# Using Capabilities for Strict Runtime Invariant Checking

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#### Abstract

In this paper we use pre-existing language support for both reference and object capabilities to enable sound runtime verification of representation invariants. Our invariant protocol is stricter than the other protocols, since it guarantees that invariants hold for all objects involved in execution. Any language already offering appropriate support for reference and object capabilities can support our invariant protocol with minimal added complexity. In our protocol, invariants are simply specified as methods whose execution is statically guaranteed to be deterministic and to not access any externally mutable state. We formalise our approach and prove that our protocol is sound, in the context of a language supporting mutation, dynamic dispatch, exceptions, and non-deterministic I/O. We present case studies showing that our system requires a much lower annotation burden compared to Spec#, and performs orders of magnitude less runtime invariant checks compared to the 'visible state semantics' protocols of D and Eiffel. [Isaac: When we said "widlely" used, we mean visible state semantics is, not the D and Eiffel languages]

Keywords: reference capabilities, object capabilities, runtime verification, class invariants

#### 1. Introduction

Representation invariants (sometimes called class invariants or object invariants) are a useful concept when reasoning about software correctness in OO (Object Oriented) languages. Such invariants are predicates on the state of an object and its ROG (Reachable Object Graph). They can be presented as documentation, checked as part of static verification, or, as we do in this paper, monitored for violations using runtime verification. In our system, a class specifies its invariant by defining a method called invariant() that returns a boolean. We say that an object's invariant holds when its invariant() method would return true.<sup>1</sup>

Invariants are designed to hold most of the time, however it is commonly required to (temporarily) violate invariants while performing complex sequences of mutations. To support this behaviour, most invariant protocols present in the literature allow invariants to be broken and observed broken. The two main forms of invariant protocols are visible state semantics [?] and the Pack-Unpack/Boogie methodology [?]. In visible state semantics, invariants can be broken when a method on the object is active (that is, currently executing). Some interpretations of the visible state are more permissive, requiring the invariants of receivers to hold only before and after every public method call, and after constructors. In the pack-unpack approach, objects are either in a 'packed' or 'unpacked' state, the invariant of 'packed' objects must hold, whereas unpacked objects can be broken.

In this paper we propose a much stricter invariant protocol: at all times, the invariant of every object involved in execution must hold; thus they can be broken when the object is not (currently) involved in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>We do this (as in Dafny [?]) to minimise the special treatment of invariants, whereas other approaches often treat invariants as a special annotation with its own syntax.

execution. An object is *involved in execution* when it is in the ROG of any of the objects mentioned in the method call, field access, or field update that is about to be reduced; we state this more formally later in the paper.

Our strict protocol supports easier reasoning: an object can never be observed broken. However at first glance it may look overly restrictive, preventing useful program behaviour. Consider the iconic example of a Range class, with a min and max value, where the invariant requires that min<=max:

```
class Range{
   private field min; private field max;
   method invariant(){ return min<max; }
   method set(min, max){
    if(min>=max){ throw new Error(/**/); }
    this.min = min;
   this.max = max;
}
}
```

In this example we omit types to focus on the runtime semantics. The code of set does not violate visible state semantics: this.min = min may temporarily break the invariant of this, however it will be fixed after executing this.max = max. Visible state allows such temporary breaking of invariants since we are inside a method on this, and by the time it returns, the invariant will be re-established. However, if min is this.max, set will violate our stricter approach. The execution of this.min = min will break the invariant of this and this.max = max would then involve a broken object. If we were to inject a call Do.stuff(this); between the two field updates, arbitrary user code could observe a broken object; adding such a call is however allowed by visible state semantics.

Using the *box pattern*, we can provide a modified Range class with the desired client interface, while respecting the principles of our strict protocol:

```
ds class BoxRange{//no invariant in BoxRange
    field min; field max;
    BoxRange(min, max){ this.set(min, max); }
    method Void set(min, max){
        if(min>=max){ throw new Error(/**/); }
        this.min = min; this.max = max;
    }
}
class Range{
    private field box; //box contains a BoxRange
Range(min, max){ this.box = new BoxRange(min, max); }
    method invariant(){ return this.box.min < this.box.max; }
    method set(min, max){ return this.box.set(min, max); }
}</pre>
```

The code of Range.set(min,max) does not violate our protocol. The call to BoxRange.set(min,max) works in a context where the Range object is unreachable, and thus not involved in execution. That is, the Range object is not in the ROG of the receiver or the parameters of BoxRange.set(min,max). Thus Range.set(min,max) can temporarily break the Range's invariant. By using the box field as an extra level of indirection, we restrict the set of objects involved in execution while the state of the object Range is modified. With appropriate type annotations, the code of Range and BoxRange is accepted as correct by our system: no matter how Range objects are used, a broken Range object will never be involved in execution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Due to its simplicity and versatility, we do not claim this pattern to be a contribution of our work, as we expect others to have used it before. We have however not been able to find it referenced with a specific name in the literature, though technically speaking, it is a simplification of the Decorator, but with a different goal. While in very specific situations the overhead of creating such additional box object may be unacceptable, we designed our work for environments where such fine performance differences are negligible. Also note that many VMs and compilers can optimize away wrapper objects in many circumstances. [?]

#### **Contributions**

Invariant protocols allow for objects to make necessary changes that might make their invariant temporarily broken. In visible state semantics any object that has an active method call anywhere on the call stacks is potentially invalid; arguably not a very useful guarantee as observed by Gopinathan et al.'s work. [? ] Approaches such as pack/unpack [? ] represent potentially invalid objects in the type system; this encumbers the type system and the syntax with features whose only purpose is to distinguish objects with broken invariants. The core insight behind our work is that we can use a small number of decorator-like design patterns to avoid exposing those potentially invalid objects in the first place, thus avoiding the need for representing them at the type level.

In the remainder of this paper, we discuss how to combine runtime checks and capabilities to soundly enforce our strict invariant protocol. Our solution only requires that all code is well-typed, and works in the presence of mutation, I/O, non-determinism, and exceptions, all under an open world assumption.

We formalise our approach and, in Appendix A, prove that our use of Reference and Object Capabilities soundly enforces our invariant protocol.

We have fully implemented our protocol in  $L42^3$ , we used this implementation to implement many case studies, showing that our protocol is more succinct than the pack/unpack approach and much more efficient then the visible state semantic. It is important to note that unlike most prior work, we soundly handle catching of invariant failures and I/O. We describe our case studies in Section 6. Our approach may seem very restrictive; the programming patterns in Section 7 show how our approach does not hamper expressiveness; in particular we show how batch mutation operations can be performed with a single invariant check, and how the state of a 'broken' object can be safely passed around.

### 2. Background on Reference and Object Capabilities

Reasoning about imperative OO programs is a non-trivial task, made particularly difficult by mutation, aliasing, dynamic dispatch, I/O, and exceptions. There are many ways to perform such reasoning; instead of using automated theorem proving, it is becoming more popular to verify aliasing and immutability properties using a type system. For example, three languages: L42 [? ? ? ? ], Pony [? ? ], and the language of Gordon et al. [? ] use RCs (Reference Capabilities)<sup>4</sup> and OCs (Object Capabilities) to statically ensure deterministic parallelism and the absence of data races. While studying those languages, we discovered an elegant way to enforce invariants: we use capabilities to restrict how/when the result of invariant methods changes; this is done by restricting I/O, and how mutation through aliases can affect the state seen by invariants.

### Reference Capabilities

RCs, as used in this paper, are a type system feature that allows reasoning about aliasing and mutation. A more recent design for them has emerged that radically improves their usability; three different research languages are being independently developed relying on this new design: the language of Gordon *et al.*, Pony, and L42. These projects are quite large: several million lines of code are written in Gordon *et al.*'s language and are used by a large private Microsoft project; Pony and L42 have large libraries and are active open source projects. In particular the RCs of these languages are used to provide automatic and correct parallelism [? ? ? ? ].

Reference capabilities are a well known mechanism [???????] that allow statically reasoning about the mutability and aliasing properties of objects. Here we refer to the interpretation of [?], that introduced the concept of recovery/promotion. This concept is the basis for L42, Pony, and Gordon  $et\ al.$ 's type systems [?????]. With slightly different names and semantics, those languages all support the following RCs for object references:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Our implementation is implemented by checking that a given class conforms to our protocol, and injecting invariant checks in the appropriate places. An anonymised version of L42, supporting the protocol described in this paper, together with the full code of our case studies, is available at http://l42.is/InvariantArtifact.zip.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>RCs are called *Type Modifiers* in former works on L42.

- Mutable (mut): the referenced object can be mutated and shared/aliased without restriction; as in most imperative languages without reference capabilities.
- Immutable (imm): the referenced object cannot mutate, not even through other aliases. An object with any imm aliases is an *immutable object*. Any other object is a *mutable object*. All objects are born mutable and may later become immutable. Thus, an object can be classified as *mutable* even if it has no fields that can be updated or mutated.
- Readonly (read): the referenced object cannot be mutated by such references, but there may also be mutable aliases to the same object, thus mutation can be observed. Readonly references can refer to both mutable and immutable objects, as read types are supertypes of both their imm and mut variants.
- Encapsulated (capsule): every mutable object in the ROG of a capsule reference (including itself) is only reachable through that reference. Immutable objects in the ROG of a capsule reference are not constrained, and can be freely referred to without passing through that reference.

That is, there are only two kinds of objects: mutable and immutable, but there are more kinds of RCs.

[Isaac: didn't a reviewer dislike this statement?]

RCs are different to field or variable qualifiers like Java's final: RCs apply to references, whereas final applies to fields themselves. Unlike a variable/field of a read type, a final variable/field cannot be reassigned, it always refers to the same object, however the variable/field can still be used to mutate the referenced object. On the other hand, an object cannot be mutated through a read reference, however a read variable can still be reassigned.<sup>5</sup>

RCs are applied to all types. This includes types in the receiver and parameters of methods. A mut method is a method where this is typed mut; An imm method is a method where this is typed imm, and so on for all the other RCs.

Consider the following example usage of mut, imm, and read, where we can observe a change in rp caused by a mutation inside mp.

```
mut Point mp = new Point(1, 2);
mp.x = 3; // ok
   imm Point ip = new Point(1, 2);
   //ip.x = 3; // type error
   read Point rp = mp;
   //rp.x = 3; // type error

140 mp.x = 5; // ok, now we can observe rp.x == 5
   ip = new Point(3, 5); // ok, ip is not final
```

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RCs influence the access to the whole ROG; not just the referenced object itself, as in the full/deep interpretation of type modifiers [? ? ]:

- A mut field accessed from a read reference produces a read reference; thus a read reference cannot be used to mutate the ROG of the referenced object.
- Any field accessed from an imm reference produces an imm reference; thus all the objects in the ROG
  of an immutable object are also immutable.

A common misconception of this line of work is that a mut field will always refer to a mutable object. Classes declare RCs for their methods and field types, but what kinds of object is stored in a field also depends on the kind of the object: a mut field of a mutable object will contain a mutable object; but a mut field of an immutable object will contain an immutable object. This is different with respect to many other approaches, where the declaration fully determines what values can be stored; in those other approaches, any contextual information must be explicitly passed through the type system, for example, with a generic RC parameter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>In C, this is similar to the difference between A\* const (like final) and const A\* (like read), where const A\* const is like final read.

Another common misconception is the belief that capsule fields and capsule local variables always hold capsule references. How capsule local variables are handled differs widely in the literature:

In L42, a capsule local variable always holds a capsule reference: this is ensured by allowing them to be read only once (similar to linear and affine types [?]). Pony and Gordon et al. follow a more complicated approach: capsule variables can be accessed multiple times, however in those cases the result will not be a capsule reference but another kind of reference that can only be used in limited ways. Pony and Gordon also provide destructive reads, where the variable's old value is returned as capsule. Like capsule variables, how capsule fields are handled differs widely in the literature, however they must always be initialised and updated with capsule references. In order for access to a capsule field to safely produce a capsule reference, Gordon et al. only allows them to be read destructively (i.e. by replacing the field's old value with a new one, such as null). In contrast, Pony does not guarantee that capsule fields contain a capsule reference at all times, as it provides non-destructive reads. L42 is even more radical: an L42 capsule field never contains a capsule reference; it is simply initialised with one. [? ?] Pony and L42's capsule fields are useful for safe parallelism but not invariant checking.

In Section 3 we present a novel kind of **capsule** field useful for invariant checking; we added support for these fields to L42, and believe they could be easily added to Pony and Gordon *et al.*'s language.

### Promotion and Recovery

Many different techniques and type systems handle the RCs above [? ? ? ? ]. The main progress in the last few years is with the flexibility of such type systems: where the programmer should use imm when representing immutable data and mut nearly everywhere else. The system will be able to transparently promote/recover [? ? ? ] the reference capability, adapting them to their use context. To see a glimpse of this flexibility, consider the following:

```
mut Circle mc = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
capsule Circle cc = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
imm Circle ic = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
```

Here mc, cc, and ic are all syntactically initialised with the same exact expression. All new expressions return a mut [? ? ], so mc is well typed. The declarations of cc and ic are also well typed, since any expression (not just new expressions) of a mut type that has no mut or read free variables can be implicitly promoted to capsule or imm. This requires the absence of read and mut global/static variables, as in L42, Pony, and Gordon  $et\ al.$ 's language. This is the main improvement on the flexibility of RCs in recent literature [? ? ? ? ]. From a usability perspective, this improvement means that these RCs are opt-in: a programmer can write many classes simply using mut types and be free to have rampant aliasing. Then, at a later stage, another programmer may still be able to encapsulate instances of those data structures into an imm or capsule reference.

#### Exceptions

In most languages exceptions may be thrown at any point; combined with mutation this complicates reasoning about the state of programs after exceptions are caught: if an exception was thrown while mutating an object, what state is that object in? Does its invariant hold? The concept of strong exception safety [??] simplifies reasoning: if a try-catch block caught an exception, the state visible before execution of the try block is unchanged, and the exception object does not expose any object that was being mutated; this prevents exposing objects whose invariant was left broken in the middle of mutations.

L42 enforces strong exception safety for unchecked exceptions using RCs<sup>7</sup> in the following way:<sup>8</sup>

• Code inside a try block that captures unchecked exceptions is typed as if all variables declared outside of the block are final and all those of a mut type were read.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>It may seem surprising that those weaker forms of encapsulation are still sufficient to ensure safe parallelism. The detailed way L42 parallelism works is unrelated to the presented work. Please see L42.is/tutorial.xhtml (specifically, section 5 and 6) for more information on parallelism in L42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>This is needed to support safe parallelism. Pony takes a drastic approach and not support exceptions. We are not aware of how Gordon *et al.* handles exceptions, however to have sound unobservable parallelism it must have some restrictions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Formal proof that these restriction are sufficient is in the work of Lagorio [?].

• Only imm objects may be thrown as unchecked exceptions.

This strategy does not restrict when exceptions can be *thrown*, but only restricts when unchecked exceptions can be *caught*. Strong exception safety allows us to throw invariant failures as unchecked exceptions: if an object's ROG was mutated into a broken state within a try block, when the invariant failure is caught, the mutated object will be unreachable/garbage-collectable. This works since strong exception safety guarantees that no object mutated within a try block is visible when it catches an unchecked exception.<sup>9</sup>

Similarly to Java, L42 distinguishes between checked and unchecked exceptions, and try-catches over checked exceptions impose no limits on object mutation during the try. That is, strong exception safety is only enforced for unchecked exceptions.

### **Object Capabilities**

OCs, which L42, Pony, and Gordon et al.'s work have, are a widely used [???] programming technique where access rights to resources are encoded as references to objects. When this style is respected, code unable to reach a reference to such an object cannot use its associated resource. Here, as in Gordon et al.'s work, we enforce the OC pattern with RCs in order to reason about determinism and I/O. To properly enforce this, the OC style needs to be respected while implementing the primitives of the standard library, and when performing foreign function calls that could be non-deterministic, such as operations that read from files or generate random numbers. Such operations would not be provided by static methods, but instead by instance methods of classes whose instantiation is kept under control by carefully designing their implementation.

For example, in Java, System.in is a *capability object* that provides access to the standard input resource. However, since it is globally accessible it completely prevents reasoning about determinism. In contrast, if Java were to respect the object capability style, the main method could take a System parameter, as in

```
public static void main(System s){... s.in().read() ...}
```

Calling methods on that System instance would be the only way to perform I/O; moreover, the only System instance would be the one created by the runtime system before calling main(s). This design has been explored by Joe-E [?].

OCs are typically not part of the type system nor do they require runtime checks or special support beyond that provided by a memory safe language.

However, L42 has no predefined standard library, but many can be defined by the community. Thus, the only way to perform I/O operations is via foreign function calls. Since enforcing the OC pattern can not be done via a unique standard library, the type system of L42 directly enforces the OC pattern as follows:

- Foreign methods (which have not been whitelisted as deterministic) and methods whose names start with #\$ are capability operations.
- $\bullet$  Classes containing capability operations are  $\it capability \ classes.$
- Constructors of capability classes are also capability operations.
- Capability operations can only be called by other capability operations or mut/capsule methods of capability classes.
- In L42 there is no main method, rather it has several main expressions; such expressions can also call capability operations, thus they can instantiate OCs and pass them around to the rest of the program.

### 3. Our Invariant Protocol

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All classes contain a read method Bool invariant() {..}, if no invariant() method is explicitly present, a trivial one returning true is assumed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Transactions are another way of enforcing strong exception safety, but they require specialised and costly run time support.

Our protocol guarantees that the whole ROG of any object involved in execution (formally, in a redex) is valid: if you can use an object, manually calling invariant() on it is guaranteed to return true in a finite number of steps. <sup>10</sup>

As the invariant() is used to determine whether this is broken, it may receive a broken this; however this will only occur for calls to invariant() inserted by our approach. User written calls to invariant() are guaranteed to receive a valid this.

We restrict invariant() methods so that they represent a predicate over the receiver's imm and capsule fields. To ensure that invariant() methods do not expose a potentially broken this to the other objects, we require that all occurrences of this 11 in the invariant()'s body are the receiver of a field access (this.f) of an imm/capsule field, or the receivers of a method call (this.m(..)) of a final (non-virtual) method that in turn satisfies these restrictions. No other uses of this are allowed, such as as the right hand side of a variable declaration, or an argument to a method. An equivalent alternative design could instead rely on static invariant(..) methods taking each imm and capsule field as a parameter.

Invariants can only refer to immutable and encapsulated state. Thus while we can easily verify that a doubly linked list of immutable elements is correctly linked up, we can not do the same for a doubly linked lists of mutable elements. We do not make it harder to correctly implement such data structures, but the invariant() method is unable to access the list's nodes, since they may contain mut references to shared/unencapsulated objects. There is a line of work [?] striving to allow invariants over other forms of state. We have not tried to integrate such solutions into our work as we believe it would make our system more complex and ad hoc, probably requiring numerous specialised kinds of RCs. Thus we have traded some expressive power in order to preserve safety and simplicity.

#### Purity

L42's enforcement of RCs and OCs statically guarantees that any method with only read or imm parameters (including the receiver) is *pure*; we define pure as being deterministic and not mutating existing memory. This holds because (1) the ROG of the parameters (including this) is only accessible as read (or imm), thus it cannot be mutated (2) if a capability object is in the ROG of any of the arguments (including the receiver), then it can only be accessed as read, preventing calling any non-deterministic (capability) methods; (3) no other pre-existing objects are accessible (as L42 does not have global variables). In particular, this means that our invariant() methods are pure, since their only parameter (the receiver) is read.

#### Capsule Fields

Former work on L42 discusses "depending on how we expose the owned data, we can closely model both owners-as-dominators[...] and owners-as-qualifiers[...]"[?], and "lent getter[s], a third variant"[?] Those informal considerations have then influenced the L42 language design, bringing to the creation of syntactic sugar and programming patterns to represent various kinds of capsule fields aimed to model various forms of ownership. Under the hood, all those forms of capsule fields are just private mut fields with some extra restrictions. Describing in the details those restrictions would be outside of the scope of this paper.

Here we present a novel kind of capsule field<sup>12</sup> (which can coexist with other kinds of capsule fields), enforcing the following key property: the ROG of a capsule field o.f can only be mutated under the control of a mut method of o, and during such mutation, o itself cannot be seen. This is similar to owner-as-modifier [? ?], where we could consider an object to be the 'owner' of all the mutable objects in the ROG of its capsule fields; but with the extra restriction that the owner is unobservable during mutation of this ROG.

More preciselly, if a reference to an object in the ROG of a capsule field o.f is involved in execution as mut, then: (1) no reference to o is involved in execution, (2) a call to a mut method for o is present in a previous stack frame, (3) mutable references to the ROG of o.f are not leaked out of such method execution, either as return values, exception values, or stored in the ROG of a parameter, or in any other field of the method's receiver.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>We will show later how we satisfy this constraint without solving the halting problem or requiring all invariant() methods to be total

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$ Some languages allow the **this** receiver to be implicit. For clarity in this work we require **this** to be always used explicit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>As for the other kinds of capsule fields, our new kind is also just a private mut fields with extra restrictions.

To show how our capsule fields ensure these properties, we first define some terminology: x.f is a field access, x.f=e is a field update, a mut method with a field access on a capsule field of this is a capsule mutator. Note that a field update of a capsule field (instead of a field access) does not make a method a capsule mutator.

The following rules define our novel capsule fields:

- A capsule field can only be initialised/updated using the result of an expression with capsule type.
- A capsule field access will return a:
  - mut reference, when accessed on this within a capsule mutator,
  - read reference, when accessed on any other mut receiver,
  - imm if the receiver is imm, read if the receiver is read, or capsule if the receiver is capsule. This last case is safe since a capsule receiver object will then be garbage collectable, so we do not need to preserve its invariant.
- A capsule mutator must:

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- use this exactly once: to access the capsule field,
- have no mut or read parameters (except the mut receiver),
- not have a **mut** return type,
- not throw any checked exceptions<sup>14</sup>.

The above rules ensure that capsule mutators control the mutation of the ROG of capsule fields, and ensures our points (1), (2), and (3): o will not be in the ROG of o.f and only a capsule mutator on o can see o.f as  $\mathtt{mut}$ ; this means that the only way to mutate the ROG of o.f is through such methods. If execution is (indirectly) in a capsule mutator, then o is only used as the receiver of the  $\mathtt{this}.f$  expression in the capsule mutator. Thus we can be sure that the ROG of o.f will only be mutated within a capsule mutator, and only after the single use of o to access o.f. Since such mutation could invalidate the invariant of o, we call the invariant() method at the end of the capsule mutator body; before o can be used again. Provided that the invariant is re-established before a capsule mutator returns, no invariant failure will be thrown, even if the invariant was temporarily broken during the body of the method.

These properties are stronger then those of the pre-existing capsule fields of L42, but still weaker than those of capsule references: we do not need to prevent arbitrary read aliases to the ROG of a capsule field, and we do allow arbitrary mut aliases to exist during the execution of a capsule mutator. In particular, our rules allow unrestricted read only access to our capsule fields.

### **Runtime Monitoring**

The language runtime will automatically perform calls to invariant(), if such a call returns false, an unchecked exception will be thrown. Such calls are performed at the following points:

- After a constructor call, on the newly created object.
- After a field update, on the receiver.
- After a capsule mutator method returns, on the receiver of the method 15.

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$ Thus a field update x.f=e is not a field access followed by an assignment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>To allow capsule mutators to leak checked exceptions, we would need to check the invariant when such exceptions are leaked. However, this would make the runtime semantics of checked exceptions inconsistent with unchecked ones.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>The invariant is not checked if the call was terminated via an an unchecked exception, since strong exception safety guarantees the object will be unreachable.

In Section 5, we show that these checks, together with our aforementioned restrictions, are sufficient to ensure our guarantee that the invariants of all objects involved in execution hold.

### **Traditional Constructors and Subclassing**

L42 constructors directly initialise all the fields using the parameters, and L42 does not provide traditional subclassing. This works naturally with our invariant protocol. We can support traditional constructors as in Pony and Gordon et al.'s language, by requiring that constructors only use this as the receiver of a field initialisation. Subclassing can be supported by forcing that a subclass invariant method implicitly starts with a check that super.invariant() returns true. We would also perform invariant checks at the end of new expressions, as happens in [?], and not at the end of super(...) constructor calls.

# 4. Essential Language Features

Our invariant protocol relies on many different features and requirements. In this section we will show examples of using our system, and how relaxing any of our requirements would break the soundness of our protocol. In our examples and in L42, the reference capability imm is the default, and so it can be omitted. Many verification approaches take advantage of the separation between primitive/value types and objects, since the former are immutable and do not support reference equality. However, our approach works in a pure OO setting without such a distinction. Hence we write all type names in BoldTitleCase to emphasise this. To save space we omit the bodies of constructors that simply initialise fields with the values of the constructor's parameters, but we show their signature in order to show any annotations.

First we consider Person: it has a single immutable (and non final) field name.

```
class Person {
   read method Bool invariant() { return !name.isEmpty(); }
   private String name;//the default RC imm is applied here
   read method String name() { return this.name; }
   mut method Void name(String name) { this.name = name; }
   Person(String name) { this.name = name; }
}
```

The name field is not final: Persons can change state during their lifetime. The ROGs of all of a Person's fields are immutable, but Persons themselves may be mutable. We enforce Person's invariant by generating checks on the result of calling this.invariant(): immediately after each field update, and at the end of the constructor. Such checks are generated/injected, and not directly written by the programmer.

```
class Person { .. // Same as before
   mut method String name(String name) {
      this.name = name; // check after field update
   if (!this.invariant()) { throw new Error(...); }
   }
   Person(String name) {
      this.name = name; // check at end of constructor
      if (!this.invariant()) { throw new Error(...); }
}
360   }
}
```

We now show how if we were to relax (as in Rust), or even eliminate (as in Java), the support for OCs, RCs, or strong exception safety, the above checks would not be sufficient to enforce our invariant protocol.

# **Unrestricted Access to Capability Objects?**

Allowing invariant() methods to (indirectly) perform non-deterministic operations by creating new capability objects or mutating existing ones would break our guarantee that (manually) calling invariant() always returns true. Consider this use of person; where myPerson.invariant() may randomly return false:

```
class EvilString extends String {//INVALID EXAMPLE
      @Override read method Bool isEmpty() { return new Random().bool(); }
370 }//Creates a new object capability out of thin air
```

```
method mut Person createPersons(String name) {
    // we can not be sure that name is not an EvilString
    mut Person schrodinger = new Person(name); // exception here?
    assert schrodinger.invariant(); // will this fail?
    ...}
```

Despite the code for Person.invariant() intuitively looking correct and deterministic (!name.isEmpty()), the above call to it is not. Obviously this breaks any reasoning and would make our protocol unsound. In particular, note how in the presence of dynamic class loading, we have no way of knowing what the type of name could be. Since our system allows non-determinism only through object capabilities, and restricts their creation, the above example is prevented.

Moreover, since our system allows non-determinism only through mut methods on object capabilities, even if an object has a capsule field referring to a "file" object, it would be unable to read such file during an invariant, since a mut reference would be required, but only a read reference would be available.

# Allowing Internal Mutation Through Back Doors?

Rust [?] and Javari [?] allow interior mutability: the ROG of an 'immutable' object can be mutated through back doors. Such back doors would allow invariant() methods to store and read information about previous calls. The example class MagicCounter breaks determinism by remotely breaking the invariant of person without any interaction with the person object itself:

```
class MagicCounter {//INVALID EXAMPLE
    Int counter = 0;
    method Int incr(){return unsafe{counter++}; /*using internal mutability*/}}
class NastyS extends String {..
    MagicCounter c = new MagicCounter(0);
    @Override read method Bool isEmpty(){return this.c.incr()!=2;}}
    ...
    NastyS name = new NastyS(); //RCs believe name's ROG is immutable
    Person person = new Person(name); // person is valid, counter=1
    name.incr(); // counter == 2, person is now broken
    person.invariant(); // returns false, counter == 3
    person.invariant(); // returns false, counter == 4
```

Such back doors are usually motivated by performance reasons, however in [?] they discuss how a few trusted language primitives can be used to perform caching and other needed optimisations, without the need for back doors.

# No Strong Exception Safety?

The ability to catch and recover from invariant failures allows programs to take corrective action. Since we represent invariant failures by throwing unchecked exceptions, programs can recover from them with a conventional try-catch. Due to the guarantees of strong exception safety, any object that has been mutated during a try block is now unreachable, as happens in alias burying [?]. This property ensures that an object whose invariant fails will be unreachable after the invariant failure has been captured. If instead we were to not enforce strong exception safety, an invalid object could be made reachable. The following code is ill-typed since we try to mutate bob in a try-catch block that captures all unchecked exceptions; thus also including invariant failures:

```
mut Person bob = new Person("Bob");//INVALID EXAMPLE

// Catch and ignore invariant failure:
try { bob.name(""); } catch (Error t) { }// bob mutated
assert bob.invariant(); // fails!
```

The following variant is instead well typed, since bob is now declared inside of the try and it is guaranteed to be garbage collectable after the try is completed.

```
try { mut Person bob = new Person("Bob"); bob.name(""); }
catch (Error t) { }
```

Note how soundly catching exceptions like stack overflows or out of memory cannot be allowed in invariant() methods, since they are not deterministically thrown. L42 allows catching them only as a capability operation, which thus can't be used inside an invariant.

### 25 Relaxing restrictions on capsule fields?

Capsule fields allow expressing invariants over mutable object graphs. Consider managing the shipment of items, where there is a maximum combined weight:

```
class ShippingList {
   capsule Items items;

read method Bool invariant(){ return this.items.weight()<=300; }
   ShippingList(capsule Items items) {
      this.items = items;
      if (!this.invariant()){ throw Error(...); }//injected check
   }

mut method Void addItem(Item item) {
      this.items.add(item);
      if (!this.invariant()){ throw Error(...); }//injected check
   }
}</pre>
```

We inject calls to invariant() at the end of the constructor and the addItem(item) method. This is safe since the items field is declared capsule. Relaxing our system to allow a mut RC for the items field and the corresponding constructor parameter would make the above checks insufficient: it would be possible for external code with no knowledge of the ShippingList to mutate its items. In order to write correct library code in mainstream languages like Java and C++, defensive cloning [?] is needed. For performance reasons, this is hardly done in practice and is a continuous source of bugs and unexpected behaviour.

```
mut Items items = ...; //INVALID EXAMPLE
mut ShippingList 1 = new ShippingList(items); // 1 is valid
items.addItem(new HeavyItem()); // 1 is now invalid!
```

If we were to allow x.items to be seen as mut, where x is not this, then even if the ShippingList has full control of items at initialisation time, such control may be lost later, and code unaware of the ShippingList could break it:

```
//INVALID EXAMPLE: 1.items can be exposed as mut
mut ShippingList 1 = new ShippingList(new Items()); // 1 is ok
mut Items evilAlias = 1.items; // here 1 loses control
evilAlias.addItem(new HeavyItem()); // now 1 is invalid!
```

Relaxing our requirements for capsule mutators would break our protocol: if capsule mutators could have a mut return type the following would be accepted:

```
//INVALID EXAMPLE: capsule mutator expose(c) return type is mut
mut method mut Items expose(C c) {return c.foo(this.items);}
```

Depending on dynamic dispatch, c.foo() may just be the identity function, thus we would get in the same situation as the former example.

Allowing this to be used more than once would allow the following code, where this may be reachable from f, thus f.hi() may observe an object that does not satisfying its invariant:

```
mut method Void multiThis(C c) {//INVALID EXAMPLE: two 'this'
read Foo f = c.foo(this);
this.items.add(new HeavyItem());
f.hi(); }//'this' could be observed here if it is in ROG(f)
```

In order to ensure that a second reference to this is not reachable through arguments to such methods, we only allow imm and capsule parameters. Accepting a read parameter, as in the example below, would cause the same problems as before, where f may contain a reference to this:

```
mut method Void addHeavy(read Foo f) {//INVALID EXAMPLE
   this.items.add(new HeavyItem());
```

```
f.hi(); }//'this' could be observed here if it is in ROG(f)
...

mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList(new Items());
  read Foo f = new Foo(l);
  l.addHeavy(f); // We pass another reference to 'l' through f
```

### 5. Formal Language Model

To model our system we need to formalise an imperative OO language with exceptions, object capabilities, and type system support for RCs and strong exception safety. Formal models of the runtime semantics of such languages are simple, but defining and proving the correctness of such a type system would require a paper of its own, and indeed many such papers exist in the literature [? ? ? ? ? ]. Thus we are assuming that we already have an expressive and sound type system enforcing the properties we need, and instead focus on invariant checking. We clearly list in Appendix A the assumptions we make on such a type system, so that any language satisfying them, such as L42, can soundly support our invariant protocol. In Appendix?? we show an example type system that soundly supports all our assumptions, but conceptually our approach can parametrically be applied to any type system supporting those. To keep our small step semantics as conventional as possible, we follow Pierce [? ] and Featherweight Java [? ]; we model an OO language where receivers are always specified explicitly, and the receivers of field accesses and updates in method bodies are always this; that is, all fields are instance-private. Constructors are all of the form  $C(T_1x_1,...,T_nx_n)$ {this.  $f_1=x_1;...$ ; this.  $f_n=x_n;$ }, where the fields of C are  $T_1f_1;...$ ;  $T_nf_n$ ;. We do not model custom constructors and traditional subclassing since this would make the proof more involved without adding any additional insight.

We additionally assume the following:

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- An implicit program/class table; we use the notation C.m to get the method declaration for m within class C, similarly we use C.f to get the declaration of field f, and C.i to get the declaration of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  field
- Memory,  $\sigma: l \to C\{\overline{v}\}$ , is a finite map from locations, l, to annotated tuples,  $C\{\overline{v}\}$ , representing objects; where C is the class name and  $\overline{v}$  are the field values. We use the notation  $\sigma[l.f = v]$  to update a field of l,  $\sigma[l.f]$  to access one, and  $\sigma \setminus l$  to delete l (this is only used in our proofs since our small step reduction does not need to delete individual locations).
- The main expression is reduced in the context of a memory and program.
- A typing relation,  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e : T$ , where the expression e can contain locations and free variables. The types of locations are encoded in a memory environment,  $\Sigma: l \to C$ , while the types of free variables are encoded in a variable environment,  $\Gamma: x \to T$ .  $\mathcal{E}$  encodes the location, relative to the top-level expression we are typing, where e was found; this is needed so that locations can be typed with different reference capabilities when in different positions.
- We use  $\Sigma^{\sigma}$  to trivially extract the corresponding  $\Sigma$  from a  $\sigma$ .

To encode object capabilities and I/O, we assume a special location c of class Cap. This location can be used in the main expression and would refer to an object with methods that behave non-deterministically, such methods would model operations such as file reading/writing. In order to simplify our proof, we assume that:

- Cap has no fields,
- instances of Cap cannot be created with a new expression,
- Cap's invariant() method is defined to have a body of 'true', and

```
:= x \mid \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid e.m(\overline{e}) \mid \text{this.} f \mid \text{this.} f = e \mid \text{new } C(\overline{e}) \mid \text{try} \{e_1\} \text{ catch } \{e_2\} \text{ expression}
                        |l|l.f|l.f = e|M(l;e_1;e_2)|try^{\sigma}\{e_1\} catch \{e_2\}
                                                                                                                                                                                                          runtime expr.
              ::= l
v
                                                                                                                                                                                                           value
              := [] | \mathcal{E}_v.m(\overline{e}) | v.m(\overline{v}_1, \mathcal{E}_v, \overline{e}_2) | v.f = \mathcal{E}_v
\mathcal{E}_v
                                                                                                                                                                                                           eval. context
                         \texttt{new}\ C(\overline{v}_1, \mathcal{E}_v, \overline{e}_2) \mid \texttt{M}(l; \mathcal{E}_v; e) \mid \texttt{M}(l; v; \mathcal{E}_v) \mid \texttt{try}^{\sigma}\{\mathcal{E}_v\} \ \texttt{catch}\ \{e\}
              := [] \mid \mathcal{E}.m(\overline{e}) \mid e.m(\overline{e}_1, \mathcal{E}, \overline{e}_2) \mid \mathcal{E}.f \mid \mathcal{E}.f = e \mid e.f = \hat{\mathcal{E}} \mid \text{new } C(\overline{e}_1, \hat{\mathcal{E}}, \overline{e}_2)
\mathcal{E}
                                                                                                                                                                                                           full context
                        \mid \texttt{M}(l;\mathcal{E};e) \mid \texttt{M}(l;e;\mathcal{E}) \mid \texttt{try}^{\sigma?}\{\mathcal{E}\} \; \texttt{catch} \; \{e\} \mid \texttt{try}^{\sigma?}\{e\} \; \texttt{catch} \; \{\mathcal{E}\}
              := class C implements \overline{C}\{\overline{F}\,\overline{M}\}\ |\ \text{interface}\ C\ \text{implements}\ \overline{C}\{\overline{M}\}
CD
                                                                                                                                                                                                           class decl.
                                                                                                                                                                                                           field
M
              := \mu \operatorname{method} T m(T_1 x_1, ..., T_n x_n) e?
                                                                                                                                                                                                           method
              ::= mut | imm | capsule | read
                                                                                                                                                                                                           reference capability
                                                                                                                                                                                                           type
              ::= \mathcal{E}_v[[].m(\overline{v})] \mid \mathcal{E}_v[v.m(\overline{v}_1,[],\overline{v}_2)] \mid \mathcal{E}_v[[].f] \mid \mathcal{E}_v[[].f = v] \mid \mathcal{E}_v[v.f = []]
                                                                                                                                                                                                           redex context
                       \mid \mathcal{E}_v[\operatorname{\mathtt{new}} C(\overline{v}_1,[],\overline{v}_2)]
error := \mathcal{E}_v[\mathtt{M}(l;v;\mathtt{false})], \text{ where } \mathcal{E}_v \text{ not of form } \mathcal{E}_v'[\mathtt{try}^{\sigma?}\{\mathcal{E}_v''\} \text{ catch } \{\_\}]
                                                                                                                                                                                                           validation error
```

Figure 1: Grammar

• all other methods in the Cap class must require a mut receiver; such methods will have a non-deterministic body, i.e. calls to them may have multiple possible reductions.

We only model a single Cap capability class for simplicity, as modelling user-definiable capability classes as described in section[???] is unnecessary for the soundness of our invariant protocol. Cap represents the set of capability classes, and the mut methods of Cap could be a foreign method.

For simplicity, we do not formalise actual exception objects, rather we have *errors*, which correspond to expressions which are currently 'throwing' an exception; in this way there is no value associated with an *error*. Our L42 implementation instead allows arbitrary imm values to be thrown as (unchecked) exceptions, formalising exceptions in such way would not cause any interesting variation of our proof.

#### 5 Grammar

The grammar is defined in Figure 1. Most of our expressions are standard. Monitor expressions are the syntactic representation of our injected invariant checks. They are of the form  $M(l;e_1;e_2)$ , they are runtime expressions and thus are not present in method bodies, rather they are generated by our reduction rules inside the main expression. Here, l refers to the object being monitored,  $e_1$  is the expression which is being monitored, and  $e_2$  denotes the evaluation of the l-invariant() expression;  $e_1$  will be evaluated to a value, and the  $e_2$  will be further evaluated, if  $e_2$  evaluated to false or an error, then l's invariant failed to hold; such a monitor expression corresponds to the throwing of an unchecked exception. In addition, our reduction rules will annotate try expressions with the original state of memory. This is used in our type-system assumptions (see Appendix A) to model the guarantee of strong exception safety, that is, the annotated memory will not be mutated by executing the body of the try. Note: this strong limitation is only needed for unchecked exceptions, in particular, invariant failures. Our calculus only models unchecked exceptions/errors, however L42 also supports checked exceptions, and try-catches over them impose no limits on object mutation during the try.

# Well-Formedness Criteria and Reduction Rules

We additionally restrict the grammar with the following well-formedness criteria:

- invariant()s and capsule mutators follow the requirements of Section 3.
- Method bodies do not contain runtime expressions (i.e.  $l, l.f, l.f = e, M, \text{ or } try^{\sigma}$ ).

Our reduction rules are defined in Figure 2. They are standard, except for our handling of monitor expressions. Monitor expressions are added after all field updates, new expressions, and calls to capsule mutators. Monitor expressions are only a proof device, they need not be implemented directly as presented.

```
(UPDATE)
                                                                                                             (NEW)
\overline{\sigma|l.f} = v \to \sigma[l.f = v] | \texttt{M}(l;l;l.\texttt{invariant()}) \qquad \overline{\sigma|\text{new } C(\overline{v}) \to \sigma, l \mapsto C\{\overline{v}\} | \texttt{M}(l;l;l.\texttt{invariant()})}
                                                                                                                             \sigma(l) = C\{\_\}
(MCALL)
                                                                                                                             C.m = \mu \operatorname{method} T m (T_1 x_1 ... T_n x_n) e
                                                                                                                             if \mu = \text{mut} and \exists f such that
\frac{}{\sigma|l.m(v_1,...,v_n)\to\sigma|e'[\texttt{this}\coloneqq l,x_1\coloneqq v_1,...,x_n\coloneqq v_n]}
                                                                                                                             C.f = \mathtt{capsule} \ \_ \ \mathrm{and} \ e = \mathcal{E}[\mathtt{this}.f]
                                                                                                                             then e' = M(l; e; l.invariant())
                                                                                                                             otherwise e' = e
(MONITOR EXIT)
                                                                                                              (TRY ENTER)
\frac{\sigma_0|e_0 \to \sigma_1|e_1}{\sigma|\texttt{M}(l;v;\texttt{true}) \to \sigma|v} \quad \frac{\sigma_0|e_0 \to \sigma_1|e_1}{\sigma_0|\mathcal{E}_v[e_0] \to \sigma_1|\mathcal{E}_v[e_1]} \quad \frac{\sigma|\texttt{try}\left\{e_1\right\} \, \texttt{catch}\left\{e_2\right\} \to \sigma|\texttt{try}^{\sigma}\{e_1\} \, \, \texttt{catch}\left\{e_2\right\}}{\sigma|\texttt{try}^{\sigma}\{e_1\} \, \, \texttt{catch}\left\{e_2\right\}}
(TRY OK)
                                                                                  (TRY ERROR)
                                                                                                                                                                               (ACCESS)
\overline{\sigma,\sigma'|\mathtt{try}^\sigma\{v\}\;\mathtt{catch}\;\{{}_-\}\to\sigma,\sigma'|v}\quad \overline{\sigma,\sigma'|\mathtt{try}^\sigma\{\mathit{error}\}\;\mathtt{catch}\;\{e\}\to\sigma,\sigma'|e}\quad \overline{\sigma|l.f\to\sigma|\sigma[l.f]}
```

Figure 2: Reduction rules

For example, in L42 we implement them by statically injecting calls to invariant() at the end of setters (for imm and capsule fields), factory methods, and capsule mutators; this works as L42 follows the uniform access principle, so it does not have primitive expression forms for field updates and constructors, rather they are uniformly represented as method calls.

The failure of a monitor expression,  $M(l;e_1;e_2)$ , will be caught by our TRY ERROR rule, as will any other uncaught monitor failure in  $e_1$  or  $e_2$ .

# **Statement of Soundness**

We define a deterministic reduction arrow to mean that exactly one reduction is possible:

$$\sigma_0|e_0 \Rightarrow \sigma_1|e_1 \text{ iff } \{\sigma_1|e_1\} = \{\sigma|e, \text{ where } \sigma_0|e_0 \to \sigma|e\}$$

We say that an object is *valid* iff calling its invariant() method would deterministically produce **true** in a finite number of steps, i.e. it does not evaluate to **false**, fail to terminate, or produce an *error*. We also require evaluating invariant() to preserve existing memory  $(\sigma)$ , however new objects  $(\sigma')$  can be created and freely mutated:

```
valid(\sigma, l) iff \sigma|l.invariant() \Rightarrow +\sigma, \sigma'|true.
```

To allow the invariant() method to be called on an invalid object, and access fields on such object, we define the set of trusted execution steps as the call to invariant() itself, and any field accesses inside its evaluation:

 $trusted(\mathcal{E}_r[l])$  iff, either:

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- $\mathcal{E}_r = \mathcal{E}_v[M(l;v;[].invariant())]$ , or
- $\mathcal{E}_r = \mathcal{E}_v[M(l;v;\mathcal{E}_v'[[].f])].$

Note that  $trusted(\mathcal{E}_r[l])$  only holds when the very next reduction we are about to perform is l.invariant() or l.f. As we discuss in our proof of Soundness, any such l.f expression came from the body of the invariant() method itself, since l can not occur in the rog of any of its fields mentioned in the invariant() method.<sup>16</sup>

We define a validState as one that was obtained by any number of reductions from a well typed initial expression and memory, containing no monitors and with only the c memory location available:

 $validState(\sigma, e)$  iff  $c \mapsto \text{Cap}\{\}|e_0 \to^+ \sigma|e$ , for some  $e_0$  with:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Invariants only see imm and capsule fields (as read), which we so as not being able to alias the current object.

```
c: \operatorname{Cap}; \emptyset; [] \vdash e_0: T, \operatorname{M}(\_;\_;\_) \notin e_0, \text{ and if } l \in e_0 \text{ then } l = c.
```

Finally, we define what it means to soundly enforce our invariant protocol:

**Theorem 1** (Soundness). If  $validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_r[l])$ , then either  $valid(\sigma, l)$  or  $trusted(\mathcal{E}_r[l])$ .

Except for the injected invariant checks (and fields directly accessed), any redex in the execution of a well typed program takes as input only valid objects. In particular, no method call (other than *injected* invariant checks themselves) can see an object which is being checked for validity.

This is a very strong statement because  $valid(\sigma, l)$  requires the invariant of l to deterministically terminate, and termination is a difficult property to ensure. Our setting does ensure termination of the invariant of any l in a redex. This works because non terminating invariant() methods would cause the monitor expression to never terminate. Thus, an l with a non terminating invariant() is never involved in an untrusted redex. Invariants are deterministic computations in function of the state of l. If l is in a redex, a monitor expression must have terminated after the object instantiation and after any update to the state of l. Thus, the very existence of an l outside of a monitor expression is a witness of the invariant termination.

### 6. Case Studies

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To perform compelling case studies, we used our system on many examples, including one designed to be a worst case scenario for our approach. We also replicate many examples originally proposed by other papers, so that not all the code examples come from us.

### 6.1. An interactive GUI

We start by presenting our GUI example; a program that interacts with the real world using I/O. It demonstrates how to verify invariants over cyclic mutable object graphs. Our example is particularly relevant since, as with most GUI frameworks, it uses the *composite* programming pattern; arguably one of the most fundamental patterns in OO.

Our case study involves a GUI with containers (SafeMovables) and Buttons; the SafeMovable class has an invariant to ensure that its children are graphically contained within it and do not overlap. The Buttons move their SafeMovable when pressed. We have a Widget interface which provides methods to get Widgets' size and position as well as children (a list of Widgets). Both SafeMovables and Buttons implement Widget. Crucially, since the children of SafeMovable are stored in a list of Widgets it can contain other SafeMovables, and all queries to their size and position are dynamically dispatched; such queries are also used in SafeMovable's invariant. Here we show a simplified version<sup>17</sup>, where SafeMovable has just one Button and certain sizes and positions are fixed. Note that Widgets is a class representing a mutable list of mut Widgets.

```
class SafeMovable implements Widget {
     capsule Box box; Int width = 300; Int height = 300;
     @Override read method Int left() { return this.box.l; }
     @Override read method Int top() { return this.box.t; }
605
     @Override read method Int width() { return this.width; }
     @Override read method Int height() { return this.height; }
     @Override read method read Widgets children() { return this.box.c; }
     @Override mut method Void dispatch(Event e) {
       for (Widget w:this.box.c) { w.dispatch(e); }
610
     read method Bool invariant() {..}
     SafeMovable(capsule Widgets c) { this.box = makeBox(c); }
     static method capsule Box makeBox(capsule Widgets c) {
       mut Box b = new Box(5, 5, c);
       b.c.add(new Button(0, 0, 10, 10, new MoveAction(b));
```

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$ The full version, written in L42, which uses a different syntax, is available in our artifact at http://l42.is/InvariantArtifact.zip

```
return b;// mut b is soundly promoted to capsule
}

}

620 class Box { Int l; Int t; mut Widgets c; Box(Int l, Int t, mut Widgets c) {..} }

class MoveAction implements Action {
   mut Box outer;
   MoveAction(mut Box outer) { this.outer = outer; }
   mut method Void process(Event e) { this.outer.l += 1; }

625 }

... //main expression
   //#$ is a capability operation making a Gui object
   Gui.#$().display(new SafeMovable(...));
```

As you can see, Boxes encapsulate the state of the SafeMovables that can change over time: left, top, and children. Also note how the ROG of Box is cyclic: since the MoveActions inside Buttons need a reference to the containing Box in order to move it. Even though the children of SafeMovables are fully encapsulated, we can still easily dispatch events to them using dispatch(e). Once a Button receives an Event with a matching ID, it will call its Action's process(e) method.

Our example shows how to encode interactive GUI programs, where widgets may circularly reference other widgets. In order to perform this case study we had to first implement a simple GUI Library in L42. This library uses object capabilities to draw the widgets on screen, as well as fetch and dispatch events. Importantly, neither our application, nor the underlying GUI library requires back doors, into either RCs or OCs.

### The Invariant

SafeMovable is the only class in our GUI that has an invariant, our system automatically checks it in two places: the end of its constructor and the end of its dispatch(e) method (which is a capsule mutator). There are no other checks inserted since we never do a direct field update on a SafeMovable. The code for the invariant is just a couple of simple nested loops:

```
read method Bool invariant() {
    for(Widget w1 : this.box.c) {
        if(!this.inside(w1)) { return false; }
        for(Widget w2 : this.box.c) {
            if(w1!=w2 && SafeMovable.overlap(w1, w2)){ return false; }
        }
    }
    return true;
}
```


Here SafeMovable.overlap is a static method that simply checks that the bounds of the widgets don't overlap. The call to this.inside(w1) similarly checks that the widget is not outside the bounds of this; this instance method call is allowed as inside(w) only uses this to access its imm and capsule fields.

### **Our Experiment**

As shown in the figure below, counting both SafeMovables and Buttons, our main method creates 21 widgets: a top level (green) SafeMovable without buttons, containing 4 (red, blue, and black) SafeMovables with 4 (gray) buttons each. When a button is pressed it moves the containing SafeMovable a small amount in the corresponding direction. This set up is not overly complicated, the maximum nesting level of Widgets is 5. Our main method automatically presses each of the 16 buttons once. In L42, using our invariant protocol, this resulted in 77 calls to SafeMovable's invariant.

# **Comparison With Visible State Semantics**

As an experiment, we set our implementation to generate invariant checks following the visible state semantics approaches of D and Eiffel [? ? ], where the invariant of the receiver is instead checked at the start and end of *every* public (in D) and



qualified<sup>18</sup> (in Eiffel) method call. In our SafeMovable class, all methods are public, and all calls (outside the invariant) are qualified, thus this difference is irrelevant. Neither protocol performs invariant checks on field accesses or updates, however due to the 'uniform access principle' [?], Eiffel allows fields to directly implement methods, allowing the width and height fields to directly implement Widget's width() and height() methods. On the other hand in D, one would have to write getter methods, which would perform invariant checks. When we ran our test case following the D approach, the invariant() method was

called 52,734,053 times, whereas the Eiffel approach 'only' called it 14,816,207 times; <sup>19</sup> in comparison our invariant protocol only performed 77 calls. The number of checks is exponential in the depth of the GUI: the invariant of a SafeMovable will call the width(), height(), left(), and top() methods of its children, which may themselves be SafeMovables, and hence such calls may invoke further invariant checks. Note that width() and height() are simply getters for fields, whereas the other two are non-trivial methods. Concluding, we have shown that when an invariant check queries other objects with invariants the visible state semantics may cause an exponential explosion in the number of checks.

### 5 Spec# Comparison

We also encoded our example in Spec#<sup>20</sup>; that relies on pack/unpack; also called inhale/exhale or the boogie methodology. In pack/unpack, an object's invariant is checked only by the explicit pack operations. In order for this to be sound, some form of aliasing and/or mutation control is necessary. Spec# uses a theorem prover, together with source code annotations. Spec# can be used for full static verification, but it conveniently allows invariant checks to be performed at runtime, whilst statically verifying aliasing, purity and other similar standard properties. This allows us to closely compare our approach with Spec#.

As the back-end of the L42 GUI library is written in Java, we did not port it to Spec#, rather we just simulated it, and don't actually display a GUI in Spec#. We ran our code through the Spec# verifier (powered by Boogie [?]), which only gave us 2 warnings<sup>21</sup>: that the invariant of SafeMovable was not known to hold at the end of its constructor and dispatch(e) method. Thus, like our system, Spec# checks the invariant at those two points at runtime. Thus the code is equivalently verified in both Spec# and L42; in particular it performed exactly the same number (77) of runtime invariant checks.

While the same numbers of checks are performed, we do not have the same guarantee provided by our approach: Spec#/Boogie does not soundly handle the non-deterministic impact of I/O, thus it does not properly prevent us from writing unsound invariants that may be non-deterministic. We also encoded our GUI in Microsoft Code Contracts [?], whose unsound heuristic also calls the invariant 77 times; however Code Contract does not enforce the encapsulation of children(), thus this approach is even less sound than Spec#.

Note how both our L42 and Spec# code required us to use the box pattern for our SafeMovable, due to the cyclic object graph caused by the Actions of Buttons needing to change their enclosing SafeMovable's position. We found it quite difficult to encode the GUI in Spec#, due to its unintuitive and rigid ownership discipline. In particular we needed to use many more annotations, which were larger and had greater variety. The following table shows the annotation burden, for the *program* that defines and displays the SafeMovables and our GUI; as well as the *library* which defines Buttons, Widget, and event handling. We only count constructs Spec# adds over C# as annotations, we also do not count annotations related to array bounds or null checks:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>That is, the receiver is not this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>This difference is caused by Eiffel treating getters specially, and skipping invariant checks when calling a getter. Thus, even ignoring getter methods, the visible state semantic would still run 14 millions of invariant checks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>We compiled Spec# using the latest available source (from 19/9/2014). The verifier available online at rise4fun.com/SpecSharp behaves differently.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>We used assume statements, equivalent to Java's assert, to dynamically check array bounds. This aligns the code with L42, which also performs such checks at runtime.

	$\operatorname{Spec} \#$	$\operatorname{Spec} \#$	L42	L42
	program	library	program	library
Total number of annotations	40	19	19	18
Tokens (except .,;(){}[] and whitespace)	106	34	19	18
Characters (with minimal whitespace)	619	207	74	60

To encode the GUI example in L42, the only annotations we needed were the 3 reference capabilities: mut, read, and capsule. Our Spec# code requires purity, immutability, ownership, method pre/post-conditions and method modification annotations. In addition, it requires the use of 4 different ownership functions including explicit ownership assignments. In total we used 18 different kinds of annotations in Spec#. In the table we present token and character counts to compare against Spec#'s annotations, which can be quite long and involved, whereas ours are just single keywords. Consider for example the Spec# pre-condition on SafeMovable's constructor:

### requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(children), children);

The Spec# code also required us to deviate from the code style shown in our simplified version: we could not write a usable children() method in Widget that returns a list of children, instead we had to write children\_count() and children(int i) methods; we also needed to create a trivial class with a [Pure] constructor (since Object's one is not marked as such). In contrast, the only indirection we had to do in L42 was creating Boxes by using an additional variable in a nested scope. This is needed to delineate scopes for promotions. Based on these results, we believe our system is significantly simpler and easier to use in comparision with Spec#, that is more verbose but supports a wider range of verification applications.

### 6.2. A Comparison of a Simple Example in Spec#

Suppose we have a Cage class which contains a Hamster; the Cage will move its Hamster along a path. We would like to ensure that the Hamster does not deviate from the path. We can express this as the invariant of Cage: the position of the Cage's Hamster must be within the path (stored as a field of Cage). This example is interesting since it relies on Lists and Points that are not designed with Hamster/Cages in mind.

```
class Point { Double x; Double y; Point(Double x, Double y) {..}
     @Override read method Bool equals(read Object that) {
       if (!(that instanceof Point)) { return false; }
735
       Point p = (Point)that;
       return this.x == p.x && this.y == p.y;
   }
   class Hamster { Point pos; Hamster(Point pos) {..} }//pos is imm by default
   class Cage {
     capsule Hamster h;
     List < Point > path; //path is imm by default
     Cage(capsule Hamster h, List<Point> path) {..}
     read method Bool invariant() { return this.path.contains(this.h.pos); }
745
     mut method Void move() {
       Int index = 1 + this.path.indexOf(this.pos()));
       this.moveTo(this.path.get(index % this.path.size())); }
     read method Point pos() { return this.h.pos; }
     mut method Void moveTo(Point p) { this.h.pos = p; }
750
```

The invariant() method on Cage simply verifies that the pos of this.h is within the this.path list. This is accepted by our invariant protocol since path is an imm field (hence deeply immutable) and h is a capsule field (hence fully encapsulated). The path.contains call is accepted by our type system as it only needs read access: it merely needs to be able to access each element of the list and call Point's equal method, which takes a read receiver and parameter. The move method actually moves the hamster along the path, but to ensure that our restrictions on capsule fields are respected we forwarded some of the behaviour to separate methods: pos() which returns the position of h and moveTo(p) which updates the position of h. The

pos method is needed since move() is a mut method, and so any direct this.h access would cause it to be a capsule mutator, which would make the program erroneous as move() uses this multiple times. Similarly, we need the moveTo(p) method to modify the ROG of the h field, this must be done within a capsule mutator that uses this only once.

As our path and h fields are never themselves updated, the only point where the ROG of our Cage can mutate is in the move To(p) capsule mutator, thus our invariant protocol will insert runtime invariant checks only here and at the end of the constructor.

Note: since only Cage has an invariant, only the code of Cage needs to be handled carefully; allowing the code for Point and Hamster to be unremarkable. Thus our verification approach is more self contained and modular. This contrasts with Spec#: all code involved in verification needs to be designed with verification in mind [?].

### Comparison with Spec#

We now show our hamster example in Spec#; the system most similar to ours:

```
// Note: assume everything is 'public'
   class Point { double x; double y; Point(double x, double y) {..}
     [Pure] bool Equal(double x, double y) { return x == this.x && y == this.y; } }
   class Hamster([Peer] Point pos; Hamster([Captured] Point pos){..} }
   class Cage {
     [Rep] Hamster h; [Rep, ElementsRep] List<Point> path;
     Cage([Captured] Hamster h, [Captured] List<Point> path)
       requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(path), path); {
         this.h = h; this.path = path; base(); }
780
     invariant exists {int i in (0 : this.path.Count);
       this.path[i].Equal(this.h.pos.x, this.h.pos.y) };
     void Move() {
       int i = 0;
       while(i<path.Count && !path[i].Equal(h.pos.x,h.pos.y)){ i++; }</pre>
785
       expose(this) { this.h.pos = this.path[i%this.path.Count]; }
```

In both this and our original version, we designed Point and Hamster in a general way, and not solely to be used by classes with an invariant: thus Point is not an immutable class.

The Spec# approach uses ownership: the Rep attribute on the h and path fields means its value is owned by the enclosing Cage, similarly the ElementsRep attribute on the path field means its elements are owned by the Cage. Conversely, in the Hamster class, the Peer annotation on the pos field means its value is owned by the owner of the enclosing Hamster, thus if a Cage owns a Hamster, it also owns the Hamster's pos. The Captured annotations on the constructor parameters of Cage and Hamster means that the passed in values must be un-owned and the body of the constructor may modify their owners (the owner is automatically updated when the parameter is assigned to a Rep or Peer field ).

Though we don't want either pos or path to ever mutate, Spec# currently has no way of enforcing that an *instance* of a non-immutable class is itself immutable.<sup>22</sup> In Spec#, an invariant() can only access fields on owned or immutable objects, thus necessitating our use of the Peer and Rep annotations on the pos and path fields.

Note that this prevents multiple Cages from sharing the same point instance in their path. Had we made Point an immutable class, we would get no such restriction. A similar problem applies to our pos field: the pos of Hamsters in different Cages cannot be the same Point instance. Note how if we consider being in the ROG of an object's capsule fields as being 'owned' by the object, our capsule fields behave like Rep fields; similarly, mut fields (that are in the ROG of a capsule field) behave like Peer fields.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$ There is a paper [?] that describes a simple solution to this problem: assign ownership of the object to a special predefined 'freezer' object, which never gives up mutation permission, however this does not appear to have been implemented; this would provide similar flexibility to the RC system we use, which allows an initially mutable object to be promoted to immutable.

The expose(this) block is needed, since in Spec# in order to modify a field of an object (like this.h.pos), we must first "expose" its owner (the Cage). During an expose block, Spec# will not assume the invariant of the exposed object, but will ensure it is re-established at the end of the block. This is similar to our concept of capsule mutators (like our moveTo method above), however it is supported by adding an extra syntactic construct (the expose block), which we avoid.

Finally, note the custom Equal(x,y) method on Point: this is needed since we can't overload the usual Object.Equals(other) method because is marked as Reads(ReadsAttribute.Reads.Nothing), which requires the method not read any fields, even those of its receiver. We resorted to making our own Equal(x,y) method. Since it is called in Cage's invariant, Spec# requires it to be annotated as Pure, this requires that it can only read fields of objects owned by the receiver of the method, so a method [Pure] bool Equal(Point that) can read the fields of this, but not the fields of that. Of course this would make the method unusable in Cage since the Points we are comparing equality against do not own each other. As such, the simplest solution is to just pass the fields of the other point to the method. Sadly this mean we can no longer use List's Contains(elem) and IndexOf(elem) methods, rather we have to expand out their code manually.

Even with all the above annotations, we needed special care in creating Cages:

```
List<Point> pl = new List<Point>{new Point(0,0),new Point(0,1)};
Owner.AssignSame(pl, Owner.ElementProxy(pl));
Cage c = new Cage(new Hamster(new Point(0, 0)), pl);
```

In Spec# objects start their life as un-owned, so each new instruction above returns an unowned object; however when the Points are placed inside the pl list, Spec# loses track of this. Thus the AssignSame call is needed to mark the elements of pl as still being unowned (since pl itself is unowned). Contrast this with our system which requires no such operation; we can simply write:

```
Cage c=new Cage(new Hamster(new Point(0,0)),List.of(new Point(0,0),new Point(0,1)));
```

In Spec# we had to add 10 different annotations, of 8 different kinds; some of which were quite involved. In comparison, our approach requires only 8 simple keywords, of 3 different kinds; however we needed to write separate pos() and moveTo(p) methods.

### 6.3. A Worst Case for the Number of Invariant Checks

The following test case was designed to produce a worst case in the number of invariant checks. We have a Family that (indirectly) contains a list of parents and children. The parents and children are of type Person. Both Family and Person have an invariant, the invariant of Family depends on its contained Persons.

```
class Person {
     final String name;
     Int daysLived;
     final Int birthday;
840
     Person(String name, Int daysLived, Int birthday) { .. }
     mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) {
       this.daysLived += 1;
       if(this.birthday == dayOfYear) {Console.print("Happy birthday "+this.name + "!");}
845
     read method Bool invariant() {
       return !this.name.equals("") && this.daysLived >= 0
           && this.birthday >= 0 && this.birthday < 365;
   }
850
   class Family {
     static class Box {
       mut List<Person> parents;
       mut List < Person > children;
       Box(mut List<Person> parents, mut List<Person> children){..}
855
       mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) {
         for(Person c : this.children) { c.processDay(dayOfYear); }
```

```
for(Person p : this.parents) { p.processDay(dayOfYear); }
     }
860
     capsule Box box;
     Family(capsule List < Person > ps, capsule List < Person > cs) { this.box = new Box(ps,cs); }
     mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) { this.box.processDay(dayOfYear); }
     mut method Void addChild(capsule Person child) { this.box.children.add(child); }
     read method Bool invariant() {
865
       for (Person p : this.box.parents) {
          for (Person c : this.box.children) {
            if (p.daysLived <= c.daysLived) { return false; }</pre>
       }
870
       return true;
     }
   }
```

Note how we created a Box class to hold the parents and children. Thanks to this pattern, the invariant only needs to hold at the end of Family.processDay(dayOfYear), after all the parents and children have been updated. Thus processDay(dayOfYear) is atomic: it updates all its contained Persons together. Had we instead made the parents and children capsule fields of Family, the invariant would be required to also hold between modifying the two lists. This could cause semantic problems if, for example, a child was updated before their parent.

We have a simple test case that calls processDay(dayOfYear) on a Family 1,095 ( $3 \times 365$ ) times.

The idea is that everything we do with the Family is a mutation; the fam.processDay calls also mutate the contained Persons.

This is a worst case scenario for our approach compared to visible state semantics since it reduces our advantages: our approach avoids invariant checks when objects are not mutated but in this example most operations are mutations; similarly, our approach prevents the exponential explosion of nested invariant checks when deep object graphs are involved, but in this example the object graph of fam is very shallow.

We ran this test case using several different languages: L42 (using our protocol) performs 4,000 checks, D and Eiffel perform 7,995, and finally, Spec# performs only 1,104.

Our protocol performs a single invariant check at the end of each constructor, processDay(dayOfYear) and addChild(child) call (for both Person and Family).

The visible state semantics of both D and Eiffel perform additional invariant checks at the beginning of each call to processDay(dayOfYear) and addChild(child).

The results for Spec# are very interesting, since it performs fewer checks than L42. This is the case since processDay(dayOfYear) in Person just does a simple field update, which in Spec# do not invoke runtime invariant checks. Instead, Spec# tries to statically verify that the update cannot break the invariant; if it is unable to verify this, it requires that the update be wrapped in an expose block, which will perform a runtime invariant check.

Spec# relies on the absence of arithmetic overflow, and performs runtime checks to ensure this<sup>23</sup>, as such the verifier concludes that the field increment in processDay(dayOfYear) cannot break the invariant. Spec# is able to avoid some invariant checks in this case by relying on all arithmetic operations performing runtime overflow checks; whereas integer arithmetic in L42 has the common wrap around semantics.

The annotations we had to add in the Spec# version<sup>24</sup> were similar to our previous examples, however since the fields of Person all have immutable classes/types, we only needed to add the invariant itself. In order to implement the addChild(child) method we were forced to do a shallow clone of the new child (this also caused a couple of extra runtime invariant checks). Unlike L42 however, we did not need to create a box to hold the parents and children fields, instead we wrapped the body of the Family.processDay(dayOfYear) method in an expose (this) block. In total we needed 16 annotations, worth a total of 45 tokens, this is worse than the code following our approach that we showed above, which has 14 annotations and 14 tokens.

### 6.4. Encoding Examples from Spec# Papers

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There are many published papers about the pack/unpack methodology used by Spec#. To compare against their expressiveness we will consider the three main ones that introduced their methodology and extensions:

- Verification of Object-Oriented Programs with Invariants: [?] this paper introduces their methodology. In their examples section (pages 41–47), they show how their methodology would work in a class hierarchy with Reader and ArrayReader classes. The former represents something that reads characters, whereas the latter is a concrete implementation that reads from an owned array. They extend this further with a Lexer that owns a Reader, which it uses to read characters and parse them into tokens. They also show an example of a FileList class that owns an array of file names, and a DirFileList class that extends it with a stronger invariant. All of these examples can be represented in L42<sup>25</sup>. The most interesting considerations are as follow:
  - Their ArrayReader class has a relinquishReader() method that 'unpacks' the ArrayReader and returns its owned array. The returned array can then be freely mutated and passed around by other code. However, afterwards the ArrayReader will be 'invalid', and so one can only call methods on it that do not require its invariant to hold. However, it may later be 'packed' again (after its invariant is checked). In contrast, our approach requires the invariant of all usable objects to hold. We can still relinquish the array, but at the cost of making the ArrayReader forever unreachable. This can be done by declaring relinquishReader() as a capsule method, this works since our type modifier system guarantees that the receiver of such a method is not aliased, and hence cannot be used again. Note that Spec# itself cannot represent the relinquishReader() method at all, since it does not provide explicit pack and unpack operations, rather its expose statement performs both an unpack and a pack, thus we cannot unpack an ArrayReader without repacking it in the same method.
  - Their DirFileList example inherits from a FileList which has an invariant, and a final method, this is something their approach was specifically designed to handle. As L42 does not have traditional subclassing, we are unable to express this concept fully, but L42 does have code reuse via trait composition, in which case DirFileList can include the methods from FileList, and they will automatically enforce the invariant of DirFileList.
- Object Invariants in Dynamic Contexts: [?] this paper shows how one can specify an invariant for a doubly linked list of ints (here int is an immutable value type). Unlike our protocol however, it allows the invariant of Node to refer to sibling Nodes which are not owned/encapsulated by itself, but rather

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Runtime checks are enabled by a compilation option; when they fail, unchecked exceptions are thrown.

 $<sup>^{24} \</sup>mbox{The Spec} \#$  code is in the artifact.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Our encodings are in the artifact.

the enclosing List. Our protocol can verify such a linked list<sup>26</sup> (since its elements are immutable), however we have to specify the invariant inside the List class. We do not see this as a problem, as the Node type is only supposed to be used as part of a List, thus this restriction does not impact users of List.

• Friends Need a Bit More: Maintaining Invariants Over Shared State: [?] this paper shows how one can verify invariants over interacting objects, where neither owns/contains the other. They have multiple examples which utilise the 'subject/observer' pattern, where a 'subject' has some state that an 'observer' wants to keep track of. In their Subject/View example, Views are created with references to Subjects, and copies of their state. When a Subject's state is modified, it calls a method on its attached Views, notifying them of this update. The invariant is that a View's copy of its Subject's state is up to date. Their Master/Clock example is similar, a Clock contains a reference to a Master, and saves a copy of the Master's time. The Master has a Tick method that increases its time, but unlike the Subject/View example, the Clock is not notified. The invariant is that the Clock's time is never ahead of its Master's. Our protocol is unable to verify these interactions, because the interacting objects are not immutable or encapsulated by each other.

### 7. Patterns

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In this section we show programming patterns that allow various kinds of invariants. Our goal is not to verify existing code or patterns, but to create a simple system that allows soundly verifying the correctness of data structures. In particular, as we show, in order to use our approach to ensure invariants, one has to program in an uncommon and very defensive style.

#### The SubInvariant Pattern

We showed how the box pattern can be used to write invariants over cyclic mutable object graphs, the latter also shows how a complex mutation can be done in an 'atomic' way, with a single invariant check. However the box pattern is much more powerful.

Suppose we want to pass a temporarily 'broken' object to other code as well as perform multiple field updates with a single invariant check. Instead of adding new features to the language, like an <code>invalid</code> modifier (denoting an object whose invariant need not hold), and an <code>expose</code> statement like Spec#, we can use a 'box' class and a capsule mutator to the same effect:

```
interface Person{ mut method Bool accept(read Account a,read Transaction t); }
   interface Transaction{ mut method ImmList<Transfer> compute(); }
   //Here ImmList<T> represents a list of immutable Ts.
   class Transfer{ Int money;
     method Void execute (mut AccountBox that) {// Gain some money, or lose some money
       if(this.money>0){ that.income+=money; }
       else{ that.expenses -= money; }
     }
   }
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   class AccountBox{
     UInt income=0; UInt expenses=0;
     read method Bool subInvariant(){ return this.income >= this.expenses; }
     //An 'AccountBox' is like a 'potentially invalid Account':
     //we may observe income >= expenses
   }
   class Account{
     capsule AccountBox box; mut Person holder;
     read method Bool invariant(){ return this.box.subInvariant(); }
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Our protocol allows for encoding this example, but to express the invariant we would need to use reference equality, which the L42 language does not support.

```
// 'h' could be aliased elsewhere in the program
    Account(mut Person h){ this.holder=h; this.box=new AccountBox(); }
    mut method Void transfer(mut Transaction ts){
        if(this.holder.accept(this, ts)){ this.transferInner(ts.compute()); }
}

// capsule mutator, like an 'expose(this)' statement
    private mut method Void transferInner(ImmList<Transfer> ts){
        mut AccountBox b = this.box;
        for (Transfer t : ts) { t.execute(b); }
}// check the invariant here
```

The idea here is that transfer(ts) will first check to see if the account holder wishes to accept the transaction, it will then compute the full transaction (which could cache the result and/or do some I/O), and then execute each transfer in the transaction. We specifically want to allow an individual Transfer to raise the expenses field by more than the income, however we don't want an entire Transaction to do this. Our capsule mutator (transferInner) allows this by behaving like a Spec# expose block: during its body (the for loop) we don't know or care if this.invariant() is true, but at the end it will be checked. For this to make sense, we make Transfer.execute take an AccountBox instead of an Account: it cannot assume that the invariant of Account holds, and it is allowed to modify the fields of that without needing to check it. Though capsule mutators can be used to perform batch operations like the above, they can only take immutable and capsule objects. This means that they can perform no non-deterministic I/O (due to our OC system), and other externally accessible objects (such as a mut Transaction) cannot be mutated during such a batch operation.

As you can see, adding support for features like invalid and expose is unnecessary, and would likely require making the type system significantly more complicated as well as burdening the language with more core syntactic forms.

In particular, the above code demonstrates that our system can:

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- Have useful objects that are not entirely encapsulated: the Person holder is a mut field; this is fine since it is not mentioned in the invariant() method.
- Wrap normal methods over capsule mutators: transfer is not a capsule mutator, so it can use this multiple times and take a mut parameter.
- Perform multiple state updates with only a single invariant check: the loop in transferInner(ts) can perform multiple field updates of income and expenses, however the invariant() will only be checked at the end of the loop.
- Temporarily break an invariant: it is fine if during the for loop, expenses > income, provided that this is fixed before the end of the loop.
- Pass the state of an 'invalid' object around, in a safe manner: an AccountBox contains the state of Account, but not the invariant method.

Under our strict invariant protocol, the invariant holds for all reachable objects. The sub invariant pattern allows to control when an object is required to be valid. Instead, other protocols strive to allow the invariant to be observed broken in controlled conditions defined by the protocol itself.

The sub invariant pattern offers interesting guarantees: any object 'a' with a subInvariant() method that is checked by the invariant() method of an object 'b' will respect its subInvariant() in all contexts where 'b' is involved in execution. This is because whenever 'b' is involved in execution, its invariant holds. Moreover, a's subInvariant() can be observed as false only if a capsule mutator of 'b' is currently active (that is, being executed), or b is now garbage collectable. Thus, even when there is no reachable reference to b in the current stack frame, if no capsule mutator on b is active, a's subInvariant() will hold.

In the former example, this means that if you can refer to an Account, you can be sure that its income >= expenses; if you have an AccountBox then you can be sure that either income >= expenses or

a capsule mutator of the corresponding Account object is currently active. This closely resemble some visible state semantic protocols, aiming to ensure that either an object's invariant holds, or one of its methods is currently active.

Another interesting and natural application of the sub invariant pattern would be to support a version of the GUI such that when a Widget's position is updated, the Widget can in turn update the coordinates of its parent Widgets, in order to re-establish their subInvariants. This would also make the GUI follow the versions of the composite pattern were objects have references to their 'parent' nodes. The main idea is to define an interface HasSubInvariant, that denotes Widgets with a subInvariant() method. Then, WidgetWithInvariant is a decorator over a Widget; the invariant method of a WidgetWithInvariant checks the subInvariant() of each widget in its ROG.

We define SafeMovable as a Widget and HasSubInvariant; since subInvariant() methods don't have the restrictions of invariant methods, it allows SafeMovable to be significantly simpler than the version shown before in Section 6.1.

```
interface HasSubInvariant{ read method Bool subInvariant(); }
    class SafeMovable implements Widget, HasSubInvariant {
      Int width = 300; Int height = 300;
      Int left; Int top; // Here we do not use a box, thus all the state
                          // is in SafeMovable.
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     mut Widgets c;
     mut Widget parent; // We add a parent field
      @Override read method Int left(){ return this.left; }
      @Override read method Int top(){ return this.top; }
      @Override read method Int width(){ return this.width; }
      @Override read method Int height(){ return this.height; }
1070
      @Override read method read Widgets children(){ return this.c; }
      @Override mut method Void dispatch(Event e){
        for(mut Widget w :this.c){ w.dispatch(e); }
      @Override read method Bool subInvariant() { /*same of original GUI*/ }
1075
     SafeMovable(mut Widget parent, mut Widgets c){
        this.c=c;
                           //SafeMovable no longer has an invariant,
        this.left=5;
                           //so we impose no restrictions on its constructor
        this.top=5;
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        this.parent=parent;
        c.add(new Button(0,0,10,10,new MoveAction(this));
     }
   }
    class MoveAction implements Action{
     mut SafeMovable o;
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     MoveAction(mut SafeMovable o){ this.o = o; }
     mut method Void process(Event e){
        this.o.left+=1;
        Widget p = this.o.parent;
        ... // mutate p to re-establish its subInvariant
1090
   }
   class WidgetWithInvariant implements Widget{
      capsule Widget w;
      @Override read method Int left(){ return this.w.left; }
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      @Override read method Int top(){ return this.w.top; }
      @Override read method Int width(){ return this.w.width; }
      @Override read method Int height() { return this.w.height; }
      @Override read method read Widgets children(){ return this.w.c; }
1100
      @Override mut method Void dispatch(Event e) { w.dispatch(e); }
      @Override read method Bool invariant(){ return wInvariant(w); }
      static method Bool wInvariant(read Widget w){
```

In this way, the method WidgetWithInvariant.dispatch() is the only capsule mutator, hence the only invariant checks will be at the end of WidgetWithInvariant's constructor and dispatch methods.

Importantly, this allows the graph of widgets to be cyclic and for each to freely mutate each other, even if such mutations (temporarily) violate their subInvariant's. In this way a widget can access its parent (whose subInvariant() may not hold) in order to re-establish it. Note that this trade off is logically unavoidable: in order to manipulate a parent in order to fix it, the parent must be reachable, but by mutating a Widget's position, its parent may become invalid. Thus if Widgets were to encode their validity in their invariant() methods they could not have access to their parents. Instead, by encoding their validity in a subInvariant() method, they can access invalid widgets, but this comes at a cost: the programmer must reason as to when Widgets are valid, as we described above.

### The Transform Pattern

Recall the GUI case study from Section 6.1, where we had a Widget interface and a SafeMovable (with an invariant) that implements Widget. Suppose we want to allow Widgets to be scaled, we could add mut setters for width(), height(), left(), and top() in the Widget interface. However, if we also wish to scale its children we have a problem, since Widget.children() returns a read Widgets, which does not allow mutation. We could of course add a mut method zoom(w) to the Widget interface, however this does not scale if more operations are desired. If instead Widget.children returned a mut Widgets, it would be difficult for Widget implementations, such as SafeMovable, to mention their children() in their invariant(). A simple and practical solution would be to define a transform(t) method in Widget, and a Transformer interface like so:

```
interface Transformer < T > { method Void apply(mut T elem); }
interface Widget { ...
    mut method Void top(Int that); // setter for immutable data
    // transformer for possibly encapsulated data
    mut method read Void transform(Transformer < Widgets > t);
}

class SafeMovable { ...
    // A well typed capsule mutator
    mut method Void transform(Transformer < Widgets > t) {t.apply(this.box.c);}}
```

The transform method offers an expressive power similar to mut getters, but prevents Widgets from leaking out. With a Transformer, a zoom(w) function could be simply written as:

```
45 static method Void zoom(mut Widget w) {
    w.transform(ws -> { for (wi : ws) { zoom(wi); } });
    w.width(w.width() / 2); ...; w.top(w.top() / 2); }
```

In the context of reference capabilities, imm lambdas/closures will only be allowed to capture imm local variables. Note that the Transformer is imm and the method Trasformer.apply takes an imm receiver.

## Using Patterns Together: A general and flexible Graph class

Here we rely on all the patterns shown above to encode a general library for Graphs of Nodes. Users of this library can define personalised kinds of nodes, with their own personalised sub invariant. The library will ensure that no matter how the library is used, for any accessible Graph, each user defined sub invariant

of its Nodes holds. Note that those sub invariants are not restricted to the local state of a node; since they can explore the state of all reachable nodes, they may even depend upon the whole graph.

The Nodes are guaranteed to be encapsulated by the Graph, however they can be arbitrarily modified by user defined transformations using the Transform Pattern.

```
interface Transform <T>{ method read T apply(mut Nodes nodes); }
1160
    interface Node{
     read method Bool subInvariant(read Nodes nodes)
     mut method mut Nodes directConnections()
   class Nodes{//just an ordered set of nodes
1165
     mut method Void add(mut Node n){..}
     read method Int indexOf(read Node n){..}
     mut method Void remove(read Node n){..}
     mut method mut Node get(Int index){..}
   }
1170
    class Graph{
      capsule Nodes nodes; //box pattern
     Graph(capsule Nodes nodes){..}
     read method read Nodes getNodes(){ return this.nodes; }
1175
     <T> mut method read T transform(Transform<T>t){
        mut Nodes ns=this.nodes;//capsule mutator with a single use of 'this'
        return t.apply(ns);
     read method Bool invariant(){
        for(read Node n: this.nodes){if(!n.subInvariant(this.nodes)){return false;}}
1180
        return true;
   }
```

We now show how our Graph library allows the invariant of the various Nodes to be customized by the library user, and arbitrary transformations can be performed on the Graphs. This is a generalization of the example proposed by [? ](section 4.2) as one of the hardest problems when it comes to enforcing invariants.

Note how there are only a minimal set of operations defined in the above code, others can be freely defined by the user code, as demonstrated below:

```
class MyNode{
     mut Nodes directConnections;
1190
     mut method mut Nodes directConnections(){ return this.directConnections; }
     MyNode(mut Nodes directConnections){..}
     read method Bool subInvariant(read Nodes nodes){
        /* any condition on this or nodes */}
      capsule method read MyNode addToGraph(mut Graph g){..}
1195
     read method Void connectWith(read Node other, mut Graph g){..}
   }
    . . .
   mut Graph g = new Graph(new Nodes());
   read MyNode n1 = new MyNode(new Nodes())).addToGraph(g);
   read MyNode n2 = new MyNode(new Nodes())).addToGraph(g);
    //lets connect our two nodes
   n1.connectWith(n2,g);
```

Here we define a MyNode class, where the subInvariant(nodes) can express any property over this and nodes, such as properties over their direct connections, or any other reachable node.

We can define methods in MyNode to add our nodes to graphs and to connect them with other nodes. Note that the method addToGraph(g) is marked as capsule; this ensures that the node is not in any other graph. In contrast, the method connectWith(other, g) is marked as read, even though it is clearly intend

to modify the ROG of this. It works by recovering a mut reference to this from the mut Graph. These methods can be implemented like this:

```
read method Void connectWith(read Node other, mut Graph g){
        Int i1=g.getNodes().indexOf(this);
        Int i2=g.getNodes().indexOf(other);
        if (i1==-1 \mid | i2==-1) {throw /*error nodes not in g*/;}
        g.transform(ns->{
1215
          mut Node n1=ns.get(i1);
          mut Node n2=ns.get(i2);
          n1.directConnections().add(n2);
        });
1220
      capsule method read MyNode addToGraph(mut Graph g){
        return g.transform(ns->{
          mut MyNode n1=this;//single usage of capsule 'this'
          ns.add(n1);
          return n1;
1225
        });
     }
```

As you can see, both methods rely on the transform pattern.

These transformation operations are very general since they can access the mut Nodes of the Graph and any capsule or imm data from outside. Note how the body of the imm lambda in connectWith(other,g), can not capture the read this or the read other, but we get their (immutable) indexes and recover the concrete objects from the mut Nodes ns object. In this way, we also obtain more useful mut references to those nodes. On the other hand, note how in addToGraph(g) we use the reference to the capsule this within the lambda.

### 8. Integration in L42

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In the last version of L42, invariants have been integrated with caching and automatic parallelism; it would be out of this articles scope to explain in detail this integration, but the overall idea is that an invariant is seen as a Void pre-cached value that is always kept up to date whenever the object is visible. That is, invariants are supported with a mechanism similar to the one required to compute and keep caches up to date. L42 also supports other kinds of cached methods, which get computed in parallel when an instance of the corresponding class is created.

L42 libraries rely on a very expressive form of metaprogramming to generate a lot of boilerplate/redundant code. In L42 many tasks can be either manually performed by writing code directly, or partially automated by code generation. L42 allows writing class methods (similar to a static method in Java) with appropriate parameters instead of invariants method and capsule mutators. The bodies of such methods don't have special restrictions as they cannot see this, instead the meta-programming generates appropriate instance methods, conforming to our restrictions, which call the user provided class methods.

Our restrictions are also checked by the type system, so even if the user manually writes these methods, instead of relying on the metaprogramming, they still cannot break our invariant protocol.

To make this work more accessible to programmers familiar with Java/C#, we have shown our examples in a more Java-like syntax. Here you can see our ShippingList example from Section 4 in the full L42 Syntax:

```
ShippingList = Data:{
    capsule Items items

@Cache.Now
    class method Void invariant(read Items items) =
        X[items.weight() <= 300 Num]

@Cache.Clear
    class method Void addItem(mut Items items,Item item) =
    items.add(item)</pre>
```

}

In this example, the Data decorator generates a factory method, a mut method Void addItem(Item item) and a lot of other utility methods, including equality and conversion to string. The @Cache.Now annotation causes the invariant method to be automatically computed, and recomputed every time a @Cache.Clear method is called. Please refer to L42.is/tutorial.xhtml for more information.

#### 9. Related Work

### Reference Capabilities

We rely on a combination of RCs supported by at least 3 languages/lines of research: L42 [????], Pony [??], and Gordon et al. [?]. They all support full/deep interpretation (see page 5), without back doors. Former work [?????] (which eventually enabled the work of Gordon et al.) does not consider promotion and infers uniqueness/isolation/immutability only when starting from references that have been tracked with restrictive annotations along their whole lifetime. Other approaches like Javari [??] and Rust [?] provide back doors, which are not easily verifiable as being used properly.

Ownership [? ? ? ] is a popular form of aliasing control often used as a building block for static verification [? ? ]. However, ownership does not require the whole ROG of an object to be 'owned'. This complicates restricting the data accessible by invariants.

#### **Object Capabilities**

In the literature, OCs are used to provide a wide range of guarantees, and many variations are present. Object capabilities [?], in conjunction with reference capabilities, are able to enforce purity of code in a modular way, without requiring the use of effects or monads. L42 and Gordon use OCs simply to reason about I/O and non-determinism. This approach is best exemplified by Joe-E [?], which is a self-contained and minimalistic language using OCs over a subset of Java in order to reason about determinism. However, in order for Joe-E to be a subset of Java, they leverage a simplified model of immutability: immutable classes must be final and have only final fields that refer to immutable classes. In Joe-E, every method that only takes instances of immutable classes is pure. Thus their model would not allow the verification of purity for invariant methods of mutable objects. In contrast our model has a more fine grained representation of mutability: it is reference-based instead of class-based. Thanks to this crucial difference, in our work every method taking only read or imm references receivers and parameters is pure, regardless of their class type; in particular, we allow the parameter of such a method to be mutated later on by other code.

### Invariant protocols

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Invariants are a fundamental part of the design by contract methodology. Invariant protocols differ wildly and can be unsound or complicated, particularly due to re-entrancy and aliasing [? ? ? ].

While invariant protocols all check and assume the invariant of an object after its construction, they handle invariants differently across object lifetimes; popular approaches include:

- The invariants of objects in a *steady* state are known to hold: that is when execution is not inside any of the objects' public methods [?]. Invariants need to be constantly maintained between calls to public methods.
- The invariant of the receiver before a public method call and at the end of every public method body needs to be ensured. The invariant of the receiver at the beginning of a public method body and after a public method call can be assumed [? ? ]. Some approaches ensure the invariant of the receiver of the *calling* method, rather than the *called* method [? ]. JML [? ] relaxes these requirements for helper methods, whose semantics are the same as if they were inlined.
- The same as above, but only for the bodies of 'selectively exported' (i.e. not instance-private) methods, and only for 'qualified' (i.e. not this) calls [?].
- The invariant of an object is assumed only when a contract requires the object be 'packed'. It is checked after an explicit 'pack' operation, and objects can later be 'unpacked' [?].

These different protocols can be deceivingly similar. Note that all those approaches fail our strict requirements and allow for broken objects to be observed. Some approaches like JML suggest verifying a simpler approach (that method calls preserve the invariant of the *receiver*) but assume a stronger one (the invariant of *every* object, except this, holds).

# Security and Scalability

Our approach allows verifying an object's invariant independently of the execution context. This is in contrast to the main strategy of static verification: to verify a method, the system assumes the contracts of other methods, and the content of those contracts is the starting point for their proof. Thus, static verification proceeds like a mathematical proof: a program is valid if it is all correct, but a single error invalidates all claims. This makes it hard to perform verification on large programs, or when independently maintained third party libraries are involved. Static verification has more flexible and fine-grained annotations and often relies on a fragile theorem prover as a backend.

To soundly verify code embedded in an untrusted environment, as in gradual typing [??], it is possible to consider a verified core and a runtime verified boundary. One can see our approach as an extremely modularized version of such a system: every class is its own verified core, and the rest of the code could have Byzantine behaviour. Our formal proofs show that every class that compiles/type checks is soundly handled by our protocol, independently of the behaviour of code that uses such class or any other surrounding code.

Our approach works both in a library setting and with the open world assumption. Consider for example the work of Parkinson [?]: he verified a property of the Subject/Observer pattern. However, the proof relies on (any override of) the Subject.register(Observer) method respecting its contract. Such assumption is unrealistic in a real-world system with dynamic class loading, and could trivially be broken by a user-defined EvilSubject: checking contracts at load time is impractical and is not done by any verification systems we know of.

#### Static Verification

AutoProof [?] is a static verifier for Eiffel that also follows the Boogie methodology, but extends it with semantic collaboration where objects keep track of their invariants' dependencies using ghost state.

Dafny [?] is a language where all code is statically verified. It supports invariants with its {:autocontracts} annotation, which treats a class's Valid() function as the invariant and injects pre and post-conditions following visible state semantics; however it requires objects to be newly allocated (or cloned) before another object's invariant may depend on it. Dafny is also generally highly restrictive with its rules for mutation and object construction, it also does not provide any means of performing non-deterministic I/O.

Spec# [?] is a language built on top of C#. It adds various annotations such as method contracts and class invariants. It primarily follows the Boogie methodology [?] where (implicit) annotations are used to specify and modify the owner of objects and whether their invariants are required to hold. Invariants can be ownership based [?], where an invariant only depends on objects it owns; or visibility based [??], where an invariant may depend on objects it doesn't own, provided that the class of such objects know about this dependence. Unlike our approach, Spec# does not restrict the aliases that may exist for an object, rather it restricts object mutation: an object cannot be modified if the invariant of its owner is required to hold. This allows invariants to query owned mutable objects whose ROG is not fully encapsulated. However as we showed in Section 6.1, it can become much more difficult to work with and requires significant annotation, since merely having an alias to an object is insufficient to modify it or call its methods. Spec# also works with existing .NET libraries by annotating them with contracts, however such annotations are not verified. Spec#, like our approach, does perform runtime checks for invariants and throws unchecked exceptions on failure. However Spec# does not allow soundly recovering from an invariant failure, since catching unchecked exceptions in Spec# is intentionally unsound. [?]

# **Specification languages**

Using a specification language based on the mathematical metalanguage and different from the programming language's semantics may seem attractive, since it can express uncomputable concepts, has no mutation or non-determinism, and is often easier to formally reason about. However, a study [?] discovered that developers expect specification languages to follow the semantics of the underling language, including short-circuit

semantics and arithmetic exceptions; thus for example 1/0 | | 2>1 should not hold, while 2>1 | | 1/0 should, thanks to short circuiting. This study was influential enough to convince JML to change its interpretation of logical expressions accordingly [?]. Dafny [?] uses a hybrid approach: it has mostly the same language for both specification and execution. Specification ('ghost') contexts can use uncomputable constructs such as universal quantification over infinite sets, whereas runtime contexts allow mutation, object allocation and print statements. The semantics of shared constructs (such as short circuiting logic operators) is the same in both contexts. Most runtime verification systems, such as ours, use a metacircular approach: specifications are simply code in the underlying language. Since specifications are checked at runtime, they are unable to verify uncomputable contracts.

Ensuring determinism in a non-functional language is challenging. Spec# recognizes the need for purity/determinism when method calls are allowed in contracts [?] 'There are three main current approaches: a) forbid the use of functions in specifications, b) allow only provably pure functions, or c) allow programmers free use of functions. The first approach is not scalable, the second overly restrictive and the third unsound'. They recognize that many tools unsoundly use option (c), such as AsmL [?]. Spec# aims to follow (b) but only considers non-determinism caused by memory mutation, and allows other non deterministic operations, such as I/O and random number generation. In Spec# the following verifies: [Pure] bool uncertain() {return new Random().Next() % 2 == 0;}

And so assert uncertain() == uncertain(); also verifies, but randomly fails with an exception at runtime. As you can see, failing to handle non-determinism jeopardises reasoning. A simpler and more restrictive solution to these problems is to restrict 'pure' functions so that they can only read final fields and call other pure functions. This is the approach used by [?]. One advantage of their approach is that invariants (which must be 'pure') can read from a chain of final fields, even when they are contained in otherwise mutable objects. However their approach completely prevents invariants from mutating newly allocated objects, thus greatly restricting how computations can be performed.

### **Runtime Verification Tools**

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By looking to a survey by Voigt et al. [?] and the extensive MOP project [?], it seems that most runtime verification (RV) tools empower users to implement the kind of monitoring they see fit for their specific problem at hand. This means that users are responsible for deciding, designing, and encoding both the logical properties and the instrumentation criteria [?]. In the context of class invariants, this means the user defines the invariant protocol and the soundness of such protocol is not checked by the tool.

In practice, this means that the logic, instrumentation, and implementation end up connected: a specific instrumentation strategy is only good to test certain logic properties in certain applications. No guarantee is given that the implemented instrumentation strategy is able to support the required logic in the monitored application. Some of these tools are designed to support class invariants: for example InvTS [? ] lets you write Python conditions that are verified on a set of Python objects, but the programmer needs to be able to predict which objects are in need of being checked and to use a simple domain specific language to target them. Hence if a programmer makes a mistake while using this domain specific language, invariant checking will not be triggered. Some tools are intentionally unsound and just perform invariant checking following some heuristic that is expected to catch most failures: such as jmlrac [? ] and Microsoft Code Contracts [?

Many works attempt to move out of the 'RV tool' philosophy to ensure RV monitors work as expected, as for example the study of contracts as refinements of types [?]. However, such work is only interested in pre and post-conditions, not invariants.

Our invariant protocol is much stricter than visible state semantics, and keeps the invariant under tight control. Gopinathan et al.'s. [?] approach keeps a similar level of control: relying on powerful aspect-oriented support, they detect any field update in the whole ROG of any object, and check all the invariants that such update may have violated. We agree with their criticism of visible state semantics, where methods still have to assume that any object may be broken; in such case calling any public method would trigger an error, but while the object is just passed around (and for example stored in collections), the broken state will not be detected; Gopinathan et al. says "there are many instances where o's invariant is violated by the programmer inadvertently changing the state of p when o is in a steady state. Typically, o and p are objects

exposed by the API, and the programmer (who is the user of the API), unaware of the dependency between o and p, calls a method of p in such a way that o's invariant is violated. The fact that the violation occurred is detected much later, when a method of o is called again, and it is difficult to determine exactly where such violations occur."

However, their approach addresses neither exceptions nor non-determinism caused by I/O, so their soundess guarantee does not scale to programs using such features.

Their approach is very computationally intensive, but we think it is powerful enough that it could even be used to roll back the very field update that caused the invariant to fail, making the object valid again. We considered a rollback approach for our work, however rolling back a single field update is likely to be completely unexpected, rather we should roll back more meaningful operations, similarly to what happens with transactional memory, and so is likely to be very hard to support efficiently. Using RCs to enforce strong exception safety is a much simpler alternative, providing the same level of safety, albeit being more restrictive.

Chaperones and impersonators [?] lifts the techniques of gradual typing [???] to work on general purpose predicates, where values can be wrapped to ensure an invariant holds. This technique is very powerful and can be used to enforce pre and post-conditions by wrapping function arguments and return values. This technique however does not monitor the effects of aliasing, as such they may notice if a contract has been broken, but not when or why. In addition, due to the difficulty of performing static analysis in weakly typed languages, they need to inject runtime checking code around every user-facing operation.

### 10. Conclusion

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In this paper we (1) identified the essential language features that support representation invariants in object-oriented verification; (2) presented a full formalism for our approach with capabilities that is proved to soundly guarantee that all objects involved in execution are valid; (3) conducted extensive case studies showing that we require many order of magnitude less runtime checking than *visible state semantics* and three times less annotation burden than an equivalent version in Spec#. We hope that as a result of this work, the software verification community will make more use of the advanced general purpose language features, such as capabilities, appearing in modern languages to achieve its goals.

Our approach follows the principles of offensive programming [?] where no attempt to fix or recover an invalid object is performed. Failures (unchecked exceptions) are raised close to their cause: at the end of constructors creating invalid objects and immediately after field updates and instance methods that invalidate their receivers.

Our work builds on a specific form of RCs and OCs, whose popularity is growing, and we expect future languages to support some variation of these. Crucially, any language already designed with such support can also support our invariant protocol with minimal added complexity.

#### Appendix A. Proof and Axioms

As previously discussed, instead of providing a concrete set of typing rules, we provide a set of properties that the type system needs to ensure. We will express such properties using type judgements of the form  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e : T$ . This judgement form allows an l to be typed with different types based on how it is used, e.g. we might have  $\Sigma; \Gamma; [].m(l) \vdash l : \text{mut } C$  and  $\Sigma; \Gamma; l.m([]) \not\vdash l : \text{mut } C$ , where m is a mut method taking a read parameter. Importantly, we allow types to change during reduction (such as to model promotions), but do not allow the type of any sub-expression of a method's body to change when they are called (see the Method Consistency assumption below). We could additionally extend the judgement form to take additional information (such as the past history of reduction), so that a main expression that was produced from one program can have a different RC than that produced by another, but this would just add noise to our assumptions and proofs without making them more interesting.

### **Auxiliary Definitions**

To express our type system assumptions, we first need some auxiliary definitions. We define what it means

for an l to be reachable from an expression or context:

 $reachable(\sigma, e, l)$  iff  $\exists l' \in e$  such that  $l \in rog(\sigma, l')$ ,  $reachable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, l)$  iff  $\exists l' \in \mathcal{E}$  such that  $l \in rog(\sigma, l')$ .

We now define what it means for an object to be *immutable*: it is in the rog of an imm reference or a reachable imm field:

 $immutable(\sigma, e, l)$  iff  $\exists \mathcal{E}, l'$  such that:

- $e = \mathcal{E}[l'], \ \Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E} \vdash l' : \text{imm}_{-}, \text{ and } l \in rog(\sigma, l'), \text{ or }$
- $reachable(\sigma, e, l')$ ,  $\exists f$  such that  $\Sigma^{\sigma}(l').f = \text{imm}_{-}$ , and  $l \in rog(\sigma, \sigma[l'.f])$ .

We define the mroq of an l to be the locations reachable from l by traversing through any number of mut and capsule fields:

 $l' \in mrog(\sigma, l)$  iff:

• l' = l or

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•  $\exists f \text{ such that } \Sigma^{\sigma}(l).f \in \{\text{capsule}_{-}, \text{mut}_{-}\}, \text{ and } l' \in mrog(\sigma, \sigma[l.f])$ 

Now we can define what it means for an l to be  $mutatable^{27}$  by a sub-expression e found in  $\mathcal{E}$ : something in l is reachable from a mut reference in e, by passing through any number of mut or capsule fields:

 $mutatable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, e, l)$  iff  $\exists \mathcal{E}', l'$  such that:

- $e = \mathcal{E}'[l'], \Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E}[\mathcal{E}'] \vdash l' : \text{mut}_{-}, \text{ and}$
- $mrog(\sigma, l')$  not disjoint  $rog(\sigma, l)$ .

Finally, we model the *encapsulated* property of capsule references:

 $encapsulated(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, l)$  iff  $\forall l' \in rog(\sigma, l)$ , if  $mutatable(\sigma, [], \mathcal{E}[l], l')$ , then not  $reachable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, l')$ .

That is, a location l found in a context  $\mathcal{E}$  is encapsulated if all mutatable objects in its rog would be unreachable with that single use of l removed. That single use of l is the connection preventing those mutatable objects from being garbage collectable.

### **Axiomatic Type Properties**

Here we assume a slight variation of the usual Subject Reduction: a (sub) expression obtained using any number of reductions, from a well-typed and well-formed initial  $\sigma_0|e_0$ , is also well-typed:

**Assumption 1** (Subject Reduction). If  $validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}[e])$ , then  $\Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E} \vdash e : T$ .

As we do not have a concrete type system, we need to assume some properties about its derivations. First we require that new expressions only have field initialisers with the appropriate type, fields are only updated with expressions of the appropriate type, methods are only called on receivers with the appropriate RC, method parameters have the appropriate type, and method calls are typed with the return type of the method:

**Assumption 2** (Type Consistency).

- 1. If  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash \text{new } C(e_1, ..., e_n) : T \text{ then } \Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[\text{new } C(e_1, ..., e_{i-1}, [], e_{i+1}, ..., e_n)] \vdash e_i : T_i \text{ where } T_i = C.i.$
- 2. If  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[[].f = e'] \vdash e : C$  and C.f = T'f, then  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[e.f = []] \vdash e' : T'$ .
- 3. If  $\Sigma$ ;  $\Gamma$ ;  $\mathcal{E}[[]m(e_1,...,e_n)] \vdash e : \_C$  and  $C.m = \mu \text{ method } Tm(T_1x_1,...,T_nx_n)$ \_, then:
  - (a)  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[[].m(e_1, ..., e_n)] \vdash e : \mu C$ ,
  - (b)  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[em(e_1, ..., e_{i-1}, [], e_{i+1}, ..., e_n)] \vdash e_i : T_i$ , and
  - (c)  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e.m(e_1, ..., e_n) : T$ .

We also assume that any expression inside a method body can be typed with the same reference capabilities as when it is expanded by our MCALL rule (in particular any x that is now an l will have the same  $\mu$ ):

**Assumption 3** (Method Consistency). If  $validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v[l.m(v_1, ..., v_n)])$  where:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>We use the term *mutatable* and not '*mutable*' as an object might be neither *mutatable* nor im*mutable*, e.g. if there are only read references to it.

- $\Sigma^{\sigma}$ ;  $\emptyset$ ;  $\mathcal{E}_v[[].m(v_1,...,v_n)] \vdash l : \_C$ ,  $C.m = \mu \operatorname{method} \_m(T_1 x_1,...T_n x_n) \mathcal{E}[e]$ ,
- $\mathcal{E}' = M(l; \mathcal{E}; l.invariant())$  if C.m is a capsule mutator, otherwise  $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}$ ,
- $\Gamma = \mathtt{this} : \mu C, x_1 : T_1, ..., x_n : T_n, \text{ and } e' = e[\mathtt{this} \coloneqq l, x_1 \coloneqq v_1, ..., x_n \coloneqq v_n],$

$$\text{then }\Sigma^{\sigma};\emptyset;\mathcal{E}_{v}[\mathcal{E}'[\texttt{this}:=l,x_{1}:=v_{1},...,x_{n}:=v_{n}]]\vdash e':\mu\,\text{\_implies }\emptyset;\Gamma;\mathcal{E}\vdash e:\mu\,\text{\_.}$$

Now we define formal properties about our RCs, thus giving them meaning. First we require that an *immutable* object can not also be *mutatable*: i.e. an object reachable from an *imm* reference/field cannot also be reached from a mut/capsule reference and through mut/capsule fields:

Assumption 4 (Imm Consistency).

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If  $validState(\sigma, e)$  and  $immutable(\sigma, e, l)$ , then not  $mutatable(\sigma, [], e, l)$ .

Note that this does not prevent promotion from a mut to an imm: a reduction step may change the type of an l from mut to imm, provided that in the new state there are no longer any mut references to the l's rog.

We require that if something was not *mutatable*, that it remains that way; this prevents, for example, runtime promotions from read to mut, as well as field accesses returning a mut from a receiver that was not mut:

```
Assumption 5 (Mut Consistency). If validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v[e]), not mutatable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v, e, l), and \sigma|\mathcal{E}_v[e] \to^+ \sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e'], then not mutatable(\sigma', \mathcal{E}_v, e', l).
```

We require that a capsule reference be encapsulated; and require that capsule is a subtype of mut:

Assumption 6 (Capsule Consistency).

- 1. If  $\Sigma^{\sigma}$ ;  $\emptyset$ ;  $\mathcal{E} \vdash l$ : capsule \_, then  $encapsulated(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, l)$ .
- 2. If  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e : \mathtt{capsule} C$ , then  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e : \mathtt{mut} C$ .

We require that field updates only be performed on mut receivers:

```
Assumption 7 (Mut Update). If \Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e.f = e' : T, then \Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[[].f = e'] \vdash e : mut_.
```

We additionally require that field accesses only be typed as mut, if their receiver is also mut:

```
Assumption 8 (Mut Access). If \Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \vdash e.f: mut _, then \Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[[].f] \vdash e: mut _.
```

Finally, we require that a **read** variable or method result not be typeable as **mut**; in conjunction with Mut Consistency, Mut Update, and Method Consistency, this allows one to safely pass or return a **read** without it being used to modify the object's *rog*:

Assumption 9 (Read Consistency).

- 1. If  $\Gamma(x) = \text{read}_{-}$ , then  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \not\vdash x : \text{mut}_{-}$ .
- 2. If  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E}[[].m(\overline{e})] \vdash e : \_C$  and  $C.m = \mu$  method read C'\_, then  $\Sigma; \Gamma; \mathcal{E} \not\vdash e.m(\overline{e}) : mut$ \_.

Note that  $\mathsf{Mut}$  Consistency prevents an access to a read field from being typed as  $\mathsf{mut}$ .

#### Strong Exception Safety

Finally we assume strong exception safety: the memory preserved by each try-catch execution is not mutatable within the try:

```
Assumption 10 (Strong Exception Safety). If validState(\sigma', \mathcal{E}[\mathsf{try}^{\sigma_0}\{e_0\} \mathsf{catch} \{e_1\}]), then \forall l \in dom(\sigma_0), not mutatable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}[\mathsf{try}^{\sigma_0}\{[]\} \mathsf{catch} \{e_1\}], e_0, l).
```

Note that this *only* needs to hold because our try-catch can catch invariant failures: in L42, try-catch's that catch *checked* exceptions doe not this restriction.

We use strong exception safety to prove that locations preserved by try blocks are never monitored (this is important as it means that a catch that catches a monitor failure will not be able to see the responsible object),

**Lemma 1** (Unmonitored Try). If  $validState(\sigma, e)$ , then  $\forall \mathcal{E}, e = \mathcal{E}[\mathsf{try}^{\sigma_0}\{\mathcal{E}'[\mathsf{M}(l; \_; \_)]\}\_])$  implies  $l \notin \sigma_0$ 

Proof. By validState we have  $c \mapsto \operatorname{Cap}\{\}|e_0 \to^+ \sigma|e$ , so we proceed by induction on the number of " $\to$ "s: in the base case,  $e = e_0$  and so it cannot contain a monitor expression by the definition of validState. If this property holds for validState( $\sigma$ , e) but not for  $\sigma'|e'$  with  $\sigma|e \to \sigma'|e'$ , we must have applied the UPDATE, MCALL, or NEW rules; since no other reduction steps introduce a monitor expression. If the reduction was a NEW, l will be fresh, so it could not have been in  $\sigma_0$ . If the reduction was an UPDATE, by Mut Update, l must have been mut, similarly (by our well-formedness rules on method bodies) MCALL will only introduce a monitor over a call to a mut method, so by Type Consistency, l was mut; either way we have that l was mutatable, since our reductions never change the  $\sigma_0$  annotation, by Strong Exception Safety, we have that  $l \notin \sigma_0$ .

#### **Determinism**

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We can use our object capability discipline (described in Section 5) to prove that the invariant() method is deterministic and does not mutate existing memory:

**Lemma 2** (Determinism). If  $validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v[l.invariant()])$  and

$$\sigma|\mathcal{E}_v[l.\mathtt{invariant()}] \to \sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e'] \to^+ \sigma''|\mathcal{E}_v[e''],$$

then  $\sigma'' = \sigma$ ,  $\sigma \mid \mathcal{E}_v[l.invariant()] \Rightarrow^+ \sigma'' \mid \mathcal{E}_v[e'']$ , and  $\forall l' \in dom(\sigma)$ , not  $mutatable(\sigma'', \mathcal{E}_v, e'', l')$ .

*Proof.* To prove this, we will use induction on the number of " $\rightarrow$ "s, and additionally prove that  $\forall l' \in dom(\sigma)$ , not  $mutatable(\sigma', \mathcal{E}_v, e', l')$ , i.e. no part of the original  $\sigma$  will become mutatable from the body of the call l-invariant().

Base case: If  $\sigma|\mathcal{E}_v[l.\mathtt{invariant}()] \to \sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e']$ , then the reduction was performed by MCALL. By our well-formedness rules, the invariant() method takes a read this, so by Method Consistency and Read Consistency, we have that l is not mutatable in e' (since l is typeable as read). By our well-formedness rules on method bodies and MCALL, we have that no other l' was introduced in e', thus nothing is mutatable in e'.

The only non-deterministic single reduction steps are for calls to mut methods on a Cap; however invariant() is a read method, so even if l=c, we have  $\sigma|\mathcal{E}_v[l.\text{invariant}()] \Rightarrow \sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e']$ . Since MCALL does not mutate  $\sigma'$ , we also have  $\sigma'=\sigma$ . Additionally, since l' is the only location reference in the expression l.invariant() and it is not mutatable, we additionally have  $\forall l' \in dom(\sigma)$ , not  $mutatable(\sigma', \mathcal{E}_v, e', l')$ .

Inductive case: We inductively assume that  $\sigma|\mathcal{E}_v[l.\text{invariant}()] \Rightarrow^+ \sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e'] \to \sigma''|\mathcal{E}_v[e'']$ ,  $\sigma' = \sigma, \neg$ , and  $\forall l' \in dom(\sigma)$ , not  $mutatable(\sigma', \mathcal{E}_v, e', l')$ . Thus by Mut Consistency, we have that each such  $l' \in dom(\sigma)$  is not mutatable in e''. Since nothing in  $\sigma$  was mutatable: by Mut Update, our reduction can't have modified anything in  $\sigma$ , i.e.  $\sigma'' = \sigma', \_ = \sigma, \_$ . As our reduction rules never remove things from memory,  $c \in dom(\sigma)$ , so it can't be mutatable in e'. By definition of Cap, no other instances of Cap exist, thus by Type Consistency, no mut methods of Cap can be called; since calling such a method is the only way to get a non-deterministic reduction, we have  $\sigma'|\mathcal{E}_v[e'] \Rightarrow \sigma''|\mathcal{E}_v[e'']$ .

### **Capsule Field Soundness**

Now we define and prove important properties about our novel capsule fields. We first start with a few core auxiliary definitions. We define a notation to easily get the capsule field declarations for an l:

 $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma,l) ext{ iff } \Sigma^{\sigma}(l).f = ext{capsule}$  ...

An l is capsuleNotCircular if it is not reachable from its capsule fields:

 $capsuleNotCircular(\sigma, l) \text{ iff } \forall f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l), l \notin rog(\sigma, \sigma[l.f]).$ 

We say that an l is wellEncapsulated if none of its capsule fields is mutatable without passing through l:  $wellEncapsulated(\sigma, e, l)$  iff  $\forall f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ , not  $mutatable(\sigma \setminus l, [], e, \sigma[l.f])$ .

We say that an l is notCapsuleMutating if we aren't in a monitor for l which must have been introduced by MCALL, and we don't access any of it's capsule fields as mut:

 $notCapsuleMutating(\sigma, e, l)$  iff  $\forall \mathcal{E}$ :

- if  $e = \mathcal{E}[M(l;e';)]$ , then e' = l, and
- if  $e = \mathcal{E}[l.f]$ ,  $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ , and  $\Sigma^{\sigma}$ ;  $\emptyset$ ;  $\mathcal{E}[[].f] \not\vdash l$ : capsule\_, then  $\Sigma^{\sigma}$ ;  $\emptyset$ ;  $\mathcal{E} \not\vdash l.f$ : mut\_.

Finally we say that l is headNotObservable if we are in a monitor introduced for a call to a capsule mutator, and l is not reachable from inside this monitor, except perhaps through a single capsule field access.

 $headNotObservable(\sigma,e,l)$  iff  $e=\mathcal{E}_v[\mathtt{M(l;e'; \_)}],$  and either:

- $e' = \mathcal{E}[l.f], f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l), \text{ and not } reachable(\sigma, \mathcal{E}, l) \text{ or }$
- not  $reachable(\sigma, e', l)$ .

Now we formally state the core properties of our capsule fields (informally described in Section 3):

**Theorem 2** (Capsule Field Soundness). If  $validState(\sigma, e)$  then  $\forall l$ , if  $reachable(\sigma, e, l)$ , then:  $capsuleNotCircular(\sigma, l)$  and either:

- $wellEncapsulated(\sigma, e, l)$  and  $notCapsuleMutating(\sigma, e, l)$ , or
- $headNotObservable(\sigma, e, l)$ .

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Proof. By validState we have  $c \mapsto \operatorname{Cap}\{\}|e_0 \to^+ \sigma|e$ , so we proceed by induction on the number of " $\to$ "s. The base case is trivial, since Cap has no capsule fields and the initial main expression  $e_0$  cannot contain monitors

In the inductive case, we assume our theorem holds for a *validState* and prove it for the next *validState*. We then proceed by cases on the non-CTXV reduction rule applied:

- 1. (NEW)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[\text{new } C(v_1, ..., v_n)] \rightarrow \sigma' | \mathcal{E}_v[M(l; l; l.\text{invariant()})], \text{ where } \sigma' = \sigma, l \mapsto C\{v_1, ..., v_n\}$ :
  - (a) Since the pre-existing  $\sigma$  was not modified, by validState,  $l \notin rog(\sigma, v_i) = rog(\sigma', \sigma'[l.f])$ ; thus capsuleNotCircular holds for l. In addition, since this reduction didn't modify the fields of any pre-existing l', by the inductive hypothesis, we have capsuleNotCircular for l and each such l'.
  - (b) Consider any l' in  $dom(\sigma')$ :
    - Suppose  $l' \neq l$  and was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating. Suppose we have made it so that it is no longer wellEncapsulated, then we must have made some  $f' \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l')$  mutatable. Since the rog of l' can't have been modified, nor could the rog of any other pre-existing l'', Since we didn't modify the rog of l' nor the rog of any other pre-existing l'', we must have that  $\sigma[l'.f']$  is now mutatable through some l.f. This requires that  $v_i$  is an initialiser for a mut or capsule field, which by Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency, means that  $v_i$  must also be typeable as mut. But then the  $\sigma[l'.f']$  was already mutatable through  $v_i$ , so l' can't have already been wellEncapsulated, a contradiction.
    - We can't have broken notCapsuleMutating either since we haven't introduced any monitor
      expressions or field accesses, and by Mut Consistency and Mut Access we can't have made any
      pre-existing field accesses in EV typeable as mut.
    - Now suppose l' = l and consider each i with  $C.i = \texttt{capsule}\_f$ . By Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency,  $v_i$  was encapsulated and  $rog(\sigma, v_i)$  is not mutatable from  $\mathcal{E}_v$ , and so  $v_i$  is not  $mutatable(\sigma' \setminus l, [], \mathcal{E}_v[M(l; l; l.invariant())], v_i)$ ; thus wellEncapsulated holds for l and each of its capsule fields.
    - We trivially have that l is notCapsuleMutating since l was fresh, there can't be any monitor expressions or field accesses for it in  $\mathcal{E}_v$ .
  - (c) By the inductive hypothesis, any other pre-existing l' must be headNotObservable, but we haven't removed any monitor expression or field-accesses (because the arguments to the constructor are all of form v), in addition, we haven't made any pre-existing object reachable (everything reachable through l was already reachable through some  $v_i$  anyway). Thus each such l' is still headNotObservable.
- 2. (ACCESS)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[l.f] \to \sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[\sigma[l.f]]$ :
  - (a) As this rule doesn't mutate memory, by the inductive hypothesis, every l' must be capsuleNotCircular.
  - (b) Consider any l' that was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating:
    - Suppose l'=l and  $f\in capsuleFields(\sigma,l)$ , by Mut Access, either  $\Sigma^{\sigma};\emptyset;\mathcal{E}_v \not\vdash \sigma[l.f]:$  mut\_or  $\Sigma^{\sigma};\emptyset;\mathcal{E}_v[[].f]\vdash l:$  capsule\_. If l was capsule, then by Capsule Consistency and  $capsuleNotCircular,\ l$  is not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}_v[\sigma[l.f]]$ , so it is irrelevant if l is no longer wellEncapsulated. Otherwise, if l was not capsule,  $\sigma[l.f]$  will not be mut, so wellEncapsulated is preserved for l.

- Now consider any l' that was not headNotObservable, then by the inductive hypothesis, it was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating. Since this reduction doesn't modify memory, by Mut Consistency, there is no other way to make the rog of a capsule field f' of l' mutatable without going through l', so wellEncapsulated is preserved for l'.
- Since this reduction doesn't modify memory, and by Mut Consistency, we can't have made the rog of any other capsule field f' of any l' mutatable without going through l', so wellEncapsulated is preserved.
- As in the above NEW case, *notCapsuleMutating* is preserved as we haven't introduced any monitor expressions or field accesses.
- (c) Consider any l' that was not wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating, then by the inductive hypothesis it was headNotObservable and:
  - If l' = l, then  $\mathcal{E}_v = \mathcal{E}_v'[M(l;\mathcal{E}[l.f]; \_)]$ , with l not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}$ , and l.f is an access to a capsule field. By capsuleNotCircular, l is not in the rog of  $\sigma[l.f]$ , and so l is not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}[\sigma[l.f]]$ , and so it is still headNotObservable.
  - If  $l' \neq l$ , it is still headNotObservable 1 is as this reduction dosen't make anything reachable that wasn't already reachable through l or  $\mathcal{E}_v$ .
- 3. (UPDATE)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[l.f = v] \rightarrow \sigma[l.f = v] | \mathcal{E}_v[M(l;l;l.invariant())]$ :

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- (a) By the inductive hypothesis we have that capsuleNotCircular holds for l. If  $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ , by Mut Update, we have that l is mutatable, so by Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency,  $encapsulated(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v[l.f = []], v)$ , hence l is not reachable from v, and so after the update, capsuleNotCircular still holds for l. In addition, if  $f \notin capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$  we obviously must still have capsuleNotCircular.
- (b) Otherwise, by the inductive hypothesis, l' was headNotObservable, and so  $l' \notin rog(\sigma, v)$ , so we can't have added l' to the rog of anything, thus capsuleNotCircular still holds.
- (c) By the inductive hypothesis we have that capsuleNotCircular holds for each l':
  - If  $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ : by Mut Update, we have that l is mutatable, so by Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency,  $encapsulated(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_v[l.f = []], v)$ , hence l is not reachable from v, and so after the update, capsuleNotCircular still holds for l.
  - Now consider any l' and  $f' \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l')$ , with  $l'.f' \neq l.f$ :
    - If l' was wellEncapsulated, by Mut Update, l is mut. By wellEncapsulated, the rog of l'.f' is not mutatable (except through a field access on l'), thus we have that  $l \notin rog(\sigma, \sigma[l'.f'])$ , in addition, since  $l'.f' \neq l.f$ , we can't have modified the rog of l'.f', hence l' is still capsuleNotCircular.
    - Otherwise, by the inductive hypothesis, l' was headNotObservable, and so  $l' \notin rog(\sigma, v)$ , so we can't have added l' to the rog of anything, thus l' is still capsuleNotCircular.
- (d) Consider any l' that was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating:
  - If l' = l and  $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ , by Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency, v is encapsulated, thus v is not mutatable from  $\mathcal{E}_v$ , and l is not reachable from v, thus v is still encapsulated and wellEncapsulated still holds for l and f.
  - Now consider any  $f' \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l')$ , with  $l'.f' \neq l.f$ ; by the above, l is capsuleNotCircular and so  $l \notin rog(\sigma, \sigma[l'.f'])$ . If f was a mut or capsule field, by Type Consistency and Capsule Consistency, v was mut, so by wellEncapsulated,  $v \notin rog(\sigma, \sigma[l'.f'])$ ; thus we can't have made  $rog(\sigma, \sigma[l'.f'])$  mutatable through l.f; so l'.f' can't now be mutatable through l. By Mut Consistency, we couldn't have have made l'.f' mutatable some other way, so l' is still wellEncapsulated.
  - As in the above cases, *notCapsuleMutating* is preserved as we haven't introduced any monitor expressions or field accesses.
- (e) By the inductive hypothesis, any l' which was not wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating, was headNotObservable; we haven't removed any monitor expression or field-accesses, nor have we made anything reachable that wasn't before, so each such l' is still headNotObservable.

4. (MONITOR EXIT)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[M(l; v; true)] \rightarrow \sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[v]$ :

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- (a) As this rule doesn't mutate memory, by the inductive hypothesis, every l' must be capsuleNotCircular.
- (b) Any l' that was wellEncapsulated, still is by Mut Consistency, since we haven't modified memory; and as with the above cases, if l' was notCapsuleMutating it still is we haven't introduced any monitor expressions or field accesses.
- (c) Now consider any l' that was not wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating, then by the inductive hypothesis it was headNotObservable:
  - If  $l' \neq l$ , then as with the ACCESS case above, we can't have broken headNotObservable.
  - Otherwise, suppose l' = l. If this monitor was introduced by NEW or UPDATE, then v = l. And so headNotObservable can't have held for l since l = v, and v was not the receiver of a field access.
  - Thus this monitor must have been introduced by MCALL, due to a call to a capsule mutator on l. Consider the state  $\sigma_0|\mathcal{E}_v[e_0]$  immediately before that MCALL:
    - We must not have had that l was headNotObservable, since  $e_0$  would contain l as the receiver of a method call. Thus, by our inductive hypothesis, l was originally wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating.
    - Because notCapsuleMutating held in  $s_0|\mathcal{E}_v[e_0]$ , and v contains no field accesses or monitor, it also holds in  $\mathcal{E}_v[v]$ .
    - Since a capsule mutator cannot have any mut parameters, by Type Consistency, Mut Consistency, and Mut Update, the body of the method can't have modified  $\sigma_0$ : thus  $\sigma = \sigma_0$ , ... Since no pre-existing memory has changed since the MCALL, and a capsule mutator cannot have a mut return type, by Type Consistency, we must have  $\Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E}_v \vdash v : \mu$  where  $\mu \neq \text{mut}$ :
      - \* If  $\mu = \text{capsule}$ , by Capsule Consistency, the value of any capsule field of l can't be in the rog of v (unless l is no longer reachable), so we haven't made such a field mutatable.
      - \* Otherwise,  $\mu \in \{\text{read}, \text{imm}\}$ , by Read Consistency, Imm Consistency, and Mut Consistency, we have that v is not mutatable.

Either way, the MONITOR EXIT reduction has restored wellEncapsulated  $(\sigma_0, \mathcal{E}_v[e_0], l)$ .

- 5. (TRY ERROR)  $\sigma |\mathcal{E}_v[\mathsf{try}^{\sigma_0}\{error\} \mathsf{catch}\{e\}] \to \sigma |\mathcal{E}_v[e]|$ , where  $error = \mathcal{E}_v'[\mathsf{M}(l; \_; \_)]$ :
  - (a) As above, since this rule doesn't mutate memory, by the inductive hypothesis, every l' must still be capsuleNotCircular.
  - (b) As above, since we didn't modify memory, or introduce any monitor expressions or field accesses, any l' that was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating is still wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating.
  - (c) Consider any l' that was not wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating, by the inductive hypothesis it must have been headNotObservable:
    - If  $l' \neq l$ . If l' was in  $\sigma_0$ , then by Strong Exception Safety we haven't modified  $\sigma_0$ , and so headNotObservable is preserved. Otherwise, by Strong Exception Safety, l' is no longer reachable, and so this theorem imposes no requirements on it.
    - If l'=l, then by our reduction rules, we were previously in state  $\sigma_0|\mathcal{E}_v[\text{try }\{e_0\} \text{ catch }\{e\}]$ . By Unmonitored Try,  $l \notin dom(\sigma_0)$ , and so l was not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}_v[\text{try }\{e_0\} \text{ catch }\{e\}]$ . By Strong Exception Safety, we have that nothing in  $\sigma_0$  has changed, so we must still have that l is not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}_v[e]$ : thus it's status is irrelevant.
- 6. (MCALL)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[l.m(v_1, ..., v_n)] \rightarrow \sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[e]$ :
  - (a) As above, since this rule doesn't mutate memory, by the inductive hypothesis, every l' must still be capsuleNotCircular.
  - (b) Consider any l' that was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating:
    - ullet Suppose m is not a capsule mutator, by our well-formedness rules for method bodies, e doesn't contain a monitor.

- Suppose l'=l. Since m is not a capsule mutator, if  $e=\mathcal{E}[l.f]$ , for some  $f\in capsuleFields(\sigma,l)$ , we must have that m was not a **mut** method. So by Mut Access and Method Consistency, we have that  $\Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E}_v[\mathcal{E}] \not\vdash l.f : \mathtt{mut}$  only if m was a capsule method, which by Method Consistency, would mean that  $\Sigma^{\sigma}; \emptyset; \mathcal{E}_v[\mathcal{E}[[].f]] \vdash l : \mathsf{capsule}_{-}$ . So regardless of what fields e accesses on l, we can't have broken notCapsuleMutating for l.
- Otherwise,  $l' \neq l$ , and since fields are instance-private, by our well-formedness rules on method bodies,  $l' \notin e$ , thus we can't have introduced any field accesses on l. As e doesn't contain monitors either, we haven't broken notCapsuleMutating for l'.
- Otherwise, suppose l' = l, e = M(l;e';l.invariant()). By our rules for capsule mutators, m must be a mut method with only imm and capsule parameters, thus by Type Consistency, l must have been mut, and each  $v_i$  must be imm or capsule. By Imm Consistency and Capsule Consistency, l can't be reachable from any  $v_i$ . Since capsule mutators use this only once, to access a capsule field,  $e' = \mathcal{E}[l.f]$ , for some  $f \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l)$ . Since l is not reachable from any  $v_i$ ,  $l \notin \mathcal{E}$ , and by our well-formedness rules for method bodies, l is not reachable from any  $l' \in \mathcal{E}$ , thus headNotObservable now holds for l.
- If l' = l then we haven't introduced a monitor expression, and as above, we haven't introduce a field access on it either, we can't have broken wellEncapsulated.
- Finally, since we didn't modify memory, l' is still notCapsuleMutating.
- (c) As above since we haven't removed any monitor expression or field-accesses, nor have we made anything reachable, by the inductive hypothesis, every other l' is still headNotObservable.
- 7. (TRY ENTER and TRY OK) these are trivial, since as used in the above cases:
  - (a) These rules don't mutate memory, thus by the inductive hypothesis, every l' must still be capsuleNotCircular.
  - (b) These rules don't modify memory, or introduce any monitor expressions or field accesses, so any l' that was wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating is still wellEncapsulated and notCapsuleMutating.
  - (c) As these rules don't remove any monitor expression or field-accesses, nor do they make anything reachable, by the inductive hypothesis, every other l' is still headNotObservable.

### 760 Stronger Soundness

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It is hard to prove Soundness directly, so we first define a stronger property, called Stronger Soundness.

An object is *monitored* if execution is currently inside of a monitor for that object, and the monitored expression  $e_1$  does not contain l as a *proper* sub-expression:

monitored(e, l) iff  $e = \mathcal{E}_v[M(l; e_1; e_2)]$  and either  $e_1 = l$  or  $l \notin e_1$ .

A monitored object is associated with an expression that cannot observe it, but may reference its internal representation directly. In this way, we can safely modify its representation before checking its invariant. The idea is that at the start the object will be valid and  $e_1$  will reference l; but during reduction, l will be used to modify the object; only after that moment, the object may become invalid.

Stronger Soundness says that starting from a well-typed and well-formed  $\sigma_0|e_0$ , and performing any number of reductions, every reachable object is either valid or monitored:

**Theorem 3** (Stronger Soundness). If  $validState\ (\sigma, e)$  then  $\forall l, \text{ if } reachable(\sigma, e, l) \text{ then } valid(\sigma, l) \text{ or } monitored(e, l).$ 

*Proof.* We will prove this inductively on the number of " $\rightarrow$ "s, in a similar way to how we proved Capsule Field Soundness. In the base case, we have  $\sigma = c \mapsto \text{Cap}\{\}$ , since Cap is defined to have the trivial invariant, we have that c (the only thing in  $\sigma$ ), is valid.

Now we assume that everything reachable from the previous validState was valid or monitored, and proceed by cases on the non-CTXV rule that gets us to the next validState.

- 1. (UPDATE)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[l.f = v] \rightarrow \sigma' | \mathcal{E}_v[e']$ , where e' = M(l;l;l.invariant()):
  - Clearly l is now monitored.

- Consider any other l', where  $l \in rog(\sigma, l')$  and l' was valid; now suppose we just made l' not valid. By our well-formedness criteria, invariant() can only accesses imm and capsule fields, thus by Imm Consistency and Mut Update, we must have that l was in the rog of l'.f', for some  $f' \in capsuleFields(\sigma, l')$ . Since  $l \neq l'$ , l' can't have been wellEncapsulated. Thus, by Capsule Field Soundness, l' was headNotObservable, and  $\mathcal{E}_v = \mathcal{E}_v'[M(l'; \mathcal{E}_v''; )]$ :
  - If  $\mathcal{E}_v{''}[l.f = v] = \mathcal{E}[l'.f']$ , then by headNotObservable, l' is not reachable from  $\mathcal{E}$ . The monitor must have been introduced by an MCALL, on a capsule mutator for l'. Since a capsule mutator can take only l imm and capsule parameters, by Type Consistency, Imm Consistency, and Capsule Consistency, l cannot be in their l in the l is only once, and by the proof of Capsule Field Soundness, there is no other l'.f' in l in l is l in l is l in l is not l is not l is not l is not l. This is no contradiction with us having just updated l.
  - Thus, by headNotObservable, we must have  $\mathcal{E}_{v''}[l.f = v] = e$ , with l' not reachable from e; so l' was, and still is, monitored.
- Since we don't remove any monitors, we can't have violated monitored. In addition, if an l was not in the rog of a valid l', by Determinism, l' is still valid.
- 2. (MONITOR EXIT)  $\sigma | M(l; v; true) \rightarrow \sigma | v$ :

By validState and our well-formedness requirements on method bodies, the monitor expression must have been introduced by UPDATE, MCALL, or NEW. In each case the  $3^{rd}$  expression started off as l.invariant(), and it has now (eventually) been reduced to true, thus by Determinism l is valid. This rule does not modify pre-existing memory, introduce pre-existing ls into the main expression, nor remove monitors on other ls, thus every other pre-existing l' is still valid (due to Determinism), or monitored.

3. (NEW)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[\text{new } C(\overline{v})] \to \sigma, l \mapsto C\{\overline{v}\}| \mathcal{E}_v[\text{M}(l;l;l.\text{invariant()})]$ :

Clearly the newly created object, l, is monitored. As with the case for MONITOR EXIT above, every other reachable l is still valid or monitored.

4. (TRY ERROR)  $\sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[\mathsf{try}^{\sigma_0} \{error\} \mathsf{catch} \{e\}] \to \sigma | \mathcal{E}_v[e]$ , where  $error = \mathcal{E}_v'[\mathsf{M}(l; \_; \_)]$ :

By the proof of Capsule Field Soundness, we must have that l is no longer reachable, it is ok that it is now no longer valid or monitored. As with the case for MONITOR EXIT above, every other  $reachable\ l$  is still valid or monitored.

None of the other reduction rules modify memory, the memory locations reachable inside of the main expression, or any pre-existing monitor expressions; thus regardless of the reduction performed, we have that each  $reachable\ l$  is valid or monitored.

### **Proof of Soundness**

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First we need to prove that an object is not reachable from one of its imm fields; if it were, invariant() could access such a field and observe a potentially broken object:

Lemma 3 (Imm Not Circular).

If  $validState(\sigma, e), \forall f, l$ , if  $reachable(\sigma, e, l), \Sigma^{\sigma}(l).f = imm$ , then  $l \notin rog(\sigma, \sigma[l.f])$ .

*Proof.* The proof is by induction; obviously the property holds in the initial  $\sigma|e$ , since  $\sigma=c\mapsto \text{Cap}\{\}$ . Now suppose it holds in a validState  $(\sigma, e)$  and consider  $\sigma|e\to\sigma'|e'$ .

- 1. Consider any pre-existing  $reachable\ l$  and f with  $\Sigma^{\sigma}(l).f = \text{imm}_{-}$ , by Imm Consistency and Mut Update, the only way  $rog(\sigma,\sigma[l.f])$  could have changed is if  $e=\mathcal{E}_v[l.f=v]$ , i.e. we just applied the UPDATE rule. By Mut Update we must have that l was mut, by Type Consistency, v must have been imm, so by Imm Consistency,  $l \notin rog(\sigma,v)$ . Since  $v=\sigma'[l.f]$ , we now have  $l \notin rog(\sigma',\sigma'[l.f])$ .
- 2. The only rule that makes an l reachable is NEW. So consider  $e = \mathcal{E}_v[\text{new } C(v_1, ..., v_n)]$  and each i with  $C.i = \text{imm}_-$ , so by Type Consistency,  $1 \le i \le n$ , and hence  $v_i$  is well-defined. But  $v_i$  existed in the previous state and  $l \notin dom(\sigma)$ ; so by validState and our reduction rules,  $l \notin rog(\sigma, v_i) = rog(\sigma', \sigma'[l.f])$ .

Note that the above only applies to imm fields: imm references to cyclic objects can be created by promoting a mut reference, however the cycle must pass through a field declared as read or mut, but such fields cannot be referenced in the invariant method.

We can now finally prove the soundness of our invariant protocol:

**Theorem 1** (Soundness). If  $validState(\sigma, \mathcal{E}_r[l])$ , then either  $valid(\sigma, l)$  or  $trusted(\mathcal{E}_r[l])$ .

*Proof.* Suppose  $validState(\sigma, e)$ , and  $e = \mathcal{E}_r[l]$ . Suppose l is not valid; since l is reachable, by Stronger Soundness, monitored(e, l),  $e = \mathcal{E}[M(l; e_1; e_2)]$ , and either:

- $\mathcal{E}_r = \mathcal{E}[M(l;\mathcal{E}';e_2)]$ , that is l was found inside of  $e_1$ , but by definition of  $\mathcal{E}_r$ , we can't have  $e_1 = l$ , this contradicts the definition of monitored, or
- $\mathcal{E}_r = \mathcal{E}[\mathsf{M}(l;e_1;\mathcal{E}')]$ , and thus l was found inside  $e_2$ . By our reduction rules, all monitor expressions start with  $e_2 = l.\mathsf{invariant}()$ ; if this has yet to be reduced, then  $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}''[[].\mathsf{invariant}()]$ , thus  $\mathcal{E}_r[l]$  is trusted. The next execution step will be an MCALL, so by our well-formedness rules for invariant(),  $e_2$  will only contain l as the receiver of a field access; so if we just performed said MCALL,  $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E}''[[].f]$ : hence  $\mathcal{E}_r[l]$  is trusted. Otherwise, by Imm Not Circular, Capsule Field Soundness, and capsuleNotCircular, no further reductions of  $e_2$  could have introduced an occurrence of l, so we must have that l was introduced by the MCALL to invariant(), and so it is trusted.

Thus either l is valid or  $\mathcal{E}_r[l]$  is trusted.

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