Releases: GrapheneOS/PdfViewer
9
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 8). Notable changes:
- fix inset regression introduced in previous release by reverting one of the changes to use non-deprecated APIs
- update Play Store icon (also usable elsewhere) to match new app icon
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
8
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 7). Notable changes:
- update pdf.js to 2.12.313
- update other dependencies
- update text layer CSS
- update SDK and build tools to 32 (Android 12L) without targeting API 32 yet (waiting for stable release)
- remove/replace some of the deprecated API usage
- expand Permissions-Policy
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
7
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 6). Notable changes:
- update pdf.js to 2.10.377
- update other dependencies
- update minimum API version to 26 (Android 8.0+)
- update target API version to 31 (Android 12)
- remove/replace some of the deprecated API usage
- replace Feature-Policy with Permissions-Policy
- remove legacy cruft from Content-Security-Policy
- replace launcher icon with a nicer one
- enable full R8 optimization
- enable strict resource shrinking
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
6
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 5). Notable changes:
- avoid notices being covered by the navigation bar after rotating the screen
- update pdf.js to 2.5.207
This release will be bundled with the next release of GrapheneOS and is also being pushed out via the Play Store.
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
5
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 4). Notable changes:
- fix new error reporting code
This release will be bundled with the next release of GrapheneOS and is also being pushed out via the Play Store.
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
4
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 3). Notable changes:
- add user-facing error reporting
This release will be bundled with the next release of GrapheneOS and is also being pushed out via the Play Store.
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
3
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 2). Notable changes:
- add initial implementation of pinch-to-zoom
- fix enabling / disabling next/previous actions
This release will be bundled with the next release of GrapheneOS and is also being pushed out via the Play Store.
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
2
Full list of changes from the previous release (version 1). Notable changes:
- add document rotation actions
- add skip to first/last page actions
- add immersive mode with entry / exit on single tap
- substantial PDF rendering compatibility and performance improvements
This release will be bundled with the next release of GrapheneOS and is also being pushed out via the Play Store.
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
1
Initial release