Secure and trustworthy file sharing over cloud storage using eID tokens

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Protbox



- System conceived for secure file sharing over cloud storage providers
 - Independent of storage providers
 - Independent of operating systems
 - Implemented in Java
 - Uses eIDs for personal identification
 - Through PKCS #11

Protbox security features



Confidentiality

Storage provider has no access to original contents

Integrity control

Malicious or involuntary file tampering is detected

Content loss


Malicious or involuntary file deletions can be overcome

Access control

Personal authorization to access files on shared folders

Architecture overview





Architectural requirements



Independence from cloud storage solutions

- Protbox only uses local folders
- Shared Folder is a local folder synchronized with a Cloud Folder by software given by the cloud provider

eID support

Protbox only requires digital signature support

Terminology




Protbox Pair

- A pair of directories
 - Shared Folder
 - Prot Folder
- Both local to the user

Pair Key

- A symmetric key for encrypting files on a Shared Folder
- Randomly generated by the first Protbox Pair created upon a Shared Folder



Terminology



- Key Distribution Key Pair (KDKP)
 - Asymmetric key pair of a user running Protbox
 - Temporary
 - Created when Protbox starts
 - Public component signed with the user eID
 - Immediately upon creation
 - Usage:
 - Signed requests of Key Pairs
 - Secure communication of Key Pairs

Use case: 1st step



- Alice and Bob want to share photos
 - In a private way
- Alice makes the first move
 - Creates a Cloud Folder

Use case: 2nd step



- Alice associates the Cloud Folder with a Prot Folder with the photos to share with Bob
 - Protbox populates the Cloud Folder with the encrypted versions of Alice's photos
- Alice invites Bob to share the Cloud Folder
 - Out of the scope of Protbox

Use case: 3rd step




- Bob associates the Cloud Folder with a Prot Folder
 - Since the Cloud Folder is not empty, Protbox needs to get its Pair Key
- Bob's Protbox sends a Pair Key request
 - Through the Cloud Folder
 - This is a signed request
 - It contains the eID identity of the signer

Pair Key distribution protocol







$$KDKP = \begin{cases} K - B \\ K + B \end{cases}$$
Bob

Pair Key request, signed with K-_B K+_B signed with Bob eID eID certificate chain

Pair Key encrypted with K+_B signed with K-_A K+_A signed with Alice eID eID certificate chain

Use case: 4th step



Alice's Protbox pops up Bob's request

- Displaying Bob's identity
- Alice disagrees
 - The request is overlooked
 - Removed after a timeout

Alice agrees

- Sends back a confidential reply with the Pair Key
 - Through the Cloud Folder
 - Encrypted with Bob's KDKP public key
- Signed reply
 - It contains the eID identity of the signer

Use case: 5th step



Bob's Protbox gets the reply

 And uses the Key Pair to populate his Prot Folder with decrypted versions of Alices' photos

Bob adds his photos to the Prot Folder

- There encrypted versions will be copied into the Cloud folder
- Alice can decrypt them into her Prot Folder

Use case: 6th step



Alice and Bob can edit the photos

- Changes will be propagated as usually
- But ... Protbox keeps old versions is a log

Alice and Bod can delete photos

- Changes will be propagated as usually
- But ... Protbox also keeps a deleted version in the log

No file content lost

 Unless ... the log limit is exceeded and it gets only populated with gibberish

Protbox control structures



Protbox Registry (PReg)

- Local data structure
- Stored in the user home directory
- Contains all information about the user's Protbox
 Pairs
 - Key Pair
 - File's metadata (name, encrypted name, digests)
 - File's log

Synchronization issues



- Alice and Bob simultaneously edit the same photo
 - And simultaneously save a snapshot of it in their
 Prot Folder
- One of them will 'win'
 - In terms of Cloud storage
- But the 'looser' does not loose it all
 - Protbox can detect the conflict and rename files
 - If not, the 'looser' version exists in his own log

Privacy issues



- The identity of Alice and Bob is disclosed to the Cloud provider
 - It can see that in the signed Pair Key requests and responses

Pair Key distribution issues



- Anyone with access to the Cloud Folder can provide a signed response
 - With or without the right Pair Key
 - Responses cannot be reused
 - They are build upon requests
- Wrong Pair Keys can be a problem
 - But, at least, attackers are not anonymous

Log management policies



- On a per file basis
 - Files may have different relevancy levels
- On a per user basis
 - Each Protbox user may have his/her own

Implementation



Java application

- Publicly available at Github
- Uses licensed third-party libraries
- Graphical user interface

eIDs are only used when Protbox starts

- A new, fresh KDKP is generated
- Its public key gets signed by the eID owner

Implementation



Crypto used

- PReg encrypted with a password-derived symmetric key
- Files encrypted with AES CBC
- File names encrypted with AES ECB
 - Encoded in a kind of base64 dialect
- HMAC-SHA1 integrity control
 - Both for files and file names
- RSA KDKPs
- eID signatures through PKCS #11 modules

Experience



Operating systems

Windows, Linux, MacOS

Cloud folders

- Dropbox
- Google Drive
- Microft OneDrive
- SugarSync

eID solutions

Portuguese eID (Cartão de Cidadão)

Conclusions



- Protbox enables people to share files through Cloud storage with security
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity control
 - Identity assurance
 - Protection against conflicting updates
 - Protection against file deletions

Conclusions



- Protbox works in different systems and with different Cloud storage providers
 - No special configurations are required

- Identity assurance is provided by eID signatures
 - It should work for many eID solutions
 - Alice and Bob can use different eID solutions