



Hunting the Shadows: In Depth Analysis of Escalated APT Attacks



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Agenda

- Why Taiwan?
- The “Lstudio” player... fun ☺
- Taking a peek at Weaponry
- APT in a Cloud
- Victimology or ... chicken-logy?

whowear



@bensonwu



[secret]



@fygrave



[censored]

Based in Taiwan

Interests in Computer Forensics

Access to some raw network traffic data (fun!)

Get to fish interesting things (PROFFFIIIITT!)

Disclaimer

A few words before we move on.

- With this research we are primarily interested in understanding the Ops and victims of discussed targeted attacks. We **DO NOT** attempt to perform any attribution of potential attackers.

Taiwan has been a frontline of APT battlefield for some time

TAIPEI 台北 TIMES

Cabinet says computers under attack

INFORMATION WARFARE : A Cabinet spokesman said Beijing is waging a campaign designed to access databases in Taiwan through an army of hackers based in China's Hubei and Fujian provinces has successfully spread 23 different Trojan horse programs to the networks 10 private high-tech companies here to use them as a springboard to break into at least 30 different government agencies and 50 private companies."

China has launched a systematic information warfare campaign against Taiwan, spreading Trojan-horse programs into private companies' computers as a means to break into government databases, the Cabinet said yesterday.

"National intelligence has indicated that an army of hackers based in China's Hubei and Fujian provinces has successfully spread 23 different Trojan horse programs to the networks 10 private high-tech companies here to use them as a springboard to break into at least 30 different government agencies and 50 private companies."

BACK
DRAFT




Many interesting things could be observed (though this is not “Lstudio” group)



Elirks: earlier campaign

Reported by Dell/Secureworks as Elirks http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/chasing_apt/



Elinks evolution

<http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!uzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4I5>

<http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977>

<http://diary.blog.yam.com/bigtree20130514/article/10173342>

<http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!>

Alex: Natalie win the competition award like 1Sa65j4W, well known for the series of 937B.

ブログをはじめました!
コメント大歓迎です。
これからどうぞよろしくお願いします!

ナイス! { 0 いいね! { 0 ツイート { 0 チェック B!

Elinks 2.0 – silly to reuse the address-space

mdb 正在 Kennedy win the competition award as CmOVZQnj, well known for the series of 836D.

mdbmdb 11111

mdbmdb 正在 Kennedy win th CmOVZQnj, wel 836D.

mute

Managed by the same IP addresses
(easy to cross-correlate)

10am Nov 26 3pm Sep 24 12

The diagram illustrates a network topology with several Autonomous System (AS) numbers represented by red ovals and their corresponding green gateway nodes. The ASes shown are AS9919, AS22781, AS30058, AS3462, AS23338, AS29838, AS55350, AS9584, HK, AS4766, KR, and AS4760. A green oval labeled 'TW' is connected to AS3462. A green oval labeled 'US' is connected to AS23338 and AS29838. A green oval labeled 'HK' is connected to AS9584 and AS4760. A green oval labeled 'KR' is connected to AS4766. A timeline at the bottom shows two tweets from 'mdbmdb' on Nov 26 at 3pm and Sep 24 at 12pm, both mentioning 'Kennedy win the competition award as CmOVZQnj'. The text 'Managed by the same IP addresses (easy to cross-correlate)' is overlaid on the timeline. The word 'mute' is also present near the timeline.

Another on-going Campaign



On average, 48 APT emails a week!

01-中共十八大之後對台政策走向研析.doc	134 K	09-兩岸交流應不應該預設前提(調查).doc	56 K
02-中韓貿易投資協議.doc	88 K	10-陸航母.doc	518 K
03-全國軍公教人員生活津貼申請修正規定.doc	518 K	11-清華大學核子工程學系87級華班通訊錄(new).doc	518 K
04-中華民國力學學會首屆會員榮譽名單.doc	518 K	12-問卷調查.doc	518 K
05-通訊錄 (new).xls		Agreement Regulation	
06-101年公務人		88 K	
08-會議紀錄.doc		10-陸航母.doc	
01.資料.xls		518 K	
02.年終總結 (11-清華大學核子工程學系87級華班通訊錄(new).doc	
03.總結報告.doc		12-問卷調查.doc	
04.笑話一籃筐		Questionnaire	
05.台北捷運路		518 K	
06.桃園捷運路		518 K	
07.大江大海一		518 K	
08.日常生活中		518 K	
01.1020205新		518 K	
02.1020206新		518 K	
03.中華民國10		518 K	
04.四個裸女打		518 K	
05.好東東.xls		518 K	
06.前衛30特別講座1月26、27日.xls	165 K	14.會議資料簡報當.doc	4,775 K
07.英文稿.doc	4,856 K	15.漢聲除夕節目表.doc	44 K
08.參考資料.doc	47 K	Conference slides	

Reference materials

XecMail
Standard, Version 2.6.2

The screenshot shows the XecMail web interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Dashboard, Emails, Report, Notification, and System. On the left, a sidebar lists various document files. The main area has three main sections: 'Today' (showing 149,184 processed emails), 'Subjects of APT Emails' (listing various email notifications), and 'System Statistics' (showing total emails processed, blocked, and bypassed, along with account and uptime information). Below these is a bar chart titled 'APT Attack Trend' showing the number of emails per day from March 17 to June 30.

Date	Count
2013-03-17	92
2013-03-24	41
2013-03-31	16
2013-04-07	53
2013-04-14	40
2013-04-21	16
2013-04-28	1
2013-05-05	0
2013-05-12	119
2013-05-19	40
2013-05-26	31
2013-06-02	70
2013-06-09	65
2013-06-16	45
2013-06-23	35
2013-06-30	10




The “Lstudio” group:

Exploring fun things in a
greater detail :)

隨裕而安
<http://yuann.myphotos.co/>

They start with a boring spearphiiissh



Almost clean :)

virustotal

SHA256: 67ed2dcd994507b603c523463d0c0b198948e09bd45c4437435d17adc7e943b9
File name: 1020704arcs.doc
Detection ratio: 5 / 47
Analysis date: 2013-07-09 03:30:58 UTC (1 week, 1 day ago)


More details

0 / 47

Antivirus	Detection	Date
Microsoft	✓	20130709
Sophos	✓	20130709
Symantec	✓	20130709
TrendMicro	✓	20130709
TrendMicro-HouseCall	✓	20130709
McAfee	✓	20130709
Kaspersky	✓	20130708
Kingsoft	✓	20130708
AhnLab-V3	✓	20130708
Avast	✓	20130708

0 0

The APT Landscape in Taiwan



We'll examine the “LStudio” group today

- Unique indicators of the “LStudio” group:
 - Debug symbols (.pdb)
 - “horse” label and generator tag
- Some curious discoveries from the “Lstudio” backend data center ... ;-)

LStudio binaries have cute things

<http://scan.xecure-lab.com>

 **XecScan**
XecRay Report
info@xecure-lab.com. Powered by Xecure lab, 2013

Date 2013-07-15 10:15:37
Type EXE
Size 270336
Hash MD5 : 4af190fb475c6d490eb266feb18148d2 [VT]
[\(Download\)](#)
SHA1: 0065a34e599b0f3ee2d8ee666126e3a88c2a4ed8

CSJ-Elise



f:\tools\code\CSJ\Elise\Release\EliseDLL.pdb

Malware
APT0LSTU
The analyzed sample has these behaviors: Ability with network behavior, APT-Malware

CVE
Sample Time 2012-10

Malware File • %USERPROFILE%\Templates\wincex.dll
MD5 = d9c98bd85ce03ef851e1e0c2b5d1ab05 [VT]
Build Time = 2012-10-23 03:35:43
[\(Download\)](#)

Autorun • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\SERVICES\WmdmPMM\

Mutex

C&C • 163.30.24.5 [VT UQ TU]
• 163.27.236.3 [VT UQ TU]
• 61.222.88.160 [VT UQ TU]
• 112.185.190.193 [VT UQ TU]

Agent Name

URL String

PDB String • F:\tools\code\CSJ\Elise\Release\EliseDLL.pdb

CSJ-Elise ..

Process Memory Report

Process Name	Address
svchost.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe
10000000	%USERPROFILE%\Templates\
	The analyzed code segment has behavior, APT-Malware
	118.163.217.37 (118.163.217.37: 118.163.217.37 (http://118.163.217.37: 118.163.60.73 (118.163.60.73:44 140.105.135.71 (140.105.135.71: http:// Host: %s %s=;expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:00 net user net localgroup administrators net view netstat -ano tasklist /v net start systeminfo 0x03, Connect Failed. \000ELISEA310.TMP

Malware Behavior Graph

The graph illustrates the malware's interaction with the Windows registry and network. It starts with a registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\SERVICES\WmdmPMMI. An arrow labeled "Autorun" points to a file entry: %UserProfile%\Templates\wince.dll. This file is then shown running in a process: svchost.exe (%UserProfile%\Templates\wince.dll). Three external IP addresses are connected to this process: 118.163.217.37, 140.105.135.71, and 118.163.60.73. Arrows indicate "Connect" relationships between the process and each of these IPs.

TAABAMoGvBjTVXHUhainwrAWfchx2x17Rf2roRBnbD/9lu13lWnlAUbBgqw+YNld2vcV5krtXoG__FXI43BxueF4FChFrk
SRgNVP2WQ==

http://140.105.135.71:443/2995ebc9/page_12180900.html
http://118.163.60.73:443/2995ebc9/page_12180912.html

**They love fast
cars 😊**




FASST CARS ☺




Evora

Lstudio Operations and C2




“Lstudio” payload Generator




We don't say victim

肉雞 = G



The typical botnet model



Very advanced Zoo-management skills :)




APT advanced farming :)

- Operated by roughly **25** “farmers”
- Has controlled over **5,884** machines
- International coverage over **30** countries
- Utilizes **4** different Botnet software families
- Active since **2007**



The “Lstudio” Chicken Cloud ☺



.. And who are the Chicken ?! ☺




International Chicken Farm Corp.




chicken farms went international

5,884
chickens




Share some Chicken 😊



When you travel, your chicken travel too... ☺




Lets look at some travelers 😊



ANOTHER DISCOVERY!!

.. do have 9 to 5 job ;)...



Just like some security researchers
do ☺



AND THE LAST .. SOME HANDY
TOOLS TO SHARE ☺



XecScan: Free API

Date	2013-07-06 02:26:40
Type	EXE
Size	118784
Hash	MD5 : 68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb [VT] (Download) SHA1: 6c4786b792f13643d408199e1b5d43f6473f5eea

Information

Malware	APTOON00 The analyzed sample has these behaviors: Ability with network behavior, APT-Malware
CVE	
Sample Time	2012-09
Malware File	• %USERPROFILE%\68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb.EXE MD5 = 68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb [VT] Build Time = 2012-09-18 20:30:16 (Download)
Autorun	• HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load\
Mutex	
C&C	• blog.yam.com [VT] [UQ] [TU]
Agent Name	
URL String	• http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977 • BLOG.YAM.COM



Xecure Lab

Yara: a swiss-knife of static sigs ;)

Yara Rule

```
meta:  
    author = "XecScan API 2.0 beta"  
    date = "2013-07-06 02:26:40"  
    description = "scan.xecure-lab.com"  
    hash0 = "68d3bf4e11a65a6ba8170c3b77cc49cb"  
  
strings:  
    $string0 = "blog.yam.com"  
    $string1 = "http://blog.yam.com/minzhu0906/article/54726977"  
    $string2 = "BLOG.YAM.COM"  
    $string3 = ""  
  
condition:  
    any of them  
}
```

Snort Rule

```
alert udp $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"APT C2 blog.yam.com"; flow:to_server; byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,2;  
content:"|4|blog|3|yam|3|com"; nocase; fast_pattern:only; metadata:impact_flag red, policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips  
drop, service dns; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1689700070; rev:1;)
```

Similar Malware

Yara use

Easy to integrate with your scripts

Integration with a proxy server is possible via
icap yara plugin: https://github.com/fygrave/c_icap_yara

Raw network traffic monitoring project (and
http/DNS indexing):

https://github.com/fygrave/eye_pkflow

More cool tools

Moloch <https://github.com/aol/moloch>

Yara mail

<https://github.com/kevthehermit/yaraMail>

Yara pcap

<https://github.com/kevthehermit/YaraPcap>

Conclusions

Complex infrastructure

Operates since 2007

Multiple software versions

Multiple back-ends

Victims – government and private sector

Mainly Taiwan but also seen world-wide



USA 2013

Questions?

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