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This means that if we pursue the handshake even if we know we can't finish the connection, we can at least grab the hash and log it.
A stretch goal would be: if we manage to crack the hash, we know we could MITM NLA because we could then create a new challenge-response on the server side. If I recall correctly the only thing preventing us from doing that was that part of the challenge response mixed the plaintext password (which we don't know) with the server's public/private/fingerprint (not sure which) and that the server would reject anything tampered. We couldn't do the double diffie-hellman trick because of the mixing of both these layers. If we have the password, we can truly do an NLA handshake in the middle. This would open up a new attack use case. Note that I'm half intentionally vague here.
If we don't use the NLA redirection feature and the server doesn't support downgrade attacks then the best we can do is steal the hash. Some ASN.1 BER improvements were required as well.
Fixes#358
Co-authored-by: Olivier Bilodeau <obilodeau@gosecure.net>
If we don't use the NLA redirection feature and the server doesn't support downgrade attacks then the best we can do is steal the hash. Some ASN.1 BER improvements were required as well.
FixesGoSecure#358
Co-authored-by: Olivier Bilodeau <obilodeau@gosecure.net>
If we don't use the NLA redirection feature and the server doesn't support downgrade attacks then the best we can do is steal the hash. Some ASN.1 BER improvements were required as well.
Fixes#358
Co-authored-by: Olivier Bilodeau <obilodeau@gosecure.net>
We know that Responder is able to dump Net-NTLMv2 hashes even if it doesn't fully support RDP.
This means that if we pursue the handshake even if we know we can't finish the connection, we can at least grab the hash and log it.
A stretch goal would be: if we manage to crack the hash, we know we could MITM NLA because we could then create a new challenge-response on the server side. If I recall correctly the only thing preventing us from doing that was that part of the challenge response mixed the plaintext password (which we don't know) with the server's public/private/fingerprint (not sure which) and that the server would reject anything tampered. We couldn't do the double diffie-hellman trick because of the mixing of both these layers. If we have the password, we can truly do an NLA handshake in the middle. This would open up a new attack use case. Note that I'm half intentionally vague here.
Tagging @danielsantos1234.
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