

# Object Detection on Encrypted Data

Using Secure Multiparty Computation

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# Voorwoord

Het voorwoord vul je persoonlijk in met een appreciatie of dankbetuiging aan de mensen die je hebben bijgestaan tijdens het verwezenlijken van je masterproef en je hebben gesteund tijdens je studie.

## Samenvatting

De (korte) samenvatting, toegankelijk voor een breed publiek, wordt in het Nederlands geschreven en bevat **maximum 3500 tekens**. Deze samenvatting moet ook verplicht opgeladen worden in KU Loket.

# Abstract

We are affected with machine learning in many aspects of our daily lives, applications ranges from facial recognition to enhanced healthcare to self-driving cars. As companies outsource image classification tasks to cloud computing service providers, we see a rise in privacy concerns for both the users wishing to keep their data confidential, as for the company wishing to keep their classifier obfuscated.

**Keywords:** Computer vision, Cryptography, machine learning, secure multiparty computation, deep learning, object detetcion, privacy preserving, MLaaS, encryption

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## Lijst van symbolen

Maak een lijst van de gebruikte symbolen. Geef het symbool, naam en eenheid. Gebruik steeds SI-eenheden en gebruik de symbolen en namen zoals deze voorkomen in de hedendaagse literatuur en normen. De symbolen worden alfabetisch gerangschikt in opeenvolgende lijsten: kleine letters, hoofdletters, Griekse kleine letters, Griekse hoofdletters. Onderstaande tabel geeft het format dat kan ingevuld en uitgebreid worden. Wanneer het symbool een eerste maal in de tekst of in een formule wordt gebruikt, moet het symbool verklaard worden. Verwijder deze tekst wanneer je je thesis maakt.

$b$	Breedte	$[mm]$
$A$	Oppervlakte van de dwarsdoorsnede	$[mm^2]$
$c$	Lichtsnelheid	$[m/s]$

## Lijst van afkortingen

MPC Secure Multiparty Computation  
MLaaS Machine Learning as a Service  
CNN Convolutional Neural Network  
ReLU Rectified Linear Unit

# 1

## Introduction

TODO: Praten over Onespan Deep learning based object detection on images is a hot topic for researchers and interest in machine learning is steadily growing among miscellaneous businesses. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a subfield of cryptography, making it possible for a party to run an algorithm on confidential data, that is supposed to stay unknown even to the party running the algorithm.

Both concepts aren't new concepts, but with the rise of big data and processing power, there has been an increase in research into these fields.

In this thesis we present the applicability of MPC for deep learning based object detection.

### 1.1 Problem

The use of third party MLaaS (Machine Learning as a Service) providers or any cloud computing solution, as processing power for an image classification task, raises privacy concerns as sensitive images of users need to be sent to servers running an instance of the neural network. It's important to note that the transport of the image from the client to the server is secure, since the parties can make use of reliable HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) connections. The user's images, however, are stored in plaintext on the server, aswell as the computed output of the image. Furthermore the whole design of the neural network including all trained parameters needs to be stored on the servers of the third party, for the image classifier to function. Both of these remote storage solutions require a considerably amount of trust in the third party. Since the third party could potentially exploit the user data for commercial purposes or even steal the intellectual property of the image classifier. In this thesis we try to tackle the need to trust a third party MLaaS provider.

We want it to compute an encrypted image on an obfuscated neural network to output a correct encrypted result.

## 1.2 Hypothesis

**How can we securely compute the forward propagation of a face recognition neural network?**

With the use of MPC protocols we can implement methods such that we can compute a whole neural network on an encrypted input. We predict a drastically decrease in performance and will try to find performance optimizations along the way of implementing a proof of concept.

# 2

## Literature study

In this chapter we will take a quick look at how convolutional neural networks (CNN) function, layer by layer. We will also learn how secure multiparty computation (MPC) in general is possible. Finally, we will discuss the related work on combining these two subjects so far.

### 2.1 Convolutional neural network

Convolution neural networks (CNN) is a special type of neural network used for images. The spatial properties of the pixels in the image are used during the evaluation of the input, meaning the neighbouring pixels of a central pixel impact the output to the next layer of that central pixel while pixels further away do not. CNNs are made of multiple layers. Typically, as you move further from the input layer to the output layer the dimensionality reduces, we can say the input gets mapped on a desired output manifold. Inputs that we classify as similar are supposed to be in the same region in the output manifold.

#### 2.1.1 Convolution layer

In this layer a discrete convolution of a kernel  $K$  shifting over an image  $I$  is performed, as shown in equation 2.1. The kernel has parameters also called weights, so that certain features get extracted from the input.

$$(I * K)[m, n] = \sum_j \sum_k I[m - j, n - k] K[j, k] \quad (2.1)$$

The output of this layer is a convolved feature map.

### 2.1.2 Activation function

Since these convolutions are simple linear operations and most image classification tasks require non-linear classifiers, non-linearity needs to be added to the neural network. This is achieved through adding a non-linear activation function after a convolution or fully connected layer. The most popular activation function is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) as seen in equation 2.2 and figure 2.1.

$$f(x) = \max(0, x) \quad (2.2)$$





Figure 2.1: ReLu activation function

### 2.1.3 Pooling layer

The dimensionality reduction we talked about in the beginning of this chapter happens in the pooling layer. A kernel is shifted over the image. In the case of max-pooling the kernel selects the maximum value of the portion of the image it covers, to create the new dimensionality reduced image. A portion of the image value is theoretically lost, but because we only retain the maximum value in the window we sort of extract a feature from the input matrix. An example of this process can be seen in figure 2.2

Figure 2.2: Example of  $2 \times 2$  max-pooling

### 2.1.4 Fully connected layer

The fully connected layer is a multilayer perceptron that discriminates different object classes and identifies identical ones. All elements in vector  $h_{i-1}^{out}$  have their own bias  $B_i$  and weight  $W_i$  so that  $h_i^{in}$  can be calculated for each layer  $i$  according to equation 2.3.

$$h_i^{in} = h_{i-1}^{out} \cdot W_i + B_i \quad (2.3)$$

The fully connected layers usually comes after the last convolution layer. The output of a convolution layer is a tensor, this means that the output needs to be flattened to a one-dimensional array. The last layer of the fully connected layers is called the output layer. This output layer determines the classification.




Figure 2.3: Overview of CNN



When all these layers are connected to each other, as you can see in figure 2.3, we speak of a model with a CNN architecture.

## 2.2 Secure multiparty computation

Secure multiparty computation is a protocol that is used between  $n$  number of parties  $P$ . Each of these parties has private data also called a secret  $S$ . With MPC it is possible for these parties to compute a public<sup>1</sup> function  $f$  on the secrets. Such that a party  $P_i \in P$  only knows his secret  $s_i \in S$  and the public securely computed output  $f(s_0, s_2, s_{n-1})$  after the protocol has successfully finished. A classic application is Yao's Millionaires' problem Yao (1982) in which two millionaires wish to know who is richer, there is catch however. Instead of making their balances publicly known. They wish to keep their balances a secret. In this case the number of parties  $n$  is 2 the secrets  $s_0$  and  $s_1$  are their balances. The public function  $f(s_0, s_1) = 1$  if  $s_0 < s_1$  and 0 otherwise.

We categorize 2 types of parties based on their willingness to deviate from the correct predefined protocol.

- **Honest parties:** Parties do not wish to know other parties secrets and will never reveal the secret.
- **Honest but curious parties (passive):** Parties wish to know other parties secrets but will not deviate from the protocol at any time. Also called semi-honest parties.
- **Malicious parties (active):** Parties wish to know other parties secrets and wish to change output of computation to favourable result. Parties will deviate from the protocol to cheat and change the outcome at any time.

In practice the whole set of parties will exist of subsets of these different types of parties. Ideally every party is honest, but this is rather a naive way of thinking.

If the two millionaires are honest but curious parties, they will not deviate from the protocol and they will compute the correct output as a result they will know who is the richer millionaire but they won't know how much money the other one has. In the other case one of the two millionaires is corrupt and acts maliciously, the honest millionaire will follow protocol while the dishonest millionaire will deviate from the protocol to change the result in his favour. In the event that the dishonest millionaire is poorer he will change the outcome thus appearing richer. From now on, we assume the set of parties are a mix of honest and semi-honest parties, unless specified otherwise. We also assume the communication between the different parties to be secure.

The efficiency of an MPC protocol is defined by three metrics:

- **round complexity:** The amount of rounds needed in the protocol. In one round each party can read all messages sent to the party in the previous round as well as perform an arbitrary amount of local computation and finally send messages to all other parties.

<sup>1</sup>public or global means known to all parties, while private or local means known only by the corresponding party

- **communication complexity:** The amount of communication between all parties (measured in bits).
- **computational complexity:** The number of primitive operations performed by all parties.

In general, the computational complexity is very low while the communication complexity dominates the protocols total complexity. Thus an estimate of the overall complexity can be measured by combining the round and communication complexity. This means the efficiency of MPC protocols is heavily based on the network's latency rather than the network's throughput.

### 2.2.1 Secret sharing


In order to do secure computing, the parties need to split their secret into secret shares. A secret sharing method can be used by the secret holder to split a secret into a number of shares. Combining these shares will reveal the secret, while individual shares alone will leak nothing about the secret. In a  $(t, n)$  threshold secret sharing scheme parties must combine atleast  $t$  shares of the total  $n$  shares, to obtain the secret. We can now set a threshold  $t$  high enough, denying the secret to small curious parties and allowing to reveal the secret when a majority ( $\geq t$ ) consensus is reached. Shamir's secret sharing scheme Shamir (1979) is based on polynomial interpolation and the essential idea is that it takes atleast  $t$  points in order to define a polynomial  $p(x)$  of degree  $t - 1$ . Given a set of  $t$  points in a 2-dimensional cartesian system  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_t, y_t)$ , there exists only one polynomial of degree  $t - 1$ . This can be proven and the mathematical construction of a polynomial  $p(x)$  of degree  $t - 1$  based on a set of  $t$  points can be calculated using Lagrange's interpolation formula 2.4.

$$p(x) = \sum_{i=1}^t y_i \delta_i(x) \quad \text{with} \quad \delta_i(x) = \prod_{1 \leq j < t; j \neq i} \frac{x - x_j}{x_i - x_j} \quad (2.4)$$

With this in mind, a secret dealer can now share his secret  $s$  to  $n$  parties by choosing a random  $t - 1$  degree polynomial  $p(x) = a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}$  in which  $a_0$  is the secret or the number representation of the secret if the secret is not a number. The dealer now calculates  $n$  points on the polynomial starting from  $x = 1$ , because the secret is located at  $x = 0$ . Each party  $P_i \in P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$  is given a different single point  $(x_i, y_i)$ , at this stage the secret is shared. The convention for the notation of a shared secret is  $[s]$ . We can say a party  $P_i$  is holding a share in the form of a point  $(x_i, y_i)$  or shortened  $[s]_i$ .

To recombine the secret, the parties simply broadcast or send their shares to a central entity, if more than  $t$  shares are known, it suffices to calculate the Lagrange polynomial  $p(x)$  and  $s = p(0)$ . In the case of not having enough shares, the Lagrange polynomial containing the secret becomes impossible to calculate since every polynomial is equally likely, thus revealing absolutely nothing about the secret.

Note that all arithmetic in this section can be done over some finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  to speed up the algorithms.



**Figure 2.4:** Shares for different  $t$  with secret  $s = 4$

A Generalisation of this  $(t, n)$ -Shamir secret sharing scheme from thesis de Hoogh (2012) as follows (Protocol 2.1 and Protocol 2.2):

1. **Share Generation:** To share  $s \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , the dealer generates random  $a_1, \dots, a_t \in \mathbb{F}_q$  and puts  $p(x) = s + a_1x + \dots + a_tx_t$ . Then the dealer computes  $[s]_i = p(i)$ .
2. **Share Distribution:** For each  $i \in 1, \dots, n$ , the dealer sends  $[s]_i$  to party  $P_i$ .
3. **Secret Reconstruction:** Let  $D \subset 1, \dots, n$  be a set of size  $t + 1$ . Each party  $P_i$  for  $i \in D$  sends his share  $[s]_i$  to all parties. Then, each party reconstructs the secret via Lagrange interpolation.

In figure 2.4 a visualisation of this scheme shows us that in order to get the secret value,  $s = 4$  in this case, we need to know atleast  $t + 1$  points for a given  $t$ . The trivial case where  $t = 0$  (green line) is simple to understand. The secret is simply the y-value of the given point. Of course this is a rather useless approach to secret sharing since you are giving away the cleartext secret. The full potential of secret sharing becomes true for cases where  $t > 0$ . Two points are needed for a first order polynomial (red line), three points for a second order polynomial and so on.

It's important to make sure the parties are distributed and to try minimizing the incentive to collude. Distribution is needed to lower the risk of having a malicious party taking over control of the network, this can be done by splitting the parties up to many small stakeholders instead of a couple centralized stakeholders. We can only totally avoid collusion if the secret holder partakes to the MPC.

## 2.2.2 Operations

A neural network can be seen as an enormous function with millions of coefficients. Lucky for us the function can be broken up into 3 different operations: addition and multiplication in fully connected

and convolution layers and a relational operator for max pooling and ReLU activation function. We will now show how to securely compute each of these basic operations.

### 2.2.2.1 Arithmetic operators

Addition, subtraction, division and multiplication all fall under the arithmetic operators. In this section we will take a look at how these operations can be performed in MPC.

**linear protocols:** Since Shamir's secret sharing scheme is a linear sharing scheme, each party  $P_i$  can locally compute any linear combination of a public or secret value with their secret share  $[s]_i$ . This gives us following operations:

- **Addition of secret and public value** ( $[c] \leftarrow [a] + \beta$ ): Each party  $P_i$  locally adds the public value  $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_q$  to its share  $[a]_i$ , resulting in the new share  $[c]_i = [a]_i + \beta$ . Since all parties add the same  $\beta$ , this value is a constant.
- **Multiplication of secret and public value** ( $[c] \leftarrow [a] \cdot \beta$ ): Each party  $P_i$  locally multiplies the public (constant) value  $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_q$  with its share  $[a]_i$ , resulting in the new share  $[c]_i = [a]_i \cdot \beta$ .
- **Addition of multiple secrets** ( $[c] \leftarrow [a] + [b]$ ): Each party  $P_i$  locally adds its secret shares  $[a]_i$  and  $[b]_i$ , resulting in the new share  $[c]_i = [a]_i + [b]_i$ .


The last operation is visually demonstrated in figure 2.5. In this example secret  $a = 1$  (green) and secret  $b = 3$  (red). After each party  $P_i$  locally computes the addition of  $[a]_i$  and  $[b]_i$  and stores it as a new share  $[c]_i$ . After broadcasting the new, computed share  $[c]$ . They can recombine the shares via Lagrange interpolation to get the polynomial of the combined shares  $[c]$  and more importantly the output of the addition of the two secrets  $a$  and  $b$ . This happens all with zero knowledge about  $a$  or  $b$ . All of the computations are done locally and no communication other than the initial share distribution and the share reconstruction is needed.

The inverse operations (subtraction and division) are possible too, and the protocol is the same.

**Multiplication protocol:** Multiplication of two secret values is more challenging since it isn't a linear operation. There are multiple methods to perform secret multiplication, the method described by Ben-Or et al. (1988) also called the BGW protocol (initials of the authors) has to solve two problems along the way of computing  $c = a \cdot b$ .

Assume  $a$  and  $b$  are respectively encoded by  $f(x)$  and  $g(x)$  and  $n \geq 2t + 1$ . The free coefficient of  $h(x) = f(x) \cdot g(x)$  is simply  $h(0) = f(0) \cdot g(0)$ , this means a simple multiplication of the polynomials would be sufficient to compute the multiplication of the secrets. There is however a major problem, multiplication of two polynomials of degree  $t$  yields a polynomial of degree  $2t$ .

While this poses no problem with interpolating  $h(x)$  from its shares  $[c]$  since  $n \geq 2t + 1$ , further multiplications will continue to raise the degree to a level where  $t > n$  making it impossible to inter-



**Figure 2.5:** Adding two secrets for  $n = 3$  parties

polate the resulting polynomial  $h(x)$ . The second problem is harder to spot. The polynomial  $h(x)$  as a result of the multiplication of polynomials  $f(x)$  and  $g(x)$  is reducible (since it's a multiplication). In other words  $f(x)$  and  $g(x)$  are uniformly random polynomials of degree  $t$ , but  $h(x)$  as a multiplication of two random polynomials is not irreducible, therefore  $h(x)$  is not uniformly random. To make sure the resulting polynomial stays of degree  $t$  and is uniformly random, the parties run a protocol to generate a random polynomial of degree  $2t$ .

This protocol works as follows. Each party  $P_i$  randomly selects a private polynomial  $q_i(x)$  with secret  $q_i(0) = 0$  of degree  $2t$  and distributes its shares among the parties. Each party  $P_i$  now has  $n$  random shares  $[q]_i^k$  (with  $k : 1 \rightarrow n$ ). After each party adds all its random shares they hold a secret, truly random polynomial  $q(x)$  with a zero as free coefficient  $q(0) = 0$ . Each party  $P_i$  now computes the multiplication of the two secret values  $[a]$  and  $[b]$  and instead of using  $[c]$  encoded as  $h(x)$  we can add the random polynomial to the result, thus randomizing the coefficients and making the polynomial uniformly random. This will not mess up the result as now  $a \cdot b$  is  $(f(0) \cdot g(0)) + q(0)$  and  $q(0)$  equals zero. This step is also called the randomization step.

The parties now run a protocol to reduce the degree of  $h(x)$  to  $t$ . This protocol can be computed locally (no communication is required) by multiplying the shares of the polynomial  $h(x)$  to a specific, matrix of constants. This will truncate the result  $h(x)$  of degree  $2t$  to a polynomial of degree  $t$ . Proof for this degree reduction step can be found in the study by Asharov and Lindell (2017).

After these two steps, the parties hold  $c = a \cdot b$  encoded by  $h(x)$  of degree  $t$  with coefficients uniformly distributed. They can now recombine their shares to find the polynomial  $h(x)$  and the product of  $a$  and  $b$ ,  $h(0)$ . The whole multiplication protocol requires only one additional round of communication, this happens during the distribution of the shares of the random polynomials  $q(x)_i$  in the randomization step. Note that since we conditioned the protocol to work in cases where  $n \geq 2t + 1$ , a majority of honest parties is needed. Opposed to the linear protocols explained earlier, where only one party needed to be honest.

A large proportion of the neural network is ready to be transformed with these secure arithmetic operators, namely the convolution layer and the fully connected layer.

### 2.2.2.2 Relational operators

In this section we will focus on comparison between secrets. There are two important protocols in secure comparison, equality testing and greater-than testing.

**Equality testing:** Suppose we have two shared secrets  $[a]$  and  $[b]$  and the parties want to know if  $a = b$ , without knowing  $a$  or  $b$ . The easy way, would be to just securely compute and reveal  $c = a - b$ . This would however reveal secret  $b$  if  $a$  was to be revealed, since  $b = a - c$ . To make sure the the output of the subtraction is irreducible and uniformly random Franklin and Haber (1996) came up with an idea to let the parties generate a random shared non-zero secret  $[r]$ . Then compute and reveal  $c = (a - b) \cdot r$ . Since  $r \neq 0$ , if  $c = 0$ ,  $a$  must be equal to  $b$ . If  $c \neq 0$ ,  $a$  and  $b$  are not equal. If we want to compare a secret with a public value  $\beta$ , we just take  $a$  as the secret and use a  $\beta$  instead of  $[b]$  in the protocol. In this case the naive method  $c = (a - \beta)$  would just give away the secret value even if  $a \neq \beta$ , so it's absolutely required to use a random multiplier  $r$  to hide the reversible operation.

The generation of a random shared non-zero secret  $[r]$  appears to be very similar to the generation of the random share in the randomization step of the multiplication protocol but there is one difference, in this case the secret value must be different than zero (invertible), while in the multiplication protocol the random share needed to be equal to zero. The idea is to generate two shared random secrets  $[x]$  and  $[y]$ . Then the parties compute the product of the two secrets  $z = x \cdot y$  and reveal  $z$ . If  $z \neq 0$ , both random secrets  $x$  and  $y$  are non-zero, thus applicable in the equality testing protocol. If  $z = 0$  repeat the random share generation protocol with different random shared secrets and retry the multiplication with these new shares.

**Greater-than testing:** Often we want to know more about two secrets than just equal or different. We want a protocol comparing two secrets  $a$  and  $b$  that returns a boolean for  $a > b$ . There exists multiple different protocols for greater-than comparisons. The one we use in our implementation is designed by Toft et al. and was published in Erkin et al. (2009). This protocol compares the two secrets on bit-level.

## 2.3 Overview

We now have seen the miscellaneous protocols MPC has to offer. From now on we will treat the seen MPC protocols like a black box that accept inputs and compute outputs.

Overview of protocols:

- Secure addition of two secrets or a secret and a public value ( $F_{add}$ ).
- Secure multiplication of secret and public value ( $F_{mul}^{constant}$ ).
- Secure multiplication of two secrets ( $F_{mul}$ ).
- Equality testing of two secrets or a secret and public value ( $F_{eq}$ ).
- Greater-than testing of two secrets ( $F_{gt}$ ).


With this set of protocols we can transform any basic CNN to a secure one. In figure 2.6 a high-level workflow of secure face recognition is shown. The MPC protocol works for 3 parties<sup>2</sup>, who each have their own computing instance connected to the MPC network and the client. The workflow commences by acquiring an image of the clients face, this can be done by taking a photograph with the front-facing camera of the clients smartphone. The client then performs secret sharing on the image<sup>3</sup> and sends the shared secret to the participating parties. The parties receive their shares and jointly compute the output of the face recognition model on the given shared image of the face. The face recognition model can be public or secret. In the case of a secret model, the secret shares of the weights and biases need to be sent to the participating parties aswell. Note that this only has to be done once, during initialisation. After the computation the parties send their resulting secret shares to the client. The client interpolates the shares to find the secret values determining if her face matches or not. This protocol ensures that the client is the only one having knowledge about the cleartext of the image and the output of the face recognition algorithm. This protocol also offers an obfuscation of the model's parameters, the parties and the client have no knowledge about the parameters if the owner of the model uses secret sharing to send the parameters to the parties.

## 2.4 Related work

Erkin et al. presented in Erkin et al. (2009) for the first time a privacy-preserving face recognition algorithm using MPC, this was before the rise of machine learning. Thus they were restricted to using eigenvalues of the faces described in Turk and Pentland (1991). They show that their privacy-preserving face recognition algorithm is as reliable as the normal face recognition algorithm. Unfortunately, the computational cost for producing the eigenvalues of an image is way less than producing a result for a CNN.

<sup>2</sup>This is the smallest amount of parties needed in order to do secure multiplication ( $F_{mul}$ ).

<sup>3</sup>Secret sharing is performed for each pixel of the image.



**Figure 2.6:** Workflow of secure face matching

Mainali et al. recently published the first framework for privacy-enhancing fall detection from a body-worn inertial measurement unit using traditional machine learning and MPC. The data they work with is time-series inertial measurements this has a significantly lower dimensionality than an image. Traditional machine learning classifiers require less computations than deep neural networks. They hint to secure video-based fall detection as part of future research and to which extent secure video-based fall detection can be performed real-time with high-dimensionality.

## 2.5 Conclusion



# 3

## Implementation

### **3.1 Specifications**

### **3.2 Design**

### **3.3 Conclusion**

# 4

## Evaluation

### **4.1 Results**

#### **4.1.1 Reliability results**

#### **4.1.2 Timing results**

### **4.2 Discussion**

### **4.3 Conclusion**

# 5

## Conclusion

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## Uitleg over de appendices

Bijlagen worden bij voorkeur enkel elektronisch ter beschikking gesteld. Indien essentieel kunnen in overleg met de promotor bijlagen in de scriptie opgenomen worden of als apart boekdeel voorzien worden.

Er wordt wel steeds een lijst met vermelding van alle bijlagen opgenomen in de scriptie. Bijlagen worden genummerd met een drukletter A, B, C,...

Voorbeelden van bijlagen:

Bijlage A:      Detailtekeningen van de proefopstelling

Bijlage B:      Meetgegevens (op USB)

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