According to MN 46 at MN I 309,31, the Buddha had asked the monks for their opinion as to the reason for this situation, in reply to which the monks requested him to expound the matter. In MĀ 175 at T I 712c10 and T 83 at T I 902b11, however, the Buddha continued his exposition without asking the opinion of the monks, pointing out that what he teaches leads to an increase of pleasant experiences and a decrease of disagreeable experiences.

¹²⁶ MN 46 at MN I 311,6 proceeds from what is painful now and in the future to what is pleasant now but leads to pain, followed by what is painful now but leads to pleasure, and concludes with what is pleasant in both respects. MĀ 175 at T I 712c14 and T 83 at T I 902b15 begin with what is pleasant now and leads to pain, followed by what is painful now but leads to pleasure, then turn to what is painful in both

MN I 311 The three parallel discourses agree that a fool, who does not understand the four ways of undertaking things, will do what should not be done and avoid what should be done, as a result of which his pleasant experiences will diminish and disagreeable experiences will increase. A wise person, however, who understands the four ways of undertaking things, will do what should be done, therefore a wise one will experience an increase in pleasure and a decrease in disagreeable experiences.

A difference in the mode of presenting this examination is that the *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta* at first takes up the case of one who does not know the four ways of undertaking things, then describes one who knows the four ways, and only after this explains what these four ways actually refer to.¹²⁷ In contrast, the two Chinese versions first explain these four ways and then relate them to the ignorant and the wise respectively (see table 5.6). From a didactic perspective, the sequence in the Chinese versions is convenient, since an understanding of the implications of these four ways forms the basis for being able to appreciate why knowledge of them marks the distinction between a fool and a wise person.

Table 5.6: Progression of Main Topics in MN 46 and its Parallels

MN 46	MĀ 175 & T 83
ignorant person (1)	explanation of 4 ways (→ 3)
wise person (2)	ignorant person (→ 1)
explanation of 4 ways (3)	wise person (→ 2)

MN I 313 The more detailed exposition of these four ways of undertaking things in the *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta* and its parallels distinguishes them according to whether a person experiences pleasure or sadness when undertaking the ten unwholesome courses of action, or else when abstaining from them.¹²⁸

The Pāli version envisages rebirth in hell as the retribution for undertaking the ten unwholesome courses of action, while to abstain from them will lead to rebirth in heaven. The Chinese versions treat the same topic from a different perspective. According to their presentation, undertaking the ten unwholesome courses of action will

respects, and finally come to what is pleasant in both respects. On variations in the sequence of the four ways of undertaking things cf. above p. 286.

¹²⁷ MN 46 at MN I 310,7 defines the unlearned worldling and the learned noble disciple in terms of their understanding or lack of understanding of the four ways of undertaking things, and only at MN I 310,35 explains these four ways of undertaking things.

¹²⁸ MN 46 at MN I 313,29 indicates that the way of undertaking things that is pleasant now is done “with happiness and joy”, *sahāpi sukhena sahāpi somanassena*. In the Chinese parallels, the same way of undertaking is instead undertaken with “own happiness and joy”, MĀ 175 at T I 712c17: 自樂自喜 and T 83 at T I 902c6: 自行樂自行喜, cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 326. This rendering could be mistaking the preposition *saha* or *sa*, “with”, for the reflexive pronoun *sa* or *sva*. Such a mistake could more easily occur if the Indic originals of MĀ 175 and T 83 had been in a Prākrit, in which the spelling of these two words is similar.

prevent knowledge and realization of Nirvāṇa, whereas such knowledge and realization can be attained if the ten unwholesome courses of action are avoided.¹²⁹

Hence in the present case, just as in the preceding *Cūladhammasamādāna-sutta*, the Chinese versions treat the benefits of properly undertaking things from the normative Buddhist perspective, as they mention knowledge and realization of Nirvāṇa instead of rebirth in heaven.

The *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta* and its parallels illustrate the four ways of undertaking things with four types of drink, which can be either sweet or bitter, and which are either poisonous or else salutary. While the Pāli discourse presents all similes together at the end of its exposition, the Chinese versions introduce each simile after the respective way of undertaking things it illustrates. Another difference is that in the Pāli version's similes someone informs the person of the advantages or disadvantages of the respective drink, while the similes in the Chinese parallels do not mention such a person.

The Pāli discourse concludes by proclaiming that the way of undertaking things that is pleasant now and pleasant in the future outshines the teachings of all other ordinary recluses and Brahmins.¹³⁰ The two parallels do not have such a statement, even though, by relating this way of understanding more closely to the Buddhist path to deliverance, their presentation would fit the role of outshining the teachings of others better than the *Mahādhammasamādāna-sutta*'s version, which only teaches that abstaining from the ten unwholesome courses of action will lead to a heavenly rebirth.

MN 47 *Vīmamsaka-sutta*

The *Vīmamsaka-sutta*, the “discourse on the inquirer”, describes how to undertake a thorough examination of the Buddha's claim to being an awakened teacher. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹³¹

The *Vīmamsaka-sutta* and its parallel begin in similar ways by suggesting that a monk, who does not have telepathic powers,¹³² should examine the Buddha by way of

¹²⁹ MĀ 175 at T I 712c25 speaks of “advancing in knowledge, advancing in realization, and advancing towards Nirvāṇa”, 趣智, 趣覺, 趣於涅槃, and T 83 at T I 902c10 refers to “accomplishing higher knowledge, reaching the even path, and being in conformity with Nirvāṇa”, 成神通, 至等道, 與涅槃相應.

¹³⁰ MN 46 at MN I 317,14.

¹³¹ The parallel is MĀ 186 at T I 731a-732a and has the title “discourse on investigating [for the sake of] understanding”, 求解經, a brief survey of MN 47 can be found in Anālayo 2009p, a translation of MĀ 186 can be found in id. 2010l. While MN 47 takes place at Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī, MĀ 186 has Kam-māsadhamma in the Kuru country as its location. Skilling 1997a: 341 notes a reference to a version of the present discourse in an *uddāna* preserved in Śamatadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 235b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 269a5. This reference has the reading *rjes [su] 'brang [ba]*, which would correspond to *anvesañā* and thus result in the title of the discourse referring to “investigating”.

¹³² While E^e-MN I 317,25 reads *ajānantena*, B^e-M I 391,6, C^e-M I 744,9, and S^e-M I 576,6 read *ajānante-*

external observation in order to find out if the Buddha's mental states were defiled, mixed, or pure.¹³³ According to both versions, the result of such an inquiry will be that only clean states are found in the Buddha.

MN I 318 The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse continues by investigating whether the Buddha had "attained" this wholesome dharma a long time ago or only recently.¹³⁴ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead examines whether the Buddha has been "practicing" this dharma for a long time or if he only practices it temporarily.¹³⁵ Judging from this slightly different formulation, the point at stake in the *Madhyama-āgama* version would not be how long ago the Buddha had attained awakening, but whether he was consistent in his conduct.

In fact, the question whether the Buddha is fully awakened or not would not depend on how long he has been awakened. This much can be seen in a discourse found in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, together with its Chinese and Sanskrit parallels. The different versions of this discourse agree that the Buddha once explained to King Pasenadi that the level of realization of even a young monk recently gone forth should not be underestimated.¹³⁶ The reason for this declaration is closely related to the present instance, since Pasenadi had expressed doubts about the Buddha's claim to be fully awakened, due to the Buddha's young age at the time when their meeting took place. Thus according to this discourse, to query whether the Buddha had only recently attained awakening would not be a valid criterion for verifying his realization.

The *Vimamsaka-sutta* continues by investigating if the Buddha had acquired fame without succumbing to the dangers that result from becoming famous.¹³⁷ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead indicates that the Buddha's practice of meditation was not

na, which the context indicates to be the preferable reading, pace Premasiri 2006b: 232-234, in fact the corresponding passage in MĀ 186 at T I 731b3 speaks of "not knowing", 不知.

¹³³ A small difference is that in MN 47 until MN I 318,22 the monk refers to the Buddha with the epithet Tathāgata, but from MN I 318,25 onwards he refers to the Buddha as "this venerable one", *ayam āyasma*. MĀ 186 is more consistent in this respect, since in its version the monk throughout refers to the Buddha as "this venerable one", 彼尊者.

¹³⁴ MN 47 at MN I 318,23: *dīgharattam samāpanno ... udāhu ittarasamāpanno ti*, which Ps II 382,5 explains to mean "since a long time ... or else ... yesterday", *cirakālato paṭṭhāya ... udāhu ... hiyyo*.

¹³⁵ MĀ 186 at T I 731b19: 為長夜行此法, 為暫行. The use of 行 in MĀ 186 does not seem to be just a free translation of an equivalent to the expression *samāpanna* found in the Pāli passage, since other occurrences of the verb *samāpajjati* or its past participle *samāpanna* in the *Majjhima-nikāya* have their counterparts in 入 or 得 in their *Madhyama-āgama* parallels, cf. MN 43 at MN I 296,12: *samāpanno* and MĀ 210 at T I 789a11: 入, MN 50 at MN I 333,24: *samāpannam* and MĀ 131 at T I 620c22: 入, MN 79 at MN II 37,26: *samāpajjati* and MĀ 208 at T I 786a16: 得, MN 106 at MN II 262,15: *samāpajjati* and MĀ 75 at T I 542b22: 得, MN 136 at MN III 207,14: *samāpanno* and MĀ 171 at T I 706b22: 入. This suggests that the original on which the translation of MĀ 186 was based had a different verb at this point of its exposition. Hirakawa 1997: 1043 lists a broad range of possible equivalents to 行, which, however, does not comprise *samāpad*.

¹³⁶ SN 3:1 at SN I 69,6 (or SN² 112 at SN² I 158,12), SĀ 1226 at T II 335a2, SĀ² 53 at T II 391c17, and the corresponding section from the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 182,17.

¹³⁷ MN 47 at MN I 318,29.

motivated by desire for fame or profit.¹³⁸ Hence, although the two versions agree that the Buddha was beyond the attraction of fame, they present this in a slightly different manner, as the *Madhyama-āgama* version does not even envisage the possibility that the Buddha could succumb to such dangers and instead highlights the meditative life style of the Buddha.

The two versions continue by indicating that the external behaviour of the Buddha was not influenced by fear, but was an expression of his aloofness from sensuality.

The *Vīmamsaka-sutta* notes that the Buddha, whether dwelling alone or in company, did not despise anyone, even those who behaved badly and were concerned with material things. In the *Madhyama-āgama* version this passage appears to have suffered from some transmission or translation error, although it could be based on a similar original.¹³⁹

MN I 319

The two versions continue by describing how an investigating monk disciple will directly question the Buddha on the latter's mental purity. In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha declares that he does not identify with his purity, a statement not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.¹⁴⁰

According to the *Vīmamsaka-sutta* and its parallel, the culmination of this inquiry is reached once the disciple acquires direct knowledge of the Dharma, at which point such a disciple will be firmly convinced that the Buddha is indeed fully awakened. Faith rooted in vision in this way, the two versions conclude, cannot be shaken by anyone in the world.¹⁴¹

MN 48 *Kosambiya-sutta*

The *Kosambiya-sutta*, the “discourse to the Kosambians”, reports the Buddha teaching six memorable qualities to the quarrelling monks at Kosambī and enumerating seven knowledges of a noble disciple. Of this discourse, so far no parallel appears to be known.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ MĀ 186 at T I 731b22: 不為名譽, 不為利義, 入此禪.

¹³⁹ The passage in MĀ 186 at T I 731c1 refers to those who are “well-gone”, 善逝, which corresponds to *sugata* at MN I 319,13; it mentions the activity of “teaching”, 化, which could correspond to “those who teach”, *anusāsanti*, mentioned at MN I 319,13; it refers to “material things”, 食, corresponding to *āmisa* at MN I 319,14 (cf., e.g., MĀ 98 at T I 583c28, where 食 corresponds to *sāmisa* in MN 10 at MN I 59,16); and it concludes by mentioning “not knowing”, 不知, which could be due to the translator mistaking *ava-*vijñā** “to despise”, at MN I 319,15, for *a+*vijñā**. Hence it seems that the main points made in MN 47 can be discerned in the Chinese translation.

¹⁴⁰ MN 47 at MN I 319,31: *no ca tena tammayo*.

¹⁴¹ MN 47 at MN I 320,18 speaks of “reasonable faith rooted in vision”, *ākāravatī saddhā dassanamūlikā*, which MĀ 186 at T I 732a5 expresses as “faith rooted in vision that is indestructible [because it is] united with knowledge”, 信見本, 不壞, 智相應.

¹⁴² Akanuma 1929/1990: 166 lists EĀ 24.7 at T II 626b as a parallel, which would be a printing error, since EĀ 24.7 begins at T II 626a while at T II 626b the next discourse begins, EĀ 24.8. The first of these two discourses, EĀ 24.7, expounds three things that lead to much merit and thus has no relation

MN 49 *Brahmanimantāṇika-sutta*

The *Brahmanimantāṇika-sutta*, the “discourse on Brahmā’s invitation”,¹⁴³ records a visit paid by the Buddha to a Brahmā in order to refute the latter’s mistaken belief that his realm was permanent.¹⁴⁴ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁴⁵ The first part of the *Brahmanimantāṇika-sutta* recurs, moreover, as a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* under the title *Bakabrahma-sutta*.¹⁴⁶

- MN I 326 The *Brahmanimantāṇika-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Bakabrahma-sutta* begin by reporting that a Brahmā, whom the Pāli versions identify as Baka the Brahmā, believed his realm to be permanent and supreme, with nothing superior to it. The Buddha, who had become aware of the deluded thought of this Brahmā, thereupon decided to visit him.¹⁴⁷

to MN 48. The second of the two discourses, EĀ 24.8 agrees with MN 48 on taking the Kosambī incident as its occasion, although its contents make it rather a parallel to MN 128, the *Upakkilesa-sutta*.

¹⁴³ Regarding the title, both versions of the discourse conclude with an explanation by the reciters that the title refers to Brahmā’s invitation to the Buddha, cf. MN 49 at MN I 331,31: *brahmuno ca abhinimantanatāya, tasmā imassa veyyākaraṇassa brahmanimantāṇikan t’ eva adhivacanān ti* (B^e-MN I 407,15: *brahmanimantanikānteva*, C^e-MN I 774,32: *brahmanimantanikanteva*, S^e-MN I 598,7: *brahmanimantanikantveva*) and MĀ 78 at T I 549a28: 是為梵天請 … 是故此經名梵天請佛。According to Ps II 415,30, “Brahmā’s invitation” (*Brahmanimantāṇika*) refers to the way Brahmā welcomed the Buddha on arrival. The same sense seems to be reflected in MĀ 78 at T I 547a9, which uses the verb “to invite”, 請, in its title and again at T I 547a19 and T I 547c3 in its description of how Brahmā welcomed the Buddha. Horner 1954/1967: 395, however, understands the expression *Brahmanimantāṇika* to have the sense of an “invitation to Brahmā”, perhaps taking *brahmuno* (in the concluding sentence) to be dative rather than genitive. Yet, to indicate the sense of an invitation ‘to’ Brahmā, the object of such an invitation should stand in the accusative, cf., e.g., Wijesekera 1993: 43: “with verbs of asking, begging … etc. the person asked … is denoted by the accusative”. Neumann 1896/1995: 356 translates the discourse’s title as “Brahma’s visitation” (“Brahmās Heimsuchung”) and Chalmers 1926: 234 as “Brahmā’s appeal”; cf. also Gombrich 2001: 106.

¹⁴⁴ Gombrich 2001: 98 points out that a comparable belief in the Brahmā world as the ultimate is reflected in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.15.

¹⁴⁵ The parallel is MĀ 78 at T I 547a-549b, which agrees with MN 49 on the location and has the closely similar title “discourse on Brahmā’s invitation to the Buddha”, 梵天請佛經. On MĀ 78 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 58 and 184-185. According to MN 49 at MN I 326,5, the Buddha’s encounter with Brahmā took place at a time when the Buddha was staying at Ukkatṭhā in the Subhaga Grove. Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1246 note 499 points out that MN 1 takes place at the same location and has a subject matter similar to MN 49, so that MN 49 can be seen “as a dramatic representation of the same ideas set forth by the *Mūlapariyāya* in abstract philosophical terms”. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t cf. below note 155.

¹⁴⁶ SN 6:4 at SN I 142-144 (or SN² 175 at SN² I 310-314), which agrees with MN 49 on the location. The subject matter of this discourse recurs also in the *Bakajātaka*, Jā 405 at Jā III 358,20.

¹⁴⁷ According to MN 49 at MN I 326,17, Brahmā welcomed the Buddha by saying that it had been a long time since the Buddha had visited him, *cirassam … imam pariyāyam akāsi yadidam idh’ āgamanāya* (S^e-MN I 590,16: *adh’ āgamanāya*), cf. also SN 6:4 at SN I 142,23 (or SN² 175 at SN² I 311,3), a form of greeting not recorded in MĀ 78. This greeting appears to be a polite expression of welcome that can be used even if the visitor is coming for the first time. A similar case can be seen when Mahāmoggallāna visits Sakka, a visit which, judging from the fact that Sakka takes him for a tour of the heavenly

On arrival in the Brahmā realm, the Buddha told Brahmā that his eternalist view was mistaken. The *Bakabrahma-sutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* continues at this point with a verse exchange between the Buddha and Brahmā, in the course of which the Buddha explains the past meritorious deeds that had led this Brahmā to his present position, after which this version ends.¹⁴⁸

According to the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, at this point Māra appeared on the scene, warning the Buddha that he should not contradict the word of Brahmā. Māra explained that recluses and Brahmins, who had developed disgust towards earth, water, fire, wind, the *devas*, Pajāpati, or Brahmā,¹⁴⁹ had on that account been reborn in a lower realm. However, recluses and Brahmins who rejoiced in earth, water, fire, wind, the *devas*, Pajāpati, or Brahmā, had been reborn in a superior realm.

The Buddha immediately recognized the speaker to be Māra, who according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version pretended to be a member of Brahmā's assembly.¹⁵⁰ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, Māra had taken possession of a member of Brahmā's assembly.¹⁵¹ This is remarkable, for although the discourses attribute power to Māra in relation to the sensuous sphere, in the thought-world of early Buddhism the *jhānas* and therewith the corresponding realms of the Brahmā world appear to be outside of his control.¹⁵² Thus it is already unexpected that he is

place and that Sakka's maidens do not know Mahāmoggallāna, appears to have been his first visit to Sakka's realm. Nevertheless, according to MN 37 at MN I 252,25 and EĀ 19.3 at T II 594a6 Sakka welcomes Mahāmoggallāna by saying that it had been a long time since he had visited (another parallel, SĀ 505 at T II 133c5, does not record such a greeting). Another case is what appears to be the Buddha's first visit to Uruvilvākāśyapa, who according to the *Catuṣpariṣat-sūtra* fragments S 360 folio 84V3 and S 365V6 in Waldschmidt 1952: 11 and 46 (cf. also Gnoli 1977: 217,18) welcomes the Buddha by saying that it had been a long time since the Buddha had come for a visit (Vin I 24,20 does not report such a greeting). Another difference between MN 49 and MĀ 78 in regard to the present passage is that, according to MN 49 at MN I 326,17, Brahmā addressed the Buddha as *mārisa*, "sir", a mode of address often used in the discourses by gods to address each other or the Buddha (cf. also Wagle 1985: 73). According to MĀ 78 at T I 547a19, however, Brahmā rather addressed the Buddha as "great seer", 大仙人.

¹⁴⁸ In his account of Brahmā's past lives, according to SN 6:4 at SN I 144,1 (or SN² 175 at SN² I 313,11) the Buddha also mentions a time when he had been a pupil of this Brahmā, a past life experience described in more detail in Jā 346 at Jā III 143,4.

¹⁴⁹ Gombrich 2001: 99 comments that this listing "summarizes, from bottom to top, the world Brahmā has created, and Māra is urging a positive attitude to both the creator and his creation".

¹⁵⁰ MĀ 78 at T I 547b24: "Māra, the Evil One, who was not Brahmā, nor a member of Brahmā's assembly, nevertheless claimed of himself: 'I am a Brahmā'", 魔波旬非是梵天，亦非梵天眷屬，然自稱說，我是梵天。An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 12.

¹⁵¹ MN 49 at MN I 326,34: "Māra, the Evil One, had taken possession of a member of Brahmā's assembly", *māro pāpīmā aññataram brahmaparīsajjam anvāvisityā*.

¹⁵² According to MN 25 at MN I 159,10 and its parallel MĀ 178 at T I 720a9, as well as according to AN 9:39 at AN IV 434,1, the *jhānas* are beyond the reach of Māra. Notably, however, his realm appears to be just bordering on the Brahmā world, as according to Ps I 34,2 Māra lives in the *paranimmittavasa-vattidevaloka*, where he governs his own following like a rebel prince in the border region of a king-

able to reach and manifest himself in the Brahmā world. According to the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta*, however, he not only took possession of a member of Brahmā's assembly, but had even taken control over Brahmā himself, together with the whole of the assembly.¹⁵³ This presentation stands in contrast to the range of Māra's power and influence described in other discourses.

MN I 327 Both versions report that Brahmā reaffirmed his eternalist view and informed the Buddha that whoever delights in the four elements, in *devas*, in Pajāpati, or in Brahmā will come under his control. The Buddha replied that he knew this to be the case, but he also knew Brahmā's past and his future destiny.¹⁵⁴

MN I 328 According to the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta* and its parallel, the Buddha described the reach of Brahmā's power, followed by referring to heavenly realms he knew, but of which Brahmā was unaware, thereby clarifying that in respect to knowledge Brahmā was not his equal.¹⁵⁵

MN I 329 According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, Brahmā had forgotten about his former life, as this took place long ago,¹⁵⁶ an explanation not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. This explanation seems to be required in order to account for Brahmā's mistaken view, which not only involves his ignorance of other higher heavenly realms, but also his belief not to be subject to birth and death.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, in reply to the Buddha's claim to superior knowledge, Brahmā affirmed to have infinite knowledge, an affirmation not recorded in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version. In this affirmation, Brahmā proclaims to be conscious of infinite elements, to have infinite knowledge, and infinite vision.¹⁵⁷ A ref-

dom, *attano parisāya issariyam pavattento raijapaccante dāmarikarajaputto viya vasati*, cf. also Boyd 1975: 112 note 33 and Gombrich 1975a: 134. The commentarial gloss on the present passage, found at Ps II 405,28, explains that Māra had only taken possession of a single member of Brahmā's retinue, cf. also Boyd 1975: 93 note 80. This does not seem to resolve the problem, since already for Māra to be able to do that much would not fit the way his range of power is depicted in other discourses.

¹⁵³ In MN 49 at MN I 327,30, the Buddha addresses Māra by acknowledging: "Evil One, Brahmā and Brahmā's assembly ... have all gone under your power", *yo c' eva, pāpima, brahmā yā ca brahmāparisā ... sabbe va tava vasagatā* (B^e-MN I 403,4 and C^e-MN I 766,29: *vasaṅgatā*, S^e-MN I 592,17: *vasaṅgatā* and without *va* before *tava*).

¹⁵⁴ Following MĀ 78 at T I 548a8: "I know where you came from and where you are going to", 我知汝所從來處, 所往至處. The version of the Buddha's reply in MN 49 at MN I 328,25 instead indicates that the Buddha knew Brahmā's destiny and "splendour", *te aham, brahme, gatiñ ca pajānāmi jutiñ ca pajānāmi*. A variant for *juti*, listed in E^e-MN I 557 and in C^e-MN I 768 note 5, reads instead *cuti*, which in view of the context and of the passage in MĀ 78 appears to be the preferable reading; cf. also Horner 1954/1967: 391 note 5, who comments that *juti* "seems to be faulty for *cuti*".

¹⁵⁵ MN 49 at MN I 329,10 and MĀ 78 at T I 548a28. A counterpart to the description of the reach of Brahmā's power has also been preserved as a discourse quotation in Śamatadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabdhāśya*, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 188b6-189a7 or Q (5595) *tu* 215b5-216a7; cf. also Abhidh-k 3:96 in Pradhan 1967: 185,3, paralleling MN I 328,18, with the Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 64c24 and T 1559 at T XXIX 222c11.

¹⁵⁶ MN 49 at MN I 329,4: *tassa te aticiranivāsena sā sati muṭṭhā* (B^e-MN I 404,14: *pamuṭṭhā*).

¹⁵⁷ According to MĀ 78 at T I 548b11, Brahmā proclaimed that "because I am conscious of infinite ele-

erence to an ‘infinite consciousness’ occurs also in the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta* at a later point, where the Pāli editions differ on whether this expression should be attributed to the Buddha or to Brahmā.¹⁵⁸

The commentary attributes this stanza to the Buddha and explains it to be a reference to Nirvāṇa.¹⁵⁹ In the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, this stanza would indeed seem to fit the Buddha better, as the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta* qualifies the infinite consciousness to be “non-manifestative” (*anidassana*).¹⁶⁰ In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, however, to be conscious of infinite elements is only an aspect of Brahmā’s claim to omniscience and does not seem to be related to Nirvāṇa.

The “infinite consciousness” recurs in a stanza in the *Kevaddha-sutta* and in its Chinese parallel,¹⁶¹ explained by the Pāli commentary to be an allusion to Nirvāṇa.¹⁶² In the case of the *Kevaddha-sutta*, the Pāli and Chinese versions agree in attributing this expression to the Buddha.

In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the Buddha replies to Brahmā’s claim to infinite knowledge by pointing out that those, who consider earth (etc.) to be ‘I’ or ‘mine’, do not truly know earth (etc.), as only those, who do not consider earth (etc.) in such a way, truly know earth (etc.).¹⁶³ Such an explanation is not found in the *Brahmanimantañika-sutta*.

ments, have infinite knowledge, infinite vision, and infinite discrimination, I know each and everything distinctly”, 以識無量境界故, 無量知, 無量見, 無量種別, 我各各知別.

¹⁵⁸ E^e-MN I 329,30, C^e-MN I 770,25, and S^e-MN I 596,1 attribute the *anantam viññānam* to Brahmā, while B^e-MN I 405,8 attributes it to the Buddha, as in this edition the *anantam viññānam* is preceded by concluding Brahmā’s speech with *iti* (as does a variant reading in E^e-MN I 558); cf. also Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1249 note 512 and Gombrich 2001: 105.

¹⁵⁹ Ps II 413,6.

¹⁶⁰ According to Nakamura 1955: 78-79, however, the stanza reflects Upaniṣadic conceptions of consciousness as the ultimate principle, in which case it would also fit Brahmā.

¹⁶¹ DN 11 at DN I 223,12: *viññānam anidassanam anantam sabbato pahamp* (B^e-DN I 213,13 and S^e-DN I 283,10: *pabham*), DĀ 24 at T I 102c17: “consciousness [that is] non-manifestative, immeasurable, and self-luminous”, 識無形, 無量, 自有光; DĀ (Skt) fragment 389c7 in Zhou 2008: 9: *vijñāyānidarśanam anantam sarvah prthum*. On this passage cf. also Brahmāli 2009: 43-47, Dutt 1960/1971: 283-293, Harvey 1989: 88-89, Meisig 1995: 200 note 223¹², Norman 1987, and Nānananda 2004: 24-43.

¹⁶² Sv II 393,14. If the claim to being endowed with an infinite consciousness should indeed have been attributed to Brahmā in ancient India, as MĀ 78 and some editions of MN 49 suggest, then the reference to the infinite consciousness in DN 11 and DĀ 24 could be seen as an instance of a recurring pattern in the early discourses, where a particular expression is reinterpreted in accordance with Buddhist teachings, a device Rhys Davids 1921: 132 refers to as “pouring new wine into the old bottles”. Hershock 2005: 4 speaks of “openly accommodating ... existing political, social and religious authorities” and then focussing “on how they might be skilfully *redirected*”, expressive of a “general strategy of accepting, but then pointedly revising the meaning” of contemporary conceptions. Behind this feature stands a particular mode of thought in India, which approaches rival views and proposals in a spirit of “inclusivism” by incorporating central elements of another religious group and treating them as if these were identical with one’s own position, while at the same time explicitly or implicitly indicating that these rival elements are in some way inferior to one’s own system, cf. also Hacker 1983, Mertens 2004, the articles collected in Oberhammer 1983, Ruegg 2008: 97-99, and Schmithausen 2005a: 171.

¹⁶³ According to MĀ 78 at T I 548b14, recluses and Brahmins who in regard to earth have the idea that “I

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse reports that the Buddha affirmed that he really knew earth, since he did not consider earth (etc.) to be ‘I’ or ‘mine’. A parallel to this statement occurs in the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta*, according to which the Buddha similarly proclaimed that he did not claim earth (etc.) to be ‘mine’.

On reading this passage in the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta*, it is not entirely clear why the Buddha should at this point proclaim that he did not consider earth, etc., to be ‘mine’. In the *Madhyama-āgama* version the progression of thought is smoother, since here Brahmā had just affirmed his superior knowledge in regard to earth (etc.), an affirmation that came as a reply to the Buddha’s disclosure of heavenly realms unknown to Brahmā. The Buddha then counters Brahmā’s presumption to have superior knowledge by highlighting that true knowledge requires going beyond the notions ‘I’ and ‘mine’. By declaring that he belongs to those who truly know, the Buddha implicitly indicates that Brahmā does not truly know, because of being under the influence of notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’.

In the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta*, the Buddha explains that he does not claim to be “earth”, to be “in earth”, or to be “from earth”, and thereby does not take earth to be “mine”.¹⁶⁴ This analysis of the process of appropriating different elements of experience and identifying with them is not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.

MN I 330 According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, Brahmā proclaimed that all beings delight in existence, whereas the Buddha was uprooting existence. This proclamation seems to intend to criticize the Buddha. In reply, the Buddha affirmed his lack of interest in existence.¹⁶⁵

A similar stanza occurs at a later point in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, after the Buddha had vanished from the sight of Brahmā.¹⁶⁶ Judging from the *Madhyama-āgama* dis-

am earth’, ‘earth is mine’, ‘I belong to earth’, having [thus] reckoned earth as being a self, do not [truly] know earth”, 地是我, 地是我所, 我是地所, 彼計地是我已, 便不知地.

¹⁶⁴ MN 49 at MN I 329,14, a presentation that brings to mind the Tathāgata’s aloofness from conceivings described in MN 1 at MN I 5,35.

¹⁶⁵ MĀ 78 at T I 548c2: “seeing fear in becoming, and seeing no fear in non-becoming, therefore one should not delight in becoming, becoming – why should it not be eradicated”, 於有見恐怖, 無有見不懼, 是故莫樂有, 有何不可斷? The way MĀ 78 introduces this statement could give the impression that it was spoken by Brahmā. The context, however, suggest this to be improbable, since for Brahmā to make such a statement would not fit the flow of the narration. That this statement should be attributed to the Buddha would also be supported by the fact that MN 49 at MN I 330,13 attributes a similar statement to him (cf. note 166 below).

¹⁶⁶ MN 49 at MN I 330,13: “having seen fear in existence, and seeing existence about to come to an end, I did not welcome any existence, nor did I cling to any delight”, *bhave vāham bhayam disvā, bhavañ ca vibhavesinam, bhavañ nābhivadim kañci, nandiñ ca na upādiyin ti* (B^e-MN I 405,28, C^e-MN I 772,11, and S^e-MN I 596,19: *kiñci*, S^e also: *upādiyan ti*). For *vibhavesinam* in this stanza cf. Norman 1995: 205, who in his note on Th 527 suggests taking *vibhavesinam* in the present context as a future active participle. Chalmers 1926: 238 renders this line as [marking] “how life still dogs the nihilist”, Gombrich 2001: 105 as [having seen] “how those who seek non-becoming still become”, Horner 1954/1967: 393 as “becoming seeking dis-becoming” (taking “esin in *vibhavesinam* in the sense of “seeking”), and Nānamoli 1995/2005: 428 as “being will cease to be”; cf. also *Udāna-(varga)* 29.22 in Bernhard 1965: 377.

course, the rationale for this stanza is to rebut Brahmā's affirmation of existence as something that should be delighted in.

The *Brahmanimantanika-sutta* and its parallel record that at this point of their discussion Brahmā unsuccessfully attempted to vanish from the Buddha's sight. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the Buddha was able to point out to Brahmā "now you are here, now you are there".¹⁶⁷ Both versions report that the Buddha then successfully vanished from Brahmā's sight. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, he accomplished this feat by emanating rays of light, so that Brahmā and his assembly could no longer see him, although they could still hear him.¹⁶⁸

While according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the Buddha at this point proclaimed his lack of interest in existence in verse, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account he did not say anything while being invisible. Here the *Majjhima-nikāya* version fits the flow of the narration better, since according to both versions the Buddha had decided to perform a supernormal feat in such a way that he would disappear visually but could still be heard by Brahmā and his assembly, a point which would be meaningless if, once invisible, he were to remain silent.

The two versions note that Brahmā and his assembly were struck with wonder, after which Māra reappeared on the scene, urging the Buddha to refrain from teaching disciples, as such teaching activities would result in an unfavourable rebirth.¹⁶⁹ Both versions reveal the real motivation behind this intervention by Māra to be his apprehension that the Buddha's disciples will escape his power if the Buddha teaches the Dharma to them.

According to the *Brahmanimantanika-sutta*, the Buddha clarified that teaching activities could result in an unfavourable rebirth only in the case of teachers who are not fully awakened.¹⁷⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version makes a similar statement, explaining that those who develop attachment to their disciples cannot really be reckoned to be [true] recluses, [true] Brahmins, arahants, or fully awakened ones.¹⁷¹

MN I 331

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the Buddha points out that, whether he should teach or not, he remains "such",¹⁷² followed by explaining that he remains "such" because he has abandoned all influxes, comparable to a palm tree cut off at the root.

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse instead reports that the Buddha told Māra to keep away from the issue whether the Buddha should teach or not, since the Buddha knew well enough himself when that was suitable and when it was not appropriate.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ MĀ 78 at T I 548c6.

¹⁶⁸ MĀ 78 at T I 548c14.

¹⁶⁹ MN 49 at MN I 330,27 reads *mā sāvakesu gedhim akāsi*. According to PED p. 253 s.v. *gedhi*, the expression *gedhim karoti* requires the locative, which explains why in the present passage the disciples, *sāvakesu*, stand in the locative case, so that the phrase seems to intend craving in relation to the disciples, not craving that takes place in the disciples themselves. This understanding is confirmed by MĀ 78 at T I 548c26, which enjoins: "don't be attached to disciples", 莫著弟子.

¹⁷⁰ MN 49 at MN I 331,15.

¹⁷¹ MĀ 78 at T I 549a21.

¹⁷² MN 49 at MN I 331,18: *desento ... tādiso va, adesento ... tādiso va*.

MN 50 *Māratajjanīya-sutta*

The *Māratajjanīya-sutta*, the “discourse on a rebuke to Māra”, reports how Mahāmoggallāna rebuked Māra for harassing him. This discourse has three Chinese parallels, one of which occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama*, while the other two are individual translations.¹⁷⁴ Counterparts to several sections of the present discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments and in a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabhaśya*, extant in Tibetan.¹⁷⁵ Two partial parallels in the *Ekottarika-āgama* have preserved narrations that correspond to sections of the *Māratajjanīya-sutta*.¹⁷⁶

MN I 332 The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three Chinese parallels report in similar terms that Māra had entered into the belly of Mahāmoggallāna, but was quickly recognized by Mahāmoggallāna and told to leave. Mahāmoggallāna then narrated that he had also been a Māra in a past life, at the time of the Buddha Kakusandha.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ MĀ 78 at T I 549a26.

¹⁷⁴ The parallels are MĀ 131 at T I 620b-623a, entitled “discourse on defeating Māra”, 降魔經, T 66 at T I 864b-866c, entitled “discourse spoken by the Buddha on Māra’s disturbance”, 佛說魔燒亂經, and T 67 at T I 867a-868c, entitled “discourse on Māra tempting Mahāmoggallāna”, 弊魔試目連經; cf. also D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 75b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 85a8, which speaks of the “discourse on having rebuked Māra”, *bdud bsdigs pa'i mdo*. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 66 was translated by an unknown translator, while T 67 was translated by Zhī Qiān (支謙), although Nattier 2003b: 241 does not include T 67 in a provisional list of the authentic translations by Zhī Qiān. MĀ 131 agrees with the Pāli version on locating the discourse in the Bhaggā country, while the individual translations take place among the Vajjians. For a remark on MĀ 131 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 37.

¹⁷⁵ The Sanskrit fragments are SHT IV 412 folios 8-11 (pp. 26-31), SHT V 1070 (pp. 61-62, cf. also SHT VII p. 279), SHT V 1424 (pp. 253), and SHT X 4022 (p. 248); cf. also Waldschmidt 1976: 141-146. SHT V 1424 parallels the description at MN I 333,15; SHT IV 412 folio 8 parallels the account at MN I 334,1 and the denigration of the monks at MN I 334,16; SHT IV 412 folio 9 and SHT V 1070 parallel the monks’ practice of loving kindness at MN I 335,21 and the excessive veneration of the monks at MN I 336,11; SHT IV 412 folio 10 parallels the instructions to the monks, the good rebirth of the householders, and Māra’s attack at MN I 336, for which cf. also SHT X 4022; SHT IV 412 folio 11 parallels some of the verses at MN I 337-338. For discourse quotations in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below notes 178 and 202.

¹⁷⁶ EĀ 45.4 at T II 772a-c, which parallels the main part of the tale that reports Māra’s mischief at the time of the former Buddha Kakusandha, and EĀ 48.6 at T II 793b13-c8, translated in Lamotte 1967: 110, which has the story of Sañjīva surviving his own cremation.

¹⁷⁷ Gombrich 1980: 66 voices the suspicion that “the tradition is garbled and that originally it was the present Māra who had been Dūsin”, the Māra at the time of Kakusandha. On the role of Māra in early Buddhism cf., e.g., Bareau 1986, Barua 1915, Batchelor 2004: 17-28, Bingenheimer 2007: 50-51, Boyd 1971, id. 1975: 73-133, Bloss 1978, Choong 2009b: 40-42, Clark 1994: 2-37 and 46-93, Coomaraswamy 1945: 471-476, Cummings 1982: 169, Dayal 1932/1970: 306-317, de La Vallée Poussin 1915b, Doniger O’Flaherty 1976/1988: 213, Falk 1987, Foucher 1949: 151-154 and 156-160, Gräfe 1974: 41, Gu-ruge 1988/1997, Haldar 1977: 153-157, Hamilton 2000: 207-210, Jayatilleke 1973: 36-38, Jones 1979: 180, Karetzky 1992: 122, King 1964: 61 note 28, Kinnard 2004b, Klimkeit 1990: 179-180, Law 1931/2004a, Ling 1962, Malalasekera 1938/1998: 611-620, Marasinghe 2002b, Misra 1972: 46, Oldenberg 1899, id. 1881/1961: 286-290, Przyluski 1927, Radich 2007: 198-201, Rahula 1978: 108-114 and 177-180, Rao 1954, Saibaba 2005: 37-38, Senart 1882b: 166-187, Strong 1992: 93, Southwold 1985: 135-

As part of their narration of events at the time of the Buddha Kakusandha, the Pāli and Chinese versions relate how Sañjīva, one of the two chief disciples of this Buddha, on one occasion entered the attainment of cessation.¹⁷⁸ Some cowherds mistook him for being dead and set him on fire in order to cremate him, which he, however, survived unharmed.¹⁷⁹ This tale of Sañjīva surviving his own cremation recurs also as part of a discourse in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁸⁰

137, Thomas 1933/2004: 145-147, Verclas 1978: 50-74, Wayman 1959: 112-125, Werner 2008: 20-28, Wikramagamage 1997, Wilson 1996: 33-37, Windisch 1895, and Yoshiko 1996: 32-33. On Māra episodes in art cf., e.g., Bautze-Picron 1998, id. 2010: 91-94, Fischer 1980, Foucher 1918: 197-202, Karetzky 1982, Kurita 1988: 113-120 plates 216-235, Malandra 1981, Longhurst 1938/1991: 46 and plate xlib, Schlingloff 1982, Sivaramamurti 1942/1956: 89-90, Tanabe 2007: 30-31 figure I-23, and Zin 2007: 100-105 and 145-148; for figures of a monk whose belly bulges out, which might be representing Ma-hāmoggallāna with Māra in his belly, cf. Luce 1969: 208 and id. 1970 plates 90-91. On the way the qualification Pāpimā was rendered into Chinese cf. Nakamura 2000a: 439 and Pelliot 1933.

¹⁷⁸ A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 75b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 85a8 parallels the description of Sañjīva's attainment of cessation and subsequent cremation at MN I 333-334, differing in so far as here the past Buddha is Vipaśyī, *rnam par gzigs*; cf. also Abhidh-k 2:45 in Pradhan 1967: 75,3, paralleling MN I 333,19, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 26c21 and T 1559 at T XXIX 185a27. T 67 at T I 867a28 differs from the other versions in as much as it does not explicitly refer to cessation, but only reports that Sañjīva was in a “concentration attainment”, 三昧正受 (introduced as 如其色像, where Kuan 2007: 191 note 24, in relation to an occurrence of the similar expression 如其像 in another discourse as a qualification of 定, explains that this expression is probably a literal rendering of a phrase similar to the Pāli *tathārūpa*).

¹⁷⁹ MN 50 at MN I 333,36 explains that this was how Sañjīva came to be given his name, since when the cowherds the next day saw him alive, they thought that he had been “resurrected”, *paṭisañjīvita*. The translators of MĀ 131 and T 67 were apparently not aware of this word play on *paṭisañjīvita* and *sañjīva*, since MĀ 131 at T I 620c12 renders his name by 想, “perception”, and T 67 at T I 867a24 by 知想, “knowing perception”, apparently taking the name Sañjīva or Samjīva to be related to *saññā* or *samjñā*. The translator of T 66 at T I 864c8 took the safer road of transcribing Sañjīva with 薩若, which he then explains at T I 865a4 to mean “born again”, 還生, a gloss which indicates that he was aware of the implications of the name Sañjīva. On renditions of the same name in the Chinese parallels to the *Mahāparādāna-sutta* cf. Waldschmidt 1956: 171. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 75b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 85a8 combines both senses, as it gives his name as ‘*tsho byed dang mkhlas pa*, although this is followed by referring to him just as ‘*tsho byed*, corresponding to *jīvaka*.

¹⁸⁰ EĀ 48.6 at T II 793b21 differs in so far as Sañjīva did not attain cessation, but rather 金剛三昧, an expression for which Hirakawa 1997: 1180 gives *vajropama-samādhi* and *vajra-samādhi* as equivalents (for the former cf. also *Mahāvyutpatti* no. 560 in Sakaki 1926: 44). The 金剛三昧 recurs in EĀ 48.6 at T II 793a13, which, as noted by Lancaster 1976: 201, is one of several peculiar *saṃādhis* mentioned in this collection. EĀ 48.6 describes how Sāriputta was seated in 金剛三昧 and remained unhurt when hit by a *yakkha* on the head, an account similar to the story found in Ud 4:4 at Ud 39,20. The commentary Ud-a 245,5 records various opinions on the meditative attainment Sāriputta had entered when he was hit by the *yakkha*, one of which is that he had attained cessation. Thus, perhaps the 金剛三昧 in EĀ 48.6 also intends the attainment of cessation. In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the *vajropama-samādhi* stands specifically for the complete cutting off of defilements, cf., e.g., Abhidh-k 6:44 in Pradhan 1967: 364,14; cf. also Frauwallner 1971a: 85. In a survey of related references (for additional references cf. Ruegg 1989: 167 note 336), de La Vallée Poussin 1925/1980: 227 note 3 points out that Pp 30,20 uses the expression *vajirūpamacitta* to qualify an arahant's freedom from the influxes, which the *Puggala-*

MN I 334 According to the *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three Chinese parallels, in his former existence as a Māra, Mahāmoggallāna had tried to harass the monk disciples of Kakkusandha Buddha by instigating the householders to revile and abuse the monks.

A similar tale is also found in another discourse in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, which differs in so far as here Māra influences the householders so that they do not give alms to the monks.¹⁸¹

The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* reports that, in order to achieve his aim, Māra had “taken possession” of the householders.¹⁸² According to the Chinese versions, however, he had only instructed the householders to act according to his design.¹⁸³ The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three main Chinese parallels agree that the householders had to suffer rebirth in hell for their conduct, a retribution for their evil conduct not recorded in the partial parallel from the *Ekottarika-āgama*.

In the light of this retribution, the Pāli version’s proposition that Māra “took possession” of the householders is puzzling, since one would not expect the householders to undergo the karmic retribution of rebirth in hell for something they had not done of their own accord.¹⁸⁴

The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three full parallels depict the abuse poured by the householders on the monks in similar terms, recording that the householders denigrated

paññatti then compares to a *vajra* that can break up any other gem or stone. In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, according to Dhammadhoti 2002/2007: 439 the same image illustrates the *vajrōpama-samādhi*, “whose strength (concentration) is comparable to that of a diamond that cuts through everything”. For a definition of the *vajropama-samādhi* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* cf. Delhey 2009a: 204,1 and T 1579 at T XXX 340b3 As already pointed out by Frauwallner 1971a: 96, the association between the arahant and the *vajra*’s ability to break up any other gem or stone can already be found in AN 3:25 at AN I 124,20, according to which the *vajirūpamacitta puggala* is one who has destroyed the influxes; cf. also Dhs 226,1. On the *vajropama-samādhi* in Mahāyāna literature cf. the survey in Pagel 2007: 15 note 17. Another tale of being burnt while seated in deep meditation can be found in T 211 at T IV 594c10, translated in Willemen 1999: 133, although in this case it is the Buddha himself who is mistaken for being dead after sitting for seven days without moving, having “entered on the concentration on Nirvāṇa”, 入泥洹三昧.

¹⁸¹ EĀ 45.4 at T II 772b10. The tale of events at the time of the former Buddha Kakusandha is preceded in EĀ 45.4 at T II 772a26 with a narration according to which Māra had decided to prevent the Buddha Gotama from receiving alms (for a similar tale cf. Dhp-a III 257,20), followed by the Buddha Gotama relating events from the past to Māra.

¹⁸² MN 50 at MN I 334,11: *anvāvisi*.

¹⁸³ According to MĀ 131 at T I 621a21 Māra “taught” the householders, 教, according to T 66 at T I 865a19 he “told” them, 說, according to T 67 at T I 867b14 he “converted” them to do his bidding, 使, and according to EĀ 45.4 at T II 772b11 he “impelled” them, 約勅 (for which Hirakawa 1997: 926 lists *codayati*). An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005b: 12-13.

¹⁸⁴ The commentary, Ps II 418,22, raises the same point and explains that what Māra did was to make the householders believe that the monks were breaking their precepts and engaging in blameworthy conduct, so that the abuse poured on the monks was due to the householders’ own volitional decision, therefore they had to reap the corresponding karmic results. Although this commentarial explanation makes sense from the viewpoint of karmic retribution, it does not fit the terminology employed in the discourse.

the meditation practice of the monks by comparing them to various predatory animals that await an opportunity to catch a mouse or a fish (see table 5.7).¹⁸⁵

Table 5.7: Similes in MN 50 and its Parallels

MN 50	MĀ 131
owl wanting to catch mice (1) jackal wanting to catch fish (2) cat wanting to catch mice (3) donkey (4)	donkey wanting fodder (→ 4) cat wanting to catch mice (→ 3) owl or fox wanting to catch mice (→ 1) crane wanting to catch fish (→ 2?)
T 66	T 67
donkey wanting fodder (→ 4) cat wanting to catch mice (→ 3) owl or fox wanting to catch mice (→ 1) heron wanting to catch fish (→ 2?)	dog or cat wanting to catch mice (→ 3) crane wanting to catch fish (→ 2?) donkey wanting fodder (→ 4) (≠ 1)

According to the three main Chinese versions, the householders not only abused the monks, but even went so far as to beat them with sticks, throw stones at them, and destroy their requisites. When reborn in hell because of such wicked deeds, the householders realized that their evil rebirth was due to having maltreated the monks.¹⁸⁶ The Pāli version neither reports that the householders went so far as to physically harm the monks, nor does it record that they realized why they had been reborn in hell.

In view of the karmic retribution of rebirth in hell, it would make sense for the householders to be shown as having gone further than just ridiculing the meditation practice of the monks, an act which, although certainly improper and unwholesome, might on its own not warrant such heavy karmic retribution.¹⁸⁷ The Chinese version's depiction

¹⁸⁵ MN 50 at MN I 334,18. The last image used for such abuse in MN 50 at MN I 334,29 describes a donkey that stands by a doorpost. This image is not entirely clear, since one may wonder what the object of the donkey's "meditation" could be, as a donkey is not a predatory animal, unlike the other animals mentioned before. MĀ 131 at T I 621a8, T 66 at T I 865a7, and T 67 at T I 867b13 provide the detail required to fill out this image, as according to their description the object that occupies the donkey's mind at the end of a day of hard work, his "meditation object", is fodder. The same idea recurs in AN 11:10 at AN V 323,8, which describes a horse "meditating" on fodder. Bollée 1988: 128 note 15 explains that it was apparently customary to let donkeys search for food themselves, instead of providing them with fodder. Their chronic hunger, resulting from this situation, then became an object of popular mocking; cf. also Gokhale 1980b: 451, who notes the humour underlying the similes in MN 50. The set of four similes recurs in Nidd I 149,28 in a commentary on Sn 4:7 at Sn 818. A related image can be found in the Jain work *Sūyagaḍa* 1.11.27-28 in Vaidya 1928: 51,9.

¹⁸⁶ MĀ 131 at T I 621a29, T 66 at T I 865a28, and T 67 at T I 867c5.

¹⁸⁷ In fact, according to AN 6:46 at AN III 355,6 some Buddhist monks disparaged other monks who were meditating in a similar way, although without employing the similes used by the householders in MN 50, caricaturing the meditating monks in the following manner: "[proclaiming] 'we are meditators, we are meditators' they meditate, they overmeditate. What do they meditate about? For what do they meditate? How do they meditate?", *jhāyino 'mhā jhāyino 'mhā ti jhāyanti, pajjhāyanti, kim h' ime jhāyanti,*

of how the householders realized the dire consequences of harassing monks also seems to fit the present discourse well, whose purpose is to impress upon Māra the dire consequences of harassing a monk.

MN I 335 According to the *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three main Chinese parallels, the Buddha Kakusandha told his monks to develop the *brahmavihāras* in order to face the abuse they were experiencing. The partial parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama* instead reports that he gave them a teaching on the true nature of nutriment.¹⁸⁸

The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three main parallels report that, once Māra realized that he had been unable to get at the monks in this way, he decided to induce the householders to respect and venerate the monks instead. According to the partial parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, he got the householders to provide the monks with an abundance of material gains.¹⁸⁹

While the Pāli discourse simply mentions that the householders honoured and revered the monks, the three main Chinese versions and a Sanskrit fragment parallel to the present passage report that they went so far as to put their hair on the road, asking the monks to step on it for the sake of good fortune.¹⁹⁰ The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its main parallels agree that the householders were reborn in heaven as a result of their reverential behaviour, with the Chinese versions again noting that, when reborn in heaven, the householders realized that their fortunate rebirth was due to their good conduct towards the monks.

MN I 336 The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its three main Chinese parallels differ on the instruction given by the Buddha Kakusandha to his monks on this second occasion.¹⁹¹ A compari-

kint' ime jhāyanti, katham h'ime jhāyanti? (B^e-AN II 312,7 adds *nijjhāyanti avajjhāyanti* after *pajjhāyanti* and reads *kim ime* and *katham ime*, S^e-AN III 397,6: *kiñ h'ime* and *kathañ h'ime*). This description has several expressions in common with the way the householders abuse the monks in MN 50 at MN I 334,16, caricaturing the meditating monk in this manner: “[proclaiming] ‘we are meditators, we are meditators’, with dropping shoulders, downcast face and [having become] languid they meditate, they overmeditate, they outmeditate, they mismeditate”, *jhāyino 'sma jhāyino 'sma ti pattakkhandhā adhomukhā madhurakajatā jhāyanti pajjhāyanti nijjhāyanti apajjhāyanti* (B^e-MN I 410,10 and S^e-MN I 603,19: ‘smā'). Although the remainder of AN 6:46 makes it clear that such derisive criticism is not appropriate, there is no indication that it is of such unwholesome nature as to lead to rebirth in hell.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. EĀ 45.4 at T II 772b14, which first lists the standard set of four types of nutriment (edible food, contact, intention, and consciousness), followed by setting forth five types of supramundane food, namely absorption, resolution, mindfulness, the eight liberations, and joy.

¹⁸⁹ EĀ 45.4 at T II 772b26.

¹⁹⁰ MĀ 131 at T I 621c1, T 66 at T I 865b29, T 67 at T I 867c15, and Waldschmidt 1976: 143. Such stepping on an item spread on the ground for good luck appears to have been a custom in ancient India, in fact Vin II 129,15 records an allowance for monks to step on cloth when asked to do so by laity for the sake of good fortune.

¹⁹¹ MN 50 at MN I 336,22 takes up the impure nature of the human body, the repulsive nature of food, the absence of delight in the whole world, and the impermanent nature of all formations, *asubhānupassī kāye viharatha, āhāre paṭikkūlasaññino, sabbaloke anabhiratasaññino, sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassino* (B^e-MN I 412,18: *asubhānupassino* and *anabhiratisaññino*). MĀ 131 at T I 621c25 mentions contemplation of all formations as impermanent and subject to arising and passing away, as well as contemplation of dispassion, discarding, cessation, and giving up, 汝等當觀諸行無常，觀興衰法，觀無欲，觀

son of these four versions suggests contemplation of impermanence to be the central aspect common to the instructions on how to confront excessive respect and worship.

The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its main parallels continue by reporting that, since Māra had not been successful with this ruse, he eventually went so far as to physically harm Vidhura, the other chief disciple of Kakusandha Buddha. As a result of this evil deed, Māra immediately wound up in hell.¹⁹² This part of the present discourse is no longer found in the partial parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁹³

When narrating this event, the Pāli version speaks of Māra having “taken possession” of a young boy,¹⁹⁴ while according to the three Chinese parallels he transformed himself into a young boy or man in order to attack Vidhura.¹⁹⁵ The verb used in the present Pāli passage is the same as in the earlier instance when Māra “possessed” the householders, yet the earlier instance when Māra took possession resulted in the householders having to bear the karmic retribution, whereas in the present instance Māra himself receives the karmic retribution.¹⁹⁶

The idea of possession by Māra brings to mind the preceding discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection, the *Brahmanimantanīka-sutta*, where according to the Pāli version Māra took possession of a member of Brahmā’s assembly, while the Chinese parallel does not attribute such powers to him.

The same idea of possession by Māra recurs again on two occasions in the *Samyuttanikāya*. One of these instances reports that he took possession of a *deva* and made it speak a stanza in the presence of the Buddha, yet, according to the *Samyukta-āgama* parallel

捨離, 觀滅, 觀斷. T 66 at T I 865c24 enjoins viewing all formations as abiding in impermanence and as being eradicated, discarded, ceasing, appeased, and abiding in the sphere of appeasement, 當於一切行見無常住. 當見盡, 當見離, 當見滅, 當見止, 當見止住處. T 67 at T I 868a2 speaks of recollecting the impermanent nature of all things, of avoiding greed and delight in regard to robes and food, and of [contemplating] *dukkha*, emptiness, and not-self, 念諸萬物所在無常, 雖著衣食莫以貪樂, 苦, 空, 非身. Since in the partial parallel EĀ 45.4 the issue at stake is the monks receiving material gains, the recommendation they get at T II 772c5 is on avoiding attachment. Hence this version does not bring in the topic of impermanence.

¹⁹² A reference to this event can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 654c17.

¹⁹³ After reporting the instruction given by the Buddha Kakusandha to his monks regarding the avoiding of attachment, EĀ 45.4 at T II 772c9 continues with the Buddha Gotama giving a similar instruction to his monks.

¹⁹⁴ MN 50 at MN I 336,33: *aññataraṇi kumāraṇi anvāvisitvā* (B^e-MN I 413,1 and S^e-MN I 607,17: *kumāra-kam*).

¹⁹⁵ MĀ 131 at T I 622a7, T 66 at T I 866a8, and T 67 at T I 868a11 agree that Māra “transformed”, 化作, himself into the perpetrator of the action. D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 119a2 or Q (5595) *tu* 136a8, which has preserved an extract from this passage, also does not report Māra taking possession of someone else.

¹⁹⁶ The commentary, Ps II 420,26, explains that in the present instance Māra indeed took control over the boy, whereas in relation to the earlier abuse the commentary at Ps II 418,22 suggests that Māra had not really taken control over the householders. MN 50 at MN I 334,11 indeed indicates that Māra only told the householders to abuse the monks, while the harming of Vidhura at MN I 336,34 is worded in such a way as to indicate that Māra himself is the subject of the action. The expression used for his interference in both cases is, however, the same, in that he “took possession”, *anvāvisati*, of the householders and the boy.

he did not take possession of the *deva*.¹⁹⁷ The other occurrence in the *Samyutta-nikāya* describes how Māra took possession of householders in order to prevent the Buddha from receiving alms, an instance where according to two Chinese parallels, found in the *Samyukta-āgama* and the *Ekottarika-āgama*, he only told the householders not to give alms to the Buddha, without taking possession of them.¹⁹⁸

The famous passage in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, according to which Māra prevented Ānanda from requesting the Buddha to continue to live on, employs a different type of terminology, since it speaks of Ānanda's mind being "obsessed" by Māra.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, here, too, the Chinese and Tibetan parallel versions make use of vocabulary that is milder in tone, indicating that Ānanda had been "blinded" or "confused" by Māra.²⁰⁰

In sum, it seems that the Pāli discourses stand alone in attributing to Māra the ability to take possession of someone and thereby make this person speak or act according to his will.²⁰¹ While in the case of the *Brahmanimantaṇika-sutta* this presentation is at odds with what can be gathered from other discourses on the range of Māra's power vis-à-vis Brahmā, the *Māratajjanīya-sutta*'s description of how Māra took possession of humans creates some inconsistency in regard to the karmic retribution described in the same discourse for the acts undertaken by these possessed beings.

MN I 337 The *Māratajjanīya-sutta* and its parallels continue by describing the hell in which the former Māra was reborn in retribution for his mischief.²⁰² The Chinese versions note

¹⁹⁷ SN 2:30 at SN I 67,1 (or SN² 111 at SN² I 154,7): *māro pāpima ... devaputtam anvāvisitvā* (B^e-SN I 67,1, C^e-SN I 128,6, and S^e-SN I 96,15: *devaputtam*), while in SĀ 1308 at T II 359c19 Māra "manifested", 著, as a *deva* to speak a stanza.

¹⁹⁸ SN 4:18 at SN I 114,7 (or SN² 154 at SN² I 253,4): *brāhmaṇagahapatikā mārena pāpimatā anvāvijñhā bhavanti*, SĀ 1095 at T II 288a15: 語, and EĀ 45.4 at T II 772a28: 告.

¹⁹⁹ DN 16 at DN II 103,14: *mārena pariyutthitacitto*. The commentary, Sv II 555,19, explains that Māra created frightening sights and sounds that disturbed Ānanda, something Māra was able to do because Ānanda's mind was not yet free from the *vipallāsas*; on the commentarial position regarding this event cf. also the study by An 2000.

²⁰⁰ The Sanskrit fragment TM 361 folio 165V2 in Waldschmidt 1950: 53 and the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 201,21 or in Vaidya 1999: 125,18 describe that Ānanda was "suffused" by Māra, *sphuto*, a description that seems not too far from the idea of possession. The Tibetan counterpart in Waldschmidt 1951: 207,14, however, indicates that Māra was "covering up" Ānanda, *khebs pa*, similarly DĀ 2 at T I 15b25 and T 6 at T I 180b20 speak of Ānanda being "covered up", 蔽, by Māra, which Weller 1939: 79 translates as "blinded" ("mit Blindheit geschlagen"). According to another individual translation and the account in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, Māra "confused" Ānanda, T 7 at T I 191b23: 迷惑 and T 1451 at T XXIV 387c17: 迷亂. T 5 at T I 165a12, translated in Puini 1909: 36, differs from all these versions by reporting that Māra entered Ānanda's belly and made him actually request the Buddha to enter *parinibbāna*.

²⁰¹ The possibility of possession is also reflected in an allowance made in Vin I 203,1 to partake of raw meat and blood in case of being possessed by a spirit, cf. also below p. 318 note 43.

²⁰² MN 50 at MN I 337,15 specifies that Māra was reborn in hell in a human body with a fish's head, a detail not mentioned in the Chinese versions. A discourse quotation paralleling Māra's ending up in hell, reported in MN 50 at MN I 337,5, can be found in Abhidh-k 3:12 in Pradhan 1967: 123,2; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 45b7, T 1559 at T XXIX 202b2, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 118b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 136a4.

that (present time) Māra was thoroughly frightened on hearing the misfortune that befell his uncle Māra for harassing the monk disciples of Kakusandha Buddha and for harming his chief disciple.²⁰³

The Chinese versions agree with the *Māratajjanīya-sutta* that Mahāmoggallāna also described some of his past deeds in verse, such as his shaking the Hall of Migāra's Mother and the palace of Sakka with his toe, and his visit to a Brahmā to check if the latter had overcome his former eternalist belief.²⁰⁴

According to all versions, Mahāmoggallāna concluded his stanzas by illustrating the karmic retribution for attacking the Buddha or his monk disciples with the image of a fool who will be burnt by fire, even though the fire does not have any intention to burn the fool.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ According to MĀ 131 at T I 622a25, Māra asked in verse for more details on this hell, whereas according to MN 50 at MN I 337,18 and T 66 at T I 866a23 a similar verse inquiring about the nature of this hell was spoken by Mahāmoggallāna as a rhetorical question when beginning his description of this hell. In T 67 at T I 868a26, this inquiry and the subsequent verses that describe the hell are spoken by the Buddha, which does not seem to fit the context too well.

²⁰⁴ MĀ 131 at T I 622c3, T I 622c1, and T I 622c15. T 66 at T I 866b28, T I 866b26, and T I 866c11. T 67 does not describe these events as explicitly as the other versions, although T 67 at T I 868b15 and T I 868b29 does record Mahāmoggallāna shaking a palace with his toe and questioning Brahmā. Mahāmoggallāna's shaking of the Hall of Migāra's Mother is recorded in SN 51:14 at SN V 270,5, his shaking of Sakka's palace in MN 37 at MN I 253,35, and his addressing Brahmā on the latter's eternalist belief in SN 6:5 at SN I 145,23 (or SN² 176 at SN²I 316,12). The stanzas that depict these events in MN 50 recur at Th 1187-1208 (for further parallels cf. Franke 1912: 174-182), as part of a set of over sixty stanzas attributed to Mahāmoggallāna. Ling 1962: 104 comments that “as the verses occur there [i.e. in Th] independently of the story of Dūsin, it is possible that the present form of the story [i.e. in MN 50] was prefixed to them at a later stage, in the way that prose narrations have been prefixed to verses in the Itivuttaka and Udāna, for instance”; on the relationship between verse and prose in the *Udāna* cf. also, e.g., Anālayo 2009e.

²⁰⁵ Windisch 1895: 160 suggests that, since the title of the discourse is *Māratajjaniya*, the reading at Th 1208: *atajjesi*, according to which Mahāmoggallāna “rebuked” Māra, seems preferable to MN I 338,29: *aghattesi*, according to which he “chastened” Māra. The other Pāli editions, B^e-MN I 415,9, C^e-MN I 788,22, and S^e-MN I 611,1, indeed read *atajjesi*. His suggestion receives further support from MĀ 131 at T I 622c29, according to which Mahāmoggallāna “scolded” Māra, 訴, and from T 66 at T I 866c24, according to which Mahāmoggallāna “told” Māra, 說. T 67 at T I 868c16, however, indicates that Mahāmoggallāna “subdued” Māra, 降伏.

Chapter 6 *Gahapati-vagga*

MN 51 *Kandaraka-sutta*

The *Kandaraka-sutta*, the “discourse to Kandaraka”, examines four types of person, namely those who:

- torment themselves,
- torment others,
- torment both,
- torment neither themselves nor others.

This discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese Āgamas. Similar expositions of these four types of person recur in other Pāli discourses,¹ however, as well as in Sanskrit fragments.²

MN 52 *Atṭhakanāgara-sutta*

The *Atṭhakanāgara-sutta*, the “discourse to [a man from] Atṭhakanāgara”, presents a survey of several approaches to awakening. This discourse has a Pāli parallel in the section on the elevens in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and two Chinese parallels, one of which occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama*, while the other is an individual translation.³

¹ Expositions in brief can be found in DN 33 at DN III 232,21 and MN 94 at MN II 159,5, detailed exposition in MN 60 at MN I 411,28 and AN 4:198 at AN II 205,23.

² Cf. especially the fragments of the *Pudgala-sūtra* in Melzer 2006: 306–329, which have preserved a complete exposition of these four types of person. Other relevant fragments are, e.g., SHT I 422 (pp. 189–190, cf. also SHT X p. 409), SHT III 879 (pp. 128–129, cf. also SHT VIII p. 183), SHT III 996 (pp. 257–258, cf. also SHT VI p. 221 and SHT X p. 417), SHT IV 165 folio 27 (pp. 200–203, cf. also SHT VI p. 212, SHT VII p. 240, and SHT X p. 403), SHT V 1153 (p. 152, cf. also SHT VIII p. 197), and SHT V 1359 (pp. 244–245, cf. also SHT X p. 427). SHT I 422 parallels the reference to tormenting oneself in MN 51 at MN I 342,23, while SHT III 879 parallels the reference to tormenting others in MN 51 at MN I 343,21; cf. also SHT V 1153 for both. SHT III 996, SHT IV 165 folio 27, and SHT V 1359 describe practices of self-mortification, such as found in MN 51 at MN I 343 and also in other similar passages, e.g., in DN 8 at DN I 166,2, DN 25 at DN III 40,26, or AN 3:151 at AN I 295,8.

³ The parallels are AN 11:17 at AN V 342–347, MĀ 217 at T I 802a-c, and T 92 at T I 916a-917a. The four versions agree on locating the discourse at Pātaliputta. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 92 was translated by Ān Shīgāo (安世高). Zürcher 1991: 297, however, does not include this translation among the works that can with certainty be attributed to Ān Shīgāo. MN 52 and MĀ 217 agree on the title *Atṭhakanāgara*/八城, while T 92 at T I 916a17 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha to the householder Ten Limbs, a man from Atṭhakanāgara”, 佛說十支居士八城人經. While the protagonist in MĀ 217 has the name 第十, which would correspond to the Dasama mentioned in MN 52, the protagonist of T 92 is instead 十支, which rendered into Pāli would be Dasaṅga. E^e and S^e do not give a title for AN 11:17, but refer to it at E^e-AN V 358,31 and S^e-AN V 390,19 in their respective chapter *uddānas* as Dasama. In B^e-AN III 542,25, the title of the discourse is *Atṭhakanāgara-sutta* and the *uddāna* at B^e-AN III 556,3 refers to it as Atṭhako. The Ceylonese edition wavers between these two op-

MN I 349 The Pāli versions begin by briefly reporting that the householder Dasama, who had been in Pāṭaliputta on some business, approached a monk in order to find out where Ānanda was staying.

The introductory narration in the two Chinese versions offers additional details, explaining that the householder Dasama, who had earlier successfully conducted some business and derived great profit from it, approached a group of monks. These taught him the Dharma in various ways and were able to please him with their exposition.⁴ After having received their teachings and being pleased by them, Dasama inquired regarding the whereabouts of Ānanda.

Another difference is that the two Chinese discourses begin by noting that the Buddha had recently attained *parinibbāna*. The same is also implicit in the introductory part of the Pāli versions, which do not mention the whereabouts of the Buddha. Usually discourses, even when spoken by disciples, begin by mentioning the location where the Buddha was staying at that time.

The four versions agree that the householder Dasama asked Ānanda if there was one way, taught by the Buddha, that leads to the destruction of the influxes. In reply, Ānanda described how liberation can be achieved through developing insight based on the attainment of any out of the four *jhānas*, of the four *brahmavihāras*, or of the three immaterial spheres of boundless space, boundless consciousness, and nothingness.

The Chinese versions also include in this presentation the fourth immaterial attainment, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.⁵ The Pāli subcommentary explains that Ānanda did not mention the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception because it is too subtle an attainment for the development of insight.⁶

A discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya* similarly confines the objects for the development of insight to the realm of perception, in line with the above commentarial expla-

tions, as C^e-AN VI 646,1 introduces the discourse as *Atthakanāgara-sutta*, but the *uddāna* at C^e-AN VI 674,31 refers to it as Dasamo. For a remark on MĀ 217 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 101. Barua 1971/2003: 351 suggests that *Atthakanāgara* probably corresponds to “a village called Hathagaon on the Bāgmatī river”.

⁴ MĀ 217 at T I 802a20 and T 92 at T I 916a29 report that the householder was so delighted at the teachings received that for a little while he remained speechless, after which he inquired about Ānanda.

⁵ MĀ 217 at T I 802b27 and T 92 at T I 916c8. Maithrimurthi 1999: 97 note 136 comments that this reference to the fourth immaterial attainment was probably added mechanically.

⁶ B^e-Ps-pt II 9 explains that the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception was not included in the present exposition because of the subtlety of the formations that still remain during its attainment, which would make it too difficult for a disciple to contemplate it, *nevasaññāsaññāyatanaḍhammānañsaṅkhārāvasesasukhumabhañappattatāya tathā sāvakānam dukkaran ti*. This principle appears to be reflected in the fact that MN 64 at MN I 436,28 and its parallel MĀ 205 at T I 780a16 stop short at the attainment of nothingness and do not mention the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in a presentation that relates deep concentration experience to the development of insight; cf. also note 7 below. The same pattern would also apply to the corresponding realms of rebirth, since AN 3:114 at AN I 267-268 describes how a noble disciple, on being reborn in one or the other immaterial realm, will attain final Nirvāṇa there, a presentation which also does not include the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.

nation that the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is not a suitable object for the development of insight.⁷

The Pāli and Chinese versions differ also in their description on how to develop insight in regard to this range of concentration experiences. According to the *Majjhimanikāya* and *Anguttara-nikāya* versions, each attainment should be contemplated as conditioned and impermanent.⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead speaks of contemplating dharmas as dharmas.⁹

The Pāli and Chinese versions indicate that their respective approaches to insight have the potential of leading to full awakening or to non-return. When describing the lesser of these two alternatives, the *Atthakanāgara-sutta* and its *Anguttara-nikāya* counterpart indicate that the attainment of non-return will be achieved due to the practitioner's "lust for the Dharma", *dhammarāga*.¹⁰ The expression "lust for the Dharma"

⁷ AN 9:36 at AN IV 426,9: "as far as there is attainment of perception, to that extent there is penetrative knowledge", *yāvatā saññāsamāpatti*, *tāvatā aññāpaticedho* (cf. also SN 14:11 at SN II 151,1, which similarly uses the term *saññāsamāpatti* only in regard to attainments up to the sphere of nothingness). Schmithausen 1981: 224 notes 86 and 87 and ibid. p. 229 note 106 draws attention to similar statements found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in Pradhan 1950: 69,15: *yāvad eva samjñāsamāpattiḥ tāvad ājñāpraticedha iti* and T 1602 at T XXXI 576c11; 唯依有想三摩鉢底領解通達; cf. also Ruegg 1989: 200. The *Yogācārabhūmi*, T 1579 at T XXX 859a13, explains that, unlike the attainment of nothingness, the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception cannot be used as a path for the eradication of the influxes, 非想非非想處, 無無漏道 (for a similar statement cf. also T 1550 at T XXVIII 823b18), but from the perspective of the development of insight can only be put to use for the purpose of developing disenchantment with the sphere of nothingness. Cf. also, e.g., the discussion in the *Dharmaskandha*, which describes the development of insight based on the *jhānas* and on the first three immaterial attainments, up to the sphere of nothingness, T 1537 at T XXVI 494a22. Gunaratana 2007: 65 sums up that, in the case of the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, "the mental contents ... are so extremely refined and subtle that even the purest mindfulness and concentration cannot explore them", hence it "cannot be used as a basis for insight". Schmithausen 1981: 224 note 87 points out that a discourse quotation in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (cf. Wogihara 1971b: 275,25), however, does include the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception among states that can be used for the development of insight; cf. also, e.g., SĀ 870 at T II 220b7, which applies an insight contemplation that is based on the aggregate analysis to all four immaterial attainments.

⁸ MN 52 at MN I 350,13: "this is conditioned and produced by volition, whatever is conditioned and produced by volition is impermanent and subject to cessation", *idam ... abhisankhatam abhisāñcetayitam, yam kho pana kiñci abhisankhatam abhisāñcetayitam tad aniccam nirodhadhamman ti*; cf. also AN 11:17 at AN V 343,22 and Hamilton 2000: 195.

⁹ MĀ 217 at T I 802b9: 觀法如法; cf. also T 92 at T I 916b18, which appears to imply the same. The injunction to contemplate dharmas as dharmas occurs in the *Satipatṭhāna-sutta*, where one of its implications is to contemplate arising and passing away, cf. MN 10 at MN I 60,30. To develop insight into the impermanent nature of deep concentration experiences would indeed be a powerful method to develop disenchantment towards such experiences. A problem with applying this to MĀ 217, however, is that the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Satipatṭhāna-sutta*, MĀ 98 at T I 584a14, does not mention contemplation of arising and passing away in its description of contemplating dharmas as dharmas.

¹⁰ MN 52 at MN I 350,17 and AN 11:17 at AN V 343,25: "by way of that lust for the Dharma and that desire for the Dharma ... he will be reborn spontaneously and attain final Nirvāṇa there", *ten' eva dhammarāgena tāya dhammanandiya ... opapātiko hoti tattha parinibbāyi*. Although the formulation reads as

occurs also in the *Madhyama-āgama* version.¹¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation speak, moreover, of “craving for the Dharma”.¹² The individual translation relates such craving for the Dharma to developing the Dharma and to having reverence or regard for it.¹³ Thus the expressions “lust for the Dharma”, or even “craving for the Dharma”, have quite positive connotations in the present context.¹⁴

MN I 352 The *Atthakanāgara-sutta* and its parallels record that the householder Dasama was delighted that Ānanda had shown eleven (or according to the Chinese versions twelve) ways to liberation on being asked to point out just a single one.¹⁵ By way of illustration, he compared this to a man who is able to escape from a house on fire through any of the eleven (or twelve) doors of the house. The four versions agree that the householder expressed his appreciation by inviting the community of monks for a sumptuous meal

if *dhammarāga* is instrumental in assuring at least non-return, the commentary, Ps III 146,28, understands *dhammarāga* to represent attachment to one’s meditative experiences that has prevented the attainment of full awakening; cf. also Harvey 2003: 319, who in relation to the present occurrence of *dhammarāga* comments that “spiritual desire may be what holds a person back from the highest attainment”, whereas Webster 2005a: 102 takes *dhammarāga* to be part of what “ultimately leads to *nibbāna*”.

¹¹ MĀ 217 at T I 802b11: 欲法.

¹² MĀ 217 at T I 802b11 and T 92 at T I 916b21: 愛法; cf. also the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* in Wogihara 1971b: 273,25, which in a similar context reads *tenaiva dharma-cchandena tenaiva dharma-snehena tenaiva dharma-premnā tayaiva dharmābhīratāya*.

¹³ T 92 at T I 916b21: 彼自愛法, 彼自習法, 彼自敬法; cf. also the otherwise unrelated discourse SĀ 866 at T II 219c21, where lust for the Dharma occurs together with recollecting the Dharma and delighting in it as the qualities by virtue of which rebirth in the Brahmā realm takes place, 即以此欲法, 念法, 樂法功德, 生大梵天中.

¹⁴ Although the term “lust”, *rāga*, may prima facie call up negative associations, even the term “craving”, *tañhā*, occurs in AN 4:159 at AN II 145,34 and its parallel SĀ 564 at T II 148b20 with positive connotations. Both propose that based on craving, craving can be overcome, *tañham nissāya tañhā pahātabbāti*, 依愛斷愛, followed by explaining the first instance of craving to represent the wish to attain liberation. In a similar vein, SN 51:15 at SN V 272,16 indicates that “desire”, *chanda* (another term which often carries negative connotations) is to be overcome with the help of *chanda*. Its parallel SĀ 561 at T II 147a19 makes the same point in slightly different terms, indicating that craving is to be overcome based on desire, 依於欲而斷愛. Such instances highlight that in the early discourses terminology is not as uniform as in later texts. By the time of the Abhidharma and the commentaries, the implications of key terminology are clearly delineated and terms such as “lust” and “craving” tend to be used only with a negative meaning. In the early discourses, however, such terms cannot be restricted to the meaning given to them in later works and are at times employed in ways which may even seem to conflict with the definitions given in the Abhidharma and the commentaries.

¹⁵ While according to MN 52 at MN I 353,3, C^e-MN II 26,4, and S^e-MN II 22,19 the householder Dasama was able to “hear” about eleven doors to the deathless, *savānāya*, according to B^e-MN II 15,25 he was able to “develop” them, *bhāvanāya*. Again, while in AN 11:17 at AN V 346,32 and B^e-AN III 546,7 he was able to “pursue” these eleven doors, *sevanāya*, in C^e-AN VI 654,5 and S^e-AN V 376,20 he was able to “hear” of them, *savanāya*. MĀ 217 at T I 802c9 describes that the householder was able to “attain a safe emerging”, 得安隱出 (my translation is based on another occurrence of the expression 安隱出 in MĀ 206 at T I 781b14, where it forms the counterpart to *sotthinā abhinibbūjituṇ* in its parallel MN 16 at MN I 104,10), in dependence on these doors to the deathless, while T 92 at T I 916c20 proclaims that “relying on each of these doors to the deathless, each will lead out”, 依各各甘露門, 各各當出之.

the next day and by making the gift of a building to Ānanda. The Chinese discourses note that Ānanda handed the building over to the Sangha of the four directions.¹⁶

MN 53 *Sekha-sutta*¹⁷

The *Sekha-sutta*, the “discourse on a disciple in higher training”, is an exposition by Ānanda on the gradual path of training and on seven qualities of a disciple in higher training.¹⁸

Of this discourse, so far no parallel appears to have been identified.¹⁹ References to a version of this discourse have, however, been preserved in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*,²⁰ which thus indicates that a version of the present discourse was known in other reciter traditions.

MN 54 *Potaliya-sutta*

The *Potaliya-sutta*, the “discourse to Potaliya”, clarifies what is required in order to truly leave behind all worldly affairs. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.²¹ A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.²²

The *Potaliya-sutta* and its Chinese parallel report that Potaliya, who had come to MN I 359 visit the Buddha, felt offended because the Buddha addressed him with the epithet

¹⁶ MĀ 217 at T I 802c24 and T 92 at T I 916c29.

¹⁷ S^e-MN II 24,1 has the title *Sekhapatiṣpadā-sutta*, corresponding even closer to the topic of MN 53.

¹⁸ A detailed exposition of these seven qualities can be found in AN 7:63 at AN IV 109,5; on the stanza found at MN I 358,28 cf., e.g., Bühler 1897.

¹⁹ Akanuma 1929/1990: 166 lists SĀ 1176 at T II 316a as a parallel to MN 53. SĀ 1176, however, is rather a parallel to SN 35:202 at SN IV 182–188, since in both these discourses Mahāmoggallāna contrasts a monk who reacts to perceptual experience with likes and dislikes with a monk who is able to stay aloof from such reactions. SN 35:202 and SĀ 1176 share with MN 53 the same introductory narration, which describes how the Sakyans invited the Buddha to their newly built hall, how the Buddha then gave a talk to them and, once the Sakyans had left, asked one of his disciples to continue instructing the monks. The similarity of the introductory narration may have led Akanuma to assign SĀ 1176 as a parallel to MN 53. The two discourses differ, however, not only in regard to their subject matter, but also in regard to their speaker, which in MN 53 is Ānanda, while in SĀ 1176 the speaker is Mahāmoggallāna.

²⁰ Cf. T 1509 at T XXV 86b24, T XXV 173c4, and T XXV 249c23, identified in Lamotte 1944/1981: 244 note 1 to be from a version of the present discourse.

²¹ The parallel is MĀ 203 at T I 773a-775b, which agrees with the Pāli version on taking the name of its protagonist as title, rendered as 睞利多, *pōlīt̄a* (following Pulleyblank 1991: 42, 85, and 188), which compared to the Pāli version has the second and third syllables in the opposite order (and omits the last, which, however, is a recurrent feature of Chinese renderings of proper names). MĀ 203 takes place in Pāvārika’s Mango Grove near the town of Nālandā, whereas MN 54 has the town Āpaṇa in the country of the Aṅguttarāpans as its location. For remarks on MĀ 203 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 71.

²² The fragments are SHT V 1332a (p. 226), SHT VI 1493 (p. 161), and SHT X 3917 (p. 217), which correspond to the concluding part in MN 54 at MN I 368,1. The fragments continue with the beginning part of MN 26, indicating that they had the same sequence as the *Madhyama-āgama*, where the parallel to MN 26 (MĀ 204) also follows the parallel to MN 54 (MĀ 203).

“householder”.²³ The *Madhyama-āgama* version precedes this meeting by narrating that Potaliya was in the habit of visiting recluses and Brahmins in parks and groves, informing them that he had left all worldly affairs behind, a statement that met with the approval of these recluses and Brahmins.²⁴

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions, Potaliya felt that he should not be called a householder, because he had left behind all worldly affairs, having handed over his wealth to his children and living merely on what he needed to subsist.²⁵ The Buddha, however, explained to Potaliya that leaving behind all worldly affairs required more than that. Potaliya was keen to receive more explanations, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version he even expressed his interest by discarding his walking stick and sandals, followed by requesting the Buddha with hands joined in respectful salutation to expiate on the matter.²⁶

MN I 360 According to both versions, the Buddha enumerated eight qualities that lead to leaving behind or cutting off worldly affairs (see table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Eight Qualities to be Left Behind According to MN 54 and its Parallel

MN 54	MĀ 203
killing (1)	killing (→ 1)
stealing (2)	stealing (→ 2)
speaking falsehood (3)	sexual misconduct
speaking maliciously (4)	speaking falsehood (→ 3)
greed (5)	greed (→ 5)
scolding (6)	anger (→ 7)
anger (7)	dislike and irritation
excessive pride (8)	excessive pride (→ 8) (≠ 4, 6)

The two versions agree in including the need to refrain from killing, stealing, lying, greed, anger, and excessive pride in this listing of requirements. While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version lists speaking maliciously and scolding as the remaining two factors, the *Madhyama-āgama* version has sexual misconduct as one factor and dislike together

²³ MN 54 at MN I 359,18: *gahapati* and MĀ 203 at T I 773a14: 居士.

²⁴ MĀ 203 at T I 773a8. The same account recurs at the end of MĀ 203 at T I 775b13, when Potaliya describes how he earlier overestimated himself and rejoices in the Buddha’s exposition.

²⁵ According to MN 54 at MN I 360,4, he referred to his condition as “having given up all work and cut off all affairs”, *sabbe kammantā pātikkhitā sabbe vohārā samucchinnā ti*, while according to MĀ 203 at T I 773a15 he spoke of the same in terms of having “renounced worldliness, abandoned worldliness, cast off worldly affairs”, 離俗, 斷俗, 捨諸俗事. Bapat 1975: 28 notes the appropriateness of the rendering 俗事 for whatever equivalent the original text would have had for Pāli *vohāra* (corresponding to Sanskrit *vyavahāra*), just as another occurrence of *vohāra* (in this case corresponding to Sanskrit *vyāhāra*) in MN 112 at MN III 29,29 has as its counterpart in MĀ 187 at T I 732b28: 說, indicating that the translator was clearly aware of these different meanings.

²⁶ MĀ 203 at T I 773a29.

with irritation as the other factor.²⁷ In regard to this difference, the absence of sexual misconduct in the Pāli version is surprising, since this factor would fit an enumeration that includes killing, stealing and falsehood, all the more since the later part of both discourses takes up the dangers of sensuality in detail.

The two versions agree that the rationale for refraining from these unwholesome activities and qualities is to avoid blame and a bad reputation, as well as the prospect of an evil rebirth.²⁸ Both versions indicate that, with this much accomplished, still more needs to be done. By way of illustration, they deliver a series of similes on the disadvantages of sensuality (see table 6.2).

The two versions compare sensuality in similar terms to:

MN I 364

- a dog that gnaws a meatless bone,
- a bird that carries a piece of meat in the air and is attacked by other birds,
- a burning torch held against the wind.²⁹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version next describes a man who is seized by two strong men and dragged to a burning charcoal pit.³⁰ Its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel has a similar image, without, however, mentioning an intervention by other men. Instead, it simply indicates that the man would not want to fall into such a burning pit, since he wants to live and wishes to avoid suffering.³¹

MN I 365

²⁷ MN 54 at MN I 360,24+25: *pisunā vācā* and *nindāroso*, MĀ 203 at T I 773b4+5: 邪淫 and 憎嫉惱 (Hirakawa 1997: 367 indicates that 嫉, besides its main meaning of ‘jealousy’, can also render *prati-ghāta*, which would fit the present context better).

²⁸ While according to MĀ 203 at T I 773b7 the Buddha described these implications on his own accord, according to MN 54 at MN I 360,20 at first he only enumerated the eight factors. Once Potaliya had requested a more detailed exposition, the Buddha explained the rationale for refraining from these eight unwholesome activities and qualities.

²⁹ The image of a bird that carries a piece of meat and is thereon attacked by other birds recurs again in Jā 408 at Jā III 378,16, where seeing the predicament of this bird causes a king to become thoroughly disenchanted with sensual pleasures, with the result that he achieved awakening as a Pacceka-buddha (this tale is part of a set of four tales on Pacceka-buddhas common to the Buddhist and Jain traditions, on these tales cf., e.g., Charpentier 1908, Pavolini 1899, and Wiltshire 1990: 118–166). A variation on this particular image occurs at Vin III 105,34 and in SN 19:2 at SN II 256,7, where the piece of meat itself flies through the air and is pecked at by birds, a bizarre karmic retribution incurred by a butcher in retribution for his evil livelihood. The Chinese parallel to SN 19:2, SĀ 509 at T II 135c1, speaks instead of a being who suffers agonizing pain, because its body is being eaten by hungry birds and other animals. The piece of meat image recurs also in MN 23 at MN I 145,3, where it stands representative for lust and delight; cf. also Jā 330 at Jā III 100,15. The simile of the burning torch occurs again at Thī 507, where it illustrates sensual pleasures. For a parallel to the simile of the dog that gnaws a meatless bone in Jain scripture cf. von Kamptz 1929: 24. Franke 1906: 345 notes a counterpart to the simile of the piece of meat in the *Mahābhārata*, which describes an eagle who, being in possession of a piece of meat, is attacked by other eagles. For a study of the similes found in MN 54 cf. Hecker 2009: 132–136; cf. also above p. 148 note 17.

³⁰ MN 54 at MN I 365,16.

³¹ MĀ 203 at T I 774b18. A version of the charcoal pit simile without the feature of two men dragging a third towards the pit can also be found in MN 12 at MN I 74,15; cf. also DN 34 at DN III 283,22, AN 8:28 at AN IV 224,15, AN 10:90 at AN V 175,6, and Sn 2:14 at Sn 396. In other occurrences of the burn-

Table 6.2: Similes on Sensual Pleasures in MN 54 and its Parallel

MN 54	MĀ 203
hungry dog gets meatless bone (1)	hungry dog gets meatless bone (→ 1)
bird gets some meat and is attacked (2)	bird gets some meat and is attacked (→ 2)
burning torch held against wind (3)	burning torch held against wind (→ 3)
burning charcoal pit (4)	burning charcoal pit (→ 4)
dream (5)	let oneself be bitten by a poisonous snake
borrowed goods (6)	dream (→ 5)
climbing a fruit tree (7)	borrowed goods (→ 6)
	climbing a fruit tree (→ 7)

The *Madhyama-āgama* account continues after the simile of the burning charcoal pit by delivering the simile of a poisonous snake, which describes a man who would not wish any of his limbs to be bitten by this snake.³² This simile does not occur in the *Potaliya-sutta*.

In regard to this difference, it is noteworthy that the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report that a group of monks quoted a series of similes as having been taught by the Buddha on the disadvantages of sensual pleasures. This series not only contains the similes found in the *Potaliya-sutta*, but also the simile of the snake, thereby lending some degree of support to its inclusion in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Potaliya-sutta*.³³

The next simile in the *Potaliya-sutta* describes a man who, while being asleep and dreaming, sees lovely parks and groves. The image of a dream occurs also in the *Madh-*

ing charcoal image, the idea of being at the mercy of two strong men occurs when the point at stake is to illustrate the pain experienced when being seriously ill or when engaging in forceful breath control, cf. MN 36 at MN I 244,28, MN 85 at MN II 93,23, MN 97 at MN II 193,17, MN 100 at MN II 212,6, MN 143 at MN III 259,10, MN 144 at MN III 264,8, SN 35:87 at SN IV 56,29, and AN 6:56 at AN III 380,14. Another occurrence is SN 12:63 at SN II 99,29, where the simile illustrates volition, apparently intended to depict the inevitability of its karmic consequences. The image of two men who drag a third to a burning pit as an illustration of sensual pleasures can also be found in MN 75 at MN I 507,7 and its parallel MĀ 153 at T I 672a6, where it occurs after an examination of the predicament of a leper who cauterises his wounds over a burning pit. Here the point of the simile is to indicate that, once this leper has been healed, he would not want to come near the pit even if dragged there by force. Another instance where the same simile is used to illustrate sensual pleasures is SN 35:203 at SN IV 188,25. Its Chinese parallel, SĀ 1173 at T II 314a17, only describes how someone would want to avoid falling into such a burning pit, without mentioning any intervention by others.

³² MĀ 203 at T I 774b29, cf. the translation in Ehara 1961/1995: 74 note 1.

³³ MN 22 at MN I 130,29 speaks of the simile of a “snake’s head”, *sappasirūpamā*, while its parallel MĀ 200 at T I 763c20 speaks of a “poisonous snake”, 毒蛇, using the same term as MĀ 203 at T I 774b29. The simile of a snake’s head recurs in Sn 4:1 at Sn 768, again as an illustration of the dangers of sensuality, cf. also above p. 148 note 17. In the context of a similar set of similes, SĀ² 185 at T II 440a6 refers to something that is poisonous and stings, which could be a reference to the snake imagery, although the passage is ambiguous: “sensual desires are like faeces and poison, they sting and pollute”, 欲如糞毒, 亦螫亦汚.

yama-āgama parallel, which, however, depicts how this man dreams of the five types of sensual pleasure.³⁴

The final two similes in both versions describe in similar terms how someone may show off with borrowed goods and how a man is in danger if, after he has climbed up a fruit tree to eat some of the fruits, another man comes and starts to cut down this tree in order to get its fruits.³⁵

The two versions agree in concluding each simile with a description of how a noble disciple realizes the disadvantages of sensual pleasures and goes beyond them. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version stands alone in describing that the noble disciple avoids diversified equanimity and instead develops unified equanimity.³⁶

According to the commentarial explanation, such unified equanimity refers to the equanimity of the fourth *jhāna*.³⁷ The attainment of the fourth *jhāna* would fit the present instance well, since the *Potaliya-sutta* continues at this point with the three higher knowledges, whose development presupposes the four *jhānas*.

The same can also be seen in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which after the final simile explicitly mentions the development of the four *jhānas*.³⁸ The *Madhyama-āgama* account continues after the four *jhānas* directly with the destruction of the influxes,³⁹ thereby not mentioning the first two higher knowledges included in the *Majjhima-nikāya* account.⁴⁰

According to both versions, Potaliya admitted that his claim to having left all worldliness behind had been an overestimation, followed by taking refuge. The *Madhyama-āgama* account adds that, by the end of the Buddha's discourse, Potaliya had become a stream-enterer.⁴¹

³⁴ MĀ 203 at T I 774c13: 夢得具足五欲自娛. The image of waking up from a dream recurs in Sn 4:6 at Sn 807, where it illustrates the separation from dear ones that have passed away and are not seen any more, just like things seen during a dream.

³⁵ The simile of climbing a fruit tree that is being cut down occurs also in the Jain *Isibhāsiyāīm* 24.32, Schubring 1969: 526: *chijjañ* va *tarum* *ārūḍhā phal'* *atthī* va *jahā narā*.

³⁶ MN 54 at MN I 364,25: *yā 'yam upekhā nānattā nānattasitā tam abhinivajjetvā yā 'yam upekhā ekattā ekattasitā ... bhāveti* (B^e-MN II 27,21, C^e-MN II 46,10, and S^e-MN II 41,15: *upekkhā*).

³⁷ Ps III 43,13. This commentarial gloss finds support in MN 137 at MN III 220,27, where the same expression *upe(k)khā ekattā ekattasitā* refers to the equanimity experienced during the four immaterial attainments (attainments that are developed based on the concentrative strength of the fourth *jhāna*).

³⁸ MĀ 203 at T I 775a21 refers to the first *jhāna* only by way of its first two factors, 有覺, 有觀, corresponding to *vitakka* and *vicāra*, after which it has a full description of the other three *jhānas*. The reference to the factors of the first *jhāna* in this instance could in principle also be a corrupted version of the beginning formula for the second *jhāna*, which begins with the overcoming of these two, in which case this passage would proceed directly from the overcoming of sensual desires to the second *jhāna*. As the overcoming of sensual desires precedes the first *jhāna*, however, which is already aloof from such desires, it seems more probable that the present passage's mentioning of 有覺有觀 is rather a remnant of a reference to the first *jhāna*.

³⁹ MĀ 203 at T I 775a27.

⁴⁰ MN 54 at MN I 367,10.

⁴¹ MĀ 203 at T I 775b4.

MN 55 *Jīvaka-sutta*

The *Jīvaka-sutta*, the “discourse to Jīvaka”, records a meeting between the Buddha and the physician Jīvaka during which the Buddha clarified under which conditions it is allowable for monks to partake of meat. This discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese Āgamas.

The absence of a parallel has been taken to be related to its content, in the sense that an attitude against meat eating, presumably prevalent among Sarvāstivādins, could be responsible for the lack of a version of the present discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama*.⁴² Further investigation, however, shows that the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* preserves the same regulation on consumption of meat as found in the *Jīvaka-sutta*.⁴³ Once this regulation is found in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, there would be little need for the Sarvāstivādins to expunge this discourse from what appears to be a collection transmitted by them.

In fact, although the *Jīvaka-sutta* does not have a Chinese Āgama parallel, Sanskrit fragments of a parallel to the *Jīvaka-sutta* have been found in the recently discovered (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Dīrgha-āgama*.⁴⁴ Hence the absence of a parallel to the *Jīvaka-sutta* among the discourses found in the Chinese Āgamas is not due to ideological is-

⁴² Minh Chau 1964/1991: 31 suggests that: “the dropping from all the Chinese Āgamas of the Pāli sutta No 55, *Jīvakasutta*, in which the Buddha was reported to allow the monks to take three kinds of meat, confirms the Sarvāstivadin’s attitude against meat-eating”; an extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2008a: 6-7.

⁴³ T 1435 at T XXIII 190b9 and T XXIII 264c27, being the counterpart to MN 55 at MN I 369,4; cf. also T 1435 at T XXIII 91b21, which includes meat and fish in a listing of allowable food, thereby clearly not taking a vegetarian stance. T 1435 at T XXIII 190b14 agrees with Vin I 238,8 on reckoning meat consumption apart from the forbidden three instances as “pure”, 三種淨, *tikotiparisuddha*. Schmithausen 2005b: 189 note 24 suggests to understand such purity “in the sense of the Jaina idea of purity ... where ‘pure’ (*suddha*) contrasts with *uddesiya* (‘prepared particularly for the ascetic’), etc., and clearly means ‘free from any contamination with *himsa*, i.e. killing or injuring’. Even the (Mahāyāna) *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* (on the title of this work cf. Habata 2007: xliii-li), according to which the Buddha enjoined a vegetarian diet (since to consume meat will be obstructive to the development of loving kindness, cf. T 374 at T XII 386a15: 食肉者, 斷大慈種), refers to the regulation on the three allowable instances of consuming meat, a regulation found also in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in Dutt 1984a: 236,17 and in T 1458 at T XXIV 570a15. A study of this regulation in the light of different *Vinayas* can be found in Prasad 1979; cf. also Heirman 2006: 60. Waldschmidt 1939/1967: 105 notes that in the older texts there is no trace of a ruling against partaking of meat. An injunction against eating (raw?) meat can be found in the *Mahāvastu* in Senart 1897: 265,14, where a newly ordained monk is told: “you have to abstain from red meat”, *mānsaśonitam te ... parityajitavyam* (Basak 1968/2004: 158,33: *māṃsa-śonitam*). To abstain from accepting raw meat forms part of the general description of moral conduct in the Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., MN 27 at MN I 180,10. Vin I 203,1 allows the consumption of raw meat in case of affliction by a non-human, i.e., possession by an evil spirit, on which cf. also Zysk 1991: 87; for parallels in other *Vinayas* cf. Frauwallner 1956: 93.

⁴⁴ Hartmann 2004b: 127 indicates that this fragment ranges from folio 433r2 to 435r5 of the newly discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* fragment (I am indebted to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for kindly providing me with a preliminary draft transliteration of this fragment); for a reference to this parallel version in an *uddāna* of this collection cf. also Hartmann 2002a: 138. Another fragment parallel to MN 55 is SHT VI 1525V1-R2 (p. 174, identified in SHT IX p. 421; cf. also SHT VIII p. 207).

sues, but is rather an outcome of the circumstance that the four *Āgamas* extant in Chinese translation belong to different schools.

Although the *Dīrgha-āgama* preserved in Chinese, which appears to belong to the Dharmaguptaka tradition, does not include a version of the *Jīvaka-sutta*, such a version could well have existed in another Dharmaguptaka *Āgama* collection. While the *Madhyama-āgama* collection preserved in Chinese, which modern scholarship assigns to the Sarvāstivāda tradition,⁴⁵ does not have a parallel to the *Jīvaka-sutta*, a version of this discourse could have been found in its *Dīrgha-āgama* collection, a collection not preserved in Chinese.

The case of the *Jīvaka-sutta* thus serves as a warning against drawing conclusions based on the absence of a whole discourse from the *Āgamas*. Conclusions can certainly be drawn in the case of the absence of a particular statement or passage from otherwise similar discourses. But in the case of the absence of a whole discourse from the Chinese *Āgamas*, the possibility that this absence could be due to the circumstance that the four *Āgamas* translated into Chinese stem from different schools or reciter traditions, with a differing distribution of the discourses over their respective collections, needs to be taken into consideration.

The *Jīvaka-sutta* and its Sanskrit fragment parallel report that Jīvaka had come to pay MN I 368 a visit to the Buddha, who was staying at Jīvaka's Mango Grove. The two versions agree that Jīvaka broached the topic of meat that has been killed on purpose to provide food for the Buddha or his monks.⁴⁶

A difference between the two versions is that, while in the Pāli account he simply indicates that he has heard of living beings being killed for the sake of the Buddha, according to the Sanskrit fragments a discussion on the topic of meat consumption by the Buddhist monks had arisen at the royal court, with Jīvaka then reporting this discussion to the Buddha.⁴⁷

In reply, in both versions the Buddha clarifies that it is not proper for his monastic disciples to partake of meat when they have seen, heard, or can by way of reasoning infer that the animal has been killed for their sake.⁴⁸ In the *Jīvaka-sutta*, the Buddha continues by describing how a monk, who has developed loving kindness and detachment, receives food from a householder, with Jīvaka confirming that such receiving of food is certainly blameless.

The Sanskrit fragment instead continues by exploring instances where meat is offered in an improper way, after which it has an abbreviated reference to the arising of the Tathāgata and his teaching of the gradual path up to the development of loving kind-

⁴⁵ Cf. above p. 7 note 64.

⁴⁶ In MN 55 at MN I 368,22, the rumour Jīvaka reports is that the Buddha himself partakes of meat killed for his sake and the discussion only later shifts to the proper behaviour of monks in regard to meat consumption. In DĀ (Skt) fragment 433r, the issue at stake is from the outset the conduct of the monks.

⁴⁷ DĀ (Skt) fragment 433r. For such a rumour cf. also Vin I 237,24 = AN 8:12 at AN IV 187,16 and Jā 246 at Jā II 262,9.

⁴⁸ DĀ (Skt) fragment 433v.

ness.⁴⁹ Here, too, Jīvaka comes to the conclusion that the partaking of food by such a monk is appropriate.

After the description of the monk who partakes of food blamelessly, the *Jīvaka-sutta* reports an exchange between Jīvaka and the Buddha about the Buddha's own endowment with loving kindness. In this exchange, Jīvaka proclaims that he has heard that the Buddha abides in loving kindness. The Buddha in reply clarifies that he has eradicated any defilement that would be opposed to loving kindness. This exchange does not appear to be found in the Sanskrit fragment version.

MN I 370 The *Jīvaka-sutta* repeats its exposition of the blameless monk and the Buddha's own mental accomplishment for the remaining three *brahmavihāras* of compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. The Sanskrit fragment version does not appear to have preserved a comparable treatment of the other *brahmavihāras*.

MN I 371 With this part of its exposition concluded, the *Jīvaka-sutta* turns to five instances of demerit incurred by someone who kills a living being for the sake of the Buddha or his disciples, followed by concluding with Jīvaka's delight and taking refuge.⁵⁰ The Sanskrit fragment instead reports that Jīvaka invited the Buddha to a meal, followed by describing how the next day this meal offering took place.⁵¹

MN 56 *Upāli-sutta*⁵²

The *Upāli-sutta*, the “discourse to Upāli”, records the conversion of the Jain lay follower Upāli. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.⁵³ Sections of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments,⁵⁴ as well as in a partial dis-

⁴⁹ The standard form of this reference begins with *iha śāstā loka utpadyate*, followed by an indication that the section on morality (*sīlaskandha*) should be supplemented; for a discussion of this type of reference cf. Melzer 2006: 12-24.

⁵⁰ MN 55 at MN I 371,21.

⁵¹ DĀ (Skt) fragment 435r.

⁵² S^e-MN II 54,1 has the title *Upālivāda-sutta*, the “discourse on the disputation with Upāli”. The *uddānas* in B^e-MN II 76,25, C^e-MN II 128,21, and S^e-MN II 122,3 refer to the present discourse as “the taming of Upāli”, *Upālidamatho* or *Upālidamo*.

⁵³ The parallel is MĀ 133 at T I 628a-632c and agrees with MN 56 on the location and on the title “discourse to Upāli”, 優婆離經. Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 246a6 or Q (5595) *tu* 281a5 also records the discourse to have been entitled after Upāli, *nye bar* (D: *ba*) 'khor gyi mdo. MĀ 133 has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 60, 188-191, 202, and 279-289.

⁵⁴ Sanskrit fragment parallels to MN 56 are SHT III 804 (pp. 8-9, cf. also SHT VII p. 266), SHT III 872 (pp. 122-123, cf. also SHT IV p. 349), SHT III 1007 (p. 263), SHT IV 412 folios 17-21 (pp. 35-46), SHT VI 1291 (pp. 66-67), SHT VI 1302 (p. 73), SHT VI 1522 (p. 173), SHT VIII 1802 (pp. 2-4), SHT VIII 1913 (pp. 95-96), SHT IX 2047 (pp. 67-68), SHT IX 2932 (p. 307), SHT X 4193 (pp. 308-309), and fragment Or. 15003/23 from the Hoernle collection, published in Wille 2006: 71-72. SHT IV 412 folio 17, SHT III 804, SHT VI 1522, and SHT IX 2047 parallel the discussion at MN I 372-373. SHT X 4193 parallels the discussion at MN I 377. SHT IV 412 folio 17 and SHT III 1007 parallel part of the report given at MN I 373-374. SHT IV 412 folios 18, 19, and 20, SHT VI 1291, SHT VI 1302, SHT VIII 1802, SHT VIII 1913, and the Hoernle fragment parallel parts the visit described at MN I 382-385. SHT IV 412

course quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.⁵⁵

The *Upāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report in similar terms a conversation between the Jain monk Dīgha Tapassī and the Buddha, each presenting their respective views to the other.⁵⁶ The question at the heart of their exchange was the relative importance of bodily, verbal, and mental activities in relation to evil deeds. While the Pāli version considers these three activities from the perspective of their relation to "performing" evil deeds,⁵⁷ the Chinese version instead presents them from the perspective of "not doing" evil deeds, in the sense of refraining from them, a presentation also found in the Sanskrit fragments.⁵⁸

This slightly different formulation in the Chinese and Sanskrit versions helps to get a clearer picture of the proposition attributed to Dīgha Tapassī. According to the Pāli and Chinese accounts, Dīgha Tapassī had made a special point of formulating his position by using the expression "punishment" or "rod" (*dandan*).⁵⁹ Another meaning of the same term is also "control" or "restraint", and this appears to be the meaning best

folios 20 and 21, SHT III 872, and SHT VI 1291 parallel the final verses at MN I 386. A fragment parallel to part of the discussion at MN I 376-378 can also be found in Lévi 1925a: 27-30, and another fragment parallel to the beginning part of the visit described at MN I 382 in Nakatani 1986: 313-314. Fragments of the final verses can also be found in Hoernle 1916/1970: 28-35 and Waldschmidt 1979.

⁵⁵ Cf. below note 66.

⁵⁶ A minor difference is that in MĀ 133 at T I 628a21+23, Dīgha Tapassī and the Buddha just address each other by their proper names, whereas in MN 56 at MN I 372,10 Dīgha Tapassī additionally uses the address "friend", *āvuso*. Feer 1887: 315 note 1 takes this to be an expression of a lack of respect, since unlike Dīgha Tapassī the Buddha was the leader of a school, so that it would have been improper for Dīgha to treat the Buddha as his equal by addressing him as "friend". Other discourses, however, similarly record the Buddha and Jain monks addressing each other as "friend" (cf. MN 14 at MN I 92,33+36 or MN 101 at MN II 214,23+25), a form of address also used among Buddhist monks. Moreover, MN 56 at MN I 372,5 depicts Dīgha Tapassī as taking a low seat, while MĀ 133 at T I 628c7 reports that he respectfully circumambulated the Buddha thrice before leaving. Although these are standard pericopes in the respective discourse collections, their occurrence in the present context shows that both discourses did not intend to present Dīgha Tapassī in a particularly disrespectful attitude towards the Buddha. Besides, a stone carving of the Bharhut stūpa with the inscription *dighatapasise anusāsati* shows what presumably would be the same Dīgha Tapassī teaching a group of disciples, cf. Cunningham 1879: 97 and plate 48 and Lüders 1963: 159-160. This suggests Dīgha Tapassī to have been an important or even a chief disciple of Niganṭha Nātaputta, which would make it less surprising for him to address the Buddha as "friend". Regarding his name, Jaini 1979/1998: 21 explains that "*dīgha-tapassī* (he who engages in extended penances) ... probably alludes to ... fasting", in the sense of regularly "abstaining from water as well as food" for prolonged periods. Such practices were held in high esteem in the Jain tradition and their undertaking would have earned the Buddha's visitor such an honorific title.

⁵⁷ MN 56 at MN I 372,9: "for the doing of evil deeds, the performing of evil deeds", *pāpassa kammaṭṭha kiriyaṭṭya pāpassa kammaṭṭha pavattiyā ti*.

⁵⁸ MĀ 133 at T I 628a22: "in order not to engage in evil deeds, not to do evil deeds", 令不行惡業, 不作惡業, SHT III 804R5: *akaraṇā/y](a)*, and SHT IX 2047V3: *kurmaṇāḥ akriyā/y](ai)*.

⁵⁹ MĀ 133 at T I 628a25 has "punishment", 罰, as its equivalent to *dandan*. On *dandan* in Jain texts cf., e.g., Jacobi 1880: 159, id. 1895/1996: xvii, Jain 1972: 73-75, 97-99, and von Hinüber 1992: 61 note 109.

suites to the present context.⁶⁰ Hence, following the account in the Chinese version and the Sanskrit fragment, the point of Dīgha Tapassī's proposition was that bodily "restraint" is of greater importance for "not doing" evil deeds, whereas restraint of the other two doors of action is of comparatively less importance.⁶¹ This presentation finds support in another Pāli discourse, in which Jain monks describe their practice to be indeed "restraint" of bodily, verbal, and mental activities, a restraint undertaken in order to avoid evil deeds.⁶²

MN I 374 According to the *Upāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, Dīgha Tapassī reported the conversation he had with the Buddha to his teacher Niganṭha Nātaputta, describing how he had upheld the prime importance of bodily restraint against the Buddha, who had accorded foremost importance to mental action.⁶³ On hearing this report, the lay follower Upāli expressed his wish to refute the Buddha on this issue.

According to both versions, Upāli illustrated how he would defeat the Buddha with a set of similes (see table 6.3). With a slight difference in sequence, the main ideas conveyed by these four similes are to compare the Buddha's impending defeat to:

- dragging a longhaired sheep around,
- a brewer who moves a sieve in water,
- someone who shakes out a sieve or a fur,⁶⁴
- a sixty-year old elephant that plunges into water.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ MW: 466 s.v. *danda*. Feer 1888: 237 points out that a passage in *Manu* 12.10.11 refers to bodily, verbal, and mental *danda*, where *danda* similarly has the sense of "control".

⁶¹ The commentary, Ps III 52,17, suggests that the Jains came to this conclusion because they thought bodily and verbal acts are performed without any participation of the mind, *acittaka*. Chaudhary 1994b: 133 comments that in "the *Upāli-sutta* ... Niganṭha Nātaputta's view has not been presented correctly ... if ... [the] Buddha regards *cetanā* as *kamma* ... Niganṭha Nātaputta also holds the same view"; cf. also Caillat 1965: 126. According to Johnson 1995: 19, however, "the emphasis in the earliest [Jain] texts is not on intention or lack of it as such ... actions are judged, in the first place, according to their result, not according to the intention of the author".

⁶² MN 101 at MN II 218,7: "being restrained in body, speech, and mind, that is the not doing of evil deeds in the future", *kāyena saṃvutā vācāya saṃvutā manasā saṃvutā, tam āyatīm pāpassa kammassa akaraṇam* (B^e-MN III 5,7 and S^e-MN III 7,5: *pāpakammassa*).

⁶³ At the background to this difference on the relative importance of the three types of activity stands the early Buddhist emphasis on intention. Bronkhorst 2007: 52 notes that, from a Buddhist viewpoint, "the real problem does not lie with one's acts as such, but with the driving force behind those acts". Hence as noted by Jain 1966: 169, the present discussion in MN 56 reflects the "distinct connotations the term 'karma' has" in Buddhism and Jainism, where for the former "it signifies volitional action"; cf. also Ergardt 1986: 69 and von Glasenapp 1951: 76. De Jong 1964: 427 explains that "Buddhist thought catalogues deeds as deeds of the body, of the word and of the mind. The core of each category of deeds is not the deed itself, but the intention which motivates it. Such a system of intentionalist ethics had no room for asceticism" of the type undertaken by the Jains; cf. also McDermott 1984/2003: 68, who emphasizes "the ethical force the Buddha believed mental acts (*manokamma*) to carry", and Upadhyaya 1971: 94, who concludes that due to their different conceptions of karma "the Jains are, thus, led to preach self-mortification as against self-discipline preached by the Buddhists".

⁶⁴ MN 56 at MN I 374,35 mentions shaking out a "hair-sieve", *vāla* (S^e-MN II 58,19: *thāla*), while MĀ 133 at T I 629a1 speaks of shaking out a "hairy fur coat", 髮裘, in order to remove the dust.

In both versions, Dīgha Tapassī expressed his apprehension that Upāli might be won over by the Buddha's converting magic, whereas Niganṭha Nātaputta felt confident to let Upāli challenge the Buddha.

Table 6.3: Upāli's Similes in MN 56 and its Parallel

MN 56	MĀ 133
longhaired sheep dragged around (1)	longhaired sheep dragged around (→ 1)
brewer's sieve moved around (2)	fur shaken out (→ 3)
strainer shaken (3)	brewer's sieve moved around (→ 2)
elephant plunges in water (4)	elephant plunges in water (→ 4)

The ensuing encounter between Upāli and the Buddha has also been preserved in a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, preserved in Tibetan.⁶⁶ According to the Pāli version, when approaching the Buddha Upāli behaved in a respectful way, paying homage and using the respectful address “venerable sir” (*bhante*).⁶⁷ The Chinese and Tibetan versions do not record him paying homage and instead depict him addressing the Buddha by his name, a less respectful way of address.⁶⁸

In view of Upāli's staunch partisanship for the Jains and his earlier somewhat boastful description of how he was going to defeat the Buddha, the Chinese and Tibetan versions offer a more realistic description of Upāli's behaviour. Such a way of behaving with little respect towards the leader of a tradition in which he did not have faith would also fit well with a later part of the discourse, according to which Upāli, once he had converted to Buddhism, behaved in a disrespectful manner towards his former teacher Niganṭha Nātaputta.

Returning to the meeting between Upāli and the Buddha that preceded Upāli's conversion, the three versions agree on the arguments employed by the Buddha, although they present these in a slightly different sequence (see table 6.4).

MN I 376

According to the Pāli version, the Buddha opened his series of arguments with the example of a sick Jain who takes only warm water and refuses to take cold water, as a

⁶⁵ While in MN 56 at MN I 375,2 this elephant plays a game of hemp washing, MĀ 133 at T I 629a6 only describes that this elephant is being washed by a strong man. The same difference in regard to this elephant imagery recurs between MN 35 at MN I 229,3 (which has the same set of four similes as MN 56), and its parallel SĀ 110 at T II 35b22, cf. above p. 226.

⁶⁶ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 246a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 281a4, paralleling the discussion in MN 56 from MN I 376,1 to MN I 378,26; cf. also the discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 4:104 in Pradhan 1967: 264,9, paralleling MN I 373,19, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 94b12 and T 1559 at T XXIX 248c14.

⁶⁷ MN 56 at MN I 376,2+4.

⁶⁸ MĀ 133 at T I 629b5 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 246b1 or Q (5595) *tu* 281a7. Von Hinüber 1994b: 11 note 8 (cf. also von Hinüber 1991: 124) draws attention to the inappropriateness of pronouncing the name of a superior person, indicated, e.g., in Vin I 92,36. Hence for the *gahapati* Upāli to address a renowned recluse and teacher like the Buddha by his name would imply a lack of respect.

result of which he passes away.⁶⁹ Attempting to get at the intent of this simile, what apparently caused the Jain's death was his refusal to drink water that according to his code of conduct was not proper for consumption.⁷⁰ Behind this concern about water stands the belief that water contains minute living beings, so that its use entails harming such beings.⁷¹ The same concern for minute living beings found in water also apparently led to two rules found in the different *Vinayas*, which enjoin to use only water that does not contain living beings.⁷² These regulations are only concerned with visible beings, however, so that filtering water is considered sufficient and there is no need for water to be boiled in order to be rendered fit for use.

Table 6.4: Buddha's Arguments in MN 56 and its Parallels

MN 56	MĀ 133 & Abhidh-k-t
Jain does not take cold water (1)	Jain kills beings while walking (→ 2)
Jain kills beings while walking (2)	Jain does not take cold water (→ 1)
destruction of Nālandā (3)	destruction of Nālandā (→ 3)
origin of certain forests (4)	origin of certain forests (→ 4)

According to the *Upāli-sutta* and its parallels, Upāli declared that the type of rebirth of this Jain would be determined by his degree of mental attachment, a statement the Buddha showed to be in contradiction to the position Upāli was trying to uphold.

The Pāli, Chinese, and Tibetan versions also take up the case of a Jain who unintentionally kills living beings while walking. According to Upāli, such a Jain will incur greater blame if he does so intentionally. The Pāli and Tibetan versions describe this Jain as one who is curbed by a fourfold restraint.⁷³ The Chinese parallel does not men-

⁶⁹ MN 56 at MN I 376,24. MĀ 133 at T I 629c3 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 247a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 282a3 do not specify that the Jain in question is sick.

⁷⁰ According to the Jain Āyāraṅga 2.6.2.2 in Jacobi 1882: 104,20, translated in Jacobi 1884/1996: 170, a monk should refuse cold water that has been offered to him since it is not acceptable; cf. also Āyāraṅga 2.1.7.7. Similarly, *Uttarājjhayana* 2.4 in Charpentier 1922: 75,14 prohibits the use of cold water. Lalwani 1973a: 16 explains that “water that a monk may accept ... must boil thrice on fire before it is acceptable”, cf. also ibid. p. 154 (8.6).

⁷¹ Ps III 57,4.

⁷² These are *pācittiya* or *pātayantika* rules 19 + 62 in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 646c18 and T XXII 677c2, rules 19 + 41 in the Kāśyapīya *Vinaya*, T 1460 at T XXIV 662b19+c21, rule 20 in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 45a6 (as Pachow 1955: 143 notes, the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* has this regulation as a single rule), rules 19 + 51 in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 345a14 and T XXII 372c23, rules 19 + 41 in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 789b21 and T XXIII 828c5, rules 19 + 41 in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 79c15 and T XXIII 97b18, and rules 20 + 62 in the Theravāda *Vinaya* at Vin IV 49,3 and Vin IV 125,20. These rules prohibit pouring out or using water that contains living beings. A description of how this observance was carried out in seventh century India can be found in Yijing's (義淨) travel records, T 2125 at T LIV 208a13, translated in Takakusu 1966: 30-33.

⁷³ MN 56 at MN I 377,1: *cātuyāmasaṇvarasaṇvuto*. In the Tibetan version, the Jain who passes away due to refusing cold water is similarly observing the fourfold restraint, so that here this qualification occurs

tion such a fourfold restraint. It also differs in as much as it describes this Jain as someone who is charitable.⁷⁴

In the Chinese version, this description is the first of the examples used by the Buddha (see above table 6.4), which due to speaking of someone who is charitable is formulated in such a way as to be applicable to the case of a lay follower of the Jains. Hence, this example could be directly aimed at Upāli himself. This would correspond to a strategy the discourses frequently attributed to the Buddha in, which consists in providing an illustration taken from the thought-world and social circumstances of his interlocutor(s).

In the present case this strategy would be particularly apt, since in the Chinese version this proposition is formulated in such a way that, should Upāli have refused to distinguish between intentional and unintentional killing of living beings, he would thereby have committed himself to the position that, by simply walking, a charitable and well-conducted lay supporter of the Jains (like himself) will inevitably incur great demerit.⁷⁵

Concerning the reference to the fourfold restraint in the Pāli and Tibetan versions, it is noteworthy that whereas the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* reckons the fourfold restraint a teaching of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan parallels to the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* do not mention such a fourfold restraint.⁷⁶ In fact, this fourfold restraint may not have been a teaching of Mahāvīra, but rather of his predecessor Pārśva.⁷⁷

twice, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 246b7 and 247a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 281b7 and 282a3. The implications of this fourfold restraint can be seen in DN 25 at DN III 48,17, according to which it involves not harming living beings, not taking what is not given, not speaking falsehood, and not yearning for sensual pleasures (for the last of the four restraints I follow the gloss at Ps III 58,19); cf. also Jaini 2002/2003: 122-128.

⁷⁴ MĀ 133 at T I 629b22.

⁷⁵ Johnson 1995: 13 comments that “it is perhaps significant that it is a lay disciple of Mahāvīra who is converted by the Buddha, since the Buddha’s view of what is karmically binding, as represented in the *Upālisutta*, is clearly more compatible with lay life than the view attributed to Mahāvīra”; cf. also Gombrich 1975b: 219 and id. 2005: 731, who notes that, in contrast to Jainism, “Buddhism offered a viable path to everyone, not just to those prepared to become extremely ascetic renunciates”.

⁷⁶ Instead of the fourfold restraint mentioned at DN 2 at DN I 57,24, according to DĀ 27 at T I 109a6 Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta claimed omniscience, according to EĀ 43.7 at T II 763c1 he denied causality, according to T 22 at T I 272b4 he explained that what one experiences is due to one’s former deeds, and according to the *Saighabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 226,4 his position was that the retribution for former deeds needs to be eradicated through penance, while new deeds should be avoided through restraint. Except for EĀ 43.7, the descriptions of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta’s teachings found in the parallels to DN 2 correspond to other Pāli passages: MN 14 at MN I 92,36, MN 79 at MN II 31,7, MN 101 at MN II 218,1, AN 3:74 at AN I 220,27, and AN 9:38 at AN IV 429,1 report that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta claimed omniscience, while MN 14 at MN I 93,2 and MN 101 at MN II 218,4 record that he taught that former deeds need to be eradicated through penance and new deeds should be avoided by restraint, a proposition that involves the belief that all one’s present experiences are due to one’s former deeds. On the description of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta’s teaching in the parallels to DN 2 cf. also Bapat 1948: 109-112, Macqueen 1988: 149-164, and Meisig 1987b: 160-167. Another reference to the fourfold restraint in SN 2:30 at SN I 66,17 (or SN² 111 at SN² I 153,7) does, however, recur in one of its parallels, namely in SĀ² 307 at T II 478a1.

⁷⁷ Bhagat 1976: 171, Bronkhorst 2000c: 515, Jacobi 1880: 160, Jaini 2002/2003: 119, Leumann 1922:

MN I 377 The *Upāli-sutta* and its parallels continue in similar ways by contrasting someone, who attempts to kill all the inhabitants of Nālandā by taking up a sword, with someone, who attempts to do the same through supernormal powers, followed by taking up an ancient account according to which the origin of several forests was due to an act of will by seers (*isi* or *r̄si*) endowed with magical powers.⁷⁸

MN I 378 Upāli expresses his approval at this point. According to the Pāli account, Upāli had already been convinced by the first example given by the Buddha, yet he nevertheless had continued to oppose the Buddha in order to hear alternative explanations. The Chinese and Tibetan version, as well as a Sanskrit fragment parallel, however, report that at the present junction of events Upāli remained silent and reflective, followed by coming to the conclusion that the position he had taken up was foolish indeed.⁷⁹ Hence according to these versions, Upāli was apparently convinced only at this point, whereas according to the Pāli account the first argument of the Buddha had already been sufficient to persuade him and the discussion had only lasted so long because Upāli wanted to enjoy the Buddha's skill at providing illustrative examples.

The idea of maintaining opposition in order to hear more arguments recurs in the *Pāyāsi-sutta*. The *Pāyāsi-sutta* and its Chinese parallels report that Prince Pāyāsi continued to oppose the monk Kumāra Kassapa in order to enjoy the latter's eloquent presentation, although he had already been convinced of the falseness of his own position by the first illustration provided by Kumāra Kassapa.⁸⁰ Although the same might have been the case with Upāli, given that he had been a staunch follower of the Jains and thus would have been firmly convinced of the truth of their position on bodily, verbal, and mental deeds, it would also not be surprising if it took several illustrations and some time before he was convinced of the opposite position.

The *Upāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue with Upāli's formal declaration of his conversion. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha advised Upāli to reflect carefully on this decision. The *Madhyama-āgama* version reports

135-136, and Mette 1995: 181. Caillat 2003: 35 explains that, although Mahāvīra had “first accepted the dharma preached by his predecessor Pārśva, that was characterized by four restraints, he soon replaced it by the ‘dharma of the five great vows’”. Balbir 2000: 13 concludes that “although the Pāli canon speaks of Niganṭha Nātaputta, whom it knew to be the same as Mahāvīra, it hands down the doctrine specific to his predecessor Pārśva”; cf. also Jacobi 1884/1996: xx, id. 1895/1996: xxi, Jain 1972: 25, 120-122, id. 1990: 352, and Tatia 1980: 321. Jain 1926: 707, however, holds that the reference in Buddhist texts to the fourfold restraint “does not refer to the four vows of Pārśva”.

⁷⁸ These events are also referred to in Mil 130,6. The events that led to the destruction of the realm of King Daṇḍakī are reported in Jā 522 at Jā V 134,3, with a counterpart in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 217,2 or in Senart 1897: 363,6; cf. also von Hinüber 1998: 132-136 and Lüders 1940d: 626-630. T 212 at T IV 660c17 gives a short discourse quotation that seems to stem from the present passage.

⁷⁹ MĀ 133 at T I 630a10, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 248a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 283a4, and the corresponding Sanskrit fragment in Lévi 1925a: 30.

⁸⁰ DN 23 at DN II 352,10 and its parallels DĀ 7 at T I 46c4 (for a translation cf. Anālayo 2012c), MĀ 71 at T I 531b8, and T 45 at T I 835b27. For the corresponding passage in a Jain version of this discourse cf. Bollée 2002: 140; for a comparison of the Jain version with DN 23 cf. Leumann 1885: 470-539.

that the Buddha even told Upāli to keep silent and not proclaim his conversion at all.⁸¹ Both versions record that Upāli was very pleased at finding that the Buddha, instead of turning Upāli's conversion to good use for propaganda purposes, advised him in such a manner.

According to the *Upāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the Buddha also requested Upāli to continue giving alms to the Jains.⁸² A difference is that, before this request, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version Upāli had declared that from now on he would close the door of his house to the Jains and open it to the Buddhist monastic and lay community.⁸³ This declaration fits the context well, as it provides a reason for the Buddha to bring up the issue of giving alms to the Jains.

The *Upāli-sutta* and its parallel agree that Upāli expressed his pleasure at this magnanimous suggestion by the Buddha and reported the hearsay that the Buddha wanted gifts to be given only to himself and his disciples, not to others. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, the Buddha declared that this report was false. He explained that gifts should be given where one's heart finds delight, adding that gifts given to those who live diligently are more fruitful than gifts given to those who live in negligence.⁸⁴

According to the *Upāli-sutta* and its parallel, the Buddha next delivered a gradual instruction, during which Upāli became a stream-enterer. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version describes Upāli's stream-entry in terms of his realization that "whatever is subject to arising, all that is subject to cessation".⁸⁵ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead specifies that he reached a vision of the four noble truths.⁸⁶

The pericope that describes stream-entry as the realization that "whatever is subject to arising, all that is subject to cessation" tends to be generally absent from *Āgama* parallels to occurrences of this formula in Pāli discourses.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the formula is

⁸¹ MN 56 at MN I 379,3 and MĀ 133 at T I 630a25. The description of this episode in MN 56 recurs in similar terms in relation to the conversion of Sīha at Vin I 236,17 and in AN 8:12 at AN IV 185,9.

⁸² A similar suggestion by the Buddha, after the successful conversion of a lay follower of other teachers, is reported in EĀ 45.7 at T II 775b12.

⁸³ MĀ 133 at T I 630b6. The same decision is recorded as part of the instructions given by Upāli to his doorkeeper in MN 56 at MN I 380,17.

⁸⁴ MĀ 133 at T I 630b18; a similar explanation can be found in SN 3:24 at SN I 98,27 (or SN² 135 at SN² I 220,3), an explanation given in more detail in the parallels SĀ 1145 at T II 204a7 and SĀ²68 at T II 397b8. Another reference to the rumour that the Buddha would discourage people from giving to others can be found in AN 3:57 at AN I 161,1 and in EĀ 47.3 at T II 781a27.

⁸⁵ MN 56 at MN I 380,7: *yāñ kiñci samudayadhammāñ, sabbāñ tam nirodhadhamman ti* (S^e-MN II 67,14: *yāñ* and *sabbāñ*).

⁸⁶ MĀ 133 at T I 630c10: "he saw the four noble truths: *dukkha*, its arising, its cessation, and the path", 見四聖諦, 苦, 習, 滅, 道. MN 56 at MN I 380,2 also refers to the four noble truths, which it does in its description of the teaching delivered by the Buddha that caused Upāli's stream-entry, *yā buddhāñāñ sāmukkamsikā dhammadesanā tam pakāsesi, dukkham, samudayam, nirodham, maggam*.

⁸⁷ This is the case for DN 3 at DN I 110,11 and its parallel DĀ 20 at T I 88a20; DN 5 at DN I 148,16 and its parallel DĀ 23 at T I 101a21; DN 14 at DN II 41,19 and its parallels DĀ 1 at T I 9a13 and T 3 at T I 157a9; and DN 21 at DN II 288,23 and its parallels DĀ 14 at T I 66a2, MĀ 134 at T I 638c1, T 15 at T I 250c2, and T 203 at T IV 477c16. Another example is MN 74 at MN I 501,7 and its parallels SĀ 969 at

not entirely unknown to the Chinese canon, as it is found in a discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama* and in some other works.⁸⁸

- MN I 380 The *Upāli-sutta* and its Chinese parallel report that, on arriving home, Upāli instructed his door keeper that he should no longer let Jain mendicants enter his house and instead admit the disciples of the Buddha. Dīgha Tapassī conveyed this unexpected turn of events to Nigantha Nātaputta who, unable to believe it to be true, himself approached Upāli in order to find out what had happened.⁸⁹

T II 250a2, SĀ² 203 at T II 449b24 (cf. the full formula at T II 423b7), the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra* in T 1509 at T XXV 62a22, the **Mahāvibhāṣā* in T 1545 at T XXVII 510a28, the Tibetan (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in Eimer 1983: 105,2, Sanskrit fragment fol. 166b1 in Pischel 1904: 816, the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 194,7 or Vaidya 1958a: 258,21, and a Tibetan *Avadāna* collection in Devacandra 1996: 718,6. The same is the case for MN 91 at MN II 145,14 and its parallels MĀ 161 at T I 689b25 and T 76 at T I 885c28. Yet another example of this tendency is SN 56:11 at SN V 423,15 and its parallels SĀ 379 at T II 104a9, EĀ 24.5 at T II 619b7, T 109 at T II 503c14, T 110 at T II 504b8, the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* in T 1421 at T XXII 104c18, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* in T 1428 at T XXII 788b25, the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in T 1435 at T XXIII 448c14, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 199,12 or in Senart 1897: 333,19, the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 136,15, and its Chinese counterpart in T 1450 at T XXIV 128a9. The same pattern also applies to AN 8:12 at AN IV 186,22 and its parallels in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 872a15, and in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 149c4. It also applies to AN 8:21 at AN IV 210,5 (=AN 8:22 at AN IV 213,26) with its parallel MĀ 38 at T I 480a2 (taking into account only cases where the parallels also describe stream-entry attainment).

⁸⁸ SĀ 396 at T II 106c21: “whatever is of a nature to arise, all that has ceased”, 所有集法, 一切滅已 (this discourse does not appear to have a Pāli parallel). Another instance can be found in the 佛本行集經, a biography of the Buddha usually referred to as the **Abhiniṣkramayā-sūtra* (Durt 2004: 56 points out that a more correct rendering would be “Sūtra on the Collected Original Activities of the Buddha”), for a brief survey of this work cf., e.g., Rajapatiṭara 1961: 96. In a counterpart to an occurrence of the *yan kiñci samudayadhammāṇi, sabbāṇi tam nirodhadhammāṇi* pericope (found in the description of the stream-entry of the mother of Yasa described in Vin I 18,19), this text, T 190 at T III 819a21 (cf. also T 190 at T III 837b18), describes that “she attained the pure Dharma-eye: ‘whatever is of a stained nature, can all be eradicated’ – she completely knew it”, 得淨法眼, 所有垢法, 諸可滅法, 一切知已. Alternative formulations in the same work are T 190 at T III 876c6, which instead of “whatever is of a stained nature” speaks of “conditioned states”, 諸有為法, as does another occurrence, T 190 at T III 877a7, with the slightly different expression 一切行法, while yet another occurrence in the same work, T 190 at T III 898b6, has a reading that corresponds closely to the Pāli pericope: “whatsoever is of a nature to arise, all that has the characteristic to cease”, 所有集法, 悉皆滅相. A similar close correspondence can be seen in the formulation used to describe stream-entry in Buddhavarman’s *Vibhāṣā*, T 1546 at T XXVIII 256a15: 能知集法, 皆是滅相, and in the **Tattvasiddhi*, T 1646 at T XXXII 257a20: 所有集相, 皆是滅相, T XXXII 363b24: 行者於集生相法, 知盡滅相, and T XXXII 370c15: 所有生相, 皆知滅相 (notably the last two quotes are introduced as *sūtra* quotations). A passage in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra* uses a formulation that matches the Pāli pericope precisely, T 1509 at T XXV 348c25: 所有集法, 皆是滅法, although the context differs in as much as the point at stake is the career of a bodhisattva.

⁸⁹ According to MN 56 at MN I 382,13, Nigantha Nātaputta went to Upāli’s house in the company of a “large” group of followers, *mahaityā niganthaparisāya saddhiṃ*, while MĀ 133 at T I 631b8 refers to the same following in terms of “five hundred men”, 五百人, a way of expressing the idea of a “large group” found also in the Sanskrit fragments, cf. SHT IV 412 folio 18V4 and Nakatani 1986: 313. An-

According to the *Upāli-sutta* and its parallel, Upāli received Niganṭha Nātaputta by taking himself the best seat. The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse reports that, when questioned by Niganṭha Nātaputta why he had taken the best seat and was behaving as if he were a recluse himself,⁹⁰ Upāli replied that it was his right to offer whatever he wanted, since he was the owner of these seats.

In both versions, Niganṭha Nātaputta illustrates Upāli's unsuccessful attempt to refute the Buddha with two similes. The first simile in the Pāli version could be describing someone who loses his testicles when going in search for eggs, an image that would involve a word play on the term *anda*, which can mean egg or testicle.⁹¹ The corresponding simile in the Chinese version, which here comes as the second simile, instead describes someone who is thirsty and enters a lake, but then emerges from the lake still thirsty.⁹² The Sanskrit fragment has preserved a few parts of this simile, which could point to yet another image, namely that of a man who searches for a bull, but comes back having lost his testicles, an image that would involve a word play on bull, *vṛṣan*, and testicle, *vṛṣaṇa*.⁹³

other minor difference is that according to MN 56 at MN I 382,28 the doorkeeper addressed Upāli with the epithet *bhante*. According to MĀ 133 at T I 631b16, he rather used the address “householder”, 居士, although during his exchange with the leader of the Jains, MĀ 133 at T I 631b15, the doorkeeper referred to Upāli as 尊者, corresponding to *bhante*, which in the present context would perhaps be more appropriately rendered as “honourable”.

⁹⁰ MĀ 133 at T I 631c5 notes that he behaved “just like one gone forth, like one practising the path, not differently”, 如出家者, 學道, 無異; cf. also the Sanskrit fragment SHT IV 412 folio 19V2, which reads (*prav*)*r(a)j(i)tasamā(na)*, “like one gone forth”. A to some extent comparable demonstration of lack of respect for one's former teacher is reported in the Jain work *Uvāsagadasāo*, translated in Hoernle 1885/1899: 141-142, in this case undertaken by a householder just converted to Jainism who is visited by his former teacher Gosāla Mañkhaliputta.

⁹¹ MN 56 at MN I 383,25: *aṇḍahārako gantvā ubbhatehi aṇḍehi āgaccheyya*. CPD I: 76 s.v. *aṇḍa-hāraka* suggests that *andahārako* refers to “one who is going (searching) for eggs” as a pun on his loss of testicles. An alternative understanding of the passage can be found in Chalmers 1926: 275, who speaks of “a gelder who successfully returns with a pair of testicles removed”. Similar understandings are reflected in the translations by Horner 1957/1970: 48, who renders the passage as: “a gelder, having gone away, might return with removed testicles”, and by Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 488, who translates it as: “a man went to castrate someone and came back castrated himself”. Yet, according to Perera 1993: 141, “the castrated eunuch ... was an alien factor in ancient Indian sex life”, as canonical references to eunuchs are to “congenital sexual weaklings ... and not [to] a castrate” (ibid. p. 137). This would make it less probable that the original intent of the simile involved castration.

⁹² MĀ 133 at T I 631c12.

⁹³ In the Sanskrit fragment this is the first of the two similes delivered by Niganṭha Nātaputta and reads *avagāhet*, “he may plunge into” or “bathe in”, cf. SHT IV 412 folio 19R1. The reference to thirst, 渴, in MĀ 133 at T I 631c12 could according to SHT IV p. 39 note 26 be due to a confusion between *tṛṣṇā* and *vṛṣan* in the original. On this assumption, the Sanskrit fragment could be restored to read *avagāhet sa-tatra ubhābhya(ām v)ṛ(saṇābhyaām udbhṛtā/bh)(yā)m āgacched*, describing someone who “plunges into” a forest or even a small pond in order to catch a bull (*vṛṣan*) and thereby loses both testicles (*vṛṣaṇa*). The idea could then be that, when bulls have been left to roam freely for some time, they might express their displeasure at being caught, which they know to mean that they will have to work, by sudden and unexpected thrusts with their horns, an action that could indeed damage someone's testicles.

The other simile in the Pāli version could be about someone who searches for myrobalan fruits and returns having lost his eyes.⁹⁴ This instance would then again involve a word play, this time on the word *akkha*, which can mean eye as well as myrobalan fruit, a fruit whose seeds were used as dice in ancient India. The corresponding simile in the Chinese version indicates that this man enters the forest in search of myrobalan fruit, to which the Sanskrit version adds that he carried a sharp axe along, thereby corroborating that this man would indeed have been in search of some forest products.⁹⁵

MN I 384 The *Upāli-sutta* and its parallel report that Upāli was quick to reply to these two similes with a simile on his part, indicating that the teaching of the Jains does not withstand closer scrutiny just as a monkey will not survive being pounded.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, at this point Niganṭha Nātaputta finally came to the conclusion that Upāli had indeed fallen prey to the Buddha's converting magic, while according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version he had already come to the same conclusion earlier.⁹⁶ In reply to Niganṭha Nātaputta's allegation that he was under the influence of the Buddha's conversion magic, both versions report Upāli's proclamation that all his relatives and friends, even all men and gods would benefit from coming under the sway of this converting magic of the Buddha.⁹⁷ Asked by Niganṭha Nātaputta whom he considered his teacher, Upāli delivered a series of impromptu stanzas in praise of the Buddha, repeatedly declaring that he was now a disciple of the Buddha.

The praise delivered by Upāli runs into ten stanzas in the Pāli, Sanskrit, and Chinese versions.⁹⁸ The three versions of these stanzas are similar in content while differing in

⁹⁴ MN 56 at MN I 383,26: *akkhikahārako gantvā ubbhatehi akkhihi āgaccheyya*. CPD I: 10 s.v. *akkha*² gives “name of a tree, Beleric Myrobalan (*Terminalia Belerica*), the seeds of which were used as dice” as one of the meanings of *akkha*, cf. also ibid. p. 13 s.v. *akkhikā* and *akkhika-hāraka*, and the similar explanation in MW: 3 s.v. *akṣa*². An alternative understanding can be found in Chalmers 1926: 275, who speaks of a “gouger who returns with a pair of eyeballs excised”, an understanding also followed by Horner 1957/1970: 48, who translates the passage as: “a gouger, having gone away, might return with removed eyeballs”, and Nānamoli 1995/2005: 488, who translates it as: “a man went to put out someone’s eyes and came back with his own eyes put out”.

⁹⁵ MĀ 133 at T I 631c10 describes a man who enters the forest in search of eyes, 有人求眼入林. SHT IV 412 folio 19R2 reads *akṣārthī akṣa[ga]l(ves)[l] tīkṣṇam kūthāram ādāya vanam pra(viśe)t* (for the continuation of this section cf. also the Hoernle fragment Or. 152003/23ve in Wille 2006: 72). The idea of losing one’s eyes while searching for some fruit or seed in the forest could be that while moving among trees and branches this person might stumble, or a branch might snap back, which could then cause damage to the eyes.

⁹⁶ MĀ 133 at T I 632a25. MN 56 at MN I 383,30 reports that Niganṭha Nātaputta drew this conclusion already when delivering his two similes. SHT IV 421 folio 20V5 concords with MĀ 133, since it has the reference to the magical conversion, */ā)vartanī māyā*, after the monkey simile delivered by Upāli. The suggestion that the Buddha knew a converting magic recurs in AN 4:193 at AN II 190,25 and in EĀ 47,3 at T II 781b7 (which explicitly indicates that this rumour was being spread by the Jains); cf. also SN 42:13 at SN IV 340,22.

⁹⁷ MN 56 at MN I 383,32 and MĀ 133 at T I 632a26. For a similar declaration cf. AN 4:193 at AN II 194,2.

⁹⁸ To these ten stanzas, MĀ 133 at T I 632c7 adds a reciter’s remark as an eleventh stanza, found also in the Sanskrit fragment in Waldschmidt 1979: 13. This eleventh stanza explains that Upāli spoke without preparation, to which MĀ 133 adds that *devas* had helped him in his poetic impromptu performance.

matters of sequence and on some of the qualities mentioned. Although an exhaustive examination of the differences found in the three versions of Upāli's verses would require a study in itself,⁹⁹ a few points can nevertheless be made.

In the first stanza, the Pāli version highlights the Buddha's accomplishment in ethical conduct and wisdom. The Chinese version also mentions his practice of meditation or *jhāna*, thereby covering all three aspects of the threefold training.¹⁰⁰

A quality of the Buddha mentioned in the fifth Pāli stanza indicates that he has “lowered”, *panna*, his banner.¹⁰¹ The Chinese version speaks instead of the Buddha's wisdom, corresponding to *paññā*.¹⁰²

Stanza six in the *Upāli-sutta* introduces the Buddha as the “seventh of seers”, an expression that could alternatively be understood to qualify him as the “best of seers”.¹⁰³ The Chinese translation supports the interpretation “seventh of seers”, while the Sanskrit fragment can be restored to read the “best of seers”.¹⁰⁴ The Pāli commentary to the *Upāli-sutta* agrees with the understanding adopted in the Chinese version and explains that to speak of the Buddha as the seventh seer refers to him being the seventh Buddha since Vipassī.¹⁰⁵ The same expression occurs also in the Jain tradition, where its usage would support the alternative meaning of being the “best of seers”.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ For a more detailed examination of the Upāli verses in the light of their Sanskrit and Chinese parallels cf. von Hinüber 1982 (cf. also id. 1985: 75) and Waldschmidt 1979, for metrical emendations of the Pāli verses cf. Alsdorf 1967: 261-262.

¹⁰⁰ MN 56 at MN I 386,4: “of developed ethical conduct and of good wisdom”, *vuddhasīlassa sādhupaññassa* (S^e-MN II 77,5: *buddhasīlassa*), MĀ 133 at T I 632b7: “trained in ethical conduct, meditation/ *jhāna*, and wisdom”, 學戒, 禪, 智慧.

¹⁰¹ MN 56 at MN I 386,16: *pannadhajassa* (C^e-MN II 80,18: *pannaddhajassa*). The same expression occurs in MN 22 at MN I 139,36, where to lower the banner represents overcoming the conceit ‘I am’, *asmimāna*.

¹⁰² MĀ 133 at T I 632b19: “wisdom born”, 慧生; on this epithet cf. von Hinüber 1982: 246-247, id. 1983: 29-32, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 327, Norman 1989b: 387, and id. 2006: 369-371.

¹⁰³ MN 56 at MN I 387,18: *isisattamassa*.

¹⁰⁴ MĀ 133 at T I 632b24: 七仙 (an expression also found as part of an eulogy of the Buddha in the introductory section of the *Ekottarika-āgama* at T II 549b13). Waldschmidt 1979: 10 note 68 points out that while MĀ 133 would have been based on *r̥sisaptamasya*, the Sanskrit fragment reads (*r̥sisa*)*ttramasya*. An account of the successful conversion of another lay follower (cf. also above note 82) in EĀ 45.7 at T II 775b17 also reports the Buddha being given the epithet “seventh of seers”, 第七仙人.

¹⁰⁵ Ps III 97,26: *vipassī ādayo cha isayo upādāya sattamassa*; for the list of seven Buddhas in the Pāli canon cf. DN 14 at DN II 2,14. Bodhi in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 1260 note 596 comments that “it is more probable, however, that *sattama* here is the superlative of *sad*, and thus the compound means ‘the best of seers’. The expression *isisattama* occurs at Sn 356, and the commentary to that verse allows both interpretations, offering *uttama* as a gloss on *sattama*”. Norman 1993: 123 note 37 draws attention to another commentarial gloss at Th-a III 195,25, which similarly offers both explanations. He suggests that possibly both explanations were current, one of which influenced the Sanskrit text, while the Chinese translator(s) may have chosen to follow the alternative explanation. Wiltshire 1990: 35 comments that the Buddha “is rarely referred to simply as an *isi*, nearly always superlatively as a great seer (*mahesi*), bull among seers (*isinisabha*) and divine seer (*devīsi*)”. Understanding *isisattama* as “best of seers” would better concord with this pattern noted by Wiltshire. Gombrich 1992b proposes that a misunder-

The Pāli version's stanza eight indicates that the Buddha had crossed over himself and leads others across.¹⁰⁷ These two qualities are not found in the parallel versions.

Stanza nine in the Pāli version employs the well-known attribute Tathāgata, found similarly in the Sanskrit fragment.¹⁰⁸ What makes this case noteworthy is that the Chinese parallel renders Tathāgata as “thus gone”.¹⁰⁹ This appears to be a unique instance in the Chinese Āgamas, as other Āgama discourses invariably employ the translation “thus come”.¹¹⁰

The word *tathāgata* itself accommodates both ways of understanding, since it can be understood to denote “thus come” (*tathā + āgata*), just as it can be taken to mean “thus gone” (*tathā + gata*).¹¹¹ It is remarkable that the translator(s) of the *Madhyama-āgama*, who in all other instances rendered Tathāgata as “thus come”, a rendering well established among Chinese translators, should in this instance have opted for a different translation.

The tenth stanza refers to the Buddha with the term *yakkha*.¹¹² The Chinese version reads “with unsurpassable eyes” instead,¹¹³ which suggests a reading of *yakkha* as “eye”, *akkha*, preceded by the euphonic *y-*.¹¹⁴

standing of *isisattama* as implying that Gotama Buddha was the “seventh in a series” might have led to the idea of six previous Buddhas.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Isibhāsiyāīm* 38.12 in Schubring 1969: 543,29: *jina-sattama*, on which Norman 1989/1993: 269 comments that this expression “gives only the meaning ‘best of jinas’, since there is no stock list of seven jinas”.

¹⁰⁷ MN 56 at MN I 386,26: *tiṇṇassa tārayantassa*.

¹⁰⁸ MN 56 at MN I 386,28: *tathāgatassa* and Waldschmidt 1979: 12: *tathāgatasya*.

¹⁰⁹ MĀ 133 at T I 632c5: 如去.

¹¹⁰ 如來, which Meisig 2005: 113 considers a warped translation (“schiefe Übersetzung”) of *tathāgata*. For other renderings of Tathāgata cf. Nattier 2003b: 210-211.

¹¹¹ Chalmers 1898: 113 suggests yet another way of understanding the compound as *tathā* + *āgata*, “arrived at truth”. The idea of truth is also the most frequently recurring nuance among the eight explanations of the term Tathāgata given by Buddhaghosa in Sv I 59,31, as well as among the additional set of eight explanations of the same term offered by Dhammapāla in Ud-a 133,5. The nuance of truth recurs also in a Jain commentary on the corresponding epithet *tahāgaya*, cf. Thomas 1936: 783. On the term Tathāgata cf. also, e.g., Anālayo 2008f, Anesaki 1921, Bodhi 1978, Coomaraswamy 1938, Dutt 1960/1971: 295-304, Endo 1997/2002: 195-206, de Harlez 1899, Harvey 1983, Habito 1988: 136 note 30, Hopkins 1911, Norman 1990/1993a: 162-163, Senart 1898, Shawe 1898, and Walleser 1930.

¹¹² MN 56 at MN I 386,31: *yakkhassa*.

¹¹³ MĀ 133 at T I 632b28: 無上眼.

¹¹⁴ Hoernle 1916/1970: 34, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 190 and 326, and Waldschmidt 1979: 14. Bapat 1969: 1, however, holds *yakkha* or *yakṣa* to be more probable, since this term “need not be interpreted in a bad sense. The word is often used in the sense of one who possesses divine or superhuman power”. Nakamura 1960: 155 draws attention to the expression *yakkhassa suddhi* in Sn 3:4 at Sn 478 and in Sn 4:11 at Sn 875 and Sn 876, explaining that “in later Buddhist mythology *yakkha* became, so to speak, an antinom to the Buddha, but in the early stage of Buddhism it was nothing but one of the appellations applied to the Buddha”. He further notes that in Jain texts the corresponding *jakkha* also has positive connotations. Positive associations are similarly evident in *yakṣas* representations in ancient Indian art, reflecting their cultic importance. On *yakṣas* in Indian art in general and in relation to early Buddhism in par-

The Pāli and the Chinese version report that on hearing all these praises Nigantha MN I 387 Nātaputta was so upset that he vomited up blood. According to the Chinese version, this caused him to pass away, a fatal consequence of Upāli's verses also recorded in the Pāli commentary.¹¹⁵

MN 57 *Kukkuravatika-sutta*¹¹⁶

The *Kukkuravatika-sutta*, the “discourse on the observance [of behaving like] a dog”, is an exposition of four types of action to two ascetics who had adopted the observance of behaving like a cow and like a dog.¹¹⁷ This discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese Āgamas.

The four types of action discussed in the *Kukkuravatika-sutta* recur in a discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya*.¹¹⁸ An exposition of these four types of action can also be found

ticular cf., e.g., Agrawala 1965: 110-118, Coomaraswamy 1971: 28-36, Misra 1968, id. 1981, Mitterwallner 1989, Moti Chandra 1954, Quagliotti 2008: 126-128, Sen 1972, Sutherland 1991: 105-136, and Swearer 2004/2007: 25-26.

¹¹⁵ MĀ 133 at T I 632c18 and Ps III 100,2, cf. also below p. 604. According to Vin I 42,29, the same happened to Sañjaya when his disciples Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna left him to become disciples of the Buddha. According to Vin II 200,34, Devadatta similarly vomited blood when his followers had been convinced by Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna to leave Devadatta and become disciples of the Buddha again. Other instances can be found in MN 36 at MN I 237,28, which relates vomiting of blood to unbalanced forms of practice that result in mental derangement, and in AN 7:68 at AN IV 135,5, where a group of monks vomits blood after hearing a rather stern discourse from the Buddha. These instances suggest that vomiting blood was understood as a physical reaction to a severe psychic shock, a reaction that, however, need not be fatal.

¹¹⁶ C^e-MN II 84,1 gives the discourse's title as *Kukkuravatiya-sutta*, and S^c-MN II 79,1 as *Kukkurovāda-sutta*.

¹¹⁷ The dog-observance, *kukkuravata*, recurs in DN 24 at DN III 6,9. The dog-observance and the cow-observance, *kukkuravrata* and *govrata*, are both mentioned also in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya 1957: 157,10 and T 1579 at T XXX 312b11, in addition to which the Sanskrit version also mentions the *nakulavrata*, the mongoose-observance. In addition to the *kukkuravata* and the *govata*, several *Jātaka* tales also mention the observance of behaving like a bat, the *vaggulivata*, cf. Jā 144 at Jā I 493,19, Jā 377 at Jā III 235,19, and Jā 487 at Jā IV 299,13. A reference to the observance of behaving like a goat, the *ajavata*, can be found in Jā 489 at Jā IV 318,8. Nidd I 89,16 lists several observances, mentioning also the observance of behaving like an elephant, like a horse, or like a crow, the *hatthivata*, the *assavata*, and the *kākavata*. The **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 226a17, also mentions the observance of behaving like a deer, 鹿戒, reconstructed by Lamotte 1970a: 1409 as the *mṛgaśīla*. On a western version of the cow-conduct cf. Chalmers 1926: xvi.

¹¹⁸ AN 4:232 at AN II 230,25; cf. also AN 3:23 at AN I 122,11. A discourse quotation paralleling the examination of the four types of action in AN 4:232 at AN II 230,27 or MN 57 at MN I 389,22 can be found in Abhidh-k 4:60 in Pradhan 1967: 235,1; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 83b18 and T 1559 at T XXIX 239b24. Regarding the third of the four types of action listed in these discourses, Adam 2008: 118 note 6 suggests that perhaps “the idea behind the third category is that we are beings of mixed motive: our intentions are a confusion of the positive and the negative”. Harvey 2000/2005: 44 note 16 speaks of actions “in which good and bad motives are juxtaposed”, McDermott 1977: 31 of deeds “which are at once harmful and beneficial”, and Vélez de Cea 2005: 7 proposes “to see dark-and-bright

as a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.¹¹⁹ While in the case of this instance the source is uncertain, a comment in the *Saṅgītiparyāya* on the same four types of action, listed in the *Saṅgīti-sutta* and its Sanskrit parallel,¹²⁰ explicitly mentions Puṇṇa, one of the two protagonists of the *Kukkuravatika-sutta*, and also specifies that he was an observer of the cow-conduct.¹²¹

Hence, even though the Chinese Āgamas do not have a parallel to the *Kukkuravatika-sutta*, the compilers of the *Saṅgītiparyāya* were acquainted with a version of this discourse. In this way, the present instance reinforces the point made above in relation to the *Jīvaka-sutta*, in that conclusions based on the absence of a discourse from the Chinese Āgamas need to be treated with caution.¹²²

MN 58 *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta*

The *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta*, the “discourse to Prince Abhaya”, describes an attempt by Prince Abhaya to corner the Buddha with a two-pronged question, in reply to which the Buddha clarified what types of speech he would use.¹²³ This discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese Āgamas. Parts of this discourse have, however, been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment,¹²⁴ and also in a discourse quotation found in the **Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*.¹²⁵

MNI 393 The Sanskrit fragment has preserved parts of the introductory narration, which appear to be similar to the Pāli version's report that Prince Abhaya had been asked by the Nigaṇṭhas to challenge the Buddha with a dilemma, a request to which he agreed. The dilemma was based on the idea that the Buddha, claiming to be an awakened teacher, should be compassionate, yet at the same time it was well known that his pronouncement on the evil character of Devadatta had sorely upset the latter.

actions ... as mental, bodily, or verbal actions whose overall morality is complex, that is, not purely good or evil”, cases that combine “the presence of both wholesome and unwholesome features in the same action”. Here it is noteworthy that AN 8:33 at AN IV 236,15 lists *chanda*, *dosa*, *moha*, and *bhaya* as possible motivations for making a gift, *dāna*, which would appear to imply that a deed that in itself is wholesome can take place with unwholesome mental qualities at its background.

¹¹⁹ Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 268b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 235a3, translated in Skilling 1979; cf. also the discourse quotation in Abhidh-k 4:60 in Pradhan 1967: 235,9, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 83c2 and T 1559 at T XXIX 239c4.

¹²⁰ DN 33 at DN III 230,1 and the Sanskrit parallel in fragments K 484 (52)Rc and S 364 (108)V5 in Stache-Rosen 1968: 25 and 36.

¹²¹ T 1536 at T XXVI 396a8 notes that the Buddha gave this exposition of the four types of action to Puṇṇa or Pūrṇa, 圓滿, the observer of the cow conduct, 牛戒.

¹²² Cf. above p. 319.

¹²³ A somewhat similar attempt to corner the Buddha is reported in SN 42:9 at SN IV 323,19 and its parallels SĀ 914 at T II 230b12 and SĀ² 129 at T II 423b26. For an examination of MN 58 from the perspective of the theory of truth in early Buddhism cf. Harvey 1995b: 110-113.

¹²⁴ Hoernle fragment Or. 15009/100 in Hirabayashi 2009: 167, identified in Hartmann 1992: 28, parallels the beginning part of MN 58 at MN I 392-394.

¹²⁵ T 1509 at T XXV 321b15-25.

The next section of the *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta* has as its counterpart the discourse quotation in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, which records that Prince Abhaya inquired whether the Buddha would say what is irritating to others, to which the Buddha replied that there was no direct answer to this question.¹²⁶

The *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta* and the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra* illustrate how beneficial action can at times be painful with the example of how the prince would extract an object that his infant son had swallowed, even if such an intervention should hurt the child.¹²⁷ MN I 395

The *Abhayarājakumāra-sutta* continues with an exposition of the types of speech the Buddha would utter, followed by clarifying that the answers the Buddha would give to questions were not pre-meditated. These sections of the discourse are not covered in the discourse extract preserved in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*. The Pāli version concludes with prince Abhaya taking refuge.

MN 59 *Bahuvedanīya-sutta*

The *Bahuvedanīya-sutta*, the “discourse on much to be felt”, presents a detailed analysis of the nature of feelings. This discourse recurs in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and has a Chinese parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹²⁸

Parts of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments,¹²⁹ and in a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.¹³⁰

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Samyutta-nikāya* versions report that a discussion on the nature of the Buddha’s analysis of feelings had arisen between the monk Udāyi and the carpenter Pañcakaṅga. While the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse agrees on the nature of

¹²⁶ MN 58 at MN I 393,33 and T 1509 at T XXV 321b15, a question and answer exchange also found in T 1521 at T XXVI 79b5. T 1521 at T XXVI 79b4 also agrees with MN 58 on the title of the discourse, given as “discourse on Prince Fearless”, 無畏王子經.

¹²⁷ MN 58 at MN I 395,1 and T 1509 at T XXV 321b19. T 1521 at T XXVI 79b7 uses the same image in a more general sense, comparing the Buddha’s attitude to a nurse who intervenes in a similar manner when a small child has swallowed something; a simile found also in AN 5:7 at AN III 6,1 and in SĀ 685 at T II 187b8.

¹²⁸ The Pāli parallel is SN 36:19 at SN IV 223-228 and has the title *Pañcakaṅga-sutta*. The part of SN 36:19 that is concerned with the Buddha’s exposition on feeling recurs again in SN 36:20 at SN IV 228-229. The Chinese parallel is SĀ 485 at T II 123c-124b, for which Akanuma 1929/1990: 55 gives the tentative title “Udayi”, 優陀夷. While MN 59 has Sāvatthī as its location, SĀ 485 locates the discourse at Rājagaha (SN 36:19 does not specify the setting). A translation and discussion of the Pāli and Chinese versions can be found in Faust-Koschinger 1999, parts of the two discourses have also been translated and compared by Choong 2000: 111-114.

¹²⁹ SHT II 51a (pp. 9-10, cf. also SHT IX p. 370), SHT VIII 1863 (p. 54), and SHT VIII 1884 (p. 73). SHT II 51a has preserved part of the Buddha’s criticism of those who quarrel about his teachings and the subsequent exposition of increasingly superior types of happiness, found at MN I 398-400. SHT VIII 1863Va and SHT VIII 1884Va-b have preserved part of the conclusion of the discourse.

¹³⁰ Cf. below note 134.

the issue at stake, it differs in so far as according to its report this had caused the arising of a dispute between the monk Udāyī and King Bimbisāra.¹³¹

MN I 397 The disagreement between Udāyī and his visitor was whether the Buddha had taught two or three types of feeling. According to the Pāli versions, Ānanda reported the disagreement between Udāyī and his visitor on the proper way of analysing feelings to the Buddha.¹³² The *Samyukta-āgama* version indicates that Udāyī and his visitor went themselves to present their disagreement to the Buddha.¹³³

The three versions agree that the Buddha clarified in reply that he had not only taught two or three types of feeling, but also six types, eighteen types, thirty-six types, and even one-hundred-and-eight types. While the Pāli versions only enumerate these types of feeling, the Chinese version and the discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary, which has preserved this part of the discourse,¹³⁴ follow this listing with a detailed explanation of each type. A similar explanation can be found in an otherwise unrelated discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya*.¹³⁵

The Chinese and Tibetan versions also differ from the Pāli versions in as much as they additionally mention one type of feeling, four types of feeling, and innumerable types of feeling (see table 6.5).¹³⁶

Table 6.5: Analysis of Feelings in MN 59 and its Parallels

MN 59	SĀ 485 & Abhidh-k-t
2 feelings (1)	1 feeling
3 feelings (2)	2 feelings (→ 1)
5 feelings (3)	3 feelings (→ 2)
6 feelings (4)	4 feelings
18 feelings (5)	5 feelings (→ 3)
36 feelings (6)	6 feelings (→ 4)
108 feelings (7)	18 feelings (→ 5) 36 feelings (→ 6) 108 feelings (→ 7) innumerable feelings

According to the exposition of these types of feeling given in the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse and the quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary, the one type of feeling re-

¹³¹ SĀ 485 at T II 123c22. For a more detailed discussion of this difference cf. Anālayo 2007i: 34-36.

¹³² MN 59 at MN I 397,27 and SN 36:19 at SN IV 224,20 .

¹³³ SĀ 485 at T II 124a1. SHT 51aV3 and R6 agrees in this respect with SĀ 485, as it reports that the Buddha addressed his exposition to Udāyī.

¹³⁴ Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa*, *nyu* 4b7 or Q (5595) *thu* 36a7 parallels the enumeration of different types of feeling in MN 59 at MN I 397,36; cf. also Abhidh-k 6:3 in Pradhan 1967: 330,10, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 114c25 and T 1559 at T XXIX 267a29.

¹³⁵ SN 36:22 at SN IV 231,30.

¹³⁶ SĀ 485 at T II 124a5+6+7. The innumerable feelings can also be found in a similar type of listing of feelings in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 325b9.

fers to all feelings being *dukkha*.¹³⁷ This seems to refer to a statement found in a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel, according to which whatever is felt is to be included within *dukkha*. In this statement, however, *dukkha* does not refer to a type of feeling, but rather stands for the unsatisfactory nature of conditioned phenomena, due to their impermanent nature.¹³⁸ Thus, it would not seem adequate to treat this qualification as if it were to refer to a type of feeling, which is the case once it is included in the present listing of ‘types’ of feelings.

The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse then explains that the reference to four types of feeling intends feelings which are:

- conjoined with the element of sensuality,
- conjoined with the element of materiality,
- conjoined with the element of immateriality,
- not conjoined (with any of these three).¹³⁹

A similar analysis can be found in the Abhidharmic exposition of feelings given in the *Vibhāṅga*.¹⁴⁰

According to the *Samyukta-āgama* version, innumerable feelings are “this and that” feelings.¹⁴¹ This is slightly puzzling, since to speak of “this and that” feelings does not constitute a category that can be used for analytical purposes.

Here it needs to be borne in mind that the analysis of feelings into various types does not appear to be motivated by a merely descriptive concern. Distinguishing feelings into mutually exclusive types would rather have the purpose of eroding the notion of a substantial self that feels.¹⁴² In such a context to speak of ‘innumerable’ feelings, or ‘this and that’ feelings, would not yield an analytical tool for differentiating types of feeling and would thus be of limited use for the purpose for which the whole analytical scheme would be meant.

The *Bahuvedanīya-sutta* and its parallels next turn to the dire consequence of getting into narrow-minded arguments on a particular form of presentation. Although the state-

MN I 398

¹³⁷ SĀ 485 at T II 124a7: 所有受, 皆悉是苦 and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 5a4 or Q (5595) *thu* 36b4: *gang cung zad tshor ba de thams cad ni sdug bsngal ba ste*.

¹³⁸ SN 36:11 at SN IV 216,22 and its parallel SĀ 473 at T II 121a9 explain that the statement *yam kiñci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin ti* (S^e-SN IV 268,8: *yani*), 所有受, 悉皆是苦, refers to the impermanent nature of feelings. Other occurrences of this proclamation can be found in SN 12:32 at SN II 53,20 and SĀ 474 at T II 121a22.

¹³⁹ SĀ 485 at T II 124a10: 欲界繫受, 色界繫受, 無色界繫受, 及不繫受. D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 5a6 or Q (5595) *thu* 36b8 speaks in the last case instead of “undefiled” feelings, *zag pa med pa*.

¹⁴⁰ Vibh 15,7 distinguishes the aggregate of feelings in a fourfold manner: *kāmāvacaro, rūpāvacaro, arūpāvacaro*, and *apariyāpanno*. The *Vibhāṅga* has this fourfold analysis as part of its exposition according to the Abhidharmic method (*abhidhammabhājaniya*), thereby setting it apart from its exposition according to the discourses (*suttantabhājaniya*).

¹⁴¹ SĀ 485 at T II 124a21: 此受彼受 and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 5b6 or Q (5595) *thu* 37b2: *ji ltar tshor yang tshor ba*.

¹⁴² Cf., e.g., DN 15 at DN II 66,19 and its parallel DĀ 13 at T I 61c8, which draw attention to the mutually exclusive nature of the three types of feeling in order to refute self notions in relation to feelings; for a discussion of this passage cf. Bodhi 1984/1995: 34-37.

ments of the monk Udāyī and the carpenter Pañcakaṅga as such were right, both were wrong in as much as they took a dogmatic stance. Such a dogmatic stance does not do justice to the teaching, which can be applied in different ways.

The Pāli and Chinese versions next turn to the five types of sensual pleasure. While in the two Pāli versions this topic comes somewhat abruptly, the Chinese version and the Sanskrit fragment offer a transition to this exposition. According to these versions, the Buddha explained that he had indeed taught two types of feeling, an explanation addressed to Udāyī who earlier had maintained that the Buddha had not taught two types of feeling.¹⁴³ These two types of feeling are those associated with sensuality and those aloof from sensuality.

As an exposition of this statement, the Buddha then contrasted the feelings that arise in relation to the five types of sensual pleasure with the feelings that arise in relation to the four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments, a presentation found similarly in the Pāli versions.

The Pāli, Chinese, and Sanskrit versions agree in correcting those who believe any of the *jhānas* or immaterial attainments to be the supreme experience of pleasant feeling and happiness, since in each case the next *jhāna* or immaterial attainment in the series is superior in happiness.

MN I 400 In all versions, the series culminates with the attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings, which the Buddha declared to be the supreme type of happiness, even though it takes place in the absence of feelings.

This seems to be an implicit corrective of the position held by Udāyī's visitor, who had earlier maintained that the Buddha simply reckoned neutral feeling as such to be peaceful.¹⁴⁴ In this way, by at first distinguishing between sensual and non-sensual types of feeling and then leading the exposition up to the attainment of cessation, the Buddha's exposition seems to deal with both of the stances taken by Udāyī and his visitor.

In order to explain why even the cessation of feeling could be reckoned a form of happiness, the Pāli versions point out that the Buddha's conception of happiness is not limited to pleasant feeling.¹⁴⁵ The Chinese version instead distinguishes between four types of (non-sensual) happiness.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ SĀ 485 at T II 124a27 and SHT II 51aV3.

¹⁴⁴ MN 59 at MN I 397,4, SN 36:19 at SN IV 224,4, and SĀ 485 at T II 123c28.

¹⁴⁵ MN 59 at MN I 400,19 and SN 36:19 at SN IV 228,17; cf. also, e.g., Collins 1998: 210 and Kalupahana 1992/1994: 100. That the Buddha identified cessation as a form of happiness is also recorded in the *Yogacārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya 1957: 99,16 and T 1579 at T XXX 300a10.

¹⁴⁶ SĀ 485 at T II 124b15 distinguishes between the happiness derived from the absence of sensuality, the happiness of seclusion, the happiness of appeasement, and the happiness of awakening, 調離欲樂, 遠離樂, 寂滅樂, 菩提樂. SHT II 51 folio (1)[41]R6-7 instead reads (a reading based in part on a preliminary transliteration, as parts of the originals have been lost): *n[ai]skṛāmyas(ukha)m [vi]vekasukham sambodhisu(kha)m nirvāṇasukham*. The set *nekkhammasukha*, *pavivekasukha*, *upasamasukha*, and *sambodhasukha* (or *sambodhisukha*), occurs in MN 66 at MN I 454,23, MN 122 at MN III 110,21, and MN 139 at MN III 233,32. A difference seems to be that MN 66 and MN 139 use these four terms as

MN 60 *Apaññaka-sutta*

The *Apaññaka-sutta*, the “discourse on what is sure”, teaches a reasonable approach to various views apparently propounded in ancient India. This discourse does not seem to have a parallel in the Chinese Āgamas. A few parts of this discourse have, however, been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.¹⁴⁷ In addition to these fragment parallels, the *Apaññaka-sutta* also has partial parallels in other Pāli discourses, as its introductory part recurs in the introduction to the *Sāleyyaka-sutta*,¹⁴⁸ its examination of views recurs as part of a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya*,¹⁴⁹ and the examination of the four types of person found in the later part of the *Apaññaka-sutta* recurs in several other Pāli discourses.¹⁵⁰

near equivalents to qualify the happiness of *jhāna* (the same appears to be also implicit in MN 122). SĀ 485, however, introduces this set as four “types” of happiness, 四種樂, not as four near equivalents for the same type of happiness, cf. also SHT II 51aR6: *catvāry-udāyī sukha(ni)*.

¹⁴⁷ The Sanskrit fragments are SHT III 966 (p. 226, identified in SHT VII p. 272, cf. also SHT IX p. 405), SHT IV 165 folio 32 and folio 37 (pp. 206 and 207, identified in SHT VI p. 212), SHT VI 1261 (pp. 54-55), SHT VI 1579 (pp. 197-198, cf. also SHT VIII p. 208), Hoernle fragment 149/add. 135, no. 2 in Hartmann 1991: 63-64, fragment Or. 15003/44 from the Hoernle collection, published in Wille 2006: 79, and fragment bleu 190 of the Pelliot collection, no. 1 in Hartmann 1991: 62. SHT VI 1261 corresponds to the beginning of the discourse at MN I 401. SHT III 966 refers among others to the view that “there is no other world”, mentioned at MN I 402,12: *n’ atti paro loko*. Pelliot fragment bleu 190 has parts of the examination of the consequence of this view at MN I 402-403. SHT IV 165 folio 32 has among others preserved the conclusion “if this word is true”, paralleling MN I 403,7: *saccam vacanam*. SHT VI 1579 has preserved words that parallel several phrases at MN I 406-407, such as the proposition that “evil things come into being with wrong view as their condition”, MN I 406,3: *pāpaka akusalā dhammā sambhavanti micchādīṭṭhipaccayā*, or the expression “right speech and non-opposition to noble ones” at MN I 407,4: *sammāvācā ariyānam apaccanikatā* (S^e-MN II 110,16: *appaccanikatā*). The Hoernle fragments parallel the adopting of the view that there is causality, described at MN I 409,7. In addition to these, Hartmann 2004b: 126 notes another Sanskrit fragment parallel in the newly discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* manuscript.

¹⁴⁸ MN 41 at MN I 285,1.

¹⁴⁹ SN 42:13 at SN IV 351,12, which as part of its examination of those views speaks of “incontrovertibility”, *apaññakatāya* (e.g., SN IV 351,20), reminding of the title of MN 60.

¹⁵⁰ MN 60 at MN I 411,28; a topic that recurs in brief in DN 33 at DN III 232,21 and in MN 94 at MN II 159,5, while a detailed exposition can be found in MN 51 at MN I 342,24 and in AN 4:198 at AN II 205,23, for Sanskrit fragment versions of this exposition cf. above p. 309 note 2. Since this exposition on the four types of person bears little relation to the main topic of MN 60, Pande 1957: 151 suggests that “it seems difficult to explain the appendix [i.e., the exposition on the four persons] except through some gross confusion in transmission”.

Chapter 7 *Bhikkhu-vagga*

MN 61 *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*¹

The *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, the “discourse on an instruction [given] to Rāhula at Ambalaṭṭhikā”, records the Buddha’s instruction to his son Rāhula on the evil consequences of speaking falsehood and on the need to reflect repeatedly on the ethical qualities of an action. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*,² as well as a parallel in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavibhaṅga*, preserved in Chinese and Tibetan.³

A version of the present meeting between the Buddha and Rāhula can, moreover, be found in the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* collection and in the Chinese *Udāna-(vara-*ga).⁴ A few lines of this discourse have also been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment,⁵ and extracts from a version of the present discourse occur in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra* and in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.⁶

¹ S^e-MN II 123,2 has the title “lesser discourse on an instruction to Rāhula”, *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta*. The same title recurs at S^e-MN III 504,1 as the title for MN 147 (a discourse where B^e, E^e, and C^e also have the title *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta*). As the next discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya* is the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* (MN 62), the Siamese edition’s referring to MN 61 as the *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta* conforms to a recurrent (but not invariable) pattern in the *Majjhima-nikāya* of presenting the *Mahā-* and *Cūla-*versions of a discourse together (cf. above p. 5). In the present case, however, this results in the Siamese *Majjhima-nikāya* edition having two discourses with the same title *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta*, namely MN 61 and MN 147.

² The parallel is MĀ 14 at T I 436a-437b, entitled the “discourse to Rāhula”, 羅云經. A quotation from the present discourse in the *Vyākhyāyukti* in Lee 2001: 95,12 (noted by Skilling 2000b: 343) similarly speaks of the *Rāhula-sūtra*, *sgra gcan zin gyi mdo sde*; cf. also the reference in Aśoka’s Bhabra edict to the *Lāghulovāda*, “spoken by the Blessed One, the Buddha, concerning falsehood”, *musāvādam adhigichya bhagavatā budhena bhāsite*, cf. Hultsch 1925: 173, while Bloch 1950: 154 and Woolner 1924/1993: 34 read *adhigicya* (cf. also Hultsch 1925: 173 note 4); on identifying this reference with MN 61 cf., e.g., Rhys Davids 1896: 95 and Schmithausen 1992: 115. While according to MN 61 Rāhula was staying at Ambalaṭṭhikā, a royal park on the road between Rājagaha and Nālandā, according to MĀ 14 he was staying at Tapodārāma, a grove near a pond fed by a hot spring, situated at the foot of a mountain outside of Rājagaha (on these locations cf. Malalasekera 1937/1995: 158 and 993). MĀ 14 has been translated in Lévi 1896: 476-483 and has been studied and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 34, 64, 131-132, 183-184, and 290-293. Skilling 1996c offers a study of different versions of this discourse with particular emphasis on the verses found in the Chinese and Tibetan versions.

³ T 1442 at T XXIII 760b-761b as well as D (3) ’dul ba, cha 215a-220b or Q (1032) je 199b-204a.

⁴ T 211 at T IV 599c-600b, translated in Willemen 1999: 171-173, and T 212 at T IV 668a. As noted by Skilling 1996c: 206 note 35, the instruction given to Rāhula about falsehood in the first part of MN 61 has also a counterpart in the *Udānavargavivarāya*, preserved in Tibetan, cf. Balk 1984: 378,4-23.

⁵ SHT V 1117 (pp. 111-112, cf. also SHT IX p. 411), parallels the instruction to disclose an unwholesome bodily deed to other monks and to rejoice in a wholesome bodily act, found at MN I 416,34 and MN I 417,6. The same fragment also parallels part of the instruction on mental acts at MN I 419.

⁶ T 1509 at T XXV 158a12, translated in Lamotte 1949/1981: 813-815, and Shukla 1973: 55-58 or ŠSG 1998: 88-92, with the Chinese version in T 1579 at T XXX 405b-c.

MN I 414 The *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin by reporting that the Buddha, who had come to visit Rāhula, illustrated the consequences of speaking falsehood with the help of the water vessel the Buddha had just used to wash his feet.

The (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavibhaṅga* precedes its account of the visit paid by the Buddha to Rāhula with a report of what had motivated the Buddha to give such an instruction to his son, an account found also in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*. According to this account, found with a few minor differences in these two works, Rāhula had in a somewhat playful mood given wrong information to visitors who had inquired about the Buddha whereabouts.⁷ Such behaviour would indeed have been a good reason for the Buddha to deliver the present discourse on the need to abstain from falsehood.

Although no reference to Rāhula's mischievous activities is found in the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta* or in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the Pāli commentary explains that the Buddha delivered the present instruction thinking that young boys like Rāhula are prone to falsehood, saying they saw when they did not see, etc.⁸ Moreover, the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta* reports that, after delivering a set of similes, the Buddha told Rāhula that he should not speak a lie even for fun.⁹ A similar instruction occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama* version after each of the similes.¹⁰ Thus, the commentarial gloss and the instructions given in the two discourses would fit with the background narration provided in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* as well as in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*.

To illustrate the consequences of consciously speaking falsehood, according to the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the account in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavibhaṅga* the Buddha compared the worth of someone who speaks falsehood to the small amount of water that was still left in the vessel he had just used to wash his feet.¹¹

While the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* account proceeds similarly,¹² according to the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* tale the Buddha asked Rāhula if the water left in the vessel

⁷ T 1442 at T XXIII 760b19 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 215a6 or Q (1032) je 199b3 report that Rāhula used to send visitors, who wished to meet the Buddha, to the wrong location, telling them that the Buddha was at Vulture Peak when in reality he was in the Bamboo Grove, etc. The account in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 158a12 (cf. also T 1813 at T XL 623b17), differs in so far as it reports that Rāhula had told the visitors that the Buddha was away, even though the Buddha was there, or else he had told them that the Buddha was in, when in reality the Buddha had left.

⁸ Ps III 125,22.

⁹ MN 61 at MN I 415,18: *hassā pi na musā bhanissāmī ti, evañ hi te, rāhula, sikkhitabbañ* (S^e-MN II 125,15: *evañ hi*).

¹⁰ MĀ 14 at T I 436a24+29 and T I 436b5+11+26: 當作是學, 不得戲笑妄言.

¹¹ MN 61 at MN I 414,11, MĀ 14 at T I 436a20, and T 1442 at T XXIII 760c5 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 215b7 or Q (1032) je 200a4.

¹² T 212 at T IV 668a10. For an account of the Buddha's arrival, Rāhula's reception, and the simile of the small amount of water left in the vessel cf. also the *Udānavargavivaraṇa*, Balk 1984: 378,4-23.

could still be used for drinking or for rinsing one's mouth.¹³ Rāhula replied that it could not be used for such purposes, since it was dirty. The Buddha then remarked that Rāhula would be as useless as this dirty water if he did not keep his mouth restrained.

According to the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Vinayavibhaṅga* account, the Buddha next poured out the remaining water and afterwards turned the vessel upside down, comparing someone who speaks a deliberate lie to the discarded water, to the upside down condition of the water vessel, and to its empty condition.¹⁴

The Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* account reports that, once he had thrown out the remaining water, the Buddha pointed out that the vessel was still dirty and thus could not be filled with water for drinking.¹⁵ The *Dharmapada Avadāna* account continues with another illustration, with the Buddha spinning the vessel around with his feet and asking Rāhula if he was concerned that the vessel might break. Rāhula replied that the vessel was an item of little worth, therefore he was not concerned about the possibility that it might break. The Buddha then drew the conclusion that someone who does not restrain body and speech is similarly held in little esteem.

The *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Vinayavibhaṅga* follow the water vessel illustrations with the simile of an elephant used for warfare.¹⁶ They describe how an elephant might fight with his whole body but keep protecting his trunk. On a later occasion, the same elephant might also use its trunk. When that happens, the elephant trainer realizes that this elephant is ready to do anything. According to the Chinese (*Mūla-*)*Sarvāstivāda Vinayavibhaṅga* and the Pāli commentary, the elephant trainer knows this to be a sign that the elephant will defeat the enemy.¹⁷

This simile recurs in similar terms in the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* account, with, however, an opposite evaluation of its implication.¹⁸ According to the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* presentation, the fact that the elephant does not even protect his trunk and has given up concern for his life shows that he is reckless to an extent that renders the elephant unfit for use in battle. The idea behind this could be that a reckless elephant might cause damage to its own troops and endanger the person who rides on it. In fact, a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and its counterpart in a partial *Ekottarika-*

¹³ T 211 at T IV 600a3.

¹⁴ MN 61 at MN I 414,14+19+23, MĀ 14 at T I 436a25 and T I 426b2+7, and T 1442 at T XXIII 760c9+13 +17 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 216a1+3+4 or Q (1032) je 200a5+6+8 (the versions differ in the sequence of the last two similes). T 212 at T IV 668a14+17 has only two similes at this point, which parallel the discarded water and the upside down vessel. The image of a vessel turned upside down recurs in AN 3:30 at AN I 130,18, where it illustrates the case of someone who does not listen properly when the Dharma is being taught. SN 45:153 at SN V 48,14 and AN 11:14 at AN V 337,6 use the same image in a positive sense.

¹⁵ T 211 at T IV 600a10.

¹⁶ MN 61 at MN I 414,29, MĀ 14 at T I 436b12, and T 1442 at T XXIII 760c21 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 216a6 or Q (1032) je 200b1.

¹⁷ T 1442 at T XXIII 760c27 and Ps III 128,11.

¹⁸ T 211 at T IV 600a23.

āgama translation employ the image of an elephant that guards the different parts of its body when engaging in battle in a positive way, comparing it to the way a monk should guard his sense-doors.¹⁹

The *Dharmapada Avadāna* account concludes that, just as the elephant should guard his trunk, so Rāhula should guard his mouth. Thus, while the simile of the elephant in the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* compares a bad quality of the elephant to a bad quality of Rāhula, from the perspective of the Chinese (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavibhaṅga* and the Pāli commentary the simile rather employs a positive quality of a war elephant to illustrate the blameworthy quality of speaking falsehood. Whichever evaluation is given to the elephant's behaviour, the Pāli, Chinese, and Tibetan versions agree that the image of an elephant that even uses its trunk illustrates the recklessness of someone who is not ashamed to speak a lie.²⁰

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account and the *Vinayavibhaṅga*, at this point the Buddha also delivered a set of stanzas to bring home the same point. The first of these stanzas indicates that one who speaks falsehood is capable of any evil, while according to the second stanza it would be better to swallow a hot iron ball rather than partaking of the offerings of the faithful when one does not maintain pure moral conduct.²¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version continues with another two stanzas, which point

¹⁹ AN 5:140 at AN III 162,10 and EĀ² 26 at T II 879c5.

²⁰ MN 61 at MN I 415,16: *sampajānamusāvāde n' atthi lajjā nāhan tassa kiñci pāpam akaraṇīyan ti vadā-mi* (B^e-MN II 78,17, C^e-MN II 132,6, and S^e-MN II 125,13: *nāham*, S^e also reads *pāpam kammañ*, instead of just *pāpam*), MĀ 14 at T I 436b25: 妄言 ... 無惡不作 (cf. also the stanza in MĀ 14 at T I 436b28), T 1442 at T XXIII 760c29: 妄語 ... 無惡而不造 (cf. also the stanza in T 1442 at T XXIII 761a2), as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 217a2 or Q (1032) je 201a3: *brdzun smra ... sdig pa'i las mi bya ba* (Q adds: *na*) *cung zad kyang med par smra'o*. A similar stanza can also be found in Dhp 176: *musāvā-dissa jantuno ... n' atthi pāpam akāriyam*, in the Patna *Dharmapada* stanza 297 in Cone 1989: 181 or stanza 298 in Roth 1980b: 124: *musāvādissa jantuno ... nāsti pāpam akāriyam*, and in the *Udāna-(var-ga)* stanza 9:1 in Bernhard 1965: 169: *mṛṣāvādasya jantunah ... nākāryam pāpam asti yat* (the corresponding part of stanza 94 in Nakatani 1987: 30 has preserved (*m*)_(yū-)), with its Tibetan counterpart *lus can brdzun du smra ba yi, sdig pa mi bya ci yang med* in Beckh 1911: 32 or in Zongtse 1990: 105 (Skilling 1996c: 212 note 61 explains that *lus can* corresponds to the Sanskrit variant reading *dehinah*, cf. also Balk 1988: 404); for another occurrence of a version of this verse cf. SĀ 1075 at T II 280b19. Skilling 1996c: 205 notes that the same statement recurs as a discourse quotation in the *Vibhāsāprabhāvṛtti* to the *Abhidharmadīpa*, cf. Jaini 1977: 128,6: *yasya, rāhula, mṛṣāvāde nāsti lajjā nāsti kaukṛtyam nāham tasya kiñcid akaraṇīyam vadāmi*.

²¹ MĀ 14 at T I 436b28 and T 1442 at T XXIII 761a2 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 217a2 or Q (1032) je 201a4. These stanzas have Pāli counterparts in Dhp 176 and Dhp 308, in It 1:3:5 at It 18,14 and It 2:2:11 at It 43,7 (= It 3:5:2 at It 90,12), instances where these two stanzas do not occur together. In the Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan versions of the *Udāna-(varga)*, however, the two stanzas occur together, serving as the introductory couplet for the chapter on action, the *karmavarga*, cf. T 212 at T IV 668a4+28, T 213 at T IV 781c10, stanza 9:1-2 in Bernhard 1965: 169 (cf. also stanzas 94-95 in Nakatani 1987: 30) and in Beckh 1911: 32 or in Zongtse 1990: 105. Skilling 1996c: 213 notes that these two stanzas also occur together in SĀ 1075 at T II 280b19, cf. also Enomoto 1994: 21, while in the Patna *Dharmapada* they occur in the same chapter, but are separated from each other by another stanza, cf. stanzas 295 and 297 in Cone 1989: 180-181 or stanzas 296 and 298 in Roth 1980b: 124.

out that if one wishes to avoid *dukkha*, one needs to avoid unwholesome deeds, since there is no escape from the retribution for evil deeds.²²

The *Ambalatthikārāhulovāda-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Vinayavibhāṅga* continue by using the reflective function of a mirror to illustrate the need to reflect on the ethical quality of any bodily action before, while, and after performing the action.²³ These three versions agree that past bodily misconduct should be confessed to one's elders, while a wholesome past bodily deed will lead to the arising of happiness, followed by training oneself day and night in wholesome states. The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Vinayavibhāṅga* specify that such training takes place in regard to right mindfulness and clear comprehension, thereby offering a gloss on the implication of "wholesome states" in the present context.²⁴

A significant difference between the *Ambalatthikārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel is that the Chinese discourse enjoins to refrain from a bodily action that is "pure" and at the same time unwholesome, whereas a bodily action should be undertaken that is "not pure", but at the same time is wholesome and does not result in suffering.²⁵ This presentation is surprising, since to qualify an action as wholesome and at the same time as impure seems contradictory.²⁶

The *Vinayavibhāṅga* account differs from the *Madhyama-āgama* version in this respect, as it does not consider that an unwholesome bodily action could be pure.²⁷

²² MĀ 14 at T I 436c3; with parallels in T 212 at T IV 668b12+23, T 213 at T IV 781c16, and stanzas 9:3-4 in Bernhard 1965: 169-170 (cf. also stanzas 96-97 in Nakatani 1987: 30) and in Beckh 1911: 32 or in Zongtse 1990: 106.

²³ For a study of the Pāli version of this instruction cf. Vélez de Cea 2004a: 133-135.

²⁴ MĀ 14 at T I 437a4: 住正念正智 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 218a3 or Q (1032) je 202a4: dran pa dang shes bzhin gyis mang du gnas par bya'o.

²⁵ MĀ 14 at T I 436c11: 彼身業淨, 或自為, 或為他, 不善, 與苦果受, 於苦報, thereby describing an action that is "pure", 淨 (a character that usually translates *suddhi* (or *śuddhi*) and is rendered by Lévi 1896: 480 as "pur"), but which at the same time is unwholesome, 不善 (*akusala*), and results in *dukkha*, 苦.

²⁶ Minh Chau 1964/1991: 34 and 132 suggests that 淨 in this context could refer to actions that are "permissible" according to the monastic code of discipline, but which have unwholesome results, as opposed to actions that are not permissible, but that have wholesome results. He then concludes that this instruction in MĀ 14 allows a more liberal attitude towards the interpretation of monastic regulations. Minh Chau's reasonable attempt to make sense out of this passage by assuming that 淨 may have a meaning different from its more usual meaning of "purity" receives support from Hirakawa 1997: 727, who lists *kalpika* and *kalpa* as possible equivalents for 淨, cf. also Bapat 1970: 223, who notes that the expression *akappiya* in Sp II 289,24 has as its counterpart 不淨 in the 善見律毘婆沙, T 1462 at T XXIV 727c23 (on the title of this work cf. Pinte 2010, on its school affiliation Heirman 2004). A problem with Minh Chau's interpretation, however, is that adopting this rendering to the instruction for a past bodily action in MĀ 14 at T I 436c27 would result in proposing that a "permissible" bodily deed should be confessed, while a "not permissible" bodily deed leads to the arising of joy. Such a statement would make little sense, since for a "permissible" bodily deed there would be no need for confession. In fact, the idea to give precedence to others' welfare over the requirements of moral conduct belongs to a later phase of Buddhist thought and is not yet found in the early discourses. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2008a: 10-12.

²⁷ T 1442 at T XXIII 761a11 examines bodily actions that are unwholesome, *dukkha*, and evil, and that re-

A quotation from the present discourse in the *Vyākhyāyukti-ṭīkā*, preserved in Tibetan, and a paraphrase of the present passage in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* agree with the *Vinayavibhaṅga* version and the *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta* that the present instructions are to refrain from a bodily deed that is harmful and unwholesome,²⁸ without envisaging that such a deed could be reckoned as pure.

Judging from the phrasing in these versions, it seems safe to conclude that with high probability this part of the *Madhyama-āgama* version has suffered from an error in transmission or translation.²⁹

MN I 417 When applying the same treatment to verbal and mental deeds, the *Majjhima-nikāya* account instructs that, if one has committed an unwholesome mental deed, one should feel repelled, humiliated, and disgusted.³⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the Tibetan *Vinayavibhaṅga* use less strong terminology in this case, as they simply instruct to discard such an unwholesome mental deed (in future).³¹

MN I 420 The *Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the account in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* round off their exposition by declaring that recluses and Brahmins of past, present, and future times purify their bodily, verbal, and mental action in this way.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Vinayavibhaṅga* conclude by repeating the instructions to Rāhula in verse, again emphasizing the need to reflect on the ethical quality of any action.³²

sult in future *dukkha*, 是不善事, 是苦惡業, 能於未來感苦異熟. D (3) 'dul ba, cha 217a5 or Q (1032) je 201a6 similarly takes up bodily actions that are harmful to oneself and others, unwholesome, *dukkha*, and result in *dukkha*, *bdag dang gzhan la gnod par 'gyur ba mi dge ba* (D: *ba'i*) *sdug bsngal 'byung ba rnam par smin pa sdug bsngal ba yin*.

²⁸ According to the discourse quotation in the *Vyākhyāyukti-ṭīkā*, D (4069) *sems tsam, si* 200b3 or Q (5570) *i* 71a5, the instruction to Rāhula is to refrain from a bodily deed that is harmful, unwholesome, and results in *dukkha*, *gnod pa dang ldan pa mi dge ba sdug bsngal 'byung ba*. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* in Shukla 1973: 55,16 similarly reads *vyābhādhikam ... ātmano vā parasya vā akuśalam*, cf. also SSG 1998: 88,20 and the Chinese counterpart in T 1579 at T XXX 405b5: 自損及以損他是不善.

²⁹ Such a textual error could have occurred due to misinterpreting a *sandhi* in the Indic original to imply that a particular word has, or else does not have, the negative prefix *a-*. A similar error can be found in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to MN 65 (cf. below p. 361 note 114), indicating that such mistakes did sometimes take place; cf. also Karashima 1992: 263, who notes similar errors in Dharmarakṣa's translation of the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra*, or Bapat 1970: lix, who points out occurrences of this type of error in the Chinese counterpart to the *Samantapāśādikā*.

³⁰ MN 61 at MN I 419,27: *attiyitabbam harāyitabbam jigucchitabbam*.

³¹ MĀ 14 at T I 437a11: 捨 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 219a7 or Q (1032) je 203a5: *gtang bar bya'o*. The presentation of mental action in MĀ 14 and in the Tibetan version also differs from MN 61 in regard to the sequence, which elsewhere in these versions proceeds from future via present to past actions. In relation to mental action, however, MĀ 14 and the Tibetan version first list those of the past, then those of the future, and lastly those of the present (the cases of verbal and mental deeds in T 1442 at T XXIII 761b2 are abbreviated and thus do not allow comparison with the other versions).

³² While MĀ 14 at T I 437b11 has five stanzas at this point, T 1442 at T XXIII 761b11 as well as D (3) 'dul ba, cha 220b3 or Q (1032) je 204a6 have only two stanzas. These two stanzas can also be found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 57,12 or SSG 1998: 92,4 and T 1579 at T XXX 405c3.

MN 62 *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*, the “greater discourse on an instruction to Rāhula”, presents a set of meditation instructions given by the Buddha to his son Rāhula. This discourse has a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.³³

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel begin with the Buddha approaching Sāvatthī to collect alms, together with his son Rāhula. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, while they were walking on the road the Buddha turned around and told Rāhula that he should contemplate the not-self nature of the aggregate of form.³⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse differs slightly, as here the Buddha told Rāhula that he should contemplate the impermanent nature of form.³⁵ Both versions report that the Buddha then extended the respective instruction to cover the other four aggregates.

MN I 421

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, this enlargement of the instruction was prompted by Rāhula, who had inquired whether the contemplation, which he had just been taught, should be applied only to form.³⁶

The Pāli commentary explains that, while following the Buddha, Rāhula had been mentally congratulating himself on having inherited the splendid appearance of his father.³⁷ The Buddha had become aware of these vain thoughts and decided to address the matter right on the spot by instructing Rāhula to contemplate the true nature of material form. This sudden and unexpected instruction apparently had its effect, since according to the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel Rāhula decided to forgo begging alms and right away sat down to meditate in order to put the instruction into practice.³⁸

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* continues by reporting that, while Rāhula was seated in meditation, Sāriputta came by and told him to practise mindfulness of breathing. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation, however, this instruction was given by the Buddha who, on his way back from collecting alms, had seen Rāhula seated in meditation.³⁹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version reports that at this point the Buddha also instructed Rāhula on contemplation of impurity (*asubha*) and on the four *brahmavihāras*.

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel agree that Rāhula next approached the Buddha and inquired about how to undertake mindfulness of breathing

³³ The parallel is EĀ 17.1 at T II 581c-582c. EĀ 17.1 agrees with MN 62 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. EĀ 17.1 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1993: 213-222.

³⁴ MN 62 at MN I 421,6: “all form should be seen as ‘not mine’, ‘not I’, ‘not my self’”, *sabbam rūpam, n' etam mama, n' eso 'ham asmi, na me 'so attā ti ... daṭṭhabban ti*.

³⁵ EĀ 17.1 at T II 581c3: “you should now contemplate form as being impermanent”, 汝今當觀色為無常.

³⁶ MN 62 at MN I 421,8: *rūpam eva nu kho, bhagavā, rūpam eva nu kho, sugatā ti?*

³⁷ Ps III 132,10.

³⁸ EĀ 17.1 at T II 581c7 describes Rāhula's reaction in additional detail, reporting how he reflected why the Buddha had addressed him in this way when they were about to enter the town for alms.

³⁹ The commentary, Ps III 136,11, explains that Sāriputta did not know that Rāhula had already received meditation instructions from the Buddha. According to Vin I 82,16, Sāriputta had ordained Rāhula. As Rāhula's *upajjhāya*, it would be natural for him to give an instruction to Rāhula.

so that it becomes fruitful.⁴⁰ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version reports that the Buddha directly replied to this question by describing mindfulness of breathing. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, he replied by at first giving a detailed instruction on contemplation of the five elements,⁴¹ followed by taking up the *brahmavihāras*, contemplation of impurity, and perception of impermanence, before turning to mindfulness of breathing. The detailed instructions on the five elements, which make up about half of the text of the Pāli discourse, are not found at all in the Chinese version.

When evaluating this substantial difference between the two versions, it comes somewhat unexpected that the Buddha, instead of directly replying to Rāhula's question, should give such a detailed exposition of other types of meditation before turning to the topic about which he had been asked, namely mindfulness of breathing. Notably, a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and its parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama* record an instruction given by the Buddha to Rāhula on the four elements.⁴² This leaves open the possibility that the instructions given by the Buddha to his son Rāhula on contemplating the elements were originally associated with the occasion described in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* and *Samyukta-āgama*, and during the course of transmission these instructions came to be added to the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*.⁴³

The Pāli commentary to the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*, however, explains that the Buddha took up the subject of the elements in order to give a more detailed explanation of his earlier instruction on contemplating the aggregate of form.⁴⁴ This commentarial gloss would explain why the Buddha first gave a detailed exposition of the short instruction he had delivered on the road to Rāhula and only then took up the practice of mindfulness of breathing. In fact, according to the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* it was Sāriputta, and not the Buddha, who had told Rāhula to practise mindfulness of breathing. The Buddha had rather asked him to contemplate the true nature of the aggregate of

⁴⁰ MN 62 at MN I 421,24: *kathām bhāvitā nu kho, bhante, ānāpānasati ... mahapphalā hoti?* EA 17.1 at T II 582a6: 云何修行安般 ... 獲大果報? In EA 17.1 this is preceded by a verse exchange between Rāhula and the Buddha that has no counterpart in MN 62. As noted by Greene 2006: 33 note 98, these verses seem to have some distant affinity with an exchange between the Buddha and Rāhula reported in Sn 2.11 at Sn 335-336.

⁴¹ MN 62 at MN I 421,27 to MN I 424,26. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Āñāayo 2005c: 97-98. A distinction of the five elements into internal and external manifestations occurs as a discourse quotation in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 387c14; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 211,4 or SSG 2007: 72,8 and T 1579 at T XXX 430a16.

⁴² AN 4:177 at AN II 164,26 and SĀ 465 at T II 118c29. SĀ 465 differs from AN 4:177 in as much as it begins with an inquiry by Rāhula on how to go beyond notions of self and conceit in regard to this body with consciousness and all external signs (AN 4:177 does not report any inquiry by Rāhula). Another difference is that SĀ 465 takes up six elements, whereas AN 4:177 covers only four elements. Compared to MN 62, the examination of the elements in AN 4:177 and SĀ 465 is also shorter, as they do not list bodily manifestations of each internal element.

⁴³ Greene 2006: 33-34 note 98 comments that “the structure of the sūtra makes far more sense in the Chinese version ... the entire section concerning the ... elements that we find in the Pāli version ... was probably a later addition”.

⁴⁴ Ps III 138,8.

form, an instruction of which the exposition of contemplating the elements would indeed be a more detailed exposition.

Be that as it may, the two versions agree in recommending the development of the four *brahmavihāras* as an antidote to particular unwholesome mental qualities, although they have these recommendations at different junctures of the discourse. The two parallels present loving kindness as a remedy for aversion and compassion as a remedy for cruelty (*vihimsā*). While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version considers sympathetic joy to be an antidote to discontent and equanimity an antidote to irritation (*patigha*),⁴⁵ the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse instead contrasts sympathetic joy with envy and equanimity with conceit (see table 7.1).⁴⁶

Table 7.1: Specific Meditations as Antidotes in MN 62 and its Parallel

MN 62	EĀ 17.1
loving kindness ≠ aversion (1)	impurity ≠ lust (→ 5)
compassion ≠ cruelty (2)	loving kindness ≠ aversion (→ 1)
sympathetic joy ≠ discontent (3)	compassion ≠ cruelty (→ 2)
equanimity ≠ irritation (4)	sympathetic joy ≠ envy (→ 3)
impurity ≠ lust (5)	equanimity ≠ conceit (→ 4, 6 ?)
impermanence ≠ conceit ‘I am’ (6)	

When evaluating this difference, the point made by the *Ekottarika-āgama* version’s presentation of sympathetic joy as a remedy for envy could be that to rejoice in someone else’s good fortune would be directly opposed to sentiments of envy.

Regarding equanimity, however, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version appears less straightforward. Situations that arouse irritation would indeed require the establishment of equanimity, as suggested by the *Majjhima-nikāya* version’s presentation, while it is less clear why equanimity should be particularly apt for overcoming conceit. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version at this point also takes up the perception of impermanence to counter the conceit ‘I am’, an instruction not found at all in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse (see table 7.1).

Perception of impermanence also features in other discourses as the appropriate method for countering conceit.⁴⁷ This suggests that perhaps the *Ekottarika-āgama* ver-

⁴⁵ MN 62 at MN I 424,30. Other Pāli discourses also place sympathetic joy in contrast to discontent, cf., e.g., DN 33 at DN III 249,2, DN 34 at DN III 280,26, AN 6:13 at AN III 291,18, and AN 6:113 at AN III 448,6. A different nuance can be found in AN 3:93 at AN I 243,23, which relates sympathetic joy to the absence of quarrelling and disputing.

⁴⁶ EĀ 17.1 at T II 581c21+22.

⁴⁷ MN 122 at MN III 115,3, MĀ 191 at T I 739b17, and their Tibetan parallel in Skilling 1994a: 240,1 indicate that contemplation of the impermanent nature of the five aggregates leads beyond the conceit ‘I am’. SN 22:102 at SN III 155,14 and its parallel SĀ 270 at T II 70c3 present perception of impermanence as the tool for overcoming various defilements, one of which is conceit. AN 9:1 at AN IV 353,11 recommends perception of impermanence to overcome the conceit ‘I am’, a recommendation given

sion's contrasting conceit with equanimity is the result of a textual error, conflating what originally were two separate topics, namely equanimity as a remedy for irritation and contemplation of impermanence as a way to counter conceit.

MN I 425 Regarding the subject of mindfulness of breathing, the two versions exhibit some interesting differences in their detailed exposition of this topic, which merit a closer examination. Both versions begin by instructing that one should retire to a secluded spot, sit down cross-legged, and keep the body straight. The *Majjhima-nikāya* account at this point recommends establishing mindfulness “in front” (*parimukha*),⁴⁸ an expression that according to the explanation given in the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* refers to the nostril area as the proper location for being mindful of the breath.⁴⁹ This explanation is reflected in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, which explicitly instructs that one should be “keeping the mind at the tip of the nose”.⁵⁰

The standard pericope description of sitting down for meditation in other *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses, however, does not mention the nose tip, but speaks just of putting mindfulness “in front”.⁵¹ This leaves open the possibility that the instruction to keep the mind at the tip of the nose in the *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel to the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* could have been an explanatory gloss on the practice of mindfulness of breathing that, either during the period of transmission or at the time of translation, became part of the discourse itself.⁵²

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* and its parallel begin their description of mindfulness of breathing with awareness of the long or short nature of in-breaths and out-breaths.⁵³

similarly in its parallel MĀ 57 at T I 492b25. The same recommendation recurs in AN 9.3 at AN IV 358,17 (= Ud 4:1 at Ud 37,18) and the parallel MĀ 56 at T I 492a7.

⁴⁸ MN 62 at MN I 425,8.

⁴⁹ Vibh 252,12: “mindfulness is established, well established, at the nose tip or the upper lip, therefore it is said: ‘having established mindfulness in front’”, *sati upatthitā hoti supatthitā nāsikagga vā mukhanimitte vā, tena vuccati parimukham satim upatthapetvā ti*; cf. also Patis I 171,19. An alternative instruction on the same practice can be found in T 613 at T XV 256c25, according to which the practice of mindfulness of breathing can also be undertaken by directing attention to the navel region, 意在臍中. The same work, a treatise on meditation whose translation is attributed to Kumārajīva (344-413), continues by instructing to count the breaths, instructions found also in Vism 278,33.

⁵⁰ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a15: 繫意鼻頭. In regard to an earlier occurrence of *parimukham satim upatthapetvā* in MN 62 at MN I 421,14, however, the parallel passage in EĀ 17.1 at T II 581c12 speaks simply of establishing unification of the mind, 專精一心. Since this instance describes contemplation of the five aggregates, to direct mindfulness to the nose-tip would in fact not have suited the context.

⁵¹ E.g., in EĀ 37.3 at T II 711c19: 念在前, corresponding to *parimukham satim upatthapetvā* in its parallel MN 32 at MN I 219,30. The same expression 念在前 as part of the standard description of sitting down for meditation occurs over thirty times in the *Ekottarika-āgama*. In contrast, the expression to keep the mind at the nose tip, 繫意鼻頭, does not seem to recur anywhere else in the *Ekottarika-āgama* or in the other three main Āgamas.

⁵² Zürcher 1959/1972: 31 explains that “during the work of translation, and perhaps also on other occasions, the master gave oral explanations (*k'ou-chieh* 口解) concerning the contents of the scriptures translated. Explanations of this kind often appear to have crept into the text”.

⁵³ Huyen-Vi 1993: 216 note 6 draws attention to the fact that the instructions for contemplating long and short breaths in EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a15 speak of doing this first in regard to the out-breath, 出息, and

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version continues by instructing to be mindful of the temperature of the in-breaths and out-breaths in terms of their coolness or warmth.⁵⁴

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version also directs mindfulness to the whole body,⁵⁵ an instruction found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version as the third step of its scheme of sixteen stages in the practice of mindfulness of breathing.⁵⁶

According to an explanation given in the *Visuddhimagga*, the expression “body” should in the present context be understood to refer to the “body” of the breath,⁵⁷ in the sense of directing awareness to the full extent of the breath from beginning to end. The formulation used in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, however, appears to intend the physical body.⁵⁸

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version next instructs to be aware if the breath is present or not present.⁵⁹ Instead of directing mindfulness to the presence or absence of the breath,

then in regard to the in-breath, 入息. MN 62 at MN I 425,9 directs mindfulness first to *assasati* and then to *passasati*, although there is some divergence of opinions on how these two Pāli expressions should be understood. Vism 272,1 states that according to the *Vinaya* commentary *assasati* represents the out-breath, whereas according to the *Suttanta* commentary *assasati* represents the in-breath. PED: 92 s.v. *ā*¹ comments that *assasati* and *passasati* “in exegesis ... have been differentiated in a way which looks like a distortion of the original meaning, viz. *assasati* is taken as ‘breathing out’, *passasati* as ‘breathing in’”. Childers 1875/1993: 61, DP I: 268, and CPD I: 523 (all s.v. *assasati*) take *assasati* to mean “to breathe in”, but according to Böhtlingk 1883/1998d: 173, Mylius 1997: 250, and MW: 696 (s.v. *praśvāsa* or *passasati*), “to breath in” is rather represented by *passasati* or *praśvasati*; cf. also Caland 1931: 62 note 1 on the possible influence of the law of waxing syllables on the sequence of terms in the *dvanda* compound *prāṇāpānau*. BHSD: 110 s.v. *āśvāsa-praśvāsa*, remarks that “whatever may have been the meaning of the two terms, it seems clear that the compound (like *ānāpāna*) was commonly used in the sense of breath, collectively and as a whole”.

⁵⁴ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a17: 冷 and 暖. The point behind this instruction could be related to the circumstance that out-breaths will be slightly warmer than in-breaths, hence attention given to this difference in temperature would be a way of developing distinct awareness of in-breaths as against out-breaths; on this instruction cf. also the 分別功德論, T 1507 at T XXV 49c3.

⁵⁵ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582b1: “completely contemplate the physical body [when] breathing in, [when] breathing out, coming to know it entirely”, 盡觀身體入息, 出息, 皆悉知之.

⁵⁶ MN 62 at MN I 425,14: “he trains: ‘experiencing the whole body I breathe in ... breathe out’”, *sabbakāyapaṭisañvedī assasissāmī ti ... passasissāmī ti sikkhati* (B^e-MN II 88,17: *sabbakāyappaṭisañvedī*).

⁵⁷ Vism 273,24. In fact MN 118 at MN III 83,31 identifies in- and out-breaths as “a body among bodies”, *kāyesu kāyaññatarāham ... vadāmi yadidam assāsapassāsam* (B^e-MN III 126,11 and C^e-MN III 230,18: *assāsapassāsā*). On this interpretation, the instruction to be aware of the ‘body’ of the breath in its whole length would intend a strengthening and further enhancement in the continuity of awareness. Bodhi 2005: 442 note 29 remarks that the commentarial interpretation of *sabbakāyapaṭisañvedī* as intending awareness of the beginning, middle, and end of the breaths “is difficult to square with the literal words of the original text, which may have originally intended simply a global awareness of the entire body. It is also difficult to see how *-paṭisañvedī* could mean ‘is aware of’; this suffix is based on the verb *paṭi-saṃvedeti* meaning ‘to experience’ or ‘to feel’, which has a different nuance from ‘awareness’”.

⁵⁸ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582b2 uses the expression 身體, whereas for a figurative sense of *kāya*, simply 身 would have been the appropriate choice.

⁵⁹ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a19: “at the time when there is breathing, he knows it is there; at a time when there is no breathing, he knows it is not there”, 有時有息, 亦復知有, 又時無息, 亦復知無. The implications of

the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* speaks of tranquillising the bodily formation.⁶⁰ Since in other discourses the expression “bodily formation” refers to in- and out-breathing,⁶¹ the instruction given in the Pāli version could be similar in meaning to what is described in the Chinese version.

The *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta* continues by directing the development of mindfulness of breathing to a range of phenomena with the help of twelve other steps of practice.⁶² Its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel, however, has only one more step of practice at this point, which instructs to be aware if the breath comes “from the heart”.⁶³

Both versions conclude their respective expositions of mindfulness of breathing by proclaiming that such practice is of great fruit and benefit. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version indicates that, if mindfulness of breathing is practised well, even one’s last breaths will be with mindfulness.⁶⁴ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version highlights that properly practising mindfulness of breathing leads to experiencing the taste of the deathless.⁶⁵

MN I 426 The *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes with the delighted reaction of Rāhula. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version continues by describing how Rāhula put the instructions re-

this instruction could be either to notice the gaps between in-breaths and out-breaths (as well as between out-breaths and in-breaths), or else the point might be that during the more deeply concentrated stages of mindfulness of breathing the breath becomes increasingly subtle, until a meditator may no longer feel it. Vism 283,16 offers a detailed examination of this phenomenon, explaining that once the breath disappears one should not get up and leave, believing that now the meditation is over.

⁶⁰ MN 62 at MN I 425,15: *passambhayañ kāyasankhārañ*. According to DN 32 at DN III 270,23 and AN 10:20 at AN V 31,27, with the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* the bodily formation has been fully tranquilized, a stage of practice where according to SN 36:11 at SN IV 217,8 the breath totally disappears.

⁶¹ SN 41:6 at SN IV 293,15: *assāsapassāsa ... kāyasankhāro*, and its counterpart SĀ 568 at T II 150a24: 出息入息名為身行. This need not be interpreted as an exclusive identification, cf. Griffiths 1986/1991: 148 note 17, who comments that “it seems more likely ... that we are supposed to regard the process of respiration (*assāsapassāsa*) as an example of physical activity rather than an exhaustive account of it”; cf. also Jayatilleke 1948: 217 and Kapani 1992: 199-200.

⁶² The same scheme of sixteen steps recurs in MN 118 and its parallel SĀ 815, cf. below p. 666. Another parallel to these instructions can be found in Sanskrit fragments of a text containing meditation instructions, the so-called Yogalehrbuch, cf. Schlingloff 1964: 65-68.

⁶³ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a20: “if the breathing comes out from the heart, he knows ‘it comes out from the heart’; if the breathing comes in from the heart, he knows ‘it comes in from the heart’”, 若息從心出, 亦復知從心出, 若息從心入, 亦復知從心入. This instruction might imply to become aware of the breath in the chest area. Huyen-Vi 1993: 217 alternatively translates “in the event of breathing out conditioned by the mind, he is fully aware of it; and in the event of breathing in conditioned by the mind, he is again fully aware of it”. Huyen-Vi thus appears to take the instruction to imply becoming aware of the interrelationship of mind and breath at this point, based on a free rendering of 從. The same character usually means “to follow” and “from”, cf. Mathews 1963: 1019 and Soothill 1937/2000: 349. Hirakawa 1997: 453 gives the following equivalents for 從: *anu-√gam, upādāya; tatas, prabhṛti; -agreṇa, adhīna, anantaram, anu-√bandh, anuvicāra, antikāt, ārabhya, itas, -tas, prabhāvita, sakāśāt, santikāt*, none of which would support the rendering “conditioned by”.

⁶⁴ MN 62 at MN I 426,1: *ye pi te carimakā assāsapassāsa, te pi vidiṭā va nirujjhanti, no aviditā ti* (B^e-MN II 89,8, C^e-MN II 150,7, and S^e-MN II 142,8: *viditāva*, B^e also reads just: *assāsā*, without *passāsā*).

⁶⁵ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a23: 得甘露味.

ceived into practice and developed the four *jhānas* as well as the three higher knowledges. He then went to the Buddha to proclaim his achievement, which the Buddha approved, followed by declaring Rāhula to be foremost among disciples who uphold the rules.⁶⁶

While the listing of eminent disciples in the *Anguttara-nikāya* somewhat similarly considers Rāhula outstanding for his willingness to be trained,⁶⁷ his full awakening is associated in the Pāli discourses with another occasion. This occasion is recorded in the *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, which, judging from its title, would be a counterpart to the present discourse, the *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*. According to the *Cūlārāhulovāda-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel, Rāhula became an arahant after receiving an instruction by the Buddha on the development of insight in regard to the six sense-spheres.⁶⁸

MN 63 *Cūlamāluñkyā-sutta*⁶⁹

The *Cūlamāluñkyā-sutta*, the “lesser discourse to Māluñkyā[putta]”, records the Buddha’s refusal to answer any of the metaphysical questions in vogue in ancient India, illustrating the pointlessness of these questions with the simile of the poisoned arrow. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in an individual translation.⁷⁰ Parts of this discourse have also been preserved as a discourse quotation in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*.⁷¹

The *Cūlamāluñkyā-sutta* and its parallels describe in similar terms how the monk Māluñkyaputta,⁷² after approaching the Buddha, requested to be given an answer to a set of metaphysical questions frequently debated in ancient India.⁷³ According to the report given in all versions, Māluñkyaputta was apparently so obsessed with these questions that he had planned to disrobe in case the Buddha would not give him an answer. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version and the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*

MN I 427

⁶⁶ EĀ 17.1 at T II 582c13: 我聲聞中第一弟子能持禁戒, 所謂羅雲比丘是, followed by a stanza in praise of gradually reaching the destruction of the fetters through moral conduct and sense-restraint.

⁶⁷ AN 1:14 at AN I 24,16: *etad aggāṇi mama sāvakānam bhikkhūnam sikkhākāmānam, yadidam rāhulo.*

⁶⁸ MN 147 at MN III 280,7 (= SN 35:121 at SN IV 107,28) and SĀ 200 at T II 51c9, translated in Anālayo 2011h. As Pāsādika 2004: 711 notes, this account differs considerably from the way Rāhula attains full awakening in EĀ 17.1.

⁶⁹ S^e-MN II 143,1 has the title “lesser discourse on an instruction to Māluñkyā[putta]”, *Cūlamāluñkyovāda-sutta*.

⁷⁰ The parallels are MĀ 221 at T I 804a-805c and T 94 at T I 917b-918b. MĀ 221 has the title “discourse on the simile of the arrow”, 箭喻經; T 94 has the similar title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on the simile of the arrow”, 佛說箭喻經. The Taishō edition indicates that T 94 was translated by an unknown translator. MĀ 221 and T 94 agree with the Pāli version on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī.

⁷¹ T 1509 at T XXV 170a8-b1, translated in Lamotte 1949/1981: 913-915.

⁷² B^e-MN II 89,16: Māluñkyaputta; SHT V 1279V3 and R6 (a parallel to MN 64): Mālakyamātāḥ.

⁷³ MN 63 at MN I 427,6, MĀ 221 at T I 804b11, T 94 at T I 917c2, and T 1509 at T XXV 170a9.

indicate that Māluñkyaputta even went so far as to give vent to this plan in the presence of the Buddha.⁷⁴

MN I 428 All versions report that the Buddha rebuked Māluñkyaputta, pointing out that he had never promised to provide an answer to such questions. The Buddha explained that, if one were to make one's going forth dependent on being given an answer to these questions, one will pass away without receiving such an answer.⁷⁵

MN I 429 The four versions illustrate this situation with the example of a man struck by a poisonous arrow, who refuses to let the arrow be pulled out unless he is informed about various irrelevant details concerning the archer, the bow used for shooting the arrow, etc.⁷⁶ Querying in this way, the victim will die before his questions have been answered.

MN I 430 According to the *Cūlamāluñkya-sutta* and its Chinese discourse parallels, the Buddha explained that to live the holy life under him is not compatible with holding these different views.⁷⁷ Independent of the various positions proposed by these views, there is *dukkha*, manifesting as birth, old age, and death, etc. The three discourses conclude by highlighting that instead of answering such questions the Buddha had taught the four noble truths, as these are beneficial and lead to Nirvāṇa.⁷⁸

The stern reply Māluñkyaputta received from the Buddha seems to have had its effect, since he apparently not only continued to live the life of a Buddhist monk instead of disrobing, but according to a discourse found in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its *Sam-*

⁷⁴ MN 63 at MN I 427,15: *no ce me bhagavā byākarissati ... evāham sikkham paccakkhāya hīnāy’ āvattis-sāmī ti* and T 1509 at T XXV 170a11: 若不能解, 我當更求餘道, where he threatens to go over to another school or group.

⁷⁵ Edgerton 1959: 82 explains that the “speculative, metaphysical questions put by Māluñkāputta are simply irrelevant to *all* the Buddha’s teaching”. Holder 1996: 450 similarly notes that these questions are set aside “because they have no utility”. King 1983: 263 comments that “theorizing about ontological metaphysical ultimates has absolutely no place in the Buddhist Dharma”; cf. also Mizuno 1969: 90 and Organ 1954: 138, who points out that “the Buddha’s reply is a pragmatic reply ... he has come to show men how to overcome ... suffering ... anything which does not contribute to that end is extraneous”. Rigosopoulos 1992/1993: 250 sums up: “the rejection of the *avyākatāni* is ... motivated by their ... uselessness. If I am hit by an arrow ... my only concern will be to remove it”.

⁷⁶ MN 63 at MN I 429,2, MĀ 221 at T I 804c24, T 94 at T I 917c27, and T 1509 at T XXV 170a17.

⁷⁷ MN 63 at MN I 430,9 states that *sassato loko ti ... ditthiyā sati brahmacariyavāso abhavissā ti, evam no*, translated by Chalmers 1926: 305 as “the higher life is not contingent on the truth of any thesis that the world either is or is not eternal”, by Gethin 2008: 171 as “it is not the case ... that by holding the view that the world is eternal, one would live the spiritual life”, by Horner 1957/1970: 100 as: “the living of the Brahma-faring ... could not be said to depend on the view that the world is eternal”, and by Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 535 as “if there is the view ‘the world is eternal’, the holy life cannot be lived”. MĀ 221 at T I 805a25 explains that “for the sake of this view, to practise the holy life under me, that is not possible”, 因此見故, 從我學梵行者, 此事不然. According to T 94 at T I 918a27, the Buddha declared that “[for one who] has this wrong view, it is not fitting to practise the holy life under me”, 有此邪見, 不應從我行梵行.

⁷⁸ MN 63 at MN I 431,28, MĀ 221 at T I 805c3, and T 94 at T I 918b12. T 1509 at T XXV 170a26 differs in that, after the completion of the simile, it points out that: “the arrow of wrong views smeared with the poison of craving has entered your heart; wanting to pull out this arrow, you have become my disciple”, 為邪見箭愛毒塗已入汝心, 欲拔此箭作我弟子.

yukta-āgama parallel, and according to the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, he eventually became an arahant.⁷⁹

MN 64 *Mahāmālunīkyā-sutta*⁸⁰

The *Mahāmālunīkyā-sutta*, the “greater discourse to Māluṇkya[putta]”, presents an exposition by the Buddha on the five lower fetters and on the way to abandon them. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*,⁸¹ and also a partial parallel in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, extant in Tibetan.⁸² A few sections of a version of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁸³

The *Mahāmālunīkyā-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels begin by reporting that the Buddha asked his disciples if they remembered the five lower fetters. The three versions agree that the monk Māluṇkyaputta replied by listing the five,⁸⁴ although they differ on the sequence in which he listed them (see table 7.2).⁸⁵

MN I 432

Even though the five items, listed by Māluṇkyaputta, correspond to the mental obstructions that are elsewhere reckoned as the ‘five lower fetters’, his reply met with the Buddha’s disapproval. According to the commentarial explanation, the problem with Māluṇkyaputta’s presentation was that he assumed bondage to occur only when these states were actually present in the mind.⁸⁶

To reveal the mistakenness of this assumption, the Buddha brought up the simile of a tender infant. The simile indicates that a tender infant already has the underlying ten-

⁷⁹ SN 35:95 at SN IV 76,19, its parallel SĀ 312 at T II 90b26, and T 1509 at T XXV 170b1.

⁸⁰ S^e-MN II 154,1 has the title “greater discourse on an instruction to Māluṇkya[putta]”, *Mahāmālunk-yovāda-sutta*.

⁸¹ The parallel is MĀ 205 at T I 778c-780b, which has the title “discourse on the five lower fetters”, 五下分結經, and agrees with MN 64 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī. For remarks on MĀ 205 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 30, 64, and 103-104.

⁸² Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 259b7-262a2 or Q (5595) *thu* 1a1-4a8; cf. also Abhidh-k 5:2 in Pradhan 1967: 278,2, paralleling MN 64 at MN I 434,19, with its parallels in T 1558 at T XXIX 98c13 and T 1559 at T XXIX 252c24. Abhidh-k-ṭ concludes by giving the discourse’s title as “discourse on the lower [fetters]”, *tha ma’i cha dang mthun pa’i mdo*.

⁸³ SHT V 1279 (pp. 201-203) and SHT IX 2155 (pp. 116-117). Both fragments correspond to the introductory discussion at MN I 432-433.

⁸⁴ According to MĀ 205 at T I 778c16, SHT V 1279V3 and SHT IX 2155V3, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 260a1 or Q (5595) *thu* 2a1, Māluṇkyaputta displayed respectful behaviour by getting up from his seat before proposing his answer to the Buddha’s question, a circumstance not mentioned in MN 64.

⁸⁵ MĀ 205 at T I 778c20: 欲, 患, 身見, 戒取, 疑 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 260a3 or Q (5595) *thu* 2a5: ‘*dod pa la ’dun pa ... gnod sems ... ’jig tshogs la lta ba ... tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog tu ’dzin pa ... the tshom* (D: *tsom*), whereas MN 64 at MN I 432,15 lists *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *silabbata-pāramāsa*, *kāmacchanda*, and *byāpāda*, a sequence of listing also observed in DN 33 at DN III 234,15, SN 45:179 at SN V 61,7, AN 9:67 at AN IV 459,5, and AN 10:13 at AN V 17,6. A discourse quotation from the introductory narration of the present discourse in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 253b7, agrees with MĀ 205 in as much as it begins with sensual desire and ends with doubt.

⁸⁶ Ps III 144,7.

dency to these five fetters, even though none of the corresponding mental states manifests in its mind.

Table 7.2: Five Lower Fetters in MN 64 and its Parallels

MN 64	MĀ 205 & Abhidh-k-t
personality view (1)	sensual desire (→ 4)
doubt (2)	aversion (→ 5)
clinging to rules, etc. (3)	personality view (→ 1)
sensual desire (4)	clinging to rules, etc. (→ 3)
aversion (5)	doubt (→ 2)

MN I 434 The three versions illustrate the futility of an attempt to eradicate the five lower fetters without undertaking the path required for such eradication with the example of a man who attempts to cut the heartwood of a tree without first cutting the bark. The question of what constitutes this path emerges in a slightly different light in the three versions (the discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary does not cover the whole of the relevant section), as their otherwise similar expositions follow a different sequence (see table 7.3).

As a result of this difference in sequence, while the *Majjhima-nikāya* version answers the question about the path to the eradication of the five lower fetters by presenting the development of *jhāna* and its insightful contemplation, the *Madhyama-āgama* and Tibetan version's reply to the same question speaks of no longer being overwhelmed by the five lower fetters and knowing how to get out of their manifestations. The *Madhyama-āgama* version also turns to the *jhānas* and their insightful contemplation, thus it evidently also consider this to be of central importance (this part is no longer covered in the quotation extract preserved in Tibetan). However, its examination of *jhāna* and insight are more closely related to a simile (found also in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version), which illustrates the predicament of not feeling inspired by the goal of cessation with the image of a weak man who attempts to swim across the river Ganges in high water.⁸⁷

MN I 435 The *Mahāmāluṇikya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel introduce the development of the *jhānas* by mentioning the detachment and mental seclusion that forms the precondition for *jhāna* development.⁸⁸

The *Madhyama-āgama* version precedes its exposition of the *jhānas* with another simile, not found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version. This simile describes a man who constructs a raft in order to cross a mountain river.⁸⁹ The implications of this image appear to be that detachment and mental seclusion are like gathering twigs and branches for the construction of a raft, attaining the *jhānas* corresponds to the raft itself, and the

⁸⁷ While MN 64 at MN I 435,23 refers to the “cessation of personality”, *sakkāyanirodha*, MĀ 205 at T I 779b28 speaks of “awakening, cessation, and Nirvāṇa”, 覺, 滅, 涅槃.

⁸⁸ MN 64 at MN I 435,28 and MĀ 205 at T I 779c16.

⁸⁹ MĀ 205 at T I 779c1. This image brings to mind the famous simile of the raft found in MN 22 at MN I 134,33 and its parallels MĀ 200 at T I 764b21 and EĀ 43.5 at T II 760a13.

subsequent development of insight would be equivalent to crossing the river with the help of this raft.

Table 7.3: Progression of Ideas in MN 64 and MĀ 205

MN 64	MĀ 205 (Abhidh-k-t only covers first five)
being overwhelmed by 5 fetters (1)	being overwhelmed by 5 fetters (→ 1)
not being overwhelmed by 5 fetters (2)	without path no eradication of 5 fetters (→ 3)
without path no eradication of 5 fetters (3)	simile of heartwood (→ 4)
simile of heartwood (4)	what is the path? (→ 6)
simile of swimming across Ganges (5)	not being overwhelmed by 5 fetters (→ 2)
what is the path? (6)	simile of swimming across Ganges (5)
<i>jhāna</i> and insight (7)	simile of raft to cross a stream <i>jhāna</i> and insight (→ 7)

The *Mahāmālurikya-sutta* presents the development of insight in regard to a *jhāna* attainment in detail, indicating that the *jhāna* experience should be analysed with the help of the scheme of the five aggregates and then contemplated from a variety of perspectives.⁹⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not employ the aggregate scheme. Instead, it directs the development of insight to contemplating the rise and fall of the *jhāna* experience.⁹¹ Both versions apply their respective development of insight to the four *jhānas* and to the first three of the four immaterial attainments.

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version envisages either full awakening or else non-return as a result of the insight developed in regard to each of these concentration attainments, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel speaks of either full awakening or else attaining a higher concentrative attainment in the series.⁹²

MN I 436

This presentation thus appears to imply that, if the attempt to reach awakening based on a lower concentrative attainment has not been successful, the meditator should de-

⁹⁰ MN 64 at MN I 435,34 instructs to contemplate each aggregate aspect of a *jhāna* as “impermanent, unsatisfactory, a disease, a tumour, an arrow, a calamity, an affliction, alien, disintegrating, empty, and not-self”, *aniccato dukkhatō rogatō gaṇḍatō sallatō aghatō abādhatō paratō palokatō suñnatō anattatō*.

⁹¹ MĀ 205 at T I 779c19: 興衰. When it comes to the attainment of nothingness, MĀ 205 at T I 780a18 depicts a more detailed development of insight. This more detailed exposition begins by taking up pleasant, painful, and neutral feelings. Since with the attainment of the sphere of nothingness pleasant and painful feelings have long been left behind, the instruction given here could be intended as a general statement applicable to all previously mentioned *jhāna* experiences. The development of insight described at this point instructs to contemplate the feelings of *jhāna* in terms of impermanence, rise and fall, dispassion, cessation, eradication, and abandoning, 觀此覺無常, 觀興衰, 觀無欲, 觀滅, 觀斷, 觀捨. Another difference between the two versions is that MN 64 at MN I 435,35, etc., instructs to turn the mind away from each *jhāna* or immaterial attainment and direct it to the deathless element, while MĀ 205 has a comparable treatment only at T I 780a21, in relation to the attainment of nothingness, whose insightful contemplation leads to not grasping at the world, which results in freedom from fear and in turn leads to realizing Nirvāṇa. MĀ 205 at T I 780a23 then illustrates such contemplation with the example of someone who cuts up a plantain tree without finding any heartwood in it.

⁹² MĀ 205 at T I 779c21: 必當昇進得止息處 (with a 聖 variant reading 上 instead of 止).

velop the next higher concentrative attainment and then use that as a basis for destroying the influxes.⁹³

MN I 437 According to both versions, Ānanda expressed his appreciation of the Buddha's exposition, followed by posing a question. In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the question he asked was why some monks were liberated by mind and others liberated through wisdom, to which the Buddha replied that this was due to differences in their faculties (*indriyavemattatā*).⁹⁴ In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the question was why only some monks quickly reach the highest attainment, to which the Buddha replied by relating this to their different dispositions.⁹⁵

MN 65 *Bhaddāli-sutta*

The *Bhaddāli-sutta*, the “discourse to Bhaddāli”, records the Buddha admonishing a monk who was unwilling to follow the regulation to eat only once a day. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and a partial parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.⁹⁶ Part of the instructions to eat only once a day have also been preserved in a Sanskrit fragment,⁹⁷ and a description of how Bhaddāli refused to follow these instructions can be found in the *Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya*.⁹⁸

MN I 437 The *Bhaddāli-sutta* and its parallels begin with the Buddha's instruction to the monks that they should partake of a single meal per day. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions report that the monk Bhaddāli publicly refused to follow this injunction, explaining that he would feel worried if he were to undertake such a practice.⁹⁹ The Pāli commentary explains that Bhaddāli was worried whether under such conditions he would be able to live as a monk for his whole life.¹⁰⁰ According to the

⁹³ Schmithausen 1981: 224 note 89.

⁹⁴ MN 64 at MN I 437,8: *kiñcarahi idh' ekacce bhikkhū cetovimuttino ekacce paññāvimuttino ti* (B^e-MN II 100,16, C^e-MN II 172,2, and S^e-MN II 162,6 have *bhikkhū* also after the second *ekacce*).

⁹⁵ MĀ 205 at T I 780b6+10: “but [why] do all monks not quickly attain the unsurpassable [goal]”, 然諸比丘不速得無上?, to which the Buddha replies: “people possess excellence in accordance to [their] past, [their respective] practice of the path is consequently refined [or] gross”, 人有勝如故, 修道便有精麤 (my rendering of this passage is based on taking 如故 to stand for *yathā-paurāṇam*, cf. Hira-kawa 1997: 349).

⁹⁶ The parallel is MĀ 194 at T I 746b-749b, while the partial parallel is EĀ 49.7 at T II 800b-801c. MĀ 194 and EĀ 49.7 agree with MN 65 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 194 also agrees with MN 65 on taking the protagonist of the discourse as its title, rendered as 跋陀和利, *bat da γwa li^h* (following Pulleyblank 1991: 27, 122, 188, and 314). EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c1 also employs a four-syllable rendering for the name of this monk, reading 跋提婆羅, *bat dej ba la* (following Pulleyblank 1991: 27, 203, 241, and 304). On MĀ 194 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 180-181.

⁹⁷ SHT II 559 (pp. 34-35), which has preserved counterparts to the instruction found in MN 65 at MN I 437,17.

⁹⁸ T 1425 at T XXII 359b11-20.

⁹⁹ MN 65 at MN I 437,27: *siyā kukkuccam siyā vippatisāro* (B^e-MN II 101,6, C^e-MN II 174,10, and S^e-MN II 163,13: *vippatisāro*), and MĀ 194 at T I 746b28: 懨惱心悔.

¹⁰⁰ Ps III 148,12.

Ekottarika-āgama version, however, he simply objected that by undertaking this practice he would become weak,¹⁰¹ and according to the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya* he told the Buddha that he would feel at ease only if he could eat morning and evening.¹⁰²

The parallel versions agree that Bhaddāli was not willing to settle for a compromise suggested by the Buddha, according to which he could take some food along from his meal and take that at a later time.¹⁰³ Bhaddāli kept up this recalcitrant attitude for the whole three-month period of the rains retreat, at the completion of which other monks (or else according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account Ānanda) prompted him to approach the Buddha and confess his transgression.¹⁰⁴

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions, the Buddha drew Bhaddāli's attention to the circumstance that, when he had refused to follow the Buddha's instruction, he had not taken into account that this refusal would become known among other monks and nuns, among the laity, and among other recluses and Brahmins residing in Sāvatthī.¹⁰⁵

MN I 438

The *Ekottarika-āgama* presentation differs, as it reports another event related to a different monk, paralleling events described in the *Laṭukikopama-sutta*.¹⁰⁶ Thus this *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse appears to conflate what in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* are two different occasions.¹⁰⁷ At a later point, the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse returns to the Bhaddāli incident, reporting that the Buddha gave him an exhortation in prose and in verse, in which he recommended the development of con-

¹⁰¹ EĀ 49.7 at T II 800b29: 氣力弱劣.

¹⁰² T 1425 at T XXII 359b14: 我朝暮食者乃得安樂, thus directly taking up the Buddha's suggestion that by eating only once the monks will feel at ease, T 1425 at T XXII 359b12: 汝等亦應一食 ... 得安樂住. This refusal reminds of how, according to MN 70 at MN I 474,2 and MĀ 195 at T I 749c27, another group of monks refused to follow the regulation on the proper time for partaking of food.

¹⁰³ MN 65 at MN I 438,1, MĀ 194 at T I 746c3, EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c4, and T 1425 at T XXII 359b17. According to MĀ 194 and T 1425, the Buddha repeated his instruction on taking a single meal three times, but Bhaddāli kept on refusing to follow suit.

¹⁰⁴ His confession and the subsequent events are not recorded in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*. For a study of the formula used for confession and the standard reply given by the Buddha in Pāli texts cf. Attwood 2008.

¹⁰⁵ MN 65 at MN I 438,33 also mentions that the Buddha himself would have been aware of the fact that Bhaddāli was not following the training, a circumstance not noted in MĀ 194.

¹⁰⁶ EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c7-801b16 narrates how on another occasion the monk Udayī had gone begging on a rainy night and so startled a pregnant woman that she had a miscarriage (cf. the similar story in MN 66 and MĀ 192). This accident caused people to criticize the Buddhist monks. On hearing this criticism, the Buddha called the monks together and recommended eating a single meal as a way of life that is conducive to the development of concentration and to insight into the four noble truths. This part of EĀ 49.7 concludes with the Buddha recommending some of the ascetic practices and praising Mahākassapa's conduct, after which EĀ 49.7 returns to the events concerning Bhaddāli, namely by reporting that Bhaddāli had not seen the Buddha for three months, followed by Ānanda's intervention and Bhaddāli's confession.

¹⁰⁷ That this is indeed a case of conflation becomes evident in EĀ 49.7 at T II 801c5, where a short sentence with an exhortation to develop contentment is addressed to Bhaddāli, 跋提婆羅, but ends by telling Upāli, 優波離, that he should train himself in this way.

tentment. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account, Bhaddāli thereon retired into seclusion for intensive practice and became an arahant.¹⁰⁸

MN I 439 The *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions instead contrast Bhaddāli's disobedience with the obedience of the seven types of noble disciple in regard to the Buddha's directives. The two versions illustrate the willingness of these noble disciples to follow the Buddha's instructions by describing that they would even lie down in the mud if asked to do so.¹⁰⁹

MN I 440 After accepting Bhaddāli's confession, according to both versions the Buddha described how a monk might retire into seclusion for intensive meditation without establishing the proper foundation for such secluded practice by fulfilling the training. The two versions agree that such a monk would be unable to reach any attainment due to being censured by his teacher, by his companions, by the gods, and by himself. The *Madhyama-āgama* version explains that, due to being censured by others, such a monk will be unable to arouse joy, which in turn prevents him from developing tranquillity, happiness, and concentration.¹¹⁰ Being without concentration, he will not be able to know and see things as they truly are.

The two versions contrast this case with a monk who, by observing the training rules and retiring into seclusion, is able to develop the four *jhānas* and the three higher knowledges. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version makes a point of highlighting that each of these attainments is the fruit of having fulfilled the training.¹¹¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version instead presents each *jhāna* as a higher state of mind that provides a pleasant abiding at present and is conducive to Nirvāṇa,¹¹² followed by introducing the three higher knowledges as realizations that arouse knowledge and eradicate ignorance.¹¹³

MN I 442 According to the *Bhaddāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, Bhaddāli inquired why only some monks were repeatedly admonished and dealt with by their companions. In reply, the Buddha took up the case of a monk who has committed several offences, explaining that the extent to which such a monk will be repeatedly admonished depends on whether he is obstinate and displays anger, instead of being submissive and obedient.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸ EĀ 49.7 at T II 801c10.

¹⁰⁹ While in MN 65 at MN I 439,26 the point is to lie in the mud as a plank for the Buddha (to walk over), *ehi me tvam bhikkhu panike saikamo hohī ti* (S^e-MN II 166,14: *hotī ti*), MĀ 194 at T I 747a28 speaks only of lying down in the mud, 來入泥, without indicating that this is done in order to become a plank for the Buddha.

¹¹⁰ MĀ 194 at T I 747c13.

¹¹¹ MN 65 at MN I 441,15: *yathā tam satthusāsane sikkhāya paripūrakārissa* (E^e actually reads *satthusāsane*, presumably a printing error, as elsewhere the same edition reads *satthusāsane*).

¹¹² MĀ 194 at T I 748a1: 增上心 ... 現法得安樂居 ... 令昇涅槃.

¹¹³ MĀ 194 at T I 748a25.

¹¹⁴ MĀ 194 at T I 748c1+13 differs from MN 65 at MN I 442,31 and MN I 443,10 by describing that the monk who prevaricates and displays anger says that he will act in such a way that it pleases the Saṅgha and meets with their approval, and he also has the intention to act in such a manner, 作如是說, 我今當作令眾歡喜而可意, 作如是意, while the monk who does not prevaricate and displays no anger

Both versions repeat the same explanation for the case of a monk who has committed only few offences,¹¹⁵ followed by comparing a monk who has but a small amount of faith to a man who has already lost one eye, due to which his friends and relatives will do what they can to protect him, so that he will not lose the other eye as well.¹¹⁶ Similarly, other monks will not admonish such a monk in order to avoid that this monk loses the little faith he has.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by reporting that Bhaddāli asked why formerly there were fewer rules and more monks were established in final knowledge, whereas at present there are many rules and only few monks are established in final knowledge.¹¹⁷

MN I 444

The corresponding question in the *Madhyama-āgama* version differs in that it does not take up the issue of being established in final knowledge. Instead, it contrasts earlier times, when many monks respectfully observed the relatively few rules, with present times, where there are many rules and only a smaller number of monks observe them respectfully.¹¹⁸ The two versions agree in attributing this development to the growth of the monastic community in various respects (see table 7.4).¹¹⁹

neither says that he will act nor wants to act in such a way that it pleases the Saṅgha and meets with their approval, 不如是說, 我今當作令眾歡喜而可意, 不作如是意. This appears to be a textual error, similar in type to the error noted above p. 346 note 29.

¹¹⁵ While MN 65 at MN I 443,22 gives this case in full, MĀ 194 at T I 748c22 has the same only in an abbreviated manner.

¹¹⁶ MN 65 at MN I 444,22 and MĀ 194 at T I 748c27.

¹¹⁷ MN 65 at MN I 444,36. Bhaddāli's question recurs as a question posed by Mahākassapa in SN 16:13 at SN II 224,2, in which case the parallel SĀ 906 at T II 226b28 contrasts the time of few rules and many monks, whose mind delighted in the practice, with the time of many rules and few monks delighting in the practice; cf. also SĀ² 121 at T II 419b18.

¹¹⁸ MĀ 194 at T I 749a10: "formerly, when few rules had been promulgated, many were the monks who observed and upheld [them] ... nowadays many rules have been promulgated, [yet] few are the monks who observe and uphold [them]", 昔日少施設戒, 多有比丘遵奉持者... 今日多施設戒, 少有比丘遵奉持者. Thus Bhaddāli's question in MĀ 194 appears less challenging than in MN 65. In fact, in MĀ 194 his attitude throughout is more respectful than in MN 65. While in MN 65 Bhaddāli simply poses his queries, according to MĀ 194 each time Bhaddāli gets up, arranges his robe over one shoulder and puts his hands together [in respect], before asking the Buddha a question, cf. MĀ 194 at T I 746b26, T I 746c11, T I 748b23, T I 749a9, and T I 749b5. The description of such respectful behaviour is a frequently recurring pericope in the *Madhyama-āgama*, however, so that its occurrence in the present context may not bear a particular relation to Bhaddāli's attitude.

¹¹⁹ While MN 65 at MN I 445,8 presents "things that are bases for the influxes", *āsavatthāniyā dhammā* (B^e-MN II 108,26 and S^e-MN II 175,4: *āsavatthāniyā*), as the reason for the promulgation of rules, MĀ 194 at T I 749a14 speaks repeatedly of 喜好法, literally "likeable things" (adopting the 聖 variant reading 喜 instead of 慶, a variation that would not affect the meaning of the phrase). Elsewhere in the *Madhyama-āgama*, e.g., in MĀ 194 at T I 748b15, influx is translated with 漏, a translation also used at the end of the present passage in MĀ 194 at T I 749a20. This makes it improbable that 喜好 could be a translation error, mistaking "influx", *āsava* or *āśravalāśrava*, for "enjoyment", *assāda* or *āsvada*. Could 喜好法 be a gloss by the translator(s) on the implication of an expression similar in meaning to *āsavatthāniyā dhammā*?

Table 7.4: Aspects of the Growth of the Saṅgha in MN 65 and its Parallel¹²⁰

MN 65	MĀ 194
greatness (1)	gains (→ 2)
highest gain (2)	great fame (→ 3)
highest fame (3)	renown (→ 5)
much learning (4)	great merit
renown (5)	much learning (→ 4) (≠ 1)

MN I 445 The *Bhaddāli-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel next turn to the simile of the horse, a simile already delivered by the Buddha on a former occasion, although at that time Bhaddāli did not pay proper attention.¹²¹ This simile describes the gradual training of a horse and compares a well-trained horse, worthy of a king, to a monk who possesses the ten path factors of one who is beyond training (*asekha*).¹²² They conclude with Bhaddāli's delight in the exposition he had received.

MN 66 *Latukikopama-sutta*¹²³

The *Latukikopama-sutta*, the “discourse on the simile of the quail”, highlights the importance of overcoming all fetters. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹²⁴

MN I 447 The protagonist of the *Latukikopama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel is a monk by the name of Udāyī,¹²⁵ who according to both versions approached the Buddha and expressed his appreciation of the Buddha's injunction to abstain from taking a meal

¹²⁰ MN 65 at MN I 445,14 and MĀ 194 at T I 749a13. Notably, an examination of the same topic in Vin III 9,35 has a somewhat different listing, comprising great seniority, great development, great gains, and great learning.

¹²¹ MN 65 at MN I 445,26 and MĀ 194 at T I 749b2. This simile recurs in MN 107 at MN III 2,3.

¹²² MĀ 194 at T I 749b22 differs from MN 65 at MN I 447,2 on the sequence of the ten path factors in as much as it has right knowledge as its last factor. For an examination of this type of difference cf. below p. 663.

¹²³ S^e-MN II 179,1 has the title *Latukikopama-sutta*.

¹²⁴ The parallel is MĀ 192 at T I 740c-744a, which has the title “discourse to Kāludāyī”, 加樓烏陀夷經, and which agrees with MN 66 on locating the discourse in Āpaṇa. On MĀ 192 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 65. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t cf. below note 144.

¹²⁵ The protagonist of MĀ 192 at T I 740c26 is 尊者烏陀夷, “venerable Udāyī”, further qualified in the title of the discourse to be “Kāludāyī”, 加樓烏陀夷. According to Th-a II 221,7, Kāludāyī was one of the ministers of the Buddha's father, sent by the latter to invite the recently awakened Buddha to Kapilavatthu, a mission during which Kāludāyī went forth and became an arahant, cf. also the account given in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 325,7 or in Senart 1890: 233,11, and again in Basak 1968/2004: 55,10 or in Senart 1897: 91,10. The Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 359b26, refers to the present discourse as the “discourse on Kāludāyī”, 優陀夷線經. Similarly, the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 662b17, and the Mahīśasaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 54a10, identify the protagonist of an event recorded in the present discourse as Udāyī “the dark”, thereby agreeing on his identity with MĀ 192.

during the afternoon or at night.¹²⁶ Udāyī contrasted his present appreciation with the discontent he experienced at the time when the Buddha had promulgated the regulation to abstain from eating in the afternoon, and when the Buddha later on also told the monks to refrain from partaking of food at night as well.¹²⁷

In both versions, Udāyī described various misfortunes met with by monks who went seeking for food at night. One of these misfortunes happened on a stormy night, when during a flash of lightning a woman suddenly saw a monk searching for alms and was thoroughly terrified, believing him to be an evil spirit.¹²⁸ The same event is recorded in

¹²⁶ A minor difference between the two versions is that, according to MĀ 192 at T I 741a4, the Buddha asked Udāyī if he felt satisfied and was not lacking anything, in reply to which Udāyī reported his present satisfaction, while according to MN 66 at MN I 448,3 Udāyī came out with his reflection without being prompted to do so by an inquiry by the Buddha. A passage similar to Udāyī's reflection in MN 66 at MN I 447,23 on how the Buddha had helped him to overcome unwholesome states occurs in fragment SHT I 186b (p. 105). A discourse quotation with Udāyī expressing his appreciation of the Buddha's instructions can be found in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 151b6.

¹²⁷ Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1270 note 671 points out that Vin IV 85,9, concerning *pācittiya* rule 37 on abstaining from taking food during the period from noon until next day's dawn, does not mention such a successive prohibition. Nor is such a successive prohibition mentioned in the account of the corresponding *pātayantika* rule 37 in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 662c8, rule 37 in the Kāśyapīya *Vinaya*, T 1460 at T XXIV 662c16, rule 36 in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 359c2 (T 1425 at T XXII 359b21 does report a successive prohibition, which, however, proceeds from the prohibition of begging at the wrong time to prohibiting the partaking of food at the wrong time), rule 38 in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 54a19, rule 37 in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 824c13, and rule 37 in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 95b14. The fact that such a successive prohibition is not mentioned in the various *Vinayas* need not contradict the *Latukikopama-sutta*'s presentation, since the promulgation of the *Vinaya* rule could have taken place after two successive instructions had been given earlier on abstaining from afternoon and evening meals. This much could be inferred from the fact that according to the Theravāda, (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda, and Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* accounts the group of seventeen, who according to these three *Vinayas* occasioned this rule, were rebuked by other monks for taking food at the "wrong time", *vikāla*/非時. The way this rebuke is formulated suggests that at the time of this event it was already customary for monks not to take food during time periods reckoned to be the "wrong time". According to the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* account, T 1442 at T XXIII 824c7, the group of seventeen (which Vin IV 128,27 and Vin IV 148,30 indicate to have been a group of young boys), admitted that they had partaken of food at the wrong time, explaining that they had done so because they had not received food before noon and therefore had been very hungry, so that when someone offered them food after noon they ate it. This suggests that the group of seventeen and the other monks were well aware of the fact that it was not appropriate to partake of food at such a time, but the group of seventeen had evidently not taken this regulation seriously enough. Thus, perhaps at first there was simply an informal injunction to stop eating at certain times, as reported in the *Latukikopama-sutta*, and when some monks nevertheless ate at what by then had become 'the wrong time', a formal *Vinaya* regulation addressing the issue was promulgated; cf. also Voyce 1983: 311-312. By presenting eating at the wrong time as a *pācittiya* or *pātayantika* offence, the *Vinaya* regulation also indicates that eating at the wrong time should be considered a more serious offence than other aspects of conduct, such as those covered in the *sekhiya* or *śaikṣa* rules. Prasad 1972a: 122 notes that partaking of food at night was also not allowable for Jain monastics.

¹²⁸ While MĀ 192 at T I 741b9 does not identify this monk and refers to him simply as "a monk", 一比丘, according to MN 66 at MN I 448,33 this monk was Udāyī himself.

an *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse and in the Dharmaguptaka and Mahīśāsaka *Vinayas*, which indicate that the woman had been pregnant and lost her child due to the fright she experienced.¹²⁹

According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version's presentation, it was this woman's misfortune that motivated the Buddha to promulgate the regulation about taking only a single meal per day.¹³⁰ In the Dharmaguptaka and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinayas*, however, the present event caused the Buddha to promulgate a rule on abstaining from eating at the wrong time, a regulation that could be observed without needing to take only a single meal.¹³¹

The Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya* does not associate the story of the frightened woman to a ruling on partaking of food only once or only at the right time, but rather presents the same event as the reason for the Buddha to lay down a regulation about not going begging at the wrong time.¹³² Although the present accident also has a bearing on regulations about the time of partaking food, the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya* seems to offer the most straightforward reaction to this particular event, since it was the nocturnal alms round that had caused the woman's fright.

MN I 449 According to the *Latukikopama-sutta*, the frightened woman made a rather cryptic remark, exclaiming that the mother and father of this monk have died.¹³³ As it stands in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, this remark is not easily intelligible. According to the commentary, the intended meaning is that, had the monk's parents been still alive, he would not need to go in search for food during the night.¹³⁴

In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the reference to the monk's parents comes as part of a set of curses spoken by the frightened woman, in which she expresses her anger by wishing that the life of this monk may come to an end, that his mother and father may pass away, and that his whole clan may meet with destruction.¹³⁵ Thus, from the per-

¹²⁹ EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c14, T 1428 at T XXII 662b20, and T 1421 at T XXII 54a11. EĀ 49.7 at T II 800c11 identifies this monk as Kāludāyī, 迦留陀夷, and explains that it was his dark skin colour that had made the woman mistake him for an evil spirit. Another occurrence of the motif of a monk frightening a pregnant woman and thereby causing an abortion, can be found in the 佛說三摩渴經, T 129 at T II 845a8 (cf. also Lévi 1916: 264 or Strong 1979: 74).

¹³⁰ EĀ 49.7 at T II 801a12: 一坐而食, preceded by explaining that the practice of taking only a single meal had been undertaken by Buddhas and their disciples of the past and will be undertaken by Buddhas and their disciples of the future, being a form of practice conducive to concentration and insight into the four noble truths. According to EĀ 49.7 at T II 801a23, the Buddha had not yet pronounced this regulation, as he was awaiting a suitable occasion to do so, such as the present accident.

¹³¹ T 1428 at T XXII 662c8 and T 1421 at T XXII 54a19.

¹³² T 1425 at T XXII 359b25.

¹³³ MN 66 at MN I 449,1: *bhikkhussa ātu māri*, *bhikkhussa mātu māri* (B^e-MN II 112,20: *mārī*). Trenckner 1888/1993: 567 comments that "the text no doubt purports to make the woman speak a sort of patois". Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 552 renders this passage as "a bhikkhu whose ma's died and whose pa's died", with Bodhi in ibid. p. 1270 note 672 explaining that "the utterance is in what appears to be a very colloquial Pali".

¹³⁴ Ps III 165,6.

¹³⁵ MĀ 192 at T I 741b16. According to MN 66 at MN I 449,2 and MĀ 192 at T I 741b18, the woman also

spective of the *Madhyama-āgama* account, the reference to the death of the monk's parents was part of a curse spoken by the frightened woman, a presentation that seems to fit the context well.

The *Latukikopama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by examining the case of those who are not willing to follow the Buddha's instructions. While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version turns to this theme in a somewhat abrupt manner, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse offers a transition to the same topic. According to its account, the Buddha at first praised Udāyi and then contrasted him with foolish monks who are unwilling to follow the regulations promulgated by the Buddha.¹³⁶

The absence of such a transition in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version could be a case of textual loss, as the passage on those who are not willing to follow the Buddha's injunctions begins with the phrase "in the same way".¹³⁷ In other discourses, this phrase has the function of connecting a passage to something said earlier, but in the present case the same phrase hangs somewhat in the air, as it does not really refer to anything said earlier. Thus, an earlier version of the *Latukikopama-sutta* might have had a transition similar to what is still found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, a transition that might then have been lost at some point during the transmission of the discourse.

In both versions, those who do not follow the Buddha's injunction assume his instruction to be concerned with a mere trifle. Yet, such a mere trifle can in turn become a strong form of bondage, which the *Latukikopama-sutta* compares to a quail tethered by a rotting creeper, while the *Madhyama-āgama* version compares it to a fly caught in a drop of saliva and unable to extricate itself.¹³⁸

The two versions contrast these disobedient disciples with those who follow the Buddha's instruction and abandon what he asks them to abandon, comparable to a strong royal elephant that is able to break even strong thongs. A minor difference between the two versions is that whereas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version those willing to implement the Buddha's instruction still consider the matter in question to be a mere trifle,¹³⁹ according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version even such a consideration does not occur to them.¹⁴⁰

The *Latukikopama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue with another simile that illustrates the bondage of someone unwilling to follow the Buddha's instructions with the example of a poor man in wretched living conditions. Although inspired to go forth on seeing a monk seated in meditation, this poor man is nevertheless

MN I 450

suggested that it would be better for the begging monk to cut up his own belly instead of searching for alms in this way.

¹³⁶ MĀ 192 at T I 741b24. On monks unwilling to follow the regulations promulgated by the Buddha cf. also Dhirasekera 1970.

¹³⁷ MN 66 at MN I 449,10: *evam eva*. This forms the beginning of a passage of the discourse spoken by the Buddha and is preceded by a section spoken by Udāyi.

¹³⁸ MN 66 at MN I 449,16 and MĀ 192 at T I 741c2.

¹³⁹ MN 66 at MN I 450,1: *te evam āhaṁsu, kiñ pan' imassa appamattakassa oramattakassa pahātabbasā?*

¹⁴⁰ MĀ 192 at T I 741c16: "they do not speak like this: 'this is a trifling matter'", 彼不作是說, 此是小事.

so attached to his meagre belongings that he is unable to abandon them. The two versions illustrate the complementary case of those who obey the Buddha's instruction by depicting a rich person who, similarly inspired to go forth on seeing a monk seated in meditation, indeed abandons all his wealth and goes forth.

MN I 453 The *Latukikopama-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by taking up four cases for closer examination:

- one who tolerates thoughts related to belongings or sensuality,
- one who dispels them,
- one in whom they arise due to temporary absent-mindedness, but who then quickly abandons them,
- one who is liberated.¹⁴¹

The two versions agree that the first three are still in bondage, whereas the fourth is free from bondage.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version reports that the Buddha reckoned them in this way because he knew the “diversity of faculties” in each case.¹⁴² According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, however, the Buddha reckoned the first three types to be still in bondage because any fetter is unwholesome,¹⁴³ whereas the fourth type can be reckoned as free from bondage, since all fetters have been eradicated.

The *Madhyama-āgama* presentation thereby indicates that the purpose of bringing in the four types of person is to highlight again the unwholesome nature of any fetter, whether weak or strong. That is, although there is a difference between the three persons in how they deal with the arising of unwholesomeness in their minds, yet, all three are still in bondage to the fetters. This indication ties in with the theme of weak and strong fetters, a theme of central relevance throughout the two versions.

MN I 454 The *Latukikopama-sutta* and its parallel continue by contrasting ignoble types of pleasure with recommendable types of pleasure. The ignoble pleasures that should better be avoided are sensual pleasures, while the type of pleasures that should be developed are the pleasures of *jhāna*. Both versions take up the mental factor(s) of a particular *jhāna* that need(s) to be overcome in order to proceed to the next *jhāna*, until with the fourth *jhāna* imperturbability has been reached.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ MN 66 at MN I 453,5 and MĀ 192 at T I 742c22. Both compare the third case to the evaporation of a few drops of water that fall on red-hot metal.

¹⁴² MN 66 at MN I 453,12: *indriyavemattatā*. A reference to such “diversity of faculties” recurs in MN 64 at MN I 437,10 as the reason for distinguishing between liberation of the mind and liberation by wisdom. Two other occurrences are SN 48:13 at SN V 200,29 and SN 48:16 at SN V 201,29, according to which due to “diversity of faculties”, *indriyavemattatā*, there will be “diversity of fruits”, *phalavemattatā*. Their parallel SĀ 653 at T II 183b12, however, speaks in the same context of “perfection of faculties”, 根波羅蜜, leading to “perfection of fruits”, 果波羅蜜, which suggests that its original may have read *pāramitā*, instead of *vemattatā* or *vaimātratā*. The “diversity of faculties”, *indriyavemattatā*, recurs again in Pet 30,24 to distinguish different types of stream-entrant, and in Vism 710,4 to distinguish different types of non-returner.

¹⁴³ MĀ 192 at T I 742c25: “all fetters are unwholesome”, 諸結不善.

¹⁴⁴ MN 66 at MN I 455,3 and MĀ 192 at T I 743b13. A discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-t at D (4094)

Highlighting the need to go beyond even the subtlest fetter, the two versions clarify that each of the four *jhānas* needs to be abandoned and transcended. This process of transcendence takes place by attaining the next *jhāna* in the series, followed by each of the four immaterial attainments. The *Latukikopama-sutta* stands alone in culminating this description of successive stages of transcendence with the attainment of the cessation of perceptions and feelings.¹⁴⁵ MN I 455

MN 67 *Cātumā-sutta*

The *Cātumā-sutta*, the “discourse at Cātumā”, relates how the Buddha took a noisy group of monks to task. This discourse has a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama* and another parallel in an individual translation.¹⁴⁶ The later part of the *Cātumā-sutta*, which examines four types of danger to the monastic life, recurs as a discourse on its own in the *Anuttara-nikāya*.¹⁴⁷

The *Cātumā-sutta* and its Chinese parallels report that a large group of monks, led by Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna, had come to visit the Buddha. On arrival, these monks created a lot of noise. According to the Pāli version, the Buddha asked Ānanda to summon the monks to his presence and, when they had come, told them that they should leave.¹⁴⁸ The two Chinese discourses report that the Buddha did not even call the monks to his presence, but simply told Ānanda that these monks should not be allowed to stay.¹⁴⁹

The three versions agree that a group of Sakyans and Brahmā intervened on behalf of the monks. According to the *Cātumā-sutta*, the Sakyans delivered two similes in order to reconcile the Buddha with the monks, after which Brahmā Sahampati delivered the same two similes.¹⁵⁰ These two similes use the image of a seed in need of water and of a calf longing for its mother to illustrate the need these newly ordained monks had of

MN I 456

MN I 457

mngon pa, ju 199b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 227b4 parallels the present examination of the four *jhānas*; cf. also Abhidh-k 3:101 in Pradhan 1967: 190,23, paralleling MN 66 at MN I 455,3, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 67a7 and T 1559 at T XXIX 224c20. Another quote relevant to the present context occurs in Abhidh-k 4:46 in Pradhan 1967: 227,15, paralleling MN 66 at MN I 454,28, with its Chinese counterparts in T 1558 at T XXIX 81a8 and T 1559 at T XXIX 237a26; cf. also the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 234a27, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1488.

¹⁴⁵ MN 66 at MN I 456,5.

¹⁴⁶ The parallels are EĀ 45.2 at T II 770c-771c and T 137 at T II 860a-861a, which appear to agree with MN 67 on the location. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 137 was translated by Kāng Mèngxiáng (康孟詳), although Nattier 2008: 103 does not include T 137 among the translations that can safely be attributed to him. T 137 has the title “discourse on Sāriputta and Moggallāna dwelling at Cātumā”, 舍利弗摩訶目連遊四衢經. A reference to the present discourse can be found in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 242c1, translated in Lamotte 1970a: 1575.

¹⁴⁷ AN 4:122 at AN II 123,13.

¹⁴⁸ MN 67 at MN I 457,10.

¹⁴⁹ EĀ 45.2 at T II 770c23 and T 137 at T II 860b3.

¹⁵⁰ MN 67 at MN I 457,34 and MN I 458,25.

being in the presence of the Buddha. The same two similes recur in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, with the difference that according to its report the Sakyans came out only with the simile of the seed in need of water, while the simile of the calf longing for its mother was spoken only by Brahmā (see table 7.5).¹⁵¹ Since in the *Cātumā-sutta* the Sakyans had already delivered both similes, in this version Brahmā's intervention just involves repeating what had already been said.

Table 7.5: Similes in MN 67 and EĀ 45.2

MN 67	EĀ 45.2
Sakyans: seedlings need water (1)	Sakyans: seedlings need water (→ 1)
Sakyans: calf needs mother (2)	Brahmā: calf needs mother (→ 4)
Brahmā: seedlings need water (3)	(# 2-3)
Brahmā: calf needs mother (4)	

According to another Pāli discourse, found in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, Brahmā Sahampati had delivered both of these two similes on what appears to be another occasion when the Buddha had dismissed a group of monks.¹⁵² In this *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse, the two similes had already occurred to the Buddha on his own while he was reflecting in solitude, before Brahmā came and spoke them.¹⁵³ Hence in this case, similar to the presentation in the *Cātumā-sutta*, Brahmā Sahampati's function is merely to repeat the two similes. A parallel to this *Samyutta-nikāya* discourse in the *Samyukta-agama*, however, does not record that either the Buddha or Brahmā thought of or spoke any of these two similes.¹⁵⁴

MN I 459 The *Cātumā-sutta* continues by reporting that Mahāmoggallāna informed the company of monks that the Sakyans and Brahmā Sahampati had succeeded in convincing the Buddha to let the monks come back.¹⁵⁵ The Pāli commentary explains that Mahāmoggallāna had witnessed Brahmā Sahampati's intervention with his divine eye and

¹⁵¹ EĀ 45.2 at T II 771a8+17. T 137 at T II 860b28 only reports a simile delivered by the Sakyans, which describes a strong water flow that is not obstructed or checked.

¹⁵² SN 22:80 at SN III 92,7+12. SN 22:80 differs from MN 67 not only in regard to the location, but also does not mention Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna. It, moreover, proceeds quite differently after Brahmā's intervention, giving the impression that SN 22:80 and MN 67 record different events. Yet another occasion when the Buddha dismissed noisy monks from his presence is recorded in Ud 3:3 at Ud 25,11. In this case, the dismissal spurred the monks to make an effort and practise seriously in seclusion, with the result that they all attained the three higher knowledges.

¹⁵³ Since according to SN 22:80 these two similes occurred to the Buddha while being in seclusion, from the perspective of this discourse he might have been remembering them from the time when he first came across them in relation to the events depicted in MN 67. In this case, the events described in MN 67 would precede the episode described in SN 22:80. According to an explanation given in Mil 210,7, however, these two similes were not new to the Buddha even when they were delivered for the first time, since due to his omniscience he knew them already.

¹⁵⁴ SĀ 272 at T II 71c22.

¹⁵⁵ MN 67 at MN I 459,5.

through his telepathic knowledge had come to know that the intervention had been successful.¹⁵⁶ The individual translation similarly indicates that Mahāmoggallāna had become aware of the turn of events through his divine eye.¹⁵⁷ According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* report, however, the Buddha just looked at Ānanda, who understood what this meant and straightaway went to inform Sāriputta that the monks were allowed to return.¹⁵⁸

The *Cātumā-sutta* and its Chinese parallels record that once Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna had returned, the Buddha asked them to relate what they had thought when he dismissed the monks. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* accounts, while Sāriputta wanted to follow the Buddha's example and remain inactive, Mahāmoggallāna had been conscious of the need to look after the other monks. The *Cātumā-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel agree that the Buddha censured Sāriputta and praised Mahāmoggallāna.¹⁵⁹

The *Cātumā-sutta* continues with an exposition on four types of danger to be expected for a monk gone forth, an exposition that recurs in similar terms as a discourse in the *Ānguttara-nikāya*.¹⁶⁰ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version instead continues by contrasting nine qualities conducive to decline with nine qualities that will lead to growth,¹⁶¹ followed by a set of stanzas on the need to overcome birth, old age, and death through right conduct and diligence.

While the *Cātumā-sutta* simply concludes with the delight of the listening monks, according to the conclusion of the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, with the delivery of this

¹⁵⁶ Ps III 175,21.

¹⁵⁷ T 137 at T II 860c8.

¹⁵⁸ EĀ 45.2 at T II 771a20. A similar situation is described in MN 85 at MN II 92,32, where the Buddha also just looks at Ānanda and the latter understands and immediately takes action.

¹⁵⁹ MN 67 at MN I 459,19: "wait, Sāriputta, wait, Sāriputta, you should not let such a state of mind arise again", *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *na kho te*, *sāriputta*, *puna pi evarūpam cittam uppādetabban ti* (the later part of this sentence is completely absent from the Burmese edition at B^e-M II 122,19, which only reads *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *dīthadhammasukhavihāran ti*, C^e-M II 210,10 combines these two versions, reading: *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *āgamehi tvam*, *sāriputta*, *dīthadhammasukhavihāran ti*, *na kho te*, *sāriputta*, *puna pi evarūpam cittam uppādetabban ti*). EĀ 45.2 at T II 771b6: "don't arouse such thoughts", 莫生此念. The individual translation seems to reverse the role of the two monks, since according to T 137 at T II 860c20+28 the Buddha praised Sāriputta and advised Mahāmoggallāna against the type of thoughts he had been entertaining on this occasion.

¹⁶⁰ A minor difference between the two Pāli versions is that when describing a monk who goes out beginning, according to MN 67 at MN I 461,25 and MN I 462,7 this monk does not guard his body and his speech, whereas according to AN 4:122 at AN II 125,14 and AN II 126,1 he also does not guard his mind, *arakkhitenā cittena*. Since the problem taken up in both versions is that the monk's mind was overwhelmed by sensual desire, the presentation in AN 4:122 seems to fit the present context particularly well.

¹⁶¹ EĀ 45.2 at T II 771b19. The nine things leading to growth are frequenting good friends, practising proper conduct, enjoying seclusion, being free from illness, having few possessions, being without attachment in regard to requisites, being energetic, understanding the meaning of what one hears, and being keen on listening to the Dharma.

discourse over sixty monks became arahants.¹⁶² The individual translation also records that sixty monks became arahants, adding that numberless monks attained stream-entry at the conclusion of the discourse as well. The individual translation differs from the *Ekottarika-āgama* version in as much as, according to its account, all that was required for leading the monks to realization was a single stanza spoken by the Buddha.¹⁶³

MN 68 *Nālakapāna-sutta*

The *Nālakapāna-sutta*, the “discourse at Nālakapāna”, takes up the following three topics:

- the importance of delighting in the holy life,
- the reasons why the Buddha still engages in restraint,
- the inspiration that arises from hearing about the attainments reached by others.

This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁶⁴

MN I 463 The *Nālakapāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin by relating that the Buddha inquired whether Anuruddha and other monk disciples, who apparently had recently gone forth, were delighting in the holy life.¹⁶⁵ Both versions clarify that Anuruddha and his companions delighted in the holy life and that they had not gone forth due to outer constraints, but in order to win liberation from *dukkha*.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² EĀ 45.2 at T II 771c15.

¹⁶³ T 137 at T II 861a2: “use faith to cross the flood, with diligence as boat, the noble truth relieves [one] from the misery of *dukkha*, wisdom is the ultimate crossing over”, 以信渡流氾, 無放逸為船, 聖諦濟苦患, 智慧究竟渡. This stanza reminds of a stanza found in the *Ālavaka-sutta*, SN 10:12 at SN I 214,26 (= Sn 1:10 at Sn 184), according to which “by faith one crosses the flood, by diligence the sea, through energy one overcomes *dukkha*, through wisdom one is purified”, *saddhāya tarati ogham*, *appamādena aṇṇavam*, *viriyena dukkham acceti*, *paññāya parisujjhati* (SN² 246 at SN² I 462,11: *taratī*, B^e-SN I 217,2: *vīriyena*, C^e-SN I 382,9: *dukkham*).

¹⁶⁴ The parallel is MĀ 77 at T I 544b-546c and has the title “discourse on three clansmen at Sāketa”, 婆雞帝三族姓子經. While MN 68 takes place at Nālakapāna (for a tale related to this location cf. Jā 20 at Jā I 170-172), MĀ 77 takes place at 婆雞帝, which Anesaki 1908: 47, Minh Chau 1964/1991: 340, and the 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition p. 641 note 5 identify with Sāketa. Notably, MĀ 9 at T I 431a5 renders the same Sāketa with the slightly different 婆雞帝 (Akanuma 1930/1994: 558 lists 婆雞帝 and 婆雞帝 as alternative renderings of Sāketa). Such variations are not unusual in the case of less known proper names, cf. also Meisig 1990: 84.

¹⁶⁵ The Pāli editions show some variations in their respective listings of the monks that were present together with Anuruddha during the delivery of this discourse. E^e-MN I 462,26 lists Anuruddha, Nandiya, Kimbila, Bhagu, Kuṇḍadhbāna, Revata, and Ānanda; B^e-MN II 125,22 lists Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Kimila, Bhagu, Konḍañña, Revata, and Ānanda; C^e-MN II 216,4 lists Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Kimbila, Bhagu, Kuṇḍadhbāna, Revata, and Ānanda; and S^e-MN II 203,5 lists Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Kimbila, Bhagu, Konḍañña, Revata, and Ānanda. Vin II 182,25 reports that Bhaddiya, Bhagu, Kim(b)ila, and Ānanda went forth at the same time as Anuruddha, which would fit their inclusion in the present context. According to MĀ 77 at T I 544b24, however, Anuruddha was only in the company of Nandiya and Kimbila, the two monks who in other discourses also stay with him, cf., e.g., MN 31 at MN I 205,17, MN 128 at MN III 155,14, MĀ 72 at T I 536a19, MĀ 185 at T I 729c4, and EĀ 24.8 at T II 629a15.

¹⁶⁶ MĀ 77 at T I 544c11 differs from MN 68 at MN I 463,16 in that according to its report the Buddha

According to the *Nalakapāna-sutta*, the Buddha explained to Anuruddha and his companions that, after going forth, they should develop non-sensual pleasure (by attaining *jhāna*), in order to be no longer overpowered by unwholesome states of mind. The *Madhyama-āgama* version introduces the same topic as an exposition on the causes for obtaining innumerable wholesome qualities,¹⁶⁷ adding to the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation that the experience of non-sensual pleasure will also enable them to patiently bear hunger and thirst, cold and heat, insect bites, evil words, and bodily pains.

The *Nalakapāna-sutta* continues by reporting that the Buddha asked Anuruddha and his companions if they thought that the Buddha practised restraint because he had not yet eradicated the influxes, which Anuruddha denied.¹⁶⁸ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, the Buddha asked Anuruddha what he thought to be the reason why the Buddha engaged in restraint, in reply to which Anuruddha asked the Buddha to elaborate. The Buddha then explained that although he had completely eradicated the influxes, he nevertheless undertook such practices because of the existence of the body, of the six sense-spheres, and of the life faculty.¹⁶⁹

In regard to this difference between the *Nalakapāna-sutta* and its parallel, the question asked by the Buddha in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version strikes an unexpected note. It is not clear why the newly ordained Anuruddha and his companions should be having any doubt about the Buddha's awakening. Thus, for the Buddha to ask if they had such thoughts comes unexpected. In contrast, the *Madhyama-āgama* version's presentation reads more natural, as it simply explains why even those who have reached the goal still practise restraint, without insinuating that Anuruddha and his companions could have been in doubt about the Buddha's successful destruction of the influxes.

Another puzzling aspect of the present passage occurs in regard to the Buddha's practice of restraint. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions agree that he undertook the practice of "removing".¹⁷⁰ According to the explanation of this practice in the *Sabbasava-sutta* and its parallel, "removing" refers to removing arisen thoughts of sensual desire, ill will, and cruelty.¹⁷¹ Since being a Buddha implies that

specified that Anuruddha and his companions had gone forth against the wish of their weeping parents. A similar specification in relation to the Buddha's going forth occurs in several other discourses, cf., e.g., MN 26 at MN I 163,29 and its parallel MĀ 204 at T I 776b3, although the Pāli discourses appear to use this description only in relation to the Buddha, not in relation to other monks.

¹⁶⁷ MĀ 77 at T I 544c20: 得無量善法.

¹⁶⁸ MN 68 at MN I 464,11.

¹⁶⁹ MĀ 77 at T I 545a20: 因此身故, 因六處故, 因壽命故. A similar expression occurs in MN 121 at MN III 108,27 in relation to the type of inevitable disturbance that will still be present after all mental disturbances have been overcome by destroying the influxes.

¹⁷⁰ According to MN 68 at MN I 464,14, the Buddha undertook the practices of "using", *patisevana*, "enduring", *adhibhāsana*, "avoiding", *parivajjana*, and "removing", *vinodana*; according to MĀ 77 at T I 545a11 he undertook the practices of "removing", 除, "using", 用, "enduring", 堪, "stopping", 止, and "throwing up" or "vomiting", 吐.

¹⁷¹ MN 2 at MN I 11,10 and MĀ 10 at T I 432c13. This explanation recurs in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*'s commentary on the corresponding passage in the *Saṅgīti-sūtra*, T 1536 at T XXVI 394c28.

one has overcome all unwholesome states of mind, the Buddha should not experience such thoughts in the first place, so that a need to remove them should not arise at all. Thus, when considered from the perspective of the *Sabbasava-sutta*, for the fully awakened Buddha to be engaging in “removing” fails to make sense, as he should not have any thought that need to be removed. Perhaps at an early stage during their transmission, both versions were influenced by occurrences of listings found elsewhere in the discourses that cover the same set of four, whereby a reference to “removing” became part of the present passage as well, even though this does not fit the context.¹⁷²

The *Madhyama-āgama* version continues by explaining that the Buddha’s reason for living in seclusion was not to attain what he had not attained. Rather, he lived in seclusion because it was a pleasant abiding for himself and out of concern for others. The *Nālakapāna-sutta* does not broach the topic of the Buddha’s delight in solitude and retreat, although the same reasoning for the Buddha’s secluded life style recurs in other Pāli discourses in a similar formulation.¹⁷³

When compared to these Pāli passages, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse can be seen to offer an additional explanation on the second of the two reasons for the Buddha’s secluded life style, his concern for others. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, the Buddha’s undertook a secluded life style in order to set an example for others to emulate.¹⁷⁴

The two versions explain that the Buddha did not declare the type of rebirth of a deceased disciple out of any mean motivation, but rather to inspire other disciples.¹⁷⁵ The *Nālakapāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel describe in similar terms how a monk will be inspired when he hears that another monk, who has passed away, had attained any of the four levels of awakening.

Both versions apply the same treatment to the case of a nun who hears about the attainments of another nun, and to the cases of male or female lay disciples who hear about

¹⁷² The set of four practices found in MN 68 and MĀ 77 recurs in DN 33 at DN III 224,20 and at DN III 270,2 (= DN 34 at DN III 291,5), cf. also the reconstructed Sanskrit counterpart in Stache-Rosen 1968: 102, other occurrences are AN 9:2 at AN IV 354,6 and AN 10:20 at AN V 30,27.

¹⁷³ MN 4 at MN I 23,32 and AN 2:3 at AN I 60,30.

¹⁷⁴ MĀ 77 at T I 545b9: “out of compassion for later generations, so that later generations may follow [the example] of the Tathāgata and [similarly] stay in secluded places”, 為慈愍後生人故, 或有後生人效如來住無事處.

¹⁷⁵ Mabbett 2001: 127-128 comments that in the present instance the Buddha seems to be “on the defensive; after declaring the rebirth states of deceased disciples, he had to explain that this was done not for the sake of his reputation ... no doubt criticism of such practices had been received”. A minor but noteworthy difference in this passage is that MN 68 at MN I 465,8 depicts the inspiration that a son of a good family, *kulaputta*, will obtain on hearing such reports, whereas its parallel MĀ 77 at T I 545b23 describes the same for sons and daughters of good families, 族姓男, 族姓女. This appears to be a recurring difference between the two collections, as MĀ 27 at T I 458a28 uses the same expression in regard to the practice of the four *brahmavihāras*, where its parallel MN 97 at MN II 195,3 instead speaks of “a monk”, and MĀ 180 at T I 722a22 speaks of sons and daughters of good families in the context of giving a gift, while its parallel MN 142 at MN III 255,29 does not specify the nature of the person who gives a gift; cf. also Skilling 2000a: 66-67.

other male or female lay disciples that have attained any of the three lower stages of awakening.¹⁷⁶

MN 69 *Gulissāni-sutta*

The *Gulissāni-sutta*, the “discourse to Gulissāni”, records an instruction by Sāriputta on proper behaviour for a forest monk who visits a monastic community. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁷⁷

The *Gulissāni-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel relate that the forest dweller Gulissāni, a monk of lax behaviour, had come to visit the monastic community.¹⁷⁸ The

MN I 469

¹⁷⁶ MN 68 at MN I 467,7+32 and MĀ 77 at T I 546b6 and T I 546c2 agree on mentioning only the three lower levels of awakening in relation to male and female lay followers. This presentation does not imply, as assumed by Hwang 2006: 34, that “the state of non-return is the maximum achievement for lay people, and only monks or nuns can achieve sainthood”; cf. also, e.g., Dutt 1957: 145 and Lamotte 1952: 388 or id. 1959: 42. As Bodhi in Nānamoli 1995/2005: 1273 note 691 explains, “though early Buddhism recognises the possibility of lay persons attaining arahantship, in all such cases attested to in the Nikāyas, they do so either when on the verge of death or just before requesting admission into the Sangha”. A case in point would be Yasa, who according to Vin I 17,3 became an arahant while still a layman, and thereon requested ordination. The same is also reported in several biographies of the Buddha, T 189 at T III 645b11, T 190 at T III 818c15, and T 191 at T III 955a16, in the Mahīśasaka Vinaya, T 1421 at T XXII 105b28, and in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1450 at T XXIV 129b8, whereas according to the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428 at T XXII 789c6, he went forth after having attained stream-entry, and as a monk then became an arahant, T 1428 at T XXII 790a1. That is, although a layman or a laywoman can attain full awakening, once that has happened they will no longer live a household life but will go forth, since to live the life of a monk or a nun is a natural expression of their attainment. The assumption by Bluck 2002: 10, Harvey 1990: 218, Samuels 1999: 238, Schumann 1982/1999: 217, and Somaratne 2009: 153 that AN 6.119-120 at AN III 450-451 proves the existence of lay arahants does not seem to be correct, as these discourses only indicate that several householders had reached some level of awakening, not necessarily the highest, in fact AN 6.44 at AN III 348,3+5 reports that the two householders Purāṇa and Isidatta mentioned in the listing in AN 6.120 at AN III 451,13 passed away as once-returners. Anāthapindika is also mentioned in AN 6.120 at AN III 451,8, yet he could not have been an arahant, since his rebirth in a heavenly realm is reported in MN 143 at MN III 262,1, SĀ 593 at T II 158b25, SĀ² 187 at T II 441c12, and EĀ 51.8 at T II 820a16; cf. also below p. 824.

¹⁷⁷ The parallel is MĀ 26 at T I 454c-456a. MĀ 26 agrees with MN 69 on taking the name of the monk in relation to whom the discourse was spoken as its title,瞿尼師經, and on locating the discourse in the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground by Rājagaha. The Pāli editions show some variations in regard to the name of this monk. While E^e-MN I 469,3 and C^e-MN II 228,3 introduce him as Gulissāni, B^e-MN II 133,5 gives his name as Goliyāni, and S^e-MN II 214,3 as Golissāni. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 173-175 offers a comparison of the aspects of conduct listed in MN 69 and in MĀ 26; cf. also Watanabe 1983/1996: 25. De Jong 1988: 12 notes that the present discourse is referred to in the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1435 at T XXIII 301a27, as:瞿尼沙修多羅, which he reconstructs as *Goniṣādasūtra*. A presentation that in some respects has affinities with sections of the *Gulissāni-sutta*, although being much shorter and without a comparable narrative framework (the discourse is in fact spoken by the Buddha), can be found in EĀ 20.8 at T II 600b18. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k- cf. below note 184.

¹⁷⁸ The 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition p. 189 note 1 draws attention to the circumstance that MĀ 26 uses throughout the expression “no thing”,無事, to render “forest dweller”, *araññaka* or *aranyaka*, yet the

Madhyama-āgama version notes that Gulissāni was arrogant and restless, with a mind like a monkey.¹⁷⁹

Sāriputta was seated with a group of monks and, on seeing from afar that Gulissāni was approaching them, he took up the opportunity to address the monks on how a visiting forest dweller should behave in order to avoid censure.

The theme of the proper conduct to be adopted by a visiting monk is presented in the two versions with several differences (see table 7.6). The *Gulissāni-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel agree, however, on the following requirements that a visiting monk should fulfil:

- be respectful,
- behave appropriately in regard to seats,¹⁸⁰
- not enter the village too early or return too late,
- not be arrogant or agitated,¹⁸¹
- not engage in loose talk,¹⁸²
- keep the senses restrained,
- know moderation with food,
- be energetic,
- be mindful,
- apply himself to the higher doctrine and discipline,¹⁸³

preceding discourse MĀ 25 at T I 454a19 employs 阿練若 to render “forest dweller”. This could be the only occurrence of 阿練若 in the *Madhyama-āgama*, whereas 無事 recurs frequently in *Madhyama-āgama* discourses to refer to a forest dwelling (occurrences in the whole collection are too numerous to be listed, a few examples are MĀ 18 at T I 442a1, MĀ 19 at T I 444b27, MĀ 33 at T I 473c24, MĀ 63 at T I 500a14). 阿練若 occurs, however, in several *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses, a collection translated by Zhú Fóniàn (竺佛念), cf. EĀ 12.5 at T II 569c14, EĀ 12.6 at T II 570a25, EĀ 13.1 at T II 571b2, EĀ 25.6 at T II 633b16, EĀ 37.3 at T II 711a8, EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a1, EĀ 39.10 at T II 734a9, and EĀ 49.2 at T II 795a26. The different ways of rendering the “forest dweller”, *araññaka* or *aranyaka*, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* collection, are noteworthy in so far as they might support the suggestion by Lü 1963: 242 that the extant translation may have incorporated terms from the earlier translation of the *Madhyama-āgama* by Zhú Fóniàn (竺佛念), in addition to the translation vocabulary employed by Gautama Saighadeva (cf. also below p. 617 note 158 and p. 785 note 143). Alternatively, the present could just be an instance of a general pattern, in fact in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* different renderings of *aranya* are also used side by side, cf. Heirman 2003: 10-11.

¹⁷⁹ MĀ 26 at T I 454c28.

¹⁸⁰ MN 69 at MN I 469,18 indicates that an aspect of proper behaviour in regard to seats is to not “keep off” young monks from their seats, *nave ca bhikkhū na āsanena paṭibāhissāmī ti*. MĀ 26 at T I 455c instead speaks of not “scolding” them, 謴, which could be due to mistaking *paṭibāhati* or *pratibādhate*, “to keep off”, for *paṭibhāsatī* or *pratibhāṣate*, “to retaliate”.

¹⁸¹ MN 69 at MN I 470,9: *anuddhatena bhavitabbam acapalena*, MĀ 26 at T I 455a11 recommends to “not be agitated”, 不躁擾, and at T I 445a24 to “not be arrogant”, 不驕傲.

¹⁸² While MN 69 at MN I 470,17 recommends not being gossipy or speaking loosely, *amukharena bhavittabam avikīṇnavācena*, MĀ 26 at T I 455a19 recommends not to engage in “much animal talk”, 多畜生論者, corresponding to *tiracchānakathā*.

¹⁸³ MN 69 at MN I 472,5: *abhidhamme abhivinaye yogo karaṇīyo*, MĀ 26 at T I 455c14: 當學共論律, 阿毘曇.

- apply himself to the immaterial attainments,¹⁸⁴
- apply himself to the attainment of realization.¹⁸⁵

Table 7.6: Proper Conduct of a Visiting Monk According to MN 69 and MĀ 26

MN 69	MĀ 26
respectful (1)	respectful (→ 1)
propriety with seats (2)	not joking or agitated (→ 5)
not enter village early or return late (3)	no irrelevant talk (→ 6)
not pay visits before or after meal (4)	not arrogant or chatty (→ 5)
not arrogant or agitated (5)	restrain senses (→ 8)
no loose talk (6)	moderate with food (→ 9)
easily spoken to & cultivating good friends (7)	energetic (→ 11)
restrain senses (8)	right mindfulness & comprehension (→ 12)
moderate with food (9)	not enter village early or return late (→ 3)
wakeful (10)	propriety with seats (→ 2)
energetic (11)	<i>Vinaya</i> and higher Dharma (→ 15)
mindful (12)	immaterial attainments (→ 16)
concentrated (13)	destruction of influxes (→ 17)
wise (14)	
higher Dharma and higher <i>Vinaya</i> (15)	
immaterial attainments (16)	
superhuman states (17)	(≠ 4, 7, 10, 13-14)

A difference can be found between the Pāli editions in regard to the need to observe proper behaviour in regard to seats. The Burmese edition presents the need to know proper behaviour as a quality of its own, separate from the need to know proper behaviour in regard to seats,¹⁸⁶ a way of reckoning that appears to also be reflected in the commentary.¹⁸⁷ In the other Pāli editions, however, both occur together as a single quality.

¹⁸⁴ A discourse quotation with the description of the peaceful liberations, found in MN 69 at MN I 472,14, can be found in Abhidh-k 2:15 and 8:3 in Pradhan 1967: 48,8 and 435,8 (not necessarily stemming specifically from the present discourse); cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 17a1 and T 1559 at T XXIX 17a28, as well as Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 57a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 62b3.

¹⁸⁵ MN 69 at MN I 472,25 refers to “applying oneself to superhuman states”, *uttarimanussadhamme yogo karanīyo*, an expression that would also cover deeper levels of concentration; on the term cf. also Anālayo 2008n. MĀ 26 at T I 456a3 speaks instead of being able to discuss “the higher knowledge of the destruction of the influxes”, 漏盡智通.

¹⁸⁶ B^e-MN II 133,23 stipulates *ābhisaṁcārikopi dhammo jānitabbo* as its third quality, while E^e-MN I 469,22, C^e-MN II 228,16, and S^e-MN II 215,3 only use this expression as part of the criticism voiced by other monks in relation to improper behaviour in regard to seats, thereby not presenting it as a separate quality. Due to this difference, the Burmese edition counts eighteen qualities, while the other Pāli editions list only seventeen. The listing in MĀ 26 comprises thirteen qualities.

¹⁸⁷ Ps III 184,6, after explaining “being skilled with seats”, turns to examine “proper behaviour”. This way of proceeding suggests that the commentary considered proper behaviour as a quality on its own, similar to the reading now found in the Burmese edition, which reckons “proper behaviour” as a separate quality.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version also does not present knowledge of proper behaviour as a quality separate from knowledge of proper behaviour in regard to seats.¹⁸⁸

MN I 470 An aspect of conduct mentioned in the *Gulissāni-sutta* that is not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel it to avoid visiting families before and after the meal.¹⁸⁹ That a monk should not visit families before or after the meal might at first sight appear redundant, as both versions already mentioned the need to avoid entering the village too early or return from it too late, which seems to be of similar meaning. A closer examination of the *Vinaya* accounts of these two stipulations, however, shows that they differ sufficiently to merit separate mention.¹⁹⁰

MN I 471 Another difference is that the *Gulissāni-sutta* takes up the need for a visiting monk to be concentrated and wise, while the same two qualities are not mentioned in its parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁹¹ Their absence from the *Madhyama-āgama* version does not appear to imply a major difference in perspective, as this version agrees with the *Gulissāni-sutta* on mentioning the need to apply oneself to the higher doctrine and discipline, to the immaterial attainments,¹⁹² and to the attainment of realization. From

¹⁸⁸ MĀ 26 at T I 455c7.

¹⁸⁹ MN 69 at MN I 469,34: *na purebhattam pacchābhuttam kulesu cārittam āpajjitatbam*.

¹⁹⁰ According to Vin IV 164,13 (*pācittiya* rule 85), the problem caused by entering a village at the wrong time was that some unruly monks had gone to the village and participated in all kinds of worldly talk with the villagers, which led to people criticising them for behaving just like householders. Conversely, the regulation on visiting families had a different background, as according to Vin IV 98,3 (*pācittiya* rule 46) the problem in this case was that a particular monk had spent much time visiting families before the meal. As the host was expecting his arrival, other monks were kept waiting until time had passed and it was too late for them to have their fill. Rebuked by the Buddha, this monk had then taken to visiting families after the meal. As a result, food sent for him and other monks to the monastery could not be used, since he came back too late to be able to accept the food before noon and thereby also deprived the other monks of their share. A perusal of the same two regulations in other *Vinayas* supports the impression that the issue of entering a village at the wrong time and the issue of visiting families before or after the meal constitute two different aspects of a monk's improper behaviour. Regulations corresponding to the Theravāda *pācittiya* rules 46 and 85 are *pātayantika* rules 42 and 83 in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 665c1 and T XXII 692c26, rules 80 and 81 in the Kāśyapīya *Vinaya*, T 1460 at T XXIV 663b27, rules 80 and 81 in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 389a7 and T XXII 389c21, rules 82 and 83 in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 69c14 and T XXII 70a18, rules 80 and 81 in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 864c14 and T XXIII 866b7, and rules 80 and 81 in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 123b12 and T XXIII 124b5. Although the stories leading to these regulations differ, these *Vinayas* agree on presenting these issues as two different matters.

¹⁹¹ MĀ 26 at T I 455b21 at this point only enjoins that such a monk "should train in right mindfulness and clear comprehension", 當學正念及正智也. MN 69 at MN I 471,22+28+34 lists three separate qualities: "established mindfulness should be developed", *upat̄hitasatinā bhavitabbam* (B^e-MN II 136,10: *upat̄hitassatinā*), "[the quality of] being concentrated should be developed", *samāhitena bhavitabbam*, and "[the quality of] being wise should be developed", *paññāvatā bhavitabbam*.

¹⁹² A quotation that appears to stem from a version of the present passage on the need for a forest monk to be able to discourse on the topic of the immaterial attainments can be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. Delhey 2009a: 148,6 and T 1579 at T XXX 331a13.

this perspective, although the listings in the two versions differ in formulation, the need for concentration and wisdom is taken into account in both versions.

The *Gulissāni-sutta* and its parallel agree that Mahāmoggallāna intervened at this MN I 472 point and asked Sāriputta if such type of conduct should be expected only of a forest dweller. In reply, Sāriputta clarified that the same certainly applies also to a town-dwelling monk.¹⁹³

MN 70 *Kītāgiri-sutta*

The *Kītāgiri-sutta*, the “discourse at Kītāgiri”, starts by reporting how the Buddha admonished a group of monks who were unwilling to follow his injunction not to eat at night, followed by providing a description of types of disciple at different levels of realization. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁹⁴

The *Kītāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin with the Buddha instructing his monks about the proper time to take food.¹⁹⁵ The two versions describe in similar terms that the monks Assaji and Punabbasuka, on being told about this regulation by other monks, refused to follow it. When the Buddha was informed about this refusal, he called Assaji and Punabbasuka to his presence.

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha asked Assaji and Punabbasuka whether in the course of his teachings he had ever made the proposal that experiencing any type of feelings will (automatically) cause unwholesome states to diminish and wholesome states to increase.¹⁹⁶ Assaji and Punabbasuka had to admit that the Buddha had never made such a proposition.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the Buddha had rather asked them whether they thought his teaching to imply that with pleasant feelings unwholesomeness increases and with painful feeling wholesomeness increases.¹⁹⁷ Assaji and Punabbasuka agreed to this proposal, a misunderstanding for which the Buddha rebuked them.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ MĀ 26 at T I 456a17 concludes with a stanza that sums up the qualities to be expected of a visiting monk. Before coming to this stanza, MĀ 26 reports that Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna rejoiced in each others’ words and departed, so that the stanza seems to be an *uddāna* by the reciters of the discourse.

¹⁹⁴ The parallel is MĀ 195 at T I 749c-752c, which is entitled after the leader of the group of unruly monks, being the “discourse to Assaji”, 阿濕具經 (adopting the 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading 具 instead of 貝). MĀ 195 agrees with MN 70 on locating the discourse in the Kāsi country. For a discourse quotation in Abhidh-k-ṭ cf. below note 202.

¹⁹⁵ According to MN 70 at MN I 473,11, the instruction was to abstain from food at night, *aññatr’ eva rat-tibhojanā bhunjatha*. In MĀ 195 at T I 749c4 the instruction reads 曰一食, literally to take “day one meal”, which at first sight would seem to refer to taking only a single meal per day. Yet, MĀ 194 at T I 746b27 refers to taking only a single meal as “one seat meal”, 一坐食, corresponding to *ekāsanabhojanā* in its parallel MN 65 at MN I 437,21. This suggests that 曰一 in MĀ 195 would intend “[during the] day only”, in which case the injunction would be similar to its counterpart MN 70.

¹⁹⁶ MN 70 at MN I 475,10.

¹⁹⁷ MĀ 195 at T I 750c8.

¹⁹⁸ The Buddha’s rebuking of the two is also recorded in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 28b6.

After rebuking Assaji and Punabbasuka, the Buddha put the same question to the other monks, who gave the proper reply by stating that this was not the way the Buddha had taught them.

According to both versions, the proper way of presenting the Buddha's teaching is to state that with some pleasant feelings unwholesomeness increases, while with others it decreases, just as with some unpleasant feelings unwholesomeness increases while with others it decreases. The *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation expounds neutral feelings in the same manner, a treatment not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart.¹⁹⁹

The *Kītāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel make it clear that the Buddha's instructions to give up feelings related to what is unwholesome are based on his own understanding and experience.

The *Madhyama-āgama* version at this point also distinguishes pleasant and painful feelings into bodily and mental types, explaining that the Buddha did not recommend bodily or mental feelings of pleasure or pain as something only to be developed or else only to be relinquished, since his injunctions were based on the wholesome or unwholesome repercussions of any type of feeling.²⁰⁰

MN I 477 The *Kītāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by indicating that the Buddha did not expect all monks to work with diligence. By way of elaboration of this statement, both versions take up seven types of noble disciple, which they present with some minor but noteworthy differences.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ MN 70 at MN I 475,23. The absence of neutral feelings in MĀ 195 is unexpected, since usually discourses in the Pāli *Nikāyas* and in the Chinese Āgamas include all three types of feeling in similar contexts. It would therefore be more in line with other discourses if the present exposition were to cover also the problem of how some types of neutral feeling may lead to unwholesome results, while other types of neutral feeling will have wholesome repercussions, as is the case in MN 70.

²⁰⁰ MĀ 195 at T I 751a17.

²⁰¹ While MN 70 and MĀ 195 agree on the sequence of presenting these seven noble disciples, a variation in the sequence of listing these seven noble disciples can be found in the *Visuddhimagga*. Vism 659,19 begins its exposition with the faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*), followed by the one liberated-by-faith (*saddhāvimutta*), the body-witness (*kāyasakkhi*), and the one liberated-both-ways (*ubhatobhāgavimutta*), after which it lists the Dharma-follower (*dhammānusārī*), the one attained-to-view (*dīttipattī*), and the one liberated-by-wisdom (*paññāvimutta*). The rationale for this presentation appears to be that the *Visuddhimagga* attempts to associate the seven noble disciples with how they developed insight. According to the *Visuddhimagga*'s presentation, the faith-follower and the one liberated-by-faith should be associated with contemplation of impermanence; the body-witness and the one liberated-both-ways should be associated with contemplation of unsatisfactoriness (as this bears a close relationship to the development of concentration); and the Dharma-follower, the one attained-to-view, and the one liberated-by-wisdom should be associated with contemplation of not-self. This way of presentation could be based on Paṭis II 49,28, which associates contemplation of impermanence with the faculty of faith, contemplation of unsatisfactoriness with the faculty of concentration, and contemplation of not-self with the faculty of wisdom. Based on this association, Paṭis II 52,1 then relates contemplation of impermanence to one who is liberated-by-faith, contemplation of unsatisfactoriness to the body-witness, and contemplation of not-self to one who has attained-to-view. Paṭis II 52,18 continues, however, to put this into perspective by indicating that contemplation of unsatisfactoriness and of not-self may also lead to being liberated-by-faith, etc. In fact, in the Pāli discourses contemplation of impermanence, for exam-

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the distinguishing mark between the two types of arahant in this listing, both of which no longer need to work with diligence, is that the one who is “liberated-both-ways” (*ubhatobhāgavimutta*) has personal experience of the immaterial liberations,²⁰² while the one who is “liberated-by-wisdom” (*paññāvimutta*) has no such personal experience of the immaterial liberations.²⁰³ The *Madhyama-āgama* version differs in as much as, instead of personal experience of the imma-

ple, does not seem to have any particular relationship to the faculty of faith. The Pāli discourses rather associate contemplation of impermanence with wisdom, speaking of the “wisdom directed to arising and passing away”, *udayatthagāminī paññā*, as the type of wisdom par excellence, whether as a faculty, *indriya*, or as a power, *bala*, cf. SN 48:9 at SN V 197,18 and AN 5:2 at AN III 2,24. Hence, from the perspective of the Pāli discourses, it seems that the degree to which faith, concentration, or wisdom are developed by different noble disciples may not bear as direct a relation to the three characteristics as the presentation in the *Visuddhimagga* suggests. On the listing of seven types of noble disciple in MN 70 cf. also Gombrich 1996: 99-103.

²⁰² A discourse quotation with the description of the peaceful liberations, found in MN 70 at MN I 477,26, can be found in Abhidh-k 2:15 and 8:3 in Pradhan 1967: 48,8 and 435,8 (not necessarily stemming specifically from the present discourse); cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 17a1 and T 1559 at T XXIX 176a28, as well as Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 57a3 or Q (5595) *tu* 62b3.

²⁰³ MN 70 at MN I 477,26: “he lives having directly experienced the peaceful immaterial liberations that are beyond form”, *ye te santā vimokhā atikkamma rūpe aruppā te kāyena phassitvā viharati* (B^e-MN II 143,2, C^e-MN II 242,26, and S^e-MN II 229,5: *vimokkhā*, B^e and S^e also read *phusitvā*, instead of *phasitvā*). The expression *kāyena phusitvā*, literally “having touched with the body”, is an idiomatic expression for personal experience (cf. PED 479 s.v. *phusati*¹, which clarifies that the usage of this verb is not confined to physical touch, cf. also Findly 2002: 258). A broader meaning for the term *kāya* is also evident, for example, in the term *sakkāya*, which stands for the whole of one’s “personality”, not only for its physical aspects, cf. also PED: 207 s.v. *kāya*. In the present instance, *kāyena* does not refer to experiencing an immaterial attainment “through the physical body” and thus has implications quite different from the same expression *kāyena phusitvā*, when this occurs in relation to the physical experience of touch, *photthabba*, e.g., in MN 27 at MN I 180,33. The same holds also for the expression *kāyena c’ eva paramasaccām sacchikaroti* found later in MN 70 at MN I 480,9, where again, pace de Silva 1987b: 30, the reference is not to realizing the ultimate truth “with the physical body”, but rather “with one’s whole being”, i.e., “directly”. Ps III 191,12 glosses *kāyena* with *nāmakāyena*, literally the “name-body”, an expression that stands for the mind (cf. also its use in DN 15 at DN II 62,15+23+26, where it indeed stands for the whole of the mind, except consciousness). Katz 1982/1989: 80 aptly translates *kāyena phusitvā* in a similar context as “having come into intimate contact with”, Radich 2007: 263 explains that this expression conveys the sense “to know directly and certainly from personal experience”; cf. also Harvey 2009a: 180 note 10. A convenient way of rendering *kāyena* into German, suggested to me by one of my students, would be “leibhaftig”, which, while preserving the term “body” (Leib), at the same time clearly conveys the sense of a direct experience. Schmithausen 1981: 214 note 50 and 249 ad. note 50 points out that the corresponding expression in Jain works refers to rules of conduct for householders and to monastic vows, occurrences where a literal translation as “touching with the body” would also not be appropriate. According to Lüders 1954: 162, the expression *dhammam kāyena passati* in Dhp 259 is probably a textual error for the same idiomatic expression *kāyena phusati*, a suggestion confirmed by the reading *ka’ena phaṣa’i* in the parallel Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* stanza 114 in Brough 1962/2001: 135 (cf. also ibid. pp. 211-212), and the reading *kāyena vai spr̄set* in the corresponding *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 4:21 in Bernhard 1965: 133, so that this stanza would also be referring to a “direct experience” of the Dharma.

terial liberations, it takes personal experience of the eight liberations to be marking the difference between these two types of arahant.²⁰⁴

A discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama*, which enumerates and defines the same seven noble disciples, also speaks of personal experience of the eight liberations when defining the arahant who is “liberated-both-ways”.²⁰⁵ The same presentation recurs in an examination of these seven noble disciples in the *Puggalapaññatti*, which similarly brings in the eight liberations when describing the arahant who is liberated-both-ways.²⁰⁶ That to merit being called “liberated-both-ways” requires personal experience of the eight liberations is also indicated in the *Mahānidāna-sutta* and its Chinese parallels, which define this particular type of arahant in terms of his or her ability to enter these eight liberations at will.²⁰⁷

Thus a definition of an arahant liberated-both-ways by way of his or her personal experience of the immaterial liberations seems to be a mode of presentation specific to the *Kūtagiri-sutta*.

According to the *Saṅgīti-sutta* and its Chinese parallel, the eight liberations cover among others the four immaterial attainments.²⁰⁸ Hence the passages listed so far can be seen to agree that an arahant who does not have personal experience of the four immaterial attainments cannot be considered “liberated-both-ways”, but would ‘only’ be an arahant reckoned to be “liberated-by-wisdom”.²⁰⁹

Other Pāli discourses exhibit some variations on this point. A discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya* speaks of an arahant who is “liberated-both-ways” even when only the first *jhāna* has been reached, while another discourse in the same collection describes different types of arahant who are “liberated-by-wisdom”, some apparently able to enter the immaterial attainments.²¹⁰ These two discourses follow each other and define these

²⁰⁴ MĀ 195 at T I 751b15 defines the type of arahant who is liberated-both-ways as “having put into operation personal experience [literally: ‘bodily contact’] of the eight liberations”, 八解脫身觸成就, whereas the type of arahant who is liberated-by-wisdom lacks this quality. The same definition can also be found in the *Śravakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 183,7 or SSG 2007: 20,9 and T 1579 at T XXX 425b15.

²⁰⁵ SĀ 936 at T II 240a12.

²⁰⁶ Pp 14,22.

²⁰⁷ DN 15 at DN II 71,17, DĀ 13 at T I 62b25, and MĀ 97 at T I 582b2.

²⁰⁸ DN 33 at DN III 262,3 and DĀ 9 at T I 52b14.

²⁰⁹ A subtle difference, however, would be that, with the definition that involves the immaterial attainments, a *paññāvimutta* would only be bereft of stages of concentration meditation based on the fourth *jhāna*. The limit set by the definition that involves the eight deliverances is lower, as the first three out of the set of eight *vimokkhas* involve forms of meditation that are related to lower *jhānas*; cf. also Bodhi 2007: 69-70.

²¹⁰ AN 9:45 at AN IV 453,10: *paṭhamam jhānam upasampaja viharati ... ettāvatā ... ubhatobhāgavimutto vutto bhagavatā pariyyāyena*. AN 9:44 at AN IV 452,24: *nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampaja viharati ... ettāvatā ... paññāvimutto vutto bhagavatā pariyyāyena*. Although the two discourses present their respective treatments as being “in a figurative sense” *pariyāyena*, they culminate in defining the *ubhatobhāgavimutta* and the *paññāvimutta* as each having reached the attainment of cessation, which they declare to be the way to define them “not in a figurative sense”, *nippariyyāyena*. Based on this presentation, one would have to conclude that the terms *ubhatobhāgavimutta* and *paññāvimutta* simply

two types of arahant in the same way. As this presentation is self-contradictory and at variance with the other Pāli and Chinese discourses examined so far, it seems probable that a textual error has occurred during the process of their transmission.²¹¹

The *Kītāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel declare that the two types of arahant, the one who is “liberated-both-ways” and the one who is “liberated-by-wisdom”, have completed their task. In regard to the other five types of noble disciple, who are not yet arahants, they recommend diligence, since by frequenting spiritual friends and developing the faculties these noble disciples can reach full awakening.

MN I 478

In regard to the “body-witness” (*kāyasakkhi*), the *Kītāgiri-sutta* again speaks of personal experience of the immaterial attainments, whereas its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel instead mentions the eight liberations.²¹² The two versions agree that a body-witness has not yet destroyed all influxes. The *Kītāgiri-sutta* indicates that this noble disciple has nevertheless destroyed some influxes.

Some Pāli editions of the *Kītāgiri-sutta* apply this specification to each of the remaining types of noble disciple.²¹³ From the perspective of the three influxes listed regularly in other discourses this presentation is puzzling, since the lowest two of the remaining five types of noble disciple, the Dharma-follower (*dhammānusārī*) and the faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*), have not yet become stream-enterers. As the influx of sensuality is only eradicated with non-return, and the influxes of existence and ignorance are overcome only with full awakening, it would not be possible to attribute the

refer to the same, a conclusion that would conflict with the distinction drawn between these two noble disciples in other discourses.

²¹¹ This becomes even more evident when one considers AN 9:43, the discourse that precedes these two discourses in the *Anguttara-nikāya*. AN 9:43 at AN IV 451,27 adopts a similar pattern for the body-witness, suggesting that a body-witness could also have only the experience of the first *jhāna*, *paṭhamāñjhānam upasampaja viharati ... ettāvatā ... kāyasakkhi vutto bhagavatā pariyāyena* (C^e-AN V 536,15 and S^e-AN IV 473,1: *kāyasakkhi*). Since other discourses, such as MN 70 and its parallel MĀ 195, agree on attributing the same high degree of concentrative proficiency to an arahant who is “liberated-both-ways” and to the “body-witness”, the presentation found in AN 9:43, AN 9:44, and AN 9:45 is most naturally explained as the result of an error in textual transmission, causing the same treatment to be applied to three different types of noble disciple: the arahant liberated-both-ways, the arahant liberated-by-wisdom, and the body-witness. What makes this case remarkable is that the presentation in AN 9:44 and AN 9:45, if taken at its face value, would imply a substantial doctrinal difference in the way these two types of arahant are defined. Yet, this ‘doctrinal difference’ is found between discourses belonging to the same Theravāda tradition and thus cannot easily be attributed to sectarian disagreements between different early Buddhist schools. In this way, the present instance could serve as a reminder that, even though the affiliation of a particular text with one or the other of the early Buddhist schools inevitably has left its traces on the textual transmission, the possibility that differences may just be errors that occurred during transmission should not be lost sight of.

²¹² On the *kāyasakkhi* cf. also Ruegg 1989: 167-170.

²¹³ E^e-MN I 478,7+21+32 and C^e-MN II 244,8+17+27 use the expression *ekacce āsavā parikkhīnā honti* for the three disciples in higher training, but speak of *ekacce āsavā aparikkhīnā honti* at MN I 479,7+21 and C^e-MN II 246,8+19 for the *dhammānusārī* and the *saddhānusārī*. B^e-MN II 144,21 and 145,5, as well as S^e-MN II 231,20 and 232,15, however, speak of *ekacce āsavā parikkhīnā honti* also in the case of the *dhammānusārī* and the *saddhānusārī*.

eradication of any of the three influxes to these two noble disciples. The *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Kītāgiri-sutta*, another discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama*, and the *Puggalapaññatti* in fact agree in not mentioning influxes at all when describing these two noble disciples.²¹⁴

Even to attribute the eradication of some influxes to the three disciples in higher training – the body-witness, the one attained-to-view, and the one liberated-by-faith – presents to some extent a difficulty, since this would restrict these disciples to the level of non-return. A discourse in the *Anguttara-nikāya*, however, indicates that each of these three noble disciples can have levels of realization that fall short of non-return.²¹⁵ Yet, a stream-enterer or a once-returner – who at the same time could be a body-witness, or one attained-to-view, or one liberated-by-faith – would not have eradicated any of the three influxes.

An attempt to solve this problem could be made by bringing in the influx of views, since this influx will be eradicated already with stream-entry.²¹⁶ Although the expression used in regard to the body-witness, etc., is formulated in the plural – speaking of “influxes” being destroyed – this could then be taken to cover either the influx of view destroyed with stream-entry, or else the influx of view together with the influx of sensuality that has been eradicated by those noble disciples who have progressed up to non-return. A problem with this solution is that the influx of views appears to be a relatively late addition to the usual set of three influxes, making it less probable that the presentation in the *Kītāgiri-sutta* took this influx into account.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ MĀ 195 at T I 752a6+17, SĀ 936 at T II 240b2+5, and Pp 15,21.

²¹⁵ AN 3:21 at AN I 120,6.

²¹⁶ According to SN 41:3 at SN IV 287,13 and its parallel SĀ 570 at T II 151a21, personality view, *sakkāyaditthi*/身見, underlies all type of views, and such personality view is one of the three fetters overcome with stream-entry, cf., e.g., Sn 2:1 at Sn 231.

²¹⁷ In the four *Nikāyas*, the *dīthasava* appears to occur only in the PTS edition of DN 16 (cf. DN II 81,11, DN II 84,6, DN II 91,12, DN II 94,18, DN II 98,15, DN II 123,19, and DN II 126,12, cf. also Rahula 1971: 78 note 2), being absent from other discourses and also from the Burmese, Ceylonese, and Siamese editions of DN 16. In the four main *Āgamas*, references to the influx of views or to four influxes appear to be found mainly in *Ekottarika-āgama* discourses, cf. EĀ 13.7 at T II 575b29, EĀ 16.1 at T II 578b27, EĀ 30.3 at T II 663c28, EĀ 31.6 at T II 670a13, EĀ 31.9 at T II 672b19, and EĀ 40.6 at T II 741b11, with one instance found in the *Samyukta-āgama*, SĀ 490 at T II 127a4, where the Pāli parallel SN 38:8 at SN IV 256,3 speaks only of three influxes (another occurrence of 見流, found in SĀ 1172 at T II 313c20, appears to be a rendering of *ogha*, cf. the parallel SN 35:197 at SN IV 175,12). The influx of views can also be found in the account of the Buddha’s awakening in the *Lalitavistara* in Lefmann 1902: 348,22 or in Vaidya 1958b: 252,26, where it comes as the last of the four influxes (in DN 16 the influx of views takes third position). The *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* in Rahder 1926: 18,5, Vaidya 1967: 11,25, or Kondō 1983: 23,14, however, still reflects the earlier stage by having only three influxes (noted by Dayal 1932/1970: 120). Regarding the fourfold reckoning, Buddharakkhita 1978/2004: 102 reasons that this merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the threefold reckoning, as “the canker of wrong views ... has been already included in the second [canker] of the Sutta classifications. The canker for the continuation of becoming can arise only when there is an ideological base which confirms becoming, and even extols it”. A considerable number of *dīthis* referred to in the discourses appear to be indeed related to forms of becoming. Yet, other instances of views seem to be related to some form of

Perhaps, then, the present passage in the *Kītāgiri-sutta* should be seen as an instance of a more unspecified usage of the term “influx”, a usage that does not intend either the three or the four influxes, but which stands in a more general sense for the “flowing in” of defilements.²¹⁸

The *Kītāgiri-sutta* explains that someone “attained-to-view” (*dīttipattā*) has examined with wisdom the Tathāgata’s teachings, while someone “liberated-by-faith” (*saddhāvīmutta*) has firm faith in the Tathāgata. These two noble disciples share in common the destruction of some influxes by seeing with wisdom.²¹⁹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version adds that both have firm faith in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha.²²⁰ Although the *Majjhima-nikāya* version does not explicitly make this point, the same should implicitly be understood, since both are at the very least stream-enterers, who by dint of their attainment would be endowed with such firm faith.

hedonism (such as the position taken in MN 45 at MN I 305,20 and its parallel MĀ 174 at T I 711b25, cf. also AN 3:111 at AN I 266,4), which would rather be due to the influx of sensuality. Again, the denial of causality attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa in DN 2 at DN I 52,22, or the position associated in the same discourse with Ajita Kesakambalī or Sañjaya Belatthiputta (cf. DN 2 at DN I 55,15 and DN I 58,24) would probably be related to the influx of ignorance, cf. also Thomas 1927/2003: 67 note 2, who reasons that to the three influxes “was later added false view (*dītti*), as a development of *avijjā*”. Thus the arising of views could be related to each of the three influxes, so that the idea of an influx of views seems to be more than just making explicit what was already implicit in the influx of becoming. Although to reckon the *dīthasava* as a fourth influx appears to be clearly a later development, its inclusion in listings of influxes could claim for support a proposal made in MN 2 at MN I 9,22 and its parallel MĀ 10 at T I 432b6. These two discourses agree on referring to the eradication of the three lower fetters, which includes the eradication of the fetter of “personality view” (*sakkāyadīthil* 身見), as “influxes to be removed by seeing”, *āsavā dassanā pahātabbā*, 漏從見斷. Thus, at least in this instance the term “influx” does refer, among others, to personality view. From this it would not seem too far-fetched to assume that the influx of views should be reckoned as a fourth type of influx.

²¹⁸ Such an understanding could perhaps reflect the more general use of the etymologically related verb *anvāssavati*, a verb which the discourses regularly employ to highlight that the purpose of sense-restraint is to avoid the “flowing in” of evil unwholesome states, e.g., MN 27 at MN I 180,30: *pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ*. MN 2 at MN I 10,3 and its parallel MĀ 10 at T I 432b13 reckon such sense-restraint to be the way to “remove influxes through restraint”, *āsavā samvara pahātabbā*, 漏從護斷, thereby further supporting the relationship between *anvāssavati* and *āsava*, found in a context where *āsava* also seems to have a rather general sense.

²¹⁹ MN 70 at MN I 478,20+31: *paññāya c’ assa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīnā honti*. Pp 15,16 gives a stronger emphasis on the wisdom factor in the case of the noble disciple “liberated by faith”, since it indicates that this noble disciple has “understood through wisdom and penetrated the teachings declared by the Tathāgata”, *tathāgatappaveditā c’ assa dhammā paññāya vodīthā honti vocaritā*, just as is the case for the noble disciple “attained to view”. MN 70 at MN I 478,21 uses the same qualification only when defining the noble disciple “attained to view”. To distinguish these two noble disciples, Pp 15,18 then adds that the eradication of some influxes through wisdom in the case of the noble disciple “liberated by faith” is “not like that of one attained-to-view”, *na ca kho yathā dīttipattassa*. The expression *dhammā paññāya vodīthā honti vocaritā* recurs in AN 9:5 at AN IV 363,16 as part of a definition of *paññābala*, the “power of wisdom”. Thus this expression does stand representative for the development of deeper levels of insight and understanding.

²²⁰ MĀ 195 at T I 751c11+23: 一向決定信佛法眾。

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version's presentation, the difference between these two noble disciples is that one who has "attained-to-view" has contemplated the Dharma with outstanding wisdom and acceptance, while one who is "liberated-by-faith" does not have these qualities to the degree to which they are possessed by a noble disciple "attained-to-view".²²¹

MN I 479 The *Madhyama-āgama* version repeats the same definition in regard to the Dharma-follower (*dhammānusārī*) and the faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*). This could be a textual error, since on this reading there would be no difference between the one attained-to-view and the Dharma-follower, or between the one attained-to-faith and the faith-follower.²²² A similar exposition of the seven types of noble disciple, found in a discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama*, agrees in fact closely with the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation of the first five, but presents the last two in terms similar to the *Kītāgiri-sutta*, thereby supporting the impression that the *Madhyama-āgama* version may have suffered from a textual error.

The *Samyukta-āgama* presentation of the Dharma-follower and the faith-follower agrees with the *Kītāgiri-sutta* on highlighting that both are endowed with the five faculties (*indriya*). The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse points out that whereas in the case of the Dharma-follower the faculty of wisdom is strong, in the case of the faith-follower it is weaker.²²³

The *Kītāgiri-sutta* expresses the same distinction in slightly different terms. It indicates the difference between them to be that the Dharma-follower has sufficiently accepted the Tathāgata's teachings with wisdom, while the faith-follower has sufficient faith and affection for the Tathāgata.²²⁴ Other Pāli and Chinese discourses add that these two noble disciples differ not only in regard to the particular faculty they have emphasized in their development, but also in that the Dharma-follower has developed the whole set of five faculties to a superior degree than the faith-follower.²²⁵

²²¹ MĀ 195 at T I 751c12 explains that the one attained-to-view has "relied on wisdom, superior insight and superior acceptance", 便以慧, 增上觀, 增上忍, while the one-liberated-by-faith does not have these qualities in the same degree, T I 751c23: 以慧, 觀, 忍, 不如見到.

²²² The only difference in the respective definitions is that whereas MĀ 195 at T I 751c16+28 predicts full liberation for diligent practice undertaken by someone attained-to-view and someone liberated-by-faith, in the case of the Dharma-follower and the faith-follower MĀ 195 at T I 752a11+22 envisages that they may either reach full liberation or else non-return.

²²³ SĀ 936 at T II 240a29: 增上智慧 and T II 240b4: 少慧; cf. also SĀ 61 at T II 16a6+8, where the distinction between the two similarly revolves around 增上智慧 in contrast to just 智慧.

²²⁴ MN 70 at MN I 479,7: *tathāgatappaveditā c' assa dhammā paññāya mattaso nijjhānam khamanti*, and MN I 479,21: *tathāgate c' assa saddhāmattam hoti pemamattam*. The same two expressions recur in SN 55:24 at SN V 377,13+21 and in SN 55:25 at SN V 379,13+20 in what are references to these two noble disciples, even though they are not explicitly mentioned. In MN 22 at MN I 142,8, however, the expression *saddhāmattam pemamattam* qualifies a stage below the *dhammānusārī* and the *saddhānusārī*, as it refers to those who by dint of their faith are destined to a heavenly rebirth. The decisive difference between this stage and the *saddhānusārī* would be that the latter has developed the five faculties.

²²⁵ SN 48:12-17 at SN V 200-202 and SN 48:24 at SN V 205,5, a difference also noted in SĀ 653 at T II 183b11.

A whole *Samyutta*, the *Okkantika-samyutta*, delineates the difference between these two disciples. It specifies that the Dharma-follower accepts with wisdom impermanence, while the faith-follower is convinced of it.²²⁶ This presentation shows that a faith-follower is not only one who has faith in the Tathāgata, but also one who is convinced of his teachings.

According to the *Puggalapaññatti*, the difference between these two types of disciple is that the Dharma-follower places wisdom first in his or her development, while the faith-follower places faith first.²²⁷

The *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* explains that Dharma-followers pursue the truth in a self-reliant manner, guided in their meditation and practice mainly by their own study of the scriptures. In contrast, faith-followers undertake the same under the guidance of another person as their teacher.²²⁸

What emerges from these presentations is that, although faith-followers rely on the faculty of faith, they nevertheless also develop wisdom, even though they do so to a lesser degree than Dharma-followers.

The *Kīṭāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by declaring that final knowledge comes about through a gradual path of training. The two versions agree that this gradual training begins with an initial degree of faith. Such faith then leads to:

- visiting,
- being respectful,
- listening to the teachings,
- bearing the teachings in mind,
- examining their meaning,
- coming to accept them.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues at this point with four more steps, which are:

- [wholesome] desire,
- energetic acting,
- examination,
- striving.²²⁹

²²⁶ SN 25:1-10 at SN III 225-228, which presents the impermanent nature of the senses, their objects, the respective type of consciousness, etc., as something in regard to which the *saddhānusārī* “has faith and is resolved”, *saddahati adhimuccati* (e.g., SN 25:1 at SN III 225,9), while the *dhammānusārī* “has sufficiently accepted them with wisdom”, *paññāya mattaso nijjhānam khamanti* (e.g., SN 25:1 at SN III 225,16).

²²⁷ Pp 15,22 highlights that in the case of a *dhammānusārī* there is a predominance of wisdom, *paññāpubbaṅgamam ariyamaggan bhāveti*, while in the case of a *saddhānusārī* the development of the noble path takes place with a predominance of faith, *saddhāpubbaṅgamāṇi*.

²²⁸ Abhidh-k 6:29 in Pradhan 1967: 353,14, with its Chinese parallels in T 1558 at T XXIX 122b19 and T 1559 at T XXIX 274b14. A similar position is taken in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, according to which the faith-follower proceeds based on the instructions received from others, Pradhan 1950: 88,12: *paropadeśamanusmṛtyā* and T 1606 at T XXXI 754b11: 隨順他教; cf. also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 175,1 or ŠSG 2007: 10,10 and T 1579 at T XXX 424c11.

²²⁹ MN 70 at MN I 480,7: *chando jāyati ... ussahati ... tuleti ... padahati*.

In contrast to these four steps, the *Madhyama-āgama* version speaks of only one more step, which is to contemplate and examine the teachings.²³⁰ The two versions agree in presenting personal realization as the final step in this series.²³¹

When comparing this difference between the two version's depiction of the gradual approach to final knowledge, the *Kītāgiri-sutta* can be seen to give additional emphasis to the factors of [wholesome] desire, energetic action, and striving, thereby describing the inspiration and commitment required for progress to liberation in more detail than its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart. This brings to mind a difference already noted above between the two versions, where in the description of the seven noble disciples the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation gives more emphasis to the factor of wisdom, while its *Majjhima-nikāya* counterpart puts the highlight more on the faculty of faith.

MN I 480 The *Kītāgiri-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue with the Buddha announcing the impending delivery of a four-phrased statement. This statement begins by noting that the attitude of Assaji and Punabbasuka would not be proper even if they had a teacher intent on material gains, not to speak of behaving as they did with a teacher like the Buddha, who is totally detached from material things.²³² According to both versions, the proper attitude for a faithful disciple would be to keep in mind that the Buddha is the teacher, while they are just his disciples.²³³

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues this reflection with the thought that the Buddha knows, whereas they, as disciples, do not know,²³⁴ a reflection not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. Instead, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse records the faithful disciple's wish to benefit from the Buddha's teaching of the Dharma.²³⁵

²³⁰ MĀ 195 at T I 752b5: 觀察.

²³¹ MN 70 at MN I 480,9: "he personally realizes the supreme truth, he sees it by having penetrated it with wisdom", *kāyena c' eva paramāṇu saccāṇi sacchikaroti, paññāya ca nāmū ativijjha passati* (B^e-MN II 145,25: *paramasaccāṇi* and C^e-MN II 248,6: *pativijjha*); on *kāyena* cf. above p. 379 note 203. MĀ 195 at T I 752b6: "he personally [lit: bodily] realizes the truth with wisdom and superior insight", 身諦作證, 慧增上觀. MĀ 195 at T I 752b6 then continues with the reflection that in this way one personally realizes and sees with wisdom the truth that one had not realized before, 此諦我未曾身作證, 亦非慧增上觀, 此諦今身作證. This reflection brings to mind a passage in SN 48:50 at SN V 226,11: "those things that I previously heard about, now I dwell personally having experienced them and see them having penetrated them with wisdom", *ime kho te dhammā ye me pubbe sutavā ahesum, te ... etarahi kāyena ca phusitvā viharāmi, paññāya ca ativijjha passāmi* (C^e-SN V 398,25 and S^e-SN V 298,19: *sutavā*). This passage in SN 48:50 does not seem to have a Chinese counterpart, cf. Akanuma 1929/1990: 251 (the 佛光 *Samyukta-āgama* edition vol. 4 appendix p. 34 lists SĀ 659 at T II 184a8-19 as a parallel, yet this discourse differs considerably from SN 48:50 and does not parallel this particular statement).

²³² MĀ 195 at T I 752b13 precedes this passage by reporting a reflection by the Buddha about the foolishness of Assaji and Punabbasuka. Although MĀ 195 does not explicitly mention at which point the Buddha began to speak, the context suggests the passage on the teacher intent on material gains to be already part of the spoken discourse, similar to MN 70.

²³³ MN 70 at MN I 480,34: *satthā bhagavā, sāvako 'ham asmi* and MĀ 195 at T I 752b17: 世尊是我師, 我是世尊弟子.

²³⁴ MN 70 at MN I 480,34: "the Blessed One knows, I do not know", *jānāti bhagavā, nāhaṇī jānāmī ti*.

²³⁵ MĀ 195 at T I 752b17: "the Blessed One teaches the Dharma to me ... may I for a long time get its

The *Kīṭāgiri-sutta* continues by illustrating the proper attitude of a faithful disciple MN I 481 with the determination that there shall be no relaxing of energy until the goal has been reached, even if the flesh and blood of the body were to dry up and only skin, sinews, and bones remain.²³⁶ Such a depiction of firm determination is not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which instead describes how a faithful disciple will experience happiness in whatever direction he or she might go, will grow day and night in wholesome things, and will finally reach full liberation or non-return,²³⁷ attainments similarly envisaged in the concluding part of the *Kīṭāgiri-sutta*.²³⁸

meaning and get benefit, peace, and happiness [from it]”, 世尊為我說法 … 令我長夜得義, 得饒益
安隱快樂.

²³⁶ MN 70 at MN I 481,1.

²³⁷ MĀ 195 at T I 752b22.

²³⁸ MN 70 at MN I 481,6.

Chapter 8 *Paribbājaka-vagga*

MN 71 *Tevijjavacchagotta-sutta*¹

The *Tevijjavacchagotta-sutta*, the “discourse to Vacchagotta on the three higher knowledges”, records the Buddha’s declaration that he had not made a claim to omniscience. Of this discourse, so far no parallel appears to have been identified.²

MN 72 *Aggivacchagotta-sutta*³

The *Aggivacchagotta-sutta*, the “discourse to Vacchagotta on the fire [simile]”, has as its main theme the nature of a Tathāgata. This discourse has two Chinese counterparts in two *Samyukta-āgama* collections,⁴ and a Tibetan counterpart in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhbāṣya*.⁵

The *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* and its parallels begin by relating that the wanderer Vacchagotta questioned the Buddha on a standard set of views that were apparently a subject of regular discussion in ancient India.⁶ The topics taken up in this standard set of views are:

MN I 484

¹ B^e-M II 148,1 has the title *Tevijjavaccha-sutta*, while S^e-M II 236,1 has the title *Cūlavacchagotta-sutta*. In this way, the Siamese edition of MN 71 forms the counterpart to MN 73, the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, while in the other Pāli editions MN 73 remains without a *cūla* counterpart.

² Warder 1970/1991: 137 comments that “we ought probably to admit this *sūtra* as an authentic part of the earliest *Tripiṭaka*, but likely to have been suppressed by most Buddhists of later times as offensive to their traditions of the greatness of their teacher”; a brief survey of MN 71 can be found in Anālayo 2008g.

³ B^e-M II 149,13 has the title *Aggivaccha-sutta*.

⁴ The parallels are SĀ 962 at T II 245b-246a and SĀ² 196 at T II 444c-445c. While MN 72 takes place in Jeta’s Grove by Sāvatthī, SĀ 962 and SĀ² 196 take place in the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground by Rājagaha. Anesaki 1908: 137 gives SĀ 962 the title “view(s)”, 見, which is how SĀ² 196 is referred to in an *uddāna* at T II 447b10. A discourse similar in some respects to MN 72 is SN 44:1 at SN IV 374-380, which also examines the standard set of views apparently discussed regularly in ancient India and illustrates the impossibility of applying them to the Tathāgata with the help of the image of the deep ocean. SN 44:1 differs from MN 72 in as much as it has King Pasenadi and the nun Khemā as its protagonists. SN 44:1 reports that, after the encounter between the two, King Pasenadi approached the Buddha and repeated his questions, receiving the same replies as he had received earlier from Khemā. SN 44:1 also differs from MN 72 in that it does not make use of the fire simile, a simile that appears to be such a distinctive mark of MN 72 that it was chosen as the discourse’s title.

⁵ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 156b7-158b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 181a3-183a6, which agrees with SĀ 962 and SĀ² 196 on locating the discourse in the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground by Rājagaha; cf. also Abhidh-k 3:29 in Pradhan 1967: 142,9, paralleling MN 72 at MN I 486,18, with its Chinese parallels in T 1558 at T XXIX 52a20 and T 1559 at T XXIX 209a10.

⁶ While SĀ 962 at T II 245b10 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 156b7 or Q (5595) *tu* 181a4 agree with MN 72 that the Buddha’s interlocutor was a wanderer, *paribbājaka*/出家/*kun tu rgyu* by the name of Vacchagotta/婆蹉種/be’u’i rigs, the protagonist of SĀ² 196 at T II 444c2 is qualified as 梵志, a standard rendering of “Brahmin” (but cf. also below p. 400 note 58), whose name is 獢子, which in Pāli would be Vacchaputta.

- the world's eternity,
- the world's finiteness,
- the identity of body and soul,
- the destiny of a Tathāgata after death.⁷

In the Pāli account, these four topics amount to ten views, since the three propositions concerned with the world's eternity, the world's finiteness, and the identity of body and soul could either be affirmed or negated and thus count up to six, whereas the destiny of a Tathāgata after death is proposed in four different modes, according to the so-called tetralemma. These four modes cover not only affirmation and negation, but also the position “yes-and-no” and the position “neither-yes-nor-no”.

The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions and the quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary apply the tetralemma not only to the destiny of a Tathāgata, but also to the world's eternity and to the world's finiteness.⁸ By presenting three topics in a fourfold mode and only the identity of body and soul in a dual mode, the *Samyukta-āgama* versions arrive at fourteen views (see table 8.1).

An application of the tetralemma to the world's eternity and finiteness can be found not only in other discourses in the two *Samyukta-āgamas*, but also in discourses from the *Dīrgha-āgama*.⁹ Discourses in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, however, present each of these two topics only in a two-fold manner, similar to the way of presentation adopted in the *Aggivacchagotta-sutta*.¹⁰ The mode of counting such

⁷ The significance of these topics in the ancient Indian setting would be reflected in a passage in the Jain *Viyāhapaññatti* 9.33 in Lalwani 1985: 103–105, where a Jain monk's claim to having become a *jina* is investigated by another Jain monk. This investigation takes place by querying the claimant whether the world is eternal or not, and whether the soul is eternal or not. As the claimant is unable to reply to these queries, his claim to having reached the final goal has been proven to be wrong. This is then followed by Mahāvīra giving the answers that these questions are held to require, namely that the world and the soul are eternal in one sense and not eternal in another sense. On parallelisms between Vacchagotta's questions and the *Katha Upaniṣad* cf. also Nakamura 1983b: 23–25.

⁸ SĀ² 196 differs from SĀ 962 in as much as, after mentioning that the world could be either eternal, or not eternal, or both eternal and not eternal, it depicts a fourth alternative according to which the world is “not eternal [and] not impermanent, not not eternal [and] not not impermanent”, T II 445a12: 非常非無常, 非非常非非無常. This appears to be a textual error, in fact the same fourth alternative at a later point in SĀ² 196 at T II 445a29 reads simply: “not eternal [and] not impermanent”, 非常非無常. The same pattern recurs in relation to the fourth position on the world's finiteness, where SĀ² 196 at T II 445a16 mentions 非有邊非無邊, but then continues with 非非有邊非非無邊, yet a recapitulation of the same position in SĀ² 196 at T II 445b1 just reads 非有邊非無邊. Again, in its counterpart to the examination of the future destiny of a Tathāgata SĀ² 196 at T II 445a19 reads 非有非無, 非非有非非無, which in this case, however, is also the formulation used later at T II 445b2. A variation can also be found in Abhidh-k-t, where Vacchagotta omits to mention the possibility that the world could be neither finite nor infinite, D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 157a4 or Q (5595) *tu* 181b1, although this possibility is taken into account in the Buddha's reply at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 157a5 or Q (5595) *tu* 181b3: *mtha' dang yang bcas la mtha' med pa*.

⁹ DĀ 17 at T I 75c12, DĀ 18 at T I 111a4, DĀ 19 at T I 128a19, SĀ 168 at T II 45b9, SĀ 408 at T II 109a29, SĀ 962 at T II 245c3, SĀ 963 at T II 246a22, SĀ 968 at T II 248c19, and SĀ² 196 at T II 445a28; cf. also SĀ² 202 at T II 448c2.

¹⁰ MĀ 220 at T I 803c16, MĀ 221 at T I 804a26, and EĀ 47.9 at T II 784b3; cf. also Enomoto 1986: 21.

views employed in the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions recurs also in the *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*.¹¹

Table 8.1: Vacchagotta's Questions in MN 72 and its Parallels

MN 72	SĀ 962 & SĀ ² 196 & Abhidh-k-ṭ
world is eternal (1)	world is eternal (→ 1)
- not eternal (2)	- not eternal (→ 2)
world is finite (3)	- both
- infinite (4)	- neither
soul is same as body (5)	world is finite (→ 3)
- different (6)	- infinite (→ 4)
Tathāgata exists after death (7)	- both
- does not exist (8)	- neither
- both (9)	soul is same as body (→ 5)
- neither (10)	- different (→ 6)
	Tathāgata exists after death (→ 7)
	- does not exist (→ 8)
	- both (→ 9)
	- neither (→ 10)

In regard to the destiny of a Tathāgata after death, one of the two *Samyukta-āgama* parallels to the *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* speaks of the destiny of the “self of beings” or the “soul of beings”.¹² This presentation parallels an explanation found in the Pāli commentarial tradition, which understands occurrences of the word Tathāgata in the context of this fourfold presentation to stand for a “living being”.¹³

From the perspective of textual transmission, it is noteworthy that the formulation of the tetralemma in one of the *Samyukta-āgama* discourses corresponds to this commentarial understanding of the term Tathāgata. Perhaps an ancient Indian commentary that was similar to the commentarial gloss preserved in Pāli influenced the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse’s formulation.

Continuing with the comparative study of the *Aggivacchagotta-sutta*, once the Buddha had declined to take up any of these different views, Vacchagotta asked what dan-

¹¹ Abhidh-k 5:22 in Pradhan 1967: 292,8: *caturdaśāvyākṛtavastūni*, introduced as a teaching from the discourses; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 103a21: 諸契經中說十四無記事 and T 1559 at T XXIX 256c17: 於經中所說，有十四種無記。Thus, as noted by Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 471, while “only ten questions are mentioned in the Pāli Canon ... in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature ... the list is extended to fourteen”.

¹² SĀ² 196 at T II 445a18: 眾生神我.

¹³ E.g., Sv I 118,1: *satto tathāgato ti adhippeto*. This explanation seems to be standard for commenting on the tetralemma, cf. also Ps III 141,21: *tathāgato ti satto*, a formulation found similarly in Spk II 201,4 and Mp IV 37,22; on this commentarial gloss cf. also Gnanarama 1997: 236-237, Karunadasa 2007: 7-12, and Manda 2005. When it comes to occurrences of the term Tathāgata in contexts not related to the tetralemma, the commentaries record two possible meanings, namely either a living being in general or else an arahant, cf., e.g., Ps II 117,13: *satto pi tathāgato ti adhippeto, uttamapuggalo khīṇāsavo pi*, an understanding also reflected in Nidd-a I 193,24 and Patis-a II 453,24: *tathāgato ti satto, arahan ti eke*.

ger the Buddha saw in these propositions. According to the Pāli and the Tibetan versions, the Buddha explained that to get entangled in these views does not lead to Nirvāṇa.¹⁴ The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions make the same point by declaring that such entanglement will lead to future birth, old age, and death.¹⁵

MN I 486 Asked by Vacchagotta if he held any view, the Buddha replied that he had done away with all resorting to views (*dīṭṭhigata*), as he had seen (*dīṭṭha*) what leads to liberation. While according to the *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* the Buddha's "vision" consisted in seeing the impermanent nature of the five aggregates,¹⁶ in the two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses and in the Tibetan version his vision concerns the four noble truths.¹⁷

According to one of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, the Buddha explained that a monk with such vision cannot be said to reappear, nor can it be said that he does not reappear.¹⁸ According to the other *Samyukta-āgama* version, the Buddha simply pointed out that such a monk will not come back to existence in any of the three realms.¹⁹ Both of the Chinese versions indicate that Vacchagotta asked for further explanations of this statement.

The Pāli and the Tibetan versions report, however, that Vacchagotta had on his own inquired after the reappearance of such a monk. According to the Pāli account, he formulated his inquiry in the same tetralemma mode he had used earlier for the future destiny of a Tathāgata.

The Pāli version records that the Buddha's denial of all four alternatives caused Vacchagotta's bewilderment, a reaction the Buddha attributed to the fact that Vacchagotta was following a different type of teaching and practice.²⁰ Such an exchange between the Buddha and Vacchagotta, or a reference to his following a different practice, is not found in the other versions.

¹⁴ MN 72 at MN I 485,28 and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 157b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 181b8. Regarding the Buddha's refusal to take up any of the four modes of predication the destiny of a Tathāgata after death, Karunadasa 1994: 8 points out that "to predicate whether something exists or not one should be able to identify it ... [but] there is no identifiable self-entity called Tathāgata, either to be perpetuated or annihilated after 'death'", wherefore any statement made about a Tathāgata after death becomes meaningless. For a survey of scholarship on the Buddha's position regarding these questions cf. Vélez de Cea 2004b: 120-125.

¹⁵ SĀ 962 at T II 245c10 and SĀ² 196 at T II 445a23.

¹⁶ MN 72 at MN I 486,12; on this passage cf., e.g., Fuller 2005: 63.

¹⁷ SĀ 962 at T II 245c22, SĀ² 196 at T II 445b9, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 157b6 or Q (5595) *tu* 182a7.

¹⁸ SĀ 962 at T II 245c26: "it is not the case that he is one to be reborn, it is also not the case that he is not reborn", 生者不然, 不生亦不然.

¹⁹ SĀ² 196 at T II 445b15: "to take up a body again in the three realms, that is impossible [for him]", 若更受身於三有者, 無有是處.

²⁰ MN 72 at MN I 487,7. A similar remark, indicating that the more profound aspects of the Buddha's teaching are difficult to understand for someone who follows a different type of teaching and practice, recurs in several other discourses that similarly present the Buddha in discussion with a wanderer, cf. DN 9 at DN I 187,13 and its parallel DĀ 28 at T I 110c29, DN 24 at DN III 35,3 and its parallel DĀ 15 at T I 70a15, or MN 80 at MN II 43,11 and its parallel MĀ 209 at T I 787b2. Another occurrence of this remark, found in DN 25 at DIII 40,8, is absent from its parallels DĀ 8 at T I 47c6 and MĀ 104 at T I 592a26.

The *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* and its parallels agree in illustrating the nature of the Tathāgata after death with the example of an extinguished fire.²¹ Once a fire has gone out, it is not possible to point out the direction to which the fire has gone. Similarly, the Tathāgata has abandoned each of the five aggregates, like a cut off palm tree unable to grow again.

The *Aggivacchagotta-sutta* continues by noting that the four modes of the tetralemma are not applicable to the Tathāgata, who is profound and unfathomable like the ocean.²² This explanation and the image of the ocean are not recorded in the other versions. One of the two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses does, however, mention the qualities “profound” and “boundless”, apparently referring to the Tathāgata, so that a similar statement could have been found in an earlier version of this discourse and may have been lost during the course of transmission or translation.²³

The four versions agree that Vacchagotta compared the Buddha’s teaching to a strong tree trunk, divested of branches and foliage.²⁴ While in the Pāli version Vacchagotta took refuge and became a lay disciple, according to the Chinese versions he left without taking refuge.²⁵

MN I 488

MN 73 *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*²⁶

The *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, the “greater discourse to Vacchagotta”, records how the wanderer Vacchagotta decided to go forth and became an arahant. This discourse has two Chinese parallels in two *Samyukta-āgama* collections,²⁷ and another parallel in a

²¹ MN 72 at MN I 487,11, SĀ 962 at T II 245c28, SĀ² 196 at T II 445b17, and D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 158a2 or Q (5595) *tu* 182b2. Interpretations of this simile can be found in, e.g., Harvey 1990: 66-67, Nāṇananda 2010, and Thanissaro 1993: 41; cf. also Siderits 1979: 496.

²² MN 72 at MN I 487,35. Harvey 1983: 35 examines this passage with the help of SN 44:1 at SN IV 376,11; cf. also Tilakaratne 1993: 78-79.

²³ After declaring that a re-arising of someone who has abandoned the five aggregates cannot be predicated, SĀ 962 at T II 246a10 continues like this: “profound, vast, boundless, innumerable, forever ceased”, 甚深, 廣大, 無量, 無數, 永滅, after which the Buddha’s explanation ends. The implications of this statement receive no further explanation, so that they might be qualifying the Tathāgata, similar to the parallel passage in MN 72.

²⁴ While MN 72 at MN I 488,28 indicates that this tree was “big”, *mahā*, according to SĀ 962 at T II 246a13 the tree was several thousand years old, 數千歲, according to SĀ² 196 at T II 445c3 the tree was a hundred-thousand years old, 百千年, and according to D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 158b1 or Q (5595) *tu* 183a3 the tree was innumerable many years old, *lo du ma zhig ci la grangs mang du*. These variations show how even minor circumstances can fall prey to successive stages of aggrandizement. Another difference is that SĀ 962 does not speak of a tree, but rather of a forest, 林, a reading also found in an Uighur fragment that parallels the present passage, cf. Kudara 1995: 27.

²⁵ SĀ 962 at T II 246a17 and SĀ² 196 at T II 445c8; Abhidh-k-t does not report either his departure or his going for refuge.

²⁶ B^e-M II 156,25 has the title *Mahāvaccha-sutta*.

²⁷ The parallels are SĀ 964 at T II 246b-247c and SĀ² 198 at T II 446a-447b. SĀ 964 agrees with MN 73 on locating the discourse in the Squirrels’ Feeding Ground by Rājagaha, while SĀ² 198 simply mentions

discourse quotation that is found in an Abhidharma treatise preserved in Chinese translation.²⁸

MN I 489 The *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta* begins by describing that the wanderer Vacchagotta approached the Buddha and requested a teaching in brief on what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. In reply, the Buddha contrasted the three mental roots of unwholesomeness with their wholesome counterparts, illustrating both with the corresponding ten courses of action.

The *Samyukta-āgama* versions report the Buddha's exposition in similar terms, although they differ to some extent in their narration of what took place beforehand. According to them, Vacchagotta had asked the Buddha three times if he could put a question to him, but the Buddha had remained silent each time.²⁹ Vacchagotta then asked the Buddha why he remained silent, in fact according to one of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions he remarked that he had been on friendly terms with the Buddha for a long time.³⁰

Notably, a somewhat similar remark occurs also in the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*.³¹ While in this version the reasons for this statement by Vacchagotta are not clear and his remark appears to be just a way of beginning their conversation, in the *Samyukta-āgama* version Vacchagotta's remark stands in a more meaningful context, as it is part of an effort to persuade the Buddha to answer Vacchagotta's question.

According to the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, when the Buddha finally agreed to answer Vacchagotta's question, he made a point of indicating that he would just give a teaching in brief on this subject.³² This additional qualification naturally follows the Buddha's initial silence, which already would have indicated that, from his perspective, the present occasion was not appropriate for longer discussions.

Rājagaha as the location, without further specifications. Anesaki 1908: 137 gives SĀ 964 the title “going forth”, 出家, an expression that is also found in an *uddāna* at T II 447b11 as a way of referring to SĀ² 198. As was the case with the *Samyukta-āgama* parallels to MN 72, the version found in the complete *Samyukta-āgama* translation (T 99), SĀ 964 at T II 246b13, agrees with MN 73 on introducing the Buddha's interlocutor as the wanderer Vacchagotta, 婆蹉種出家, while the version found in the ‘other’ *Samyukta-āgama* translation (T 100), SĀ² 196 at T II 446a11, presents the protagonist of the present event as 罇子梵志, on which cf. above p. 389 note 6.

²⁸ This is the 佛阿毘曇經, which according to the information given in the Taishō edition was translated by Paramārtha. The relevant part is found in T 1482 at T XXIV 963a14-965a4 (noted as a parallel by Chung 2008: 197), which mentions Rājagaha as the location and introduces its protagonist as the heterodox practitioner Vacchaputta, 罇子外道.

²⁹ SĀ 964 at T II 246b17, SĀ² 198 at T II 446a14, and T 1482 at T XXIV 963a18.

³⁰ SĀ² 198 at T II 446a15: “for a long time I have had close relations with you”, 我於長夜與汝親厚; cf. also T 1482 at T XXIV 963a22.

³¹ MN 73 at MN I 489,12: “for a long time I have had conversation with sir Gotama”, *dīgharattāham bhotā gotamena sahakathī*.

³² SĀ 964 at T II 246b25, SĀ² 198 at T II 446a23, and T 1482 at T XXIV 963b2: 略說. According to SĀ² 198 at T II 446a23 and T 1482 at T XXIV 963b1, the Buddha indicated that he was going to teach in brief even though he would be able to expound this subject in detail, similar to a remark he made according to MN 73 at MN I 489,15: “I could teach you in detail”, *vitthārena pi kho te aham ... deseyyam*.

The *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, however, reports that it was Vacchagotta who had asked to be given only a teaching in brief. In reply, the Buddha explained that, although he would be able to teach this topic in brief and in detail, he would agree to Vacchagotta's request and teach only in brief.³³ Thus, while in the *Samyukta-āgama* versions the Buddha had on his own decided that he would only give a brief exposition, and that after initially refusing to get involved in a discussion at all, in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version it was in order to comply with Vacchagotta's explicit request that the Buddha decided to give only a brief answer to his visitor's query.

According to other Pāli discourses, Vacchagotta had come with his questions to the Buddha or some of his disciples on numerous occasions,³⁴ so that the Buddha's attitude in the *Samyukta-āgama* parallels to the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta* could be seen as a teaching device to restrain Vacchagotta's inquisitive habit.

An instance of this device can in fact be found in a discourse in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and its parallels, which report that on another occasion the Buddha remained silent and did not reply at all to a question posed by Vacchagotta.³⁵ The Buddha's attitude depicted in these discourses would be similar to the account given in the *Samyukta-āgama* parallels to the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, according to which on the present occasion the Buddha was also somewhat hesitant to engage in a discussion with Vacchagotta.

The Pāli commentary's gloss on the present passage devotes some space to discussing the nature of brief and detailed expositions, explaining that the seven works of the Abhidharma should be considered as teachings "in brief".³⁶ What makes this remark noteworthy is that the Chinese versions also refer to the Abhidharma. This reference comes as part of their description of what went on in the Buddha's mind before he allowed Vacchagotta to put his question. According to both versions, the Buddha decided to listen to or to reply to Vacchagotta's question according to or by way of Abhidharma and *Vinaya*.³⁷

This specification is puzzling. The reference to the Abhidharma together with the *Vinaya* would correspond to a frequently found phrase in the Pāli discourses, which speaks of *abhidhamma abhivinaya*.³⁸ In such contexts, the prefix *abhi-* appears to have mainly

³³ MN 73 at MN I 489,14.

³⁴ The Pāli *Nikāyas* record over sixty discourses featuring Vacchagotta's inquiries, cf. MN 71-72 at MN I 481-489, SN 33:1-55 at SN III 257-263, SN 44:7-11 at SN IV 391-402, and AN 3:57 at AN I 160-162.

³⁵ SN 44:10 at SN IV 400,17+19, SĀ 961 at T II 245b12, and SĀ² 195 at T II 444c4.

³⁶ Ps III 200,19: *sappakarāṇam abhidhammapiṭakañ ca sabbam saṅkhittam eva.*

³⁷ SĀ 964 at T II 246b20: "I will now by way of Abhidharma and *Vinaya* receive that [question]", 我今當以阿毘曇律納受於彼, SĀ² 198 at T II 446a18: "I will listen according to Abhidharma and *Vinaya* to that question", 吾當聽之, 若阿毘曇毘尼, 隨其所問, T 1428 at T XXIV 963a25: "I shall reply to his question according to the deeper meaning of the Abhidharma and the deeper meaning of the *Vinaya*", 當如阿毘曇密義, 如律密義, 有問當為敷說.

³⁸ E.g., Vin I 64,28, Vin I 68,14, DN 33 at DN III 267,27, DN 34 at DN III 290,14, MN 69 at MN I 472,5, AN 3:137 at AN I 288,20, AN 3:138 at AN I 290,6, AN 3:139 at AN I 291,14, AN 9:22 at AN IV 398,1, AN 10:17 at AN V 24,17, AN 10:18 at AN V 27,18, AN 10:50 at AN V 90,27, AN 10:98 at AN V 201,13, and AN 11:15 at AN V 339,2.

the meaning “pertaining to” or “related to”, so that *abhidhamma* would stand for what “pertains to the Dharma”.³⁹ Yet, for the Buddha to reflect that he would listen to a question in a way that pertains to the Dharma or the *Vinaya* seems curious, since it is difficult to imagine how he could be depicted as doing otherwise. Besides, the topic of Vacchagotta’s inquiry and the ensuing exposition given by the Buddha involve rather basic teachings on wholesome and unwholesome conduct, hence the later meaning of Abhidharma as a form of profound analysis of deeper aspects of the teaching would also not fit the present context.

Thus, the most natural explanation of the occurrence of this specification in the Chinese versions would be that it could have originated from a remark on the Abhidharma, presumably as representative of teachings in brief, made in an ancient Indian commentary on this discourse, similar to the remark now found in the Pāli commentary.

Continuing with the comparative study of the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta*, after expounding the three roots and the ten courses of action, the Pāli and Chinese versions take up the case of a monk who has reached liberation. The Chinese versions provide a transition to this topic by indicating that to understand the three roots and the ten courses of action in accordance with reality forms the basis for being able to eradicate the influxes and reach liberation.⁴⁰

MN I 490 According to the *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta* and its parallels, Vacchagotta next inquired after the existence of realized disciples.⁴¹ Finding out that large numbers of the Buddha’s disciples had reached distinction, males as well as females, with monastics reaching levels of awakening up to full liberation and laity up to non-return, Vacchagotta came to the conclusion that the Buddha’s teaching was complete in every respect.⁴²

MN I 493 The Pāli version reports that Vacchagotta illustrated this completeness by comparing the way the river Ganges inclines and flows to the ocean to the way the disciples of the Buddha are inclined towards Nirvāṇa, an image that recurs frequently in other Pāli discourses.⁴³ Instead of the Ganges imagery, the Chinese versions illustrate how the disciples of the Buddha advance towards Nirvāṇa with the example of how the water of a great rain flows downwards.⁴⁴ One of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions further enhances

³⁹ Cf. the discussion in Geiger 1920: 118-119, Horner 1941: 298, van Zeyst 1959: 64, and von Hinüber 1996/1997: 64; cf. also above p. 213 note 50.

⁴⁰ SĀ 964 at T II 246c3, SĀ² 198 at T II 446a29, and T 1428 at T XXIV 963b6.

⁴¹ A comparable inquiry addressed to Mahāvīra regarding the level of realization of disciples can be found in the *Viyāhapaññatti* 5.4.59 in Lalwani 1974: 165,7, although the inquirers in this instance are gods and the conversation takes place purely on the mental level.

⁴² On the levels of awakening attainable by laity cf. also above p. 373 note 176.

⁴³ This is the case to such an extent that a recurring passage in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which uses this image in order to illustrate how various aspects of the Dharma lead to Nirvāṇa, is called the *Gangāpeyyāla*, the “Ganges repetition”. This “Ganges repetition” occurs at the end of the *Maggasamyutta* at SN V 38, and is then repeated at the end of the *Bojjhaṅga-samyutta* at SN V 134 and SN V 137, at the end of the *Sati-paṭṭhāna-samyutta* at SN V 190, at the end of the *Indriya-samyutta* at SN V 241, at the end of the *Bala-samyutta* at SN V 251, and at the end of the *Iddhipāda-samyutta* at SN V 290.

⁴⁴ SĀ 964 at T II 247a15, SĀ² 198 at T II 446c17, and T 1428 at T XXIV 963c22.

this image by indicating that the disciples advance in such a way due to receiving the ‘rain’ of the Buddha’s teaching.⁴⁵

The *Mahāvacchagotta-sutta* and its parallels record in similar ways that Vacchagotta requested to be ordained, in reply to which the Buddha explained a standard practice according to which followers of other sects need to go through a probation period of four months before they are given full ordination.⁴⁶ The parallel versions agree that, nevertheless, Vacchagotta was soon admitted to the order.⁴⁷

Not long after his ordination, Vacchagotta went to the Buddha to receive further instructions. According to all versions, Vacchagotta made it clear that he had accomplished what was to be done by a disciple in higher training, an expression the commentary explains to imply that he had become a non-returner.⁴⁸

According to the Pāli account, the Buddha instructed Vacchagotta to train himself further in tranquillity and insight, indicating that training in this way has the potential

MN I 494

⁴⁵ SĀ² 198 at T II 446c19: 蒙佛法雨.

⁴⁶ According to MN 73 at MN I 494,10, Vacchagotta proclaimed that he would undergo a probation period for four years, a proposition which Horner 1957/1970: xvi considers to be slightly exaggerated. T 1428 at T XXIV 964a4 agrees with MN 73. In SĀ² 198 at T II 446c25, however, Vacchagotta only states that, even if he had to wait for four years he would do so, what to say about four months. In SĀ 964 at T II 247a26 he just states that he is willing to undergo a four months’ probation period. SĀ 964 at T II 247a20 and T 1428 at T XXIV 963c26 also indicate that the Buddha’s statement on the standard procedure regarding ordination of followers of other sects was prompted by an inquiry by Vacchagotta, as he had asked about the time period required for heterodox wanderers to get ordained.

⁴⁷ Regarding such going forth after a probation period, the description in MN 73 at MN I 494,3 reads as if the going forth is to be given only after the four months are over, *catunnampi māsānam accayena ... pabbajenti*. Dhirasekera 1982/2007: 220 notes that this stands in contrast to the description of the probation period in Vin I 69,11, according to which the probationer should be shaved and clothed in robes. SĀ² 198 at T II 446c22 seems to agree in this respect with the Theravāda *Vinaya* account, as it also indicates that the probationer should be shaved before the probation period begins, 先剃其鬚髮. In fact, for other monks to be able to assess the sincerity of a probationer, it would be convenient if the latter were to live in close association with them, which would be facilitated if he were given some degree of going forth. That is, the probationer would need to receive at least some form of *pabbajā*, so that he could set out begging alms with shaven head and wearing the robes of a Buddhist monastic, as keeping his former style of dress and hair would create a somewhat awkward situation for him as a freshly converted Buddhist in front of the donors. Hence, the formulation in MN 73 should perhaps not be taken too literal. Thus, the point of the probation period would be, as explained by Olivelle 1974: 69, that “during this period the new recruit was excluded from the official acts of the community”, a situation thus “similar to the penal *parivāsa* by which a monk guilty of an offence was [temporarily] excluded from full communion with the community”. Deo 1956: 143 notes that in the Jain tradition a probation period had to be observed in general before being admitted to the monastic community, lasting either a week, or four months, or six months. According to Prasad 1972a: 89, there was, however, no special procedure for the case of those who had earlier been members of a different sect.

⁴⁸ MN 73 at MN I 494,18: *yāvata&am; ... sekhena nānena sekhāya vijjāya patti&bam; anuppattam tam ma-yā* (S^e-MN II 258,1 without *tam*), with the commentarial gloss at Ps III 202,5. In SĀ 964 at T II 247b10, Vacchagotta proclaims that “in regard to what a *sekha* needs to know ... I know it all”, 我於學所應知 ... 悉知, and in SĀ² 198 at T II 447a5 he declares that “in regard to the stage of a *sekha*, I have already realized it all”, 我於學地, 都證知已; cf. also T 1428 at T XXIV 964a18.

of leading to the attainment of the six supernormal knowledges. The Chinese versions present a broader range of benefits, as, in addition to the six supernormal knowledges,⁴⁹ they list:

- the four *jhānas*,
- the four *brahmavihāras*,
- the four immaterial attainments,
- the three lower stages of realization (see in more detail table 8.2).

Regarding the reference in the Chinese versions to the three lower stages of realization, i.e. to the attainments of stream-entry, once-return, and non-return,⁵⁰ it is noteworthy that, according to the description given in all versions of Vacchagotta's development at this point, he had already attained at least stream-entry, if not more. Thus, this part of their list of benefits appears to some degree redundant, as it mentions levels of attainment that he would have already reached.

Table 8.2: Listing of Benefits in MN 73 and its Parallels

MN 73	SĀ 664
supernormal powers (1) divine ear (2) knowing others' mind (3) recollecting past lives (4) divine eye (5) destruction of influxes (6)	4 <i>jhānas</i> 4 <i>brahmavihāras</i> 4 immaterial attainments stream-entry once-return non-return supernormal powers (→ 1) divine eye (→ 5) divine ear (→ 2) know others' mind (→ 3) recollect past lives (→ 4) know birth & death of beings (→ 5) destruction of influxes (→ 6)

⁴⁹ The list of the six *abhiññas* in SĀ 664 appears somewhat jumbled, as SĀ 664 at T II 247b23 speaks first of the “divine eye”, 天眼, but after listing three other supernormal knowledges refers to the same divine eye again in terms of “knowledge of the birth and death [of beings]”, 生死智. This duplication would not be required and also stands in contrast to other discourses in the same *Samyukta-āgama*, which list the six *abhiññas* in the same sequence as the Pāli discourses, without any such duplication, cf., e.g., SĀ 814 at T II 209b10, SĀ 815 at T II 209c27, SĀ 1042 at T II 273a23, and SĀ 1142 at T II 302a25. In the case of SĀ² 198 at T II 447a16, another noteworthy circumstance is that this discourse presents the divine eye and the divine ear together as a single supernormal knowledge, 天眼耳. This could be an abbreviation of 天眼耳, an expression used in the same discourse collection in SĀ² 117 at T II 417a19. Another discourse in the same collection, SĀ² 119 at T II 418c27, presents the divine ear as a knowledge on its own as 天耳, followed by referring to the divine eye as “knowledge of the birth and death [of beings]”, 生死智.

⁵⁰ SĀ 964 at T II 247b21, SĀ² 198 at T II 447a14, and T 1428 at T XXIV 964b3.

SĀ ² 198	T 1428
4 <i>jhānas</i>	1 st <i>jhāna</i>
4 <i>brahmavihāras</i>	2 nd <i>jhāna</i>
4 immaterial attainments	3 rd <i>jhāna</i>
stream-entry	4 th <i>jhāna</i>
once-return	4 <i>brahmavihāras</i>
non-return	4 immaterial attainments
supernormal powers (→ 1)	stream-entry
know others' mind (→ 3)	once-return
recollect past lives (→ 4)	non-return
divine eye and ear (→ 2, 5)	supernormal powers (→ 1)
destruction of influxes (→ 6)	divine ear (→ 2)
	know others' mind (→ 3)
	recollect past lives (→ 4)
	divine eye (→ 5)
	destruction of influxes (→ 6)

The four versions report that Vacchagotta eventually realized the final goal.⁵¹ He then MN I 496 sent a message conveying his accomplishment to the Buddha, who in reply indicated that he already knew about Vacchagotta's progress and had also been told about it by *devas*.

MN 74 *Dīghanakha-sutta*

The *Dīghanakha-sutta*, the “discourse to Dīghanakha”, examines views and feelings, an examination during which the wanderer Dīghanakha became a stream-enterer and Sāriputta an arahant. This discourse has two parallels in two *Samyukta-āgama* translations,⁵² and another parallel in the *Pravrajyāvastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*.⁵³

⁵¹ MN 73 at MN I 496,31, SĀ 964 at T II 247b28, SĀ² 198 at T II 447a22, and T 1428 at T XXIV 964c26.

⁵² The discourse parallels are SĀ 969 at T II 249a-250a and SĀ² 203 at T II 449a-b. While MN 74 takes place at Mount Vulture Peak near Rājagaha, SĀ 969 and SĀ² 203 have the Squirrel's Feeding Ground near the same Rājagaha as their location. Anesaki 1908: 137 lists SĀ 969 under the title “Dīghanakha”, 長爪, a title used in an *uddāna* at T II 453b19 to refer to SĀ² 203. A variation on the Pāli version's title can be found in the Pāli commentaries, which refer to this discourse as the *Vedanāpariggaha-suttanta*, the “discourse on comprehending feelings” (cf. Sv II 418,19, Ps IV 87,7, Spk II 234,8, Mp I 161,7, Dhp-a I 96,9, and Th-a III 95,22). In the early discourses, *pariggaha* refers to “acquisition”, which would not result in a meaningful title for the present discourse. The title *Vedanāpariggaha-sutta* appears to be rather based on a sense *pariggaha* acquired later, in the post-canonical period, as “comprehension” or even “investigation”, cf., e.g., the gloss given in B^e-Vibh-mṭ 32 on the expression *pariggaha thito* as *vīmaṇasāya thito*; cf. also Nāṇamoli 1994: 69, who lists “discerning” for *pariggaha*. Thus this alternative title for MN 74 appears to be a commentarial coinage. Another discourse given to a different person with the same name as the protagonist of MN 74 is the “discourse on the query of the Brahmin Dīghanakha”, 長爪梵志請問經, T 584 at T XIV 968a-c, a Tibetan version being in D (342) *mdo sde, a* 298b-330a and Q (1009) *shu* 302b-304a (a survey of its content can be found in Feer 1881a: 283), and a Sogdian version, edited in Benveniste 1940: 74-79; for a translation of the Sogdian version and comparison with its Chinese counterpart cf. Gauthiot 1912; for a recently discovered Sanskrit version cf. Vinītā 2010: 358-

Several parts of the present discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁵⁴ Versions of the present discourse can also be found in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*,⁵⁵ in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*,⁵⁶ and in the *Avadānaśataka*.⁵⁷

MN I 497 The *Dīghanakha-sutta* and its parallels report that the wanderer Dīghanakha came to visit the Buddha and presented his view.⁵⁸ Additional narrative background to this meeting is provided in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, and the *Avadānaśataka*, which report that Dīghanakha had been displeased or even irritated on hearing that his close relative Sāriputta, whom he respected for his intelligence, had become a disciple of another teacher.⁵⁹ This would explain the slightly provocative nuance that appears to underlie the way he presents his view to the Buddha in the discourse versions.

389, who collates the Sanskrit text with its Chinese and Tibetan counterparts. This discourse relates how a Brahmin visitor by the name of Dīrghanakha inquired from the Buddha about the karmic causes for various physical qualities of the Buddha (in some respects similar to DN 30 at DN III 145-179). Thus, as already noted by Sander 1979: 62, this discourse has little in common with MN 74, as “only in the introduction to the sūtra are there any similarities and the locality is the same”. Another reference can be found in the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*, which mentions a discourse spoken to the Brahmin Dīghanakha, a discourse it allocates to the *Dīrgha-āgama*, cf. T 212 at TIV 736c28.

⁵³ The relevant section of the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* has been edited in Eimer 1983: 96-105. Its Chinese counterpart, T 1444 at T XXIII 1028c4-15, is abbreviated and gives only the beginning part of the encounter between the Buddha and Dīghanakha.

⁵⁴ The Sanskrit fragments can be found in Pischel 1904: 814-816 or Hosoda 1989b: 144-151. The close correspondence of these fragments to SĀ 969 was noticed soon after their publication by Lévi 1904: 299.

⁵⁵ T 1509 at T XXV 61b-62a and T XXV 254b, translated in Lamotte 1944/1981: 47-51 and id. 1970a: 1688-1689.

⁵⁶ T 1545 at T XXVII 509b-510b.

⁵⁷ The relevant *Avadānaśataka* tale is no. 99 in Speyer 1909/1970: 186-196 or in Vaidya 1958a: 255-259, with its Chinese counterpart in T 200 at T IV 255a-256b, translated in Pachow 1945: 49-53, and its Tibetan counterpart in Devacandra 1996: 708-721. On the depiction of Dīrghanakha’s karmic background in this tale cf. also Feer 1882: 339. Oldenberg 1912b: 178 highlights the close similarity between the Sanskrit fragments in Pischel 1904 and the Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka* tale.

⁵⁸ As Wagle 1966: 49 explains, Dīghanakha is a nickname, alluding to his “long nails”. A reference to his name has also been preserved in an Uighur fragment in Kudara 1995: 28. According to the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 61c5, the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 509b22, and the *Pravrajyāvastu* in Dutt 1984d: 22,1 and folio 6r1 in Vogel 1992: 79, this wanderer was called Dīghanakha or Dīrghanakha because he did not cut his finger nails (according to the otherwise unrelated EĀ 34.4 at T II 694a12, to keep the nails long was one of five characteristics of contemporary recluses and wanderers). SĀ² 203 at T II 449a5 differs from the other sources in so far as it introduces its protagonist as 長爪梵志. It is a recurring characteristic of this *Samyukta-āgama* collection (T 100) that it uses 梵志 for what in the parallel versions are wanderers, as the same recurs also in the parallels to MN 72 and MN 73, SĀ² 196 and SĀ² 198, cf. above p. 389 note 6 and p. 394 note 27. In the present case, this specification would fit the context, as all versions reckon Dīghanakha a close relative of Sāriputta, so that he would indeed stem from a Brahmin family. According to Goshima 2008: 332, however, it is also quite possible that in the present context 梵志 renders *parivrājaka*, cf. also Karashima 2001: 88 s.v. 梵志.

⁵⁹ T 1509 at T XXV 61c15, T 1545 at T XXVII 509c4, and the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 187,4 or in Vaidya 1958a: 256,1, with its counterparts in T 200 at T IV 256a8 and in Devacandra 1996: 709,16.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version reports that Dīghanakha made the proclamation that he did not approve of anything.⁶⁰ According to one of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, his proposition was that he did not approve of any view, while according to the other *Samyukta-āgama* version he did not approve of any teaching.⁶¹

Dīghanakha's proposition in the Sanskrit fragment, in the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Avadānaśataka* tale is as brief as the Pāli statement.⁶² The way the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra* and the Chinese *Pravrajyāvastu* record his statement, however, is more elaborate and thus resembles more closely the *Samyukta-āgama* versions.⁶³

The Pāli commentary suggests that Dīghanakha was an annihilationist and hence his proclamation implied that he did not approve of any kind of rebirth.⁶⁴ The formulation in one of the *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, however, suggests that his refusal referred to views or doctrines.⁶⁵ This much seems to be also implicit in the reply the Buddha gave to Dīghanakha's proclamation in all versions, since tongue in cheek he asked his visitor if this refusal to approve of anything also included Dīghanakha's own view.⁶⁶ The humour underlying the Buddha's reply is lost when Dīghanakha's proposition is seen as only being concerned with modes of rebirth.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version reports Dīghanakha replying that it would not matter if he were to approve of his own view.⁶⁷ According to the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, the

⁶⁰ MN 74 at MN I 497,26: *sabbam me na khamatī ti* (B^e-MN II 165,13: *nakkhamatī ti*), literally “all is not bearable to me”, which in the present context would have the sense “I do not approve of anything”.

⁶¹ SĀ 969 at T II 249b3: “I do not approve of any view”, 我一切見不忍, and SĀ² 203 at T II 449a6: “in regard to all teachings, I do not approve of any”, 於一切法, 悉不忍受. The character 忍 means literally “to bear, to endure, to put up with” and thus closely corresponds to *khamati* or *ksamati* and to their equivalent *bzod do* used in the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*; cf. also Hirakawa 1997: 467, who begins his list of equivalents for 忍 with *kyānti* and *ksama*.

⁶² Fol. 162a5 in Pischel 1904: 814: *sarvam me na ksamati*, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 96,13: *bdag ni thams cad mi bzod do*, the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 509c9: 我一切不忍, and the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 187,10 or in Vaidya 1958a: 256,7: *sarvam me, bho Gautama, na kṣamata iti*, with its Tibetan counterpart in *bdag ni thams cad mi 'tshal lo* in Devacandra 1996: 710,9 (the Chinese *avadāna* tale does not record his statement).

⁶³ According to the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 62a3, he proclaimed: “I do not approve of any teachings”, 我一切法不忍 (adopting the 元, 宮, and 石 variant reading 忍 instead of 受), thereby bringing in the notion of teachings found also in SĀ² 203. In the Chinese *Pravrajyāvastu*, T 1444 at T XXIII 1028c5, his proposition is more elaborate: “any of my [own] teachings, or the holding of a corresponding view, all that I do not desire”, 一切我法, 所有見等, 皆我不欲.

⁶⁴ Ps III 204,3 (as a gloss on his position): “all [types of] arising are not approved of by me ... I am an annihilationist”, *sabbā me upapattiyo nakkhamanti ... uchedavādo 'ham asmi ti*.

⁶⁵ SĀ 969 at T II 249b3: 見, although a 宋, 元, 明, and 聖 variant reading does not mention the “view”, 見.

⁶⁶ Fuller 2005: 154 explains the purpose of this inquiry to be that “the Buddha is attempting to find out how this view is being held. Is Dīghanakha's view a non-position, its aim to overcome all cognitive standpoints, or is Dīghanakha holding to this view?”. Premasiri 2006a: 186 notes that “Dīghanakha's position could itself become a dogma. For if one dogmatically holds the view ‘I agree with no view’, it can have the same consequences as taking any other dogmatic position”.

⁶⁷ MN 74 at MN I 497,28: “if this view were to be approved of by me, it would still be the same, it would

Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, and the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* tale, however, he affirmed that he also did not approve of his own view.⁶⁸ One of the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions reports that the Buddha followed up this inconsistency by asking Dīghanakha why he had proclaimed a view he did not approve of.⁶⁹ In fact, according to the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, already on the Buddha's first question Dīghanakha realized his self-contradictory position and remained silent.⁷⁰

MN I 498 The parallel versions continue by examining three possible variations of this type of view, which could be:

- to approve of all,
- to approve of nothing,
- to approve of some and to disapprove of some.

The Pāli and Chinese discourses, the Sanskrit fragments, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, and the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Avadānaśataka* tale point out that to hold any of the three possible variations of this view will lead to dispute with those who take a different position on this matter.⁷¹

MN I 500 The *Dīghanakha-sutta* and its parallels next turn to the nature of the human body, made up of the four elements. The Pāli version recommends contemplating the body

still be the same”, *esā ce me ... diṭṭhi khameyya, tam p' assa tādisam eva, tam p' assa tādisam evā ti* (S^e-MN II 263,10: *tam pi 'ssa*).

⁶⁸ SĀ 969 at T II 249b5: “this view, I also do not approve of”, 此見亦不忍, SĀ² 203 at T II 449a8: “I also do not approve of a view like this”, 如此之見, 我亦不忍. According to the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 96,16, he proclaimed that “I also do not approve of this view”, *lta ba de yang mi bzod* *do*, with its Chinese counterpart in T 1509 at T XXV 62a14: “that view I also do not approve”, 是見亦不忍 (adopting again the variant reading 忍 instead of 受). The *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 187,11 or in Vaidya 1958a: 256,8 similarly reads “this view is also not approved by me”, *esā pi me ... drystir na kṣamate*, with the Tibetan counterpart *lta ba gang lags pa 'di yang bdag mi 'tshal lo* in Devacandra 1996: 710,12.

⁶⁹ SĀ² 203 at T II 449a9: “if you do not approve of such a view, why did you proclaim it”, 汝若不忍如是見者, 何故而言?

⁷⁰ T 1545 at T XXVII 509c13, cf. also Dhammadhoti 2004: 192. The Chinese *Avadāna* account, T 200 at T IV 256a14, similarly reports that he remained silent, although according to its report this happened after the Buddha had pointed out that Dīghanakha's view did not lead to Nirvāṇa. According to T 200, Dīghanakha continued to remain silent three times, at which point a thunderbolt wielding spirit intervened and forced him to reply to the Buddha. T 200 then continues differently from the other versions and does not report the instructions on contemplation of the body and feelings at all.

⁷¹ MN 74 at MN I 498,17 indicates that to approve of all is closer to attachment than to disapprove of all, a position similarly taken in fol. 163a4 in Pischel 1904: 814 (cf. Hosoda 1989b: 146), SĀ 969 at T II 249b17, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 97,12, the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 188,11 or in Vaidya 1958a: 256,20, with its Tibetan counterpart in Devacandra 1996: 711,19, and the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 509c24. The Sanskrit fragment, SĀ 969, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, the *Avadānaśataka*, and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* differ from MN 74 at MN I 498,21 in as much as they do not report that Dīghanakha drew the conclusion that the Buddha commended his view. SĀ² 203 at T II 449a24 differs from the other versions, as according to its presentation all three types of view, including the disapproval of everything, are related to attachment and aversion and will therefore obstruct progress towards liberation.

from a standard set of eleven perspectives, which revolve around the three characteristics of impermanence, *dukkha*, and not-self.⁷² The *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, and the Sanskrit and Tibetan version of the *Avadānaśataka* tale present contemplations of the body that involve the related topics of impermanence, dispassion, and relinquishment.⁷³

After describing contemplation of the body, the *Dīghanakha-sutta* and its parallels turn to contemplation of feelings. The *Majjhima-nikāya* account begins examining this topic by clarifying that the three types of feeling are mutually exclusive.⁷⁴ Instead of taking up the mutually exclusive nature of the three types of feeling, the *Samyukta-āgama* versions highlight that feelings arise in dependence on contact and cease with the cessation of contact.⁷⁵

The Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* and the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Avadānaśataka* tale agree with the Pāli discourse on taking up the mutually exclusive nature of the three feelings.⁷⁶ The same works also mention the dependency of feelings on contact, in this respect resembling the *Samyukta-āgama* versions.⁷⁷

The *Dīghanakha-sutta* and its parallels continue by directing awareness to the impermanent and conditioned nature of feelings, to which the Sanskrit fragment, one of

⁷² MN 74 at MN I 500,3: “[the body] should be contemplated as impermanent, unsatisfactory, a disease, a tumour, an arrow, a calamity, an affliction, alien, disintegrating, void and not-self”, *aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassitabbo*, where *aniccato* and *palokato* can be understood as corresponding to the characteristic of impermanence, *dukkhato*, *rogato*, *gandato*, *sallato*, *aghato*, *ābādhato* represent the characteristic of *dukkha*, and *parato*, *suññato*, *anattato* pertain to the characteristic of not-self.

⁷³ SĀ 969 at T II 249c8: “contemplate impermanence, cessation, freedom from passion, full eradication, and the abandoning of [any] establishings”, 觀無常, 觀滅, 觀離欲, 觀滅盡, 觀捨住者. SĀ² 203 at T II 449b8: “having contemplated [this body] as impermanent, one is able [to develop] freedom from passion; seeing this body [as subject to] cessation, [one] promptly relinquishes [it]”, 既見無常, 便能離欲, 見此身滅, 即便捨離. Fol. 164b2 in Pischel 1904: 815 has preserved *vyayā*, thereby indicating that the Sanskrit fragment version would have instructed to contemplate impermanence. The Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 101,1 speaks of repeatedly contemplating arising and disintegration as the means to remove all longing and attachment, etc., towards the body, *yang dang yang du* ‘*byung ba dang*, ‘*jig par rjes su lta zhing gnas na*, *de la lus la* ‘*dun pa dang*, *lus la chags pa dang*, *lus la dga’ ba dang*, *lus la zhen pa dang*, *lus la chums pa dang*, *lus la lhag par chags par* ‘*byung ba gang yin pa des de’i sems yongs su gtugs te mi gnas so*. The instructions in the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 191,5 or in Vaidya 1958a: 257,16 are to dwell contemplating arising and passing away, dispassion, and letting go, *udayavyayānudarśinā vihartavyaṇ virāgānudarśinā pratinisargānudarśinā* (Vaidya: *vihartavyam*), to which the Tibetan version in Devacandra 1996: 714,20 adds cessation as the penultimate aspect to be contemplated, ‘*gog par rjes su lta ba*.

⁷⁴ MN 74 at MN I 500,10.

⁷⁵ SĀ 969 at T II 249c13 and SĀ² 203 at T II 449b13, a presentation also found in fol. 165a1-2 in Pischel 1904: 815. The **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra* and the **Mahāvibhāṣā* do not report instructions for contemplating body and feelings. The focus of their presentation appears to be more on the issue of views and the effect this discourse had on Sāriputta.

⁷⁶ Eimer 1983: 101,8, Speyer 1909/1970: 192,2 or Vaidya 1958a: 257,21, and Devacandra 1996: 715,7.

⁷⁷ Eimer 1983: 102,6, Speyer 1909/1970: 192,10 or Vaidya 1958a: 257,29, and Devacandra 1996: 716,3.

the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, and the Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka* version add awareness of the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to feelings.⁷⁸

The two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, the Sanskrit fragment, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, and the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Avadānaśataka* tale also turn to the feelings to be experienced when life comes to an end.

Although this particular perspective on feelings occurs frequently in other Pāli discourses concerned with contemplation of feelings,⁷⁹ it does not form part of the instructions in the *Dīghanakha-sutta*. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version also stands alone in reporting that the Buddha made a pronouncement on the type of speech used by an arahant.⁸⁰

MN I 501 The parallel versions report that Sāriputta, who had been present during this discourse, reached full awakening, while Dīghanakha became a stream-enterer.⁸¹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version indicates that Sāriputta became an arahant once he had realized that the Buddha's instruction aimed at abandonment through direct knowledge.⁸²

⁷⁸ SĀ 969 at T II 249c15: “he knows in accordance with reality how [feelings] arise, how [they] cease, how [they provide] gratification, how [they are beset by] danger, and how to escape [from them]”, 若集, 若滅, 若味, 若患, 若出, 如實知. Fol. 165a4-5 in Pischel 1904: 815: *cāsvādaṇ cādīnavāṇ ca nih(saranyaṁ) and yathābhūtaṇ prajānaṁ*, indicating that the Sanskrit version also took up the gratification, danger, and escape in relation to feelings. The same formulation is also found in the Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka* tale in Speyer 1909/1970: 193,1 or in Vaidya 1958a: 258,3.

⁷⁹ MN 140 at MN III 244,33, SN 12:51 at SN II 83,1, SN 22:88 at SN III 126,14, SN 36:7 at SN IV 213,10, SN 26:8 at SN IV 214,21, SN 54:8 at SN V 319,24, and AN 4:195 at AN II 198,29.

⁸⁰ MN 74 at MN I 500,34: “he expresses himself in the words used [commonly] in the world without holding on [to them]”, *yañ ca loke vuttam tena voharati aparāmasan ti* (C^e-MN II 284,24: *teneva*, S^e-MN II 268,4 adds *kho* before *loke*). This statement recurs in Nidd I 284,9 and Nidd I 303,28 as a quote from the present discourse; on its implications cf., e.g., Katz 1982/1989: 218. A similar proposition can also be found in DN 9 at DN I 202,8.

⁸¹ SĀ 969 at T II 249c26 and SĀ² 203 at T II 449b21 further specify that at the time of this event Sāriputta had been a monk for half a month, 半月, a specification made also in the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 104,6, in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa)-śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 61c17, in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 510b1, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 194,1 or in Vaidya 1958a: 258,15 and in Devacandra 1996: 717,14; cf. also the survey of sources related to Sāriputta's going forth and awakening in Migot 1952: 426-443. The *Mahāvastu* also associates his full awakening with the *Dīghanakhaparivrājaka-sūtra*, cf. Basak 1968/2004: 40,19 or Senart 1897: 67,7, as does Xuánzàng (玄奘) in his travel records, T 2087 at T LI 925a10, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 179. The same *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 40,12 or in Senart 1897: 66,17 also reports, however, that Sāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana attained awakening during an instruction given to them by the Buddha right after their ordination, an instruction similar to an exposition given in MN 28 at MN I 190,20 by Sāriputta. The *Mahāvastu*'s suggestion that the two attained full awakening together stands in direct contrast to a specification given in the same passage in Basak 1968/2004: 40,14+16 or in Senart 1897: 67,2+3 that it took Mahāmaudgalyāyana a week to awaken, while Sāriputra achieved the same in two weeks. As the two ordained together, this passage in the *Mahāvastu* appears to conflate two different and to some degree conflicting accounts, something not uncommon in this work, cf. also above p. 175 note 157.

⁸² MN 74 at MN I 501,2: “the Blessed One tells us about abandoning those things through direct knowledge”, *tesam tesam kira no bhagavā dhammānam abhiññā pahānam āha*.

The *Samyukta-āgama* versions, the Sanskrit fragment, the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, and the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Avadānaśataka* tale present the same event more in terms of actual meditation practice. According to their report, Sāriputta became an arahant by practising contemplation of impermanence and thereby developing dispassion.⁸³

The *Majjhima-nikāya* account concludes by reporting that Dīghanakha became a lay follower of the Buddha. According to the Chinese and Sanskrit discourses, however, and according to the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu*, he requested ordination and in due turn became an arahant.⁸⁴ The **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, as well as the Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* tale similarly report that Dīghanakha became a monk and eventually an arahant.⁸⁵

This would be a more natural presentation, since after becoming a stream-enterer it is difficult to imagine Dīghanakha continuing to live on as a non-Buddhist wanderer or even to revert to lay status, so that for him to become a Buddhist monk would be the most reasonable course of action to be taken at this point.⁸⁶

According to the Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka* tale and the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, after going forth Dīghanakha was known by the name of Koṣṭhila or Koṭhitā.⁸⁷ In fact, once he had ordained as a Buddhist monk, Dīghanakha would have cut his fingernails, so that the use of the sobriquet “long nail” could indeed fall out of use.

⁸³ SĀ 969 at T II 249c29: “he contemplated those dharmas as impermanent, as arising and ceasing, [and in terms of] freedom from passion, full eradication, and relinquishment”, 於彼彼法觀察無常, 觀生滅, 觀離欲, 觀滅盡, 觀捨. SĀ² 203 at T II 449b22: “he contemplated all these dharmas as impermanent, promptly realised freedom from passion, [thereby] discarding and relinquishing all views”, 觀察諸法無常, 即便離欲證成, 棄捨諸見. Fol. 166a5 in Pischel 1904: 815 similarly refers to contemplating dispassion, *virāgānupaśyino*. According to the Tibetan *Pravrajyāvastu* in Eimer 1983: 104,21, Sāriputra reached full awakening after contemplating the relinquishment of all phenomena, dispassion, extinction, and complete relinquishing, *chos de dang de dag la spong bar rjes su lta zhing gnas pa dang*, ‘*dod chags dang bral bar rjes su lta ba dang*, ‘*gog par rjes su lta ba dang*, *rab tu spong bar rjes su lta zhing gnas pa*. The Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* tales in Speyer 1909/1970: 194,5 or Vaidya 1958a: 258,19 report that Sāriputra contemplated impermanence, passing away, dispassion, cessation, and relinquishment, *anityatānudarśino viharato vyayānudarśino virāgānudarśino nirodhānudarśinah pratinihsargānudarśino*, with the Tibetan counterpart passage in Devacandra 1996: 718,2 reading *mi rtag par rjes su lta bas gnas pa dang*, ‘*jig par rjes su lta ba dang*, ‘*dod chags dang bral bar rjes su lta ba dang*, ‘*gog par rjes su lta ba dang*, *dor bar rjes su lta bas gnas nas*.

⁸⁴ SĀ 969 at T II 250a1, SĀ² 203 at T II 449b27, fol. 166b4 in Pischel 1904: 816, and Eimer 1983: 105,11; cf. also T 1444 at T XXIII 1028c15, which after abbreviating the main body of the discourse ends with “(up to) he went forth”, 乃至出家.

⁸⁵ T 1509 at T XXV 62a24, T 200 at T IV 256a19, Speyer 1909/1970: 194,14 or Vaidya 1958a: 258,27, and Devacandra 1996: 718,18.

⁸⁶ Freiberger 1997: 128, in his survey of the usage of the term *paribbājaka* in the Pāli discourses, comes to the conclusion that there is no evidence for the existence of any Buddhist *paribbājakas*; cf. also Karunaratna 2004b: 318. Thus a Buddhist who “goes forth”, or one “gone forth” who turns Buddhist, would presumably both become members of the Buddhist monastic order.

⁸⁷ T 1509 at T XXV 61b24: 摩訶俱絺羅, rendered by Lamotte 1944/1981: 47 note 1 as Mahākauṣṭhila, and the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 195,4 or Vaidya 1958a: 259,4, discussed in Oldenberg

Thus, from the perspective of *Avadānaśataka* tale and the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā*-(*upadeśa*-)śāstra, the wanderer Dīghanakha and the monk Mahākoṭṭhita appear to be the same person.

This identification stands in contrast to the Pāli commentarial tradition, which reckons Mahākoṭṭhita and Dīghanakha as two different persons. However, closer inspection reveals some internal inconsistencies in the commentarial presentation.⁸⁸

In sum, the wanderer Dīghanakha might indeed be identical with the monk Mahākoṭṭhita, a suggestion that would also provide a meaningful background to the close relationship between Mahākoṭṭhita and Sāriputta and their frequent discussions recorded elsewhere in the discourses.

1912b: 178 note 3; cf. also Feer 1891: 425 note 3. The Tibetan (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in Eimer 1983: 95,15+17 also refers to him as *stod rings*, which Panglung 1981: 303 lists as a rendering of the name Koṣṭhila.

⁸⁸ According to the *Therāpadāna*, Ap 534:23 at Ap II 480,17, the parents of Mahākoṭṭhita were Assalāyana and Candavatī, whereas according to Ps III 203,17 Sāriputta was Dīghanakha's maternal uncle, *mātula*, i.e., Dīghanakha was the son of Sāriputta's sister, cf. also Ps IV 87,6: *sāriputtathero ... bhāgineyyassa dīghanakhaparibbājakassa*. Sāriputta is recorded to have had three sisters, Cālā, Upacālā, and Sisūpacālā, all of which, according to DhP-a II 188,16, went forth (cf. also their verses at Thī 182-203 and SN 5:6-8 at SN I 132-134 or SN² 167-169 at SN² I 290-294). Thī-a 159,21 indicates that, before going forth, Cālā, Upacālā, and Sisūpacālā each had a son and each of these sons was given the same name as his respective mother, a name under which each of them went forth (cf. also Th-a I 117,15). Thus, none of the three sisters seems to be identifiable as the mother of Dīghanakha, so that the commentarial presentation of Dīghanakha as a son of a sister of Sāriputta appears to lack support from the information provided in the same commentarial tradition. According to several other works, Dīghanakha was in fact Sāriputta's uncle, cf. the *Pravrajyavastu* in Dutt 1984d: 23,13 and folio 6r-9-10 in Vogel 1992: 80 (which record the names given to the son of Dīghanakha's sister as Upatiṣṭha and Sāriputra), the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā*-(*upadeśa*-)śāstra, T 1509 at T XXV 61c11, the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 509c3, and the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 187,3 or Vaidya 1958a: 255,26, T 200 at T IV 256a9, and Devacandra 1996: 709,7. This, however, does not fully solve the situation either, as according to the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* tales in Speyer 1909/1970: 186,7 or in Vaidya 1958a: 255,20 and in Devacandra 1996: 709,6, the father of Dīghanakha and his sister Śāri (= Sāriputra's mother) was called Mathara (*ma tha ra*). Lamotte 1944/1981: 47 note 1 points out that this would not fit with the parents the *Therāpadāna* at Ap II 480,17 attributes to Mahākoṭṭhita, according to which his father was Assalāyana. Yet, this attribution seems also to be beset with difficulties, since at the time of the *Assalāyana-sutta*, MN 93 at MN II 147,10, Assalāyana was only sixteen years old. This discourse seems to have taken place at a later stage of the Buddha's ministry, when his teaching had become generally known, since MN 93 takes its occasion from a group of Brahmins who want to challenge the Buddha on his proclamation of purification of all four social classes, *cātuvaṇṇa suddhi*. The identity of the Assalāyana mentioned in this discourse and the one referred to in the *Apadāna* can be seen in the next *Apadāna* verse, according to which the Buddha converted Assalāyana by a teaching on purification for all, *vinayī sabbasuddhiyā* (following B^e-Ap II 132,26, whereas E^c reads *sabbabuddhiyā*), a reference that evidently refers to the discussion in MN 93. Following the *Apadāna* account, then, Mahākoṭṭhita would have been the son of a Brahmin who at the time of the delivery of the *Assalāyana-sutta* was only sixteen years old, a presentation that seems less probable than the assumption that he could have been identical with Dīghanakha. In sum, as this little excursion into 'historical' information amply shows, the indications given in the various sources on family relationships, etc., are at times not easily reconciled with each other.

MN 75 *Māgandiya-sutta*

The *Māgandiya-sutta*, the “discourse to Māgandiya”, examines the disadvantages of sensual pleasures.⁸⁹ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.⁹⁰

The *Māgandiya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel describe in similar ways MN I 502 how the wanderer Māgandiya chanced upon a place prepared for the Buddha to stay overnight. On being told by the Brahmin landlord that this place was meant for the Buddha, Māgandiya expressed his displeasure by calling the Buddha a “destroyer”.⁹¹

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, Māgandiya asserted that he would repeat the same statement in the presence of the Buddha, after which the Brahmin asked Māgandiya’s permission to report the term used by Māgandiya to the Buddha.⁹² The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse adopts the opposite sequence, as in its version the Brahmin first asked Māgandiya if the expression he had used may be reported to the Buddha, in reply to which Māgandiya asserted that he would have no qualms to repeat the

⁸⁹ The title *Māgandiya-sutta* recurs for a discourse in the *Sutta-nipāta*, Sn 4:9 at Sn 835-847, whose protagonist Māgandiya unsuccessfully attempts to offer his beautiful daughter to the Buddha. Ps III 209,23 explains that the wanderer Māgandiya of MN 75 was the nephew of the Māgandiya in Sn 4:9 at Sn 835-847. According to Pj II 543,2, the Māgandiya in Sn 4:9 was a Brahmin, according to a parallel in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 515,14, or in Vaidya 1999: 446,3, this Māgandiya (spelled Mākandika) was also a wanderer; the same holds for a Sanskrit fragment counterpart to Sn 4:9 in Hoernle 1916: 714-715, where fragment IIIr1 reads *māgandikasya parivrājakasya*, cf. also fragment IIr5. SN 22:3 at SN III 12,20 refers to the *Sutta-nipāta* version of the *Māgandiya-sutta* as the *Māgandiyapañha* from the *Attha-kavagga*.

⁹⁰ The parallel is MĀ 153 at T I 670a-673a, which agrees with MN 75 on locating the discourse in the Kuru country and also uses the name of the main protagonist as the title, 髦闊提經, although the Indic name of the visitor to the Buddha would have been different (Pulleyblank 1991: 304, 335, and 348 gives *suṄye:n dej* as the Early Middle Chinese pronunciation of 髦闊提). For a summary account of the beginning and concluding sections of MĀ 153 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 61-62 and 185.

⁹¹ MN 75 at MN I 502,15: *bhūnahuno* (S^e-MN II 271,3: *bhūnahanassa*), a “destroyer of beings” or a “destroyer of growth”, with its counterpart in MĀ 153 at T I 670b17: 壞敗地 (at T I 670b24: 敗壞地); a reference to the present discourse in Mil 314,1 reads *bhūtahacco*. Bodhi in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 1281 note 740 draws attention to the commentarial gloss at Ps III 211,4 as *hatavāḍdhino*, “destroyer of increase”, and *mariyādakārakassa*, “maker of limitations”, in support of taking *bhūnahuno* to refer to the destruction of “growth”. According to Barua 1921/1981: 355, “Māgandīya judged Buddha to be an exterminator of the human race”. Bhagwat 1946: 64 explains that “the word means ‘one who destroys (or suppresses) by his teachings the essential nature of Beings, which consists of their primary and fundamental instincts and emotions’”. Horner 1946: 287 understands the term to refer to “a slayer of creatures, or ‘rigid repressionist’”, Horner 1957/1970: 181 then translates the term as “destroyer of growth”, while Law 1931/2004b: 97 glosses it as a “killer of the embryo” and id. 1933: 141 takes the term as referring to a “repressionist”, as does Chalmers 1926: 354, adding the qualification “rigid”. Saksena 1936: 713 notes that “*būnaha* most certainly corresponds to Skt. *bhrūñahan-*, *bhrūñaghna-* ‘the killer of an embryo, one who produces abortion’”; cf. also Alsdorf 1965: 46-47 and Norman 2004: 81. Vetter 2000: 132 note 45 explains *bhūnahuno* to intend that “the Buddha is ... a person who prevents children from being conceived”. According to Sn 3:10 at Sn 664, the Buddha used the same expression in regard to Kokālika, a follower of Devadatta.

⁹² MN 75 at MN I 502,20.

same statement himself in the presence of the Buddha.⁹³ A need for the Brahmin to inform the Buddha did anyway not arise, as according to both versions the Buddha had overheard the conversation between Māgandiya and the Brahmin with his divine ear.⁹⁴

Soon after the Buddha had come back to the Brahmin's place, Māgandiya came to join them. According to both versions, the Buddha inquired whether it was due to his practice of sense-restraint that Māgandiya considered him to be a "destroyer", which Māgandiya affirmed. In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, Māgandiya supported his statement by declaring that this was recorded to be so in the discourses of his tradition,⁹⁵ a remark without a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* version. The Pāli commentary ex-

⁹³ MĀ 153 at T I 670b21.

⁹⁴ While according to MĀ 153 at T I 670c8 the Brahmin simply attributed the Buddha's telepathic knowledge of the conversation between the Buddha and Māgandiya to the fact that the Buddha was fully awakened, according to MN 75 at MN I 503,2 the Brahmin was awe struck and his hair stood on end when the Buddha made it clear that he already knew what had been said. Another difference is that while MN 75 at MN I 502,31 simply reports that the Brahmin came to greet the Buddha and then sat down, MĀ 153 at T I 670c1 precedes the same with a description of the beautiful sight of the Buddha, who was just like the moon surrounded by stars, emanating a bright light like a golden mountain, 猶星中月, 光耀燁曜, 晃若金山. This description is a recurrent pericope in the *Madhyama-āgama*, found in, e.g., MĀ 20 at T I 445b13 (parallel to SN 42:13), MĀ 28 at T I 460b11 (parallel to MN 143), and MĀ 38 at T I 479c18 (parallel to AN 8:21), MĀ 152 at T I 667a13 (parallel to MN 99), and as a description of Kassapa Buddha in MĀ 63 at T I 500c21 (parallel to MN 81). Minh Chau 1964/1991: 37 comments that this image "strikes a rather exaggerated note, unknown to the moderate attitude of early Buddhism". Similar images are a recurrent feature in other texts. Thus, for example, in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 67,8 or in Senart 1890: 47,15 the sight of the young bodhisattva seated in meditation under the Jambu tree with unmoving shadow causes his father to compare the splendour of his son to a moon surrounded by stars, śāśīva naksatragaṇavakīrṇo, differing in so far as instead of a golden mountain, this passage in the *Mahāvastu* speaks of a sacrificial fire on a mountain top, hutāsano vā girimūrdha-nasmiṇ. The *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 542,2 or in Lefmann 1902: 132,13 or in Vaidya 1958b: 92,14 similarly reports that the bodhisattva's father made use of the image of the moon surrounded by stars and of the fire on a mountain top on that occasion. The *Divyāvadāna* combines the simile of a sacrificial fire with that of a golden mountain in a series of images to describe the splendour of the Buddha, cf. Cowell 1886: 158,24 or Vaidya 1999: 98,9. The fire imagery recurs in ancient Indian art, where at times the first meditation under the Jambu tree is depicted with a fire representing the bodhisattva, cf. Stache-Weiske 1990: 110. The image of the moon surrounded by stars recurs again in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 274,14 or in Senart 1890: 196,13 as part of a description of the bodhisattva soon after he had set out on his spiritual search, nakṣtrairiva candramāḥ, a verse preceded by comparing him to a golden post, kāmcanastambhasadrśo, cf. Basak 1965: 274,11 or Senart 1890: 196,10. The same image can also be found in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 70,23 or in Senart 1897: 115,5 in the context of the first meeting between the Buddha and his father. The image of a golden post occurs also in the *Sarighabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 150,1, which compares the outer appearance of the Buddha to a golden sacrificial post, suvarṇayūpam iva śriyā jvalantam, a formulation found similarly in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 198,21 and 516,13 or in Vaidya 1999: 123,14 and 446,19.

⁹⁵ MN 75 at MN I 502,22: "this comes down in our discourses", evam hi no sutte ocaratī ti (S^e-MN II 271,10: evañ hi; on the term *ocarati* cf. PED p. 562 s.v.). That Māgandiya (spelled Māgañdiya in B^e and S^e) could have been part of or perhaps even leader of a particular group of wanderers suggests itself from AN 5:298 at AN III 276,32, which mentions the Māgañdikas in a listing of contemporary wanderers, comprising also the Niganṭhas, Jatilakas, Paribbājakas, etc.

plains that Māgandiya made this remark to show that he had some authority on which he could rely when accusing the Buddha of being a “destroyer”.⁹⁶

The *Māgandiya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by contrasting the enjoyment of sensual pleasures with the aloofness from their attraction that can be accomplished by going forth and overcoming sensual desire. A difference between the two versions is that the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse at this point describes how the bodhisattva used to live in three mansions, spending the rainy season period in the company of female musicians.⁹⁷ Such a way of life not mentioned at all in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, which only reports a statement by the Buddha that in his lay life he had had easy access to the five types of sensual pleasure.⁹⁸

The two versions illustrate the Buddha’s disinterest in sensual pleasures with the example of a householder who has been reborn in a celestial realm and enjoys celestial pleasures, thereby automatically losing any interest in the types of sensual pleasure this householder formerly had at his disposal, when he was still a human being.⁹⁹

The *Māgandiya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by illustrating the nature of sensual pleasures with the help of a similar series of similes concerned with a leper, although the two versions differ in regard to the sequence in which they present these similes (see table 8.3).

Table 8.3: Similes to Illustrate Sensual Pleasures in MN 75 and its Parallel

MN 75	MĀ 153
healed leper does not envy other leper (1)	leper cauterizes wounds over fire (→ 3)
healed leper afraid of fire (2)	king indulges in sense-pleasures (→ 4)
leper cauterizes wounds over fire (3)	healed leper does not envy other leper (→ 1)
king indulges in sense-pleasures (4)	healed leper afraid of fire (→ 2)

The *Madhyama-āgama* version begins by describing a leper who scratches his wounds and cauterises them over a fire, even though his wounds will only get worse by being scratched and cauterised. The discourse then compares this behaviour to indulging in sensual pleasures, as indulgence will likewise only increase craving for sensual plea-

⁹⁶ Ps III 212,3.

⁹⁷ MN 75 at MN I 504,24. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 161,11 or in Senart 1890: 115,8 describes in detail the furnishings of these three palaces and other supplies meant for the bodhisattva’s entertainment.

⁹⁸ MĀ 153 at T I 671a24: “I obtained the five types of sensual pleasure, which I obtained easily, without difficulty”, 得五欲功德, 易不難得. Bareau 1974a: 214 compares this part of MN 75 with MĀ 153 and concludes that MĀ 153 offers the more original presentation.

⁹⁹ In his reply to this proposition by the Buddha, according to MĀ 153 at T I 671b13 Māgandiya qualified human sensual pleasures to be “smelly” and “impure”, 臭 and 不淨. This does not seem to fit too well with his earlier criticism of the Buddha, which would have been based on some form of approval of their enjoyment. The same qualification fits, however, as part of the Buddha’s conclusion after the series of similes on sensual pleasures in MĀ 153 at T I 672a25. This suggests that this qualification originally belonged only to the Buddha’s statement. Perhaps due to an error during the process of transmission or at the time of translation, it then also became part of Māgandiya’s statement in MĀ 153 at T I 671b13.

ures. Next the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse illustrates the same principle with the example of a king. In spite of all the sensual gratification a king has at his command, he will not be able to experience mental peace free from desire for sensual pleasures.

The *Madhyama-āgama* account then turns to the case of a leper whose leprosy has been healed. Such a healed leper would lose all interest in the temporary relief experienced by another leper who cauterises his wounds over a fire. Taking up the case of a healed leper again, the *Madhyama-āgama* version depicts how this leper, on being dragged forcefully close to a fire, will try all he can to avoid the fire.

In reply to this image, Māgandiya explained that the reason the leper earlier experienced the heat of the fire as pleasant was due to his “distorted perception”.¹⁰⁰ In a similar way, the *Madhyama-āgama* version explains, beings have a distorted perception when they search for happiness through sensual pleasures, as sensual pleasures are in reality painful to touch, impure, and smelly.¹⁰¹

The corresponding similes in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version begin with the healed leper seeing another leper cauterising his wounds. Next comes the image of the healed leper who is dragged forcefully close to a fire, followed by describing how the leper’s wounds get worse by scratching and cauterising. The last image in the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse then is the simile of the king.

This sequence appears jumbled, since in this way the example of the king comes almost as an anticlimax after the powerful images related to the healed leper. The *Madhyama-āgama* version, in contrast, presents a logical build-up of the argument, as it begins by clarifying the predicament of the leper, then applies this to beings in general and to a king in particular, followed by turning to a healed leper’s attitude to the fire he had formerly found so attractive, an attitude it presents in an ascending series by proceeding from his disinterest in using the fire for cauterisation to his actual fear of being forcefully dragged to the fire.

MN I 508 According to both versions, the Buddha concluded his exposition with a stanza in praise of health as the highest gain and Nirvāṇa as the highest happiness.¹⁰² Māgandiya expressed his approval of the stanza spoken by the Buddha, as this stanza was also known in his tradition. Being asked by the Buddha what he took to be Nirvāṇa, Māgandiya pointed to his body in reply, proclaiming this to be health and Nirvāṇa.¹⁰³ According to

¹⁰⁰ MĀ 153 at T I 672a12: 有顛倒想, corresponding to *viparītasaññā* in MN 75 at MN I 507,21.

¹⁰¹ MĀ 153 at T I 672a25.

¹⁰² MN 75 at MN I 508,30: *ārogya paramā labhā, nibbānam paramam sukham*, MĀ 153 at T I 672a28: 無病第一利, 涅槃第一樂. The same indications recur at the beginning and end of a verse in the *Dhammapada*, Dhp 204a+d, with parallels in stanza 162a+d of the Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* in Brough 1962/2001: 145, stanza 76 a+d of the Patna *Dharmapada* in Cone 1989: 123 or in Roth 1980b: 104, verse 26:6 a+d in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* in Bernhard 1965: 319 (stanza 355 in Nakatani 1987: 73 has only preserved the second section) and Beckh 1911: 86 or Zongtse 1990: 257; cf. also the first and last lines in the stanzas in T 210 at T IV 573a27, T 212 at T IV 732a13, and T 213 at T IV 790b26.

¹⁰³ MN 75 at MN I 509,10 and MĀ 153 at T I 672b6. This type of view forms the first of a set of five views on “Nirvāṇa here and now” listed in the *Brahmajāla-sutta* and its parallels, cf. DN 1 at DN I 36,23, DĀ 21 at T I 93b17, and the Tibetan version in Weller 1934: 58,1.

the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, he explained his proposition further by indicating that he was healthy and happy.¹⁰⁴

The *Māgandiya-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel report that the Buddha was quick to point out that Māgandiya had misunderstood the nature of Nirvāṇa, a misunderstanding similar to a blind man who has been cheated into wearing a dirty and soiled garment, believing it to be clean and spotless. The Buddha then repeated his stanza on health as the highest gain and Nirvāṇa as the highest happiness together with another stanza, in which he drew attention to the eightfold path as the best of paths, since it will safely lead to the deathless.¹⁰⁵ MN I 509

While in the *Madhyama-āgama* version this is the first time the Buddha pronounces the second stanza on the eightfold path, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version he had already done so when speaking the stanza on Nirvāṇa as the highest happiness for the first time.

When evaluating this difference, the reference to the eightfold path would not be required for the first utterance of the stanza on Nirvāṇa as the highest happiness, which led to the discussion with Māgandiya on the nature of Nirvāṇa. If the Buddha had at that point already mentioned the need of the noble eightfold path in order to reach Nirvāṇa, one would not expect Māgandiya to assert self-confidently a type of Nirvāṇa that obviously does not require any such path.

At the present junction of events, however, when the point is to clarify that Māgandiya's notion of Nirvāṇa is mistaken, a reference to the noble eightfold path fits the context well, thereby indicating that a path of practice is required to attain this Nirvāṇa. This hint seems to have had its effect, since in both versions Māgandiya requests that the Buddha teaches him how he might get a vision of Nirvāṇa. This request would have been caused by the fact that the Buddha has just highlighted the need for a path to Nirvāṇa. In view of this, the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation suits the progression of ideas well, in the sense that at first the Buddha only spoke a stanza on Nirvāṇa. When Māgandiya had expressed his misunderstanding of the nature of Nirvāṇa, however, the Buddha also brought up the noble eightfold path.

If this should be the more original version, then the *Majjhima-nikāya* version's presentation could easily be the result of a transmission error, as during the course of oral tradition a reciter might accidentally employ the full version of the stanza at the earlier point, where originally only the lines on Nirvāṇa and health were required.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions agree that the Buddha replied to Māgandiya's request to be led to Nirvāṇa with the simile of a blind man. While the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse only notes that someone born blind would not be able to see colours, the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation of the same simile also describes an un-

¹⁰⁴ MN 75 at MN I 509,11: “this is that Nirvāṇa: I am now healthy and happy, nothing afflicts me”, *idam tam nibbānaṃ, aham ... etarahi arogo sukhi, na mañ kiñci ābādhati ti* (B^e-MN II 176,23, C^e-MN II 298,27, and S^e-MN II 281,17: *idan*, B^e also: *ahañ (hi)*, C^e: *ābādhayatī*).

¹⁰⁵ MN 75 at MN I 510,10: *atthaṅgiko ca maggānañ, khemāñ amatagāminan ti*, MĀ 153 at T I 672b24: 諸道八正道, 住安隱甘露 (with a 聖 variant reading 往 instead of 住).

successful attempt to cure the blind man.¹⁰⁶ The two versions continue by describing a successful attempt to cure the blind man, who once healed will realize that he had been cheated into wearing a dirty and soiled garment, believing it to be clean and spotless.

MN I 511 The *Majjhima-nikāya* version applies this image to the five aggregates, indicating that with the vision of Nirvāṇa, Māgandiya would similarly realize that by grasping at the five aggregates he has just been cheating himself, a passage not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. Instead, the *Madhyama-āgama* version notes that the blind man, once he has been healed, would be able to see his dirty garment for what it really is. Similarly, by purifying the noble eye of wisdom, Māgandiya would be able to see Nirvāṇa for himself.¹⁰⁷

MN I 512 In order for Māgandiya to acquire a vision of Nirvāṇa, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version he should fulfill the following requirements:

- frequent worthy men,
- listen to the Dharma,
- practise accordingly.¹⁰⁸

The *Madhyama-āgama* version presents the same in a fourfold manner, as it adds the need for proper attention to the three aspects mentioned in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version.¹⁰⁹ Other Pāli discourses similarly stipulate these four requirements for being able to reach various stages of awakening.¹¹⁰

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, the Buddha thereon gave an exposition of the four noble truths, during which Māgandiya attained stream-entry.¹¹¹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version instead reports a teaching given by the Buddha on dependent arising in its cessation mode.¹¹² The *Majjhima-nikāya* version also differs in so

¹⁰⁶ MĀ 153 at T I 672c8 and MN 75 at MN I 509,14. Hoffman 1987: 401 notes that the simile of the blind man who is cheated into accepting something on faith in MN 75 at MN I 509,31 shows that from an early Buddhist viewpoint “having *saddhā* is not always regarded as a good thing”.

¹⁰⁷ MĀ 153 at T I 672c14: 若汝聖慧眼得淨者，汝便自知 … 此是涅槃。

¹⁰⁸ MN 75 at MN I 512,6: “you should frequent true men ... hear the right Dharma [and] practise in accordance with the Dharma”, *sappurise bhajeyyāsi ... saddhamman sossasi ... dhammānudhamman patipajjissasi*.

¹⁰⁹ MĀ 153 at T I 672c28 speaks of 四種法, which are “associating in a respectful and receptive manner with good friends, hearing the good Dharma, giving proper attention, and advancing in the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma”, 親近善知識恭敬承事, 聞善法, 善思惟, 趣向法次法.

¹¹⁰ DN 33 at DN III 227,3, SN 55:5 at SN V 347,19, SN 55:50 at SN V 404,10, and SN 55:55 at SN V 411,1 list association with worthy men, hearing the Dharma, proper attention, and practice in accordance with the Dharma as the four factors that lead to stream-entry. SN 55:56-58 at SN V 411 present the same four as the path to the higher stages of awakening. SN 55:59-74 at SN V 411-413 indicate that these four factors lead to all types of wisdom, cf. also AN 4:246 at AN II 245,22. In contrast to this frequent occurrence of the set of all four, MN 75 appears to be the only instance where proper attention, *yoniso manasikāra*, is not mentioned. A Sanskrit fragment of the *Daśottara-sūtra*, S 486V4 in Mittal 1957: 32 (cf. also the reconstruction on p. 58), also mentions *y[o]niśo manas[i]kārah*, although differing in as much as here it forms part of only three factors, the other two being frequenting worthy men and listening to the Dharma. On *yoniso manasikāra* cf. also Anālayo 2009y.

¹¹¹ MĀ 153 at T I 673a16.

far as it does not record that Māgandiya became a stream-enterer during this exposition. The two versions agree, however, that Māgandiya requested ordination,¹¹³ and that, after having been ordained, he eventually became an arahant.

MN 76 *Sandaka-sutta*

The *Sandaka-sutta*, the “discourse to Sandaka”, presents an examination by Ānanda of what renders going forth meaningless or fruitless. This discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese *Āgamas*.¹¹⁴ A few parts of this discourse have, however, been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.¹¹⁵ Although these fragments do not suffice for a full comparative study, two points can be made from a comparative perspective.

¹¹² According to MN 75 at MN I 512,13, by undertaking practice in accordance with the Dharma, Māgandiya would come to know by himself how the cessation of clinging leads via the cessation of becoming and birth to the cessation of *dukkha*.

¹¹³ While in MN 75 at MN I 512,26 the Buddha replied to this request by indicating that followers of a different tradition need to undergo a probation period of four months, in MĀ 153 at T I 673a21 the Buddha readily ordained Māgandiya by saying “welcome monk, practise the holy life”, 善來比丘, 修行梵行. Pali instances of this short form of ordination, the *ehi bhikkhu upasampadā*, can be found, for example, in Vin I 12,23 or at Th 625; on such early form of ordination as a combination of what later were the two stages of going forth and higher ordination, cf. also, e.g., Bhagvat 1939: 131, Dhirasekera 1982/2007: 222, Dutt 1924/1996: 147, Gokuldas 1955: 41, Gombrich 1984b: 42, and Upasak 1975: 138. For Māgandiya to have changed his earlier attitude towards the Buddha to such an extent as to request ordination, it would fit the context for him to attain stream-entry during the delivery of the discourse, as reported in MĀ 153.

¹¹⁴ Akanuma 1929/1990: 167 identifies SĀ 973 at T II 251b-c and SĀ² 207 at T II 451a-b as parallels to MN 76. These two discourses report Ānanda explaining the need to overcome lust, anger, and delusion, followed by pointing out the noble eightfold path as the means to achieve this. Thus, these discourses would rather be parallels to AN 3:71 at AN I 215-217. Moreover, according to SĀ 973 at T II 251b22 Ānanda’s interlocutor was a heterodox wanderer called 梅陀, whom the Taishō edition p. 251 note 7 and the 佛光 *Samyukta-āgama* edition p. 1463 note 5 identify to be Channa, the same person featuring in AN 3:71 at AN I 215,24 as the one whose visit caused Ānanda to deliver the discourse. Possibly the fact that SĀ 973 and SĀ² 207 take place at Ghosita’s park in Kosambī, the location of MN 76, may have led Akanuma to consider these two discourses as parallels to MN 76. AN 3:71 differs in fact in this respect from SĀ 973 and SĀ² 207, since AN 3:71 at AN I 215,23 has the standard reference to *sāvatthi nidānam*, which may indicate the location of the discourse or else, according to a suggestion made by Rhys Davids in Woodward 1924/1975: xi-xii, this standard reference might refer to the place where the discourses were collected. The examination of a teacher’s claim to omniscience in MN 76 at MN I 519,13 has a counterpart in MĀ 188 at T I 734b18, although here the criticism of such a claim is voiced by a heterodox recluse, instead of being spoken by Ānanda.

¹¹⁵ The Sanskrit fragments are SHT III 886 (p. 136, identified in SHT VIII p. 183, cf. also p. 184), SHT III 942 (pp. 204-205), and fragment Or. 15003/53 from the Hoernle collection, edited in Wille 2006: 83. SHT III 886A5-B8 parallels part of the introductory narration at MN I 513,20; SHT III 942 parallels the exposition of the first type of “holy life without consolation” (*anassāsika brahmacariya*) described at MN I 519,13; and the Hoernle fragment has preserved a few words of the exposition of the third type of “holy life without consolation”, found at MN I 520,19. The as yet unpublished fragment 149/160 of the Hoernle collection parallels, according to Hartmann 1992: 47, the beginning part of MN 76 from MN I

MN I 517 The first of these two points concerns the fourth of the ways that negate living the holy life. According to the *Sandaka-sutta*'s presentation, this fourth way occurs when a teacher proposes a theory of seven immutable bodies, proclaiming that purification comes about through a predetermined and fixed samsāric process. While the *Sandaka-sutta* presents this as one coherent view, in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* the same position amounts to two different views, as this discourse attributes the theory of seven immutable bodies to Pakudha Kaccāyana, whereas the doctrine of a fixed samsāric process of purification was, according to the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, a teaching propounded by Makkhali Gosāla.¹¹⁶

The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* reports Makkhali Gosāla's view to have been that the purification of beings happens without any cause.¹¹⁷ Such a denial of causality would not fit too well with the remainder of the theory attributed to him in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, since the idea of a fixed samsāric process of purification proposes a cause for the purification of beings, namely repeated rebirths.¹¹⁸

The theory of this fixed samsāric process of purification proposes a staggering number of fixed principles, describing a set number of actions, a set number of types of abode, a set number of elements, etc. Prominent among these classifications are analyses involving sets of sevens. A theory of a fixed process of purification based on fixed principles and making frequent usage of the number seven would fit Pakudha Kaccāyana's theory of seven immutable bodies well, as his theory does involve static principles and makes much use of the number seven. It would certainly fit his theory better than Makkhali Gosāla's denial of causality.¹¹⁹

513,13 to MN I 514,26. A discourse quotation paralleling the view described in MN 76 at MN I 515,4 can be found in Abhidh-k 4:78 in Pradhan 1967: 247,20; cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 88b14 and T 1559 at T XXIX 243b25.

¹¹⁶ DN 2 at DN I 56,20 and DN I 53,32.

¹¹⁷ DN 2 at DN I 53,25: “there is no cause or condition for the purification of beings, beings are purified without cause or condition” *n’ atthi hetu n’ atthi paccayo sattānanī visuddhiyā, ahetu apaccayā sattā visujjhanti*. A similar proposition is attributed to him in the *Sanghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 221,29, according to which he proclaimed that *nāsti hetuh nāsti pratyayaḥ, sattvāḥ visuddhyante, ahetvapratyayaṁ sattvā viśudhyante* (with the decisive difference that the *Sanghabhedavastu* does not combine this view with the proposal of the fixed samsāric process of purification). As already noted by Barua 1921/1981: 304, the Jain *Viyāhapaññatti* (quoted with translation in Basham 1951: 219), also attributes a theory of natural transformation to Makkhali Gosāla.

¹¹⁸ This difficulty had already been noted by Law 1919: 133. According to Harvey 2007: 43, however, the two positions can be seen to harmonize, if one interprets the denial of causality to refer only to the absence of any “cause within the current control of a person”.

¹¹⁹ A closer examination of the presentation of Makkhali Gosāla's view in DN 2 at DN I 53,29 further supports the possibility that the theory of samsāric purification and the denial of causality may not belong to the same teacher. Franke 1913a: 56 note 5 notes several occurrences of -e terminations for nominative singular masculine and neuter, which are found predominantly in the later part of the statement attributed to Makkhali Gosāla, cf. also Lüders 1954: 16. Based on these occurrences, Basham 1951: 24 and Vogel 1970: 23 note 20 suggest that the view attributed to Makkhali Gosāla may be a composite of what originally were two different passages. According to Bechert 1957: 74, however, the -e forms could

The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* stands in fact alone in its presentation, as neither its Chinese parallels nor a version of this discourse preserved in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* attribute the teaching of a fixed samsāric process of purification to Makkhali Gosāla.¹²⁰ One of the Chinese parallels to the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* even attributes the theory of a fixed samsāric process of purification to Pakudha Kacca-yana.¹²¹

Thus this Chinese discourse, as well as the *Sandaka-sutta*, combine the idea of a fixed samsāric process of purification with the theory of seven immutable bodies and thereby treat them as one coherent view. A combination of these two views can also be found in the *Pravrajyāvastu* and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, although these texts attribute this view to Ajita Kesakambali.¹²²

Other Pāli discourses show some inconsistencies in their presentation of Makkhali Gosāla's views, indicating that some degree of confusion about what view(s) should be attributed to him may already have been present at an early stage of their transmission,¹²³ a confusion that might also have affected the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*. Although the *Sandaka-sutta* does not mention Makkhali Gosāla or any of the other six teachers by name, its combination of the theory of seven immutable principles with a fixed samsāric process of purification may, after all, be a more coherent presentation.

The other point that can be made from a comparative perspective in regard to the *Sandaka-sutta* concerns a teacher's claim to omniscience. This claim occurs as the first of the four types of holy life without consolation. Parts of the examination of the first type of such a holy life without consolation have been preserved in one of the Sanskrit fragments, which offers additional examples that render such a teacher's claim to omniscience self-contradictory. The Sanskrit fragment agrees with the *Sandaka-sutta* in describing how a supposedly omniscient teacher enters an empty house (presumably in search of alms), comes across a wild animal, or has to ask for someone's name or for the way. In addition, the Sanskrit fragment depicts how such a teacher falls into a pond, a sewer, or a cesspool,¹²⁴ or even bangs (his head) on a door.¹²⁵ These additional descriptions further enhance the absurd situation that can result from claiming omniscience.

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be Sinhalisms. Yet, Norman 1976: 120 draws attention to a similar fluctuation between *-o* and *-e* terminations in a Jain text that also takes up views of other teachers, which obviously could not be due to any Sinhalisms. This makes it improbable that similar fluctuations in Pāli descriptions of the views of other teachers should be due to the influence of the Sinhalese reciters.

¹²⁰ The Chinese parallels are DĀ 27 at T I 108b13, EĀ 43.7 at T II 763b17, and T 22 at T I 271c9. The relevant part from the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* version can be found in Gnoli 1978a: 221,27.

¹²¹ T 22 at T I 272a6.

¹²² The *Pravrajyāvastu* fragments folio 10r10-v6 in Vogel 1984: 306-307 and the corresponding section in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 224,2.

¹²³ Cf. SN 22:60 at SN III 69,3, which puts the view that according to DN 2 at DN I 53,25 was held by Makkhali Gosāla into the mouth of Pūraṇa Kassapa, or AN 3:135 at AN I 286,24, which seems to confuse Makkhali Gosāla with Ajita Kesakambali. As noted by Olivelle 1974: 30, Makkhali Gosāla's "views are no doubt distorted in Buddhist literature".

¹²⁴ SHT III 942R3: *palvalam prapā[ta]m syandanikām gūtho[d]igallam*.

The agreement between the Pāli and Sanskrit presentations on the predicament caused by such claims makes it rather improbable that such a claim had already been attributed to the Buddha at the time when the *Sandaka-sutta* came into being.¹²⁶

MN 77 *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*

The *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*, the “greater discourse to Sakuludāyī”, sets forth those qualities of the Buddha that cause his disciples to respect him. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹²⁷

MN II 2 The *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin by relating that the Buddha went to visit the wanderer Sakuludāyī.¹²⁸ During the ensuing conversation, Sakuludāyī contrasted the disrespectful behaviour of the disciples of six other well-known contemporary teachers with the respectful behaviour of the Buddha’s disciples. Although the main thread of presentation in this part of the two discourses is the same, the two versions exhibit a few minor but noteworthy differences.

Both discourses describe that just before the Buddha’s arrival, Sakuludāyī and his assembly had been engaging in various types of pointless talk.¹²⁹ On arrival, the Bud-

¹²⁵ SHT III 942R4: *kavātam vā [ma]r[date]*.

¹²⁶ On the probably late nature of the attribution of omniscience to the Buddha cf., e.g., Anālayo 2006b, Gombrich 2007: 205-207, Jain 1972: 278-282, Jaini 1974, Jayatilleke 1963/1980: 376-381, Kariyawasam 1990, id. 2002, Karunaratna 2004a, Katz 1982/1989: 132, Nāgapriya 2006, Naughton 1991: 37, Tilakaratne 1997: 602-603, and Warder 1970/1991: 135-137.

¹²⁷ MĀ 207 at T I 781b-783c, which agrees with MN 77 on the location. The title of MĀ 207 is 箭毛經, literally “discourse to Arrow Hair”. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 378 and the Taishō edition p. 781 note 18 indicate that 箭毛 corresponds to Sakuludāyī. 箭毛 recurs in SĀ² 323 at T II 481c15 to render Sūcīloma (cf. also the more fitting rendering of this name as 针毛, “Needle Hair”, in SĀ 1324 at T II 363c1). Throughout MĀ 207 the Buddha in fact addresses 箭毛 as 優陀夷, Udāyī, which supports the Taishō edition’s suggestion that in MĀ 207 箭毛 does stand for Sakuludāyī, although the reasoning behind the choice of this rendering by the translator(s) remains unclear to me. For remarks on MĀ 207 see Minh Chau 1964/1991: 71-72; a translation of MĀ 207, together with extracts from the present discussion, can be found in Anālayo 2009d. A discourse quotation paralleling the description of the *abhibhāyatana*s in MN 77 at MN II 13,16 (not necessarily specific to the present discourse) can be found in Abhidh-k 8:35 in Pradhan 1967: 457,2, cf. also T 1558 at T XXIX 151c14 and T 1559 at T XXIX 303b1.

¹²⁸ While according to MN 77 at MN II 1,8 the Buddha went to the Peacock’s Sanctuary to visit Sakuludāyī because it was yet too early to beg alms in Rājagaha, MĀ 207 at T I 781c3 reports that after completing his alms round and taking his meal the Buddha took his sitting mat and approached the Peacock’s Sanctuary where Sakuludāyī was staying.

¹²⁹ MN 77 at MN II 1,15 and MĀ 207 at T I 781c8 speak literally of “various animal talk”, *anekavihitam tiracchānakatham*, 種種畜生之論. Bodhi in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 1282 note 748 explains that “*tiracchāna* means literally ‘going horizontally’, and although this term is used as a designation for animals, ... [the commentary] explains that in the present context it means talk that goes ‘horizontally’ or ‘perpendicularly’ to the path”. Norman 1993/1994: 91 suggests that “*tiracchāna kathā* was at one time one example of ... gossip, ‘talk about animals’, on the same lines as ‘talk about kings’, etc., and it then became used in a generic sense, to stand for all such talk”; on the significance of the topics listed in such descriptions cf. also Law 1918: 402. The instances listed in the standard Pāli and Chinese descriptions

dha politely inquired after the topic of the conversation that had been interrupted by his arrival. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, in reply Sakuludāyī explained that it had been a conversation of little interest, after which he turns to what seems to be a different topic, namely a former discussion on the behaviour of the disciples of other teachers.¹³⁰ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* report, however, the Buddha had asked up to three times to be informed about the conversation that had been going on, thereby finally prompting Sakuludāyī to explain that he and his disciples had been reviewing a former discussion on the behaviour of the disciples of other teachers.¹³¹

In both versions, this topic regarding the behaviour of the disciples of other teachers then forms the beginning point of the ensuing discussion between Sakuludāyī and the Buddha. Thus, whereas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the behaviour of the disciples of other teachers constitutes a change of topic from what Sakuludāyī and his disciples had been conversing about, in the *Madhyama-āgama* version it was just this subject that they had been discussing.

Although the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation fits the narrative flow well, it stands in contrast to the earlier indication, made in both discourses, that Sakuludāyī and his assembly had been engaged in various types of pointless talk. Such descriptions of pointless talk form a standard pericope in the discourses in order to depict the behaviour of heterodox wanderers. If it were not for this description, the *Madhyama-āgama* version's presentation would present a meaningful sequence of events, where Sakuludāyī and his disciples are engaged in discussing a topic that is interrupted by the Buddha's arrival, but then is taken up again on the Buddha's repeated request.¹³²

The *Madhyama-āgama* version also differs from the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* as it reports that at that time the Buddha was living in the company of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty monks.¹³³ In general, the early discourses use the number five hundred in such circumstances. Both numbers are not to be taken too literal, as they often appear to have a predominantly symbolic value,¹³⁴ that is, the number "five hundred" usually

of such 'pointless talk' are fairly similar. A noteworthy difference is that while MN 77 at MN II 1,19 speaks merely of "talk about women", *itthikathā* (S^e-MN II 310,17: *itthī*), MĀ 207 at T I 781c9 lists "talk about married women", "talk about girls" and "talk about adulterous women", 論婦人, 論童女, 論姪女. This presentation puts the heterodox wanderers in an even more unfavourable light than in MN 77. "Talks with or about women", *itthikahā*, was also censured among Jain monks, cf. Balbir 2002: 72 and *Thāṇaṅga* 4.282 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 111,15, which distinguishes between four types of talk about women, namely their caste, their families, their beauty and their adornments; cf. also *Thāṇaṅga* 4.284 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 113,15, which indicates that monastics do not indulge in talk about women, and *Thāṇaṅga* 7.569 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 234,7 for a listing of seven unbefitting types of talk.

¹³⁰ MN 77 at MN II 2,19.

¹³¹ MĀ 207 at T I 781c23.

¹³² A similar description of Sakuludāyī's congregation of wanderers engaged in pointless talk can be found in MN 79 at MN II 30,1 and its parallel MĀ 208 at T I 783c12; cf. also below p. 432 note 192.

¹³³ MĀ 207 at T I 781b29.

¹³⁴ The number five hundred seems to derive its significance from the number five, which in turn is taken from the number of the fingers of a hand and thus in the early discourses represents a basic unit, cf. Rhys Davids 1937: 410, who explains that the number five is "a comprehensive unit in Indian thought

stands representative for “a great number”.¹³⁵ Such a symbolic use of numbers is one of the characteristics of oral traditions in general, where numbers tend to be stereotyped and to be used in a predominantly allegorical way.¹³⁶ Besides, in ancient India numbers would have still possessed a significance on their own, beyond their function as devices for mathematical operations.¹³⁷

A count of five hundred occurs also in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, namely as the number of disciples of Sakuludāyī and of the six other teachers. In this way, the numbering of the Buddha’s disciples as one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty stands in a favourable contrast to the other teachers, indicating that they were not able to command a following as large as the Buddha.¹³⁸

Examining descriptions of the Buddha’s disciples in other discourses brings to light that the number one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty occurs only sporadically in the Pāli *Nikāyas*,¹³⁹ in the *Madhyama-āgama*, and in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹⁴⁰ A considera-

... probably derived from the *pañcangulika* formation of the human hand”. Multiplying five with ten times ten (= both hands) makes ‘five hundred’ and stands for a ‘large group’. PED: 388 s.v. *pañca* explains that the number five hundred has lost its “original numerical significance ... psychologically five hundred is to be explained as a ‘great hand’, i.e. the five fingers magnified to the 2nd decade, and is equivalent to an expression like ‘a lot’”, a number found “especially frequent in recording a company of men, a host of servants, animals in a herd, etc., wherever the single constituents form a larger ... whole”. The idea of a ‘very large group’ could then be arrived at by five times five times five times ten, which results in the number ‘one-thousand-two-hundred-fifty’; cf. also Deeg 1995: 77–78 and Yuyama 1992.

¹³⁵ Bareau 1971a: 80–81 takes the number five hundred to represent “many” (beaucoup), PED: 388 s.v. *pañca* similarly explains five hundred to correspond to “a lot”, and Wagle 1966: 16 speaks of “a sizable group”; cf. also Feer 1884b: 114 and Wiltshire 1990: 176.

¹³⁶ Vansina 1985: 171 explains that numbers “are both abstract and repetitive so that they fare badly in all [oral] traditions and are stereotyped to numbers meaning ‘perfect’, ‘many’, ‘few’”.

¹³⁷ Syrkin 1983: 156 speaks of “an archaic and universal tendency to describe the world with the help of definite number complexes ... manifoldly reflected in the Pali canon”.

¹³⁸ MĀ 207 at T I 781c6 counts Sakuludāyī’s followers and MĀ 207 at T I 782a4+9 counts the followers of the other six teachers as five hundred, 五百, while according to MĀ 207 at T I 782a13 (cf. also T I 781b29) the Buddha had one-thousand-two-hundred-fifty followers, 千二百五十. Manné 1990: 49 comments that in discourses that have a debate character and feature a meeting with an opponent “the description of the size of the following around each of the opponents ... serves to enhance, or otherwise, the importance of each adversary”.

¹³⁹ DN 2 at DN I 47,4, DN 14 at DN II 6,11, SN 8:8 at SN I 192,10 (or SN² 216 at SN² I 414,5), and Sn 3:7 at Sn p. 102,20 (= MN 92) depict the Buddha in the company of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty monks. The parallels to DN 2, DĀ 27 at T I 107a22, EĀ 43.7 at T II 762a8, and T 22 at T I 271a2, agree with DN 2 on the number of monks present. The parallels to DN 14 agree with the Pāli account on the number of monks, cf. Sanskrit fragment S 360 folio 11(7)V4 in Fukita 2003: 4 or in Waldschmidt 1953: 15 and the Chinese parallels DĀ 1 at T I 2c1, EĀ 48.4 at T II 791a3, T 2 at T I 151c28, and T 4 at T I 160a22. A parallel to SN 8:8, SĀ 1219 at T II 332b2, records only the presence of one-thousand monks. A parallel to Sn 3:7, EĀ 49.6 at T II 798a26, reports that only five hundred monks were present.

¹⁴⁰ MĀ 207 appears to be the only discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama* to portray the Buddha with a congregation of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty monks, just as SĀ 914 at T II 230b4 appears to be the only discourse in the *Samyukta-āgama* to depict him with such a large following. Nakamura 2000a: 306 suggest that this number may represent the converted disciples of the three Kassapa brothers (five

bly more frequent use is made of this number, however, in discourses from the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹⁴¹ In the *Dīrgha-āgama*, then, the number one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty is standard in the description of the congregation of the Buddha's monk disciples in the introductory narration to a discourse, only on rare occasions giving way to the less impressive number of five hundred disciples.¹⁴²

The comparatively high number of references to one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty disciples in the *Dīrgha-āgama* could be related to the circumstance that this collection appears to have been transmitted within the Dharmaguptaka tradition, which tends to give a particular emphasis to the superior qualities of the Buddha.

The tendency to exalt the Buddha's status as a teacher is, however, not confined to the Dharmaguptaka tradition, in fact the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel to the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* carries its numerological conceptions even further. When relating the Buddha's delivery of teachings on a former occasion, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version his audience amounted to "innumerable hundred-thousands",¹⁴³ whereas the *Majjhima-nikāya* version only records the comparatively less impressive presence of "several hundreds" of listeners during this teaching.¹⁴⁴

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse's tendency to exalt the Buddha can also be seen in its description of how Sakuludāyī rose up on seeing the Buddha come, arranged his robe over one shoulder and greeted the Buddha with palms together, a behaviour not recorded in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version.¹⁴⁵ Since, according to both discourses, Sakuludāyī was a famous teacher,¹⁴⁶ such outward display of humility and respect in the presence of his own disciples, when being visited by another teacher, seems a little out of proportion.

hundred + three hundred + two hundred, cf. Vin I 24,13) and the converted disciples of Sañjaya (two-hundred-and-fifty, cf. Vin I 39,24), which together would amount to a following of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty monks.

¹⁴¹ The presence of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty disciples or listeners is recorded in EĀ 26.9 at T II 639a15, EĀ 30.3 at T II 660a2, EĀ 36.5 at T II 708a26, EĀ 43.7 at T II 762a8, EĀ 45.7 at T II 773c21, EĀ 48.2 at T II 787b5, EĀ 48.4 at T II 791a3, and EĀ 50.4 at T II 806c22.

¹⁴² Nearly all of the thirty discourses found in the *Dīrgha-āgama* report the Buddha to be in the presence of one-thousand-two-hundred-and-fifty disciples, cf. DĀ 1 at T I 1b13, DĀ 2 at T I 11a9, DĀ 3 at T I 30b12, DĀ 4 at T I 34b6, DĀ 5 at T I 36c1, DĀ 6 at T I 39a23, DĀ 8 at T I 47a19, DĀ 9 at T I 49b28, DĀ 10 at T I 52c19, DĀ 11 at T I 57b27, DĀ 12 at T I 59b16, DĀ 13 at T I 60b1, DĀ 15 at T I 66a11, DĀ 16 at T I 70a21, DĀ 17 at T I 72c14, DĀ 18 at T I 76b25, DĀ 20 at T I 82a8, DĀ 21 at T I 88b14, DĀ 22 at T I 94a20, DĀ 23 at T I 96c18, DĀ 24 at T I 101b16, DĀ 25 at T I 102c26, DĀ 26 at T I 104c18, DĀ 27 at T I 107a22, DĀ 28 at T I 109c24, DĀ 29 at T I 112c22, and DĀ 30 at T I 114b9.

¹⁴³ MĀ 207 at T I 782b17: 無量百千.

¹⁴⁴ MN 77 at MN II 4,34: *anekasata*.

¹⁴⁵ MĀ 207 at T I 781c16: 從坐起, 偏袒著衣, 叉手向佛. This description is a pericope used frequently in the *Madhyama-āgama* to depict the attitude of disciples who are in discussion with the Buddha, so that its occurrence in the present context may simply be due to the application of a stereotype.

¹⁴⁶ MN 77 at MN II 1,5 specifies that Sakuludāyī was one out of several "well-known wanderers", *abhiññātā abhiññātā paribbājakā*, and MĀ 207 at T I 781c5 indicates that he was "of great fame", 有大名譽. AN 4:30 at AN II 29,24 and AN 4:185 at AN II 176,10 also report that Sakuludāyī was a famous wanderer.

The same *Madhyama-āgama* version, however, reports that Sakuludāyī addressed the Buddha by his name Gotama, a not particularly respectful way of behaviour.¹⁴⁷ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, Sakuludāyī rather used the respectful address “Blessed One” and “venerable sir”.¹⁴⁸ In this respect, then, the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation would correspond more closely to the way other discourses depict the common usage among wanderers.

The respectful address “venerable sir”, in contrast, is in the discourses usually employed by disciples towards their teacher, or by laity when speaking with monks and wanderers, while the address “Blessed One” seems to be used mainly by followers of the Buddha. Although Sakuludāyī may have felt respect and sympathy for the Buddha, it strikes an unusual note for a teacher and leader of a congregation of non-Buddhist wanderers like Sakuludāyī to be depicted as adopting the behaviour of a faithful Buddhist disciple.¹⁴⁹

That the *Majjhima-nikāya* version might have suffered from some confusion in regard to modes of address becomes evident at a later point, when both versions take up the respect the Buddha’s disciples had for their teacher. While in the *Madhyama-āgama* account the Buddha describes how his disciples would refer to him as “our Blessed One”, in the corresponding *Majjhima-nikāya* passage he indicates that his disciples would use the expression “recluse Gotama” to refer to him, an expression that in other discourses is regularly employed by outsiders that do not consider themselves disciples of the Buddha.¹⁵⁰ Hence, according to the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* Sakuludāyī used what the disciples should have used, while the disciples used the address to be expected of Sakuludāyī. This presentation may be the outcome of a mix up during the process of transmission.

- MN II 3 The two versions agree that none of the six teachers was able to silence his disciples in order to be able to reply to a question asked by his visitors. The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse describes that these disciples even openly proclaimed that their teacher did not know how to reply, telling the visitors that it would be better to ask them instead of asking their teacher.¹⁵¹ This presents the followers of the other six teachers in a more unfavourable light than the *Madhyama-āgama* version. If the disciples of the six teachers had indeed been as disrespectful as reported in the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*, it would be difficult to conceive of these teachers being held in as high an esteem by their contemporaries as reported in both versions of the present discourse.

¹⁴⁷ MĀ 207 at T I 781c21:瞿曇.

¹⁴⁸ MN 77 at MN II 2,11: *bhante bhagavā*.

¹⁴⁹ Allon 1997a: 121 explains (in relation to another similar instance) that “the use of *bhante* ‘venerable sir’ is particularly unusual as a form of address used by an ascetic towards the Buddha, as is the ascetic referring to the Buddha as *Bhagava*”.

¹⁵⁰ MĀ 207 at T I 782c24 and T I 783a1+6+11+17: “our Blessed One”, 我世尊, and MN 77 at MN II 7,2+18 and MN II 8,1+17+34: “recluse Gotama”, *samāṇo gotamo*. According to Wagle 1966: 56, the address “*samāṇa*, although a term of respect, denotes a certain indifference”.

¹⁵¹ MN 77 at MN II 3,17.

In relation to the behaviour of the disciples of the Buddha, the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* MN II 4 and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel relate an instance when a disciple made some noise while the Buddha was giving a talk. Whereas according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account the disciple had merely cleared his throat, according to its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel he had actually fallen asleep and was snoring, a not too flattering description of what can happen when the Buddha delivers a talk.¹⁵²

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version, moreover, reports that, whenever the Buddha taught, the assembled audience was totally intent on what he said.¹⁵³ The *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* also notes that even those who give up the life of a Buddhist monk and return to lay life will nevertheless praise the Buddha and his teaching. The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not report the attentive behaviour of the assembly, nor does it take up the issue of monks disrobing. In fact, its description of a monk who falls asleep and is snoring would not fit the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*'s account of the attentive behaviour of the Buddha's audience.

Looking back on these variations between the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, it seems that both versions are under the influence of the same tendency to enhance the status and position of the Buddha, although this tendency manifests in different ways in each of the two versions.

The *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* and its parallel continue by reporting five reasons that *Sakuludāyī* thought to be responsible for the respect shown by the Buddha's disciples to their teacher. Although differing in the sequence (see table 8.4), the two versions agree on these five reasons being the taking of little food, contentment with any robe, any alms food, and any dwelling place, and a secluded life-style.

MN II 5

In reply to this proposition, according to both versions the Buddha pointed out that some of his disciples surpassed him in regard to each of these qualities, so that these five reasons would not suffice for instilling respect in his disciples.¹⁵⁴ Instead, he explained, his disciples respected him for five other qualities.

¹⁵² MN 77 at MN II 4,35: *ukkāsi*, MĀ 207 at T I 782b18: 鬱眠作聲. The description of a disciple who is admonished for clearing his throat recurs in MN 89 at MN II 122,10, where the parallel MĀ 213 at T I 797a18 again suggests that the disciple was actually snoring, while a parallel to the same discourse in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1451 at T XXIV 238a26, agrees with the Pāli version that he merely cleared his throat; cf. below p. 515 note 348. Another such case appears to be found in T 212 at T IV 700b18. According to a description of the conduct of ancient Indian śramaṇas by Megasthenes, during the delivery of a discourse “the hearer is not allowed to speak or even to cough, and much less to spit, and if he offends in any of these ways he is cast out ... as being a man who is wanting in self-restraint”, cf. McCrindle 1877: 99. According to EĀ 38.5 at T II 718c19, on another occasion Anuruddha fell asleep while the Buddha was giving a teaching to a vast assembly, and according to EĀ 30.2 at T II 659c2 on yet another occasion an elderly monk even stretched out his feet towards the Buddha and took a nap while the Buddha was giving a talk to a vast assembly.

¹⁵³ MN 77 at MN II 5,5. This depiction of an invariably attentive assembly would stand in contrast to MN 65 at MN I 445,31 and its parallel MĀ 194 at T I 749b3, according to which a monk met with rebuke for not paying attention when the Buddha taught the Dharma.

¹⁵⁴ MĀ 207 at T I 783a4 contrasts the Buddha's partaking of a single or even half a *beluva* fruit with his disciples who take a single or half a cup full of food. Since the point of the whole exposition in both ver-

Table 8.4: Five Outward Qualities of the Buddha in MN 77 and its Parallel

MN 77	MĀ 207
taking little food (1)	contentment with robes (→ 2)
contentment with robes (2)	contentment with food (→ 3)
contentment with food (3)	taking little food (→ 1)
contentment with dwelling place (4)	contentment with dwelling place (→ 4)
living in seclusion (5)	living in seclusion (→ 5)

MN II 9 With some differences in sequence (see table 8.5 below), the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* and its parallel agree that the first four of these five qualities are:

- higher virtue,
- knowledge-and-vision,
- higher wisdom,
- teaching the four noble truths.¹⁵⁵

In regard to the Buddha's higher virtue, while the *Majjhima-nikāya* version does not offer further information on this quality, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse explains that the Buddha's higher virtue was such that he spoke as he acted and acted as he spoke.¹⁵⁶ This specification sets a meaningful contrast to the type of more external virtuous conduct envisaged as praiseworthy by Sakuludāyī.

MN II 10 In regard to higher wisdom, the *Majjhima-nikāya* account points out that it was due to the confidence of his disciples in his wisdom that they would not interrupt the Buddha when he was teaching.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation continues by noting that the Buddha did not expect teachings from his disciples, but they expected teachings from him.¹⁵⁷ These specifications, which are not found in the *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, explain why the Bud-

sions is to show that some of the disciples surpassed the Buddha in regard to each of the five qualities, this part of MĀ 207 appears to have suffered from a confusion during its transmission or translation. In the corresponding passage in MN 77 at MN II 6,34, the *beluva* fruit and the cup full of food are both part of the depiction of the small amounts taken by disciples, in contrast to which the Buddha is said to sometimes take a whole bowl full of food, or even more.

¹⁵⁵ MĀ 207 at T I 783b2+5 has these qualities in a slightly different order, as it first takes up “unparalleled wisdom”, 無上智慧, and then “unparalleled knowledge and vision”, 無上知見, whereas in MN 77 at MN II 9,22 “knowledge-and-vision”, *ñāṇadassana*, precedes “higher wisdom”, *adhipaññā*.

¹⁵⁶ MĀ 207 at T I 783a25: 如所說所作亦然, 如所作所說亦然, similar to a qualification of the Buddha as one who speaks as he acts and acts as he speaks, *yathāvādī tathākārī*, *yathākārī tathāvādī*, in DN 19 at DN II 224,3, DN 29 at DN III 135,15, AN 4:23 at AN II 24,7, and It 4:13 at It 122,2.

¹⁵⁷ MN 77 at MN II 10,11: *na kho panāhaṇi ... sāvakesu anusāsanī paccāsiṃsāmi, aññadathu mamaṃ yeva sāvakā anusāsanī paccāsiṃsanti* (B^e-MN II 202,22; *paccāsiṃsāmi*, *paccāsiṃsanti*, and *mama*, S^e-MN II 323,7: *aññadatthum*). A related statement can be found in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 78,15, according to which the Buddha did not expect his disciples to protect his proclamation of Dharma and Vinaya, nor did it occur to them to do so, *na mām śrāvakāḥ svākhyātadharmavinayato 'nurakṣitavyam manyante, nāhaṇi śrāvakāṇām antikāt svākhyātadharmavinayatyānurakṣaṇam pratyāśamsāmi*, a statement similarly made for the Buddha's *sīla*, *ājīva*, *jñānadarśana* and *vyaṅkarana*.

dha's disciples would display a type of behaviour different from the behaviour of the disciples of the other teachers.

Table 8.5: Five Inner Qualities of the Buddha in MN 77 and its Parallel

MN 77	MĀ 207
higher virtue (1)	supreme virtue (→ 1)
knowledge and vision (2)	supreme wisdom (→ 3)
higher wisdom (3)	supreme knowledge and vision (→ 2)
teaching of four noble truths (4)	teaching of four noble truths (→ 4)
teaching ways of development (5)	teaching higher knowledge (→ 5)

In regard to the fifth inner quality of the Buddha, the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation takes up his teaching of the recollection of past lives and of the eradication of the influxes. The *Madhyama-āgama* version concludes that his disciples had confidence in the Buddha because through these teachings they were able to go beyond doubt and reach the other shore.¹⁵⁸

MN II 11

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version differs considerably, as it instead presents a detailed exposition of various aspects of the Buddhist path that covers the following topics:

- the four *satipatthānas*,
- the four right efforts,
- the four ways to [psychic] power (*iddhipāda*),
- the five faculties,
- the five powers,
- the seven awakening factors,
- the noble eightfold path,
- the eight liberations (*vimokkha*),
- the eight bases for transcendence (*abhibhāyatana*),
- the ten *kasiṇas*,
- the four *jhānas*,
- insight into the nature of body and consciousness,¹⁵⁹
- production of a mind-made body (*manomaya kāya*),
- supernormal powers (*iddhi*),
- the divine ear,
- telepathic knowledge of the minds of others,
- recollection of past lives,

¹⁵⁸ MĀ 207 at T I 783b16. MĀ 207 precedes this description by referring to the Buddha's ability to teach the four noble truths, found in similar terms in MN 77 at MN II 10,20. An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005c: 95-96.

¹⁵⁹ A parallel to the simile of the reed, used to illustrate this particular insight, can be found in the *Katha Upaniṣad* 2.3.17. Another parallel occurs in the Jain *Sūyagada* 2.1.16 in Bollée 1977b: 25,23, translated ibid. p. 140, preceded by the simile of drawing a sword from its scabbard; cf. also the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 4.3.3.16, on which cf. Chaudhary 1994e: 161 and Norman 1976/1991: 101-102.

- the divine eye,
- the destruction of the influxes.¹⁶⁰

When considering this exposition in the light of its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, the Buddha's ability to teach the path to the eradication of the influxes would suffice in order to explain what really makes him worthy of respect. The long exposition given in the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* appears somewhat out of proportion, as after announcing an exposition of five qualities it takes up the first four qualities only in brief but then delivers a disproportionately long exposition of the fifth quality. Due to this detailed exposition, the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* has become a rather long discourse that would perhaps find a more fitting placement in the *Dīgha-nikāya*, instead of being included among discourses of "middle length". In sum, this whole exposition in the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* gives the impression of being an expansion of what originally would have only been a reference to the destruction of the influxes or to the three higher knowledges.

MN II 22 While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version ends with Sakuludāyi's delight in the Buddha's exposition, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account Sakuludāyi took refuge and asked to be accepted as a lay follower.¹⁶¹ For him to become a lay follower would, however, seem a rather unexpected course of action. Had Sakuludāyi really been ready to formally become a disciple of the Buddha, it would have been more appropriate for him to request ordination as a Buddhist monk. This ending in the *Madhyama-āgama* version may thus be another instance of the tendency to exalt the Buddha by depicting the effect his teaching had on his listeners, a tendency which in its various manifestations can be seen to be at work in both versions of the present discourse.

MN 78 Samanamandikā-sutta¹⁶²

The *Samanamandikā-sutta*, the "discourse to Samanamandika[putta]", defines what makes one a "supreme recluse". This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ MN 77 at MN II 11,3 to MN II 22,15. Eimer 1976: 53 notes that the first part of this listing, up to the ten *kasiṇas*, follows a numerical ascending order, while the items listed after the ten *kasiṇas* no longer follow this order, but instead come in the same sequence as found in DN 2 at DN I 73,23 to DN I 84,12. This suggests that two originally independent listings have been combined in the present instance.

¹⁶¹ MĀ 207 at T I 783b28: "may the Blessed One accept me as a lay follower from now on", 唯願世尊受我為優婆塞, 從今日始. Notably, at this point Sakuludāyi switches from the address "ascetic Gotama" to the address "Blessed One", as demanded by the situation.

¹⁶² B^e-MN II 214,9 and S^e-MN II 342,1 have the title *Samanamandika-sutta*.

¹⁶³ The parallel is MĀ 179 at T I 720a-721c. MĀ 179 has the title "discourse to the carpenter Pañcakañga", 五支物主經, and agrees with MN 78 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. A translation of MĀ 179, together with extracts from the present discussion, can be found in Anālayo 2009h. The *Vyākhyāyukti* in Lee 2001: 14,12 refers to the present discourse as *yan lag Inga pa'i phyā* (Lee reads *phywa*) *mkhan gyi mdo*, which Skilling 2000b: 342 indicates to correspond to *Pañcāṅga-sthapati-sūtra*. For counterparts to MN 78 at MN II 26,16-22 and MN II 27,5-10 in *Vyākhyāyukti* literature cf. Skilling 2000b: 342.

The *Samañamāṇḍikā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin by relating that the carpenter Pañcakaṅga visited the wanderer Samañamāṇḍikaputta,¹⁶⁴ who proposed that to be a supreme recluse requires not doing evil by way of body, speech, thought, and livelihood. The two versions differ in the sequence in which they present these four qualities (see table 8.6). Both report that Pañcakaṅga left and reported this view to the Buddha who disapproved, explaining that a small infant would also fulfil these requirements.¹⁶⁵

MN II 24

Table 8.6: Qualities of a Supreme Recluse in MN 78 and its Parallel¹⁶⁶

MN 78	MĀ 179
no evil bodily deed (1)	no evil bodily deed (→ 1)
no evil verbal deed (2)	no evil verbal deed (→ 2)
no evil thought (3)	no evil livelihood (→ 4)
no evil livelihood (4)	no evil thought (→ 3)

The *Samañamāṇḍikā-sutta* continues by proclaiming that a person should not be considered accomplished in what is wholesome, or a supreme recluse, simply because of not doing evil by way of body, speech, thought, and livelihood.¹⁶⁷ The *Madhyama-āgama* version introduces a finer distinction at this point. In agreement with the *Majjhimanikāya* version, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse proclaims that merely avoiding evil by way of body, speech, thought, and livelihood does not suffice for being a supreme recluse, followed by pointing out, however, that to avoid evil in this way is nevertheless an accomplishment in what is wholesome.¹⁶⁸ In this way, the *Madhyama-āgama* ver-

MN II 25

¹⁶⁴ The Pāli editions differ in their description of the company of the wanderer Samañamāṇḍikā, which according to E^e-MN II 23,1 numbered three hundred, while B^e-MN II 214,14 and S^e-MN II 342,6 give the more usual number five hundred (thereby agreeing with MĀ 179 at T I 720b10), and C^e-MN II 366,5 speaks of seven hundred.

¹⁶⁵ In relation to the image of the small infant, MN 78 at MN II 24,33 and MN II 25,1 presents the moaning of the infant as an example of its intention and the milk of the child's mother as its livelihood. In this way, MN 78 highlights that the intention of the child manifests through sulking and its livelihood is to depend on the mother's milk. MĀ 179 at T I 720c9+10 instead relates the infant's moaning to its livelihood and the mother's milk to the thoughts or intentions of the child, 慮, for which Hirakawa 1997: 469 lists *samkalpa* as one of its possible equivalents, besides *smṛti*, *smarana*, *anusmṛti*, *manasikāra*, etc. (MN 78 at MN II 24,32 speaks in this context of *saṅkappa*, "intention"). Thus MĀ 179 indicates that the child's thoughts or intentions revolve around the mother's milk and its demand for such livelihood takes place through moaning.

¹⁶⁶ The qualities are listed in MN 78 at MN II 24,7 and in MĀ 179 at T I 720b25, which thereby presents thought, the subtlest of the four, as its last.

¹⁶⁷ MN 78 at MN II 25,14: "[he is] not accomplished in what is wholesome, not perfected in what is wholesome, not an invincible recluse attained to the supreme", *na c' eva sampannakusalam na paramakusalam na uttamapattipattam samañam ayojjham* (S^e-MN II 345,13: *uttamapattipattam*).

¹⁶⁸ MĀ 179 at T I 720c13: "he is accomplished in wholesomeness, is supreme in wholesomeness, yet is not an unsurpassable person, has not reached the supreme essence, and has not the nature of a forthright recluse", 成就善, 第一善, 然非無上士, 不得第一義, 亦非質直沙門.

sion gives proper place to the importance of avoiding evil action, whereas the same is somewhat lost out of sight with the *Majjhima-nikāya* version's sweeping dismissal.¹⁶⁹

The *Samanamandikā-sutta* continues with a brief reference to the ten qualities required for being a supreme recluse, a reference found only in the concluding section of its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.¹⁷⁰ In relation to this difference, it is worthy of note that in the early discourses it is a standard procedure to follow such a brief statement with a detailed exposition, usually by way of a rhetorical question about the nature of what has been said in brief. The two versions of the present discourse do indeed have such a corresponding question together with a more detailed exposition, yet this is found in both versions in their concluding sections.¹⁷¹

In the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, this statement, the subsequent question, and the more detailed exposition come together, follow each other naturally, and fit the context. In contrast, in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the initial statement on the ten qualities hangs somewhat in the air, as it is followed by a different exposition that takes up the need to understand unwholesome conduct. The transition between these two is rather abrupt and the ensuing exposition of unwholesome conduct does not stand in a direct relation to the ten qualities. As the question corresponding to the brief statement and the detailed exposition of the same ten qualities occur only much later, at the end of a treatment of the path to the cessation of wholesome intentions, it seems as if during the process of transmission the natural connection between the initial brief statement on the ten qualities and the subsequent question and detailed exposition was lost and the initial statement ended up in an earlier part of the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse.

In order to provide a contrast to the assumption that not doing evil suffices to become a supreme recluse, the *Samanamandikā-sutta* and its parallel highlight the need to properly understand the nature, the origin, the cessation, and the path leading to the cessation of:

- unwholesome conduct,
- wholesome conduct,
- unwholesome intentions,
- wholesome intentions.

The exposition of the nature and origin of conduct that is either unwholesome or else wholesome is similar in the two versions.

¹⁶⁹ Cf., e.g., AN 4:116 at AN II 119,30, a whole discourse dedicated to the importance of developing wholesome bodily, verbal, and mental conduct, together with right view. This discourse supports the presentation in MĀ 179, in the sense that proper bodily, verbal, and mental conduct can indeed be reckoned an accomplishment in what is wholesome.

¹⁷⁰ MN 78 at MN II 25,18: "endowed with ten qualities do I describe a man as ... a supreme recluse", *dasa-hi ... dhammehi samannāgatañ purisapuggalañ paññāpemi ... samañam ayojjham* (B^e-MN II 216,27: *paññāpemi*). The corresponding reference to being endowed with ten qualities occurs in MĀ 179 at T I 721c12.

¹⁷¹ MN 78 at MN II 28,34: "endowed with what ten qualities do I describe a man as ... a supreme recluse", *katamehi ... dasahi dhammehi samannāgatañ purisapuggallañ paññāpemi ... samañam ayojjham* (B^e-MN II 220,16: *paññāpemi*)? The corresponding question occurs in MĀ 179 at T I 721c14.

Regarding the cessation of unwholesome conduct, the two versions agree on mentioning the need to abandon not only unwholesome bodily and verbal conduct, but also to abandon any unwholesome mental activity.¹⁷² This is surprising, as both versions later on examine unwholesome and wholesome intentions on their own, whereas the present context is concerned with forms of conduct. MN II 26

The triad of bodily, verbal, and mental action occurs frequently in other discourses, so that a passage that mentions only bodily and verbal action could easily have led a reciter to supplement the ‘missing’ mental counterpart. Thus, the reference to mental activity in the Pāli and Chinese versions’ exposition of the cessation of unwholesome conduct could be a reciter’s error that happened early enough to make its way into the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions of the present discourse.¹⁷³

The *Samanamandikā-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel continue by explaining that the complementary cessation of wholesome conduct requires avoiding attachment to such wholesome conduct.¹⁷⁴ To this the *Majjhima-nikāya* version adds the need to understand liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom, where wholesome conduct ceases completely, a statement not found in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.¹⁷⁵

The commentary explains that the cessation of wholesome conduct comes about with full awakening.¹⁷⁶ The formulation in the Pāli discourse itself, however, does not necessarily entail full awakening, since it speaks only of “knowing” these two liberations, not of having “realized” them. While references to “realizing” liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom in other discourses do indeed stand for full awakening,¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² MN 78 at MN II 26,20: *manoduccaritāñ pahāya manusucaritāñ bhāveti* and MĀ 179 at T I 721a8: 捨 … 意不善業, 修 … 意善業.

¹⁷³ A similar case can be found in MN 39 at MN I 272,20 and its parallel MĀ 182 at T I 725a12. These two discourses agree on mentioning pure mental conduct after pure bodily and verbal conduct, before turning to pure livelihood, restraint of the senses, clear comprehension of bodily activities, removing the hindrances, and developing the four *jhānas*. In this case, too, the reference to mental conduct seems out of order and reduplicates the later detailed treatment of development of the mind, cf. Bucknell 1984: 16-20.

¹⁷⁴ MN 78 at MN II 27,12: *sīlavā hoti, no ca sīlamayo*, which Chalmers 1927: 15 renders as “[he] embodies virtue and not merely virtuous observances”, Horner 1957/1970: 226 as “[he] is of moral habit and has no addition to make to moral habit”, and Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 651 as “[he] is virtuous, but he does not identify with his virtue”. MĀ 179 at T I 721a17: “he practises morality without being attached to morality”, 行戒不著戒.

¹⁷⁵ MN 78 at MN II 27,12: *tañ ca cetovimuttīñ paññāvimuttīñ yathābhūtāñ pajānāti, yath' assa te kusalā sīlā aparisesā nirujjhanti* (B^e-MN II 218,26 and S^e-MN II 248,15: *kusalā sīlā*).

¹⁷⁶ Ps III 270,6. Bodhi in Nāṇamoli 1995/2005: 1286 note 775 explains that since an arahant’s “virtuous habits no longer generate kamma, they are not describable as ‘wholesome’”.

¹⁷⁷ References to realizing these two liberations that invariably stand for full awakening speak of “having oneself and with direct knowledge realized here and now liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom”, *cetovimuttīñ paññāvimuttīñ dīṭhe va dhamme sayam abhiññā (va) sacchikatvā*, cf., e.g., in the first volume of the *Majjhima-nikāya* the occurrences MN 9 at MN I 35,36, MN 12 at MN I 71,10, MN 40 at MN I 284,21, MN 41 at MN I 289,31, MN 42 at MN I 291,26, MN 53 at MN I 357,35, MN 54 at MN I 367,19, MN 71 at MN I 482,34, and MN 73 at MN I 490,14.

occurrences that speak only of “knowing” them can also refer to a stage of development that falls short of full awakening.¹⁷⁸

The *Samaññamandikā-sutta* and its parallel differ on the path to the cessation of unwholesome conduct, a difference that similarly obtains in relation to the path to the cessation of wholesome conduct. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, this path can be found in the four right efforts, while according to its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel the same path requires the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.¹⁷⁹

MN II 27 With their examination of conduct completed, the two versions turn to thoughts or intentions, whose arising they attribute to perception. According to both versions, unwholesome thoughts or intentions cease with the first *jhāna*. In relation to the cessation of wholesome thoughts or intentions, the *Majjhima-nikāya* account attributes such cessation to the second *jhāna*, whereas its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel speaks of the fourth *jhāna* instead.¹⁸⁰

MN II 28 The two versions also disagree on the path to the cessation of wholesome and unwholesome thoughts or intentions, where the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse again speaks of the four right efforts, just as the *Madhyama-āgama* version again brings up the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ In MN 38 at MN I 270,11, SN 35:202 at SN IV 186,16, and AN 5:142 at AN III 166,8, the expression “he understands in accordance with reality liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom”, *ceto-vimuttim paññāvimuttim yathābhūtam pajānāti*, seems to stand for full awakening, as MN 38 at MN I 270,13 indicates that someone endowed with such understanding does not delight in feelings and has eradicated *dukkha*, SN 35:202 at SN IV 187,22 similarly notes that someone with this understanding has overcome those states that lead to re-becoming and *dukkha*, and according to AN 5:142 at AN III 167,14 someone who has such understanding ranges as the fifth in an examination of five different types of person, of which only the other four are still in need of eradicating the influxes. Occurrences of the same expression in SN 35:203 at SN IV 189,33 and AN 10:75 at AN V 139,26, however, clearly do not refer to full awakening, since SN 35:203 at SN IV 190,9 envisages the arising of evil and unwholesome states, *pāpakā akusalā dhammā*, for someone who has understood in accordance with reality the liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom, while in AN 10:75 at AN V 139,24 a person endowed with the same understanding can even be of “bad morality”, *dussila*. SN 35:132 at SN IV 120,21 and SN 35:206 at SN IV 199,24 mention such knowledge in relation to sense-restraint, a usage which would also not refer only to arahants.

¹⁷⁹ MN 78 at MN II 26,24 and MĀ 179 at T I 721a10. In relation to this difference, although mindfulness plays an important role in matters of conduct, the four right efforts would be more appropriate to the present context, since to avoid and overcome unwholesomeness and to develop and establish what is wholesome has a direct bearing on matters of conduct; cf. also Gethin 1992a: 78.

¹⁸⁰ MN 78 at MN II 28,22 and MĀ 179 at T I 721b17. In relation to this difference, it is noteworthy that the standard description of the *jhānas* in the Pāli and Chinese discourses presents the removal of initial and sustained mental application as the decisive precondition for entering the second *jhāna*. Thus, although wholesome thoughts and intentions will certainly have ceased with the fourth *jhāna*, the same already takes place as soon as the second *jhāna* has been attained, so that the presentation in MN 78 appears to be more to the point.

¹⁸¹ In relation to the path leading to the cessation of unwholesome types of thought or intention, depicted in MN 78 at MN II 28,4 and MĀ 179 at T I 721b4, it is noteworthy that *satipaṭṭhāna* can lead to a change in perception, which according to MN 78 and MĀ 179 is the source for the arising of such thoughts or

The *Samanamāṇḍikā-sutta* at this point proclaims that someone endowed with the ten path factors of an arahant is a supreme recluse. This is the later part of the passage already discussed above, where the brief introductory reference to the ten qualities required for being a supreme recluse may have been shifted to an earlier part of the discourse during the course of transmission. MN II 29

The *Madhyama-āgama* version differs not only by having the introductory statement in what appears to be its proper place, but also in so far as it leads up to this exposition with some intermediate steps, thereby giving a more detailed account of what takes place at this point.

Before taking up the ten path factors of an arahant, the *Madhyama-āgama* version describes how a noble disciple develops the factors of the noble eightfold path, a development that takes place based on knowing conduct and thoughts in their wholesome and unwholesome manifestations and based on insight into their arising and cessation. The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse presents these factors in a conditional sequence, depicting how based on right view right intention arises, based on right intention right speech, etc.¹⁸²

Endowed with the right concentration that has been developed based on establishing the other factors of the eightfold noble path, a noble disciple then reaches liberation from desire, anger, and delusion. Through such liberation, the noble disciple becomes

intentions. Thus, e.g., SN 52:1 at SN V 295,11 and its parallel SĀ 536 at T II 139c3 present the ability to have control over the evaluative function of one's perception (*appatikūle paṭikkulasaññī*, etc.) as an outcome of *satipaṭṭhāna* practice. However, the second of the four right efforts appears to be more directly concerned with the cessation of unwholesome thoughts or intentions, cf., e.g., SN 49:1 at SN V 244,8: "he strives ... for the abandoning of arisen evil and unwholesome states", *uppannānam pāpakānam akusalānam dhammānam pahānāya ... padahati*, similarly described in SĀ 877 at T II 221a24: 已起惡不善法斷, 生欲, 方便, 精勤, 心攝受 (where, however, this forms the first of the four right efforts). Again, MN 117 at MN III 73,20 and its parallels MĀ 189 at T I 736a4 and D (4094) *mngon pa, nyu* 45a2 or Q (5595) *thu* 84b4 (which due to a textual error actually speaks of overcoming wrong view) indicate that while mindfulness plays an important role in relation to the overcoming of wrong intentions, their actual removal is a task performed by right effort. In relation to the complementary path to the cessation of wholesome thoughts or intentions, depicted in MN 78 at MN II 28,25 and MĀ 179 at T I 721b19, it would seem that *satipaṭṭhāna* constitutes indeed an important foundation for *jhāna* attainment. In fact, according to SN 52:11-24 at SN V 303-306 and their parallel SĀ 539 at T II 140b4, Anuruddha attributed his concentrative proficiency to his practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. Moreover, SN 47:8 at SN V 151,28 and its parallel SĀ 616 at T II 172c18 present *satipaṭṭhāna* as the tool to overcome mental obstructions in order to attain deeper stages of concentration. AN 4:14 at AN II 17,2, however, relates the development of concentration to the fourth right effort in particular, indicating that to protect the *samādhiṇimitta* constitutes *anurakkhanappadhāna* (B^e-AN I 323,11: *anurakkhanāppadhāna*, C^e-AN II 32,6: *anurakkhaṇappadhāna*, S^e-AN II 20,14: *anurakkhanāppadhāna*), "effort at protecting", an expression that AN 4:69 at AN II 74,17 defines with the standard formulation used for the fourth right effort (AN 4:14 speaks in this context of the *samādhiṇimitta* arisen through perception of a skeleton or a decaying corpse, whose potential to lead to *jhāna* Vism 186-190 describes in detail); cf. also SĀ 879 at T II 221b26. Hence in relation to the cessation of wholesome thoughts or intentions, it seems that a case could be made for right effort just as well as for *satipaṭṭhāna*.

¹⁸² MĀ 179 at T I 721c4, a presentation also found in MN 117 at MN III 76,1.

an arahant endowed with the ten path factors of one beyond training.¹⁸³ The *Madhyama-āgama* version concludes that one endowed with these ten path factors has reached the highest and become a supreme recluse.

The presentation in the *Madhyama-āgama* version thus offers a more gradual transition from the topic of conduct and thoughts to the attainment of full liberation. Such a more detailed examination of the path to liberation accords well with the main thrust of the discourse, which took its occasion from the mistaken belief that to become a supreme recluse requires merely wholesome conduct and intentions.

With the Pāli commentary, however, this perspective gets lost, as the commentators interpret the exposition of conduct and intentions from the point of view of the supramundane paths. Thus according to their explanation, the cessation of unwholesome conduct takes place with stream-entry, while the cessation of wholesome conduct occurs with full awakening.¹⁸⁴ Similarly, the cessation of unwholesome intentions takes place with non-return, while the cessation of wholesome intentions comes with the attainment of full awakening.

This commentarial explanation seems to rest on a too literal interpretation of the expression “cease without remainder”.¹⁸⁵ A perusal of other instances of the same expression in the discourses indicates that to “cease without remainder” does not always stand for the type of final eradication that is achieved through the different stages of realization. The same expression occurs, for example, when describing how certain types of perception “cease without remainder” by attaining the sphere of nothingness, or how unwholesome thoughts “cease without remainder” when one is well established in mindfulness.¹⁸⁶

Although perceptions and thoughts have indeed ceased without remainder while being in the attainment of the sphere of nothingness or while maintaining mindfulness, later on perceptions and thoughts will arise again. The same sense may well be relevant for the use of the expression to “cease without remainder” in the present discourse.

In fact, a closer inspection of the *Samanamandikā-sutta* suggests the commentarial explanation to be unconvincing. According to the exposition given in the discourse itself, the cessation of unwholesome intentions takes place with the first *jhāna*, and the cessation of wholesome intentions with the second *jhāna*.

If the cessation of unwholesome and wholesome intentions were indeed a matter of non-return and arahant-ship, as stated by the commentary, then the first and second *jhāna* mentioned in the discourse would be completely irrelevant as far as the cessation of in-

¹⁸³ MĀ 179 at T I 721c15 differs from MN 78 at MN II 29,9 in regard to the sequence of the final two factors, as it precedes right knowledge with right liberation. This presentation reflects the description of the noble disciple’s attainment of liberation in MĀ 179 at T I 721c8, followed by his knowledge of being liberated in MĀ 179 at T I 721c10. For an examination of this difference in sequence, which recurs between other *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, cf. below p. 663.

¹⁸⁴ Ps III 269,21.

¹⁸⁵ MN 78 at MN II 25,23: *aparisesā nirujjhati*.

¹⁸⁶ MN 106 at MN II 263,17 and SN 22:80 at SN III 93,23.

tentions is concerned.¹⁸⁷ In this way, the commentarial explanation renders the stipulations given in the discourse superfluous.

In the case of the exposition of unwholesome and wholesome conduct, the cessation of unwholesome conduct may similarly be only a matter of refraining from misconduct, not necessarily requiring the attainment of stream-entry. In fact a stream-enterer, although being incapable of major evils, may still commit minor breaches of conduct.¹⁸⁸ Hence the commentarial suggestion that with stream-entry all unwholesome conduct ceases without remainder would not be fully to the point.

Along the same lines, the cessation of wholesome conduct might also be just a matter of avoiding attachment to wholesome behaviour, something possible even before becoming an arahant. From this perspective, the *Samanamandikā-sutta*'s reference to knowing liberation of the mind and liberation through wisdom in the context of its exposition of the cessation of wholesome conduct need not have full awakening in mind, but only a stage of development that leads up to the same.

MN 79 *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta*

The *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta*, the “lesser discourse to Sakuludāyī”, examines the way to an entirely happy world. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹⁸⁹

The *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* and its parallel begin by relating that the Buddha had come to visit the wanderer Sakuludāyī.¹⁹⁰ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, Sakuludāyī declared that, although his congregation of wanderers engaged in pointless talk when left to themselves, if he was present they were all keen to listen to him, but once the Buddha was also present, the wanderers and Sakuludāyī were all keen to listen to the Buddha.¹⁹¹ The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not record such a remark by Saku-

MN II 29

¹⁸⁷ Brahmāli 2007: 82.

¹⁸⁸ Although a stream-enterer would be unable to commit a breach of the five precepts, cf., e.g., SN 12:41 at SN II 68,18, Sn 2:1 at Sn 232 indicates, in evident reference to a stream-enterer, that “whatever evil deed he may do, by body, speech, or mind, he is unable to cover it up”, *kiñcāpi so kammam karoti pā-pakam, kāyena vācā uda cetasā vā, abhabbo so tassa paticchadāya* (B^e-Sn 314,5+7: *kamma* and *abhabba*, C^e-Sn 370,3: *vācāyuda*). This statement would be meaningless if with stream-entry minor instances of unwholesome conduct had become a total impossibility. Similarly, MN 48 at MN I 324,9 describes a stream-enterer, here referred to as the *dīthiśampanno puggalo*, who commits an offence of the type that allows rehabilitation, *āpattim āpajjati yathārūpāya āpattiyyā vutthānam paññāyati* (C^e-MN I 760,13: *utthānam*). Thus MN 48 agrees with Sn 2:1 that stream-enterers are capable of such deeds. AN 3:87 at AN I 234,19 in a similar vein envisages the possibility that noble disciples may commit minor breaches of the training rules.

¹⁸⁹ The parallel is MĀ 208 at T I 783c-786b, which agrees with MN 79 on locating the discourse in the Squirrels' Feeding Ground at Rājagaha. MĀ 208 has the title 箭毛經, identical to the title of MĀ 207, cf. above p. 416 note 127.

¹⁹⁰ Minor differences between the two versions in regard to the timing of the Buddha's visit, how Sakuludāyī behaved, and what mode of address he used, are the same as between MN 77 and its parallel MĀ 207, cf. above p. 416.

¹⁹¹ MN 79 at MN II 30,30.

ludāyī. The description given by Sakuludāyī in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version would in fact not correspond to the introductory narration of both discourses, according to which the wanderers had been indulging in pointless talk, even though Sakuludāyī was present.¹⁹²

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, after the Buddha had inquired three times about the subject of the conversation interrupted upon his arrival, Sakuludāyī related that they had been discussing another teacher's claim to omniscience. The topic of a teacher who claimed to be omniscient forms the starting point for the discussion between Sakuludāyī and the Buddha in both versions of the discourse. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation, then, it was the same topic that Sakuludāyī and his followers had already been talking about.

MN II 31 The *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* identifies the teacher who had claimed omniscience to be Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, whereas according to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse all of the six well-known contemporary teachers had made such a claim.¹⁹³ While other Pāli discourses record that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had indeed claimed omniscience,¹⁹⁴ and in one instance also attribute a claim to omniscience to Pūraṇa Kassapa,¹⁹⁵ they do not report that Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, or Sañjaya Belatṭhiputta had made such a claim.¹⁹⁶

According to the *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* and its parallel, Sakuludāyī felt confident that the Buddha would be able to answer questions about the past. The Buddha replied that to answer questions about the past or the future would only be fruitful when conversing with someone who was able to recall his past lives and had the divine eye. Sakuludāyī had to admit that he was not even able to recollect events of his present life or to see a spirit, let alone recall past lives or avail himself of the divine eye.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² MN 79 at MN II 30,1 and MĀ 208 at T I 783c12. Cf. also above p. 416, where the reference to the pointless talk in which the wanderers were engaged stands in contrast to the narrative flow of the parallel MĀ 207. Thus MN 77 and MN 79, together with their parallels, give the impression that perhaps the reciters just applied the standard description of pointless talk indiscriminately to any company of non-Buddhist wanderers. In fact, if to spend their time in such pointless and trivial chatter had been characteristic of Sakuludāyī and his company, one might also wonder why the Buddha is reported to have repeatedly approached such a company.

¹⁹³ MĀ 208 at T I 784a10+15.

¹⁹⁴ MN 14 at MN I 92,36, MN 101 at MN II 218,1, AN 3:74 at AN I 220,27, AN 9:38 at AN IV 429,1, and MĀ 196 at T I 753c8.

¹⁹⁵ AN 9:38 at AN IV 428,20.

¹⁹⁶ Another claimant to omniscience occurs in MĀ 114 at T I 603a8, according to which Uddaka Rāmaputta had also claimed to be omniscient. The *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 143,9 or in Vaidya 1999: 89,6 agrees with MĀ 208 that the six teachers had all (mistakenly) claimed omniscience.

¹⁹⁷ According to MĀ 208 at T I 784a27, the Buddha began his explanation by telling Sakuludāyī that for a follower of a different tradition it was not possible to understand the meaning of what the Buddha had taught. This remark is curious, since the Buddha had not yet delivered any teachings that Sakuludāyī could have misunderstood. The same remark recurs in MN 80 at MN II 43,11 and its parallels MĀ 209 at T I 787b2 and T 90 at T I 914b9, where it fits the context much better, as it occurs after the Buddha's interlocutor had indeed misunderstood a proposition made by the Buddha. MĀ 208 and MĀ 209 are

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha next gave Sakuludāyī a succinct presentation of the principle of dependent origination, a teaching not recorded in its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.¹⁹⁸

The *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart continue in similar ways by relating that Sakuludāyī spoke in praise of the “highest splendour”,¹⁹⁹ yet was unable to explain what such “highest splendour” implied. The Buddha then illustrated the futility of such propositions with the image of a man who claims to be in love with a girl he had never seen.²⁰⁰ When Sakuludāyī compared his “highest splendour” to a shining piece of jewellery,²⁰¹ the Buddha responded with a series of items of increasingly superior splendour, which in both versions cover:

fairly similar, as in both instances the Buddha is in discussion with a wanderer on a similar topic, delivering the same set of similes. Both discourse, moreover, follow each other in the *Madhyama-āgama*, as is the case for their parallels in the *Majjhima-nikāya*. Hence, the passage about a follower of a different teaching who is unable to understand may have mistakenly made its way from MĀ 209 to MĀ 208 during the course of the discourse’s transmission.

¹⁹⁸ MN 79 at MN II 32,5: “let be the past and let be the future, I will teach you the Dharma. When this exists, that comes to be” (etc.), *tiṭṭhatu pubbanto tiṭṭhatu aparanto, dhammam te desessāmi, imasmim sati idam hoti* (etc.) (S^e-MN II 355,8: *dhamman te*). For the Buddha to come out with a succinct statement on conditionality at this point is unexpected, since Sakuludāyī would hardly have been able to understand what was meant. The Pāli commentary explains that the Buddha knew Sakuludāyī would not be able to understand, but nevertheless wanted to deliver this teaching since it would lead to a wholesome mental impression on Sakuludāyī for the future, Ps III 272,11: “this he will all the more not understand, but seeing that ‘in the future this will be a condition for his mental tendency’, the Blessed One spoke it”, *evam pag’ eva na bujjhissati, anāgate pan’ assa vāsanāya paccayo bhavissatī ti disvā bhagavā evam āha*. This commentarial explanation revolves around the concept of *vāsanā*, a mental tendency or impression that leads to a particular interest or way of behaving in the future. The *vāsanā* theory appears to be comparatively late, as this term is not found in the early discourses except for a single occurrence as part of a compound in the *Vatthugāthā* of the *Pārāyanavagga*, Sn 5:1 at Sn 1009: *pubbevāsanavāsitā* (where one might even wonder if this could be an error for *pubbenivāsa* + √*vas*). On the comparative lateness of the *Vatthugāthā* in general cf. Jayawickrama 1948: 243-249 and Norman 1983a: 69. Regarding this occurrence of the term *vāsanā* in Sn 1009, Jayawickrama 1948: 247 comments that “the doctrine of *vāsanā* is apparently alien to early Buddhism ... this term does not occur in earlier Pāli works. It is probable that the concept of *pubbevāsanā* was further developed into a fuller theory by the time of the Commentaries”; cf. also Rhys Davids 1930: 83.

¹⁹⁹ MN 79 at MN II 32,27: *ayam paramo vanño, ayam paramo vanno ti*, MĀ 208 at T I 784c26: 彼色最勝, 彼色最上.

²⁰⁰ The same simile recurs in DN 9 at DN I 193,4 (in the context of a related discussion about the way to an entirely pleasant world) and its parallel DĀ 28 at T I 111c16, in DN 13 at DN I 241,26 and its parallel DĀ 26 at T I 105c4, and in MN 80 at MN II 40,19 and its parallel MĀ 209 at T I 786b20. The version of this simile in the *Dīrga-āgama* differs in as much as here the man claims to have already had an affair with the girl, a specification not made in a version of this simile in the *Pr̄śthapāla-sūtra* fragment 420v6-8 in Melzer 2006: 272.

²⁰¹ According to MN 79 at MN II 33,28, Sakuludāyī came out with a more explicit formulation of his view, indicating that the “highest splendour” represents the self that survives unimpaired after death, *evam vanño attā hoti arogo param maranā ti* (C^e-MN II 382,6: *param*), a proclamation not found in MĀ 208. This additional qualification in MN 79 suggests Sakuludāyī’s view to correspond to the proposition of

- a glow-worm,
- a lamp,
- a great fire,
- the morning star,
- the full moon,
- the sun.

At the end of this series, the Buddha proclaimed that he did not speak of the “highest splendour” even in regard to gods whose splendour surpasses the sun, whereon Sakuludāyī had to acknowledge defeat.²⁰²

MN II 35 The discussion in both versions turns to the path that leads to an entirely happy world, which according to Sakuludāyī’s understanding requires abstaining from killing, theft, sexual misconduct, and false speech. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, Sakuludāyī also mentioned the need to engage in some form of asceticism as part of this path to an entirely happy world, while according to the *Madhyama-āgama* presentation he additionally mentioned the need to avoid any of the other unwholesome courses of action.²⁰³

MN II 36 Both versions highlight a contradiction in Sakuludāyī’s proposition, according to which an entirely happy world could be reached by a path that involves the experience of both pleasure and displeasure. They clarify that the path to an entirely happy world is rather to be found in the development of the three *jhānas*.

a self that survives unimpaired after death, recorded in DN 1 at DN I 31,6 (cf. also MN 102 at MN II 229,1), a proposition that in the parallels DĀ 21 at T I 92b22, T 21 at T I 268b5, and Weller 1934: 48,13 does not specify that the self survives “unimpaired”, *aroga*, cf. also Skilling 1997a: 480 and below p. 591 note 24. The image of the shining jewel recurs in DN 2 at DN I 76,21, DN 10 at DN I 208,26, and MN 77 at MN II 17,8 to illustrate the nature of consciousness in contrast to the physical body, and in MN 120 at MN III 102,3 to describe the splendour of Brahmā.

²⁰² According to MĀ 208 at T I 785b22, Sakuludāyī at this point changed from addressing the Buddha by his name Gotama, 頴曇, used by him so far, to the respectful address “Blessed One”, 世尊, and “Well Gone One”, 善逝, found also in the corresponding passage in MN 79 at MN II 35,18. Yet, in MĀ 208 at T I 785b25, i.e., right after this instance of using the respectful mode of address, Sakuludāyī returns to use the address “Gotama”, except for another acknowledgement of defeat at T I 785c14, where he again uses the more respectful way of address. These alternations suggest some textual error has occurred, since if Sakuludāyī had indeed at some point changed to the more respectful form of address, thereby expressing his faith in the Buddha, it would be natural for him to continue in the same manner instead of reverting again to a considerably less respectful form of address. Except for these instances, the two *Madhyama-āgama* discourses in which Sakuludāyī takes part, MĀ 207 and MĀ 208, agree that he addressed the Buddha by his name, while in their parallels MN 77 and MN 79 he throughout uses the more respectful address normally employed by the Buddha’s disciples.

²⁰³ MN 79 at MN II 36,1 speaks of undertaking and practising “some kind of asceticism”, *aññataranī vā pana tapoguṇam*. After mentioning the need to abstain from killing, theft, sexual misconduct, and false speech, MĀ 208 at T I 785c4 continues like this: “(up to) abstaining from wrong view he attains right view”, 乃至離邪見得正見, thereby indicating that the other courses of action – abstaining from slander, rough speech, useless chatter, covetousness, and ill will – should be supplemented. Regarding this difference, the presentation in MN 79 seems closer to what could be expected from a non-Buddhist wanderer like Sakuludāyī.

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version directly comes out with a description of the three *jhānas*, its *Madhyama-āgama* counterpart approaches the same via a description of the gradual path. This description begins with the arising of a Tathāgata and his teaching of the Dharma, followed by depicting how someone goes forth and eventually overcomes the hindrances and attains the three *jhānas*.²⁰⁴ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version has a similar description of the gradual path at a later point.²⁰⁵

According to the *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta*, the Buddha identified the attainment of the three *jhānas* as the ‘path’ to an entirely happy world and proposed the fourth *jhāna* and communion with those *devas* that dwell in an entirely happy world as the ‘realization’ of an entirely happy world.²⁰⁶ The *Madhyama-āgama* account, however, presents attainment of the three *jhānas* as the ‘realization’ of the entirely happy world and communion with *devas* of the corresponding realms as the ‘path’ to an entirely happy world, thereby perhaps confusing the path with the goal.²⁰⁷

According to the Pāli commentary, the reference to the fourth *jhāna* points to the need to develop the psychic powers that enable visiting the celestial realm of the Subhakiṇṇa realm.²⁰⁸ From this perspective, the *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta*’s stipulation of attainment of the fourth *jhāna* for being able to “realize” an entirely happy world would fit better than the third *jhāna* mentioned in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, since for developing the psychic power required for celestial travels the fourth *jhāna* would be required according to the standard presentation of the attainment of supernormal powers in other discourses.

In both versions, Sakuludāyī inquired whether this entirely pleasant world was the goal of living the holy life as a disciple of the Buddha, which the Buddha denied. In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, this denial caused an uproar among the followers of Sakuludāyī.²⁰⁹ A similar uproar occurs in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version at an earlier point, after the Buddha had indicated that even with the third *jhāna* an entirely pleasant world has not yet been reached.²¹⁰

Hence, although the two versions present this reaction at different junctions of their narration, they agree that the reason for this uproar was that the Buddha had pointed out something that is superior to the third *jhāna*. This suggests the third *jhāna* and rebirth in the corresponding celestial realm to have been the goal aspired to by Sakuludā-

²⁰⁴ MĀ 208 at T I 785c24.

²⁰⁵ MN 79 at MN II 38,4.

²⁰⁶ MN 79 at MN II 37,24; as noted by Masefield 1983: 79, the present passage reflects “the traditional belief that it is possible to make contact with the devas of a particular region of the Brahmaloka through entering into the appropriate *jhāna*”.

²⁰⁷ MĀ 208 at T I 786a5+17.

²⁰⁸ Ps III 275,15 distinguishes between “realization obtained [on rebirth]”, *paṭilābhāsacchikiriyā*, and “present realization”, *paccakkhasacchikiriyā*, explaining that for the latter the fourth *jhāna* is required, so that through the exercise of psychic power, *iddhivikubbanā*, the Subhakiṇṇa realm can be visited in one’s present life.

²⁰⁹ MĀ 208 at T I 786a24.

²¹⁰ MN 79 at MN II 37,16.

yī and his followers, presumably being the type of experience reckoned by them as the “highest splendour”.

MN II 38 The *Majjhima-nikāya* version presents its account of the gradual path at this point, a description that begins with the arising of a Tathāgata and his teaching of the Dharma, which inspires someone to go forth (etc.), eventually culminating in the attainment of the four *jhānas* and the three higher knowledges.

This account does not fit its context too well, since the *Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta* follows each attainment of a *jhāna* and of a higher knowledge with the declaration that this is a state superior to the entirely happy world discussed earlier. In this way, it proposes that each of the *jhānas* mentioned in its description of the gradual path is superior to the four *jhānas* mentioned in its exposition of the path to an entirely happy world.²¹¹

This contradictory presentation suggests that a shift of the description of the gradual path away from its original location may have taken place in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version. Judging from the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the original location of the gradual path exposition would have been at the outset of the description of the path to an entirely happy world, at which point the practice of the gradual path up to the attainment of the *jhānas* would come in its proper place.

The remainder of the gradual path, which describes the development of the three higher knowledges, does, however, stand in its proper place in the present context, where it forms the reply to Sakuludāyī’s question after the goal of the holy life.

Yet, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version at the present junction the Buddha only mentioned the fourth *jhāna*.²¹² This could be a loss of text, since it would be unusual for the Buddha to stop short at the fourth *jhāna* in reply to a question about the goal of living the holy life under him, without bringing in the topic of realization.

MN II 39 The two versions agree that Sakuludāyī was highly inspired by this discourse,²¹³ recording in slightly different ways how an intervention by his company of wanderers prevented Sakuludāyī from becoming a disciple of the Buddha.²¹⁴

²¹¹ MN 79 at MN II 38,8: “he dwells having attained the first *jhāna*. This, Udāyī, is a state superior and more sublime” [than the earlier mentioned four *jhānas*], *pāṭhamajjhāṇaṃ upasampajja viharati. ayam pi kho, udāyī, dhammo uttaritaro ca paññatataro ca* (B^e-MN II 229,8, C^e-MN II 388,26, and S^e-MN II 363,18: *pāṭhamam jhānam*). An extract from the present discussion already appeared in Anālayo 2005c: 94–95.

²¹² MĀ 208 at T I 786b1.

²¹³ According to MN 79 at MN II 39,18, Sakuludāyī expressed his wish to go forth under the Buddha. MĀ 208 at T I 786b4 does not report him explicitly requesting ordination, although it records that he worshipped the Buddha, at which point his assembled followers told him to behave in accordance with his status as a teacher and asked him whether he intended to become a disciple of the Buddha.

²¹⁴ Ps III 275,29 explains this intervention to be the karmic result of a deed of Sakuludāyī in a former life, when he had encouraged a monk to disrobe in order to inherit this monk’s requisites. Hecker 1972: 179 draws attention to the contrast between MN 79 and MN 76, the former depicting the readiness of the wanderer Sakuludāyī to go forth, even though he was a renowned teacher, whereas according to MN 76 at MN I 524,6 the wanderer Sandaka was sufficiently convinced by Ānanda’s exposition to recommend his disciples to go forth as Buddhist monks, but was himself too attached to his gains and honours to do the same.

MN 80 *Vekhanassa-sutta*

The *Vekhanassa-sutta*, the “discourse to Vekhanassa”, records a discussion between the Buddha and the wanderer Vekhanassa.²¹⁵ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and another parallel in an individual translation.²¹⁶

The *Vekhanassa-sutta* and its two parallels describe in similar terms that the wanderer Vekhanassa came to visit the Buddha and spoke in praise of the “highest splendour”. According to the Pāli commentary, Vekhanassa was the teacher of Sakuludāyī and had heard that Sakuludāyī had been unsuccessful in upholding the teaching on the “highest splendour” in front of the Buddha (as recorded in the *Cūlasakuludāyī-sutta* and its parallel).²¹⁷ Vekhanassa had thereon decided to come all the way from Rājagaha to Sāvatthī in order to confront the Buddha himself.

MN II 40

The *Vekhanassa-sutta* and its parallels depict the first part of the exchange between Vekhanassa and the Buddha in the same way as the *Cūlasakuludāyī-sutta* and its parallel describe the exchange between Sakuludāyī and the Buddha, covering the Buddha’s delivery of the simile of someone in love with a beautiful girl he had never seen, his interlocutor illustrating the “highest splendour” by comparing it to a shining piece of jewellery, and the Buddha depicting an ascending series of radiances ranging from a glow-worm to the sun.

At this point, the *Vekhanassa-sutta* and its parallels turn to the topic of sensual pleasures, a presentation the *Majjhima-nikāya* account concludes by speaking of the “highest sensual happiness”, *kāmaggasukha*.²¹⁸ The parallels to the *Vekhanassa-sutta* present

MN II 42

²¹⁵ B^e-MN II 231,3 gives the name of this wanderer as Vekhanasa and S^e-MN II 367,1 as Vekhaṇasa. The name of the protagonist of MN 80 brings to mind the Vaikhānasa hermits of the Brahminical tradition; cf., e.g., Eggers 1929 for a translation and study of their *Dharmasūtra*.

²¹⁶ The parallels are MĀ 209 at T I 786b-788a and T 90 at T I 913c-914c. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 90 was translated by Guṇabhadra. MĀ 209 and T 90 agree with MN 80 on locating the discourse in Jeta’s Grove near Sāvatthī and on taking the name of the main protagonist as title, thus MĀ 209 is the “discourse to Vekhanassa”, 韶摩那修經, and T 90 the “discourse spoken by the Buddha to Vekhanassa”, 佛說韶摩肅經. For remarks on MĀ 209 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 62; for a translation of MĀ 209, together with extracts from the present discussion, cf. Anālayo 2007g.

²¹⁷ Ps III 277,2.

²¹⁸ MN 80 at MN II 43,4: *kāmasukhā kāmaggasukham tattha aggam akkhāyatī ti*, which Chalmers 1927: 22 translates as “sensuous pleasure ... culminating in that refinement of pleasure which is accounted the highest of all”, Horner 1957/1970: 237 as “from happiness in sense-pleasures the topmost happiness in sense-pleasures is there accounted topmost”, and Nānamoli 1995/2005: 664 as “beyond sensual pleasure there is a pleasure at the peak of the sensual, and that is declared to be the highest among them”; on the range of meaning of *kāma* in Sanskrit literature cf. also Hara 2007: 82-87. That the expression *kāmaggā* does indeed refer to the “topmost” or “peak” of sensual pleasures, in the sense of being the highest type of sensual pleasure, can be seen in parallel constructions such as *bhavagga*, “highest [point of] existence”, found in SN 22:76 at SN III 83,14 and also in AN 4:75 at AN II 79,5, a discourse which has several other similar expressions, such as the “highest [type of] ethical conduct”, *sīlagga*, the “highest [type of] liberation”, *vimuttagga*, or the “highest [type of] perception”, *saññagga*, etc. According to Ps III 277,19, in the present context “highest sensual happiness refers to Nirvāṇa”, *kāmaggasukhan ti nibbānam adhippetam*. For a more detailed discussion cf. Anālayo 2007g: 97-98.

the Buddha's exposition of sensual pleasures in a different manner. According to them, the Buddha distinguished between sense objects that are agreeable and sense objects that are disagreeable, concluding that, compared to disagreeable sense objects, agreeable sense objects appear to provide the supreme form of happiness.²¹⁹

Hence, judging from these versions, the Buddha simply acknowledged that to obtain desirable sensual objects provides gratification. This acknowledgement may have been the first step in an examination of sensual pleasures from the perspective of their gratification (*assāda*), their danger (*ādīnava*), and the release from them (*nissarana*), an examination apparently interrupted before its completion by Vekhanassa, who according to all versions expressed his approval.²²⁰

MN II 43 According to the *Vekhanassa-sutta* and its parallels, the Buddha was quick to point out that this approval was based on a misunderstanding. He explained that a follower of a different type of teaching and practice, like Vekhanassa, could easily misunderstand him, since only his arahant disciples were beyond misunderstanding his exposition.

The implication of this statement appears to be that arahant disciples are incapable of misunderstanding a description of the gratification of sensual pleasures by the Buddha, since by having eradicated all sensual lust they are beyond the attraction of sensual pleasures and have fully understood their deceptive nature. Vekhanassa, however, apparently misunderstood the Buddha's statement to be an approval of sensual desires, in the sense that agreeable sense objects constitute the peak of happiness.²²¹

The *Vekhanassa-sutta* and its parallels note that the Buddha's reply irritated Vekhanassa to such an extent that he reacted by deriding the claim of those who, without possessing knowledge of the past and the future, profess to have reached realization. The way this statement is formulated suggests that Vekhanassa was referring to recollection of past lives and knowledge of the re-arising of beings in accordance with their deeds.²²²

²¹⁹ MĀ 209 at T I 787a21 and T 90 at T I 914a29.

²²⁰ While according to MN 80 at MN II 43,8 Vekhanassa approved by indicating that the Buddha's proposal was well spoken, *subhāsita*, according to MĀ 209 at T I 787a27 he approved by commenting that "the recluse Gotama has explained to me in various ways sensual pleasure and the foremost sensual pleasure", 沙門瞿曇為我無量方便說欲樂, 欲樂第一. In MĀ 209, Vekhanassa then continues by illustrating his understanding of the Buddha's proposition with the example of using grass that is on fire to ignite wood or wood that is on fire to ignite grass (the simile in T 90 at T I 914b6 differs, as it speaks of fire that depends on wood and grass). The fire imagery found in both Chinese versions seems to convey Vekhanassa's approval of providing fuel for the 'fire' of sensual delight.

²²¹ This suggests his way of thinking to have been similar to the hedonistic affirmation of sense pleasures apparently implicit in the position taken by the wanderer Māgandiya in MN 75 at MN I 503,18 and its parallel MĀ 153 at T I 670c16. This parallelism might help to explain why the commentary to MN 80 was led to gloss *kāmaggasukha* as a reference to Nirvāṇa, as according to MN 75 at MN I 508,30 and MĀ 153 at T I 672a29, during his discussion with Māgandiya the Buddha indeed referred to the supreme happiness of Nirvāṇa, *nibbānam paramam sukham* and 涅槃第一樂. Given that MN 80 at MN II 43,14, moreover, indicates that the Buddha's arahant disciples will not misunderstand a reference he makes to *kāmaggasukha*, the commentators perhaps came to the conclusion that the preceding statement must be related to Nirvāṇa.

²²² Vekhanassa's reference to knowing the past appears to intend recollection of past lives, since MĀ 209

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha acknowledged Vekhanassa's criticism by replying that those who make such claims are rightly to be censured.²²³ The Buddha then changed topic and told Vekhanassa to let be past and future, proclaiming that he was able to guide a sincere disciple to realization.

As it stands, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version's presentation strikes an unexpected note. It is surprising for the Buddha to acknowledge Vekhanassa's criticism in this way, since to know past and future is elsewhere not reckoned a necessary requisite for full awakening. Although both will result from developing the three higher knowledges, the destruction of the influxes can also be reached without developing the other two higher knowledges.

According to the parallel versions, the Buddha did not acknowledge Vekhanassa's criticism. They report that the Buddha, who had realized that Vekhanassa was speaking out of anger, instead replied that for those who claim realization without knowing past and future it would be proper to let be past and future.²²⁴ Having in this way set aside knowledge of past and future as irrelevant, according to the Chinese versions the Buddha then told Vekhanassa to also let be past and future, an injunction similarly found in the Pāli account.²²⁵

The Chinese versions agree with the Pāli discourse that the Buddha proclaimed to be able to guide a sincere disciple to realization. According to their account, however, he made a point of explaining that he was able to guide a disciple to realization even if this disciple should be unable to remember a single birth.²²⁶

In this way, the Chinese versions make it clear that the Buddha disagreed with Vekhanassa's assumption that knowledge of the past and the future are necessary for realization. According to them, concern with past and future can be dispensed with, as even without recollecting a single birth it will be possible to reach awakening. This presentation fits the present context better than an acknowledgement of Vekhanassa's criticism.

According to the Pāli account, the Buddha illustrated his ability to guide a sincere disciple to realization with the example of an infant bound with a five-fold bond,

at T I 787b10 speaks additionally of knowing “endless births and deaths”, 無窮生死, and T 90 at T I 914b17 of “infinite births in the world”, 無量生世間. Ps III 278,5 similarly refers to *pubbenivāsañāna* and *dibbacakkhuñāna* in its gloss on the Buddha's reply to Vekhanassa.

²²³ MN 80 at MN II 44,3: “this censure of theirs is in accordance with what is proper”, *tesam so yeva saha-dhammiko niggaho hoti*.

²²⁴ According to MĀ 209 at T I 787b28, in regard to recluses and Brahmins who claim realization without knowing past and future, “for them it would be fitting to make this statement: ‘let be the world’s past, let be the world’s future’”, 彼應如是說, 置世前際, 置世後際, a proposition similarly made in T 90 at T I 914b28: 彼時應作是言, 置過去世, 置當來世.

²²⁵ MN 80 at MN II 44,4: *tijthatu pubbanto tijthatu aparanto*.

²²⁶ MĀ 209 at T I 787c1: “even without recalling a single birth, a monk disciple of mine who comes ... [and is sincere, etc.] ... will certainly attain knowledge of the right Dharma”, 設不憶一生, 我弟子比丘來 ... 必得知正法. T 90 at T I 914c1: “to remember a single birth is not necessary... [if he is sincere, etc.] ... and follows the Dharma, he will come to know what is wholesome”, 不應念一生 ... 近於法知有善.

image that might represent the five-fold bondage of sensual pleasures.²²⁷ Once grown up and released from these bonds, the child will know to be free from bondage.

The Chinese versions' presentation of the same simile offers further details. They mention that the parents had bound the child's hand and feet. The idea behind this might be that the parents wanted to prevent the child from harming itself, as can easily happen when an infant is left unattended and is able to move around freely. This assumption receives support from the Pāli commentary, which indicates that the bondage has the purpose of protecting the child.²²⁸

According to the Chinese versions, once grown up the child will no longer be bound, independent of whether or not it recalls having been bound up when it was still an infant.²²⁹ This ties in well with the preceding topic on knowledge of past and future, as it illustrates that the child's freedom from bondage is the result of its growth and maturity, independent of any knowledge of what happened in the past. In this way, the simile in the Chinese versions comes as an appropriate illustration of the fact that knowledge of the past, and by implication also knowledge of the future, are not necessary for freedom from bondage.

The Chinese versions continue with two more similes. These similes illustrate how a sincere disciple reaches realization with the example of an oil lamp and the example of a wood fire, both of which will be extinguished when no further oil or wood is supplied.²³⁰

The *Vekhanassa-sutta* concludes with Vekhanassa taking refuge as a lay follower. This conclusion is puzzling, since if he had indeed been convinced by the Buddha's exposition, it would have been more natural for him to request ordination, all the more since the Buddha had quite explicitly indicated that he was able to lead a sincere disciple to realization. Thus, for Vekhanassa to become a lay disciple, which would imply that he reverted from the life of a wanderer to the lay life, seems a rather improbable reaction.

According to the parallel versions, Vekhanassa rather attained stream-entry during this discourse, requested the going forth and in due course became an arahant.²³¹

²²⁷ MN 80 at MN II 44,9. However, to interpret the image as representing the pleasures of the five senses would not be applicable to MĀ 209 at T I 787c4 and T 90 at T I 914c4, as both speak only of the child's hands and feet being bound, without mentioning a fifth bondage (which according to the Pāli commentarial gloss would have been placed around its neck, cf. note 228 below).

²²⁸ Ps III 278,9: "for the purpose of protection they bind his hands, feet, and neck with strings", *tassa hi ārakkhatthāya hatthapādesu ceva givāya ca suttakāni bandhanti*.

²²⁹ MĀ 209 at T I 787c5 and T 90 at T I 914c5.

²³⁰ MĀ 209 at T I 787c10 and T 90 at T I 914c7. These similes thus provide a contrast to the fire simile used in MĀ 209 at T I 787a28 and T 90 at T I 914b6 by Vekhanassa to illustrate his approval of the highest sensual pleasure, indicating to him that the task is not to ignite the fire of sensuality, but rather to deprive it of fuel. The same image regarding the extinction of a fire can be found in SN 12:52 at SN II 85,17 and its parallel SĀ 286 at T II 80b17, while the image of the extinction of a lamp recurs in SN 12:53 at SN II 86,22 and its parallel SĀ 285 at T II 80b1.

²³¹ MĀ 209 at T I 787c24 and T 90 at T I 914c15.

Chapter 9 *Rāja-vagga*

MN 81 *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*

The *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*, the “discourse about Ghaṭikāra”, is a *jātaka* tale of a potter who lived at the time of the former Buddha Kassapa.¹ This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.² The same tale recurs, moreover, in the *Mahāvastu* of the Mahā-sāṅghika-Lokottaravāda *Vinaya*, in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, and in a Chinese *Avadāna* collection.³ In addition to these, a few words of a version of this discourse have been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁴

The *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Mahāvastu* account begin by describing that the Buddha displayed a smile. Asked by Ānanda for the reason,⁵ the Buddha explained that in the very same spot where they stood, the former Buddha Kassapa once sat and taught his monks.⁶

MN II 45

¹ On the *jātaka* genre cf., e.g., Ahir 2000, Appleton 2007, id. 2010, Anālayo 2010f: 55-71, Behm 1971, Brown 1997, Cowell 1895/2000: v-x, Cummings 1982, Ferer 1875, Gokuldas 1951, Hamm 1968, Jones 1979, Kulasuriya 1996, Lal Nagar 1993, Laut 1993, Lévi 1906, Norman 1983a: 77-84, Ohnuma 2004, Oldenberg 1919/1967, Peris 2004, Rhys Davids 1903/1997: 189-209, Sarkar 1990, Sen 1974, Shaw 2006: xix-lxvii, Skilling 2006a, id. 2006b, id. 2008, Sugimoto 2002/2003, von Hinüber 1996/1997: 54-58, id. 1998, and Winternitz 1913/1914.

² The parallel is MĀ 63 at T I 499a-503a, entitled after Ghaṭikāra’s hometown 韩婆陵; for a partial translation of MĀ 63, together with extracts from the present discussion, cf. Anālayo 2009c. MN 81 and MĀ 63 are both located in the chapter dedicated to the topic of ‘kings’ in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and in the *Madhyama-āgama*, the *Rāja-vagga* or 王相應品. The (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 217,12 also locates the present discourse in the *Rājasamyukta* of the *Madhyama-āgama*. As already noted above p. 6, this allocation is unexpected in so far as the two main protagonists of the discourse are a potter and a Brahmin youth, neither of which is a king. Although the king of Vārāṇasī also appears in the discourse, he plays only a relatively minor role. The 佛光 *Madhyama-āgama* edition in its introduction on p. 17 suggests that the present tale was allocated to the chapter on kings in order to show how past and contemporary kings took refuge and accepted the Buddha’s teachings (過去及現世諸王之歸敬如來, 接受佛教).

³ The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 409-428 or in Senart 1882a: 317-329 and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 22-30, with its Tibetan counterpart at D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a-10a or Q (1030) nge 3b-9a. The Chinese *Avadāna* collection is the 佛說興起行經, a collection of ten tales that explain the past causes for misfortunes that befell the Buddha, the relevant part being tale 10 in T 197 at T IV 172c-174b.

⁴ The fragments are SHT X 3596 (p. 133) and the so far unpublished SHT XI 4607a, identified by Klaus Wille (I am indebted to Klaus Wille for kindly providing me with a draft transliteration of this fragment). SHT XI 4607a corresponds to the beginning part of the discourse at MN II 45; SHT X 3596 parallels the final part of the discourse at MN II 53-54.

⁵ T 197 at T IV 172c8 differs in so far as it reports that the Buddha narrated the present tale to Sāriputta instead of Ānanda.

⁶ While MN 81 at MN II 45,11 refers to the location as Vebhalīṅga, the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 412,10 or in Senart 1882a: 319,8 speaks of Mārakaraṇḍa, formerly called Veruḍīṅga. The *Saṅghabhedavastu* in

In the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, however, a smile by the Buddha does not provide the occasion for the delivery of the present tale. Instead, the reason for relating events at the time of the former Buddha Kassapa was to explain to the monks the karma that was responsible for the six years of asceticism spent by Gotama during the time before his awakening.⁷

In agreement with its parallels, the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* narrates that at the time of the Buddha Kassapa there were two friends, a potter and a Brahmin youth. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version introduces the potter under the name of Ghaṭikāra and the Brahmin youth as Jotipāla (later on identified with the Buddha Gotama in a previous life).⁸

The *Mahāvastu* tale agrees with the Pāli version on these two names,⁹ while the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* speak instead of the potter Nandīpāla and the Brahmin youth Uttara.¹⁰ When referring to Nandīpāla, the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* qualifies him to be a “maker of pots”, thereby also employing the term that in the Pāli version is his proper name.¹¹ The Chinese *Avadāna* account combines features from

Gnoli 1978a: 22,1 and the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 217,11 speak of Vaibhiḍīngī, cf. also D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a1 or Q (1030) nge 3b3. According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 411,8 or in Senart 1882a: 318,12, not only Buddha Kāśyapa, but also the two earlier Buddhas had been seated on the same spot. Oldenberg 1912a: 138 comments that the sudden introduction of three Buddhas stands in contrast to the preceding account, which is concerned only with Kāśyapa Buddha, hence this reference to three Buddhas appears to be a maladroit attempt to improve on this passage (“ein ungeschickter Versuch ... den Effekt zu steigern”). Mus 1935: 481 notes that references to such locations used by former Buddhas point to a simple form of cult, before sacred iconography and architecture became important; cf. also the discussion in Strong 2004: 36-39.

⁷ Gnoli 1978a: 21,31, with its Tibetan counterpart in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 3b6 or Q (1030) nge 3b1. The same is also implicit in T 197 at T IV 172c5, which gives the title of the present tale as “discourse spoken by the Buddha on the causes in former existences [for his present undertaking of] ascetic practices”, 佛說苦行宿緣經.

⁸ While E^e-MN II 46,2 and C^e-MN II 404,23 spell his name as Ghaṭikāra, B^e-MN II 236,27 and S^e-MN II 375,11 refer to their protagonist as Ghaṭikāra.

⁹ Ghaṭikāra and Jyotiṣpāla in Basak 1963a: 412,11+13 or Senart 1882a: 319,9+11.

¹⁰ MĀ 63 at T I 499b3: 難提波羅 and at T I 499a28: 優多羅 (another occurrence of the name Jotipāla in AN 6:54 at AN III 372,1 has as its counterpart 儲提摩麗 in MĀ 130 at T I 619c17), Gnoli 1978a: 23,1: *uttara māṇava* and *nandīpāla ghaṭikāra*, with its Tibetan counterparts in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a6+2 or Q (1030) nge 3b8+4: *bram ze'i khye'u bla ma* and *rdza mkhan dga' skyong*. The *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 217,12 refers to the present discourse as the *Nandīpāla-sūtra* and on p. 261,20 introduces Uttara as a former life of the Buddha as a Brahmin youth at the time of Kassapa Buddha. The name Uttara for the same former life of Gotama Buddha recurs also in the *Avadānaśataka*, e.g., in Speyer 1906/1970: 239,7, id. 1909/1970: 23,5, 51,8, and 88,1, or in Vaidya 1958a: 105,20, 184,21, 196,23, and 212,30, and in references to the present discourse found, e.g., in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 347,11 or Vaidya 1999: 215,12 and in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-(upadeśa-)śāstra*, T 1509 at T XXV 261c14, translated in Lamotte 1970/1976: 1778. A past life of the bodhisattva as a Brahmin youth by the name of Uttara who goes forth as a Buddhist monk is also recorded in Bv 12.11-12 at Bv 53,21 and Jā I 37,31, although, according to these sources, this event took place at the time of the former Buddha Sumedha.

¹¹ Gnoli 1978a: 26,19: *nandīpālo nāma ghaṭikāra* (the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 217,12 also speaks of *nandīpālo ghaṭikāro*) and D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a2 or Q (1030) nge 3b4 of *rdza mkhan dga' skyong*; on the potter in ancient India cf., e.g., Auboyer 1961: 125-126.

both of these two naming traditions, as it speaks of the potter Nandīpāla and his Brahmin friend Jotipāla.¹²

The different versions describe how the potter Ghaṭīkāra (or Nandīpāla) tried to convince his friend Jotipāla (or Uttara) to visit Kassapa Buddha.¹³ According to the *Ghaṭīkāra-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, Jotipāla was disinclined to visit Kassapa Buddha, since he thought it useless to go to see such “bald-headed recluses”.¹⁴ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, and the Chinese *Avadāna* account report that Jotipāla expressed his disbelief in Kassapa Buddha’s awakening, which he apparently held to require the undertaking of ascetic practices.¹⁵

The *Saṅghabhedavastu*, in agreement with the Chinese, Pāli, and Tibetan *Apadāna/Avadāna* collections, notes that Jotipāla’s disdain for Kassapa’s awakening had dire karmic repercussions.¹⁶ When reborn as Gotama, the Buddha-to-be, as a result of this

¹² T 197 at T IV 172c13 speaks of Nandīpāla, 難提婆羅, introduced as a potter’s son, 瓦師子, but gives the name of his Brahmin friend as 火鬘, which according to Akanuma 1930/1994: 251 stands for Jotipāla. Karashima 2006: 361 notes another rendering of Jotipāla or Jyotipāla as 焰鬘, found in DĀ 3 at T I 31b23, where the use of the character 銮 “indicates that -pāla (‘guard’) had become -māla (= mālā ‘wreath, garland’). The same appears to be the case for the second character in the rendering adopted in T 197.

¹³ MĀ 63 at T I 500a12 and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 23,9 and D (1) ’dul ba, ga 5a1 or Q (1030) nge 4b1 indicate that Ghaṭīkāra was just coming from the presence of Kassapa Buddha when he met his friend Jotipāla, who was driving out of town in the company of other Brahmin youths. According to the Sanskrit text of the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, Jotipāla wanted to teach the other Brahmin youths the reciting of Brahminical hymns, Gnoli 1978a: 23,13: *brāhmaṇakān mantrān vācayitukāmaḥ*, while the Tibetan version in D (1) ’dul ba, ga 5a2 or Q (1030) nge 4b3 only indicates that he “wanted to make the Brahmins (the Brahmin youths) recite”, *bram ze* (Q adds: *khye'u*) *rnams klog tu 'jug par 'dod nas*. In MĀ 63 at T I 500a15, Jotipāla wanted to instruct them to recite Brahminical “scriptures”, 令讀梵志書 (according to Hirakawa 1997: 613 and Soothill 1937/2000: 326, 書 renders √likh, lekha, and pustaka). In regard to a comparable reference in DN 27 at DN III 94,18 to *gantha* (a term that usually means “book”) as a Brahminical occupation, Gombrich 1990b: 27 notes that in Sn 2.7 at Sn 302 and 306 “Brahmins are said to ‘knot together mantras’ – the words are *mante ganthetvā* – and the reference is to their composing Vedic texts”. The same sense would underlie the reference to ‘making books’, *ganthe karontā*, in DN 27, or to ‘scriptures’, 書, in MĀ 63, in the sense of oral composition or recitation.

¹⁴ MN 81 at MN II 46,11: “what [use] of seeing that little bald headed recluse”, *kim pana tena muṇḍakena saṃaṇakena diṭṭhenā ti?*? MĀ 63 at T I 500a21: “I do not want to see the bald headed recluse”, 不欲見禿頭沙門. On the term *muṇḍa* cf. also Tedesco 1945.

¹⁵ MĀ 63 at T I 500a21: “the bald recluse will not be able to attain the path, since the path is to be attained [through what is] difficult”, 禿沙門不應得道, 道難得故, cf. also T 197 at T IV 172c23. The reference to “difficult”, 難, in MĀ 63 and T 197 might intend *duṣkara*, as suggested by the parallel passage in the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, Gnoli 1978a: 23,19: *kutas tasmin muṇḍake śramaṇake bodhiḥ, bodhir hi parama-duṣkarā*, a term that recurs again in Gnoli 1978a: 21,31 in relation to the Buddha’s practice of austerities for six years, *śaḍvarṣāni duṣkaram caritam*. The standard rendering for the second instance of *duṣkara-caryā* in the sense of “ascetic practice”, however, would be 苦行, cf., e.g., MĀ 152 at T I 669b19, discussed below p. 576 note 238. According to D (1) ’dul ba, ga 5a6 or Q (1030) nge 4b7, Uttara similarly considered awakening to be very ‘difficult’, *byang chub ni mchog tu dka' ba'o*, using the same expression as found at D (1) ’dul ba, ga 3b7 or Q (1030) nge 3b1 to refer to the Buddha’s six years of austerities, *lo drug tu dka' ba*.

¹⁶ Regarding the term *apadāna*, Cutler 1994: 5 notes an occurrence in DN 27 at DN III 90,14, where *apa-*

former deed he had to undertake ascetic practices for six years before reaching liberation, thereby apparently having to prove to himself that such practices were not required for awakening.¹⁷

According to the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*, when the potter's repeated invitation to visit Kassapa Buddha met with Jotipāla's firm refusal, Ghaṭikāra suggested that they go and bathe instead. While the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* do not record this interlude, the *Mahāvastu* and the Chinese *Avadāna* account proceed in a way that is similar to the Pāli discourse. The *Mahāvastu* indicates that the idea to go and bathe had come to Ghaṭikāra as an expedient means, since the place for bathing was close to where Kassapa Buddha was staying.¹⁸

MN II 47 When they had washed their heads, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account Ghaṭikāra repeated his request and, when Jotipāla kept on refusing, Ghaṭikāra seized Jotipāla first by his belt and then by his hair.¹⁹ The *Mahāvastu* reports that Ghaṭikāra had gone so far as to seize Jotipāla's hair because Jotipāla had pushed him away and was about to leave.²⁰

In this way, the *Mahāvastu* explains why Ghaṭikāra undertook an action that would have been a serious breach of etiquette in view of the ancient Indian respect for the head and the fact that the potter Ghaṭikāra was of a considerably lower social standing than the Brahmin Jotipāla.²¹ According to the Chinese *Avadāna* account, this action was so outrageous that in this part of ancient India it was punishable with the death penalty.²²

dāna “is used with the meaning of ‘cutting (in an agricultural sense) or reaping’”. Ibid. p. 6 concludes that the nuance of “‘reapings’ enables us to understand the *apadāna*-s as stories to illustrate the reaping in a present life of the fruit (*phala*) or result of good or bad deeds performed in the past”. For another shade of meaning cf. Neelis 2008: 152, who notes the existence of a type of *avadāna* that are edifying narrations without references to a story from the past. Another point relevant to an appreciation of this genre of texts would be the suggestion by Granoff 1996: 88 that *avadāna* tales may have been meant specifically for a monastic audience.

¹⁷ The *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 21,31 and its Tibetan counterpart in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 3b7 or Q (1030) nge 3b1, the Chinese *Avadāna* account in T 197 at T IV 173c24 and T IV 174a3-5 (in verse), and the *Therāpadāna* Ap 39:92-93 at Ap I 300-301; for a corresponding Sanskrit fragment and its Tibetan counterpart cf. Bechert 1961: 238-239. The *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 217,15 also considers Gotama's ascetic practices to be the karmic result of his former life as Uttara (or Jotipāla), cf. also the *Bodhisattvāvadāna-kalpalatā* résumé in Mitra 1882/1971: 58; on this motif cf. also Cutler 1997: 73, Hara 1997: 250-253, Guang Xing 2002a: 21, Strong 2001: 33, and Walters 1990: 77. A further step is then taken in the *Upāyakauśalya-sūtra*, which reasons that the bodhisattva's reluctance was only a skilful means in order to convince some friends to visit the Buddha Kassapa as well, T 310 at T XI 602b3, cf. also Tatz 1994/2001: 62-65.

¹⁸ Basak 1963a: 414,1 or Senart 1882a: 320,7: “what, now, may be the means”, *ko nu khalu syād upāyo* (by which to get Jyotiṣpāla to approach Kāśyapa Buddha)?

¹⁹ MĀ 63 at T I 500a22, however, reports that Ghaṭikāra seized Jotipāla's hair immediately after the first time the latter had indicated his lack of interest in visiting Kassapa Buddha.

²⁰ Basak 1963a: 415,7 or Senart 1882a: 321,6; cf. also the similar account in T 197 at T IV 173a3.

²¹ Vin IV 7,1 includes pottery, *kumbhakārasippa*, in a listing of crafts considered as being of low status.

²² T 197 at T IV 173a6. In his detailed study of the implications of the act of seizing someone's hair in the

The *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and its parallels agree that this drastic action was effective and overcame Jotipāla's resistance. The two friends thereupon visited Kassapa Buddha, who delivered a discourse to them.²³ This discourse inspired Jotipāla to go forth. Ghaṭikāra could not do the same, as he had to support his blind parents.²⁴

The Chinese *Avadāna* tale takes a different route at this point. It reports how Jotipāla noticed that Kassapa had thirty of the marks of a superior being (*mahāpurisalakkaṇa*) and requested in verse to be shown the other two.²⁵ On ascertaining that Kassapa had all thirty-two marks, Jotipāla was filled with faith. Kassapa then gave him a description of the conduct of a bodhisattva,²⁶ on hearing of which Jotipāla had to confess that he had not kept up such a conduct.²⁷

In this way, the Chinese *Avadāna* tale focuses on the meeting between Jotipāla and Kassapa Buddha as a stage in the bodhisattva career of the future Buddha Gotama. Quite probably due to taking this perspective, the Chinese *Avadāna* account does not cover the later events described in the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and its other parallels, events in which Jotipāla no longer plays a role.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses and their counterparts in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* continue by describing how Kassapa Buddha arrived in Vārāṇasī. King Kiki of Vārāṇasī treated the Buddha and his monks to a meal, at the completion of which the king invited Kassapa Buddha to spend the three months of the rainy season at Vārāṇasī, promising his abundant support.²⁸ Kassapa Buddha, however, did not accept the king's invitation.²⁹

Indian context, Hara 1986a: 71-72 explains that in a fighting situation “the seizure of the hair in single combat means complete control over one’s adversary”, as “once he succeeds in holding his adversary’s hair, he is in a position to behead him”. Therefore, “being held by the hair is an unbearable humiliation”. Outside of a battle context, forcefully grabbing the hair of another, such as, e.g., one’s teacher or of another’s wife, are similarly humiliating and therefore “censured as an ignoble act” (ibid. p. 83).

²³ The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 416,4 or in Senart 1882a: 321,18 reports that before delivering the discourse, Kāśyapa Buddha wanted to give the three refuges and the five precepts to his visitors. Jyotipāla, however, said that he could not take all the five precepts, since he still had to kill someone. Asked by Kāśyapa whom he needed to kill, Jyotipāla explained that he had to kill Ghaṭikāra for having seized his hair. This slightly bizarre episode thus agrees with the Chinese *Avadāna* version’s indication that Ghaṭikāra’s action was a rather serious deed. On the idea of taking only some out of the five precepts in general cf. Agostini 2008.

²⁴ Bailey 2003: 247 explains that “Ghaṭikāra … is the archetypal image of the village lay Buddhist”, and that “the symbolism of the blind parents, found often elsewhere in Indian literature … lends more dramatic emphasis to his domestic responsibility”.

²⁵ T 197 at T IV 173a19, an account in some respects similar to MN 91 at MN II 143,1.

²⁶ T 197 at T IV 173b9.

²⁷ T 197 at T IV 173b20.

²⁸ While MN 81 at MN II 50,25 only implicitly refers to the support the king was willing to give with the expression “like this will be the maintenance of the community”, *evariūpam saṅghassa upatthānam bhavissati ti*, thereby indicating that he would continue to offer supplies similar to the meal offering he had just made, the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* give a detailed description of the dwellings and supplies the king intended to provide, cf. Basak 1963a: 422,7 or Senart 1882a: 325,17, Gnoli 1978a: 26,3 and D (1) ‘dul ba, ga 7a6 or Q (1030) nge 6b5. MĀ 63 at T I 501a22 similarly reports that the king listed

Kassapa's refusal to accept the invitation upset the king and prompted him to inquire if Kassapa Buddha had a better supporter.³⁰ Kassapa confirmed that this was the case and told the king that his supporter was the potter Ghaṭīkāra. The *Mahāvastu* draws out in more detail the point made in the present passage, as it describes that the king asked Kassapa (Kāśyapa) what kind of wealth this potter had so as to be able to support the Buddha and the community of monks.³¹ Kassapa replied by describing Ghaṭīkāra's virtuous conduct, explaining that this was the potter's wealth.

MN II 51 The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses and their counterparts in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* agree in their description of Ghaṭīkāra's exemplary conduct, recording that he had adopted a behaviour that closely resembles the monastic code of conduct. Thus, he would not even dig the earth to make pots, but only take clay that had fallen off naturally. Moreover, he did not sell his pots, but offered them in free exchange for beans and rice.³² By avoiding the harm caused to creatures through digging the ground and by abstaining from sale and barter, Ghaṭīkāra was adopting rules usually only incumbent on and compatible with the life of a monastic.³³

While the *Majjhima-nikāya* account indicates that Ghaṭīkāra was a non-returner, the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* present him as a stream-enterer.³⁴ The *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation receives support from a discourse found in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and in two *Samyukta-āgama* collections. These three discourses report that Ghaṭīkāra, who had been reborn as a *deva*, paid a visit to Gotama Buddha in

the number of dwellings and the sumptuous food he wished to give. These descriptions further enhance the contrast between the king's material wealth and Ghaṭīkāra's spiritual wealth.

²⁹ The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 389-409 or Senart 1882a: 303-317 provides some additional background to Kāśyapa's refusal to spend the rainy season in Vārāṇasī, as it precedes the story of Ghaṭīkāra and Jyotiṣpāla with a narration of what took place earlier between Kāśyapa and the king, a tale also found in the Mahiśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 172a7. According to this tale, the veneration and support shown by the king's daughter to Kāśyapa and his monks had infuriated the local Brahmin community. Events had escalated up to the point where the Brahmins demanded that the king's daughter be killed and (according to the *Mahāvastu*) even employed assassins to kill Kāśyapa Buddha, cf. Basak 1963a: 404,13 or Senart 1882a: 313,19. Given such feelings of resentment among the local Brahmin community, it would be natural for the story to continue with Kāśyapa preferring to spend the rainy season elsewhere, in order to avoid exacerbating the situation.

³⁰ According to the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 422,14 or in Senart 1882a: 326,4, the king was so upset that he even started to cry.

³¹ Basak 1963a: 423,4 or Senart 1882a: 326,12.

³² MN 81 at MN II 51,24, MĀ 63 at T I 502a5, Basak 1963a: 424,2 or Senart 1882a: 326,19, Gnoli 1978a: 26,24 and D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a4 or Q (1030) nge 3b6; cf. also T 197 at T IV 172c16.

³³ This becomes all the more evident in the detailed description of Ghaṭīkāra's virtuous conduct in MĀ 63, which notes that he would not accept livestock, slaves, land, and grains, etc., a description similar to the standard description of proper ethical conduct for recluses found, e.g., in DN 1 at DN I 5,12.

³⁴ MN 81 at MN I 51,16 notes that Ghaṭīkāra was free from doubt in relation to the three jewels and the four noble truths, thereby implicitly indicating that he had attained stream-entry, an indication also made in MĀ 63 at T I 501b12, and in Gnoli 1978a: 26,22 as well as in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 4a3 or Q (1030) nge 3b5. MN 81 at MN I 52,2 then concludes its description by specifying that Ghaṭīkāra had destroyed the five lower fetters, thereby specifying that he had progressed to the level of non-returning.

order to brief him on the progress made by some monks reborn in the Pure Abodes,³⁵ realms in which according to Buddhist cosmology only non-returners are reborn. The two Chinese versions explicitly indicate that Ghaṭīkāra had been reborn as a non-returner in the Pure Abodes,³⁶ a fact also implicit in their Pāli counterpart, since for him to know what was taking place in the Pure Abodes suggest that he would have been living there himself and thus would also be a non-returner.

The *Mahāvastu* also reports that Ghaṭīkāra took rebirth in the Pure Abodes. According to its account, in his life as an inhabitant of the Pure Abodes Ghaṭīkāra again played an important role in helping his former friend Jotipāla (Jyotipāla), now reborn as the bodhisattva Gotama, the Buddha-to-be. The *Mahāvastu* account indicates that the *deva* Ghaṭīkāra, together with other *devas* of the Pure Abodes, was responsible for conjuring up the sight of an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a recluse – sights that stirred the mind of the bodhisattva sufficiently to motivate him to go forth.³⁷

The *Ghaṭīkāra-sutta* and its parallels continue by relating that on one occasion Kas-
sapa Buddha had come to Ghaṭīkāra's house when the latter was out.³⁸ The potter's MN II 52 blind parents told Kassapa that he should help himself to the food that was ready in the kitchen.

While the other versions simply indicate that Kassapa did so, the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Saṅghabhedavastu* further specify that he helped

³⁵ SN 1:50 at SN I 35,6 (or SN² 50 at SN² I 75,3), a discourse that recurs in the *Samyutta-nikāya* collection as SN 2:24 at SN I 60,4 (or SN² 105 at SN² I 137,16). The Chinese parallels are SĀ 595 at T II 159c3 and SĀ² 189 at T II 442c26, which differ in as much as they speak of Nandipāla, 難提婆(羅).

³⁶ SĀ 595 at T II 159b22 and SĀ² 189 at T II 442c14.

³⁷ Basak 1965: 212,3, 214,9, 217,6, and 221,3, or Senart 1890: 150,16, 152,10, 154,7, and 156,18. This intervention by Nandipāla recurs also in a Buddha-biography preserved in Chinese, the 修行本起經, T 184 at T III 466b18. Another Buddha-biography, the 過去現在因果經, T 189 at T III 629c17, T III 630a17, T III 630c27, and T III 631c13 attributes the manifestation of an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a monk to an unnamed *deva* from the Pure Abodes. According to the *Buddhacarita* 3:26, 3:40, and 3:54 in Johnston 1936/1995a: 23, 25, and 27, the *devas* from the Pure Abodes were only responsible for the first three manifestations, i.e., the old man, the sick man, and the dead man, while according to the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 73,2, they were only responsible for conjuring the apparition of a monk, cf. also T 1450 at T XXIV 113b18.

³⁸ The *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 27,5 and in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 7b7 or Q (1030) nge 7a6 reports that Kāśyapa at first softly knocked on the bolt to announce his presence to the blind parents, thereby causing them to initiate the conversation, whereas according to MN 81 at MN II 52,8 Kassapa directly asked them where Ghaṭīkāra had gone. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 424,12 or in Senart 1882a: 327,7 and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 27,3 note that Kāśyapa had come to the potter's house while undertaking the practice of going begging without interruption, *sāvadānam pīṇḍāya caranto*. Childers 1875/1993: 461 s.v. *sapadānam* calls into question the commentarial etymology at Vism 60,20 of the corresponding Pāli expression *sapadāna* as *saha apadānena*, “without interruption”, as does Senart 1882a: 595, who suggests the Sanskrit expression to point to *sa + avadāna*, “part by part”, in the sense of “successively”. The corresponding passage in MĀ 63 at T I 502a13 speaks of begging food “one after another” or “in turn”, 次第乞食. The implication of this practice is that a monk begs at each house on the road he has taken, not leaving out any house because he anticipates that he might not receive food or only get low-quality alms.

himself to the food in accordance with the “custom of the northern Kurus”.³⁹ According to the *Ātānātiya-sutta*, in the (mythical) region of northern Kuru private ownership had been abolished,⁴⁰ a circumstance also recorded in the *Divyāvadāna*.⁴¹ Thus the “custom of the northern Kurus” might imply that in an ownerless society there would be no need to offer food formally.

The *Ghaṭīkāra-sutta* and its parallels agree that when Ghaṭīkāra came home and heard from his parents what had taken place, his joy lasted for two weeks.⁴² The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses report that Kassapa took food in Ghaṭīkāra’s house another time in the same manner, a description that differs from the previous occasion only in regard to the type of food he took. The *Mahāvastu* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* do not report such a second occasion.

It would indeed seem of little interest to repeat the whole episode just to show that Kassapa Buddha at first had rice to go with the curries, while later he instead had porridge to go with the curries.⁴³ One might wonder if this passage in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions could be the outcome of a textual doubling of what was originally only a single episode.

Notably, the *Saṅghabhedavastu* follows its description of the Buddha’s visit to Ghaṭīkāra’s house by narrating how the parents gave a full account of the whole episode to their son Ghaṭīkāra when he came home.⁴⁴ Thus in this version, the tale of the partaking of food also occurs twice, although these are two accounts of the same occasion. If a similar repetition of the account of this episode should have been found in an early

³⁹ MĀ 63 at T I 502a19 and again at T I 502b8; 鬱單曰法, to which the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 27,14 refers to as “depending upon the conventions of Uttarakuru”, *uttarakauravaṇi samayam adhiṣṭhāya* and D (1) ’dul ba, ga 8a3 or Q (1030) nge 7b1: *byang gi sgra mi snyan gyi dus byin gyis brlabs nas*. This specification may be related to the fact that under normal circumstance it is reckoned improper for a *bhikkhu* (and thus implicitly also for the Buddha) just to help himself to food; cf. the *pācittiya* rule 40 in Vin IV 90,1, and its parallels, *pātayantika* rule 39 in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 663c15, rule 39 in the Kāśyapīya *Vinaya*, T 1460 at T XXIV 662c18, rule 37 in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXV 53a28, rule 35 in the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 357b4, rule 39 in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 826c18, and rule 39 in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 96b9, which agree in prohibiting a fully ordained monk from partaking of food that has not been offered to him.

⁴⁰ DN 32 at DN III 199,27; cf. also its Chinese parallel, T 1245 at T XXI 217c2, and the Tibetan version in Hoffmann 1939: 46.

⁴¹ Cowell 1886: 215,20 or Vaidya 1999: 133,18; cf. also AN 9:21 at AN IV 396,10, SHT IV 558V1 (p. 244), and T 1440 at T XXIII 527a11. For further references to Uttarakuru cf. Anālayo 2008m and Schmitzhausen 2005a: 178.

⁴² MN 81 at MN II 53,12 and Basak 1963a: 425,10 or Senart 1882a: 327,20. MĀ 63 at T I 502a26 and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 27,31 as well as in D (1) ’dul ba, ga 8b1 or Q (1030) nge 7b6 add that he sat cross-legged for seven days experiencing only joy.

⁴³ According to MN 81 at MN II 52,12+33, in the first instance he took “rice”, *odana*, and in the second instance he took “porridge”, *kummāsa*. According to MĀ 63 at T I 502a18, however, in the first instance he took “wheat and rice”, 麥飯, and on the second occasion described at T I 502b7 he had “rice”, 糜米飯.

⁴⁴ Gnoli 1978a: 27,20 and D (1) ’dul ba, ga 8a4 or Q (1030) nge 7b3.

version of the discourse, it could easily be imagined how a minor slip of memory in regard to the type of food taken by Kassapa Buddha could have introduced a variation that resulted in turning into two consecutive events what was originally only a single event. If that should indeed have been the case, then this doubling took place at a relatively early stage of the transmission of the discourse, as it is found in the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Madhyama-āgama* versions.

The *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and their counterparts in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* relate another occasion when Kassapa Buddha's hut was without roofing, which caused his monks to take some dry grass from the newly made roof of Ghaṭikāra's workshop during the latter's absence.⁴⁵ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, the *Madhyama-āgama* version, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* agree that even though Ghaṭikāra's workshop remained without a roof for three months, for the whole of this period it did not rain into it.⁴⁶

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the *Mahāvastu*, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu*, Kassapa Buddha highlighted the contrast between Ghaṭikāra, who was not at all irritated when the newly made roofing of his working place had been removed or when his meal had been eaten by someone else, and King Kiki, who was sorely displeased when Kassapa did not accept the invitation to spend the rainy season at Vārāṇasī.⁴⁷ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse also contrasts the attitude of the king with that of Ghaṭikāra, although it does this at an earlier point, by way of introduction to its description of how Ghaṭikāra reacted when his food and roofing had been taken away during his absence.⁴⁸

According to the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and its parallels, the king dispatched cartloads of food as a gift to Ghaṭikāra, which Ghaṭikāra politely refused to accept. The *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and its parallels agree that Gotama Buddha identified the Brahmin youth Jotipāla as one of his former lives.⁴⁹ While the *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes at this point,

⁴⁵ A minor difference is that when the potter's parents asked who was taking away the roof, according to MN 81 at MN II 53,25 the monks replied by addressing both parents as "sister", *bhagini*. According to MĀ 63 at T I 502b26, they used the address 長老, "elders".

⁴⁶ MĀ 63 at T I 502c11 explains that this happened due to the power of Kassapa Buddha, 蒙佛威神故, a specification similarly made in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1978a: 29,5: *buddhasya buddhānubhāvena* and in D (1) 'dul ba, ga 9a6 or Q (1030) nge 8b4: *sangs rgyas rnams kyi sangs rgyas kyi mthu*, followed by also mentioning the power of the (rain) gods, *devatānām devatānubhāvena* or else *lha rnams kyi lha'i mthus*; on such association of the power of the Buddha with the power of *devas* cf. also Granoff 1996: 81. Jā I 172,12 notes that no rain will fall into Ghaṭikāra's workshop for the whole of the present aeon (*kappa*).

⁴⁷ MĀ 63 at T I 502c12, Basak 1963a: 427,10 or Senart 1882a: 329,6, Gnoli 1978a: 29,7 and D (1) 'dul ba, ga 9a7 or Q (1030) nge 8b4.

⁴⁸ MN 81 at MN II 51,7.

⁴⁹ MN 81 at MN II 54,16, MĀ 63 at T I 503a4, Basak 1963a: 436,2 or Senart 1882a: 335,5 (on which cf. also von Hinüber 1998: 198), Gnoli 1978a: 30,14 and D (1) 'dul ba, ga 10a3 or Q (1030) nge 9a7. The **Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545 at T XXVII 863c22, also refers to a former life of the bodhisattva during which he was a monk disciple of Kassapa Buddha. Lüders 1913: 883 notes a pictorial representation of the meeting between Kassapa Buddha and the young Brahmin, in which the latter is depicted as a monk en-

according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account the Buddha continued by highlighting that, in contrast to his present life as a fully awakened Buddha, in his former life as Jotipāla he had not been able to reach perfection.⁵⁰

The *Mahāvastu* continues differently, as it narrates how the monk Jotipāla (Jyotipāla) developed the aspiration to become a future Buddha. Through his telepathic powers, the Buddha Kassapa (Kāśyapa) became aware of this and called Jotipāla to his presence, informing the young monk that he should first acquire merit by making offerings to the Buddha and the monastic community.⁵¹ Once Jotipāla had carried out this instruction, Kassapa Buddha predicted that Jotipāla was destined to become a Buddha, a proclamation repeated by the gods of various celestial realms up to and including the Brahmā world.

In this way, the *Mahāvastu* account presents the events described in the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* from the perspective of the bodhisattva's career. This shift of emphasis finds its explicit expression in the discourse's title in the *Mahāvastu*, where the "discourse on Ghaṭikāra" has become the "discourse on Jyotipāla".⁵²

In the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, however, the circumstance that Jotipāla was a former life of the Buddha does not seem to be the central point of the tale. In fact, the Buddha's former life as Jotipāla, unlike his former lives as Mahāsudassana and as Ma(k)hādeva, has not even made its way into the Pāli *Jātaka* collection.⁵³

The central theme of the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* appears to be rather the contrast between the potter Ghaṭikāra and the king of Vārāṇasī, in the sense that due to his virtues Ghaṭikāra was a better supporter than the king of the country. Thus the didactic function of the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* seems to be the depiction of an ideal layman, who fulfills his filial

dowed with *uṣṇīṣa* and *ūrṇā*. The young Brahmin's possession of these two out of the thirty-two characteristics is a clear indication of his impending Buddha-hood and thus confirms his status as a former life of the Buddha Gotama, in fact his possession of thirty out of the thirty-two characteristics is explicitly mentioned in T 197 at T IV 172c11. For another representation of the same event in a Gandhāran sculpture cf. Vogel 1954: 810.

⁵⁰ MĀ 63 at T I 503a8: "[I] did not reach the ultimate ... did not abandon birth, old age, disease, and death ... was not able to overcome *dukkha* completely", 不至究竟 ... 不離生老病死 ... 未能得脫一切苦.

⁵¹ Basak 1963a: 431,3 or Senart 1882a: 331,12 list robes and a golden basket as offerings to be made, *svavṛṇapīṭhakam dusyayugam*. BHSD: 346 s.v. *pīṭhaka* indicates that *pīṭhaka* could be an error for *pīṭaka* and suggests the translation "basket".

⁵² Basak 1963a: 436,5 or Senart 1882a: 335,8: *jyotipāla-sūtra*. The same would also be implicit in the placing of this episode within what, according to Hiraoka 2002/2003: 355, would have been the original overall structural pattern of the *Mahāvastu*, in that the *Jyotipāla-sūtra* originally would have come directly after the accounts of previous predictions of Gautama's future Buddhahood by the earlier Buddhas Dīpaṃkara and Maṅgala, the intervening tales about the Buddha in Vaiśālī being a later addition; cf. also Dutt 1956: 147-148.

⁵³ This has already been noted by Oldenberg 1912b: 189. The counterparts to the former lives of the Buddha, depicted in DN 17 and MN 83, are the *Mahāsudassana-jātaka*, Jā 95 at Jā I 391-393, and the *Mahādeva-jātaka*, Jā 9 at Jā I 137-139. For a more detailed examination of the *jātaka* nature of the present tale cf. Anālayo 2010f: 74-84.

duty by supporting his blind parents and at the same time lives a life that corresponds as closely as possible to monastic standards. From the perspective of the *Ghaṭīkāra-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, such an ideal layman is superior even to the king of the country.

MN 82 *Ratthapāla-sutta*

The *Ratthapāla-sutta*, the “discourse about Ratthapāla”, records the going forth of Ratthapāla and his later visit to his parents as a monk. This discourse has three Chinese parallels, one of which is found in the *Madhyama-āgama*, while the other two are individual translations.⁵⁴ Considerable parts of this discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.⁵⁵ A version of the present discourse can, moreover, be found in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, preserved in Tibetan.⁵⁶

Descriptions of Ratthapāla’s going forth are also given in the Pāli and Sanskrit *Apadāna/Avadāna* collections and in their Chinese and Tibetan counterparts,⁵⁷ as well as in a commentary on the beginning parts of the *Ekottarika-āgama*, preserved in Chinese.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ The parallels are MĀ 132 at T I 623a-628a, T 68 at T I 868c-872a, and T 69 at T I 872a-875a. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 68 was translated by Zhī Qīan (支謙); on this attribution cf. also Nattier 2008: 129. T 69 was according to the information in the Taishō edition translated by Fǎxián (法賢). MĀ 132, T 68, and T 69 agree with MN 82 on locating the discourse in the Kuru country and entitling it after its protagonist Ratthapāla. The same title recurs also in a reference to the present discourse in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, T 1448 at T XXIV 37c1. MĀ 132 has been summarized and translated by Minh Chau 1964/1991: 66-69, 294-305. For counterparts to MN 82 at MN II 68,15f in *Vyākhyāyukti* literature cf. Skilling 2000b: 343.

⁵⁵ The fragments are SHT III 804 (p. 8), SHT IV 412 folios 12-16 (pp. 31-35), SHT V 1896 (pp. 269-270), and SHT VI 1423 (p. 130), SHT X 4092 (p. 263), the so far unpublished SHT XI 4568, identified by Lore Sander (I am indebted to Klaus Wille for kindly providing me with a draft transliteration of this fragment), and the so far unpublished fragment no. 2376/37 of the Schøyen collection, identified by Seishi Karashima (I am indebted to Jens-Uwe Hartmann for kindly providing me with a preliminary draft transliteration of these fragments). SHT IV 412 contains considerable parts of the discourse and has been published by Waldschmidt 1980b. Matsumura 1985 has published SHT III 804, SHT IV 412, and SHT V 1896 together with their Tibetan counterpart from the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Bhaiṣajyavastu*. SHT XI 4568 corresponds to the beginning part of the discourse; SHT V 1896 parallels the request for ordination and the parents’ reaction at MN II 56-57; SHT VI 1423 and Schøyen fragment 2376/37B have a few words paralleling the verses at MN II 64-65; Schøyen fragment 2376/37A parallels the report given to the king at MN II 65; and SHT III 804 has a few words from the conclusion of the discourse at MN II 74. For a comparison of some aspects of the diction found in the Sanskrit fragments and in the corresponding *Avadānaśataka* tale cf. Hartmann 1985: 221-222.

⁵⁶ D (1) ’dul ba, kha 100b-112a or Q (1030) ge 93a-103a.

⁵⁷ *Therāpadāna* no. 18 in Ap I 63-64, *Avadānaśataka* tale no. 90 in Speyer 1909/1970: 118-126 or in Vaidya 1958a: 227-230, T 200 at T IV 249b12-c26, and the Tibetan version in Devacandra 1996: 631-641. For an examination of some of these tales cf. Bode 1911; on the *Avadānaśataka*’s depiction of the karmic background of Rāṣtrapāla cf. also Feer 1881c: 480. The relevant part in a collection of former stories of the Buddha’s disciples, preserved in Chinese, the 佛五百弟子自說本起經, occurs in T 199 at T IV 196b1-196c24. *Avadāna* stanzas related to Rāṣtrapāla can be found in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, T 1448

MN II 54 The *Ratthapāla-sutta*, its three Chinese parallels, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* describe how a group of householders came to visit the Buddha.⁵⁹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions employ standard pericopes found regularly in other discourses of the respective collections to describe several variations in the behaviour that was adopted by the householders on approaching and meeting the Buddha. As part of this standard description, they also mention that some visitors just sat down silently.⁶⁰ The Pāli commentary on another occurrence of this description explains that those who remained silent did so out of hypocrisy or out of stupidity.⁶¹

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* description, in the present instance these householders sat down silently once they had “seen the Buddha from afar”, a detail not mentioned in the Pāli version of this pericope.⁶²

at T XXIV 84b24-c6, with its Sanskrit and Tibetan counterparts in Hofinger 1954: 94-98; for the Sanskrit version cf. also Bechert 1961: 155-158, Dutt 1984a: 200-202, and Wille 1990: 100-101. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 25,2 or in Senart 1897: 41,1 also refers to Rāṣtrapāla, identifying him with the protagonist of one of its *jātaka* accounts.

⁵⁸ The 分別功德論, T 1507 at T XXV 42b17-c20; on this work cf. also Mori 1970.

⁵⁹ In regard to the description of what motivated the householders to visit the Buddha, it is perhaps noteworthy that MĀ 132 at T I 623a22 qualifies the Dharma taught by the Buddha to “have meaning”, 有義, corresponding to MN 82 at MN II 55,9: *sāttham* (while T 68 and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* do not employ this pericope at all, T 69 at T I 872b1 speaks of “phrasing and meaning that are profound, genuine, and not confused”, 文義深遠純一無雜). Bapat 1969: 3 explains the use of 有義 to point to a Prākrit original used for the translation of the *Madhyama-āgama*, since if the translator “had a Sanskrit text as his basic original, he would have naturally used an expression corresponding to Sanskrit *svartham* (*su-artham*)”. The use of *svartha* can be found, for example, in a description of the Dharma taught by the Buddha in fragment 493V2 of the *Daśottara-sūtra* in Mittal 1957: 27, and also in the same context in the *Sanighabhedavastu*’s parallel to the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* in Gnoli 1978a: 230,15. Another variation in regard to the description of what motivated the householders to visit the Buddha occurs in T 68 at T I 869a3 in relation to the Buddha’s qualities, as in this context this version also mentions the Buddha’s supernormal power, such as being able to fly through the air and to enter the earth.

⁶⁰ MN 82 at MN II 55,20: “some kept silent and sat down at one side”, *app’ ekacce tuṇhībhūtā ekamantam niśidimsu*, and MĀ 132 at T I 623b1: “[some] sat down silently”, 默然而坐. The pericope employed in the *Madhyama-āgama* collection to describe such variations in behaviour of the visitors differs from its Pāli counterpart in as much as the description that some visitors pronounced their name and then sat down, cf., e.g., MN 82 at MN II 55,19: *app’ ekacce bhagavato santike nāmagottam sāvetvā ekamantam niśidimsu*, is without a counterpart, cf., e.g., MĀ 16 at T I 438c1, MĀ 62 at T I 497b27, MĀ 64 at T I 560c15, and MĀ 161 at T I 688a3 (in addition to the present instance in MĀ 132 at T I 623b1). However, the same type of behaviour is taken into account in a Sanskrit version of this pericope in fragment 3v2 in Hartmann 2002b: 4 (parallel to MN 95): *apy ekat� bhagavataḥ saṃnike svakasvakāni mātāpaitrīkāni nāmagotrāṇi anuśrāvayitvā ekatamanyante niśidimsu*. The same detail can also be found in such a description in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 619,2: *apy ekat� bhagavataḥ purataḥ svakasvakāni mātāpaitrīkāni nāmagotrāṇi anuśrāvyaikāntē niśannāḥ* and in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 266,6 or in Senart 1897: 443,20: *apy ekat� bhagavato svakasvakāni mātāpaitrīkāni nāmagotrāṇi anuśrāvayitvā ekamante niśidensuḥ*; cf. also Skilling 1994a: 128 note 9.

⁶¹ Ps II 273,33: *ye pana tuṇhībhūtā niśidimsu, te kerāṭikā c’ eva andhabālā ca*.

⁶² MĀ 132 at T I 623b1: “having seen the Buddha from afar,” 遙見佛已.

The same additional specification recurs in versions of this pericope in the *Catuspariṣat-sūtra* and the *Saṅghabhedavastu*.⁶³ From the perspective of these texts, it seems that such visitors simply wish to witness the Buddha's exposition from an uninvolving distance. As they remain at a distance, it would only be natural that they do not pay respects or speak to the Buddha, an action that need not be interpreted as a sign of hypocrisy or stupidity.

Ratṭhapāla was among the visiting householders and felt so inspired by the exposition delivered by the Buddha that he wished to go forth. One of the individual translations relates that, once the Buddha's exposition was over and the visitors were leaving, Ratṭhapāla turned back and approached the Buddha again to express his desire to go forth.⁶⁴ The Pāli commentary reports the same, explaining that in order to avoid interference by friends and relatives who had been present during the Buddha's discourse, Ratṭhapāla had left together with them and then turned back on a pretext in order to approach the Buddha again and request ordination.⁶⁵ According to all versions, the Buddha told Ratṭhapāla that, if he wished to go forth, he would need to get the consent of his parents.⁶⁶

MN II 55

The Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadāna* tales differ from the presentation given in the discourse parallels and in the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, as according to these tales Ratṭhapāla's inspiration to go forth arose on seeing that the Buddha was endowed with the thirty-two characteristics of a superior being (*mahāpurisa-lakkhaṇa*), together with their accompanying eighty minor characteristics.⁶⁷ Ratṭhapāla had noticed these characteristics when he saw the Buddha begging alms in town, so that in the Sanskrit and

⁶³ *Catuspariṣat-sūtra* fragment M 368V2 in Walder 1952: 46: (*dūrād e*)[va] *drṣṭvā tūṣṇīm-ekānte nyāśidān*, its Chinese counterpart, T 1450 at T XXIV 135b27: “some remained at a distance and sat down silently”, 一分遠住默然而坐, and the Tibetan version in Walder 1962: 343,3: “some saw the Blessed One from afar and silently sat down at one side” (my translation), *kha cig ni bcom ldan 'das rgyang ring po nas mthong nas cang mi smra bar phyogs gcig tu 'khod do*; cf. also von Simson 1965: 89. The pericope used in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 155,2 similarly reads *eke bhagavantam dūrād eva drṣṭvā tūṣṇīm ekānte niṣāṇnāḥ*. A comparable description in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 266,9 or in Senart 1897: 444,1, however, does not have this specification, just reading *apy ekaṭyā māgadhadhā brāhmaṇa-grhapatikā tūṣṇībhūtā ekānte niṣīdensuh*, as is the case for an occurrence of such a description in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 619,5: *apy ekaṭyās tūṣṇībhūtā ekānte niṣāṇnāḥ*.

⁶⁴ T 68 at T I 869a22.

⁶⁵ Ps III 291,1.

⁶⁶ A reference to the Buddha's refusal to ordain Rāṣtrapāla without the consent of his parents can also be found in the *Karmavibhaṅga* in Kudo 2004: 118,1 and 119,1 or in Lévi 1932a: 59,8. According to Prasad 1972a: 104, getting the consent of one's parents was also required for going forth in the Jain tradition.

⁶⁷ Speyer 1909/1970: 118,11 or Vaidya 1958a: 227,11 and Devacandra 1996: 632,8. The same versions in Speyer 1909/1970: 118,9 or in Vaidya 1958a: 227,9 and in Devacandra 1996: 632,3 agree with their Chinese counterpart, T 200 at T IV 249b13, that the Buddha had come on purpose to convert Rāṣtrapāla. According to the same tale in Speyer 1909/1970 124,17 or in Vaidya 1958a: 229,30 and in Devacandra 1996: 639,12, in a former life Rāṣtrapāla had also been inspired on seeing Kāśyapa Buddha endowed with the thirty-two characteristics. This perhaps helps to explain why in the present *Avadāna* tale the mere sight of Gautama Buddha endowed with the thirty-two characteristics had such an impact on him.

Tibetan *Avadāna* accounts Ratṭhapāla conceived the wish to go forth without even having heard an exposition of the Dharma.

The Chinese *Avadāna* account, however, agrees with the discourse parallels and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in as much as it records the Buddha delivering some teachings to Ratṭhapāla.⁶⁸ The same Chinese *Avadāna* account also reports the impact of the Buddha's thirty-two major and eighty minor characteristics on Ratṭhapāla, although in its account this only appears to have inspired Ratṭhapāla to approach and listen to the Buddha.⁶⁹

MN II 57 The *Ratṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels relate that Ratṭhapāla went on a hunger strike, because his parents had refused to allow him to become a monk. One of the individual translations offers additional background to this refusal, mentioning that before his birth Ratṭhapāla's parents had longed to have a son who would ensure continuity to their family line.⁷⁰

This ties in with a passage in a *Dīgha-nikāya* discourse, according to which the duties of a son are to continue the family line, to look after his parents when they are old, to maintain the inheritance, and to give offerings for the benefit of the departed ancestors.⁷¹

⁶⁸ T 200 at T IV 249b21, according to which the Buddha delivered teachings on the four (noble) truths on this occasion, 四諦法. The fact that T 200 refers to teachings given by the Buddha is of interest in the light of the suggestion by Bagchi 1945: 57 and Pachow 1953: 2 that this version of the *Avadānaśataka* collection preserved in Chinese translation is earlier than the Sanskrit version at our disposal, the latter containing several later interpolations and amplifications not yet found in the version that was translated into Chinese. The situation appears to be, however, somewhat complex, as can be seen in the detailed comparative study of two *Avadānaśataka* tales in Meisig 2004. The same also becomes evident in the present case, as T 200 at T IV 249b15 describes various miracles that took place when the Buddha entered town, such as an earthquake, a rain of heavenly flowers, a great light, the blind could see, the deaf hear, the mute speak, and the lame walk. These miracles are not found in the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions. In this case, the Chinese *Avadāna* version might be showing signs of later amplification, since a general tendency in Buddhist texts appears to be to add miracles rather than leaving them out. A similar description of various miracles that happened when Kāśyapa Buddha once entered a town can be found in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 396,2 or in Senart 1882a: 308,1. According to the same *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 153,18 or in Senart 1897: 255,17, such miraculous events are regularly part of the Buddha's entry into a city. For another description of the wonders that accompany the Buddha's arrival in a city cf., e.g., the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 365,2 or Vaidya 1999: 229,16.

⁶⁹ T 200 at T IV 249b19.

⁷⁰ T 68 at T I 869b17.

⁷¹ DN 31 at DN III 189,7; for a comparison of this discourse with its four Chinese parallels cf. Pannasiri 1950 (Strong 1983a: 173 comments that the substantial number of Chinese translations of this discourse reflects its common use "by Buddhists in China to show their religion's support for Confucian filiality"); cf. also AN 5.39 at AN III 43,14, which lists five expectations parents have in regard to their son. The same duties recur among a listing of the benefits that parents expect from a son in the *Karmavibhaṅga* in Kudo 2004: 118,8 and 119,8 or in Lévi 1932a: 59,12; cf. also the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 2,15 or in Vaidya 1999: 1,22. Cohen 2000: 13 explains that "a son is so valued ... because his behaviors as a son are crucial to the well being of fathers and forefathers"; cf. also Bareau 1976: 19. For a description of the parents' affliction at their son's wish to go forth in Jain texts cf. the *Antagadadasāo*, translated in

In view of this set of duties, if Ratṭhapāla as the only son of the household would go forth, this would not only deprive his parents of the company of their beloved son, but would also threaten to bring the family lineage to an end and cause the loss of the family's inheritance. Moreover, there would be no son to make offerings on behalf of the parents once they had passed away, an important requirement for their well-being after death according to ancient Indian beliefs. These repercussions of Ratṭhapāla's going forth would have been at the background of his parents' wish to prevent him from ordaining.

According to the Chinese *Avadāna* account, Ratṭhapāla had already become a stream-enterer during his first meeting with the Buddha.⁷² Although the Pāli and Chinese discourse versions do not explicitly mention any attainment, their account also suggests that the Buddha's sermon had left a strong impression on Ratṭhapāla, as he was so determined to go forth that he went on a prolonged hunger strike in order to get his parents' approval.⁷³

Although his parents, relatives, and friends tried to persuade him to give up his fast, Ratṭhapāla remained firm in his decision.⁷⁴ Faced with the prospect that their son might

MN II 58

Barnett 1907/1973: 39-43, as well as the *Nāyādhammakahāo* in Steinthal 1881: 33,15 (cf. also Schubring 1978: 12).

⁷² T 200 at T IV 249b22, which happened when the Buddha had expounded the four noble truths to him.

⁷³ According to the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970 119,8, Rāstrapāla was so determined to go forth that he abstained from food for six meals, *yāvac chad bhaktacchedāḥ kṛtāḥ* (Vaidya 1958a: 227,22; *yāvat ṣaḍ*), cf. also SHT V 1896R5: /yā/va/t]-ṣa/d-a/pi. MN 66 at MN I 448,5 and its parallel MĀ 192 at T I 741a14+20 indicate that it was customary in ancient India to take three meals per day, so that to forgo six meals would imply that Ratṭhapāla's fast continued for a period of about two days. According to the Burmese and Siamese editions of MN 82, his fast lasted for seven meals, B^e-MN II 247,18 and S^e-MN II 392,8: *satta pi bhattāni na bhuñji*, while E^e and C^e do not specify the time period (cf. also the parallel account of the going forth of Sudinna at Vin III 13,21, which records that Sudinna abstained from seven meals). The Sanskrit fragment in Waldschmidt 1980b: 366 also reports that he fasted for seven meals, *yāvat sapta bhaktacchedānām akārṣit*. According to MĀ 132 at T I 623c11, however, Ratṭhapāla fasted for "over four days", 二, 三, 四, 多日 (a fast earlier specified to also imply abstention from drinking), and according to T 68 at T I 869b13 he fasted up to five days, 至五日 (here, too, including abstention from drinking), while T 69 does not specify the time period. The *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Hofinger 1954: 96 notes that he fasted for six days, *saḍrātram*, a time period also mentioned in T 199 at T IV 196c1: 六日, in T 200 at T IV 249b28: 六日, in T 1507 at T XXV 42b26: 六日, and in the Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* in Devacandra 1996: 633,5: *zhag geig dang ... drug gi bar du kha 'tshos so*. The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 102a1 or Q (1030) ge 94a6 (or Matsumura 1985: 45,1) records that he fasted for up to seven days, *nyi ma gcig ... bdun gyi bar du zan bcad pa byas so*, a time period also mentioned in B^e-Ap-a 328: *sattāham bhaktacchedam katvā*. The same is implicit in Jā I 156,13, which speaks of another young man who, "just like the elder Ratṭhapāla", *ratṭhapālathero viya*, fasted for seven days in order to get his parents' permission to ordain (for a modern version of a similar tale, whose delivery forms part of ordination ceremonies in Thailand, cf. Keyes 1983: 276-277). In sum, Ratṭhapāla's determination to become a monk appears to have been enhanced by progressive extensions of the period of his fast as a way of throwing into relief his strong determination. On the threat to starve oneself to death as a means to achieve an objective in the ancient Indian context in general cf. Hopkins 1900.

⁷⁴ MN 82 at MN II 59,3 mentions only that Ratṭhapāla's friends attempted to persuade him to listen to his

starve himself to death, Ratthapāla's parents finally allowed him to go forth under the condition that he should come to visit them, a permission given in the hope that he would become dissatisfied with the life of a monk and return to live with them.⁷⁵

MN II 60 Ratthapāla ordained,⁷⁶ and after practising earnestly in due time became an arahant.⁷⁷ According to the commentary on the *Ekottarika-āgama*, Ratthapāla had become an arahant after being taught the four noble truths,⁷⁸ while according to the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* tales he accomplished the same by developing insight into the impermanent nature of all formations.⁷⁹

MN II 61 With the Buddha's permission, Ratthapāla went to visit his family. Begging his food in successive order from house to house, Ratthapāla approached his parents' place. On seeing Ratthapāla from afar, Ratthapāla's father did not recognize his own son and voiced his displeasure at seeing one of those "bald-headed recluses" that had taken his only son away from him.⁸⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* account adds that the father right

parents, while another intervention by his relatives is mentioned in MĀ 132 at T I 623c18, T 68 at T I 869b16, the Sanskrit fragment in Waldschmidt 1980b: 367, the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 102a4 or Q (1030) ge 94b1 (or Matsumura 1985: 46,1), the Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1909/1970: 120,1 or in Vaidya 1958a: 228,2, and the Tibetan *Avadānaśataka* in Devacandra 1996: 633,19. T 69 at T I 872c9 does not mention that either the friends or the relatives attempted to convince Ratthapāla to stop fasting, only reporting that Ratthapāla's friends counselled his parents to allow him to go forth.

⁷⁵ Notably, the description of Ratthapāla's hunger strike to obtain his parents' permission to go forth and his later visit to them as a monk recurs in almost the same terms in the *Vinaya* account of the going forth of the monk Sudinna in Vin III 11-17, cf. also Jā 14 at Jā I 156,11, a parallelism already noted by Lupton 1894: 770. Von Hinüber 1976: 37 (cf. also id. 1996/1997: 13) considers the Sudinna tale to be the earlier version of the two stories, because of the form *viheṭhayittha* found in Vin III 17,28, in contrast to the form *viheṭhertha* in MN 82 at MN II 64,17. According to Lupton 1894: 771, however, the tale of "Sudinna ... evolved as the correlative of Ratthapāla"; cf. also below note 123. For a study of different versions of the Sudinna tale cf. Anālayo 2012a.

⁷⁶ According to T 68 at T I 869c13, the Buddha had already left for Sāvatthī while Ratthapāla was on hunger strike, so that, to get ordained, Ratthapāla had to go all the way to Sāvatthī to meet the Buddha there.

⁷⁷ The *Therāpadāna* at Ap I 64,4 and the Chinese *Avadāna* version in T 200 at T IV 249c5 record that Ratthapāla attained the six *abhiññās*; cf. also T 68 at T I 869c23.

⁷⁸ T 1507 at T XXV 42c2: 為說四諦便成羅漢.

⁷⁹ Speyer 1909/1970: 122,6: *svasamksāragatīḥ śatanapatanavikaraṇavidhvamsanadharmaṭayā parāhat-ya sarvakleśaprahāṇād arhattvāṇi sākṣātκrtavāṇi* (Vaidya 1958a: 228,27: *śatanapatanavikaraṇavidhvamsanadharmaṭayā*), and Devacandra 1996: 636,6: 'du byed kyi rnam pa thams cad snyil ba dang, ltung ba dang, rnam par 'thor ba dang, rnam par 'jig pa'i chos can yin par rtsad chod de, nyon mongs pa thams cad spangs nas dgra bcom pa nyid mngon sum du byas te. This is the standard description of the arrival at arahant-ship in *Avadānaśataka* tales, so that its occurrence in the present instance is a case of applying a pericope and need not be characteristic of the individual person concerned. The same pericope recurs in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 177,10 in a different context.

⁸⁰ MN 82 at MN II 61,33: *imehi munḍakehi samānakehi*, MĀ 132 at T I 624b25: 此禿沙門, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 103b4 or Q (1030) ge 95b6 (or Matsumura 1985: 50,9) *dge sbyong mgo reg 'o*. T 68 at T I 870a7 only records that he received abuse instead of food, without specifying what type of abuse. T 69 at T I 873a9 does not report the episode with the father at all, but proceeds directly from Ratthapāla's setting out to beg alms to the next episode, concerned with his meeting with a female slave that was about to throw away stale food.

away gave orders that no food should be given,⁸¹ a reaction which caused Rāṭṭhapāla to leave quickly.⁸² One of the individual translations offers the additional information that the whole family felt hostile towards monks, to the extent that they would avoid even looking at them.⁸³

The *Rāṭṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels describe how Rāṭṭhapāla asked a female slave of his parents' household, who was about to throw away stale food, to give the food to him instead. The *Madhyama-āgama* version and one of the individual translations note that the food was already smelly.⁸⁴ The commentary on the Pāli *Vinaya* reckons Rāṭṭhapāla's partaking of food in a condition that it was to be thrown away as an example of supreme contentedness.⁸⁵

MN II 62

The *Rāṭṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels relate that when coming close to Rāṭṭhapāla to give him the food, the female slave recognized him.⁸⁶ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account and one of the individual translations, she reported her discovery to Rāṭṭhapāla's mother, who was so delighted as to promise to set her free from slavery.⁸⁷ The *Madhyama-āgama* version, the other individual translation, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account instead report that the female slave informed the father of her discovery.⁸⁸

The *Rāṭṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels agree in recording that Rāṭṭhapāla's father approached his son, asking him to come and take food at his parent's house. The Pāli *Vinaya* has preserved a verse exchange between Rāṭṭhapāla and his father that seems to pertain to the present turn of events, although these verses are not found in any of the

⁸¹ MĀ 132 at T I 624b28: 當莫與食.

⁸² MĀ 132 at T I 624c3: 速出去. The Sanskrit fragment and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* also indicate that he left quickly, Waldschmidt 1980b: 371: (tva)ritatvaritam̄ pratiniskrānt(ah) and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 103b6 or Q (1030) ge 95b8 (or Matsumura 1985: 50,25): myur ba myur bar phyir byung ngo.

⁸³ T 68 at T I 870a5: 舉家惡見沙門故, 不應視也.

⁸⁴ MĀ 132 at T I 624c19 and T 68 at T I 870a8: 臭. The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 103b6 or Q (1030) ge 95b8 (or Matsumura 1985: 51,5) similarly reports that the food was already beginning to rot, rul pa.

⁸⁵ Sp I 208,18: "the venerable Rāṭṭhapāla is supreme in (practising the) noble tradition", *agga-ariyavamśiko āyasmā rāṭṭhapālo*. The four types of *ariyavamśa* are contentment with robes, food, and lodging, and delight in mental purification, cf. DN 33 at DN III 224,22, its parallel DĀ 9 at T I 51a1 (where the fourth is contentment with medicine, cf. also Nattier 2003a: 129), and the Sanskrit fragment SN 510V4-5 in Stache-Rosen 1968: 24; cf. also AN 4:28 at AN II 27,15 and on the theme of the four *ariyavamśa* Rahula 1943/1997.

⁸⁶ According to the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version, on being asked by the female slave, he confirmed his identity. Regarding the reference to a female domestic slave in the different versions, according to Thapar 1975: 121 domestic slaves were "the more common category [of slaves] met with in the Indian sources ... slaves were probably expensive ... and could not therefore be used too extensively in production"; on slaves in ancient India cf. also, e.g., Auboyer 1961: 52-56.

⁸⁷ MN 82 at MN II 62,13: mātarām̄ etad avoca and T 68 at T I 870a13: 語其母. The Sanskrit fragment in Waldschmidt 1980b: 371 similarly reads (maha)ll(i)k(ā)m-idam̄ avocat.

⁸⁸ MĀ 132 at T I 624c11: 父所, 而作是語, T 69 at T I 873a15: 白長者曰, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 104a2 or Q (1030) ge 96a3 (or Matsumura 1985: 51,31): pha la 'di skad ces smras so.

different versions of the present discourse. According to this verse exchange, the father asks Ratthapāla why he did not come to beg from his father, to which Ratthapāla replies that begging is not pleasing to others, just as for one who begs it is not pleasing when he receives nothing – an evident reference to the events that according to the *Ratthapāla-sutta* and its parallels had just taken place.⁸⁹

It is noteworthy that the *Ratthapāla-sutta*, in spite of giving such a detailed account of events, has not included this exchange between father and son in its account, even though according to the *Vinaya* passage the Buddha explicitly attributed this stanza to Ratthapāla, an identification that is, moreover, evident from the use of Ratthapāla's name in the father's stanza.

This is just one of several examples where even texts belonging to the same Theravāda tradition have not been thoroughly homogenized. From a general perspective, this shows that it is rather improbable that instances where they agree should be entirely due to a later levelling of texts.

MN II 63 Returning to the comparative study of the *Ratthapāla-sutta*, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and one of the individual translations report that Ratthapāla went straight away to the house with his father,⁹⁰ whereas according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version and the other individual translation he only came the next day.⁹¹

The Pāli and Chinese discourses and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account report that when Ratthapāla came for the meal, his parents tried to make him give up the life of a monk by offering him wealth.⁹² In reply, he told them to better throw their riches into the river Ganges in order to avoid the sorrow and anguish that would inevitably result from owning wealth. The two individual translations further explain this remark by mentioning the suffering that arises due to the fear of losing one's wealth to kings, robbers, or natural calamities.⁹³ The Pāli commentary offers a similar explanation.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Vin III 148,32: *yācako appiyo hoti, yācam adadam appiyo*. Oldenberg 1912b: 187 note 1 draws attention to a similar verse exchange found in Jā 403 at Jā III 353,6 and in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 251,7 or in Senart 1897: 419,7, attributed to a former existence of the bodhisattva under the name of Aṭṭhisena or Asthisena (a comparative study of the *Jātaka* and *Mahāvastu* versions of these stanzas can be found in Schneider 1953).

⁹⁰ MĀ 132 at T I 624c28 and T 69 at T I 873a24.

⁹¹ MN 82 at MN II 63,14 and T 68 at T I 870a26. T 1507 at T XXV 42c6 also records that Ratthapāla refused to accept food the same day and only came the next day, which according to its account he did because the proper time for partaking of food had already passed.

⁹² While according to MN 82 at MN II 63,21 it was the father who made this offer, the Chinese and Tibetan versions attribute this device to the mother, cf. MĀ 123 at T I 625a8, T 68 at T I 870b5, T 69 at T I 873b1, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 104b2 or Q (1030) ge 96b1; on the expression used in MN 82 to describe the gold etc., offered on this occasion, cf. Rhys Davids 1877: 5.

⁹³ T 68 at T I 870b14 and T 69 at T I 873b7. Regarding the reference to kings as a potential threat to one's wealth, Gokhale 1966: 16 notes that in early Buddhist scripture "kings are always greedy ... always searching for pretexts allowing them to acquire more wealth or territory". That kings can be a threat to one's property is also recognized in the Jain tradition, cf., e.g., the Āyāraṅga 1.2.3.5 in Schubring 1910/1966: 9,5: *rāyāno vā se vilumpanti* (Jacobi 1882: 9,25 reads *vilūmpaṇti*).

⁹⁴ Ps III 300,6.

After this ruse proved unsuccessful, Rāṭṭhapāla's former wives entered the scene,⁹⁵ MN II 64 tantalizingly asking him whether he had undertaken the life of a monk for the sake of winning heavenly nymphs. The Pāli and Chinese discourses, the Sanskrit fragment, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version agree that Rāṭṭhapāla reacted by calling them "sisters", indicating through this form of address that he was beyond any interest in their female charms.⁹⁶ While according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the two individual translations, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account he merely made it clear that he did not practise for the sake of nymphs, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version he further explained that the objective for which he had undertaken the life of a monk had been fully accomplished by him.⁹⁷

Having partaken of the meal offered by his parents, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, one of the individual translations, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account Rāṭṭhapāla delivered a discourse and thereby satisfied and pleased his parents.⁹⁸ At the conclusion of this discourse he spoke a set of stanzas, in which he contrasted a fool deluded by female charms with someone who is in search of the other shore.⁹⁹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse records a similar set of stanzas spoken by Rāṭṭhapāla, a set of stanzas also found in the *Theragāthā*.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ From the different versions itself it is not clear how far, given the apparently young age when Rāṭṭhapāla went forth, the existence of these former wives could be reflecting child marriage. The existence of child marriage suggests itself from a passage in Vin IV 322,6 (*pācittiya* rule 65 of the *Bhikkhunīvibhariga*), which refers to a married girl whose age is less than twelve years (in her detailed examination of this passage, Kieffer-Pülz 2005a: 235 concludes that the twelve years probably stand for the age of the girl, not for the time she has been married; for a reply to her presentation cf. von Hinüber 2008). The same appears to be implicit also in SN 37,3 at SN IV 239,13, according to which one of the disadvantages of being a woman is to be separated at a tender age from one's own family and to have to go and live in the family of one's husband; cf. also Horner 1930/1990: 27, Misra 1972: 179, and Talim 1972: 163.

⁹⁶ MN 82 at MN II 64,12: *bhagini* (B^e-MN II 252,21 and C^e-MN II 434,4: *bhagini*), MĀ 132 at T I 625b9: 妹, T 68 at T I 870b25: 姉, T 69 at T I 873b17: 姊, Waldschmidt 1980b: 374: *bhaginiyah*, and the Tibetan counterpart in D (1) 'dul ba, kha 105a7 or Q (1030) ge 97a6 (or Matsumura 1985: 55,2): *sring mo*. The implications of considering a woman to be one's sister can be seen in SN 35,127 at SN IV 110,31, where young monks are instructed to look on women as their sisters (or else as mothers or daughters) in order to avoid the arising of sensual desire. The use of the address "sister" by Rāṭṭhapāla has a counterpart in the Chinese and Tibetan parallels to the *Mahāsudassana-sutta*, where the king in a similar way indicates his disinterested attitude towards his queen by addressing her as "sister", cf. T 1451 at T XXIV 394a18: 妹, with its counterpart *sring mo* in Waldschmidt 1951: 345 (cf. also the corresponding fragment SN 360 folio 222V3 in Waldschmidt 1950: 38). In the Pāli version, DN 17 at DN II 192,12, however, the king used the term *devī*, a normal way for a king to address his queen.

⁹⁷ MĀ 132 at T I 625b10.

⁹⁸ MĀ 132 at T I 625b18, T 69 at T I 873b23, D (1) 'dul ba, kha 105b7 or Q (1030) ge 97b5. T 68 does not mention that the parents were delighted.

⁹⁹ The corresponding section in T 68 at T I 870c4 is not in verse.

¹⁰⁰ MN 82 at MN II 64,25 and Th 769-774; cf. also Franke 1912: 183-192. Another stanza belonging to the same context at Th 775 is, however, without a parallel in the *Rāṭṭhapāla-sutta* or in its Chinese counterparts. Rāṭṭhapāla's stanza Th 769 recurs in Dhp 147, his stanzas Th 769-770 and Th 772 have parallels

According to the Chinese versions and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account, Ratṭhapāla departed by flying up in the air.¹⁰¹ One of the individual translations explains that he did so because his parents had locked the door to prevent him from leaving after the meal.¹⁰²

MN II 65 The *Ratthapāla-sutta* and its parallels continue by relating that, after leaving the house of his parents, Ratṭhapāla went to the royal park. On being informed of Ratṭhapāla's presence in the royal park, the local king came to pay him a visit.

Although the ensuing discussion between Ratṭhapāla and the king may at first sight appear to form an epilogue to the narration of Ratṭhapāla's going forth and visit home, the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection nevertheless allocates the *Ratthapāla-sutta* to its chapter on kings.¹⁰³ As the discourse does not present Ratṭhapāla as being either a king or a member of the king's family,¹⁰⁴ the reason for including this discourse in the chapter on

in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanzas 27:20-21 and 27:23 in Bernhard 1965: 341-344 (cf. also stanzas 381-382 in Nakatani 1987: 78) and in Beckh 1911: 94-95 or in Zongtse 1990: 279-280. On the description of the deceptive nature of women's bodies in these stanzas cf., e.g., Lang 1986: 71.

¹⁰¹ MĀ 132 at T I 625c3, T 68 at T I 870c14, T 69 at T I 873b24, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 105b7 or Q (1030) ge 97b5.

¹⁰² T 68 at T I 870c1. Ps III 304,4 similarly narrates that Ratṭhapāla departed by flying up in the air, explaining that his father had planned to remove Ratṭhapāla's robes forcefully and clothe him in white. Although in ancient India the status of a wandering monk was perhaps not what the parents of a rich and important household would have wished for their only son, it seems difficult to conceive of them trying to forcefully remove his robes and dress him in white. Vin I 73-76 reports that to become a Buddhist monk was a way for soldiers to escape from having to go to war and for robbers to avoid being charged for their crime, it even saved slaves from being taken back by their owners. In view of such degree of immunity, there would seem to be little scope for Ratṭhapāla's parents to be depicted as trying to force their adult son to comply with their wishes.

¹⁰³ While MN 82 occurs in the *Rāja-vagga*, MĀ 132 occurs in the "great chapter", 大品, of the *Madhyama-āgama*.

¹⁰⁴ According to the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadāna* account, however, Rāṣtrapāla was the son of the king's brother, cf. Speyer 1909/1970: 118,9 or Vaidya 1958a: 227,9 and Devacandra 1996: 632,1, and according to the Chinese *Avadāna* account, T 200 at T IV 249b27, he was even the crown prince. Feer 1891: 363 remarks that Ratṭhapāla's name, whose meaning is "protector of the country", supports the assumption that he was a member of the royal family ("cette naissance royale ... est, du reste, comme indiquée par le nom même du héros"). Yet, in the majority of sources Ratṭhapāla does not seem to have royal status, as becomes particularly evident from the remainder of the description of the conversation between the local king and Ratṭhapāla in the Pāli and Chinese discourses and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*. The Sanskrit *Avadāna* tale no. 84 in Speyer 1909/1970: 80,15 or in Vaidya 1958a: 209,30, and its Chinese and Tibetan counterparts, T 200 at T IV 246a19 and Devacandra 1996: 584,2, relate that at the time of Buddha Kāśyapa the crown prince of Vārāṇasī also obtained permission to go forth by going on a hunger strike, just as Rāṣtrapāla did. According to Sanskrit *Avadāna* tale no. 90 in Speyer 1909/1970: 125,4 or in Vaidya 1958a: 230,5 and its Tibetan counterpart in Devacandra 1996: 639,7, at the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, Rāṣtrapāla had also been a son of the same king of Vārāṇasī, presumably a brother of the crown prince mentioned in tale no. 84. Perhaps a confusion between these stories caused the attribution of royal status to Rāṣtrapāla also in his present life account. T 200 at T IV 249c24 even reports that at that time Ratṭhapāla was the king himself. Demoto 1998: 119-123 (page reference and résumé provided to me by the author) explains that the Chinese translation has preserved an earlier version of

kings would be the appearance of the local king during this final part of the discourse. This indicates that, from the perspective of the reciters, this section constitutes the discourse proper, so to say, to which the earlier narration of Ratṭhapāla's going forth and subsequent visit home serves as an introductory narration.

In regard to the king's visit, the Pāli, Chinese, and Tibetan versions differ in their portrayal of the degree of respect shown by the king towards Ratṭhapāla.¹⁰⁵ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the king politely invited Ratṭhapāla to sit on what apparently was the king's own sitting rug, and only once Ratṭhapāla had declined to use this rug the king sat down on it himself.¹⁰⁶ The Chinese versions do not mention such a rug at all. According to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, however, the king made a point of waiting until he was invited to sit down.¹⁰⁷ One of the individual translations reports that he paid his respect and then simply sat down, without any explicit invitation,¹⁰⁸ while according to the other individual translation Ratṭhapāla, on seeing the king approach, quickly got up himself, went forward, and invited the king to come and sit down with him.¹⁰⁹ These minor differences (see further below table 9.3) give a different flavour to the ensuing meeting.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, one of the individual translation, and the Tibetan *Bhaisajyavastu* account, the king offered some of his wealth to Ratṭhapāla.¹¹⁰ Ratṭhapāla declined, indicating that a more proper offer the king could make to him would be to ensure that the country was peaceful and prosperous.

The *Ratṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels agree that the king thought the motivation for someone to go forth could be:

- old age,
- disease,

MN II 66

the *Avadāna* tale, which in the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions has been expanded by absorption of discourse material. This caused a conflict between Rāstrapāla as a crown prince in the original *Avadāna* account and Rāṣtrapāla as a *kulaputra* or *grhapatiputra* in the discourse, a conflict that was resolved by treating him as the *bhrātṛputra*, as the son of the king's brother.

¹⁰⁵ Another difference is that according to MN 82 at MN II 65,11 and T 68 at T I 870c18 the king originally intended to come to the park for recreation, while according to MĀ 132 at T I 625c9 his original intention was to hunt.

¹⁰⁶ E^e-MN II 66,4, B^e-MN II 254,7, and C^e-MN II 436,18 report that the king offered Ratṭhapāla his “elephant rug”, *hatthatthara*, to sit down. Ps III 305,6 explains that he did so because he felt it improper to just sit on this rug himself, without first inviting Ratṭhapāla to sit on it. An elephant rug occurs in a list of unsuitable seats not used by the Buddha in DN 1 at DN I 7,10. According to Vin I 192,17, the possession of elephant rugs was prohibited to monks, although according to Vin II 163,24 monks were allowed just to sit on an elephant rug if invited to do so by laity. Instead of an elephant rug, S^e-MN II 402,10 speaks of a “mat made of twigs”, *kaṭṭhatthara*.

¹⁰⁷ MĀ 132 at T I 625c29; cf. also the similar report in D (1) 'dul ba, kha 106b4 or Q (1030) ge 98b1. For a comparable behaviour in the case of a Brahmin who visits a monk cf. MN 94 at MN II 158,16.

¹⁰⁸ T 68 at T I 870c23.

¹⁰⁹ T 69 at T I 873c12. This would be rather unusual behaviour for a monk, who is not supposed to rise at the arrival of any layperson, even a king.

¹¹⁰ MĀ 132 at T I 626a6, T 68 at T I 870c25, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 106b7 or Q (1030) ge 98b4.

- poverty,
- loss of relatives.¹¹¹

The parallel versions differ from each other in the sequence in which they list these four themes (see table 9.1).

On considering these possible motivations, the king was puzzled to find that Rāṭṭhapāla, who was young and healthy, from a wealthy family, and with many friends and relatives, had nevertheless gone forth.¹¹²

Table 9.1: Themes of the King's Inquiry in MN 82 and its Parallels

MN 82	MĀ 132	T 68 & 'dul ba	T 69
old age (1)	disease (→ 2)	old age (→ 1)	loss of kin (→ 4)
disease (2)	old age (→ 1)	disease (→ 2)	poverty (→ 3)
poverty (3)	poverty (→ 3)	loss of kin (→ 4)	disease (→ 2)
loss of kin (4)	loss of kin (→ 4)	poverty (→ 3)	old age (→ 1)

The *Rāṭṭhapāla-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels differ to some extent on the reasoning the king attributed to these four types of motivation. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, in all four instances the rationale for going forth is that the person in question feels no longer able to acquire wealth or else to increase the wealth that has already been acquired.¹¹³ The *Madhyama-āgama* version and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account, however, do not mention the problem of acquiring or increasing wealth.¹¹⁴ One of the individual translations envisages this problem only for the

¹¹¹ Schmidt-Leukel 1984: 69 notes that the king sees old age, disease, etc., as causes for searching material security, not as something that can inspire a radical change of one's attitude to life. On early Buddhist attitudes to poverty cf. also Fenn 1996. Schopen 2010: 127 notes that in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, however, old age, poverty, and loss of relatives regularly motivate going forth as a Buddhist monk (cf. also below note 117). The present case could perhaps serve as a reminder that conclusions based on a reading of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* are not necessarily representative of what early Buddhist texts have to say on a particular issue.

¹¹² The same motif recurs in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 227,15 or in Senart 1890: 161,15, which notes that the bodhisattva also did not go forth because of old age, disease, loss of wealth, or loss of relatives.

¹¹³ MN 82 at MN II 66,17+31 and MN II 67,16+32: "it is not easy for me to acquire riches that have not [yet] been acquired, or to increase riches that have been acquired", *na kho pana mayā sukaram anadhibigatā vā bhogā adhigantum, adhigatā vā bhogā phātim kātum* (B^e-MN II 254,18, C^e-MN II 436,28, and S^e-MN II 403,4: (*an)adhigatañ vā bhogam*). This explanation does not fit each of the four cases equally well. Someone who is poor may indeed find it difficult to acquire riches, but a poor person would not really have a problem concerning the increase of riches that have already been acquired, as the very condition of being poor implies that there are no acquired riches in the first place.

¹¹⁴ According to MĀ 132 at T I 626a25 and T I 626b2 and according to the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 107a7 and 107b6 or Q (1030) ge 99a3 and 99b1, sick or old persons realize that they are anyway no longer able to enjoy sensual pleasures and thus decide to go forth. In the case of loss of relatives or lack of wealth, MĀ 132 at T I 626b6+11 and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 108a4 and 108b1 or Q (1030) ge 99b6 and 100a2 do not mention any explicit motivation for going forth, apparently taking the reasons to be self-evident.

case of old age,¹¹⁵ while the other individual translation relates the problem of acquiring and protecting wealth to the case of being old, being ill, or being without relatives.¹¹⁶ The same version, however, makes a point of not bringing in the need to protect wealth in its examination of the case when someone is poor. Instead, this individual translation indicates that someone who is poor and has difficulties earning his livelihood will go forth in order to support himself by begging.¹¹⁷

In reply to the four motives proposed by the king, Ratṭhapāla explained that his reasons for going forth had been: MN II 68

- the changing nature of the world,
- the absence of any real shelter in it,
- the fact that all has to be left behind at death,
- the insatiability of craving.

These four motives are presented in the parallel versions in different sequences (see below table 9.2). The parallel versions agree, however, that Ratṭhapāla presented these four reasons only in a succinct manner, which caused the king to request a more detailed exposition. Ratṭhapāla did so by skilfully adjusting his explanations to the king's personal experience, drawing the king's awareness to the fact that:

- his physical condition had changed with the coming of old age and he was no longer as strong as he had been in his youth,
- nobody could protect him from the suffering of sickness,
- when passing away, he will have to leave behind all his possessions,
- being a king he will never be satisfied with his dominion, always ready to conquer additional territory.¹¹⁸

Ratṭhapāla then summed up his exposition in verse form.¹¹⁹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse concludes with the last of Ratṭhapāla's verses.¹²⁰ The *Madhyama-āgama* version, MN II 72

¹¹⁵ T 69 at T I 874a6. The same version reckons loneliness due to loss of relatives, the suffering of having an incurable disease, and the suffering of poverty to be reasons for going forth.

¹¹⁶ T 68 at T I 871a9+14+17.

¹¹⁷ T 68 at T I 871a20. In fact, although monks were not always sure to get their fill, to become a monk appears to have been a way of accessing a relatively stable supply of food and other minimal necessities. This seems to have been the case to such an extent that, according to Vin IV 129,10, parents decided to get their children ordained in order to ensure that they will not lack food, since Buddhist monks, after "having eaten good food lie down on beds sheltered from the wind", *subhojanāni bhuñjitvā nivātesu sayanesu sayanti* (for other instances that testify to relatively profane motivations for going forth cf. Brekke 1996: 9-10). According to Vin IV 91,20, on another occasion an ascetic even made fun of the Buddhist monk community for their abundant supplies, derisively calling the Buddha a "shaven headed householder", *munḍagahapati*; for a study of Jain texts that mock the abundant food partaken off by Buddhist monks cf. Granoff 1998.

¹¹⁸ The theme of protection, in that even a king is not able to protect himself against disease, is also employed by a Jain monk in discussion with King Bimbisāra in *Uttarājjhayana* 20.12 in Charpentier 1922: 153,19.

¹¹⁹ While MN 82 at MN II 72,26 (= Th 776-788, cf. also Sn 50), MĀ 132 at T I 627c14, T 69 at T I 874c8, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 111b2 or Q (1030) ge 102b5 record this in verse form, T 68 at T I 871c17 has the same in prose, cf. also above note 99. According to Zürcher 1991: 283,

a Sanskrit fragment, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* account additionally report that the king was pleased,¹²¹ according to one of the individual translations he took refuge, and according to the other individual translation he became a stream-enterer.¹²² The king's reaction depicted in the different versions thus stands in direct contrast to how the different versions portray his initial behaviour towards Rāṭṭhapāla.

Table 9.2: Themes of Rāṭṭhapāla's Reply in MN 82 and its Parallels

MN 82 & T 68 & 'dul ba	MĀ 132	T 69
change / old age (1)	no shelter (→ 2)	change / old age (→ 1)
no shelter (2)	change / old age (→ 1)	no shelter (→ 2)
leave all at death (3)	leave all at death (→ 3)	never satisfied (→ 4)
never satisfied (4)	never satisfied (→ 4)	leave all at death (→ 3)

Whereas in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version the king acted in a very respectful manner, yet the discourse ends without even going so far as to record that the king expressed his appreciation, the individual translations show him behaving without any particular expression of respect, yet according to them he took refuge or even became a stream-enterer. By in this way providing a sharper contrast between the king's attitudes before receiving instructions and afterwards, these versions enhance Rāṭṭhapāla's abilities as an eloquent teacher (see below table 9.3).

In addition to being an eloquent teacher, according to the *Āguttara-nikāya*'s list of eminent disciples Rāṭṭhapāla was outstanding among the Buddha's disciples in respect to going forth out of faith.¹²³ Sanskrit and Tibetan *Avadāna* sources, however, reckon him to have been foremost among forest dwellers.¹²⁴

it was common among early Chinese translators active during the second century AD to render verse as prose, so that perhaps Zhī Qīan (支謙) may have decided to render in prose what in his Indic original was in verse.

¹²⁰ MN 82 at MN II 74,12.

¹²¹ MĀ 132 at T I 628a10, the Sanskrit fragment SHT III 804V4, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, khu 112a4 or Q (1030) ge 103a7 (or Matsumura 1985: 56,28).

¹²² T 68 at T I 872a7 (stream-entry) and T 69 at T I 875a5 (refuge).

¹²³ AN 1:14 at AN I 24,18: *eta aggam ... saddhāpabbajitānam*. This qualification to some degree supports the above-mentioned hypothesis by Lupton 1894: 771 (cf. above p. 456 note 75) that the Sudinna tale drew on elements found originally in the story of Rāṭṭhapāla, since if at the time of the coming into being of the listing of eminent disciples in the *Āguttara-nikāya* the Sudinna tale in the *Vinaya* had already taken its present shape, he would have been associated with the same faithful determination to go forth at all cost as Rāṭṭhapāla, making it less probable that Rāṭṭhapāla could be reckoned as foremost in this respect. B^o-Ap-a 327 reports that already in a previous life Rāṭṭhapāla had received a prediction by Padumuttara Buddha that he would become "foremost among those gone forth out of faith", *saddhā-pabbajitānam aggo*. According to the list of eminent disciples in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, Rāṭṭhapāla was rather outstanding among those who had gone forth from a noble and wealthy family, EĀ 4.2 at T II 557b13: 貴豪種族, 出家學道.

¹²⁴ Bechert 1961: 158,3 restores *āraṇyaka*, Hofinger 1954: 97 and Devacandra 1996: 636,18 read *dgon pa*

Although Ratṭhapāla would quite probably have spent a considerable part of his monk's life in the forest, to dwell in the forest appears to have been a fairly common practice among the early generation of monks.¹²⁵ Thus in order to be reckoned an outstanding forest dweller, he would have to have lived an exceptionally secluded life style. According to at least one of the individual translations, however, Ratṭhapāla had closely followed the Buddha after his ordination, which implies that he did not live exclusively in the forest.¹²⁶

Table 9.3: King's Meeting with Ratṭhapāla

	before conversation	after conversation
MN 82: MĀ 132/'dul ba':	king offers his own sitting rug to R. king waits for invitation to sit down	no reaction reported king is pleased
T 68:	king sits down on his own	king attains stream-entry
T 69:	R. gets up and invites king to sit	king takes refuge

Whatever may be the last word on the quality in regard to which Ratṭhapāla excelled all other disciples, his exemplary conduct appears to be the central theme of the *Ratṭhapāla-sutta* and its parallels. The different versions agree in portraying a young man who, on hearing a single discourse by the Buddha, is willing to discard a secure and affluent social position and is ready to risk death just in order to be able to join the Buddhist monastic community, and who in his later meeting with his family and the local king conducts himself as an exemplary monk.

Thus, after the preceding discourse in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta*, has depicted an exemplary layman, the present discourse presents the image of an exemplary monk.¹²⁷ The same mode of presentation continues with the next discourse, the *Makhādeva-sutta*, which describes the conduct of an exemplary king. In this way an in-

pa; cf. also Feer 1891: 358 note 1 and Speyer 1909/1970: 123 note 1. T 199 at T IV 196c19 presents him as foremost among those who delight in seclusion, 樂閑居第一.

¹²⁵ On the transition from a wandering life spent mainly in forests to a more settled life style during the subsequent development of the Buddhist monastic community cf., e.g., Dutt 1962: 53-57, Holt 1981/1999: 30-32, Olivelle 1974: 37-38, and Panabokke 1993: 17-41. In spite of a growing tendency to a more settled life style, the forest life appears to have remained an important factor throughout Buddhist history, cf. Ray 1994: 251-292 on the importance of the forest life for the early Mahāyāna and Carrithers 1983b for an account of the revival of the forest life in modern day Theravāda (for a critical assessment of Ray 1994 cf. Sasaki 2004). Durt 1991: 6 relates “the tendency of Indian monks to settle in urban monasteries more than in forests” to the circumstance that “the development of Indian Buddhism was connected with the expansion of an urban and mercantile civilization”.

¹²⁶ T 68 at T I 869c26: “for ten years [he] followed the Buddha like a shadow follows a man”, 隨佛十歲, 如影隨人.

¹²⁷ Widmer 2008: 441 comments that Ratṭhapāla illustrates an exemplary development by way of representing the ideal man who renounces the world to go forth and practice the teachings of the Buddha “Ratṭhapāla illustriert eine vorbildhafte Entwicklung, indem er das oberste Ideal eines Menschen darstellt, der alles Weltliche zurück lässt, um in der Hauslosigkeit ... die Lehre Buddhas zu verwirklichen”.

ner connection between these three discourses can be seen, all of which use a predominantly narrative mode to inculcate Buddhist values. This inner connection might offer an additional explanation why the *Ghaṭikāra-sutta* and the *Ratthapāla-sutta* have been included together with the *Makhādeva-sutta* in a chapter on kings, even though in the former two discourses kings do not play a central role.

MN 83 *Makhādeva-sutta*¹²⁸

The *Makhādeva-sutta*, the “discourse on Makhādeva”, is a *jātaka* tale of a past life of the Buddha as a king. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and another parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.¹²⁹ Parts of the same tale recur also in the introductory section of the *Ekottarika-āgama* collection,¹³⁰ and in a discourse quotation in Śamathadeva’s commentary on the *Abhidharmaśabdhāya*, preserved in Tibetan.¹³¹

The events described in the *Makhādeva-sutta* are also recorded in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, preserved in Tibetan,¹³² in the Pāli *Jātaka* collection,¹³³ and in a collection of tales of former existences of the Buddha, assembled under the heading of the six perfections, preserved in Chinese translation.¹³⁴

The story of King Nimi, which constitutes the theme of the later part of the *Makhādeva-sutta* and its parallels, has also made its way as a tale on its own into the Pāli *Jātaka* and Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* collections.¹³⁵

¹²⁸ B^e-MN II 262,1 and the S^e-MN II 415,1 have the title *Maghadeva-sutta*.

¹²⁹ MĀ 67 at T I 511c-515b and EĀ 50.4 at T II 806c-810b. MĀ 67 and EĀ 50.4 agree with MN 83 on locating the discourse at Mithilā, the capital of the Videha country, on which cf., e.g., Law 1932/1979: 30. EĀ 50.4 at T II 806c21, however, places Mithilā in the Magadha country, 摩竭國. MĀ 67 has the title “discourse on Mahādeva’s Mango Grove”, 大天棕林經. On MĀ 67 cf. also Minh Chau 1964/1991: 65 and 184, a translation of EĀ 50.4 can be found in Anālayo 2011g. A reference to the present discourse in the **Karmavibharīgopadeśa* in Lévi 1932a: 161,14 speaks of the *Mahādeva-sūtra*.

¹³⁰ EĀ 1 at T II 551b27-552b4, a translation of which can be found in Huyen-Vi 1985: 40-43. The Ma(k)hādeva tale occurs in the introductory part of the *Ekottarika-āgama* in the context of a narration according to which the monk Uttara, to whom Ānanda entrusts the preservation of the *Ekottarika-āgama* collection, had in a former life been a descendant of King Ma(k)hādeva, cf. EĀ 1 at T II 552a23.

¹³¹ Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 76b2-77b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 86a8-87b8, which does not cover the story of Nimi; cf. also Abhidh-k 2:45 in Pradhan 1967: 75,4, with its Chinese parallels in T 1558 at T XXIX 26c21 and T 1559 at T XXIX 185a27.

¹³² D (1) ’dul ba, kha 53a-56b or Q (1030) ge 48b-52a; cf. also Yao 2007 and below note 135.

¹³³ Jā 9 at Jā I 137-139.

¹³⁴ Tale no. 87 in a collection of tales on the six perfections, 六度集經 (reconstructed as **Saṭpāramitā-saṃnipāta-sūtra* by Durt 1999: 247), T 152 at T III 48b26-49b23, translated in Chavannes 1910: 321-328.

¹³⁵ Jā 541 at Jā VI 95-129 and the Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* tale no. 38 in T 211 at T IV 608b8-608c12, translated in Willemen 1999: 220-221. In the Tibetan (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, the Ma(k)hādeva tale and the Nimi tale recur again as separate stories, D (1) ’dul ba, kha 194b or Q (1030) ge 183a and D (1) ’dul ba, kha 196a or Q (1030) ge 184b. My comparative study is based on the combined occurrence of both stories mentioned above in note 132. On such reduplication of tales as a

Before turning to the actual story of king Makhādeva, it is worthy of note that the Sanskrit version of the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, which only refers to the present tale, indicates that the details should be supplied from the *Mahādeva-sūtra* found in the chapter on kings of the *Madhyama-āgama*.¹³⁶ This indication accords with the actual location of the present discourse in the Chinese *Madhyama-āgama* collection.

The Sanskrit *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* gives another four such references to *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, each time specifying the chapter where the discourses are to be found.¹³⁷ Each of these references corresponds to the location of the equivalent discourse in the Chinese *Madhyama-āgama*.¹³⁸ Although these locations accord with the indications given in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, all five Chinese discourses have titles that differ from the titles mentioned in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu*.¹³⁹

recurrent feature of Jātaka literature cf. Feer 1875: 403, for an examination of the same phenomena cf. also Lüders 1940a: 96 and id. 1940c: 356.

¹³⁶ Dutt 1984a: 111,20: *vistareṇa mahādevasūtre madhyamāgame rājasamyuktakanipāte*. This might intend only the first part of the present discourse, as the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* refers in a similar way to the tale of Nimi, Dutt 1984a: 112,19: *vistareṇa nimiśūtre madhyamāgame rājasamyuktakanipāte*, so that perhaps the later part of what now is MN 83 or MĀ 67 was considered a separate discourse, similar to the separate Pāli *Jātaka* and Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* accounts. The Chinese translation of the *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, T 1448 at T XXIV 58c1, also indicates that the story of Mahādeva, 大天, is located in the *Madhyama-āgama*, without, however, specifying in which chapter it can be found.

¹³⁷ The *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 93,10 refers to the *Māndhāṭr-sūtra* found in the *Rājasamyuktanipāta*, p. 98,15 to the *Velāma-sūtra* in the *Brāhmaṇanipāta*, p. 112,19 to the *Nimi-sūtra* in the *Rājasamyuktanipāta*, and p. 217,12 to the *Nandīpāla-sūtra* in the *Rājasamyuktanikāya* (Skilling 1997a: 282 note 65 suggests that in the last case “*nikāya* could be a wrong reading for *nipāta*”). De Jong 1979c: 400 notes the following counterpart references in the Chinese translation: T 1448 at T XXIV 56b11 (*Māndhāṭr*), T 1448 at T XXIV 57b13 (*Velāma*), T 1448 at T XXIV 58c1 (*Mahādeva*), and T 1448 at T XXIV 58c16 (*Nimi*). T 1448, however, mostly refers to the subject matter without explicitly giving the discourse title, and only specifies the chapter of the *Madhyama-āgama* collection in the case of the *Māndhāṭr-sūtra*, T 1448 at T XXIV 56b11: 頂生, 如中阿笈摩王法相應品中廣說 (where the reading 品 supports Skilling’s suggestion that *nikāya* in the Sanskrit version is an error for *nipāta*). The location of the *Mahādeva-sūtra* is given also in T 1448 at T XXIV 30b8. I already surveyed these instances in Anāloyo 2010m: 69.

¹³⁸ Waldschmidt 1980a: 142-144 identifies the following counterparts: the *Māndhāṭr-sūtra* corresponds to MĀ 60 at T I 494b-496a, the *Velāma-sūtra* corresponds to MĀ 155 at T I 677a-678a, the *Mahādeva-sūtra* and the *Nimi-sūtra* correspond to MĀ 67 at T I 511c-515b, and the *Nandīpāla-sūtra* corresponds to MĀ 63 at T I 499a-503a. MĀ 60, MĀ 63, and MĀ 67 are indeed found in the “chapter collection on kings”, *Rājasamyuktakanipāta*, 王相應品, and MĀ 155 occurs in the “chapter on Brahmins”, *Brāhmaṇanipāta*, 梵志品. The Pāli counterpart to the *Māndhāṭr-sūtra* is the *Mandhāṭu-jātaka*, Jā 258 in Jā II 310-314, the Pāli parallel to the *Velāma-sūtra* is the *Velama-sutta*, AN 9:20 at AN IV 392-396, the *Mahādeva-sūtra* and the *Nimi-sūtra* have their Pāli counterpart in the *Makhādeva-sutta*, MN 83 at MN II 74-83, and the Pāli counterpart to the *Nandīpāla-sūtra* is the *Ghaṭikārā-sutta*, MN 81 at MN II 45-54. Thus the Pāli parallels occur in different collections.

¹³⁹ The counterpart to the *Māndhāṭr-sūtra*, MĀ 60 at T I 494b9, has the title 四洲經, “discourse on four continents”. The counterpart to the *Velāma-sūtra*, MĀ 155 at T I 677a8, has the title 須達哆經, the “discourse to Sudatta”. The counterpart to the *Mahādeva-sūtra* and the *Nimi-sūtra*, MĀ 67 at T I 511c21,

That the indications given in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* on the location of discourses should agree with the *Madhyama-āgama* collection but disagree in regard to the respective titles of these discourses further supports a point already made above, in that the titles of discourses appear to have been relatively open to change during the process of transmission.¹⁴⁰

MN II 74 The *Makhādeva-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* parallels, and the Tibetan *Bhaisajyavastu* begin by reporting that the Buddha displayed a smile.¹⁴¹ The introductory section of the *Ekottarika-āgama* and the collection of tales on the six perfections add that lights of five different colours emanated from the Buddha's mouth when he displayed this smile.¹⁴²

Asked by Ānanda about the reason for this smile, the Buddha narrated the tale of a former king, whose name the Pāli editions give as Makhādeva or Maghadeva, whereas the parallel versions mostly speak of King Mahādeva.¹⁴³ The *Madhyama-āgama* and

has the title 大天棕林經, “discourse at Mahādeva’s Mango Grove”. The counterpart to the *Nandīpāla-sūtra*, MĀ 63 at T I 499a9, has the title, 韶婆陵耆經, corresponding to its location at Vebhaļiṅga or Vaibhiṇḍīngyā. Notably, Abhidh-k-ṭ gives the title of MĀ 67 just as *lha chen po*, cf. D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 76b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 86a8, thereby agreeing with the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (and the **Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* in Lévi 1932a: 161,14). In the case of MĀ 63, however, Abhidh-k-ṭ uses the name of the location as the discourse’s title, thereby agreeing with the *Madhyama-āgama* collection against the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, cf. D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 244b4 or Q (5595) *tu* 279a7, cf. also Skillings 1997a: 279-285.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. above pp. 106 and 123.

¹⁴¹ Xuánzàng (玄奘) reports that a *stūpa* had been erected in the place where this was believed to have happened, cf. T 2087 at T LI 909b8, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 74. In regard to *stūpa* worship, Schopen 1989/1997: 91 assumes this to be characteristic of Buddhism already at a very early stage and concludes that “the total absence of rules regarding *stūpas* in the Pāli *Vinaya* would seem to make sense only if they had been systematically removed”. A perhaps more reasonable explanation is given by Hirakawa 1993/1998: 272, who takes the absence of any reference to *stūpa* worship to indicate that the Pāli *Vinaya* was closed by the time *stūpa* worship came to be generally practised; cf. also Bareau 1960: 230, Roth 1980a: 186, Sasaki 1979: 196, and Vetter 1994: 1248 note 17. Wynne 2005: 45 comments that “Schopen seems to have proved, inadvertently, that the Pāli canon was relatively closed ... at an early date”. For a criticism of Schopen’s assumption cf. also Enomoto 2007: 194-195, Gombrich 1990c, Hallisey 1990, and von Hinüber 1990.

¹⁴² EĀ 1 at T II 551c6 and T 152 at T III 48b27: □出五色光. For a description of the manifestations that accompany the smile of a Buddha cf., e.g., the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 67,16 or Vaidya 1999: 41,10.

¹⁴³ E^e-MN II 74,24 and C^e-MN II 452,9 speak of Makhādeva, while B^e-MN II 262,11 and S^e-MN II 415,11 refer to Maghadeva. MĀ 67 at T I 511c29 and EĀ 50.4 at T II 807a1 speak instead of Mahādeva, 大天, EĀ 1 at T II 551b29 transcribes the same name as 摩訶提婆, cf. also T 152 at T III 48c4: 摩訶, a transcription found again in T 744 at T XVII 553b25: 摩訶, which the same work explains to refer to 大天, while T 194 at T IV 122a23 uses 摩訶提披. The *Bhaisajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 111,19 and the *Karmavibhaṅga* in Kudo 2004: 48,10 or in Lévi 1932a: 36,9 also speak of Mahādeva, rendered in the Chinese *Bhaisajyavastu*, T 1448 at T XXIV 58c1, as 大天. The Tibetan *Bhaisajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 53a1 or Q (1030) ge 48b6 and Abhidh-k-ṭ at D (4094) *mgong pa, ju* 76b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 86a8 similarly speak of *lha chen po*. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 270,10 or in Senart 1897: 450,18 also employs the name Mahādeva (when referring to his mango grove). A Bharhut *stūpa* inscription, however,

Ekottarika-āgama discourses, the discourse quotation in Śamathadeva's commentary, and the Tibetan *Bhaīṣajyavastu* differ from the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation in that they present Ma(k)hādeva as a wheel-turning king (*cakkavatti rājā*). The two Chinese *Āgama* versions describe in detail each of the seven treasures of a wheel-turning king,¹⁴⁴ whereas the two Tibetan versions just enumerate them.¹⁴⁵ The descriptions in the two *Āgama* discourses are similar to the portrayal of a wheel-turning king found in the *Bālapañḍita-sutta*, in which case it is the Pāli version that describes these qualities in detail, while such a treatment is absent from its parallels.¹⁴⁶

The introduction to the *Ekottarika-āgama* collection shows an intermediate stage in the application of the motif of the wheel-turning monarch. While this account does not introduce Makhādeva as a wheel-turning king, it does present the first descendant of King Ma(k)hādeva as a wheel-turning king endowed with the seven treasures.¹⁴⁷

These variations testify to the increasing interest among the Buddhist traditions in the image of the wheel-turning king, which apparently made them explore this image whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself. Although the basic idea of such a universal monarch predates Buddhism and thus need not be a sign of lateness in itself,¹⁴⁸ its use would have become particularly popular with the rise to power of the Mauryan kings.

refers to Maghādeva, cf. Barua 1934a: 82, Cowell 1895/2000: 32, Cunningham 1879 plate 48, and Lévi 1912: 497.

¹⁴⁴ MĀ 67 at T I 512a1-513a26 and EĀ 50.4 at T II 807a2-808a23. MĀ 67 at T 513a27-513b27 also describes the four outstanding personal qualities of such a wheel-turning king.

¹⁴⁵ D (1) 'dul ba, kha 53a7 or Q (1030) ge 49a5 and D (4094) mngon pa, ju 76b2 or Q (5595) tu 86b1. The Sanskrit *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 111,19 and 112,18 has also preserved a reference to the status of Mahādeva and Nimi as wheel-turning kings, cf. also T 1448 at T XXIV 58c1, which has the same for Mahādeva. Another reference to Mahādeva's status as a wheel-turning king occurs in T 744 at T XVII 553b25. T 211 at T IV 608b9 also presents Nimi as a wheel-turning king. T 152 at T III 48c5+26 speaks of both as 飛行皇帝, literally “flying emperors”, which according to Hirakawa 1997: 1273 renders *cakravartin*, cf. also Chavannes 1910: 322.

¹⁴⁶ MN 129 at MN III 172,14, cf. below p. 746.

¹⁴⁷ EĀ 1 at T II 552a16.

¹⁴⁸ Armelin 1975: 6, in his detailed study of the concept of a wheel-turning king, notes that the idea of such a ruler can already be found in Vedic times, although the use of the term *cakravartin* for this idea appears to have originated only later. Chakravarti 1996: 6 explains that “the word ... cakkavatti already existed in sixth century B.C. vocabulary”. Drekmeier 1962: 203 suggests that “the concept of a state ... under the rule of a chakravartin goes back at least to the tenth century B.C.”. According to Gombrich 1988: 82, the notion of “a world-ruler of untrammelled power is a commonplace of the ideology informing Vedic ritual”. Nanayakkara 1977: 592 traces the origins of the idea of a *cakravartin* to the world ruler, *śāmraju*, mentioned in the *Rgveda*, while Wijesekera 1957: 265 points out that the notion of setting in motion the wheel is also found in the *Rgveda* (associated with Indra). Zimmer 1951: 129 explains that the “conception of the *mahāpuruṣa cakravartin*, ‘the superman turning the wheel’, goes back not only to the earliest Vedic, but also to the pre-Vedic, pre-Āryan traditions of India”. On the antiquity of the concept cf. also Collins 1998: 470, Horsch 1957: 73, Mahony 2005: 1350, Sastri 1940, and Strong 1983b: 48; on the term *cakravartin* cf. also Gonda 1966: 123. A reference to the *cakravartināḥ* can be found in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 1.4 in Radhakrishnan 1953/1992: 797. On the significance of the *cakravartin* motif in Buddhist literature cf. also Gokhale 1994/2001d: 129 and Reynolds 1972: 19-21.

MN II 75 The *Makhādeva-sutta* and its Chinese and Tibetan parallels relate in similar terms that King Ma(k)hādeva requested his barber to inform him once any of his hair turned white.¹⁴⁹ When this happened, King Ma(k)hādeva decided to go forth.¹⁵⁰

The Pāli version indicates that King Ma(k)hādeva had decided to go forth as he had realized that the appearance of white hair on his head meant that the divine messengers had manifested,¹⁵¹ a realization similarly recorded in the Chinese discourses,¹⁵² as well as in the Tibetan versions.¹⁵³ The same insight is also reported in the Pāli *Jātaka* account of the life of King Ma(k)hādeva,¹⁵⁴ in the Chinese *Dharmapada* collection, and

¹⁴⁹ A Barhut relief that depicts the barber showing the grey hair to the king can be found in Cummings 1982: 44 plate 7; cf. also Barua 1934a: 82-85, Lal Nagar 1993: 160-161, Schlingloff 1981b: 102, and Sarkar 1990: 124; for further references cf. Grey 1994: 233-234. On the motif of the grey or white hair in Indian literature cf. Bloomfield 1916: 57-58; for an occurrence in the Jain *Parīśīṣṭaparvan* 1.95 cf. Jacobi 1883: 10, translated in Hertel 1908: 25; for parallels to the notion of the messenger of death in European literature cf. Morris 1885.

¹⁵⁰ According to MN 83 at MN II 75,16, before going forth King Makhādeva granted his barber an “excellent village”, *gāmavaram*, which Ps III 311,11 explains to be a “foremost village with a revenue of a hundred-thousand”, *satasahassuṭṭhanakam jetṭhakagāmam*. MN 83 at MN II 75,24 reports that Makhādeva then summoned the crown prince and told him to act in the same manner and also give such a grant to his barber in future. According to Ps III 311,12, King Makhādeva gave the grant because he had been mentally agitated by the manifestation of the white hair on his head. Jā I 138,6 elaborates the same in greater detail, describing how sweat poured down his body and he felt as if he was on fire within, as he realized that the king of death was hovering above him (similar reactions of fear on seeing the first white hair are associated with another two former lives of the Buddha in Jā 411 at Jā III 393,12 and Jā 525 at Jā V 177,27). From the perspective of the narration in the Pāli and Chinese discourses, however, it seems as if King Makhādeva had long before expected old age to manifest and was ready to act on it, otherwise he would not have instructed his barber to keep a look out for the first white hair. The motif of a gift of a village as a boon for a barber recurs in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 117,5 or in Senart 1897: 191,16, in this case motivated by the fact that the barber had accomplished the feat of cutting the king’s hair and beard while the latter was asleep.

¹⁵¹ MN 83 at MN II 75,17: “the divine messengers have appeared to me, white hair can be seen to have arisen on [my] head”, *pātubhūtā kho me ... devadūtā, dissanti sirasmiṃ phalitāni jātāni*.

¹⁵² MĀ 67 at T I 513c7: “white hair has arisen on my head, my life span is deteriorating and coming to an end, the divine messenger has already come, it is time for me to practise the path”, 我頭生白髮, 壽命轉衰減, 天使已來至, 我今學道時. EĀ 50.4 at T II 808b1: “on top of my own head, the demolishing of health has manifested, the body’s messenger has come to summon [me], time to embark on the path has arrived”, 我身首上, 生此毀莊, 身使來召, 入道時到. EĀ 1 at T II 551c29: “just now on my head, hair [indicating] decay and disappearance has arisen, the divine messenger has come, it is the proper time to go forth”, 於今我首上, 已生衰耗毛, 天使已來至, 宜應時出家 (adopting the 聖 variant reading 應 instead of 當).

¹⁵³ D (1) ‘dul ba, kha 53b6 or Q (1030) ge 49b4: “now on my head, hair [that signifies] the defeat of aging has arisen, the divine messenger has appeared, the time has come for me to go forth”, *da ni bdag gi mgo bo la, na tshod 'joms pa'i skra skyes te, lha yi pho nya byung gyur pas, bdag gi rab byung dus la bab*. D (4094) *mngon pa, ju 77a2* or Q (5595) *tu 87a2*: “the first thief of aging has arisen on the crown of my head, the divine messenger has appeared, time has come to go forth”, *bdag gi yan lag mchog spyi bor, na tshod 'phrog pa dang por skyes, lha yi pho nya byung gyur pas, rab tu byung ba'i dus la bab*.

¹⁵⁴ Jā I 138,23: “among my head hair, the destruction of life has arisen, the divine messengers have ap-

in a Chinese *Dharmapada Avadāna* account of the life of King Nimi.¹⁵⁵ Old age as one of several divine messengers, exemplifying the impermanent nature of life and the importance of wholesome conduct, is described in more detail in the *Devadūta-sutta* and its parallels.¹⁵⁶

The *Makhādeva-sutta* and its *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel report that, after handing over the kingdom to the crown prince and going forth, King Ma(k)hādeva developed the four *brahmavihāras* and was consequently reborn in the Brahmā world.¹⁵⁷ The descendants of King Ma(k)hādeva's kept living their lives according to the same pattern for eighty-four-thousand generations.¹⁵⁸ MN II 76

peared, it is time for me to go forth”, *uttamarigaruḥā mayham, ime jātā vayoharā, pātubhūtā devadūtā, pabbajjāsamayo mama*. Ps III 311,20 quotes this stanza in its gloss on the present passage.

¹⁵⁵ T 210 at T IV 574c26 and T 211 at T IV 608b23: “now, on my body’s head, white [hair] has arisen to be taken away, already there is the divine messenger’s summons, it is the proper time to go forth”, 今我上體首, 白生為盜, 已有天使召, 時正宜出家.

¹⁵⁶ MN 130 at MN III 180,6 and its parallels AN 3:35 at AN I 138,20, DĀ 30.4 at T I 126b25, MĀ 64 at T I 504a15, EĀ 32.4 at T II 674c17, T 42 at T I 827b8, T 43 at T I 828c23, T 86 at T I 909c13, and T 741 at T XVII 547a26.

¹⁵⁷ MN 83 at MN II 77,28 and EĀ 50.4 at T II 808b15. MĀ 67 at T I 513c28 reports that he “practised the path, practised [as] a royal seer and developed the holy life”, 學道, 學仙人王, 修行梵行. The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) ’dul ba, kha 54a6 or Q (1030) ge 50a4 and Abhidh-k-t at D (4094) *mngon pa, ju* 77b2 or Q (5595) *tu* 87b4 similarly indicate that “he practised the holy life of a seer”, *drang srong gi* (Q *tu: gis*) *tshangs par spyod pa spyad do*. Hence, these descriptions do not explicitly mention his practice of the four *brahmavihāras*. The parallel passage in EĀ 50.4 at T II 808b15 speaks of him practising the 四梵行, the “four *brahmacariyas*”, which EĀ 50.4 then shows to stand for the practice of the four *brahmavihāras*, 慈, 悲, 喜, 護; cf. also Bronkhorst 1993/2000: 94 note 32. Although a more common way to refer to the *brahmavihāras* would be 梵住 or else 無量 (*appamaññā*), alternatively referred to in EĀ 1 at T II 552a14 as 四等心, judging from the implications of 楚行 in EĀ 50.4, the occurrence of the same expression 楚行 in MĀ 67 could also stand for the *brahmavihāras*, in fact Soothill 1937/2000: 178 notes 四梵行 as an alternative for 四無量; cf. also Nattier 2003a: 265 note 355 for another instance where 楚行 stands for *brahmavihāra*. T 744 at T XVII 554a6 also records that King Mahādeva practised 慈, 悲, 喜, 護, to which it refers to as “four pure practices”, 四淨行. Anyway, as noted by Shaw 2006: xliii, the tale of Makhādeva ends with what is “a common and natural conclusion to a Jātaka story in that he leaves the lay life” to go forth and meditate.

¹⁵⁸ MN 83 at MN II 78,8, MĀ 67 at T I 514b5, EĀ 50.4 at T II 809a22 (adopting a variant reading), and D (1) ’dul ba, kha 54b2 or Q (1030) ge 50a6. The number eighty-four-thousand is a recurrent number in early Buddhist literature to convey the sense of a very long time span, perhaps the result of multiplying the twelve months of the year by seven, and enhancing the resultant eighty-four by further multiplication by a thousand (eighty-four-thousand can then itself become the basis for further multiplications, cf., e.g., Fukita 1997: 158). The number seven has a clearly symbolic sense: PED: 673 s.v. *satta* indicates that seven is a number “invested with a peculiar magic nimbus”. According to Dumont 1962: 73, the number seven in ancient India “indicates a totality”, Senart 1882b: 285 considers references to seven days to be “typique et conventionnel”; cf. also Sen 1974: 64. On the number seven in religious traditions in general cf. Davidson 1917: 406, Keith 1917: 407-408 and 413, and Schimmel 1987: 15-16; cf. also Gombrich 1975a: 118; on the symbolism of the number twelve in ancient India cf. Spellman 1962. Symbolic use of the number seven can be seen, for example, in Jā 514 at Jā V 48,28, which depicts the long time it took a hunter to reach a remote area by indicating that his journey lasted seven years, seven months, and seven days. Another instance can be found in AN 7:58 at AN IV 89,4 and its parallel MĀ

MN II 79 The Pāli and Chinese discourses, as well as the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, relate in similar terms that the gods of the Thirty-three were desirous to see Nimi, one of the descendants in the lineage of kings instituted by Ma(k)hādeva.¹⁵⁹ Sakka thereon invited Nimi on behalf of the gods of the Thirty-three and sent his chariot to fetch him.¹⁶⁰

The *Mahādeva-sutta*, its Chinese parallels, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* report that Nimi wanted to be taken to heaven along both possible paths, the path that leads through the spheres where evildoers experience their retribution and the path that goes via the spheres where the result of wholesome conduct is experienced. The three dis-

138 at T I 646b18 (cf. also MĀ 61 at T I 496b5), according to which the Buddha in a past life practised loving kindness for seven years. As a result of such prolonged practice, he was not reborn in the sensual world for seven aeons. Yet another example can be found in MN 10 at MN I 62,34, which speaks of mindfulness practice undertaken for various time periods that range from seven years to seven days. The parallel MĀ 98 at T I 584b18 differs in so far as it speaks of a period that ranges from seven years to a single day or night. The time range depicted in MN 10 recurs also in the *Mahāvastu* counterpart to the *Mahāgovinda-sutta*, Basak 1968/2004: 132,6 or Senart 1897: 219,4 (another example of this pattern can be found in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 189,1, although in this case the series describes different heights instead of different time periods); cf. also fragment 420v4 of the *Prīṭhapāla-sūtra* in Melzer 2006: 272, which speaks of personally realizing an entirely happy world and the path leading to it for a period ranging from seven years to less than a moment. What is particularly noteworthy is that, after counting down by single years from seven years to one year, the *Prīṭhapāla-sūtra* fragment, MN 10, MĀ 98, and the *Mahāvastu* next speak of seven months, after which they again count down by single months. Had their presentation followed numerical logic, it would have proceeded from a single year to eleven months instead. This shows that the mode of counting is influenced by the symbolic value of the number seven. A departure from this pattern can be found, however, in AN 10:46 at AN V 85,4, where a countdown of time periods by years, months and days revolves around the number ten instead of the number seven.

¹⁵⁹ When describing the succession of kings that reigned after Mahādeva, EĀ 50.4 at T II 808c13 narrates that seven days after the going forth of the next wheel-turning king his seven treasures disappeared. This disappearance motivated the grandson of Mahādeva to visit his father for advice, who explained to his son that the seven treasures were not inheritable. The father then instructed his son how to rule the kingdom rightly, as then the seven treasures might reappear. This account brings to mind a similar description of the succession of wheel-turning kings given in the *Cakkavatti-(sīhanāda)-sutta* and its parallels, DN 26 at DN III 60,9, DĀ 6 at T I 39b24, and MĀ 70 at T I 520c14. It is perhaps also noteworthy that EĀ 50.4 gives a full account of the succeeding king's reaction to this disappearance only when describing the disappearance of the seven treasures after the son of King Mahādeva had gone forth, not when describing what happened after King Mahādeva went forth (where it only notices the disappearance of the woman treasure, not of the other six treasures, cf. EĀ 50.4 at T II 808b17). This brings to mind the earlier noted fact that EĀ 1 at T II 552a16 only associates the wheel-turning king motif with the son of Mahādeva, giving the impression that the motif of the wheel-turning king was applied in a somewhat inconsistent manner in both *Ekottarika-āgama* versions.

¹⁶⁰ While according to MN 83 at MN II 80,24 and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 55a3 or Q (1030) ge 50b8 this chariot was drawn by a thousand thoroughbred horses, *sahassayutta ājaññaratha* and *rta cang shes stong dang ldan pa'i shing rta*, according to MĀ 67 at T I 514c11 it was drawn by a thousand elephants, 千象車. EĀ 50.4 at T II 809b21 agrees with MN 83 that the chariot was drawn by horses, 馬車, without, however, specifying their number. EĀ 50.4 at T II 809b16 also differs from the other versions in as much as, instead of Sakka himself calling on Nimi, a heavenly maiden was sent by Sakka to invite Nimi.

courses and the Tibetan *Bhaisajyavastu* refer to this journey only in brief, while the *Jātaka* tale reports it in considerable detail.¹⁶¹

The same *Jātaka* tale also throws a light on why the gods of the Thirty-three would want to invite Nimi for a visit. According to this *Jātaka* account, King Nimi had urged others to undertake wholesome deeds to such an extent that large numbers of his subjects were reborn among the gods of the Thirty-three.¹⁶² As these newly arisen gods of the Thirty-three owed their favourable rebirth to his instructions, it would be quite natural that they should wish to invite him.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* account reports that, when visiting the gods of the Thirty-three, Nimi delivered a set of instructions to them.¹⁶³ From the perspective of the *Jātaka* account, this would then have been just a continuation of his earlier tutorial relationship with them.

The Pāli and Chinese discourses, as well as the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, relate that, on arrival in the heaven of the Thirty-three, Nimi was invited to enjoy himself. He preferred to return home, however, and rather continue his exemplary and meritorious conduct.¹⁶⁴

MN II 80

The *Makhādeva-sutta* and its Chinese discourse parallels note that Nimi was the last of the kings that kept up the way of acting instituted by King Ma(k)hādeva.¹⁶⁵ According to the collection of tales on the six perfections, Nimi was in fact a reincarnation of Ma(k)hādeva.¹⁶⁶ The *Jātaka* tale reports the same, explaining that Ma(k)hādeva had de-

¹⁶¹ Jā 541 at Jā VI 105-126, a journey that took so long that Sakka had to repeatedly intervene to urge his charioteer to move on.

¹⁶² Jā 541 at Jā VI 97,4.

¹⁶³ EĀ 50.4 at T II 809c22.

¹⁶⁴ MN 83 at MN II 80,19 reports that Nimi just briefly declined and indicated that he wished to return home to conduct himself as a righteous king. According to MĀ 67 at T I 515a3 and the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* in Dutt 1984a: 113,4 and at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 55b6 or Q (1030) ge 51b3, he expressed his sentiments in more detail by comparing the temporary nature of the heavenly pleasures of the Thirty-three to a borrowed chariot. Jā 494 at Jā IV 358,2, Jā 541 at Jā VI 127,32 (quoted in Ps III 318,3), and T 152 at T III 49b14 similarly report that Nimi compared a sojourn among the Thirty-three to borrowed goods. According to EĀ 50.4 at T II 809c17, after being asked three times to remain, Nimi finally explained that the heaven of the Thirty-three did not provide the appropriate conditions for practising the path and that he wanted to follow his father's example and eventually go forth.

¹⁶⁵ EĀ 50.4 at T II 810a14 reports the discontinuation of Mahādeva's conduct in additional detail, narrating how once Nimi's son did not keep up the tradition of his forefathers the condition of the whole country deteriorated and people became short lived, diseased, and poor. Poverty led to theft, to which the king reacted by instituting the death penalty. This reaction in turn caused further increase of unwholesome actions of all kinds. This account brings to mind the deterioration of conditions due to bad rulership depicted in the *Cakkavatti-(sihanāda)-sutta*, DN 26 at DN III 65,15, and its parallels DĀ 6 at T I 40b23 and MĀ 70 at T I 522a28. Another parallelism occurs earlier, as part of the description of King Nimi's visit to the Heaven of the Thirty-three. According to EĀ 50.4 at T II 809c7, Sakka shared his throne with Nimi, and when the two sat together on the throne they looked completely alike. A similar description can be found in the tale of King Māndhāṭ in MĀ 60 at T I 495b17 and in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 222,17 or in Vaidya 1999: 137,20 (another version of this story, Jā 258 at Jā II 310-314, does not mention their sharing of the throne).

¹⁶⁶ T 152 at T III 48c25. The *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 624,15 or in Lefmann 1902: 170,16 or in

cided to take birth as Nimi in order to make sure that the conduct instituted by him was carried to its numerical completion of eighty-four-thousand descendants.¹⁶⁷

MN II 82 According to the *Makhādeva-sutta*, its Chinese parallels, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, the Buddha identified Ma(k)hādeva as one of his former lives and explained that the type of practice he had instituted at that time did not lead to liberation, unlike the practice he had instituted now,¹⁶⁸ followed by exhorting Ānanda that he should maintain the presently instituted tradition alive.¹⁶⁹

Vaidya 1958b: 119,14 also reckons King Nimi to have been a former life of the Buddha, while according to EĀ 50.4 at T II 810a27 he was a former life of Ānanda. Nimi's son, who discontinued the conduct instituted by King Mahādeva, was according to EĀ 50.4 at T II 810a29 a former life of Devadatta. According to the identifications reported in Jā 9 at Jā I 139,28 and Jā 541 at Jā VI 129,16, Ānanda had been Makhādeva's barber and then Sakka's charioteer Mātali, who took King Nimi to the heaven of the Thirty-three. Tanabe 2002/2003: 50 comments that the tale of King Nimi is based on an ancient Indian tale that was adopted as a story reporting a previous life of the Buddha and then introduced into the Buddhist canon.

¹⁶⁷ Jā 541 at Jā VI 96,17. The same account continues by reporting that the soothsayers told the king that his newborn son had come to "round off" the number of descendants. The king then associated the idea of "rounding off" with the "rim" of a wheel and decided to give his son the name *nemi*, "rim" (for an explanation of the name of the twenty-second Jain Tīrthaṅkara that similarly involves the sense of *nemi* as a wheel-rim cf. von Glasenapp 1925/1999: 317 and Jacobi 1884/1996: 277 note 1). The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* at D (1) 'dul ba, kha 54b2 or Q (1030) ge 50a7 similarly renders his name as *mu khyud*, "rim". Dīp 3:35 in Oldenberg 1879: 28,24 records his name as Nemijo, whereas the protagonist of MN 83 at MN II 78,28 has the name Nimi. MĀ 67 at T I 514b8 renders his name as 尼彌, *nri-mji* (following Pulleyblank 1991: 212 and 223). T 152 at T III 48c27 and T 211 at T IV 608b9 render his name as 南, which according to Chavannes 1910: 324 points to Nami, while Willemen 1999: 220 translates the same as Nemi. EĀ 50.4 at T II 809a23 renders his name as 莢, a character that according to Mathews 1963: 466 among others means "alternating". Could this be an attempt to render *nimi*, for which MW: 551 s.v. *nimi* gives "the closing or winking of the eyes, twinkling"? Still other renderings can be found in DĀ 6 at T I 39b5, which renders the name (Daḥa)nemi found in DN 26 at DN III 59,1 (on which cf. also Collins 1996: 428) as (堅固)念, cf. also Karashima 1994: 179, and in the *Mahāvyut-patti* no. 3583 in Sakaki 1926: 248, which employs the rendering 輻輳.

¹⁶⁸ MN 83 at MN II 82,24, MĀ 67 at T I 515a14, EĀ 50.4 at T II 810b6, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 56a2 or Q (1030) ge 51b6. EĀ 1 at T II 552a28 also contrasts the way of practice instituted by King Mahādeva with the liberating teachings of the Buddha. While according to MN 83 at MN II 82,33, MĀ 67 at T I 515a26, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 56b2 or Q (1030) ge 52a5 the Buddha explained that the path he taught at present is the noble eightfold path, EĀ 50.4 at T II 810b11 does not report such an identification. A comparable case can be found in DN 19 at DN II 251,18, which contrasts the practice instituted by the bodhisattva in a former life with the Buddha's present teaching of the noble eightfold path, while the parallel DĀ 3 at T I 34a21 (cf. also Hahlweg 1954: 150) does not mention the noble eightfold path.

¹⁶⁹ In MN 83 at MN II 83,8 this exhortation is worded in the plural, *tam vo ahām, ānanda, evam vadāmi*, giving the impression that other monks were also present, even though MN 83 at MN II 83,12 concludes with only Ānanda rejoicing in the discourse. EĀ 50.4 at T II 810b19 similarly reports only Ānanda rejoicing, even though EĀ 50.4 at T II 806c22 indicates that the Buddha was in the company of one-thousand-two-hundred-fifty monks. Only MĀ 67 at T I 515a29 explicitly states that "other monks" also rejoiced. As already mentioned above, p. 66, such variations are mainly differences in formulation, as by naming the most prominent person anyone else present appears to be included, so that a statement according to which "Ānanda rejoiced" would cover the delight of other monks that were present as well.

MN 84 *Madhura-sutta*

The *Madhura-sutta*, the “discourse at Madhurā”,¹⁷⁰ examines the Brahminical claim to supremacy among ancient Indian social classes. This discourse has a parallel in the *Samyukta-āgama*.¹⁷¹

The *Madhura-sutta* and its *Samyukta-āgama* parallel report in similar terms that the MN II 84 king of Madhurā had asked Mahākaccāna’s opinion on the claim made by the Brahmins to being the superior social class (*vāṇī*).¹⁷² In reply, Mahākaccāna clarified that the Brahminical claim to superiority was mere hearsay. According to the *Samyukta-āgama* version, he also explained that what really matters are one’s own deeds.¹⁷³

The *Madhura-sutta* illustrates that economic might is more powerful than class membership with the example of a wealthy person from any of the four classes who is served by members of each of these four classes.¹⁷⁴ Instead of Brahmins, warriors, merchants, and workers, the *Samyukta-āgama* version’s explanation of the same point speaks of Brahmins, warriors, and two types of householder.¹⁷⁵ Other discourses in the *Samyukta-*

¹⁷⁰ Jaini 1989: 215 comments that “Mathurā is always referred to as Madhurā in the Pāli texts. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Pāli suttas retain the original name of the city or only a variant spelling of the same”.

¹⁷¹ The parallel is SĀ 548 at T II 142a-143a, for which Akanuma 1929/1990: 60 gives 摩偷羅, corresponding to Madhurā, as a tentative title.

¹⁷² A circumstantial difference between the two versions is that MN 84 at MN II 83,18 begins by reporting Mahākaccāna’s good reputation as a learned and wise arahant and also describes in detail how the king drove out of town in his chariot to meet Mahākaccāna, while SĀ 548 does not mention Mahākaccāna’s reputation, nor does it describe in what manner the king approached him.

¹⁷³ SĀ 548 at T II 142b2: “great king, you should know that [one’s] deeds are what is truly real [in this regard], it depends on [one’s] deeds”, 大王當知業真實者, 是依業者, a remark that might be related in meaning to a statement found in Sn 3:9 at Sn 650, according to which it is through one’s deeds that one becomes a [true] Brahmin, cf. also Sn 1:7 at Sn 136. According to SĀ 548 at T II 142b3, the king then requested Mahākaccāna to explain this matter in more detail, so that their subsequent discussion is a more detailed exposition of this short statement. This becomes particularly evident in SĀ 548 at T II 142b17+c3+23, where after each argument Mahākaccāna refers back to this statement on karma, a statement that recurs also in the king’s final conclusion in SĀ 548 at T II 142c27.

¹⁷⁴ MN 84 at MN II 84,18. The suggestion that all four classes were able to reach a position of being served by members of each of the other classes is to some extent surprising. Although some degree of social fluctuation may well have been possible in ancient India, it seems improbable that members of the fourth class were able to have members of the other three classes at their service and command. In fact, the statement in MN 84 is formulated as a hypothetical case, so that to apply this possibility to the worker class may not have been intended as an accurate reflection of ancient Indian social mobility.

¹⁷⁵ SĀ 548 at T II 142b6: 婆羅門, 利剝, 居士, 長者, a listing which Nakamura 1957: 167 takes to be due to a tendency on the side of the translator(s) “to adapt the text to the understanding of readers brought up on Confucian hierarchical ethics”. The same type of enumeration recurs again in SĀ 472 at T II 120c10 (which adds “wilderness men and hunters”, 野人獵師, to this list), where the Pāli parallel SN 36:14 at SN IV 219,12 has instead the standard enumeration of the four classes. According to Hirakawa 1997: 403 and 1195, 居士 is an equivalent to *grhapati* or *vaiśya*, while 長者 corresponds to *grhapati*, to *mahāśāla*, or to *śreṣṭhin*. According to Soothill 1937/2000: 257 and 284, 居士 refers to a *kulapati*, a householder in the sense of being the head of a family, and 長者 stands for a *grhapati* as a householder

āgama, however, have the standard listing of all four classes that includes the merchants and the workers.¹⁷⁶ Since the present context is clearly related to class issues, the reference to Brahmins, warriors, and two types of householder could be a confusion of the four classes with the four types of wise man (a listing that covers Brahmins, warriors, householders, and recluses),¹⁷⁷ or else a confusion of the four classes with the three types of great family (a listing that mentions Brahmins, warriors, and householders).¹⁷⁸

The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse also differs in so far as instead of taking up the possibility of becoming wealthy, it speaks of becoming a king. This results in envisaging the possibility that Brahmins and householders become kings.¹⁷⁹ The *Samyukta-āgama* version's indication that Brahmins and householders can become kings receives support from the Mahāsāṅghika and Sarvāstivāda *Vinayas*, from the *Divyāvadāna*, and from the *Mahāvastu*.¹⁸⁰

in general. Hence, even though a subtle difference might be found between the two expressions, their main import appears to be similar. This impression is born out in SĀ 1074 at T II 279a27+29, which uses the two terms 居士 and 長者 to refer to the same group of persons. A similar closeness of meaning of these two expressions can also be seen in their use in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, where EĀ 39.8 at T II 732c5+6 uses 居士 and 長者 interchangeably to refer to the same person. Along similar lines, MĀ 64 at T I 506a8, MĀ 134 at T I 637c29, and MĀ 199 at T I 763a2 use the combination 居士大長者 to represent one of the three great families. These instances show a considerable overlap in meaning between 居士 and 長者.

¹⁷⁶ SĀ 95 at T II 26b5 and SĀ 592 at T II 157c5 speak of 婆羅門, 剎利, 麋舍, 首陀羅, while SĀ 1145 at T II 304a9, SĀ 1146 at T II 304b29, and SĀ 1235 at T II 338b14 speak of 婆羅門, 剎利, 鞍舍, 首陀羅, each of these two ways of presentation corresponding to the four classes usually mentioned in the early texts. It is noteworthy that between discourses belonging to the same *Samyukta-āgama* collection and presumably translated by the same translation team, alternative ways of rendering *vessa* or *vaiśya* can be found. SĀ 95 reads 麋舍, SĀ 1145 uses 鞍舍, and SĀ 548 employs 居士, even though their Pāli parallels AN 3:57 at AN I 162,17 (parallel to SĀ 95), SN 3:24 at SN I 99,15 (or SN² 135 at SN² I 221,3, parallel to SĀ 1145) and the present discourse MN 84 at MN II 85,9 (parallel to SĀ 548) all use the same term *vessa*, making it probable that the Indic original used for translating these *Samyukta-āgama* discourses had the same reference to *vessa* or *vaiśya* in each instance.

¹⁷⁷ This listing is found in SĀ 108 at T II 33c20 and includes 剎利, 婆羅門, 長者, and 沙門, being the counterpart to *khattiya*, *brāhmaṇa*, *gahapati*, and *samana* in its parallel SN 22:2 at SN III 6,16.

¹⁷⁸ This listing shows some variations, as SĀ 1042 at T II 273a7 has 剎利, 婆羅門, and 居士 (preceded in SĀ 1042 at T II 273a6 by a reference to 長者), while SĀ 1146 at T II 304c21 has 剎利, 婆羅門, and 長者. Thus, these two discourses again point to the close similarity between 居士 and 長者. The Pāli parallels MN 41 at MN I 289,2 and SN 3:21 at SN I 94,33 (or SN² 132 at SN² I 212,6) speak of *khattiya*, *brāhmaṇa*, and *gahapati* (each case qualified as *mahāsāla*).

¹⁷⁹ SĀ 548 at T II 142b5+9 speaks of becoming a Brahmin king, of a warrior becoming king, and (twice) of becoming a householder becoming king, 為婆羅門王, 剎利為王, 居士為王 and 長者為王.

¹⁸⁰ The Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 244b7, in the context of its regulation against theft, defines kings by listing the same four types of king as found in SĀ 548: "about kings – kings [can be] designated as warriors, Brahmins, householders, and householders", 王者, 王名剎利, 婆羅門, 長者, 居士 (notably another instance where 長者 and 居士 feature together in a listing). The Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 309b24, goes a step further, since in its definition of kings it lists not only Brahmins and householders, but also women as potential candidates, "if a Brahmin, a householder, or a woman are given the office of a king, this is also reckoned as 'becoming a king by sprinkling water on the

The *Madhura-sutta* and its parallel agree that undertaking the ten unwholesome courses of action will result in evil rebirth independent of class affiliation.¹⁸¹ Both versions apply the same principle to the ten wholesome courses of action and their potential to lead to a heavenly rebirth.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version next describes someone who breaks into a house, commits burglary, makes an ambush or seduces the wife of another. In each case the king would punish him, independent of whatever class the culprit may belong to. The *Samyukta-āgama* version takes up the same case at an earlier point of its exposition.¹⁸² It also differs in so far as it only describes how this person commits a theft, without taking into account the other types of evil conduct mentioned in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version.

The *Madhura-sutta* continues by taking up the case of someone gone forth, who would be worthy of the king's respect and offerings independent of his former class, an example not found in the *Samyukta-āgama* presentation (see below table 9.4).¹⁸³

The *Samyukta-āgama* discourse concludes by reporting that the king rejoiced in the exposition and left. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, he expressed his wish to take refuge and was thereon told by Mahākaccāna that he should take refuge with the Buddha. In reply to the king's inquiry after the whereabouts of the Buddha, Mahākaccāna explained that the Buddha had passed away.¹⁸⁴ The *Majjhima-nikā-*

head”, 若婆羅門, 若居士, 若女人受王職, 亦名為王水澆頂. A similar definition occurs in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 544,3 or in Vaidya 1999: 464,19: *stry-api ... brāhmaṇo 'pi vaiśyo 'pi śudro 'pi rājyābhisekenābhīṣikto bhavati rājā*. The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 105,28 or in Senart 1897: 172,8 introduces a Brahmin king in one of its tales, indicating that from its perspective it was indeed possible for a Brahmin to take up the office of a king. The same *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 98,6 or in Senart 1890: 70,1, in the context of a fable, however, records the statement that “nowhere females are kings, everywhere males are kings”, *na ca kahim cit istriyo rājā, sarvatra puruṣā rājā*. Megasthenes reports that in a part of India a queen could be found, cf. McCrindle 1877: 147, 156, and 158; cf. also Altekar 1956: 186. In relation to the *Divyāvadāna* passage, Oldenberg 1912b: 166 remarks: “won't it be experiences and considerations of later times – one may think of the Maurya dynasty – that recommended such broadminded interpretation?” (“sind es nicht Erfahrungen und Rücksichten späterer Zeiten – man denke etwa an die Maurya-Dynastie – die zu dieser weitherzigen Interpretation rieten?”); cf. also Lamotte 1958/1988: 218-219 on Candragupta's probable low birth.

¹⁸¹ A minor difference in regard to the examination of the ten courses of action is that, according to MN 84 at MN II 86,16, the king on his own indicated that he had heard from arahants about the prospective rebirth in hell, while according to SĀ 548 at T II 142c6 Mahākaccāna asked the king what he had heard from arahants concerning the rebirth to be expected for undertaking the ten unwholesome courses of conduct, thereby prompting the king to refer to arahants in his reply.

¹⁸² SĀ 548 at T II 142b18 examines the punishment inflicted by a king on a thief before taking up the ten courses of action, whereas MN 84 at MN II 88,7 takes up the topic of the king's punishment only after having examined the ten courses of action.

¹⁸³ MN 84 at MN II 89,2. This example seems to fit well into the exposition, as it provides a contrast to the description of what will happen to someone who breaks the law and incurs the king's punishment, similar to the earlier contrast between rebirth in heaven and rebirth in hell.

¹⁸⁴ MN 84 at MN II 90,16. This indication stands in contrast to SĀ 548 at T II 142a18, which begins by re-

ya version concludes with the king's proclamation that he would have been willing to undertake a journey of up to a hundred *yojanas* in order to meet the Buddha, had the Buddha still been alive.¹⁸⁵

Table 9.4: Arguments against Brahminical Superiority in MN 84 and SĀ 548

MN 84	SĀ 548
all serve the rich (1)	all serve the king (→ 1)
10 evil deeds lead to hell (2)	theft is punished (→ 4)
10 good deeds lead to heaven (3)	10 evil deeds lead to hell (→ 2)
killing, theft, etc. is punished (4)	10 good deeds lead to heaven (→ 3)
recluse is respected and supported (5)	(≠ 5)

MN 85 *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*

The *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*, the “discourse to Prince Bodhi”, records a meeting between the Buddha and Prince Bodhi.¹⁸⁶ Although this discourse does not have a parallel in the Chinese *Āgamas*, parts of a version of this discourse have been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.¹⁸⁷ Versions of the introductory narration to the *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*,

cording that at the time of this discourse the Buddha was staying at Sāvatthī, so that from the perspective of the *Samyukta-āgama* version he was still alive.

¹⁸⁵ MN 84 at MN I 90,26: *yojanasatam pi mayam gaccheyyāma tam bhagavantam dassanāya* (S^e-MN II 439,12: *yojanasatam*). A similar statement recurs in MN 94 at MN II 162,33 and in SHT V 1332bR3-5 (p. 228). The parallelism between MN 84 and MN 94 in regard to taking place after the Buddha's death had already been noted by Chalmers 1894: 341. On the assumption that a *yojana* would correspond to approximately seven miles (cf. also above p. 164 note 106), to cover a distance of a hundred *yojanas* would have required a rather long journey.

¹⁸⁶ While the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* T 1421 at T XXII 74b13 gives the name of the prince as 菩提, corresponding to the name Bodhi used in the parallel passage in the Theravāda *Vinaya* at Vin II 127,20, most Sanskrit fragments refer to the protagonist of the present discourse as Prince Bodha, cf., e.g., SHT IV 33 folio 21V3, SHT IV 180 folio 1R3, SI B/14 2A3 in Bongard-Levin 1989: 510, or folio 342V3 in Hartmann 2004b: 129. An exception to this pattern is SHT IV 160 folio 20Rc, which reads Bodhi. The *uddāna* in folio 299V3 in Hartmann 2004b: 123 reads *bodhah*, suggesting the title *Bodhah-sūtra*. Alternatively, the *uddāna* may have abbreviated the title, which in analogy to the Pāli version could also have been *Bodharājakumāra-sūtra*.

¹⁸⁷ The fragments from the newly discovered *Dīrgha-āgama* are folios 342-343 in Hartmann 2004b: 129-131, with the complete version covering folios 340-344 in Silverlock 2009. Other fragments are SHT III 997 B (p. 259), SHT IV 33 folios 17-28 and 35 (pp. 162-170 and 174, the last identified in SHT VIII p. 162, cf. also SHT VIII p. 161-162 and SHT IX p. 369), SHT IV 165 folios 20-24 (pp. 194-198, cf. also SHT IX p. 378), SHT IV 180 folios 1-2 (pp. 211-213, cf. also SHT VII p. 247), SHT VI 1361 (pp. 96-97), SHT VI 1373a (p. 103), SHT IX 2063d (p. 80), the so far unpublished SHT XI 4573, identified by Klaus Wille (I am indebted to Klaus Wille for kindly providing me with a draft transliteration of this fragment), Hoernle fragment 149/280, edited as no. 12 in Hartmann 1991: 77 (corresponding to Or. 15009/106 in Kudo 2009: 172-173), fragment SI B/14 1-3 in Bongard-Levin 1989, Hoernle fragment Or. 15004/76 in Wille 2009: 91, Or. 15009/187 in Melzer 2009: 220. Of these, SHT III 997B, SHT III 4 folios 17-18, SHT IV 165 folios 20-22, SHT VI 1361, SHT VI 1373a, SHT XI 4573, Hoernle frag-

which reports how Prince Bodhi invited the Buddha to a meal, can also be found in the Theravāda and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinayas*,¹⁸⁸ and in the *Dhammapada* commentary.¹⁸⁹

The *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*, the Sanskrit fragments, and the two *Vinayas* report in similar terms that Prince Bodhi invited the Buddha for a meal to his newly built palace.¹⁹⁰ On arrival, the Buddha refused to enter the palace, as the steps had been covered with cloth. Ānanda told Prince Bodhi to remove the cloth, as the Buddha would not step on it.

According to the *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta*, the reason given by Ānanda for the Buddha's reluctance was that the Buddha "looked after future generations".¹⁹¹ The Theravāda and Mahīśāsaka *Vinayas* as well as the Sanskrit fragments speak of his "compassion for future generations".¹⁹²

The commentary explains that Prince Bodhi was childless and had spread the cloth with the aspiration that, if the Buddha should step on it, his wish to have a child would be fulfilled.¹⁹³ The Buddha, however, knew that in retribution for an evil deed done in a past life Prince Bodhi was destined to remain childless, wherefore the Buddha refused to step on the cloth. The commentary further explains that at the Buddha's time many monks had supernormal powers and were able to find out if someone was destined to remain childless. Based on such knowledge, the monks were able to decide if it was opportune to step on a cloth on such occasions. In later times, however, monks who would not have such supernormal powers might not know if it was opportune to step on a cloth in similar circumstances. If they should step on a cloth and then the couple were to remain childless, this would cause people to look down on the monks. In order to prevent this from happening, the Buddha remained silent, out of compassion.

ment Or. 15004/76, Or. 15009/187, and fragment SI B/14 1B correspond to the beginning of the discourse and the invitation of the Buddha at MN II 91-92. SHT IV 33 folios 21-22 and SHT IV 165 folio 23 report the offering of the meal described at MN II 93. SHT IV 33 folios 23-24, SHT IV 180 folios 1-2, Hoernle fragment 149/280 V or Or. 15009/106, fragment SI B/14 2-3, and folios 342-344 of the *Dīrgha-āgama* fragment parallel the exposition of the five factors of striving found at MN II 94-96. SHT IV 33 folios 24+28, SHT IV 165 folio 24, SHT IV 180 folios 1-2, and Hoernle fragment 149/280R record the prince's taking of refuge, described at MN II 97.

¹⁸⁸ Vin II 127-129 and T 1421 at T XXII 74b-c.

¹⁸⁹ Dhp-a III 136,1.

¹⁹⁰ SHT IV 33 folio 17V2 and R6, SHT IV 165 folio 20Vc and folio 22V7, and folio 340R2-3 in Silverlock 2009: 73 note that the Buddha was staying in the Bhīṣṇakā or Bhīṣṇikā Grove on Mount Śimśumāra or Śiśumāra, a location given in MN 85 at MN II 91,2 as the Bhesakalā Grove on Mount Sumsumāra.

¹⁹¹ MN 85 at MN II 93,3: "the Tathāgata looks after future generations", *pacchimam janatam tathāgato apaloketi*. While C^e-MN II 482,23 and S^e-MN II 442,19 agree with E^e on the reading *apaloketi*, B^e-MN II 279,8 reads *anukampati* instead, a reading also followed by the *Majjhima-nikāya* commentary Ps III 323,10, whereas the *Dhammapada* commentary, Dhp-a III 136,12, quotes the same passage with the reading *oloketi*.

¹⁹² Vin II 128,30: "the Tathāgata has compassion for future generations", *pacchimam janatam tathāgato anukampati ti*, with a similarly worded counterpart in fragment 341v8 in Silverlock 2009: 76: *paścimā[ṇi] janatām anukampamāno* and in T 1421 at T XXII 74b29: 懇後世故.

¹⁹³ Ps III 322,3.

This commentarial explanation does not really help to explain the situation. If the Buddha knew that Prince Bodhi was to remain childless, that would be sufficient for not stepping on the cloth, without any need to have concern or compassion for future generations.

The expression used in this context in the Theravāda *Vinaya* and in the Sanskrit fragment recurs in several other Pāli discourses, occurrences that suggest compassion for future generations to stand for acting as a model to be emulated.¹⁹⁴ From this perspective, then, the present passage might simply intend that the Buddha did not step on a cloth in order to set an example that discourages the keen interest his Indian contemporaries apparently had in such supposedly auspicious actions.

This would be in keeping with a general tendency that manifests repeatedly in the early discourses, where the search for externals and auspicious tokens is redirected towards inner purification of the mind.¹⁹⁵ In fact, according to the Theravāda *Vinaya* account the Buddha took the present instance as the occasion to promulgate a rule against stepping on cloth.¹⁹⁶

The Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* differs from the Theravāda *Vinaya*, as it does not relate the present event to a regulation about stepping on cloth. According to the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, the problem that arose was rather that the monks made a mess when partaking of the food offered by Prince Bodhi. This behaviour caused the laity to criticize the monks and led the Buddha to lay down a regulation that food should be received and partaken of in a proper manner.¹⁹⁷

The story of how Prince Bodhi wanted the Buddha to step on a cloth recurs also in the *Dhammapada* commentary. According to the *Dhammapada* commentary, Prince Bodhi in fact asked the Buddha why he was not willing to step on the cloth. In reply, the Buddha explained that the prince was destined to remain childless, followed by giving an account of Prince Bodhi's former evil deed that was responsible for his pre-

¹⁹⁴ According to MN 4 at MN I 23,35 (cf. also AN 2:3:9 at AN I 61,1), the Buddha lived a secluded life style out of compassion for future generations, *pacchimāñ ca janatāñ anukampamāno ti*. Another example can be found in SN 16:5 at SN II 203,5, which reports that Mahākassapa continued to undertake ascetic practices in spite of his advanced age for the same reason, further explained to imply that in this way he hoped to set a model to be emulated by others, *app' eva nāma pacchimā janatā diṭṭhanugatiñ āpajjeyyūm* (B^e-SN I 405,26, C^e-SN II 310,7 and S^e-SN II 339,7: *diṭṭhanugatiñ*, C^e and S^e: *āpajjeyya*).

¹⁹⁵ Cf., e.g., MN 7 at MN I 39,13 and its parallels MĀ 93 at T I 575c23, SĀ 1185 at T II 321b4, SĀ² 98 T II 408c3, EĀ 13.5 at T II 574c15, and T 51 at T I 844a21, which contrast external purification by bathing in sacred rivers with internal purification of the mind. Witanachchi 2005b: 549 comments that the commentarial explanation, according to which the Buddha did not step on the cloth "because he knew that the prince's wish for a child will not be fulfilled, seems to be completely off the mark. If that were so, there was no reason for the Buddha to have laid down a rule restraining his disciples from following the practice".

¹⁹⁶ Vin II 129,3. When, however, the demands of the laity to have monks step on cloth became too pressing, this rule was amended. Granoff 2002/2003: 200 note 39 comments that "a monk may step on the cloth offered by a woman who has just had a miscarriage ... behind this might lie a belief in the fructifying power of the monk's touch".

¹⁹⁷ T 1421 at T XXII 75c9.

sent childlessness.¹⁹⁸ The evil deed was that Prince Bodhi and his wife in a former life had survived on eggs and birds, after being shipwrecked, without feeling any remorse at killing living beings. The Buddha concluded his explanation to Prince Bodhi with a stanza – the stanza the *Dhammapada* commentary's tale is intended to explain – highlighting the need to protect oneself and to remain wakeful during the three watches of the night.¹⁹⁹

Whatever may be the final word on the reasons why the Buddha refused to step on the cloth, the *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta* reports that, during the conversation that ensued after the completion of the meal, the Buddha gave an autobiographical account of his striving for awakening.²⁰⁰

At the end of this account, according to the *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta* Prince Bodhi asked the Buddha how long it would take a disciple to reach the final goal. According to the Sanskrit fragment, however, he asked how many qualities were required to reach the final goal.²⁰¹ The Pāli and Sanskrit versions agree that the Buddha replied with a counter-question,²⁰² asking Prince Bodhi if he could impart his knowledge to a man with the following qualities:

MN II 94

¹⁹⁸ Dhp-a III 137,2. Dhp-a III 139,7 concludes this tale by reporting that Prince Bodhi attained stream-entry at the end of the Buddha's exposition.

¹⁹⁹ Dhp 157: "holding oneself dear, one should well protect oneself, the wise should keep watchful during any of the three watches of the night", *attānañc piyam jaññā, rakkheyya nam surakkhitam, tinnam aññatarāñ yāmam, pañjaggeyya pañđito*, with counterparts in stanza 312 in the Patna *Dharmapada* in Cone 1989: 185 or in stanza 313 in Roth 1980b: 125, and in stanza 5:15 in the Sanskrit *Udāna-(varga)* in Bernhard 1965: 143, with its Tibetan counterpart in stanza 5:16 in Beckh 1911: 22 or in Zongtse 1990: 79. Similar stanzas found in T 196 at T IV 161a7, T 210 at T IV 565c21, T 211 at T IV 593b16, T 212 at T IV 652b11, and T 213 at T IV 780a17 differ in their second part and do not refer to the three watches. T 211 embeds its version of this stanza into a different story, which describes a monk on the verge of suicide out of desperation at his inability to learn the Dharma. T 211 at T IV 593b24 concludes by reporting that, stirred by the verses spoken by the Buddha, this monk soon enough became an arahant; cf. also Willemen 1999: 121-123. Some elements of this story are similar to the tale of Cūlapanthaka at Dhp-a I 239,14, although Cūlapanthaka was not on the verge of suicide, but only about to leave the order.

²⁰⁰ This account combines the information given in MN 26 at MN I 163-173 and MN 36 at MN I 240-249. The Sanskrit fragment does not present this account in full, but indicates that it should be supplemented from the preceding discourse, the *Kāyahāvanā-sūtra* (parallel to MN 36), cf. folio 342R7 in Hartmann 2004b: 129 or Silverlock 2009: 77. E^e similarly gives this account only in an abbreviated manner, indicating that it should be supplemented, while B^e-MN II 279-297, C^e-MN II 484-508, and S^e-MN II 443-470 give it in full.

²⁰¹ MN 85 at MN II 94,8: "how long", *kīva cirena?*, whereas according to folio 342V2 in Hartmann 2004b: 129 he inquired "endowed with how many qualities, venerable sir", *k(a)tihi/r bhadam]tāñgaiḥ sam-a/nv]āgata?*; cf. also Silverlock 2009: 78.

²⁰² Since according to both versions the Buddha used a counter-question, the Pāli version of Prince Bodhi's inquiry might fit the context better. If Prince Bodhi had asked about the qualities required to reach liberation, there would have been no need to reply with a counter-question, as the Buddha could just have listed the five qualities straightforwardly. A counter-question usually occurs in reply to a type of question that cannot be answered straightforwardly, but needs to be tackled by asking a question in return (that is,

- faithless,
- ill,
- deceitful,
- lazy,
- stupid.²⁰³

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the Buddha illustrated his reply with the example of Prince Bodhi teaching someone how to ride an elephant. The Sanskrit fragment version takes up also other abilities that could be taught by Prince Bodhi, such as elephant and horse riding, driving a chariot, fencing and archery, as well as writing and calculation.²⁰⁴

To bring in several crafts fits the context well, since such variety illustrates that the task of leading a monk to liberation requires training him in various abilities, instructing him in proper conduct, in the development of concentration, and in the development of insight,²⁰⁵ just as a prince would not only need to be able to ride an elephant, but also to ride a horse, to drive a chariot, to fence, and to perform archery.²⁰⁶

In the case of calculation and writing, the situation appears less straightforward. Other Pāli passages indicate that calculation was a specific profession in ancient India, yet perhaps some basic training in this art would be appropriate in the case of someone who in future hopes to become a king.²⁰⁷

this would be an instance of the *patipucchā vyākaranīya pañha*, in contrast to the *ekamsa vyākaranīya pañha*, cf. AN 3:67 at AN I 197,20). This is indeed the case for the prince's question in the Pāli version, as the time period required to reach the goal cannot be simply stated, since this time period depends on the qualities of the practitioner.

²⁰³ MN 85 at MN II 94,18. SHT IV 180 V3-5 has preserved being faithless, ill, and stupid, and at V8-9 mentions the positive qualities of being honest and energetic, thereby accounting for all five qualities mentioned in MN 85. Similarly, the fragments SI B/14 2A4+B2 and SI B/14 3A1+B4 in Bongard-Levin 1989: 510-512 mention the positive qualities of faith, health, honesty, energy, and wisdom. Folio 342V7-8 in Hartmann 2004b: 129-130 or Silverlock 2009: 78 only mentions being faithless, deceitful, and stupid, which Hartmann 2004b: 132 note 34 suggests to be "most likely due to a haplography in this highly repetitive passage". Parts of a description of the five factors of striving, mentioned in the present discourse, have also been preserved in the Sanskrit fragments of the *Daśottara-sūtra*, cf. fragment S 493cR2-5 in Mittal 1957: 34.

²⁰⁴ Folio 342V6 in Hartmann 2004b: 129 or Silverlock 2009: 78: *hastigrīvāyām aśvapṛṣṭhe rathe sarau dhanuṣy ... lipigānananyasanasamkhyāmudrāyām*, SHT IV 180 folio 1V1 (cf. also SHT VII p. 247): (*hatigrīvā*)[y](ā)m-aśvapṛṣṭe rathe tsaro dhanuṣi, and SHT IV 33 folio 23R1: *lipigānanāsam/khJy*.

²⁰⁵ The image of an elephant to illustrate the training of a monk recurs in MN 125 at MN III 132,2, which compares the practice of the gradual path to an elephant trainer who catches and trains a wild elephant. The image used in MN 125 differs from MN 85 at MN II 94,13, where the task is only to teach someone how to ride an elephant. To ride an elephant (that would have already been tamed and trained by someone else) would be considerably less demanding than having to catch and tame a wild elephant.

²⁰⁶ A list of the abilities of a king in MN 82 at MN II 69,8 mentions riding a horse, driving a chariot, archery, and fencing, together with riding an elephant; cf. also AN 5:135 at AN III 152,29, where these recur as the learning curriculum of a prince.

²⁰⁷ DN 1 at DN I 11,10 mentions *muddā*, *gāṇā*, and *sankhāna* as forms of livelihood. Vin IV 7,5 includes *gāṇā* together with *muddā* (S^e-Vin II 166,4: *muddhā*) in a listing of various types of craft (on

The *Lalitavistara*,²⁰⁸ the *Mahāvastu*, and the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in fact include the art of writing in the curriculum of a prince,²⁰⁹ while a description of the training of a prince given in a discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama* does not mention accounting or writing.²¹⁰

The Pāli and Sanskrit versions agree that in reply to the Buddha's exposition of these five detrimental qualities, Prince Bodhi remarked that even the presence of one of these qualities would inhibit someone from being able to learn.²¹¹

The *Bodhirājakumāra-sutta* and its Sanskrit parallel repeat their respective treatment for the complementary positive case of someone who has faith and is healthy, honest, energetic, and wise. According to both versions, Prince Bodhi remarked that even one of these five positive qualities would make it easy to teach such a person.²¹² MN II 95

This statement seems to stand to some extent in logical contrast to the earlier statement, according to which even one of the negative qualities would render such a person incapable of learning. The logical consequence of the earlier statement would be that all five positive qualities are required for being able to learn, not just one of them. That is, in order to be able to learn someone would need to be not only healthy, for example, but also should have faith and be free from deceit, laziness, and stupidity.

Perhaps the formulation found in both versions is the outcome of stereotyping during the course of transmission, due to which the pattern of the treatment used for the negative case was applied in an identical manner to the positive case, without noting that this creates an inner inconsistency.

gaṇanā and *muddā* cf. also Franke 1913a: 18 note 9+10 and Rhys Davids 1899: 21 note 4 and ibid. p. 22 note 1).

²⁰⁸ The *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 526,13 or in Lefmann 1902: 126,2 or in Vaidya 1958b: 88,13 lists various types of scripts, including the script of the *devas*, etc., which are absent from a list of Indian scriptures given in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1963a: 160,6 or in Senart 1882a: 135,5 (on the significance of this listing cf. also the comments in Harrison 2003: 115-116).

²⁰⁹ The *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1965: 570,14 or in Senart 1890: 423,15, and in Basak 1968/2004: 112,27 or in Senart 1897: 184,6, a (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Pravrajyāvastu* fragment folio 2r2 in Vogel 1992: 71, and the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 58,2 and in Gnoli 1978a: 119,30 and 179,11; cf. also the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 58,16 or in Vaidya 1999: 35,24. For a Gandhāran sculpture that depicts the bodhisattva at school, holding a writing slate, cf. Dehejia 1997: 203; for another Gandhāran sculpture with three monks holding writing scrolls cf. plate IIb in Taddei 1983; on this and additional instances cf. also Solomon 1999: 103-104.

²¹⁰ MĀ 72 at T I 534a5.

²¹¹ MN 85 at MN II 94,28 and folio 342V8 and 343R1 in Hartmann 2004b: 130 or Silverlock 2009: 78-79.

A minor difference between the two versions is that in MN 85 the Buddha presents all five qualities and then asks Prince Bodhi if such a person would be able to learn, while in the Sanskrit fragment the Buddha poses the same question after each of the five qualities, each time Prince Bodhi replying that someone with this quality would not be able to learn from him.

²¹² MN 85 at MN II 95,12: *ekam ekena pi, bhante, aīgena samannāgato so puriso mama santike ... sippam sikkheyā, ko pana vādo pañcaḥ' aīgehī ti* (B^e-MN II 298,22: *ekenā*), folio 343R5-6 in Hartmann 2004b: 130 or Silverlock 2009: 79: *ekaikena tāvad bhadanta ito 'nīgena samanvāgatena tena puruṣeṇa sukarāṇi mamāntikād anyatamānyatamac chilpasthānakarmasthāna samanvāgamayitum, kah punar vādaḥ sarvair;* cf. also SHT IV 33 folio 24V2-3 and fragment SI B/14 3A3 in Bongard-Levin 1989: 511.

The Pāli version illustrates the first quality of faith with the example of a monk's confidence in the awakening of the Tathāgata, described with the standard formula for recollecting the Buddha.²¹³ The Sanskrit fragment speaks instead of a noble disciple whose faith is firmly established so that it cannot be shaken by anyone in the world.²¹⁴

The Pāli and Sanskrit versions agree in explaining that to be energetic is to make a steadfast effort to develop what is wholesome. To this the Sanskrit fragment adds the determination not to slacken in energy even if the flesh and blood of the body should dry up and only skin, sinews, and bones remain.²¹⁵

MN II 96 The Pāli version continues by specifying the time period within which a disciple may reach realization, a time period that ranges from seven years at most to a single day-and-night at least.²¹⁶ Instead of listing various time periods, the Sanskrit discourse only explains that realization can be reached "quickly".²¹⁷ A listing of time periods within

²¹³ MN 85 at MN II 95,17: *iti pi so bhagavā arahāñ sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno*.

²¹⁴ Folio 343R7-8 in Hartmann 2004b: 130 or Silverlock 2009: 79 describes that the noble disciple's faith has become "rooted and established", *mūlajātā pratiṣṭhitā*. In other Pāli discourses, such unshakeable faith appears to be a quality of those who have reached stream-entry. Thus, e.g., DN 27 at DN III 84,21 indicates that those whose faith is firm, *mūlajātā patitīthitā*, can claim to be "born from the mouth" of the Blessed One, *mukhato jāto*, an expression the commentary Sv III 865,7 explains to imply that they have reached the paths and fruits, *maggaphalesu patitīthitattā oraso mukhato jāto*. MN 47 at MN I 320,12 speaks of the same firm faith once a monk can claim that he has "through direct knowledge come to a conclusion in regard to a certain teaching among the teachings", *abhiññāya idh' ekaccaṁ dhammaṇī dhammesu niṭṭham agamāñ* (S^e-MN I 580,6: *niṭṭhaṅgamāñ*). The commentary Ps II 388,23 explains that the firm faith of stream-entry is intended here, *mūlajātā ti sotāpatti maggavaśena sañjāta-mūlā*. MN 70 at MN I 478,32 qualifies the *saddhāvimutta*, a person who is at least a stream-enterer, to be endowed with such firm faith, *saddhā niViṭṭhā hoti mūlajātā patitīthitā*. SN 48:42 at SN V 219,2 indicates that the Brahmin Uṇṇābha had reached firm faith, *saddhā niViṭṭhā mūlajātā patitīthitā*, followed by noting that this Brahmin will not be reborn in this world, which the commentary Spk III 246,24 explains to imply that he was a stream-enterer and a *jhāna* attainer. These passages indicate that references to such firm faith usually imply at least stream-entry. The same would, however, not work so well for the Sanskrit version, as this would imply turning the fruit of progress on the path into a requirement for being taught the path.

²¹⁵ Folio 343V4-5 in Hartmann 2004b: 131 or Silverlock 2009: 80: *kāmam tvak snāv asthi cāvatiṣṭhatām pariśuṣyatu śarīrān māṃsaśoṇitam*. While AN 2:1:5 at AN I 50,8 relates this type of determination to the Buddha's breakthrough to awakening, other discourses use the same expression in the context of a general definition of energetic practice, cf., e.g., MN 70 at MN I 481,1, SN 12:22 at SN II 28,23, SN 21:3 at SN II 276,11, and AN 8:13 at AN IV 190,8, similar to the way this determination occurs in the Sanskrit fragment.

²¹⁶ MN 85 at MN II 96,16 speaks of realising the goal within a period that ranges from seven years to a single day-and-night, *ekam rattindivam*. For practice that takes place only from morning to evening or from evening to morning, MN 85 at MN II 96,19 indicates that "distinction" can be reached, *visesam adhigamissati*. The proclamation in MN 85 that practice can lead to realization within a single day-and-night appears to be unique in the Pāli discourses for envisaging such a short time period. A similar position is taken in SĀ 703 at T II 189a24 and in SĀ 1121 at T II 297c19, however, discourses otherwise not related to MN 85.

²¹⁷ Folio 343V8 in Hartmann 2004b: 131 or Silverlock 2009: 80: *kṣipram*. Consequently the two versions also differ on the reason for Prince Bodhi's appreciation of the Buddha's teaching, which according to

which realization can be attained is also found in the two (*Mahā-*)*Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* and in the *Udumbarikasīhanāda-sutta*, which, however, reckon a minimum of seven days to be necessary for reaching full awakening.²¹⁸

The *Bodhirajakumāra-sutta* and the Sanskrit fragments agree that Prince Bodhi expressed his appreciation and took refuge.²¹⁹ Both versions note that refuge had already been taken on his behalf when he was in his mother's womb and when he was an infant.²²⁰

MN II 97

MN 86 *Aṅgulimāla-sutta*

The *Aṅgulimāla-sutta*, the “discourse about Aṅgulimāla”, records the conversion of the brigand Aṅgulimāla.²²¹ This discourse has five Chinese parallels: two parallels in

MN 85 at MN II 96,23 was the ability of the Dharma to lead to distinction within a period of twelve hours, while according to the Sanskrit fragment folio 344R2 in Hartmann 2004b: 131 or Silverlock 2009: 80 his appreciation was due to the potential of the five factors of striving to lead quickly to the destruction of the influxes.

²¹⁸ DN 22 at DN II 314,11 (= MN 10 at MN I 62,35) and DN 25 at DN III 55,21 list time periods that range from seven years to seven days for reaching realization. The prediction in the parallel to MN 10, MĀ 98 at T I 584b24, corresponds to MN 85 in as much as it envisages realization for a period of practice (of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*) from seven years down to a single day-and-night, followed by indicating that by undertaking practice from morning to evening or from evening to morning, “progress”, 昇進, can be reached (Hirakawa 1997: 596 gives *parā-vkram* and *ā-vkram* as possible equivalents for 昇進, a similar description, found in fragment 421r7 of the *Prsthapāla-sūtra* in Melzer 2006: 274, speaks of reaching *viṣeṣa* if practice is undertaken from evening to morning or from morning to evening). An example for the possibility of reaching realization within a very short time can be found in Ud 1:10 at Ud 8,13, which reports that Bāhiya, a non-Buddhist ascetic, reached full awakening during his very first meeting with the Buddha, right after receiving a short but penetrative instruction.

²¹⁹ According to the Sanskrit fragments, the prince employed a golden pitcher when taking refuge, apparently pouring out water in a ceremonial gesture, cf. folio 344R8 in Silverlock 2009: 80, SHT IV 33 folio 28V4 and SHT IV 165 folio 24V5-6. A golden pitcher occurs in a similar contexts in the *Saṅghabheda-vastu*, cf. Gnoli 1978a: 25,39, where at the conclusion of a meal offering to the Buddha Kāśyapa the king of the country invites the Buddha and the monks for the rains residence, Gnoli 1977: 166,10, where King Bimbisāra offers the Squirrels' Feeding Ground, and Gnoli 1977: 180,26, where Anātha-piṇḍada offers Jeta's Grove.

²²⁰ According to MN 85 at MN II 97,2+10, when the prince's mother was pregnant with him, she took refuge in his name when visiting the Buddha in the Ghositārāma at Kosambī, and later on his nurse took refuge in his name when the Buddha was staying in the Bhesakalā Grove at Mount Sumsumāra, the same location where MN 85 takes place. The Sanskrit fragments give one location of taking refuge as the Ghoṣilārāma in Kauśāmbī, cf. folio 344R5 in Silverlock 2009: 80, SHT IV 33 folio 24R6; cf. also SHT IV 165 folio 24V2 and the Hoernle fragment 149/280R6, no. 12 in Hartmann 1991: 77. The other location is the Badarikārāma, Badārikārāma, or Batarikārāma, cf. folio 344R7 in Silverlock 2009: 80, SHT IV 33 folio 24R4, SHT IV 180 folio 1R6, and Hoernle fragment 149/280R4, no. 12 in Hartmann 1991: 77 (compared to MN 85, SHT IV 33 folio 24 and the Hoernle fragments refer to these two locations in the opposite sequence). This grove would have been close to the Ghositārāma, as in SN 22:89 at SN III 126-132 a discussion between the monk Khemaka and a group of monks takes place by way of sending a messenger back and forth between these two places.

²²¹ On brigandage in ancient Indian narrative in general cf. Bloomfield 1926.

two *Samyukta-āgama* collections, one parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, and two parallels in the form of individual translations.²²² Parts of the present discourse have also been preserved in Sanskrit fragments.²²³

The story of Aṅgulimāla recurs, moreover, in an *Udāna-(varga)* preserved in Chinese.²²⁴ A version of the present narration is also found in the “discourse on the wise and the fool”, a collection of Buddhist tales extant in Chinese and Tibetan.²²⁵ In addition, the events surrounding Aṅgulimāla have also served as the basis for the composition of a Mahāyāna *sūtra*, extant in Chinese and Tibetan translation.²²⁶

The *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and its discourse parallels vary in the degree to which they incorporate various narrations and events that took place either before or after the encounter between Aṅgulimāla and the Buddha (see table 9.5)

MN II 98 Regarding the actual encounter between the Buddha and Aṅgulimāla, which is narrated in all versions, according to the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and its Chinese parallels the Buddha had been proceeding towards Aṅgulimāla’s haunts, but was warned by onlookers to desist from proceeding further.

²²² The parallels are SĀ 1077 at T II 280c-281c, SĀ² 16 at T II 378b-379a, EĀ 38.6 at T II 719b-722c, T 118 at T II 508b-510b, and T 119 at T II 510b-512a. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 118 was translated by Dharmarakṣa, cf. also Boucher 1996: 282, and T 119 by Fājù (法炬), (variant readings attribute T 119 also to Dharmarakṣa). SĀ 1077 takes place at 央瞿多羅國, identified in Bareau 1985: 655 to correspond to the Āṅga country, SĀ² 16 is located in Magadha, whereas EĀ 38.6, T 118, and T 119 agree with MN 86 on placing the discourse at Sāvatthī. According to the restoration of the relevant Hoernle fragment in Hartmann 1998: 358, the Sanskrit version also appears to have had Magadha as its location. T 118 and T 119 have the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha on Aṅgulimāla”, 佛說鳩掘摩經 or 佛說鳩崛毘經. Anesaki 1908: 117 gives the title “robber”, 賊, for SĀ 1077. For a translation of SĀ 1077, together with extracts from the present study, cf. Anālayo 2008b; a translation of SĀ² 16 can be found in Bingenheimer 2006: 46-49.

²²³ SHT I 160c (pp. 90-91, cf. also SHT X p. 402), SHT VI 1561 (p. 189, identified in Hartmann 1998: 356 note 18), and two fragments from the Hoernle collection published in Hartmann 1998. One of the Hoernle fragments parallels the beginning part of the discourse at MN II 97-98; SHT VI 1561 might correspond to Aṅgulimāla seeing the Buddha coming, described at MN II 98,27; SHT I 160c and the other Hoernle fragment parallel Aṅgulimāla’s attempt to catch up with the Buddha and their ensuing exchange at MN II 99. A correlation of SĀ 1077 with its Sanskrit counterparts can be found in Enomoto 1994: 22-23.

²²⁴ T 212 at T IV 703a-704b.

²²⁵ T 202 at T IV 423b-424b, with its Tibetan counterpart D (341) or Q (1008) published in Schmidt 1843: 239-261, a work apparently compiled in China based on stories transmitted via Khotan, cf. T 2145 at T LV 67c10 and the discussion in Lévi 1925b and Mair 1993.

²²⁶ This is the 央掘魔羅經, T 120 at T II 512b-522a, with a Tibetan counterpart in *sor mo'i phreng ba la phan pa* found at D (213) *mdo sde, tsha* 126a-206b or Q (879) *tsu* 133b-215a. Nattier 2007: 185 note 16 comments that T 120 “should not be treated as a close relative of the Pāli *sutta* or the Chinese *āgama* texts in which Aṅgulimāla is the main figure, but rather as an independent scripture whose authors took earlier traditions concerning Aṅgulimāla as their point of departure”. Thus T 120 and its Tibetan counterpart fall outside the scope of my present comparative study of MN 86. A survey of the main differences between the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and its Chinese parallels that takes into account T 120 can be found in Bareau 1985: 654-658. For a study of the bodhisattva ethics proposed in T 120 cf. Schmithausen 2003: 22-34.

Table 9.5: Progression of the Narration in MN 86 and its Discourse Parallels

MN 86	EĀ 38.6
Aṅgulimāla's killings (1)	people complain to Pasenadi (→ 5)
Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (2)	Aṅgulimāla's killings (→ 1)
Aṅgulimāla's conversion (3)	mother visits Aṅgulimāla
Aṅgulimāla goes forth (4)	Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 2)
people complain to Pasenadi (5)	Aṅgulimāla's conversion (→ 3)
Pesenadi meets Aṅgulimāla (6)	Aṅgulimāla goes forth (→ 4)
Aṅgulimāla's asseveration of truth (7)	Aṅgulimāla becomes stream-enterer
Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (8)	Pesenadi meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 6)
Aṅgulimāla is attacked (9)	Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (→ 8)
Aṅgulimāla's verses (10)	Aṅgulimāla's asseveration of truth (→ 7)
	Aṅgulimāla is attacked (→ 9)
	Aṅgulimāla's verses (→ 10)
	Aṅgulimāla's former life
	Aṅgulimāla is foremost in quick understanding

SĀ 1077	SĀ ² 16
Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 2)	Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 2)
Aṅgulimāla's conversion (→ 3)	Aṅgulimāla's conversion (→ 3)
Aṅgulimāla goes forth (→ 4)	Aṅgulimāla goes forth (→ 4)
Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (→ 8)	Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (→ 8)
Aṅgulimāla's verses (→ 10)	Aṅgulimāla's verses (→ 10)
(# 1, 5-7, 9)	(# 1, 5-7, 9)

T 118	T 119
Aṅgulimāla's youth	people complain to Pasenadi (→ 5)
Aṅgulimāla's killings (→ 1)	Aṅgulimāla's killings (→ 1)
people complain to Pasenadi (→ 5)	Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 2)
mother visits Aṅgulimāla	Aṅgulimāla's conversion (→ 3)
Buddha meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 2)	Aṅgulimāla goes forth (→ 4)
Aṅgulimāla's conversion (→ 3)	Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (→ 8)
Aṅgulimāla goes forth (→ 4)	Pesenadi meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 6)
Aṅgulimāla becomes arahant (→ 8)	Aṅgulimāla's asseveration of truth (→ 7)
Pesenadi meets Aṅgulimāla (→ 6)	Aṅgulimāla is attacked (→ 9)
Aṅgulimāla's asseveration of truth (→ 7)	Aṅgulimāla's verses (→ 10)
Aṅgulimāla is attacked (→ 9)	Aṅgulimāla is foremost in quick understanding
Aṅgulimāla's verses (→ 10)	

In the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions, these onlookers simply tell the Buddha that a dangerous brigand by the name of Aṅgulimāla is living in this area.²²⁷ The other versions present the threat posed by Aṅgulimāla in increasingly stronger degrees:

- up to forty men had been overpowered by Aṅgulimāla according to the Pāli version,

²²⁷ SĀ 1077 at T II 280c22 and SĀ² 16 at T II 378b18.

- up to fifty men had met with the same fate according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* report,
- even a hundred men would not dare to oppose him according to one individual translation,
- even up to a thousand men had been caught by Aṅgulimāla according to the other individual translation.²²⁸

These differences reveal a tendency to exaggeration, a tendency that makes itself felt again and again in the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and its parallels. In as much as the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and its parallels present themselves as records of an actual event, it is difficult to imagine how a single person should be able to overpower a group of forty or fifty men, leave alone for him to be able to do the same when faced with a thousand men.

The two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses begin directly with their description of how the Buddha set out on his way towards Aṅgulimāla. The Pāli discourse and the other Chinese versions precede this with an introductory account. In this introductory account, the Pāli discourse, the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, and one of the individual translations explain that Aṅgulimāla wore the fingers of his victims as a garland,²²⁹ which explains why he was called Aṅgulimāla, “Finger-garland”.

One of the individual translations reports that Aṅgulimāla had caused harm to villages and towns.²³⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* version goes further, as it records that Aṅgulimāla had lain waste not only villages and towns, but even whole districts.²³¹ The commentary explains that people had deserted their homes and fled to Sāvatthī because of Aṅgulimāla.²³²

Although the abandonment of a village in the vicinity of Aṅgulimāla’s murderous activities seems conceivable, it appears exaggerated to suggest that a single criminal could cause whole districts to be left deserted.²³³

²²⁸ MN 86 at MN II 98,16, EĀ 38,6 at T II 719c11, T 118 at T II 509a25 (the reference to the hundred men occurs here in a different context, namely as a reflection made by Aṅgulimāla when meeting the Buddha), and T 119 at T II 510c12. The sentence in T 119 indicates that “at his wish that Aṅgulimāla got all of them and ate them”, 彼鶩崛髦, 從意所欲, 皆取食之. On adopting a 宋, 元, and 明 variant reading, the last part of the sentence would indicate that “he got all of them and killed them”, 皆取殺之, a preferable reading, as also indicated by a similar expression at a slightly later point in T 119 at T II 510c16: 隨意所欲而殺害. The curious intrusion of 食, “to eat”, in the present context in T 119 is nevertheless noteworthy, as according to Jā 537 at Jā V 456-511 Aṅgulimāla in a past life feasted on human flesh.

²²⁹ MN 86 at MN II 98,2, EĀ 38,6 at T II 720c7, and T 119 at T II 510b24.

²³⁰ T 119 at T II 510c8.

²³¹ MN 86 at MN II 97,26: “by him villages have been made no-villages, towns made no-towns, and districts made no-districts”, *tena gāmā pi agāmā katā, nigamā pi anigamā katā, janapadā pi ajanapadā katā*.

²³² Ps III 330,20.

²³³ In a predominantly agricultural society such a mass exodus would imply loss of livelihood for a considerable part of the population and thus be quite a dramatic decision. According to Wagle 1966: 29-37, a *janapada* represents a socio-cultural unit in the sense of a region with distinct social habits and customs, cf. also Gräfe 1974: 168. Although the term *janapada* would not necessarily imply a geographical dimension as large as a *mahājanapada* (a term used for the sixteen Indian counties regularly mentioned

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version's suggestion that whole districts had been laid waste stands, moreover, in contrast to the circumstance that according to the same *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse cowherds, shepherds, ploughmen, and travellers had warned the Buddha of Aṅgulimāla.²³⁴ Their presence in so close proximity to Aṅgulimāla suggests that the area of his activities was not as abandoned as the same version's description suggests. Hence, its indication that Aṅgulimāla had laid waste whole districts appears to be another instance of the above-mentioned tendency to exaggeration.

As part of their introduction to the meeting between the Buddha and Aṅgulimāla, the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse and the two individual translations relate that a group of monks had gone into town and witnessed a great crowd complaining to the king and demanding that action should be taken against the brigand. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version also records such a complaint made about Aṅgulimāla to the king, although this occurs at a later point of its narration, by way of introducing King Pasenadi's visit to the Buddha.²³⁵

According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse and the two individual translations, after hearing from the monks what had happened in town, the Buddha left for Aṅgulimāla's haunts.²³⁶ Hence in these versions, it seems as if the Buddha decided to approach Aṅgulimāla in order to prevent him being arrested by the king.²³⁷

One of the individual translations additionally precedes this introductory account by narrating the story that caused Aṅgulimāla to become a murderer. This account resembles in several respects the story of Aṅgulimāla's youth given in the Pāli commentary.

According to the description given in this individual translation, Aṅgulimāla had been an extraordinary strong, intelligent, and beautiful young Brahmin. The wife of his teacher had fallen in love with him and tried to seduce him. He, however, refused to comply with her wishes. Enraged, she pretended to her husband that Aṅgulimāla had forcefully tried to seduce her. Out of fear of Aṅgulimāla's strength, the teacher did not dare to punish him directly and thus devised the idea to command Aṅgulimāla that he should procure the fingers obtained by killing a hundred victims within a single day, hoping that this would lead Aṅgulimāla to be reborn in hell.²³⁸

elsewhere in the discourses) a *janapada* comprises a considerable area with “villages”, *gāmas*, “towns”, *nigamas*, and even “fortified cities”, *nagaras*, on which cf. also Erdosy 1995: 114 and Ghosh 1973: 46. Thus, to turn several such districts into “no-districts”, in other words, to devastate an entire or even several *janapadas*, would be an impossible feat for a single man, no matter what remarkable strength he is supposed to possess.

²³⁴ MN 86 at MN II 98,7: *gopālakā pasupālakā kassakā pathāvino* (following B^e-M II 301,12 and C^e-M II 516,10, against *padhāvino* found in E^e and in S^e-M II 476,12; cf. also a similar description in Vin IV 108,22, where E^e does read *pathāvino*).

²³⁵ MN 86 at MN II 100,17.

²³⁶ EĀ 38.6 at T II 719c6, T 118 at T II 509a15, and T 119 at T II 510c4.

²³⁷ While this is only implicit in EĀ 38.6 and T 119, as these versions simply report that the Buddha left, according to T 118 at T II 509a14 the Buddha told the monks “you just stay, I will go to rescue [him]”, 汝等且止，吾往救之.

²³⁸ T 118 at T II 508c19+23.

The Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* offers a similar account, differing in so far as it speaks of a thousand victims to be killed, a number also mentioned in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, in the “discourse on the wise and the fool”, and in the Pāli commentary.²³⁹

The Pāli commentarial narration differs from the individual translation and the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* account in so far as it attributes Aṅgulimāla’s defamation to jealous fellow students. The commentary to the *Aṅgulimāla Theragāthā* agrees with the individual translation that out of fear of Aṅgulimāla’s strength the teacher did not try to kill him.²⁴⁰ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* commentary, however, the teacher desisted from killing his student Aṅgulimāla in order to avoid damaging his reputation as a teacher.²⁴¹ Both commentaries relate that already at Aṅgulimāla’s birth it had become clear that he was destined to become a brigand, thereby presenting him in a less favourable light than the individual translation and the *Udāna-(varga)*.²⁴²

The *Majjhima-nikāya* commentary explains that Aṅgulimāla had decided to wear the fingers as a garland in order to keep count of his victims. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, the individual translation, and the *Udāna-(varga)* account, however, his teacher had instructed him to make a garland out of the fingers of his victims.²⁴³ Whatever may have been the rationale for constructing such a garland, it would have been impossible to wear it, so that the idea of a garland with a ‘thousand’ fingers is perhaps best understood in a symbolic sense as a garland with ‘many’ fingers.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ T 212 at T IV 703b17. Although EĀ 38.6 does not directly report the teacher’s instruction, in its description of Aṅgulimāla’s thought after his verse exchange with the Buddha, EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b1 records him reflecting on his teacher’s instruction to kill a thousand men and make a garland out of their fingers, 能取千人殺, 以指作鬘者. The “discourse on the wise and the fool” specifies that the teacher demanded the fingers of a thousand victims within a period of seven days, cf. T 202 at T IV 423c28: 若持七日之中, 斬千人首, 而取一指 and Schmidt 1843: 242,3: nyin zhag bdun gyis ... mi stong gi mgo bcad nas sor mi re re zhing blangs nas. According to Ps III 330,1, the teacher told him that he should “kill a thousand by-passers”, *jaighasahassam ghātehi* (it seems preferable to take *jaigha* in this sense, a meaning which suggests itself from the compound *jaighavihāra*, “a walker’s abiding”, e.g., at MN 18 at MN I 108,20, although literally *jaighasahassam ghātehi* would mean to “kill a thousand legs”).

²⁴⁰ Th-a III 55,31.

²⁴¹ Ps III 329,21. Such differences between commentaries on the same tale are not uncommon, in fact according to Goonesekera 1967: 346 “there are numerous instances where accounts of the same episode in the different *atthakathā* differ as regards details”.

²⁴² According to Ps III 328,8 and Th-a III 55,2, his father, the Brahmin minister of the king of Kosala, knew from the constellation of stars at his son’s birth that Aṅgulimāla was destined to become a robber. The father then asked the king to put Aṅgulimāla to death before he could do any harm.

²⁴³ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b1, T 118 at T II 508c17, and T 212 at T IV 703b17. T 202 at T IV 423c29 and its Tibetan counterpart in Schmidt 1843: 242,4 report the same. EĀ 38.6, T 118, T 202, and T 212 refer to this garland as 髮 (T 119 at T I 510b24 similarly speaks of 髮). This suggests this garland to be a form of hair dress or decoration, instead of being a necklace. In fact, T 118 at T II 508c17 specifies that the finger garland is to be worn on the forehead, 其額.

²⁴⁴ Although Aṅgulimāla could have strung up a few fingers and worn them as a garland, making a garland of a thousand fingers would have become so bulky that he would no longer have been able to use his weapons. Gombrich 1996: 149 suggests that “the idea that he needed a thousand must have arisen from an over-literal interpretation” of a passage found in the *Aṅgulimāla Theragāthā*, Th 868: “having heard

The Pāli commentary explains that when a great crowd complained to the king about Aṅgulimāla's murderous activities, Aṅgulimāla's father realized that this robber must be his son. Aṅgulimāla's mother thereupon decided to approach her son and fetch him, before the king would capture him. In order to prevent Aṅgulimāla from killing his own mother and thereby committing a crime that would have barred him from reaching any of the stages of awakening, the Buddha decided to approach Aṅgulimāla himself.

Aṅgulimāla's mother also takes part in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version and in one of the individual translations, as well as in the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* tale. According to these three versions, Aṅgulimāla's mother had come to bring her son some food.²⁴⁵ As Aṅgulimāla lacked only one more finger to make up the number of victims required, he decided to kill his mother. In the individual translation, his willingness to kill his own mother is related to the circumstance that the sun is about to set and, in order to follow his teacher's command, he had to accomplish his murderous feat within a single day.²⁴⁶

According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse and the individual translation, Aṅgulimāla had already gotten hold of his mother when the Buddha intervened.²⁴⁷ The individual translation relates that the Buddha suddenly appeared in front of Aṅgulimāla, while according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version the Buddha emanated a great light that illuminated the whole forest. The *Ekottarika-āgama* account reports that Aṅgulimāla was alarmed by this great light and asked his mother to explain what was taking place. In reply, she told him that the source of this light could only be the Buddha. When Aṅgulimāla heard this he was full of joy, as his teacher had told him that by killing the Buddha he would be reborn in heaven.²⁴⁸ He told his mother to wait for a moment, as he would just kill the Buddha and then partake of the meal she had brought.²⁴⁹

your stanza connected with the Dharma, I will abandon a thousand evils", so 'ham cajissāmi sahassapāpām, sutvāna gāthām tava dhammayuttam'.

²⁴⁵ EĀ 38.6 at T II 719c14, T 118 at T II 509a20, and T 212 at T IV 703b22. T 202 at T IV 424a12 and Schmidt 1843: 242,16 report the same.

²⁴⁶ This suggestion does not sit too well with the same version's account in T 118 at T II 509a9, according to which begging monks witnessed people complaining to the king about Aṅgulimāla's deeds. Monks have to partake of their food before noon, so that for them to hear peoples' complaints would have to have taken place during the early hours of the day, the time when they approach the town to beg alms. This would imply that within a few hours of the same day on which Aṅgulimāla began his murderous activities rumours of his deeds spread, people realized that they were unable to handle this situation on their own and decided to approach the city to complain to the king. Even with considerable imagination, this seems to be putting too much into too short a time period.

²⁴⁷ EĀ 38.6 at T II 719c21 and T 118 at T II 509a24. T 202 at T IV 424a19 and Schmidt 1843: 243,5, as well as the *Maitrisimit* in Tekin 1980: 162, also report that Aṅgulimāla was about to kill his mother and only let go of her to kill the Buddha.

²⁴⁸ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720a7. Xuánzàng's (玄奘) travel records in T 2087 at T LI 899a24, translated in Beal 1884/2001b: 3, report a version of the Aṅgulimāla tale that similarly depicts him about to kill his mother and then rejoicing at the prospective of being able to kill the Buddha instead, as according to Aṅgulimāla's teacher this would lead to a heavenly rebirth.

²⁴⁹ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720a9. T 212 at T IV 703c9 also reports that Aṅgulimāla thought of coming back for his meal after killing the monk he had seen, whom in this version he had not recognized to be the Buddha.

MN II 99 At this point the narrative threads of the different versions come together again, as all versions describe that Āṅgulimāla was unable to catch up with the Buddha even though the latter was walking at a slow pace. The *Udāna-(varga)* account explains that the Buddha accomplished this feat by magically contracting the earth where Āṅgulimāla was and expanding the earth where the Buddha was himself.²⁵⁰

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse and one individual translation, Āṅgulimāla was surprised at being unable to catch up with the Buddha, as he was usually able to catch even an elephant, a horse, or a chariot.²⁵¹ These descriptions of Āṅgulimāla's abilities again show a tendency to exaggeration, since for a human being to be strong enough to catch an elephant or fast enough to catch up with a horse is hard to imagine.

According to the Pāli and Chinese discourses, the Sanskrit fragments, and the *Udāna-(varga)* account, Āṅgulimāla told the Buddha to stop. The Buddha replied that he had already stopped, whereas Āṅgulimāla had not yet stopped.²⁵²

This riddle caused Āṅgulimāla to reflect and request an explanation. In reply, the Buddha explained that, whereas he had stopped harming other beings,²⁵³ Āṅgulimāla was without restraint and hence in need of stopping.

²⁵⁰ T 212 at T IV 703c11: “the Buddha used his magical power so that where ‘Harmless’ [i.e. Āṅgulimāla] was, the earth suddenly contracted, [whereas] the earth [where] the Buddha was became broad and spread out, so that [Āṅgulimāla] became very tired and could not reach the Buddha”, 佛以神力令彼無害在地頓縮, 佛地寬舒, 如是疲極不能及佛. Ps III 332,10 somewhat similarly describes how the Buddha used his magical power to influence the earth in such a way that Āṅgulimāla was unable to catch up with him.

²⁵¹ MN 86 at MN II 99,12: “formerly I could catch up and seize a running elephant, catch up and seize a running horse, or catch up and seize a racing chariot” (followed by also mentioning a running deer), *pubbe hatthim pi dhāvantam anupatitvā gaṇhāmi, assam pi dhāvantam anupatitvā gaṇhāmi, ratham pi dhāvantam anupatitvā gaṇhāmi* (S^e-MN II 479,15 reads *hatthim, assam, and ratham*) and T 119 at T II 510c20: “I can run and seize an elephant, or reach a horse, or reach a chariot” (followed by also mentioning an ox and a man). 我走能逮象, 亦能及馬, 亦能及車. His prowess in matters of speed recurs also at a later point in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, being part of Āṅgulimāla's reflection after the Buddha had spoken to him, cf. EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b12: “at the time of running, I can reach an elephant, a horse, or a chariot” (followed by also mentioning a man), 我奔走之時, 能及象, 馬, 車乘. According to Th-a III 55,24, Āṅgulimāla had the strength of seven elephants, and according to the “discourse on the wise and the fool”, Āṅgulimāla's strength was such that he was able to resist a thousand men, T 202 at T IV 423c22: 力敵千人 and Schmidt 1843: 239,14: *gcig pus mi stong thub pa*.

²⁵² MN 86 at MN II 99,18, SĀ 1077 at T II 280c27, SĀ² 16 at T II 378b25, EĀ 38.6 at T II 720a18, T 118 at T II 509b2, T 119 at T II 510c24, and the Sanskrit fragment from the Hoernle collection V4 in Hartmann 1998: 358; cf. also SHT I 160cV4.

²⁵³ The “discourse on the wise and the fool” differs from the other versions in so far as its treatment of the topic of “stopping” contrasts the Buddha's self-control with Āṅgulimāla's mental agitation. Thus, in T 202 at T IV 424a23 the Buddha points out that: “I have calmed my faculties ... your mind is shaky and does not reach stability, [as you] day and night kill and harm, committing innumerable sins”, 我諸根寂定 ... 變易汝心, 不得定住, 畫夜殺害, 造無邊罪, a contrast found similarly in the Tibetan version in Schmidt 1843: 243,10: *nga'i dbang po rnams ni rtag tu zhi zhing ting nge 'dzin ... khyod kyis sems kyang bslus te mi sdod pas, nyin mtshan du gsod pa'i las byed de, sdig pa mtha' med pa'i las byed do*. This contrast would suit the ensuing transformation of Āṅgulimāla well. According to Harris 1990/1994: 36, due to

The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse and one of the individual translations present this reply by the Buddha in a single stanza,²⁵⁴ while the *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the other individual translation have the same in two stanzas.²⁵⁵ The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions, which in all other respects present by far the briefest account, report the Buddha's reply in five or six stanzas, explaining in detail in what sense he had stopped and Aṅgulimāla had not yet stopped.²⁵⁶

From the perspective of the discourse as a whole, this more detailed treatment seems quite to the point, since the words spoken by the Buddha at this moment converted Aṅgulimāla from a criminal, ready to kill the Buddha, to a repentant desiring to become a monk. In fact, later Buddhist traditions tend to consider this act of conversion as the climax of the whole story and its most prominent feature.²⁵⁷

The Pāli and Chinese discourses report that Aṅgulimāla acknowledged the truth of MN II 100 the Buddha's exposition,²⁵⁸ threw away his weapons, and requested to be ordained,

the words spoken by the Buddha, “Aṅgulimāla is forced into the realization that his life has been a futile chase, a fretful searching, without peace and fulfilment. The tranquillity of the Buddha contrasts sharply with his own turbulence and the destructive state of his mind. The contrast makes him see the nature of his mind. A revolution – in its true sense of a complete turning around – takes place”.

²⁵⁴ MN 86 at MN II 99,29 and T 119 at T II 511a1; cf. also Th 867.

²⁵⁵ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720a24 and T 118 at T II 509b9. EĀ 38.6 continues with Aṅgulimāla's reflection after hearing these two stanzas, reporting that he knew that Tathāgatas arise only rarely in the world and that he even had some idea of what a Tathāgata would teach.

²⁵⁶ SĀ 1077 at T II 281a4 and SĀ² 16 at T II 378c2. SHT I 160cR1-3 also has several stanzas similar to the two *Samyukta-āgama* versions. The *Udāna-(varga)* account, which has only a single stanza, nevertheless specifies that this should be supplemented with what is found in detail in the respective discourse, T 212 at T IV 703c20: 廣說如契經偈, thereby indicating that the Buddha's treatment of the topic of “stopping” was longer than the single stanza it quotes.

²⁵⁷ References in other works to Aṅgulimāla tend to highlight in particular the Buddha's ability to transform him, cf., e.g., the *Avadānaśataka* in Speyer 1906/1970: 148,9 or in Vaidya 1958a: 68,20 and in T 200 at T IV 215a24, or the Sanskrit fragments of a *buddhastotra* in Schlingloff 1955: 104; for further references cf. Hartmann 1998: 353-355 and Skilling 1997a: 297 note 111. Schlingloff 1988a: 229 describes a representation of the Aṅgulimāla tale from Ajantā where “Aṅgulimāla appears before the Buddha twice; once rushing towards him to attack and then bowed at his feet”. This contrast highlights the present turn of events and the Buddha's ability to tame and convert a ferocious brigand. On Amarāvatī sculptures depicting aspects of the tale of Aṅgulimāla cf., e.g., Sivaramamurti 1942/1956: 191-193; for Gandhāran representations cf., e.g., Foucher 1918: 12 figure 304 and Kurita 1988: 227-229, plates 471-476.

²⁵⁸ Gombrich 1996: 151-152 suggests to emend the first line of Aṅgulimāla's stanza in MN 86 at MN II 100,1: *mahesi* (B^e-MN II 303,5, C^e-MN II 518,27, and S^e-MN II 480,14: *mahesī*) to *maheso*. Based on this emendation, he concludes that Aṅgulimāla could have been a “proto-Śaiva/Śākta” and that “his practice of collecting fingers for a necklace is thus sure to be the result of a vow, in which the worshipper tries to attain the iconic form of his god”. A relation between Aṅgulimāla and Śivaitism has also been suggested by Eitel 1888/2004: 13, who s.v. *Angulimālyā* speaks of a “Śivaitic sect of fanatics who practiced assassination as a religious act. One of them was converted by Śākyamuni”, by Legge 1886/1998: 56 note 2, who suggests that “the Aṅgulimālyā were a sect of Śivaitic fanatics, who made assassination a religious act”, and by Soothill 1937/2000: 454, who under the entry 驚崛摩羅 speaks of a “Śivaitic sect that wore ... chaplets” of finger-bones. Maithrimurthi 1998: 170 and 173 points out that “there seems to be no testimony at all in the history of Indian religions to the practice of killing for decorating oneself

which the Buddha readily granted.²⁵⁹ According to one of the individual translations, Aṅgulimāla's hair and beard magically disappeared, a miracle also recorded in the Pāli commentary.²⁶⁰ The *Ekottarika-āgama* account relates that, after granting Aṅgulimāla's request for ordination, the Buddha spoke a stanza of encouragement, on hearing of which Aṅgulimāla reached stream-entry.²⁶¹

The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions report that Aṅgulimāla became an arahant and conclude with a set of verses spoken by him. The two individual translations similarly record his attainment of full awakening at this point, while the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions turn to the same at a later point of their narration.²⁶²

Unlike the two *Samyukta-āgama* discourses, the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions and the two individual translations record several additional events related to Aṅgulimāla. One of these events begins with King Pasenadi who, on his way to catch Aṅgulimāla, paid a visit to the Buddha. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version and one of the individual translations, Pasenadi had in fact visited the Buddha to get advice on how to best undertake his mission.²⁶³

The Pāli commentary explains that Pasenadi was too afraid to set out straight away to catch Aṅgulimāla and wanted to report the matter to the Buddha in order to find out if he was going to be victorious. In case the Buddha should warn him, indicating that the brigand will defeat him, then Pasenadi would have a good reason for not setting out on his mission.²⁶⁴ According to the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* account, however, King Pase-

with parts of the victim's body” and explains that such a proto-Śaiva/Śākta cult would considerably antedate “other known practitioners of Śaivic tantra”. The respective readings in the parallels are: SĀ 1077 at T II 281a16: “sage”, 牟尼, SĀ² 16 at T II 378c15: “such a man”, 如此人, EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b16: “venerable one”, 尊, T 118 at T II 509b13: “great sage”, 大聖, T 119 at T II 511a5: “recluse”, 沙門, and T 212 at T IV 704a6: “great sage”, 大聖. Thus, none of the Chinese versions supports the assumption that Aṅgulimāla's stanza could have referred to Śiva.

²⁵⁹ MN 86 at MN II 100,9, SĀ 1077 at T II 281a21, SĀ² 16 at T II 378c23, and T 119 at T II 511a8 present this information in verse form, a verse obviously spoken by the narrator of the discourse. EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b18 has Aṅgulimāla's reaction still in verse, but the Buddha's granting of ordination in prose, and T 118 at T II 509b15 has this whole part in prose.

²⁶⁰ T 119 at T II 511a10 and Ps III 334,13.

²⁶¹ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b23: “[as] you now have a shaven head, it is appropriate [for] you to discard the fetters, the eradication of the fetters yields great fruit, there will be no further sadness and vexation”, 汝今以剃頭, 除結亦當爾, 結滅成大果, 無復愁苦惱. T 202 at T IV 424a29 and its Tibetan counterpart in Schmidt 1843: 243,17 also locate Aṅgulimāla's stream-entry at this point of events, followed by reporting that soon after he became an arahant, cf. T 202 a T IV 424b3 and Schmidt 1843: 244,1.

²⁶² T 118 at T II 509b23 and T 119 at T II 511a19. In the case of T 119, this placement of his full awakening meets with an inner inconsistency, as later on in T 119 at T II 511c27 the Buddha instructs Aṅgulimāla “not to develop evil thoughts”, 勿發惡意, after he had been attacked by people while begging. If Aṅgulimāla had already been an arahant when this happened, there would have been no need for him to be instructed in this way.

²⁶³ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720b28 and T 119 at T II 551a23.

²⁶⁴ Ps III 335,1, a suggestion that seems somewhat out of proportion, given that according to MN 86 at MN II 100,24 King Pasenadi had five hundred men on horse-back at his disposal, which should be sufficient to handle a single brigand, without needing to ascertain beforehand the chances of defeat.

nadi had heard that the killer he wanted to capture had become a monk in the meantime. Pasenadi then decided to approach the Buddha in order to ascertain if this was true.²⁶⁵

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, as well as the individual translations, the Buddha told King Pasenadi that Aṅgulimāla had become a monk and was sitting close by.²⁶⁶ All versions report that the sight of Aṅgulimāla instilled fear in the king.²⁶⁷

After overcoming his fear, Pasenadi approached Aṅgulimāla and offered to support him with requisites.²⁶⁸ According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, Aṅgulimāla refused,²⁶⁹ as he had undertaken the ascetic practices of begging and wearing rag robes.²⁷⁰ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, as well as the individual translations, conclude their narration of this event with King Pasenadi's admiration of the Buddha's ability to tame Aṅgulimāla.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse next describes that Aṅgulimāla, by dint of practising in seclusion, became an arahant endowed with the six supernormal knowledges.²⁷¹ The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse turns to his attainment of full liberation only after reporting his intervention on behalf of a woman in labour.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, as well as the two individual translations, record this intervention in similar terms, describing that, while begging

MN II 101

MN II 102

²⁶⁵ T 212 at T IV 704b7.

²⁶⁶ EĀ 38.6 at T II 720c14 and T 119 at T II 511b9 additionally specify that Aṅgulimāla was seated in meditation. According to MN 86 at MN II 101,3, when the king arrived, the Buddha inquired if Pasenadi had been attacked by other kings, a question not recorded in the Chinese versions.

²⁶⁷ For King Pasenadi to find himself suddenly confronted with Aṅgulimāla in a situation where the king is not accompanied by his soldiers could indeed arouse fear, all the more since according to T 119 at T II 511a27 he had put aside his royal insignia, among them also his sword, before approaching the Buddha. Although the other versions do not explicitly mention his putting aside the sword, the same action can be assumed to be implicit in their report that he approached the Buddha, as it is customary conduct for a king when approaching a religious teacher to divest himself of his royal insignia, cf., e.g., MN 89 at MN II 119,27 and its parallels MĀ 213 at T I 795c12, T 1451 at T XXIV 237a27, and D (6) 'dul ba, tha 82b7 or Q (1035) de 79b5. For a listing of the five insignia in a similar situation cf. also the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 147,12 or Vaidya 1999: 91,12 (cf. also Upreti 1995: 106); an enumeration of the five insignia of a king can also be found in the Jain *Thāṇaṅga* 5.408 in Jambūvijaya 1985: 182,5.

²⁶⁸ Harvey 2009b: 58 notes that "once Aṅgulimāla was reformed by the Buddha, the king saw no reason to punish him ... he would respect him [as a monk], rather than seek to drive him from his kingdom".

²⁶⁹ MN 86 at MN II 102,14. According to EĀ 38.6 at T II 720c23, after the king's offer Aṅgulimāla "remained silent without answering", 默然不對, which in the discourses is a standard way of expressing acceptance. T 118 at T II 509c14 reports that the king left Aṅgulimāla after having "received approval", 獲許, which also gives the impression that Aṅgulimāla accepted the offer. Yet, EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a1 and T 118 at T II 509c19 report that Aṅgulimāla had undertaken the practice of begging and wearing rag robes, ascetic practices that would not be compatible with accepting the king's offer. T 119 at T II 511b18 also mentions the king's offer, but does not record how Aṅgulimāla reacted.

²⁷⁰ MN 86 at MN II 102,12. EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a1, T 118 at T II 509c19, and T 119 at T II 551a20 similarly note that Aṅgulimāla subsisted by begging alms and wearing rag robes.

²⁷¹ EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a7. T 118 at T II 509b23 and T 212 at T IV 704b4 also record that Aṅgulimāla had attained the six supernormal knowledges.

alms in town, Aṅgulimāla saw a woman in birth difficulties. According to one of the individual translations, the woman even addressed Aṅgulimāla and asked him for relief from her difficulties.²⁷² The Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* presents a variation to this tale, as it reports that the problem was not a woman in birth difficulties, but a female elephant in labour.²⁷³

MN II 103 According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, Aṅgulimāla reported what he had seen to the Buddha, whereon the Buddha told him to declare in front of the woman that, since his birth, he had never deprived a living being of life, wishing her well by the strength of this asseveration of truth. Aṅgulimāla objected that in this way he would be speaking a falsehood. In reply to this objection, the Buddha reformulated the statement, suggesting he should declare that since his “noble” birth, i.e., since his going forth, he had never consciously deprived a living being of life.²⁷⁴

One of the individual translations agrees with the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation on the Buddha’s first proposition and on Aṅgulimāla’s objection. According to this individual translation, in reply to Aṅgulimāla’s objection the Buddha explained that this statement was meant to refer to Aṅgulimāla’s “birth” as a monk, so that it was not a falsehood. Aṅgulimāla then made his actual asseveration of truth without using the qualification “noble”, simply asserting that since his birth he had not killed a single being.²⁷⁵

According to the other individual translation, however, the Buddha used the qualification “noble” already in his first proposition. Aṅgulimāla nevertheless objected, apparently because he had not realized the implication of the expression “noble birth”.²⁷⁶

The *Ekottarika-āgama* version also reports that the Buddha used the qualification “noble” already in his first proposition. Aṅgulimāla apparently straightaway understood

²⁷² T 118 at T II 509c21.

²⁷³ T 212 at T IV 704a11. The Chinese version of the “discourse on the wise and the fool”, T 202 at T IV 424b5, also introduces Aṅgulimāla’s asseveration of truth by reporting an elephant in labour, 象, while its Tibetan counterpart in Schmidt 1843: 244,4 speaks instead of a cow, *ba lang mo*. The *Dhammapada* commentary Dhp-a III 185,16 provides another relation between Aṅgulimāla and an elephant, narrating that, during a meal offering, King Pasenadi had elephants stationed near each monk. The elephant that had been placed close to Aṅgulimāla was untrained and fierce, yet due to the power of Aṅgulimāla it remained perfectly calm.

²⁷⁴ MN 86 at MN II 103,19: “since I was born with the noble birth, sister”, *yato aham, bhagini, ariyāya jātiyā jāto* (here and below, B^e-MN II 306,6+12, C^e-MN II 524,1+6, and S^e-MN II 485,3+8 read *yato 'ham*), whereas the earlier statement in MN 86 at MN II 103,13 reads *yato aham, bhagini, jāto* (B^e-MN II 306,30 and C^e-MN II 524 note 2 record a variant reading of the Buddha’s first instruction as *yato aham bhagini jātiyā jāto*). Masefield 1992: 306 note 12 sees the notion of a noble birth as “equivalent to the *upanaya-na* rite, the second ‘birth’ of the twice born *varṇas*”.

²⁷⁵ T 118 at T II 510a3: “from birth until now”, 從生以來. The *Udāna-(varga)*, T 212 at T IV 704a21, reports a similar asseveration of truth, which in its case helped the elephant out of its difficulties. A reference to this proclamation occurs also in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 568b19: “being ‘born’ from the Buddha’s discipline, you are then truly ‘born’, just like Aṅgulimāla”, 從佛戒所生, 爾乃是真生, 猶如驚崛魔.

²⁷⁶ T 119 at T II 511c5: “since my noble birth”, 我從聖生以來.

what was meant, as he did not object to the Buddha's proposition.²⁷⁷ Hence in these two versions, just as in the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, Aṅgulimāla's actual asseveration of truth claims harmless conduct since his "noble" birth.

The Pāli commentary explains that Aṅgulimāla found it difficult to obtain food when begging, since people were too afraid to approach him.²⁷⁸ In order to ameliorate this situation, the Buddha had instructed Aṅgulimāla to proclaim publicly in an asseveration of truth that he had completely given up his former murderous conduct and no longer harmed any living beings.

In line with the commentary's suggestion that Aṅgulimāla's appearance as a begging monk led to fear and negative reactions among the population, the Pāli *Vinaya* reports that the going forth of Aṅgulimāla had caused an uproar among the people. This then made the Buddha promulgate a rule against ordaining such brigands in the future.²⁷⁹

The Pāli and Chinese discourses agree that Aṅgulimāla's asseveration of truth proved its worth in helping the woman to overcome her difficulties.²⁸⁰ For an asseveration of truth to have its effect, Aṅgulimāla's proclamation would have to be worded in terms of "noble birth".

If his proclamation had been worded only in terms of "birth", as reported in one of the individual translations, this would have been a falsehood. Making a mental comment to himself that with "birth" only "ordination" is meant would not solve this problem, since everyone who hears this proclamation would understand it to refer to physical birth.²⁸¹ Only once the qualification "noble" is added to the statement would Aṅgulimāla's proclamation no longer be a falsehood and thereby become invested with

²⁷⁷ EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a20: "since my noble birth", 我從賢聖生已來.

²⁷⁸ Ps III 338,8.

²⁷⁹ The regulation in Vin I 74,34 prohibits ordaining a "robber who wears an emblem", *dhajabaddho coro*. Horner 1951/1982: 93 note 1 comments that "it is difficult to reconcile the above *Vinaya* ruling with the story of Aṅgulimāla's going forth", as recorded in MN 86. Yet, the introduction to this rule in Vin I 74,26 speaks of Aṅgulimāla, qualified as a *cora*, which leaves little doubt that the same person must be meant. Perhaps the rationale behind this rule is that, while the Buddha's decision to ordain Aṅgulimāla was based on an assessment of the latter's potential, other monks might not have such knowledge. In view of the repercussions that such an ordination can cause among the laity, this rule could have been intended to prevent other monks from imitating the Buddha's action by indiscriminately ordaining criminals.

²⁸⁰ His asseveration of truth has become a well-known protective chant, a *paritta*, already referred to in Mil 151,1 as the *Aṅgulimālaparitta* and still in use today, cf., e.g., Spiro 1970/1982: 146.

²⁸¹ The Buddha's paradoxical reply to Aṅgulimāla at their initial meeting, in which he proclaims that he has stopped while Aṅgulimāla has not yet stopped, differs in this respect. Although the statement in MN 86 at MN II 99,18: *thito aham*, "I am standing", is contrary to the real situation, as the Buddha is still walking, this proclamation does not have a potential to deceive. For Aṅgulimāla, it would have been immediately clear that the Buddha is still walking, making it self-evident that this proclamation is not intended literally, as can be seen by the circumstance that Aṅgulimāla immediately requests an explanation of its meaning. The enigmatic nature of the Buddha's statement is also highlighted by Kalupahana 2002: 124, who compares it to a "kung-an (*koan*) ... given to a disciple by a Ch'an (Zen) master". Aṅgulimāla's proclamation that since his birth he had never deprived a living being of life, however, would not necessarily have been a similarly self-evident riddle to anyone who heard it.

the transformative potential that ancient Indian thought apparently attributed to an asseveration of truth.²⁸²

As according to the commentarial explanation the purpose of Āṅgulimāla's declaration of truth was to assure the inhabitants of Sāvatthī that he was no longer dangerous, it is also not clear why the Buddha should at first instruct Āṅgulimāla to make a proclamation that is not true and thus would not have this effect, as reported in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse, it was only after Āṅgulimāla's objection that the Buddha reformulated the asseveration of truth in such a way that it was indeed true and thereby could have the effect for which it was meant.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version's presentation would imply that the Buddha instructed one of his disciples to speak what does to some degree amount to a falsehood, which would stand in contrast to the types of speech a Buddha would use according to other discourses.²⁸³ At an earlier point, the *Āṅgulimāla-sutta* itself in fact explicitly states that a Buddhist monk does not speak falsehood.²⁸⁴

The account given in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version and in one of the individual translations avoids such difficulties, as according to these versions the Buddha straightforwardly uses the formulation "noble birth", so that the question of speaking a falsehood does not arise in the first place.

Against the background information provided in the Pāli commentary, it would also fit the situation better if the Buddha were to phrase his instruction right away with the qualification "noble", as on hearing such a proclamation people in town might indeed have felt reassured that Āṅgulimāla's conduct had changed.

That Āṅgulimāla's proclamation of truth was aimed at the population in general is particularly evident in the individual translation, according to which the Buddha told Āṅgulimāla that he should deliver an exposition on the five precepts and their karmic fruits in the streets of the town before approaching the woman and making his declaration of truth.²⁸⁵

Even with the qualification "noble" the declaration of truth has a riddle-like effect, as can be seen in the individual translation according to which Āṅgulimāla at first did not understand the implications of the expression "noble birth". Hence, this formulation is startling enough to cause those who hear it to ponder over its meaning. In sum, given the narrative setting, the use of the qualification "noble" right from the outset would better fit the context.

²⁸² On the notion of an asseveration of truth and its effect cf. Brown 1968, id. 1972a, id. 1972b, Burlingame 1917, Coomaraswamy 1944, Evans 2007: 98, Fiordalis 2008: 102-107, Hopkins 1932: 317-323, Jones 1979: 140-143, Lüders 1959: 486-509, Schlingloff 1963b: 82-85, Venkatasubbiah 1940, Wayman 1968, and Zimmer 1951: 160-169; on the same in relation to *maitri* cf. Schmithausen 1997.

²⁸³ MN 58 at MN I 395,7 clarifies that the Buddha will only speak what is true. DN 16 at DN II 73,3 (= AN 7:20 at AN IV 18,2), MN 87 at MN II 108,12, AN 4:23 at AN II 24,5, and It 4:112 at It 122,1 confirm that a Tathāgata speaks only what is true.

²⁸⁴ MN 86 at MN II 99,19: "these recluses, sons of the Sakyans, speak the truth", *ime kho samanā sakyaputtiyā saccavādino*. The parallels do not record such a statement.

²⁸⁵ T 119 at T II 511c11.

The next event related in the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta*, an event recorded also in the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, the two individual translations, and the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*, confirms the impression that the asseveration of truth may have been intended to ameliorate the negative attitude of the population towards Aṅgulimāla. The Pāli and Chinese versions narrate that on one occasion people went so far as to throw sticks and stones at Aṅgulimāla, so that he came back from begging food with torn robes and a bleeding head. The *Udāna-(varga)* explains that the people who attacked him had lost some of their close relatives due to Aṅgulimāla's former murderous activities.²⁸⁶ The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions and one of the individual translations report that the Buddha told Aṅgulimāla that he should patiently bear the fruits of his deeds, which could have led to his suffering for many future life times.²⁸⁷

The Pāli and Chinese discourses record a set of stanzas spoken by Aṅgulimāla, stanzas found also in the *Aṅgulimāla Theragāthā*.²⁸⁸ While in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version these stanzas were spoken by Aṅgulimāla when he was alone in seclusion, according to the *Ekottarika-āgama* account and the individual translations he spoke them in the Buddha's presence.²⁸⁹

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version begins with three stanzas that revolve around the image of a moon in a sky free from clouds. The first stanza employs this image to illustrate overcoming negligence, the second stanza applies it to doing what is wholesome instead of what is evil, and in the third stanza this image illustrates how a young monk energetically applies himself to the Buddha's teaching.²⁹⁰ While all three stanzas recur

²⁸⁶ T 212 at T IV 704a27. A somewhat similar story can be found in the Jain *Antagaḍadasāo*, translated in Barnett 1907/1973: 91, where a Jain monk on his begging tour is attacked by relatives of his former victims. As a layman, he had been a garland-maker and had killed numerous people due to being possessed by a spirit. On one occasion, however, he was unable to get close to his prospective victim, who was a Jain disciple. Thereon the spirit left him and he went forth as a Jain monk, eventually reaching full liberation. The parallelism of several aspects of this tale to the story of Aṅgulimāla is remarkable.

²⁸⁷ MN 86 at MN II 104,13, EĀ 38.6 at T II 721a28, and T 119 at T II 511c27. T 118 does not record the Buddha's admonition, but turns directly to Aṅgulimāla's verses. According to the *Udāna-(varga)* account, T 212 at T IV 704b3, when Aṅgulimāla came back bleeding and with torn requisites, the Buddha gave him a long exposition that caused him to attain all four stages of awakening together with the six supernormal knowledges. The *Udāna-(varga)*'s sequence of narration differs from the other versions, as it has the episode with King Pasenadi only at this point, i.e., after Aṅgulimāla had made the asseveration of truth, had been attacked while going begging, and become an arahant.

²⁸⁸ Th 871-886; cf. also Franke 1912: 192-206 (who also covers the verses at MN II 99,25 / Th 866-870).

²⁸⁹ EĀ 38.6 at T II 721b2, T 118 at T II 510a9, and T 119 at T II 512a1.

²⁹⁰ MN 86 at MN II 104,21. The first of these three stanzas, which recurs at Dhp 172 and Th 871, has parallels in the Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* stanza 122 in Brough 1962/2001: 136, in the Patna *Dharmapada* stanza 20 in Cone 1989: 109 or in Roth 1980b: 99, in T 213 at T IV 785a25, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 16:5 in Bernhard 1965: 225 (cf. also stanza 189 in Nakatani 1987: 46) and in Beckh 1911: 53 or in Zongtse 1990: 165. The second stanza, which recurs at Dhp 173 and Th 872, has a parallel in the *Pravrajyāvastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, cf. Dutt 1984d: 56,6 and Nāther 1975: 48,12, cf. also Lévi 1932b: 28,35, in T 210 at T IV 562c25, T 211 at T IV 584b5, T 212 at T IV 704b25, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 16:9 in Bernhard 1965: 226 and in Beckh 1911: 54 or in Zongtse 1990: 166. The third stanza, which recurs at Dhp 382 and Th 873, has parallels in T 210

in one of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, the other *Samyukta-āgama* version has only the stanza on doing what is wholesome instead of what is evil.²⁹¹ The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and one of the individual translations have only the other two stanzas, which apply the image of the moon free from clouds to no longer doing evil and to a young monk's practice of the Buddha's teaching.²⁹²

The stanza on overcoming former evil by doing what is wholesome stands at the heart of the *Udāna-(varga)* account of Aṅgulimāla, according to which this poetic declaration forms part of the Buddha's reply to King Pasenadi's inquiry as to how a mass murderer could possibly become an arahant.²⁹³

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues with stanzas expressing Aṅgulimāla's wish that his enemies might hear the Dharma and develop patience, as then they would not wish to harm him.²⁹⁴ The same topic is taken up in one of the *Samyukta-āgama* versions, according to which Aṅgulimāla highlighted his practice of patience towards those who feel resentment towards him.²⁹⁵

This is noteworthy, since even though this *Samyukta-āgama* version does not record Aṅgulimāla's experience of being attacked while begging alms, the way the stanza is formulated implies an accident of this kind. The *Ekottarika-āgama* version and the individual translations, in contrast, do not have such a stanza, even though they earlier related that Aṅgulimāla had been attacked while begging alms.

Hence, the fact that the *Samyukta-āgama* versions do not mention certain events recorded in the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* and the other Chinese versions does not necessarily mean that these tales were not known to the *Samyukta-āgama* reciters. Perhaps the reciters that transmitted this *Samyukta-āgama* collection knew of these stories as a sepa-

at T IV 562c23, T 211 at T IV 584b3, T 212 at T IV 704c14, T 213 at T IV 785b2, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 16:7 in Bernhard 1965: 226 (cf. also stanza 191 in Nakatani 1987: 46) and in Beckh 1911: 54 or in Zongtse 1990: 165.

²⁹¹ SĀ 1077 at T II 281b11+15+19 and SĀ² 16 at T II 379a15. SĀ² 16 continues with a stanza on overcoming former negligence that, however, does not employ the moon imagery.

²⁹² EĀ 38.6 at T II 721b17+21 and T 119 at T II 512a14+16. EĀ 38.6 repeats these two stanzas with a change of image, as it speaks additionally also of the sun that is free from clouds (the second of these two stanzas, however, has the moon as a 元 and 明 variant reading for the sun). T 118 at T II 510a24 +26 takes up this alternative theme and illustrates overcoming former negligence and no longer doing evil with a sunrise unobstructed by clouds, while in the case of a young monk who energetically practises the Buddha's teaching this version uses the image of the full moon, without referring to the absence of the clouds.

²⁹³ T 212 at T IV 704b25. Dhp-a III 170,9 also quotes this stanza in relation to Aṅgulimāla, although according to its report the question about Aṅgulimāla's ability to become an arahant arose after his death and was posed by other monks.

²⁹⁴ MN 86 at MN II 104,27.

²⁹⁵ The reference to those who feel resentment towards Aṅgulimāla occurs in SĀ 1077 at T II 281b25 and is followed in SĀ 1077 at T II 281b27 by: "because of receiving the Buddha's kindness and strength, I have loving kindness and practise forbearance, and always praise patience", 蒙佛恩力故, 我慈行忍辱, 亦常讚歎忍 (adopting the 元 and 明 variant reading 慈 instead of 怨). According to SĀ² 16 at T II 379a21, Aṅgulimāla similarly said: "people, who get [to hear] my words, [may they] all discard the bondage of resentment [from their mind]", 諸人得我說, 皆除怨結心.

rate discourse, or as part of their respective commentaries. The two *Samyukta-āgama* versions are rather brief and most of their presentation is in verse. This suggests them to be comparable to the *Aṅgulimāla Theragāthā*. The *Theragāthā* account also refers to several events from Aṅgulimāla's life only implicitly, without giving the full tale, a tale narrated in full only in its commentary.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues with two stanzas that compare abilities in various crafts to the wise who tame themselves,²⁹⁶ followed by proclaiming that Aṅgulimāla had been tamed without external force.²⁹⁷ Similar stanzas occur in the *Samyukta-āgama* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, as well as in the individual translations.²⁹⁸

Another Pāli stanza highlights that Aṅgulimāla already now experienced the fruits of his evil deeds. The *Samyukta-āgama* version reports the same, thereby again suggesting that the story of how he was attacked while going begging was at the background of its verses.²⁹⁹

The Pāli version concludes with Aṅgulimāla's proclamation that he had reached the goal, a proclamation found at an earlier point also in the Chinese versions.³⁰⁰ The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse and one of the individual translations continue after these stanzas by reporting that the Buddha declared Aṅgulimāla to be foremost in understanding quickly.³⁰¹ This declaration could refer to his swift comprehension at the time of his conversion. According to the *Ekottarika-āgama* version, the Buddha continued by narrating a former life of Aṅgulimāla at the time of Kassapa Buddha, explaining that those who in his present life had become his victims had killed him in that former life.³⁰²

²⁹⁶ MN 86 at MN II 105,5. This stanza recurs in Dhp 80, Dhp 145, Th 19, and Th 877, with parallels in T 210 at T IV 564a9, T 211 at T IV 587b28, T 212 at T IV 707c27, T 213 at T IV 785c22, and in the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* stanza 17:10 in Bernhard 1965: 236 (cf. also stanza 214 in Nakatani 1987: 50) and in Beckh 1911: 57 or in Zongtse 1990: 176.

²⁹⁷ MN 86 at MN II 105,7. This stanza recurs in Vin II 196,3 in the context of the Buddha's taming of the elephant Nālāgiri, thereby providing yet another link between Aṅgulimāla and an elephant.

²⁹⁸ SĀ 1077 at T II 281b7, SĀ² 16 at T II 379a9, EĀ 38.6 at T II 721b13, T 118 at T II 510a22 (without reference to crafts), and T 119 at T II 512a18.

²⁹⁹ According to SĀ 1077 at T II 281b24, Aṅgulimāla had “already experienced the fruits of evil” (i.e., of the evil deeds mentioned in the line before), 已受於惡報.

³⁰⁰ SĀ 1077 at T II 281b6, SĀ² 16 at T II 379a7, EĀ 38.6 at T II 721b8, T 118 at T II 510a15, and T 119 at T II 512a9. MN 86 at MN II 105,21+23 introduces this and the preceding stanza with Aṅgulimāla's assertion that he has made a welcome choice, an assertion not recorded in the Chinese versions. The first of these two stanzas recurs in Th 9, spoken by the monk Pilindavaccha. A similar stanza can be found in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 156,7: *svāgatañ te vyavasitañ, naitad duścintitam tvayā, pravibakteṣu dharmeṣu, yac chreṣṭhaṁ tad upāgama*, here spoken by the Buddha.

³⁰¹ EĀ 38.6 at T II 722c20: “among my disciples, the monk Aṅgulimāla is reckoned foremost in intelligence and quick understanding”, 我弟子中, 第一聰明捷疾智者, 所謂鳶掘魔比丘是. T 119 at T II 512a27: “among my disciples, the monk Aṅgulimāla is reckoned the foremost monk in quick understanding”, 我聲聞中, 第一比丘有捷疾智, 所謂指鬚比丘是.

³⁰² EĀ 38.6 at T II 722c5+14, at which point EĀ 38.6 augments the number of his victims to eighty-thousand, 八萬. T 119 at T II 511c8 goes further, since it states that he had killed and harmed innumerable hundred-thousands of living beings, 殺害無數百千眾生. The Chinese *Udāna-(varga)* T 212 at T IV 704b27 similarly notes that he killed and harmed innumerable thousands of men, 數千人.

Looking back on the *Āngulimāla-sutta* and its parallels, it is noteworthy that this discourse is an extended narration with relatively few parts that purport to be direct speech by the Buddha.³⁰³ From the perspective of oral transmission, the *Āngulimāla-sutta* is thus closer in kind to the narrative material found usually in the commentaries.

The somewhat commentarial character of major parts of the present discourses, together with the fascinating contrast between the bloody-handed brigand Āngulimāla and the arahant monk Āngulimāla, may account for the considerable differences found between the various versions and for the recurring tendency to exaggerate aspects of the narration, a tendency evident in nearly all versions.

Despite all variations, the central message of the discourse remains the same, in that it throws into relief the Buddha's ability to transform even an abominable criminal into a saint.

MN 87 *Piyajātika-sutta*

The *Piyajātika-sutta*, the “discourse on [the consequences that] arise from affection”, explains why sorrow arises from those one holds dear. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*, a parallel in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, a parallel in an individual translation, and a fourth parallel in an *Udāna-(varga)* extant in Chinese.³⁰⁴

³⁰³ A word count of MN 86 indicates that only about 11% of the total text is presented as being spoken by the Buddha, and even the total percentage of direct speech (including the use of direct speech to report thoughts) only accounts for about 60% of the whole text. Compared to other discourses, this is a remarkably low percentage, since an average *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse will have an introduction and conclusion section by the reciters, but the main body of the text will be almost entirely in direct speech. This is even the case for predominantly narrative discourses, like for example MN 81 or MN 83. In MN 81, about 94% of the discourse is presented as being spoken by the Buddha (direct speech accounts for about 96% of MN 81), while in MN 83 about 96% of the whole discourse is presented as being spoken by the Buddha (direct speech amounts to about 98% of MN 83). Notably, in the case of MN 81 and MN 83 variations between the Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit, and Tibetan versions are less prominent than in the case of MN 86 and its parallels. This ties in with an observation made by von Simson 1977: 484, who noticed that in texts of the Sarvāstivāda tradition there is a strong tendency to replace phrases of the type *yena ... tenopasamkrāntah* with *yena ... tenopajagāma*. Yet, in places where this expression is used in direct speech by the Buddha (i.e., the Buddha reports how someone came to see him) the old form remains. Von Simson concludes that this shows the respect the reciters had for what they perceived as the word of the Buddha, which was kept in the old form, while parts of the discourses not held to have been spoken by the Buddha could more easily be changed. The same respect may also account for the occurrence of less variations in the case of MN 81 or MN 83, where greater parts of the discourse were considered to be original Buddha word, compared to the variations found in the case of MN 86, where only a minor fraction of the discourse, about 11%, was reckoned to have been spoken by the Buddha.

³⁰⁴ The parallels are MĀ 216 at T I 800c-802a, EĀ 13.3 at T II 571b-572c, T 91 at T I 915a-916a, and T 212 at T IV 649c8-650a29. According to the information given in the Taishō edition, T 91 was translated by Ān Shīgāo (安世高). MĀ 216, EĀ 13.3, T 91, and T 212 agree with MN 87 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī. MĀ 216 has the title “discourse on [what] arises [from] affection”, 愛生經, while T 91 has the title “discourse spoken by the Buddha to a Brahmin who did not separate [himself] from thoughts of affection for his dead son”, 佛說婆羅門子命終愛念不離經. The summary verse at T

The *Piyajātika-sutta* and its parallels begin by describing how a householder, who was mourning the loss of his only son, approached the Buddha.³⁰⁵ On seeing the householder's condition, the Buddha commented that sorrow and grief arise from those one holds dear.³⁰⁶ According to the *Piyajātika-sutta* and its parallels, the householder disapproved of this proposition, got up and left.³⁰⁷ He then repeated the Buddha's comment to some gamblers, who agreed with him that those one holds dear are rather a source of happiness and delight.

Eventually King Pasenadi came to hear about this conversation and confronted Queen Mallikā with the statement made by the Buddha. When she expressed her agreement with the Buddha's proposition, King Pasenadi was dissatisfied, as he took her facile agreement to be a sign of blind submission to whatever her teacher said.³⁰⁸ According

II 576a6 refers to EĀ 13.3 as 竹脢, which could be a scribal error for 竹脢, the name of the Brahmin sent in EĀ 13.3 at T II 572a8 by Queen Mallikā to the Buddha. For a remark on MĀ 216 cf. Minh Chau 1964/1991: 72. EĀ 13.3 has been translated by Huyen-Vi 1990: 81-86. The first part of the *Piyajātika-sutta* recurs, moreover, in a Chinese *Jātaka* collection, in the fifteenth chapter of the “discourse on [former] births”, 生經, T 154 at T III 80c, which according to the Taishō edition was translated by Dharmarakṣa, cf. also Boucher 1996: 269.

³⁰⁵ While MN 87 at MN II 106,3 and EĀ 13.3 at T II 571b29 introduce the Buddha's visitor as a “householder”, *gahapati*/長者, according to MĀ 216 at T I 800c22, T 91 at T I 915a8, and T 212 at T IV 649c8 he was a Brahmin, 梵志 or 婆羅門.

³⁰⁶ While in MĀ 216 at T I 801a3, T 91 at T I 915a17, and T 212 at T IV 649c19 the Buddha's remark is as brief as in MN 87 at MN II 106,17, according to EĀ 13.3 at T II 571c10 he spoke in more detail, explaining to the householder that “birth, old age, disease, and death are permanent conditions in the world, to be separated from what one has affection is *dukkha*, to be together with what one dislikes is *dukkha*, the loss of your son is [due to] impermanence”, 生老病死世之常法, 恩愛離苦, 怨憎會苦, 子捨汝無常. In this way, EĀ 13.3 seems to draw out the implications of the short comment made by the Buddha in the other versions, where he only gives a brief pointer to the first noble truth, in the sense that dissociation from what is liked causes the arising of *dukkha*, cf., e.g., SN 56:11 at SN V 421,22: *piyehi vippayogo dukkho*. A more detailed exposition of the same theme can be found in Ud 8:8 at Ud 91,12. This discourse starts with a situation similar to MN 87, as it records how Visākhā was mourning the death of a grandson. The Buddha then asked Visākhā if she would like to have as many children as there were inhabitants in Sāvatthī. When she enthusiastically agreed, the Buddha made her realize that in Sāvatthī every day someone passes away, so that on having so many children she would be in continuous mourning. He then concluded his exposition by proclaiming that those who hold a hundred dear will suffer a hundred times, Ud 8:8 at Ud 92,2, while those who hold nothing dear, will not suffer, Ud 8:8 at Ud 92,16. Another discourse in the same collection, Ud 2:7 at Ud 14,20, also takes up the theme of the loss of someone's only son and, similar to MN 87, recommends detachment from what is dear in order to avoid being afflicted by grief.

³⁰⁷ While according to MN 87 at MN II 106,19 and T 212 at T IV 649c20 the householder expressed his disagreement once and then left, according to MĀ 216 at T I 801a7 and T 91 at T I 915a20 the Buddha repeated his statement three times, each time being contradicted by his visitor. According to EĀ 13.3 at T II 571c13, the householder just left, without voicing his disagreement at all. In the version of this story found in T 154 at T III 80c24, however, on hearing the Buddha's proposition the householder suddenly had an insight into impermanence. After taking the precepts from the Buddha, he bowed down and left, apparently satisfied with the Buddha's explanation, with which T 154 concludes.

³⁰⁸ While according to MN 87 at MN II 108,1 and EĀ 13.3 at T II 572a7 the king was displeased to the ex-

to all versions, with the exception of the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*, a Brahmin was sent to the Buddha to find out whether he had indeed stated that grief arises from those one holds dear.³⁰⁹

MN II 108 The Buddha then illustrated his proposition to this Brahmin by describing how the death of different family members had caused sorrow and grief to various people.³¹⁰ To bring home the same point, he related a former case of suicide, which had been caused by a woman's relatives trying to separate her from her husband and marry her to someone else. The *Ekottarika-āgama* account indicates that the reason for wanting to remarry her was that the husband had become poor.³¹¹ All versions of this episode record that the husband killed his wife and himself. The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* versions indicate that he undertook this act in the hope that he and his wife would be together in the next world.³¹²

MN II 110 According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* and the *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, the Brahmin reported the Buddha's exposition to Queen Mallikā, whereas in the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation he only confirmed to King Pasenadi that the Buddha attributed the arising of sorrow and grief to those one holds dear. The four discourse versions continue by describing how Mallikā illustrated the Buddha's statement to King Pasenadi by asking him if he would feel sorrow or grief if something were to happen to those close to him, to his subjects, or even to herself. Her eloquent presentation in front of the king is also recorded in the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*. In each case, the king had to agree that this would cause him sorrow and grief.

In the *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions, her exposition appears to be based on what she had heard from the Brahmin whom she had sent to the Buddha. In the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the individual translation, however, she has not yet

tent of asking Mallikā to leave, according to MĀ 216 at T I 801b4, T 91 at T I 915b14, and T 212 at T IV 650a7 the situation did not escalate up to this point.

³⁰⁹ While MN 87 at MN II 108,3 and EĀ 13.3 at T II 572a8 report that Mallikā dispatched the Brahmin, according to MĀ 216 at T I 801b5 and T 91 at T I 915b14 Pasenadi dispatched the Brahmin, following a suggestion made by Mallikā to verify the Buddha's statement. T 212 at T IV 650a7 does not have the episode with the Brahmin at all, as here Mallikā on her own engages the king in the question and answer session that in the other versions she undertakes once the Brahmin has come back from his mission.

³¹⁰ MN 87 at MN II 108,28 stands alone in working through the same set of family members twice, first from the perspective of a woman who mourns the loss of various family members and then again from the perspective of a man who mourns the loss of various family members. MĀ 216 at T I 801b19 and T 91 at T I 915b28 just have a human being, 人, as the subject of their treatment, while EĀ 13.3 at T II 572a22 speaks of a householder, 長者. Another difference is that while MN 87 and EĀ 13.3 present their various cases as actual happenings that took place in Sāvatthī, in MĀ 216 and T 91 these cases are not connected to any particular location.

³¹¹ EĀ 13.3 at T II 572b1; cf. also the related story in T 211 at T IV 602c17, translated in Willemen 1999: 185.

³¹² MN 87 at MN II 110,1: “we will both be [together] after death”, *ubho pecca bhavissāmā ti*, and MĀ 216 at T I 801c3: “[we will] together reach the next world”, 偕至後世. According to EĀ 13.3 at T II 572b11, however, he said: “we two will take hold of death together”, 我二人俱取死, and according to T 91 at T I 915c11 he said: “[we] shall leave together”, 當共同去.

had a chance to hear the Buddha's explanation, as all the Brahmin did on returning to the palace was to confirm to Pasenadi and Mallikā that the statement attributed to the Buddha had indeed been made by him, without relating the exposition the Buddha had given to explain this statement. Thus in these versions, her exposition is based on her own wisdom, as is the case in the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*, where no messenger was sent to the Buddha at all.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Ekottarika-āgama* versions record that Pasenadi formally expressed his respect for the Buddha.³¹³ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the individual translation, and the Chinese *Udāna-(varga)*, he even took refuge and declared himself to be a disciple of the Buddha.³¹⁴

MN 88 *Bāhitika-sutta*³¹⁵

The *Bāhitika-sutta*, the “discourse on the foreign cloth”, records King Pasenadi's attempt to ascertain the Buddha's moral integrity during a discussion with Ānanda. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama*.³¹⁶

The *Bāhitika-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel begin by describing that King Pasenadi saw Ānanda from afar and inquired from his minister if this was indeed the monk Ānanda. In the *Madhyama-āgama* version, Ānanda in a similar way also inquired

³¹³ MN 87 at MN II 112,3 and EĀ 13.3 at T II 572c18. EĀ 13.3 continues by noting that King Pasenadi's esteem for Mallikā increased considerably after the explanation he had heard from her. According to the same version, the Buddha came to hear of the conversation that had taken place between Pasenadi and Mallikā and approved of her exposition, declaring her to be chief among his realized female lay disciples for her firm faith, EĀ 13.3 at T II 572c27: 我聲聞中, 第一得證優婆斯, 篤信牢固. While the list of eminent lay disciples in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* does not mention Mallikā, its *Ekottarika-āgama* counterpart in EĀ 7.2 at T II 560b11 declares her to be foremost among those who offer support to the Tathāgata, 供養如來.

³¹⁴ MĀ 216 at T I 802a4, T 91 at T I 916a8, and T 212 at T IV 650a27. On King Pasenadi's conversion cf. also below p. 519.

³¹⁵ S^e-MN II 498,1 has the title *Bāhitiya-sutta*.

³¹⁶ The parallel is MĀ 214 at T I 797c-799b, which agrees with MN 88 on locating the discourse in Jeta's Grove by Sāvatthī and on entitling the discourse after the cloth given by Pasenadi to Ānanda, the 鞭訶提, corresponding to the *bāhitikā* in MN 88. For a translation of MĀ 214, together with extracts from the present study, cf. Anālayo 2007h. According to the commentarial explanation at Ps III 347,13, this cloth was called *bāhitikā* because it came from a foreign country, *bāhitirāṭha*, an explanation followed by Chalmers 1927: 61, who renders the term as “piece of foreign fabric”, and by Horner 1957/1970: 296, who translates it as “foreign cloth”. PED: 486 s.v. *bāhitikā*, however, derives the word from *bāheti*, “to ward off”, and suggests it to refer to a mantle or wrapper that “keeps out” the cold or the wind. This *bāhitikā* was apparently of considerable size, as according to MN 88 at MN II 116,30 it measured sixteen by eight, *solasasamā āyāmena atthasamā vitthārena*. The commentary, Ps III 347,15, explains these measurements to refer to the cubit, an understanding also reflected in MĀ 214 at T I 799a22: 長十六肘, 廣八肘. Hence, this cloth would have been too large for serving as a mantle or wrapper. The same size would, however, suffice for making three robes, for which purpose according to both versions Pasenadi offered it to Ānanda. Therefore it seems to me preferable to follow the commentarial explanation and take *bāhitikā* to stand for a “foreign cloth”.

from another monk if the person they saw riding an elephant was indeed King Pasenadi, an inquiry not recorded in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version.

In relation to this difference, someone not too well acquainted with the Buddhist monk community might indeed be in doubt if a monk he sees at a distance is Ānanda. In contrast, it is more difficult to imagine that anyone could be uncertain about the identity of the king of the country. Even if someone should never have seen King Pasenadi, the very fact that the person he sees is riding an elephant, presumably wears emblems of a king (such as turban, fly whisk, royal umbrella, etc.) and is accompanied by an entourage should make it evident that this is the king of the country.³¹⁷ Hence, the additional inquiry found in the *Madhyama-āgama* could be an attempt to counterbalance the loss of status incurred by Ānanda through not being immediately recognized by Pasenadi.

The two versions' description of events does in fact show a recurring tendency to enhance Ānanda's status. Thus according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account, King Pasenadi simply rode on his elephant close to Ānanda and in polite terms requested a meeting on the bank of the nearby river. According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, he at first sent a messenger to tell Ānanda that Pasenadi paid homage to him and asked him to stop. Then Pasenadi came close on his elephant, dismounted the elephant, and approached Ānanda on foot, paid homage, and politely asked for a meeting at the bank of the river nearby. Once Ānanda had expressed his agreement, Pasenadi remounted his elephant to approach the riverbank, where he got down again from the elephant and again paid homage to Ānanda. This procedure seems rather complicated for the simple task of asking a monk for a meeting. The way King Pasenadi acts in the *Madhyama-āgama* account reads more realistic in comparison.

MN II 113 The two versions agree that, on reaching the riverbank, Pasenadi offered his elephant rug to Ānanda, which the latter declined to use.³¹⁸ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version, Pasenadi repeated this offer three times, so that Ānanda consequently refused three times. While in the *Majjhima-nikāya* version King Pasenadi simply put his ques-

³¹⁷ A relief on a pillar of the Bhārhut Stūpa, reproduced in Cunningham 1879 plate 13 (described on p. 91), shows Pasenadi in a chariot attended by three servants, one of which holds an umbrella over the king while the other holds a chauri (fly whisk). The chariot is preceded by footmen and a horseman, and followed by other men and elephants. Although in this instance Pasenadi rides a chariot and not an elephant, this representation gives some idea of the pomp with which an ancient Indian king like Pasenadi would set out (Barua 1934a: 46 suggests that this relief portrays Pasenadi's visit to the Buddha described in MN 89). This makes it improbable that someone who met him on the roads of the city could have been in doubts whether the person he saw was the king of the country. In fact, according to information provided by Megasthenes, in ancient India "a private person is not allowed to keep ... an elephant. These animals are held to be the special property of the king", cf. McCrindle 1877: 90. Independent of the accuracy of this description, the fact that according to both versions Pasenadi was riding an elephant and was in the company of a minister should have been sufficiently clear indications regarding the identity of the elephant's rider.

³¹⁸ MN 88 at MN II 113,27: *hatthatthara* (S^o-MN II 500,3 reads *kaṭṭhatthare*, using the same term as in the case of MN 82, cf. above p. 461 note 106) and MĀ 214 at T I 798a2: 象驥 (adopting the 元 and 明 variant reading 驥 instead of 驥).

tion, according to the *Madhyama-āgama* account he at first asked permission to pose a question, which Ānanda readily granted.³¹⁹

The tendency to enhance the respectful behaviour shown by King Pasenadi towards Ānanda, found in both versions, could be due to what according to tradition forms the background to the question King Pasenadi is about to ask. The Pāli commentary explains that King Pasenadi's inquiry was related to the murder of the female wanderer Sundarī.³²⁰

A discourse in the *Udāna* reports this incident in detail, relating that other wanderers had wanted to discredit the Buddha. For this purpose, they asked the female wanderer Sundarī to visit Jeta's Grove on frequent occasions. When they knew that her visits had become public knowledge, they killed Sundarī and buried her in Jeta's Grove. Once her body had been discovered in Jeta's Grove, the other wanderers went around town, announcing this discovery and accusing the Buddhist monks of having taken their pleasure with Sundarī and then killed her.³²¹ People believed this defamation and started to revile the monks.

The Buddha thereon instructed the monks that they should react to such abuse by pronouncing a stanza on the evil destiny of those who makes false allegations and of those

³¹⁹ MĀ 214 at T I 798a9: "I would like to ask a question, will you allow me to ask it", 欲有所問, 聽我問耶? Such a formal request for permission to ask a question is a recurrent feature of *Madhyama-āgama* discourses, whereas it is not found in the corresponding *Majjhima-nikāya* parallels, cf., e.g., MĀ 34 at T I 475a17 and MN 124 at MN III 125,5, MĀ 79 at T I 549c26 and MN 127 at MN III 145,28, MĀ 144 at T I 652a12 and MN 107 at MN III 1,7, MĀ 145 at T I 654a5 and MN 108 at MN III 8,4, MĀ 150 at T I 661a4 and MN 96 at MN II 177,21, MĀ 151 at T I 664a12 and MN 93 at MN II 148,23, MĀ 152 at T I 667a17 and MN 99 at MN II 197,6, MĀ 171 at T I 706b18 and MN 136 at MN III 207,9, MĀ 173 at T I 710a10 and MN 126 at MN III 138,10, MĀ 198 at T I 757a9 and MN 125 at MN III 128,16, MĀ 210 at T I 788a19 and MN 44 at MN I 299,7, MĀ 211 at T I 790b14 and MN 43 at MN I 292,8, MĀ 212 at T I 793b15 and MN 90 at MN II 126,32, MĀ 217 at T I 802a28 and MN 52 at MN I 349,24. Hence the occurrence of this formulaic request in MĀ 214 may just be an instance of a pericope used by the *Madhyama-āgama* reciters, without necessarily being related to the particular event recorded in MĀ 214.

³²⁰ Ps III 346,16: *sundarivatthusmim uppannam idam suttam*.

³²¹ Ud 4:8 at Ud 43-45. An account of the same incident in Dhp-a III 474,3 differs in so far as it presents the attempt at defamation as being more directly aimed at the Buddha. According to its presentation, on coming from Jeta's Grove Sundarī had told people that she had spent the night with the Buddha. Thus, the rumour spread by the wanderers was that the Buddha's disciples murdered her in order to cover up the Buddha's misconduct (cf. also Jā II 416,5). A version of this incident in the Chinese counterpart to the *Aṭṭhaka-vagga* (the Pāli version is only found in the commentary, cf. Pj II 518-519) agrees with Dhp-a that the purpose of the plot was to bring the Buddha into disrepute, cf. T 198 at T IV 176c3, translated in Bapat 1945: 156-158; for a parallel in the *Udānālankāra*, preserved in Tocharian, cf. fragment 16b4-6 in Sieg 1949: 29. For the plot to be aimed specifically at the Buddha would in fact fit the *Bāhitikasutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel better, as in both versions King Pasenadi inquired about the moral integrity of the Buddha himself, not about the morality of the monks in general. Fǎxiān (法顯) and Xuánzàng (玄奘) refer to the place where Sundarī had been buried, cf. T 2085 at T LI 860c17 and T 2087 at T LI 899c20, translated in Legge 1886/1998: 59 and Beal 1884/2001b: 7, for further references cf. Deeg 2005: 307-308 and Lamotte 1944/1981: 507 note 1. Feer 1897: 316 suggests that this tale and the story of Ciñcamāṇavikā may be derivatives of a single event.

who deny a misdeed they have done.³²² This served its purpose and convinced people of the innocence of the Buddhist monks.

Against this background, it becomes understandable why the *Bāhitika-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel are at pains to show that King Pasenadi did not exhibit any disrespect to Ānanda, even though his mission was to inquire into the moral integrity of Ānanda's teacher, the Buddha.

According to both versions, King Pasenadi went about this inquiry by asking Ānanda if the Buddha would undertake a bodily deed censured by other Brahmins and recluses. Ānanda denied this, making a point of qualifying in his answer that the Buddha would not undertake a bodily deed censured by "wise" Brahmins and recluses.³²³

The point of this additional qualification appears to be that Ānanda wanted to distinguish between righteous censure by "wise" recluses and Brahmins and unjustified criticism that presumably sometimes had been raised by contemporary recluses and Brahmins against the Buddha.

MN II 114 The two versions record that King Pasenadi expressed his appreciation for the finer distinction introduced by Ānanda in this way. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version reports that the king did this by proclaiming that, what he had not been able to accomplish with his question, Ānanda had accomplished with his reply.³²⁴ According to the *Madhyama-*

³²² Dhp 306: "he who speaks falsehood and who disclaims what he has done goes to hell", *abhūtavādī nirayam upeti*, *yo vā pi katvā na karomi c' āha* (C^e-Dhp 100,14 and S^e-Dhp 55,14: *karomī ti*), a stanza also found in Sn 3:10 at Sn 661 (in relation to the monk Kokālika), in Ud 4:8 at Ud 45,10, and in It 2:11 at It 42,18. Parallels to this stanza can be found in stanza 269 of the Gāndhārī *Dharmapada* in Brough 1962/2001: 161, stanza 114 of the Patna *Dharmapada* in Cone 1989: 132 or Roth 1980b: 107, T 210 at T IV 570a7, T 212 at T IV 663c29, T 213 at T IV 781b3, and stanza 8:1 of the Sanskrit and Tibetan *Udāna-(varga)* in Bernhard 1965: 161 (cf. also stanza 83 in Nakatani 1987: 28 and the study of 8:1c in Schmithausen 1970: 83) and in Beckh 1911: 29 or in Zongtse 1990: 98. Rau 1959: 173 notes that a similar stanza occurs in the *Mahābhārata* (Mbh 12.197.3). According to the background narration in T 212 at T IV 663c18, the Buddha spoke this stanza in reply to a woman who feigned to be pregnant by tying a piece of wood in front of her belly and then publicly accused him of being responsible for her pregnancy. This account reminds of the story of Ciñcamāṇavikā described at Dhp-a III 178,4 and in Jā 472 at Jā IV 187,3, cf. also the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* version of this tale in Dutt 1984a: 161. For a more detailed examination of this stanza cf. also Palihawadana 2009 and Silk 2009.

³²³ Following B^e-MN II 316,6 and C^e-MN II 542,10, where the king spoke only of censure by recluses and Brahmins, *samaṇehi brāhmaṇehi*, while Ānanda in his reply spoke of "wise recluses and Brahmins", *samaṇehi brāhmaṇehi viññūhi*. This subtle difference is lost in E^e-MN II 113,33 and in S^e-MN II 500,8, as in these editions the king uses the qualification "wise" already in his question, so that the reply he receives corresponds to his question. On this reading, Ānanda's answer would be formulated exactly as the king's question, in which case there would be no reason for the king to express his appreciation of Ānanda's ability to accomplish something with his answer that had not been accomplished in the question, as reported in all editions of MN 88 (cf. quote in note 324 below). MĀ 214 at T I 798a12 agrees with the Burmese and Ceylonese editions, as it reports that the king formulated his question by referring only to Brahmins and recluses, whereas Ānanda in his reply additionally brought in the qualification "intelligent and wise", 聰明智慧.

³²⁴ MN 88 at MN II 114,7: "what we have not been able to accomplish by [our] question, that the venerable Ānanda has accomplished by answering the question", *yam hi mayam ... nāsakkhimha pañhenā*

āgama version, the king went so far as to repeat his first question, this time with the qualification “wise”, thereby acknowledging that his question should from the outset have been phrased in the way Ānanda had formulated his reply.³²⁵

In both versions, King Pasenadi next inquired about the nature of a censurable deed. This inquiry proceeds, via a series of alternative terms, to the definition of a censurable deed to be a deed that leads to one’s own affliction and to the affliction of others, being a deed that causes an increase of unwholesomeness.

While the *Madhyama-āgama* version examines only bodily conduct in this way, the *Majjhima-nikāya* version applies a similar examination also to verbal and mental conduct.³²⁶

The *Madhyama-āgama* version continues to explore the nature of a censurable deed in additional detail, indicating that such a censurable deed obstructs the attainment of Nirvāṇa and prevents one from knowing in accordance with reality what should be done and what should not be done.³²⁷

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, King Pasenadi concluded his examination of the nature of unwholesome deeds by inquiring from Ānanda if the Buddha recommended the abandoning of all unwholesome states. His question in the *Madhyama-āgama* version was instead why the Buddha would not undertake unwholesome conduct.³²⁸ Both versions report Ānanda replying that the Buddha had eradicated all unwholesomeness and was endowed with wholesome qualities. The *Bāhitika-sutta* and its parallel continue by applying their respective treatments to the complementary case of wholesome deeds.

According to both versions, King Pasenadi was so delighted by Ānanda’s exposition that he would have given him even an elephant, a horse, or a village, if such gifts had been allowable to a monk.³²⁹ The two versions agree that Pasenadi offered Ānanda a

MN II 115

MN II 116

paripūretum, tam ... āyasmatā ānandena pañhassa veyyākaranena paripūritam (B^e-MN II 316,14 and S^e-MN II 500,16: *yañ hi*).

³²⁵ MĀ 214 at T I 798a21.

³²⁶ MN 88 at MN II 114,30. When evaluating this difference, the treatment in MĀ 214 would seem sufficient in the present context. The background to the king’s inquiry is an allegation of murder, so that it would be natural for the king to inquire about bodily conduct. A case could still be made for verbal conduct, since the speaking of falsehood in the sense of a denial to have anything to do with the murder could also be pertinent. Once this much has been ascertained, however, to continue examining mental conduct would not add further proof to the king’s inquiry. In the discourses, it is a standard procedure to present conduct from the perspective of its bodily, verbal, and mental aspects, so that it could easily have happened during the process of transmission that an occurrence of bodily conduct on its own, or perhaps of bodily and verbal conduct, was ‘completed’ so as to cover mental conduct as well.

³²⁷ This exposition in MĀ 214 at T I 798b4 brings to mind the four ways of undertaking things, examined in MN 46 at MN I 310,10.

³²⁸ MĀ 214 at T I 798b21: “what is the reason why the Tathāgata does not undertake such things at all”, 如來何故終不行此法耶?

³²⁹ While according to MĀ 214 at T I 799a14 the king mentioned an ordinary elephant or horse (and additionally also cattle and sheep, women and gold), MN 88 at MN II 116,22 speaks of the *hatthiratana* and the *assaratana*, two properties of a wheel-turning king. Since Pasenadi was not a wheel-turning king,

precious cloth. After initial hesitation Ānanda accepted, convinced by Pasenadi's dexterous comparison of the nearby river that overflows after a heavy rain to the overflowing of merit that would accrue if Ānanda were to accept the cloth and share his old robes with other monks.

MN II 117 According to both versions, Ānanda reported the conversation he had with the king to the Buddha. The *Majjhima-nikāya* version concludes with a proclamation made by the Buddha to the monks, indicating that it was a great gain for King Pasenadi to have met and worshiped Ānanda. The *Madhyama-āgama* version does not report such a statement. According to its account, after hearing the conversation that had taken place, the Buddha simply concluded that Ānanda had replied in the proper way.

MN 89 *Dhammadetiya-sutta*

The *Dhammadetiya-sutta*, the “discourse on Dharma monuments”, describes the reasons for King Pasenadi's faith in the Buddha. This discourse has two Chinese parallels, found in the *Madhyama-āgama* and in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.³³⁰ An account of the events reported in the present discourse can also be found in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, preserved in Chinese and in Tibetan.³³¹ Besides, a few sections of a version of this discourse have been preserved in Gāndhārī fragments.³³² In addition to these parallel versions, a Pāli discourse similar in several respects to the *Dhammadetiya-sutta* can be found among the tens of the *Ānguttara-nikāya*.³³³

for him to proclaim his willingness to make a gift quite evidently beyond his abilities would have to have a symbolic sense. In fact, in SN 3:22 at SN I 97,6 and its parallel SĀ 1227 at T II 335b18 he similarly indicates that he would be willing to give away these two treasures if by doing so he could have prevented the passing away of his grandmother. However, in other parallels to SN 3:22, SĀ² 54 at T II 392b6, EĀ 26.7 at T II 638b24, and T 122 at T II 545b4, what he would be willing to give away seem to be just a normal elephant or horse. Another difference is that in these versions it is the death of his mother that Pasenadi would rather have prevented; cf. also SHT VI 1586 (p. 202).

³³⁰ The parallels are MĀ 213 at T I 795b-797c and EĀ 38.10 at T II 724b-725b. MĀ 213 agrees with MN 89 on locating the discourse in the Sakyān country and has the title “discourse on Dharma ornaments”, 法莊嚴經, similar to the title of MN 89 (Hirakawa 1997: 1015 and Soothill 1937/2000: 363 indicate 莊嚴 to correspond to *alampkāra*). According to EĀ 38.10 at T II 724c10, the Buddha was staying in a village in the Sakyān country, 釋種有村, which stands in direct contrast to the same version's initial declaration at T II 724b28 that the Buddha was staying in Jeta's Grove, 佛在舍衛國祇樹給孤獨園. This internal inconsistency shows how at times locations like Jeta's Grove are automatically applied to a discourse without taking into account if this location fits the particular event depicted in the discourse (cf. also below p. 887 note 138). According to Barua 1934a: 46, a relief on the Bhārhut Stūpa, cf. Cunningham 1879 plate 13, portrays the visit by Pasenadi to the Buddha that is described in MN 89.

³³¹ T 1451 at T XXIV 237a-238b and D (6) 'dul ba, tha 82a-86a or Q (1035) de 79a-83a, parts of which have been translated in Rockhill 1883/1907: 112-114.

³³² Senior Kharoṣṭī fragments 1+3 A and B, cf. also Allon 2008: 165 (I am indebted to Mark Allon for kindly providing me with a draft version of his entry on this fragment in Allon (forthcoming)).

³³³ AN 10:30 at AN V 65-69. B^e-AN III 307,24 and C^e-AN VI 116,1 introduce AN 10:30 as the *Dutiya-Kosala-sutta*, cf. also the *uddānas* in E^e-AN V 70,2 and in S^e-AN V 74,5.

The *Dhammadceiya-sutta*, its two Chinese discourse parallels, and the *Kṣudrakavastu* MN II 118 report that during a pleasure outing King Pasenadi felt inspired to pay a visit to the Buddha. According to the introductory account in the *Ānguttara-nikāya* discourse, however, King Pasenadi approached the Buddha after having won a battle.³³⁴

The *Dhammadceiya-sutta* and its parallels describe in similar ways how monks engaged in walking meditation directed King Pasenadi to the dwelling where the Buddha was staying. According to the *Dhammadceiya-sutta* and the *Ānguttara-nikāya* discourse, on coming to the presence of the Buddha, King Pasenadi went so far as to caress and kiss the Buddha's feet.³³⁵ The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, and the *Kṣudrakavastu* version do not record that King Pasenadi kissed or caressed the Buddha's feet.³³⁶

Several Pāli discourses portray other visitors displaying similar behaviour towards the Buddha. Except for one parallel in an individual translation, none of the Chinese Āgama parallels to these instances depict the visitors performing any kissing or caressing of the Buddha's feet.³³⁷

³³⁴ AN 10:30 at AN V 65,7 specifies that this was a “sham fight”, *uyyodhika*, whereas according to the commentary Mp V 27,26 it was a real fight.

³³⁵ MN 89 at MN II 120,3 and AN 10:30 at AN V 65,25; cf. also Horner 1957/1970: xxv. MN 89 and AN 10:30 agree that King Pasenadi at the same time also pronounced his name and rank twice. For King Pasenadi to go so far as to kiss the Buddha's feet and caress them comes somewhat unexpected at this point of events. All that has happened so far, according to MN 89, is that during a pleasure outing Pasenadi saw roots of trees, suitable for secluded dwelling, which reminded him of the Buddha. Although the inspiration derived from seeing these tree roots may well have motivated him to travel a reasonable distance in order to visit the Buddha, it would be considerably more difficult to envisage such inspiration to be sufficient grounds for the king of the country to show such an extreme way of expressing his humility and worship. The same hold true all the more if the meeting with the Buddha took place after Pasenadi had won a battle, as is the case in AN 10:30.

³³⁶ MĀ 213 at T I 795c18 and EĀ 38.10 at T II 724c26 only report that King Pasenadi expressed his respect by bowing at the Buddha's feet and pronouncing his name and rank three times. Although MĀ 213 introduces Pasenadi's words by indicating that he proclaimed his name and rank three times, 再三, the actual quote of his words runs only into two proclamations, similar to MN 89 at MN II 120,3. The *Saṅghabhedavastu* in Gnoli 1977: 154,14 reports that on another occasion King Bimbisāra also approached the Buddha, after putting aside his royal insignia, and expressed his respect by proclaiming his name and rank for three times, *trir ātmano nāmadheyam anuśrāvayati*, a case where, as in MĀ 213, the actual quote of his words only has two proclamations. T 1451 at T XXIV 237b4 does not even record that King Pasenadi pronounced his name, but only describes that he bowed down and expressed his joy at personally beholding the Buddha after a long time. Its Tibetan counterpart in D (6) 'dul ba, tha 83a3 or Q (1035) de 79b8 notes that, after bowing down at the Buddha's feet, King Pasenadi “wiped his face and mouth” (wiping of perspiration?) before addressing the Buddha, *gdong dang kha phyi nas*. Could this be a misunderstanding of an expression similar to the Pāli version's *pādāni mukhena ca paricumbati* in MN 89 at MN II 120,2? Senior fragments 1+3 A1.1 have preserved what appears to be a description of the king's prostration at the Buddha's feet.

³³⁷ In MN 91 at MN II 144,26 an old Brahmin of high social standing kisses and caresses the Buddha's feet; in SN 7:15 at SN I 178,7 (or SN² 201 at SN² I 383,3) the same is undertaken by a Brahmin known for his unwillingness to pay homage to anyone, even his parents; and in SN 8:9 at SN I 193,32 (or SN² 217 at SN² I 417,13) the monk Kondañña expresses his respect for the Buddha in this way. MĀ 161 at T I

MN II 120 The *Dhammadceiya-sutta* and the *Ariyuttara-nikāya* discourse report that the Buddha asked King Pasenadi why he gave such supreme honour to the Buddha's body.³³⁸ According to the Chinese and Tibetan versions, however, the Buddha simply asked King Pasenadi what motivated his respect for the Buddha, a way of presenting the Buddha's inquiry in keeping with Pasenadi's less exceptional way of worshipping the Buddha in these accounts.³³⁹

The *Dhammadceiya-sutta* and its parallels differ on the reasons given by King Pasenadi in reply. While the *Majjhima-nikāya*, the *Madhyama-āgama*, and the *Kṣudraka-vastu* versions describe similar reasons, only one of these reasons recurs in the *Ekottarika-āgama* list.³⁴⁰ The *Ariyuttara-nikāya* discourse does not have any of the reasons mentioned in the *Dhammadceiya-sutta* (see table 9.6).³⁴¹

689a13 (parallel to MN 91), SĀ 92 at T II 24a10 and SĀ² 258 at T II 464a18 (parallels to SN 7:15), as well as SĀ 1209 at T II 329b10 and SĀ² 225 at T II 456c12 (parallels to SN 8:9) do not mention any kissing or caressing of the Buddha's feet. The only exception to this is the individual translation T 76 at T I 885c10 (parallel to MN 91, cf. below p. 544 note 78), which agrees with the Pāli version's description of the Brahmin's behaviour. Regarding this particular instance in MN 91, Wagle 1967: 282 comments that "such behaviour by a brāhmaṇa is extremely rare and one suspects the missionary bias of the Buddhist writers in describing this scene".

³³⁸ According to MN 89 at MN II 120,5 (cf. also AN 10:30 at AN V 66,1), the Buddha asked King Pasenadi "what reason, great king, do you see for doing such supreme honour to this body", *kim pana tvam, mahārāja, athavasam sampassamāno imasmīm sarīre evarūpam paramanipaccākāram karosi* (B^e-MN II 322,16 and S^e-MN II 509,2: *paramanipaccākāram*)? The Senior fragments 1+3 Aa+d.2 recto and 1.2 verso have preserved parts of this question, which appears to be similar to MN 89.

³³⁹ According to MĀ 213 at T I 795c23, the Buddha asked: "what reasons do you see in me [that you] lower yourself with the intention to pay respect at [my] feet and perform an act of worship", 見我有何等義, 而自下意稽首禮足, 供養承事耶? EĀ 38.10 at T II 725a10 records the Buddha's question in this manner: "now, what do you say [why] the Tathāgata should receive people's worship", 汝今云何言如來應受人禮拜? According to T 1451 at T XXIV 237b6, the Buddha asked the king: "for what reason do you prostrate to me, being able to lower yourself and be [so] solicitous", 何故於我頓能降伏屈己懸慇?, while in its Tibetan counterpart at D (6) 'dul ba, tha 83a4 or Q (1035) de 80a1, the Buddha asked: "great king, why do you humble yourself towards the Tathāgata so much more than even the lowliest", *rgyal po chen po khyod ci'i phyir de bzhi gshegs pa la shin tu dman pa bas kyang ches dman pa byed?* EĀ 38.10 at T II 724c28 provides additional background to its version of the Buddha's question, as it reports that Pasenadi had also expressed the wish that the Buddha may live long for the benefit of gods and men. The Buddha replied by also wishing Pasenadi long life, so that he may govern rightly and receive the fruits of his good conduct on being reborn in heaven. Pasenadi then proclaimed that people pay homage to the Tathāgata because of his virtues, which caused the Buddha to inquire what Pasenadi thought to be the reason why people pay homage to the Tathāgata.

³⁴⁰ EĀ 38.10 at T II 725a11 lists six reasons for Pasenadi's regard for the Buddha, out of which five are not found in the other versions. These five (cf. also table 9.6) are that the teaching of the Buddha is practised by the wise; that his noble disciples are accomplished in morality, wisdom, liberation, and knowledge-and-vision-of-liberation (宋, 元, and 明 variant readings include also their accomplishment in concentration); that he has four assemblies of practising disciples (i.e. male and female, monastics and laity); that he has overcome the sixty-two views (a reference to the sixty-two grounds for views described in DN 1 at DN I 12-43 and its parallels); and the potential of recalling the virtues of the Buddha at the time of passing away, by dint of which even someone of evil bodily, verbal, or mental conduct will be

The *Majjhima-nikāya* and *Madhyama-āgama* discourses and the *Kṣudrakavastu* agree that Pasenadi contrasted other recluses, who after some time disrobe and enjoy sensual pleasures, with the case of the Buddhist monks, who instead keep living the holy life until they pass away.³⁴²

Table 9.6: Pasenadi's Praise of the Buddha in MN 89 and its Parallels

MN 89	MA 213
monks don't disrobe (1)	disciples don't disparage after disrobing
monks don't quarrel (2)	monks don't disrobe (→ 1)
monks are happy (3)	monks are happy (→ 3)
monks don't interrupt the Buddha (4)	disputants are converted (→ 6, 8)
disputants are converted (5-8)	monks don't interrupt the Buddha (→ 4)
Pasenadi's courtiers respect Buddha (9)	Pasenadi's courtiers respect Buddha (→ 9)
similarities Pasenadi & Buddha (10)	similarities Pasenadi & Buddha (→ 10) (≠ 2, 5, 7)

AN 10:30	EĀ 38.10
Buddha benefits many Buddha is virtuous Buddha lives in seclusion Buddha is contented Buddha is worthy of honour Buddha engages in proper conversation Buddha is able to attain 4 <i>jhānas</i> Buddha is able to recollect past lives Buddha is able to exercise divine eye Buddha has destroyed influxes (≠ 1-10)	Buddha's teaching is practised by the wise monastic community is accomplished Buddha has four assemblies of disciples disputants are converted (→ 5-8) Buddha has transcended 62 views recollecting Buddha leads to good rebirth (≠ 1-4, 9-10)

reborn in a heavenly realm, EĀ 38.10 at T II 725a29: 身口意行惡, 彼若命終, 憶如來功德 ... 得生天上. Harrison 1978a: 36 draws attention to other passages in the *Ekottarika-āgama* that similarly emphasize the potential of recollecting the Buddha, such as EĀ 41.5 at T II 740a1, where a householder destined to be reborn in hell goes forth and practises the ten recollections for a single day, with the result that he is reborn in heaven, or EĀ 3.1 at T II 554a12, which gives quite detailed instructions for undertaking recollection of the Buddha; cf. also below p. 822 note 9. AN 1:16 at AN I 30.6 reckons recollecting the Buddha a practice that is entirely conducive to realization (*sambodha*) and [the attainment of] *Nirvāṇa*, thereby also highlighting its potential, although in less exuberant terms than the *Ekottarika-āgama*; cf. also Demiéville 1924: 232 note 6. In fact, even what appears to be an incipient stage of a more visual mode of undertaking recollection of the Buddha can be found already among the early discourses, highlighted by Schmithausen 2000b: 10, cf. also Odani 2007: 441. The passage in question occurs in a stanza in the *Sutta-nipāta*, where the Brahmin Piṅgiya explains that he has no need to be in the presence of the Buddha, since he is able to see the Buddha with his mind as if with the eyes, Sn 5.17 at Sn 1142: *passāmi nañ manasā cakkhunā va* (C^e-Sn 350,13: *ca*).

³⁴¹ AN 10:30 at AN V 66,6.

³⁴² Senior fragments 1+3 B recto appear to have preserved counterparts to this and the next reason given in MN 89.

T 1451	'dul ba
disputants are converted (→ 6, 8) monks are happy (→ 3) disciples don't disparage after disrobing monks don't disrobe (→ 1) monks don't interrupt the Buddha (→ 4) Pasenadi's courtiers respect Buddha (→ 9) similarities Pasenadi & Buddha (→ 10) (≠ 2, 5, 7)	disputants are converted (→ 6-8) monks are happy (→ 3) disciples don't disparage after disrobing monks don't interrupt the Buddha (→ 4) monks don't disrobe (→ 1) Pasenadi's courtiers respect Buddha (→ 9) similarities Pasenadi & Buddha (→ 10) (≠ 2, 5)

The *Majjhima-nikāya* version continues by contrasting the quarrels that arise even between close family members with the absence of quarrels among the Buddhist monks, who live together harmoniously.³⁴³

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and the *Kṣudrakavastu* present the same topic in different terms, as they contrast family quarrels with monks who, even though they disrobe and return to the lay life, nevertheless do not lose their respect for the Buddha and blame themselves for not having been able to continue to stay in robes.³⁴⁴ This description does not fit too well with the other reason for Pasenadi's faith, which was that the Buddhist monks do not disrobe.³⁴⁵

MN II 121 According to the *Dhammadceiya-sutta*, its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel, and the *Kṣudrakavastu* account, King Pasenadi was also inspired by the happy demeanour of the Buddhist monks,³⁴⁶ as well as by their silent attention when the Buddha was delivering

³⁴³ MN 89 at MN II 120,22.

³⁴⁴ MĀ 213 at T I 796a3, T 1451 at T XXIV 238a8, and D (6) 'dul ba, tha 85a1 or Q (1035) de 81b5. The respectful attitude of monks who have disrobed is also described in MN 77 at MN II 5,14.

³⁴⁵ That monks did disrobe is also recorded in other Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., MN 12 at MN I 68,8 and AN 3:64 at AN I 185,8, according to which Sunakkhatta and Sarabha even spoke disparagingly about the Buddha's teaching after they had left the order. The monk community also does not always seem to have lived in harmony and concord, as according to MN 128 at MN III 153,3 and its parallels (cf. below p. 732), among the monks of Kosambī such a quarrel arose that they were unwilling to allow even the Buddha to intervene and settle it. To this one could add Devadatta's schism, an event that would be another instance when the Buddhist monks' community did not live in harmony and concord, cf. Vin III 171,3; for a comparative study of this event cf. Bareau 1991 and Mukherjee 1966: 74-94.

³⁴⁶ MN 89 at MN II 121,21 describes that the monks were "dependent on others, dwelling with a mind like deer", *paradavutte migabhūtena cetasā viharante* (B^e-MN II 323,21: *paradattavutte*, C^e-MN II 554,20: *paradavuttā* and *viharanti*). The corresponding passage in MĀ 213 at T I 796a29 reads 護他妻食如鹿. The reference to 他妻 may be due to a mistaking of *parada* for *paradāra*, "the wife of another", while the idea of "protection", 護, could be due to mistaking *vutta* for *vṛta*, "stopped", "checked", "held back", or else 護 could be a scribe's error for 獲, "to get". Even though the translator(s) appear to have misunderstood an expression like *paradavutta* (an expression which does indeed have its difficulties, cf. Horner 1952/1975: 259 note 2), perhaps, through knowledge of some commentarial explanation similar to Ps III 167,3: *paradavuttā ti parehi dinnavuttino*, they might have known that the idea of "depending on others" was involved, an idea they perhaps then attempted to bring out with the image of 他妻食, "[taking] food from the wives of others". While T 1451 at T XXIV 237c29 describes that the monks "always feel fear, like deer in the forest", 常懷兢懼如鹿依林, the passage in D (6) 'dul ba, tha 84b4 or Q (1035) de 81b1 could also be based on an equivalent to *paradavutta*, as it reads "not depending on

teachings.³⁴⁷ As was already the case in the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta*, here too the *Majjhima-nikāya* version illustrates the silent attention that prevails during a talk given by the Buddha by narrating how on one occasion a disciple was admonished for clearing his throat, while the *Madhyama-āgama* version instead reports that this disciple was snoring.³⁴⁸ In agreement with the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the *Kṣudrakavastu* also records that the disciple merely coughed, not envisaging the possibility that he may have fallen asleep while the Buddha was giving a talk.³⁴⁹

The *Dhammadetiya-sutta* next describes how warriors, Brahmins, householders, and recluses would approach the Buddha with the intention of challenging and vanquishing him in debate. Instead of defeating the Buddha, the *Dhammadetiya-sutta* reports, they are much rather converted, in fact the recluses even go forth under the Buddha and become arahants. This quality is also included in the *Ekottarika-āgama* account, which similar to the *Dhammadetiya-sutta* speaks of warriors, Brahmins, householders, and recluses that are unable to defeat the Buddha in debate, without, however, mentioning that they would become his disciples or even go forth under him and become arahants.³⁵⁰

MN II 122

The *Madhyama-āgama* discourse and the Chinese *Kṣudrakavastu* account differ from the *Dhammadetiya-sutta* in as much as they speak only of recluses and Brahmins who approach the Buddha for debate, thereby not mentioning warriors or householders.³⁵¹ In regard to these wise recluses and Brahmins, they envisage four possible outcomes:

other sustenance”, ’tsho ba gzhān la rag ma lus pa. A contrast between the happy demeanour of the Buddhist monks and other ascetics can also be found in SHT III 806 R2-5 (p. 13), attributed in this fragment to the Brahmin Lokecca (a fragment which does not seem to correspond to any of the two occurrences of the Brahmin Lohicca in the Pāli discourses, DN 12 at DN I 224-234 or SN 35:132 at SN IV 116-121).

³⁴⁷ While according to MN 89 at MN II 122,10, on this occasion the Buddha was teaching an audience of “several hundreds”, *anekasatāya parisāya*, and according to MĀ 213 at T I 797a17 a “great assembly”, 大眾, according to T 1451 at T XXIV 238a22 he was teaching “a great company of uncountable hundred-thousands”, 無量百千大眾. The Tibetan *Kṣudrakavastu* at D (6) ’dul ba, tha 85a5 or Q (1035) de 82a2, however, agrees with MN 89 that the Buddha was teaching ‘only’ an audience of many hundreds, ’khor brgya phrag du ma'i gung la.

³⁴⁸ MN 89 at MN II 122,12: *ukkāsi*, whereas according to MĀ 213 at T I 797a18 he “made noise [by] snoring [while] sleeping”, 鼾眠作聲, with a 聖 variant reading according to which the monk “made noise [by] drooling [while] sleeping”, 口汙眠作聲. Cf. also above p. 421 note 152.

³⁴⁹ T 1451 at T XXIV 238a26: 聲欬發聲, to which D (6) ’dul ba, tha 85a5 or Q (1035) de 82a2 adds that he also made the sound of sneezing, *lud pa'i sgra* and *sbrid pa'i sgra*.

³⁵⁰ EĀ 38.10 at T II 725a25. The same difference recurs between MN 27 at MN I 177,13 and its parallel MĀ 146 at T I 656b23, where MN 27 also stands alone in reporting that those who challenge the Buddha become his disciples and some even go forth and become arahants. A contrast to the descriptions given in MN 27 and MN 89 can be found in DN 25 at DN III 57,12 and its parallel MĀ 104 at T I 595b29, according to which on one occasion a whole group of recluses were unwilling to go forth under the Buddha even though he had openly invited them.

³⁵¹ MĀ 213 at T I 796b15 and T 1451 at T XXIV 237b11. This is not entirely the case for the Tibetan *Kṣudrakavastu* version, which in its examination of the fourth group of debaters at D (6) ’dul ba, tha 84a1 or Q (1035) de 80b6, switches from the earlier used *dge sbyong dang bram ze*, “recluses and Brahmins”, to *bram ze dang khyim bdag*, “Brahmins and householders”.

- the recluses and Brahmins do not even dare to put their question,
- they are delighted with what the Buddha teaches them,
- they take refuge,
- they go forth under the Buddha and by dint of earnest practice in seclusion become arahants.

MN II 123 Another reason for King Pasenadi's faith, listed in the *Dhammadacetiya-sutta*, the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse, and the *Kṣudrakavastu* version,³⁵² is that his two courtiers showed more respect to the Buddha than they would show to him, even though they depended on the king for their livelihood.

To illustrate this, Pasenadi related an occasion when he had to put up in the same room with his two courtiers. The two courtiers lay down in such a way that their head was pointing towards the direction where the Buddha was dwelling, even though this caused them to point their feet towards the king, a disrespectful way of behaviour according to Indian custom.³⁵³

According to the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, the two courtiers spent much of the night in a discussion on the Dharma. The *Madhyama-āgama* account, however, instead reports that they spent the first part of the night silently sitting in meditation.³⁵⁴ The *Kṣudrakavastu* agrees in this respect with the *Majjhima-nikāya* presentation, as it reports that the two courtiers were engaged in praising the virtues of the Buddha and speaking about the Dharma and the Saṅgha.³⁵⁵

Another minor but noteworthy difference is that, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya* account, the king referred to his two courtiers as “those venerable ones”, using the word *āyasmant*,³⁵⁶ while the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse does not record that the king used this epithet.³⁵⁷

³⁵² MĀ 213 at T I 797a25 and T I 797b2 presents this issue as two qualities, first taking up the higher respect they had for the Buddha as a reason for Pasenadi's faith, and then relating how they once spent the night in the same room together with King Pasenadi, which MĀ 213 presents as yet another reason for Pasenadi's faith in the Buddha. T 1451 at T XXIV 238b4 and its Tibetan counterpart at D (6) 'dul ba, tha 85b4 or Q (1035) de 82a8, however, agree with MN 89 on presenting this as only one quality. In fact, the story of their behaviour at night is but an illustration of their respect for the Buddha and thus does not amount to a separate quality.

³⁵³ SN 55:6 at SN V 352,3 indicates that Isidatta and Purāṇa had reached stream-entry (cf. also AN 6:120 at AN III 451,12) and according to AN 6:44 at AN III 348,1 (= AN 10:75 at AN V 139,3) they passed away as once-returners. This would explain why they had such high regard for the Buddha.

³⁵⁴ MN 89 at MN II 124,5: *bahudeva rattīñ dhammīyā kathāyā vītināmetvā* and MĀ 213 at T I 797b4: 初夜結跏趺坐, 默然燕坐.

³⁵⁵ T 1451 at T XXIV 238b10 records that the two “praised the excellent qualities of the Buddha and discussed the right Dharma and the jewel of the order as a field of merit”, 敦佛功德, 并說正法, 僧寶福田. D (6) 'dul ba, tha 85b6 or Q (1035) de 82b2 similarly reports that they praised the Buddha, his teaching and the community, *sangs rgyas kyi bsngags pa brjod, chos dang dge 'dun gyi bsngags pa brjod nas*.

³⁵⁶ MN 89 at MN II 124,11: *ime āyasmanto*.

³⁵⁷ According to MĀ 213 at T I 797b7, Pasenadi referred to his employees as “these two courtiers Isidatta and Purāṇa”, 此仙餘及宿舊二臣 (the Chinese and Tibetan *Kṣudrakavastu* do not have such a reference).

At first sight, the use of *āyasmant* is unexpected, since this term is usually employed in the discourses to refer to monks.³⁵⁸ The use of *āyasmant* to address laity recurs in several Pāli discourses, where again the Chinese versions differ by not recording this form of address.³⁵⁹ Instances of the use of the address *āyasmant* for laity can also be found in the case of several *pātimokkha* rules, which depict even a monk addressing laity with *āyasmant*.³⁶⁰ In this case, too, the Chinese *Vinayas* do not employ this form of address.³⁶¹

The Sanskrit versions of the Mahāsāṅghika, (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda, and Sarvāstivāda *prātimokṣa* rules, however, do employ the corresponding address *āyuṣmant*,³⁶² just as the Tibetan version of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *prātimokṣa* uses the corresponding form *tshe dang ldan pa*.³⁶³

In fact, the use of *āyasmant* in its counterparts in these different passages does not necessarily convey nuances of venerability,³⁶⁴ as the address “friend”, *āvuso*, is merely a vocative form of the same word.³⁶⁵ Hence, the use of *āyasmant* would be an appropriate way for a king to refer to his employees, or for a monk to refer to laity.

³⁵⁸ DP I: 321 s.v. *āyasma(t)* explains that this term is a “honorific and respectful title of a bhikkhu”. Chilvers 1875/1993: 75 s.v. *āyasmā* and PED: 105 s.v. *āyasmant* similarly speak of a “respectful appellation” for a *bhikkhu* “of some standing”.

³⁵⁹ MN 68 at MN I 467,10 describes how a lay follower recollects another lay follower as a “venerable one”, *āyasmā*, while in its counterpart in MĀ 77 at T I 546b8 the lay follower recollects the other as a “lay follower”, 優婆塞. Another instance can be found in SN 55:54 at SN V 409,4, which describes a layman who addresses another layman about to pass away as *āyasma*, while in its Chinese counterpart in SĀ 1122 at T II 298a18 the layman simply addresses the other layman with “you” (respectful form), 仁者, and “you”, 汝. An instance without a Chinese counterpart can be found in AN 4:242 at AN II 241,26+28, which depicts how a layperson confesses a misdeed to another layperson by using *bhante* and *āyasmant*.

³⁶⁰ A monk addresses a lay person with the expression *āyasmant* in *nissaggiya pācittiya* rules 8, 9, 10, and 27 at Vin III 216,15, Vin III 218,35, Vin III 220,2 and Vin 259,11.

³⁶¹ The relevant *niḥsargikāḥ pātayantika* rules 8, 9, 10, and 24 of the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, T 1428 at T XXII 611a17, T XXII 612a21, T XXII 613b3, and T XXII 625b13 use “householder”, 居士, and “you”, 汝. The corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 27 of the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 305a2, T XXII 305b4, T XXII 306a11, and T XXII 321c2 use no address or “you”, 汝. The corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 12 of the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 28b11, T XXII 28c5, T XXII 29a25, and T XXII 29c12 use “you”, 汝. The corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 24 of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1442 at T XXIII 732c7, T XXIII 733a10, T XXIII 734c18, and T XXIII 749b23 use “you” (respectful form), 仁者, and “you”, 汝. The corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 24 of the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 45c29, T XXIII 46b20, T XXIII 47a26, and T XXIII 56a6 (translated in Rosen 1959: 87-89 and 117) use “you”, 汝.

³⁶² These are the *niḥsargikāḥ pātayantika* rules 8, 9, 10, and 27 of the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya* in Tatia 1975: 14,11+19+27 and 18,3, translated in Prebish 1975/1996: 66 and 72; the corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 24 of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in Banerjee 1977: 26,10, 27,2, 28,14, and 30,11, translated in Prebish 1975/1996: 67, 69, and 73; and the corresponding rules 8, 9, 10, and 24 of the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in von Simson 2000: 186,14, 187,11, 191,7, and 198,4.

³⁶³ Vidyabhusana 1915: 67,2+13, 69,17, and 73,3.

³⁶⁴ Nakamura 2000b: 235 note 67 comments on ways of translating *āyasmant* that “in many cases ‘venerable’ is not suitable”.

³⁶⁵ Cf. BHSD: 102 s.v. *āyuṣmam*, CPD II: 230 s.v. *āvuso*, PED: 113 s.v. *āvuso*, Geiger 1916: 60 (§ 46.1),

By the time of the Chinese translations, however, the term *āyasmant* or *āyuṣmant* may have become an exclusively monastic form of address, so that, when translating the above surveyed passages, the translators replaced *āyasmant* (etc.) with other expressions that seemed more appropriate to the context, or simply left the passage without any form of address. Thus, this rather minor difference in formulation, which appears to be a persistent trait in Chinese translations, provides a good example for how the Chinese worldview could influence the way the Indian originals were translated.

MN II 124 Another quality that according to the *Dhammadceiya-sutta* inspired King Pasenadi's respect for the Buddha was that they were both members of the warrior class, they both came from the Kosala country, and were both of the same age.³⁶⁶ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* version and the *Kṣudrakavastu* account, King Pasenadi also noted the similarity of his status as the king of the country and the Buddha's status as the king of the Dharma. The *Kṣudrakavastu* makes it clear that, in this respect, the king felt inferior to the Buddha.³⁶⁷

This helps to clarify what inspired Pasenadi's respect, since to be of similar origin and age may inspire feelings of friendship and companionship, but would not be self-evident grounds for worshipping the other. In contrast, for the king of the country to meet a king of the Dharma would indeed be a good reason to feel respect and have a desire to worship the latter.

The *Dhammadceiya-sutta* and its Chinese parallels agree that, once King Pasenadi had left, the Buddha instructed the monks to memorize this discourse, as to bear it in mind would be beneficial for their progress.³⁶⁸ According to the *Madhyama-āgama* ac-

and Pischel 1900/1981: 324; cf. also Horner 1938/1982: xxxviii. In fact, in the description of the actual events leading up to the rules at Vin III 215,23, Vin III 218,7, Vin III 220,2, and Vin III 259,8, the monk uses the address *āvuso*. According to Wijesekera 1993: 36, however, *āvuso* "probably has its origin in an older *āyuṣah (the derived adj. from *āyus* 'life') having the sense of 'O long-lived one!' and the suggested derivation ... *āyuṣmant* seems to be phonetically less likely". For a survey of occurrences of *āvuso* in the Pāli discourses and in the *Vinaya* cf. Franke 1908: 20-43.

³⁶⁶ Regarding their being of the same age, the *Saṅghabheda-vastu* in Gnoli 1977: 46,5 reports that King Prasenajit and the Buddha were even born on the same day.

³⁶⁷ MĀ 213 at T I 797b12: "I am the king of the country, the Blessed One is the king of the Dharma", 我亦國王, 世尊亦法王, and T 1451 at T XXIV 238b18: "I have been crowned as the warrior king, the Blessed One is the unsurpassable Dharma king, my power cannot measure up in any way compared to the Buddha", 我是灌頂剎帝利王, 世尊亦是無上法王, 我力比佛非喻能測. T 1451 at T XXIV 238b29 sums up the point made with this statement by proclaiming that "the king is no equal to the Buddha", 王不如佛. In the Tibetan version at D (6) 'dul ba, tha 86a3 or Q (1035) de 82b7, the king simply points out that "although I am indeed the head-anointed warrior king, yet the Blessed One is indeed the unsurpassable king of the Dharma", *bdag kyang rgyal po rgyal rigs spyi po nas dbang bskur ba lags, bcom ldan 'das kyang bla na med pa'i chos kyi rgyal po lags pas*. As noted by Brekke 1999a: 858, whereas "the figure of the king symbolizes external mastery", the Buddha "symbolizes internal mastery".

³⁶⁸ T 1451 at T XXIV 238c1 and D (6) 'dul ba, tha 86a7 or Q (1035) de 83a3 continue by narrating that, while Pasenadi had this conversation with the Buddha, the general who had accompanied him left and, taking advantage of having received the royal insignia in custody, helped the prince to usurp the throne. The ensuing series of events culminate with King Pasenadi passing away while seeking help against

count, the Buddha even went so far as to ask Ānanda to summon whatever other monks were living nearby in order to be able to give them this recommendation.³⁶⁹

Looking back on the different versions, it is noteworthy that, while the *Kṣudrakavastu* in several aspects agrees with the *Dhammadceṭiya-sutta* against the *Madhyama-āgama* version, the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* discourse differs considerably from the *Dhammadceṭiya-sutta*. While as an account of an actual encounter it seems improbable that the Buddha on more than one occasion got King Pasenadi to explain why he had faith in him, the differences between the two Pāli versions are substantial enough to make it improbable that they should be considered records of the same event.

MN 90 *Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta*

The *Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta*, the “discourse at Kaṇṇakatthala”, reports a conversation between the Buddha and King Pasenadi on omniscience, class distinctions, and *devas*. This discourse has a parallel in the *Madhyama-āgama* and a parallel in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, preserved in Tibetan.³⁷⁰

The *Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta* and its parallels begin by relating that King Pasenadi had sent a messenger to announce his impending visit to the Buddha.³⁷¹ Judging from other discourses, to have one’s visit announced in this manner could be a polite way of approaching someone that one meets for the first time.³⁷²

MN II 125

The impression that the present discourse reports an early or perhaps even the first meeting between King Pasenadi and the Buddha is reinforced by the circumstance that in both versions Pasenadi does not know Ānanda, the Buddha’s personal attendant.³⁷³

this dethronement; cf. also, e.g., Amritananda 1983: 68-69, Feer 1883: 65-67, Panglung 1981: 172-173, and Rockhill 1883/1907: 114-116. The Pāli commentary, Ps III 354,18, reports a similar series of events taking place after the delivery of the present discourse; cf. also Jā 465 at Jā IV 152,2, Bareau 1981a: 53, and T 211 at T IV 583a16, translated in Willemen 1999: 56.

³⁶⁹ MĀ 213 at T I 797b20.

³⁷⁰ The parallels are MĀ 212 at T I 792c-795b and D (1) ‘dul ba, kha 86a-92a or Q (1030) ge 79b-85a. MĀ 212 has the title “discourse on omniscience”, 一切智經.

³⁷¹ MN 90 at MN II 125,11, MĀ 212 at T I 792c17, and D (1) ‘dul ba, kha 86a7 or Q (1030) ge 79b8. MĀ 212 at T I 792c25 additionally describes how the Buddha replied to the messenger and then told Ānanda to get a room ready for receiving the king. Although the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version does not report any reply given by the Buddha to the messenger, D (1) ‘dul ba, kha 86b7 or Q (1030) ge 80a7 agrees with MĀ 212 that the Buddha told Ānanda to prepare a place to receive the king. MĀ 212 at T I 793a21 stands alone in recording that, on arrival, the king encountered monks engaged in walking meditation, who told Pasenadi to approach the hut where the Buddha was staying, to clear his throat, and to quietly knock on the door. This part of MĀ 212 thus has the same introductory narration as found in MĀ 213 at T I 795c5 and its parallels MN 89 at MN II 119,17 and D (6) ‘dul ba, tha 82b5 or Q (1035) de 79b3.

³⁷² DN 21 at DN II 265,1 and MN 91 at MN II 141,22 describe how Sakka and the Brahmin Brahmāyu in a similar way sent a messenger ahead to announce their impending arrival. Both instances are their respective first meetings with the Buddha.

³⁷³ MN 90 at MN II 131,32, MĀ 212 at T I 795a15, and D (1) ‘dul ba, kha 91b1 or Q (1030) ge 84a8 report in similar ways that King Pasenadi inquired after the name of Ānanda. According to the commentary at

Moreover, in the concluding part of the discourse King Pasenadi expresses his appreciation of the Buddha's explanation in a somewhat longwinded manner, listing each answer he has received and expressing his approval after each answer listed, a way of expressing appreciation found only rarely in other discourses.³⁷⁴

In the *Carikī-sutta*, a visitor who has just discarded his distrust and disrespect towards the Buddha in what the context suggests to be their first meeting uses the same way of expressing appreciation.³⁷⁵ This further supports the impression that King Pasenadi's meeting with the Buddha at Kanṇakatthala could be recording the first or at least one of their very first meetings.

This impression is corroborated in the Chinese and Tibetan versions by the circumstance that King Pasenadi addresses the Buddha by his name Gotama,³⁷⁶ a form of address used in the discourses only by those who do not consider themselves disciples of the Buddha. In the *Majjhima-nikāya* version, however, King Pasenadi addresses the Buddha as "venerable sir" and "Blessed One",³⁷⁷ a form of address implying that he considers himself to be in a close relationship with the Buddha.

In the Pāli *Nikāyas*, an instance where King Pasenadi addresses the Buddha by his name Gotama can be found in the *Dahara-sutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which according to the commentarial explanation was the first meeting of the two.³⁷⁸ At the end of the *Dahara-sutta*, Pasenadi takes refuge and declares himself a lay disciple of the Buddha.³⁷⁹

Ps III 361,3, however, King Pasenadi knew Ānanda and only asked this question in order to be able to praise him. Yet, the formulation of Pasenadi's question in MN 90, MĀ 212, and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version is such as to suggest that he had not met Ānanda before. The present case can be compared with MN 88 at MN II 112,18, which together with its parallel MĀ 214 at T I 797c19 describes another occasion when Pasenadi saw Ānanda from afar but was apparently not sure if he had properly recognized him (cf. also above p. 505). MN 88 at MN II 112,18 reports that Pasenadi asked a member of his entourage to confirm that the monk they saw was indeed Ānanda, "isn't this the venerable Ānanda", *āyasmā no eso ... ānando ti* (C^e-MN II 540,7: *nu kho* instead of *no*)? The question he asked according to MN 90 at MN II 131,32, however, is different, as he inquired: "what is the name of this monk", *ko nāmo ayam ... bhikkhū ti* (S^e-MN II 525,20: *nāmāyam*)? Whereas the instance reported in MN 88 seems to reflect some faint acquaintance, in the present case it seems as if the king inquires about the identity of a monk he has not met before. Thus, the formulation of the question in MN 90 does not fit too well with the commentarial explanation.

³⁷⁴ MN 90 at MN II 132,22+25+27+30+33 reports that for each reply he expressed his approval, stating: "that is liked and accepted by us, thereby we are pleased", *tañ ca pan' amhākam ruccati c' eva khamati ca, tena c' amhā attamanā*. MĀ 212 at T I 795b5 and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 92a3 or Q (1030) ge 85a2 also report that Pasenadi expressed his approval by listing the answers he had received, without, however, formulating his approval after each of the answers listed.

³⁷⁵ MN 95 at MN II 176,26.

³⁷⁶ MĀ 212 at T I 793b1 and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 87b4 or Q (1030) ge 81a2.

³⁷⁷ MN 90 at MN II 126,14.

³⁷⁸ SN 3:1 at SN I 68,17 (or SN² 112 at SN² I 157,16): *bho gotama*. Spk I 129,16 comments: *ito pubbe ta-thāgatassa aditthatā*. Bodhi 2000: 399 note 199 notes that "his cordial (as distinct from reverential) manner of greeting ... indicates that he has not yet acknowledged the Buddha as his master".

³⁷⁹ SN 3:1 at SN I 70,11 (or SN² 112 at SN² I 161,17).

In the *Samyukta-āgama* versions of the same discourse, however, on this occasion King Pasenadi uses the respectful address “Blessed One” right from the outset.³⁸⁰ This suggests that, from the perspective of the *Samyukta-āgama* reciter tradition, King Pasenadi was already a disciple of the Buddha at the time of the *Dahara-sutta*. In fact according to the *Madhyama-āgama* collection, King Pasenadi’s going for refuge took place in relation to the events described in the *Piyajātika-sutta*.³⁸¹ In keeping with this perspective, the Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan parallels to the *Dahara-sutta* only report that he rejoiced in the discourse, without declaring himself to have become a lay disciple of the Buddha on this occasion.³⁸²

Hence, while from the viewpoint of the Theravāda tradition the *Dahara-sutta* would have preceded the *Kanṇakatthala-sutta*, from the perspective of the Sarvāstivāda tradition the *Kanṇakatthala-sutta* should probably rather be placed before the meeting between Pasenadi and the Buddha described in the *Dahara-sutta*.

King Pasenadi’s first question in the *Kanṇakatthala-sutta* and its parallels is whether the Buddha had categorically stated omniscience to be impossible.³⁸³ The Buddha de-

MN II 127

³⁸⁰ SĀ 1226 at T II 334c17 and SĀ² 53 at T II 391c5: 世尊.

³⁸¹ MĀ 216 at T I 802a4; cf. also above p. 505.

³⁸² SĀ 1226 at T II 335b7 and SĀ² 53 at T II 392a24 (on these two versions cf. also Choong 2006: 33), the Sanskrit parallel in Gnoli 1977: 183,28, and the Tibetan parallel, the *gzhon nu dpe'i mdo*, D (296) *mdo sde, sha* 297a1 or Q (962) *lu* 325b2, translated in Feer 1883: 138. According to the Tibetan (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda *Vinayavastu*, however, Pasenadi was converted by means of the *Dahara-sutta*, D (1) ‘*dul ba, ka* 127b5 or Q (1030) *khe* 125b1: *bcom ldan 'das kyis ko sa la'i rgyal po gsal rgyal gzhon nu'i dpe'i mdo sdes btul ba*; cf. also Feer 1874: 300.

³⁸³ The three versions agree on preceding the actual discussion by relating that two of Pasenadi’s wives sent their regards to the Buddha. A minor difference is that in MĀ 212 at T I 793b13 the Buddha replies by expressing his blessings not only for the welfare of the two wives, but also for *devas*, *asuras*, *gandhabbas* and *rakkhasas*, a formulation used again in MĀ 212 at T I 792c26 to express the Buddha’s blessings for the welfare of Pasenadi. This is a recurring pericope in the *Madhyama-āgama*, cf. also MĀ 28 at T I 458c21, MĀ 79 at T I 549b25, MĀ 134 at T I 633c25, and MĀ 161 at T I 688b5. Although this pericope is not found in MN 91 at MN II 142 (parallel to MĀ 161), MN 127 (which does not have the whole episode found in MĀ 79), or SN 55:26 at SN V 381 (parallel to MĀ 28, cf. below p. 821 note 1), a similar formulation occurs in DN 21 at DN II 269,17 (parallel to MĀ 134): *sukhakāmā hi devā manussā asurā nāgā gandhabbā ye c'aññe santi puthukāyā ti*. Another difference between MN 90 and its parallels is that, while in MĀ 212 at T I 793b19 and D (1) ‘*dul ba, kha* 88a2 or Q (1030) *ge* 81a7 King Pasenadi simply asks if the Buddha had made such a statement on the impossibility of omniscience, in MN 90 at MN II 127,3 he also asks if to attribute such a statement to the Buddha would not provide grounds for censure, thereby making use of a standard pericope found in similar contexts in other *Majjhima-nikāya* discourses, such as MN 55 at MN I 368,28, MN 71 at MN I 482,11, MN 103 at MN II 243,11 (abbreviated version), and MN 126 at MN III 139,31. An equivalent to this pericope is not found in the corresponding Chinese parallels, as MN 55, MN 71, and MN 103 do not appear to have a Chinese parallel at all, and the parallel to MN 126, MĀ 173 at T I 710b2, does not record such a statement. A similar statement can be found, e.g., in SĀ 110 at T II 35c15, in which case the parallel MN 35 at MN I 230,1 does not have this passage. Alsdorf 1959: 319 explains that in the expression *na ca koci sahadhammiko vādānuvādo gārayham thānam āgacchati*, used in this pericope, *thānam* is nominative and subject together with *vādānuvādo* (he refers to AN 4:30 at AN II 31,20 and AN 5:5 at AN III 4,9, where both occur together in the nominative plural) and *sahadhammiko* qualifies both, so that the

nies this, explaining that he had only stated that it was impossible to know and see all at one moment, i.e., simultaneously.³⁸⁴

MN II 128 The three versions continue by broaching the topic of the four classes, explaining that the warrior and Brahmin classes are reckoned superior. The Pāli and Tibetan versions make it clear that to speak of superiority only intends the homage and respect these two classes receive.³⁸⁵ In all versions, King Pasenadi clarifies that his question was not about their present social status, but about their spiritual potential.³⁸⁶ In reply, the Pāli and Chinese versions declare that a member of any of the four classes would derive great benefit from the five factors of striving.³⁸⁷

This is followed by a further inquiry if class would make a difference in regard to possessing these five factors of striving. This query meets with the reply that the degree to which someone strives is what makes the difference, thereby indicating that class has no direct influence on such matters. By way of illustration, all versions contrast tamed elephants, horses, and oxen with their untamed counterparts, thereby illustrating the tameability of members of different classes with the tameability of different types of mammal.³⁸⁸

point made in this passage is if, by making such a statement, one will incur disapproval and reprobation that are justified (ibid. p. 323: “trifft sie nicht vielmehr irgendeine gemäß der (wahren) Lehre berechtigte Mißbilligung ihrer Lehre und (gemäß der wahren Lehre) tadelnswerte Konsequenz”?).

³⁸⁴ MN 90 at MN II 127,29: *sakid eva sabbañ ñassati sabbam dakkhīti* (B^e-MN II 329,11, C^e-MN II 566,3, and S^e-MN II 520,12: *sabbam* and *dakkhīti*), MĀ 212 at T I 793c7: 一時知一切, 一時見一切, and D (1) *'dul ba, kha* 88b1 or Q (1030) *ge* 81b6: *thams cad shes pa'am, mthong ba gang yin pa*. Such seems to have been the conception of omniscience upheld in the Jain tradition, which Jaini 1979/1998: 267 explains to involve that “the Jina’s soul in fact *perceives only itself*. But the absence of karmic obstructions in such a soul means that ... all external objects will be reflected therein”. Schubring 1962/2000: 169 sums up that this then results in “cognition of all that is, was and will be”.

³⁸⁵ MN 90 at MN II 128,8 and D (1) *'dul ba, kha* 88b4 or Q (1030) *ge* 82a1.

³⁸⁶ While in MN 90 at MN II 128,9 and D (1) *'dul ba, kha* 88b5 or Q (1030) *ge* 82a2 this reaction by Pasenadi comes right after the Buddha’s reply, in MĀ 212 at T I 793c18 Pasenadi first praises the Buddha’s reply, before indicating that it had failed to provide an answer to what he had on his mind. This is a recurrent pericope in MĀ 212, where King Pasenadi expresses his appreciation and politely requests to be allowed to put yet another question after each of the replies given by the Buddha, which in the present instance, however, fits the context less well.

³⁸⁷ The two discourses describe the five factors of striving in similar ways, differing in so far as MN 90 at MN II 128,15 attributes them to a *bhikkhu*, while MĀ 212 at T I 793c29 has a learned noble disciple, 多聞聖弟子, as the subject. The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version does not mention the five factors of striving at this point and only takes them up later. Instead, D (1) *'dul ba, kha* 88b7 or Q (1030) *ge* 82a4 highlights the importance of the Tathāgata’s role as the teacher, a condition mentioned also in MĀ 212 at T I 793c27. This stipulation brings to mind MN 85 at MN II 95,30, which rounds off an exposition of the five factors of striving by mentioning the need to be trained by the Tathāgata, *tathāgatāñ vināya-kam labhamāno*.

³⁸⁸ While the simile in MN 90 at MN II 129,4 lists only elephants, horses, and oxen, MĀ 212 at T I 794a29 and D (1) *'dul ba, kha* 89a5 or Q (1030) *ge* 82a8 additionally mention “men”, 人/skyes bu (D: *skyes pa*). The same image recurs in MN 125 at MN III 130,2, where again the parallel MĀ 198 at T I 757b13 lists “men” in addition to the elephants, horses, and oxen mentioned in the Pāli version. Thus, the num-

The *Kannakatthala-sutta* and its parallels next take up the related question if there is MN II 129 a difference between the deliverance of members of the four classes,³⁸⁹ explaining that just as the colour and flames of fires lit by different types of wood are alike, so, too, the deliverance reached by members of different classes is the same.³⁹⁰

The next question posed by King Pasenadi was if “there are *devas*”.³⁹¹ According to MN II 130 the Pāli and Chinese versions, the Buddha asked Pasenadi to clarify what he meant

ber of living beings listed in MĀ 212 and the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version corresponds to the number of classes that this image intends to illustrate.

³⁸⁹ According to MN 90 at MN II 129,1, in his first question King Pasenadi asked about members of the four classes who possess the five factors of striving, while in the present instance at MN II 129,25 he further qualifies their striving to be “right”, *te c’ assu sammappadhānā*, an expression the commentary Ps III 359,13 relates to the attainment of the path, *sammappadhānā ti maggpadhānenā sammappadhānā*. MĀ 212 at T I 794a21 reports that King Pasenadi at first asked: “is there a distinction [between] these in regard to the practice of eradication”, 此有差別於斷行耶? This is followed in MĀ 212 at T I 794b16 by asking: “is there a distinction [between] these in regard to what is reckoned eradication”, 此有差別謂斷耶? The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* is more explicit in this respect, as according to D (1) ’dul ba, kha 89b4 or Q (1030) ge 82b7 at the present junction of events Pasenadi asked if there would be a difference between their respective achievements of liberation, *rnam par grol ba la khyad par ram?* The use in MĀ 212 of the character 斷, “eradication”, reflects a recurrent tendency in the *Madhyama-āgama* to refer to *pahāna* or *prahāṇa*, where the Pāli counterpart has *padhāna*, “striving”, such as when rendering the four right efforts, *sammappadhānā*, as 四正斷; cf. also Bapat 1969: 5 and Minh Chau 1964/1991: 327; for the same usage of 斷 in a text by Ān Shīgāo (安世高) cf. Deleanu 2003: 68 note 15; for a more detailed discussion cf. Gethin 1992a: 69-72. The corresponding *samyakprahāṇa* can be found, e.g., in SHT I 614 folio bV5-R1 (p. 273), in the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* in Samtani 1971: 29,1, in the *Divyāvadāna* in Cowell 1886: 208,8 or in Vaidya 1999: 129,10, in the *Lalitavistara* in Hokazono 1994: 282,9 or in Lefmann 1902: 8,5 or in Vaidya 1958b: 7,6, and in a *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* fragment S 360 folio 180V5 in Waldschmidt 1950: 23. In contrast, the expression *samyakprahāṇa* can be found, e.g., in the *Mahāvastu* in Basak 1968/2004: 74,14 or Senart 1897: 120,14, or in the *Saundaranandakāvya* 17.24 in Johnston 1928: 127,15. Particularly noteworthy is a reference to the effort of eradicating unwholesome states in SĀ 876 at T II 221a16 as 斷斷, which would be a counterpart to *prahāṇaprahāṇa*, found, e.g., in SHT V 1445 V1 or in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla 1973: 312,19 or SSG 2007: 208,15, where the Chinese counterpart, T 1579 at T XXX 443a23, indeed reads 斷斷. The corresponding Pāli expression *pahāṇapadhāna* can be found, e.g., in DN 33 at DN III 225,27. Another variation along the same lines occurs in MĀ 189 at T I 736b10, where a passage that takes up the development of the right effort speaks of 滅, which in the Pāli standard presentations has as its counterpart the verb *padahati*, cf. also Meisig 1987a: 222.

³⁹⁰ MN 90 at MN II 129,28. In MĀ 212 at T I 794b18 and D (1) ’dul ba, kha 89b5 or Q (1030) ge 82b8 the simile is further developed, as these two versions describe members of each of the four classes that come from one of the cardinal directions with a particular type of wood to make a fire, an image found also in MN 93 at MN II 152,2 and in MN 96 at MN II 183,13. Another minor difference is that, while MN 90 and the Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu* version speak of four different types of wood, according to MĀ 212 at T I 794b19+20 the warrior and the Brahmin use the same dry sāla wood, 嫩羅木.

³⁹¹ MN 90 at MN II 130,13: *atthi devā ti?*, MĀ 212 at T I 794c8: 有天耶?, and D (1) ’dul ba, kha 90b1 or Q (1030) ge 83b2: *lha rnams mchis sam?* Thus, the Chinese and Tibetan versions do not support the emendation to *atthi adhideva* suggested by Norman 1985: 150. The same is also the case for MN 90 at MN II 132,2: *atthi Brahmā?*, as MĀ 212 at T I 795a20 reads 有梵耶?, and D (1) ’dul ba, kha 91b3 or Q (1030) ge 84b2: *tshangs pa de mchis lags sam?*, thereby also not supporting Norman’s emendation to

with this question,³⁹² in reply to which Pasenadi explained that he wanted to know if *devas* are subject to rebirth in the human realm.

According to the *Madhyama-āgama* account,³⁹³ before the Buddha could reply to this question a general from King Pasenadi's retinue interrupted the discussion, an intervention also recorded in the Pāli and Tibetan versions, although according to these versions this intervention took place after the Buddha had replied.³⁹⁴ This perhaps a little impolite way of interrupting a discussion between the king and the Buddha prompted Ānanda to join the discussion, in order to reply to the general in place of the Buddha.

The three versions describe in similar terms how Ānanda illustrated the impossibility that *devas* subject to affliction could oust *devas* free from affliction with the example of King Pasenadi's inability to banish anyone from the heaven of the Thirty-three.³⁹⁵

atthi adhibrahmā. While in MN 90 at MN II 132,26+29 Pasenadi uses the expressions *adhideve* and *adhibrahmānam* when expressing his appreciation of the Buddha's replies, in the corresponding passage in MĀ 212 at T I 795b9 Pasenadi does not refer to the discussion on the *devas* at all, and in relation to the discussion on Brahmās he again speaks just of 有梵, corresponding to *atthi Brahmā*. The Tibetan *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, however, agrees in this respect with the Pāli version, as according to D (1) 'dul ba, kha 92a4 or Q (1030) ge 85a3 the king in his concluding remark referred to *lhag pa'i lha* and *lhag pa'i tshangs pa*.

³⁹² MN 90 at MN II 130,14 and MĀ 212 at T I 794c8, while the Tibetan version does not record such a counterquestion. Marasinghe 1974: 125 comments that "while the first one questions the validity of the belief in the gods itself, the second ... inquires as to whether the gods come to be reborn in the human world, thus accepting that the gods are there, this being the very basic premise that was queried in the first one". Yet, according to SN 3:9 at SN I 75,31 (or SN² 120 at SN² I 172,6) King Pasenadi once prepared a great sacrifice (a passage noted by Marasinghe himself), which suggests that he did believe in the existence of gods. Moreover, according to MN 90 King Pasenadi and his general went along without objection when Ānanda brought up the example of the gods of the Thirty-three, a passage which suggests that, although the two had never seen the *devas* of the Thirty-three, they both accepted their existence. Perhaps the discrepancy between the two questions is not as strong as Marasinghe suggests, in fact, if Pasenadi had wanted to question the validity of the belief in gods, there seems to be no reason why he should not have expressed this openly when the Buddha asked him to clarify what his question was about. For yet another interpretation of the present passage, based on assuming that King Pasenadi inquired after his own position as a king (*adhideva*) and a possible threat to this position by Viḍūḍabha, cf. Ireland 1990a: 78.

³⁹³ In MĀ 212 at T I 794c9 Pasenadi asks if afflicted *devas* were reborn in this world and *devas* free from affliction were beyond being reborn in this world. Thus, MĀ 212 attributes to Pasenadi's question what according to MN 90 was the Buddha's answer.

³⁹⁴ While in MN 90 at MN II 130,21 the general addresses the Buddha, according to D (1) 'dul ba, kha 90b6 or Q (1030) ge 83b7 he addresses the king. On this general cf. also Bareau 1993: 28-29.

³⁹⁵ Neumann 1896/1995: 1114 note 236 suggests that the general's question if *devas* subject to affliction could oust *devas* free from affliction could have in mind the wars between *devas* and *asuras*. References to such wars can be found repeatedly in the Pāli discourses, cf., e.g., DN 21 at DN II 285,6, MN 37 at MN I 253,2, SN 11:3 at SN I 218,31 (or SN² 249 at SN² I 472,6), SN 11:4 at SN I 221,1 (or SN² 250 at SN² I 475,8), SN 11:5 at SN I 222,22 (or SN² 251 at SN² I 480,3), SN 11:6 at SN I 224,17 (or SN² 252 at SN² I 483,8), SN 11:10 at SN I 227,7 (or SN² 256 at SN² I 489,6), SN 35:207 at SN IV 201,18, SN 56:41 at SN V 447,25, and AN 9:39 at AN IV 432,3. Witanachchi 2005a: 321 explains that "the myth of the Deva-Asura battle, as portrayed in Buddhist literature, is ... a symbolic representation

Pasenadi expressed his appreciation of Ānanda's reply and then asked the Buddha if “there are Brahmās”, a question intended to find out if Brahmās were subject to human rebirth. At this point a messenger arrived, reporting the arrival of the person that Pasenadi had summoned earlier, in order to find out who had misrepresented the Buddha's position on omniscience.³⁹⁶ The investigation into this matter was not yet completed when another attendant informed the king that it was time to leave.³⁹⁷ Pasenadi thereon expressed his appreciation for the answers he had received from the Buddha and left.³⁹⁸

of the conflict between good and evil in the human mind and in human society”. The topic of the abilities of impure *devas* vis-à-vis pure *devas* is also taken up in the Jain *Viyāhapaññatti* 6.9.144 in Lalwani 1974: 308,22, suggesting that such topics were of considerable interest in ancient India.

³⁹⁶ While according to MĀ 212 at T I 795a24 the messenger arrived before the Buddha could give a full reply to King Pasenadi's question, according to MN 90 at MN II 132,10 the Buddha had answered Pasenadi's question before the messenger arrived. D (1) 'dul ba, kha 91b5 or Q (1030) ge 84b4 reports that the Buddha had answered Pasenadi's question about Brahmās, but then Pasenadi asked yet another question on the same theme and the messenger arrived before the Buddha could answer this other question.

³⁹⁷ MN 90 at MN II 132,19: *yānakālo*, MĀ 212 at T I 795b4: 嚴駕已至, 天王當知時, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 92a2 or Q (1030) ge 85a1: *gshegs pa'i dus la bab lags so*. This announcement fits well with the subsequent occurrence in MN 90 at MN II 133,1, MĀ 212 at T I 795b11, and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 92a5 or Q (1030) ge 85a4 of a standard pericope for taking leave after a visit, according to which Pasenadi announced that he had much to do. Manné 1993: 36, based on surveying instances of the use of this pericope in the Pāli *Nikāyas*, concludes that this “formula is quite simply a standard means of polite leave-taking ... a conventional means to end a conversation and to enable a polite departure”. Although in some circumstances one might have the impression that it conveys a sense of self-importance on the side of the speaker, according to Manné 1993: 38 its general usage is as “an excuse for going, but without self-importance ... the speaker is going somewhat against his will ... he is obliged to go. It is all very polite and conventional”.

³⁹⁸ While MN 90 at MN II 133,4 and D (1) 'dul ba, kha 92a6 or Q (1030) ge 85a5 only mention that King Pasenadi rejoiced in the discourse, MĀ 212 at T I 795b14 reports that Ānanda and the whole great assembly, 一切大眾, also rejoiced in the Buddha's exposition.

