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ESTIMATING EQUILIBRIUM MODELS  
OF LOCAL JURISDICTIONS

Dennis Epple  
Holger Sieg

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### **ABSTRACT**

Research over the past several years has led to development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. An important insight from these models is that plausible single-crossing assumptions about preferences generate strong predictions about the equilibrium distribution of households across communities. To date, these predictions have not been subjected to formal empirical tests. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated approach for testing predictions from this class of models. We first test conditions for locational equilibrium implied by these models. In particular, we test predictions about the distribution of households by income across communities. We then test the models predictions about the relationships among locational equilibrium conditions, housing markets, and housing prices. By drawing inferences from a structural general equilibrium model, the approach of this paper offers a unified treatment of theory and empirical testing.

Dennis Epple  
Graduate School of Industrial Administration  
Carnegie Mellon University  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890  
and NBER  
epple@cmu.edu

Holger Sieg  
Department of Economics  
Duke University  
Durham, NC 27708-0097

# 1 Introduction

Over the past several years, research has investigated existence and properties of equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions.<sup>1</sup> In this paper we test some key implications of the models that have been developed by a formal econometric analysis of equilibrium in a such a system of communities. The framework we study involves a set of communities with fixed jurisdictional boundaries that constitute a metropolitan area. A competitive housing market determines price and quantity of housing within each community. Each community provides a congestable local public good. The cost of providing the public good is financed by a local tax on housing property. A collective choice process within each community determines the tax rate and expenditure on the locally provided public good in that community. Agents move costlessly among the communities. In equilibrium, all community budgets are balanced, all markets clear, and no household wishes to change its community of residence.<sup>2</sup>

This paper first investigates the properties of the locational equilibrium implied

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<sup>1</sup>Tiebout (1956) inspired research on inter-jurisdictional mobility. Ellickson (1971) introduces a single-crossing condition to explain stratification by income. Using such a condition Westhoff (1977) proves existence of equilibrium in a model without housing markets. Epplé, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993) prove existence with housing markets. Goodspeed (1989) studies income taxation in this framework. Epplé and Romer (1991a) study redistribution with voters anticipating the migration induced by tax and expenditure changes. Epplé and Platt (1998) extend the model to consider heterogeneity in both preferences and income. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) show that this framework can be cast as an overlapping generations model and use the model to study education policies. Benabou (1996a) studies forces leading to stratification and their consequences for income distribution and efficiency.

<sup>2</sup>The model we test is an extension of that proposed by Epplé and Romer (1991b), but our approach to estimation differs from the one proposed there.

by the model. These properties entail strong predictions about the distribution of households by income across communities. The central idea of the first stage of the estimation strategy is to match the observed quantiles of the income distributions in communities with those predicted by the model. This step of our analysis identifies some of the most interesting parameters of the model and, additionally, provides a test of the general validity of the framework. If we were unable to match the empirical income distributions across communities with those predicted by the model, then there would be little hope that the stronger implications of the model regarding the determination of the levels of the public goods would be satisfied by the data. We do not have to appeal to a particular collective choice mechanism such as majority rule to justify this analysis.

Tiebout's conjecture implies that in making locational decisions households take account of the tax and expenditure policies adopted by the communities in the metropolitan area. There are other factors that are likely to affect the desirability of various locations including environmental amenities or disamenities, crime rates, proximity to business centers, or accessibility to places of enjoyment and recreation. Our model assumes that households choosing among locations will consider such factors regardless of whether they are exogenously determined, determined by the local government, a higher level of government, or market forces. The goals of the second step of the analysis are to test this hypothesis, identify factors that influence

locational choices and quantify their importance.

The basic idea of this second step of the estimation strategy is to see whether the levels of public good provision implied by the parameters characterizing household locational choices (estimated in the first stage) can explain their observed empirical counterparts. To implement the second stage of the estimation strategy we need to solve a number of problems. Housing prices are unobserved and need to be estimated based on data on housing values. Public good provision is multidimensional and only partially observed by the econometrician. We discuss different approaches to solving these problems and implement the proposed estimation strategy. As with the first stage of our analysis, we do not need to specify a particular collective choice mechanism. From a purely statistical perspective, the observed expenditure levels are sufficient statistics for the collective decision making processes.

Thus the paper provides an integrated approach for testing a class of models that have played a major role in the urban economics and public finance literature. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of previous approaches for testing Tiebout style models. Section 3 lays out the general equilibrium model and derives a set of conditions that characterize the equilibrium allocation. Section 4 introduces a parameterization of the model. The estimation strategy is explained in Section 5. Section 6 provides information about the data set, which is an extract of the 1980 census. The empirical results are discussed in Section 7, and Section 8

presents the conclusions of the analysis and discusses future research.

## 2 Previous Approaches to Testing the Tiebout Model

Early tests of the Tiebout model primarily attempted to evaluate whether fiscal variables affect residential decisions of households. The Tiebout hypothesis implies that there is at least a partial sorting of individuals in communities based on local public goods. Some studies looked at migration and mobility patterns explicitly, while others focused on indirect tests. These studies investigated primarily whether public spending affected property values (Rubinfeld, 1987).

The most prominent approach was introduced by Oates (1969), who studied whether public spending and taxation were capitalized into land values. Oates reasoned that an increase in public spending, holding everything else including taxes equal, should increase property values. The idea is that more public spending would attract more individuals to the community and hence increase the demand for housing in this particular community resulting in an increase in prices. Most of the studies following Oates (1969) find evidence that capitalization of public spending and taxes is prevalent. However, these provide only a partial test of the Tiebout model.

Closely related to this literature is one focused on estimation of demand functions for local public goods. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) provided sufficient assumptions to allow estimation of demand functions from community-level data. Their seminal paper spurred a large literature which estimated demand functions by combining data on public good expenditures with community specific information such as median income levels and demographics. However, as pointed out by Goldstein and Pauly (1981), these studies ignored the effects of migration. This raises a number of econometric issues. Because of the migration of individuals in response to differences in public spending across jurisdictions, estimates of demand for public goods which ignore such sorting are subject to a self selection bias which is typically referred to as "Tiebout bias".

Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) proposed an alternative methodology of estimating demand functions based on survey data. Using micro data sets that incorporate more detailed information about preferences for local public goods, they overcome many of the difficulties associated with studies that rely primarily on community-level data. To address the issues raised in Goldstein and Pauly (1981), Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) presented a framework that controls for Tiebout bias by adding a selection function. Their approach to dealing with this problem avoids the specification of a full equilibrium model. They noted, however, that "a proper empirical analysis of the Tiebout bias question would involve a complete the-

oretical specification of a model of community choice and public choice which would suggest the identifying restrictions.” (p.432) Our approach involves precisely such a theoretical specification.

### 3 The Framework

This section describes the general framework of the analysis, defines the equilibrium concept, and derives some general properties of equilibrium that hold under a set of fairly weak assumptions. The economy consists of a continuum of households,  $C$ , living in a metropolitan area. The homogeneous land in the metropolitan area is divided among  $J$  communities, each of which has fixed boundaries. Jurisdictions may differ in the amount of land contained within their boundaries.

Communities offer a good  $g$  which may be thought of as a composite function that incorporates locally provided public goods, environmental amenities, and other community specific attributes. For expositional convenience we will refer to  $g$  as a public good, but the broader interpretation should be kept in mind. Communities differ in the gross-of-tax price of housing,  $p$ . Communities assess an *ad valorem* tax,  $t$ , on the value of housing services. Thus, the gross-of-tax price,  $p$ , is related to the net-of-tax price,  $p^h$ , by the identity  $p = (1 + t) p^h$ .



Households have preferences defined over the local public good,  $g$ , a local housing good,  $h$ , and a composite private good,  $b$ . Households differ in their endowed income,  $y$ , and in a taste parameter,  $\alpha$ , which reflects the household's valuation of the public good. The continuum of households,  $C$ , is implicitly described by the joint distribution of  $y$  and  $\alpha$ . We assume that this distribution has a continuous density,  $f(\alpha, y)$ , with respect to Lebesgue Measure. We refer to a household with taste parameter,  $\alpha$ , and income,  $y$ , as  $(\alpha, y)$ . The preferences of a household can be represented by a utility function,  $U(\alpha, g, h, b)$ , which satisfies the standard assumptions.

Each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(h,b)} U(\alpha, g, h, b) \\ \text{s.t. } p h = y - b \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

Alternatively, we can represent the preferences of a household by the indirect utility function derived by solving the optimization problem in equation (3.1). This presumes households can purchase as much or as little housing as they desire at the going price. Hence we assume that zoning does not constrain housing choices. Let

$$V(\alpha, g, p, y) = U(\alpha, g, h(p, y, \alpha), y - ph(p, y, g, \alpha)) \tag{3.2}$$

denote the indirect utility function of a household. Consider the slope of an “indirect

indifference curve” in the  $(g, p)$ -plane:

$$\begin{aligned} M(\alpha, g, p, y) &= \left. \frac{dp}{dg} \right|_{v=\bar{v}} \\ &= - \frac{\partial V(\alpha, g, p, y) / \partial g}{\partial V(\alpha, g, p, y) / \partial p} \end{aligned} \tag{3.3}$$

If  $M(\cdot)$  is monotonic in  $y$  for each  $\alpha$  then indifference curves in the  $(g, p)$ -plane satisfy “single-crossing” in  $y$ . Likewise, monotonicity of  $M(\cdot)$  in  $\alpha$  provides single-crossing in  $\alpha$  for given  $y$ . We assume that  $M(\cdot)$  is everywhere monotonically increasing in  $\alpha$  and  $y$ .

The single-crossing properties prove to be quite valuable in yielding a structure in which necessary conditions for an equilibrium can be characterized in a rather straightforward way.<sup>3</sup> We assume that agents behave as price takers and that mobility between the communities is costless. In equilibrium every household lives in its preferred community.

Let  $(g_i, p_i)$  and  $(g_j, p_j)$  be the level of public good provision and gross-of-tax housing price in community  $i$  and  $j$ , respectively, and suppose that some individuals prefer  $(g_j, p_j)$  and others prefer  $(g_i, p_i)$ . Then the set of individuals indifferent between the

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<sup>3</sup>Dunz (1989) and Nechyba (1997) have shown the existence of a voting and mobility equilibrium without using the single-crossing properties. However, their approach assumes an exogenously specified distribution of types of housing.

two communities is given by  $(\alpha, y)$  such that:

$$V(\alpha, g_j, p_j, y) = V(\alpha, g_i, p_i, y) \quad (3.4)$$

If  $M(\cdot)$  is monotonic in  $y$  and  $\alpha$ , then Epple and Platt (1998) show that equation (3.4) defines a monotonic function  $y(\alpha)$  such that that  $(\alpha, y)$  is indifferent between  $(g_i, p_i)$  and  $(g_j, p_j)$ .

We assume that an equilibrium exists and test necessary conditions for existence of equilibrium.<sup>4</sup> The necessary conditions for locational equilibrium impose a number of restrictions on the equilibrium allocation that apply quite broadly, in that they do not depend on specific features of the model as the tax structure, the collective choice mechanism that determines policy variables in each community, or the technology of producing the public good. Proposition 1 summarizes three necessary conditions that hold in equilibrium for communities that are not identical and, hence, differ in housing prices.

**Proposition 1** *Consider an equilibrium allocation in which no two communities have the same housing prices. For such an allocation to be a locational equilibrium – no-one wishes to move – there must be an ordering of community pairs,  $\{(g_1, p_1), \dots, (g_J, p_J)\}$ ,*

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<sup>4</sup>For a rigorous existence proof in a model with only income heterogeneity see Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993). Existence has not been established in this class of models when there is heterogeneity in both preferences and income, but equilibrium has been found to exist in computational examples (Epple and Platt, 1998).

such that:

1. **Boundary Indifference:** *The set of “border” individuals between any two adjacent communities are indifferent between the two communities. This set is characterized by the following expression:*

$$I_j = \{(\alpha, y) \mid V(\alpha, g_j, p_j, y) = V(\alpha, g_{j+1}, p_{j+1}, y)\} \quad j = 1, \dots, J-1 \quad (3.5)$$

2. **Stratification:** *Let  $y_j(\alpha)$  be the implicit function defined by equation (3.5). Then, for each  $\alpha$ , the residents of community  $j$  consist of those with income,  $y$ , given by:*

$$y_{j-1}(\alpha) < y < y_j(\alpha) \quad (3.6)$$

3. **Increasing Bundles:** *Consider two communities  $i$  and  $j$  such that  $p_i > p_j$ . Then  $g_i > g_j$  if and only if  $y_i(\alpha) > y_j(\alpha)$ .*

(A Proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix A)

If preferences were homogeneous, the stratification condition would imply that, in equilibrium, each community would have individuals whose incomes lie in a single interval.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the set of communities would partition the support of the income

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<sup>5</sup>Durlauf (1996) and Benabou (1996b) find similar implications for stratification of households across communities and they study the macroeconomic implications of this stratification.

distribution. With heterogeneous preferences, as in the current setup, this need no longer be the case. There may be several communities that have residents of a given income, so that communities are not perfectly stratified by income alone.

Our analysis focuses on these necessary conditions. Hence, we need not specify the mechanism determining the tax and expenditure levels of individual localities. The mechanism of majority rule is typically adopted, and analysis of the necessary conditions for a majority-voting equilibrium is a natural direction for extending our empirical strategy in future research.

## 4 A Parameterization of the Model

Since we are interested in empirical implementation, further development of the model is best done in a more fully parameterized context. First, we introduce some assumptions about the distribution of income and the unobserved taste parameter. Let the joint distribution of  $\ln(\alpha)$  and  $\ln(y)$  be bivariate normal with correlation  $\lambda$ . A slight abuse of notation simplifies exposition without causing ambiguities. Hence, we denote the marginal density functions with  $f(\ln(y))$  and  $f(\ln(\alpha))$  and let  $f(\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y))$  be the conditional density function of  $\ln(\alpha)$  given  $\ln(y)$ . We also assume that the indirect

utility function is given by:<sup>6</sup>

$$V(g, p, y, \alpha) = \left\{ \alpha g^\rho + \left[ e^{\frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} e^{-\frac{Bp^{\eta+1}-1}{1+\eta}} \right]^\rho \right\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad (4.1)$$

where  $\rho < 0$ ,  $\alpha > 0$ ,  $\eta < 0$ ,  $\nu > 0$  and  $B > 0$ . We assume that  $\eta$ ,  $\nu$ ,  $\rho$ , and  $B$  are the same for all households. Given this indirect utility function, Roy's Identity implies that the demand for housing can be expressed as:

$$h(p, y) = B p^\eta y^\nu \quad (4.2)$$

The slope of an "indirect" indifference curve in the  $(g, p)$  plane is:

$$M(g, p, y, \alpha) = \frac{\alpha g^{\rho-1} \left[ e^{\frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} \right]^{-\rho} \left[ e^{-\frac{Bp^{\eta+1}-1}{1+\eta}} \right]^{-\rho}}{B p^\eta} > 0 \quad (4.3)$$

Given the assumptions about the signs and magnitude of the parameters,  $M(\cdot)$  is increasing in  $y$  and  $\alpha$ , satisfying the single-crossing properties. Note in particular that our single-crossing assumption requires that  $\rho < 0$ . The sign of the estimate of  $\rho$  is thus an important test of the model. The utility function (4.1) is separable in the public- and private-good components. This could be relaxed by replacing  $B$  with a function that depends on  $g$ . This would not affect stage one but would complicate stage two of our estimation procedure. Hence we treat separability as a maintained

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<sup>6</sup>There is no closed-form direct utility function which yields this indirect utility function.

hypothesis.

The boundary indifference condition for community  $j$  versus community  $j + 1$  can be written as:

$$\ln(\alpha) - \rho \left( \frac{y^{1-\nu} - 1}{1 - \nu} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{Q_{j+1} - Q_j}{g_j^\rho - g_{j+1}^\rho} \right) \quad (4.4)$$

where

$$Q_j = e^{-\frac{\rho}{1+\eta} (Bp_j^{\eta+1} - 1)} \quad (4.5)$$


For notational simplicity define:

$$\begin{aligned} K_0 &= -\infty \\ K_j &= \ln \left( \frac{Q_{j+1} - Q_j}{g_j^\rho - g_{j+1}^\rho} \right) \quad j = 1, \dots, J-1 \\ K_J &= \infty \end{aligned} \quad (4.6)$$

The lowest income community includes all of the distribution lying below the boundary locus separating that community from the next-highest income community. Hence, the lower boundary of the community is  $-\infty$ . Similarly, the highest income community has an upper bound of  $\infty$ .

Given this parameterization, the shape of all boundary indifference loci in the  $(\ln(\alpha), \ln(y))$ -space is determined by the parameters  $\rho$  and  $\nu$ , and the effects of all

Figure 1: The Distribution of Households across Communities



This figure illustrates the distribution of households across communities given the parameterization of the model for the case where  $\nu = 1$ . If the income elasticity is less than one, the boundary indifference curves are not linear but concave.

community specific variables are impounded in a community-specific intercept. The population living in community  $j$  can be obtained by integrating between the lines that go through  $K_{j-1}$  and  $K_j$ . This is the key result of this section. It is illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1** *Given the parameterization of the model, the income distributions of the  $J$  communities are completely specified by the parameters of the distribution function,  $(\mu_y, \mu_\alpha, \lambda, \sigma_y, \sigma_\alpha)$ , the preference parameters  $\rho$  and  $\nu$ , and the community specific intercepts,  $(K_0, \dots, K_J)$ .*

Based on this result we can compute the measure of the population in community  $j$



as:

$$P(C_j) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{K_{j-1} + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}}^{K_j + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} f(\ln(\alpha) \ln(y)) d\ln(\alpha) d\ln(y) \quad (4.7)$$

The second important result is that the system of equations above can be solved recursively to obtain the community specific intercepts as a function of  $(\mu_y, \mu_\alpha, \lambda, \sigma_y, \sigma_\alpha, \rho, \nu)$  and the community sizes,  $P(C_1), \dots, P(C_J)$ . Appealing to the inverse function theorem we obtain the following lemma:

**Lemma 2** *The community specific intercepts,  $\{K_j\}_{j=0}^{J-1}$  are recursively defined by the following equations:*

$$\begin{aligned} K_0 &= -\infty \\ K_j &= K_j(K_{j-1}, P(C_j) \mid \rho, \mu_y, \sigma_y, \mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha, \lambda, \nu) \quad j = 1, \dots, J-1 \\ K_J &= \infty \end{aligned} \quad (4.8)$$

Given the distribution of agents across communities, we can derive expressions for the quantiles of the distribution. According to the model, the  $q$ th quantile of the income

distribution in community  $j$  ,  $\zeta_j(q)$ , is implicitly defined by the following equation:

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\ln(\zeta_j(q))} \int_{K_{j-1} + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}}^{K_j + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} f(\ln(\alpha), \ln(y)) d\ln(\alpha) d\ln(y) = q P(C_j) \quad (4.9)$$

Let  $\theta \in \Theta$  be an element of the underlying parameter space,  $\Theta$ . Appealing to the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain the following Lemma:

**Lemma 3** *For every community  $j$ , the logarithm of the quantiles of the income distribution are given by a differentiable function from  $(0,1) \times \Theta$  to  $R$ . Let us denote this function by  $\ln(\zeta_j(p, \theta))$ .*

Summarizing the results of this section, we have introduced a parameterization of the model that allows us to characterize the distribution of households across communities and the income distribution within each community in a computationally tractable way. These distributions are characterized by their quantiles which are differentiable functions of the underlying parameters of the model. The equilibrium conditions provide an explicit relationship between household locational choices and community-specific variables via the community specific intercepts of the boundary loci.

## 5 The Estimation Strategy

The structure of the model permits estimating the parameters of the model in two steps. The key idea of the first step of the estimation procedure is to match the quantiles of the income distribution predicted by the model with their empirical counterparts. This allows us to estimate a subset of the structural parameters and provides a first test of the underlying theory. In the second step of the estimation procedure, we derive orthogonality conditions that exploit the boundary indifference conditions. These orthogonality conditions allow us to estimate and identify the remaining structural parameters of the model provided we observe (or can estimate) housing prices and a vector of public good expenditures and local amenities.

### 5.1 Matching Quantiles of the Income Distributions

The model defines a joint distribution of income and taste parameters for every community. Let  $q$  be any given number in the interval  $(0, 1)$ , and let  $\zeta_j(q)$  denote the  $q$ th quantile of the income distribution, i.e.  $\zeta_j(q)$  is defined by  $F_j[\zeta_j(q)] = q$ . We observe the empirical income distribution for each community. An estimator of  $\zeta_j(q)$  is given by:

$$\zeta_j^N(q) = F_{j,N}^{-1}(q) \tag{5.1}$$

where  $F_{j,N}^{-1}(\cdot)$  is the inverse of the empirical distribution function. In the first stage of the estimation procedure, we estimate a subset of parameters by matching the empirical quantiles in the sample with those predicted by the model. We have data on the 25% quantile, the median and the 75% quantiles. For notational simplicity we combine the  $3 \times J$  restrictions into one vector:

$$e_1^N(\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} \ln(\zeta_1(0.25, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_1^N(0.25)) \\ \ln(\zeta_1(0.50, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_1^N(0.50)) \\ \ln(\zeta_1(0.75, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_1^N(0.75)) \\ \dots \\ \ln(\zeta_J(0.25, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_J^N(0.25)) \\ \ln(\zeta_J(0.50, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_J^N(0.50)) \\ \ln(\zeta_J(0.75, \theta)) - \ln(\zeta_J^N(0.75)) \end{pmatrix} \quad (5.2)$$

If the model is correctly specified the difference between the observed and the predicted quantiles will vanish as the number of households in the sample go to infinity. The estimation is simplified since the quantiles of the income distribution of community  $j$  depend on  $(p_j, g_j)$  only through  $K_j$ . We can estimate a subset of the underlying structural parameters of the model using a Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE) treating the community specific intercepts as fixed effects.

The estimation strategy described so far has ignored information about commu-

nity populations. This is a drawback for a number of reasons. First, there is fairly accurate information on community populations. Therefore one would like to incorporate this information in the estimation procedure. Broadly speaking, adding more information to the estimation procedure should improve the estimation results. Second, the populations of the communities vary substantially within a metropolitan area. A failure to account for the different populations of the communities would lessen the credibility of the framework. Incorporating information about community populations into the estimation procedure is easier than one might expect. Lemma 2 shows that one can express the community specific intercepts recursively as a function of the parameters of the model and the observed community sizes. This procedure constrains the community specific intercepts  $K_j$  to replicate the observed population sizes.

We show in Appendix B that the following set of structural parameters is identified in this first step of our estimation strategy:

$$\theta_1 = \left( \nu, \frac{\rho}{\sigma_\alpha}, \mu_y, \sigma_y, \lambda \right)' \quad (5.3)$$

where  $\theta_1$  is a  $5 \times 1$  vector. Provided that  $J \geq 2$ , the following equation defines a Minimum Distance Estimator for  $\theta_1$ :

$$\theta_1^N = \arg \min_{\theta_1 \in \Theta_1} \{ e_1^N(\theta_1)' A_1^N e_1^N(\theta_1) \} \quad (5.4)$$

for some positive semidefinite weighting matrix,  $A_1^N$ , that converges in probability to  $A_1^0$ . The estimator  $\theta_1^N$  is a consistent estimator of  $\theta_1^0$  and  $N^{1/2} (\theta_1^N - \theta_1^0) \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \Sigma)$ .<sup>7</sup> The optimally weighted MDE is obtained by setting the weighting matrix equal to the inverse of a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the quantiles. A key advantage of this estimator is that we only need to know  $\{F_{j,N}(\cdot)\}_{j=1}^J$  to implement it. We do not need data on housing prices and public good provision,  $\{p_j, g_j\}_{j=1}^J$ . However, in this first stage we can only identify a subset of the structural parameters of interest. Additional parameters are identified and estimated in the second stage, which we discuss next.

## 5.2 Public Good Provision

Suppose we also observe (or can estimate) housing prices for the sample of communities. We can identify and estimate the remaining structural parameters of the model provided we have data characterizing local public goods and amenities. The biggest problem encountered in the empirical implementation of the model is that local public good provision is multidimensional (school quality, crime, parks, pollution etc.) and partially unobserved by the econometrician. Following the empirical literature on differentiated products in industrial organization, we assume that the level of public

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<sup>7</sup>An appendix which derives the covariance matrix of the estimator is available from the authors.

good provision can be expressed as an index that consists of observed characteristics of community  $j$  denoted  $x_j$  and an unobserved characteristic denoted  $\epsilon_j$ :

$$g_j = x_j' \gamma + \epsilon_j \quad (5.5)$$

where  $\gamma$  is a parameter vector to be estimated.  $\epsilon_j$  is observed by the households, but unobserved by the econometrician.

The basic idea behind the estimation procedure is to use the information incorporated in the boundary indifference conditions to construct an estimator for the remaining parameters. Equation (4.6) implies that community specific intercepts are functions of housing prices and (unobserved) levels of public good provision. Unfortunately, we cannot just substitute equation (5.5) into equation (4.6) and estimate the model because public good provision, and hence the unobserved  $\epsilon_j$ , enters equation (4.6) in a highly nonlinear way. For a similar reason, we cannot assume that public good provision is measured with error (for example by education expenditures per student), substitute the variable into (4.6) and estimate the parameters using NLLS. This approach suffers from complicated nonlinear errors-in-variables problems.

However, we can proceed along the lines suggested by Berry (1994) and solve equation (4.6) for the  $g_j$ 's which are the equivalents of the mean utility levels in the differentiated products framework. Hence we obtain the following recursive represen-

tation for  $g_j$ :

$$g_{j+1}^\rho = g_j^\rho - (Q_{j+1} - Q_j) \exp(-K_j) \quad (5.6)$$

where  $Q_j$  is a monotonic function (4.5) of  $p_j$ , and  $K_j$  can be estimated as shown in the previous section. Equation (5.6) can be rewritten as follows:

$$g_j = \left\{ g_1^\rho - \sum_{i=2}^j (Q_i - Q_{i-1}) \exp(-K_i) \right\}^{1/\rho} \quad (5.7)$$

Substituting equation (5.5) into equation (5.7) yields:

$$\epsilon_j = x'_j \gamma - \left\{ g_1^\rho - \sum_{i=2}^j (Q_i - Q_{i-1}) \exp(-K_i) \right\}^{1/\rho} \quad (5.8)$$

By solving equation (4.6) for  $\epsilon_j$ , we have effectively put the model into a nonlinear regression framework. Assuming that  $E[\epsilon_j \mid x_j, p_j] = 0$  (or a similar conditional moments restriction), we show in Appendix B that we can identify the remaining structural parameters of the model,  $\theta_2 = (\rho, \eta, \gamma, \sigma_\alpha, \mu_\alpha)$ .<sup>8</sup>

A crucial assumption thus far is that the  $\epsilon_j$  are uncorrelated with prices and observed amenities. There are a number of local amenities that can probably be taken as exogenous since they are either naturally supplied public goods or determined by

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<sup>8</sup>We also need to estimate the “incidental parameter  $g_1$ . If the households had the opportunity to move to community which did not provide any public goods, we could set  $g_1$  equal to zero which would avoid the need to estimate it. Also while  $\eta$  is identified, its value is difficult to estimate because of the need to deduce housing prices from housing expenditures data, as we discuss below.



actions beyond the control of the residents in a community. However, if households make residential decisions based on all characteristics (not just the ones observed by the econometrician), then the endogenously determined variables like housing prices and expenditures will be correlated with the unobserved components. A high unobserved amenity level will attract high income households who will vote for high expenditure levels of education and are willing to pay higher housing prices. The estimation procedure must therefore control for these correlations. The same problem is encountered in the empirical literature on differentiated product where prices set by oligopolists are correlated with unobserved product characteristics. (For a discussion, see Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).) If prices are correlated with unobserved amenities, we need to use an instrumental variable estimator instead of the NLLS estimator above. In this paper, we use (functions of) the income rank of the community as an instrument. This approach goes back to an old idea by Wald and Durbin who propose to use ranks as instruments when estimating a model with measurement errors. Provided we have a sufficient number of instruments, we can estimate the model using a GMM estimator (Hansen, 1982).

Three aspects of our use of rank as instrument deserve emphasis. First, we use the income rank of communities as our instrument rather than a ranking based on the variables in the equation (5.8) being estimated. Second, Proposition 1 (c) implies that, were it not for unobservables and measurement error in  $p_j$  and  $g_j$ , those variables

would have the same rank order as community income. Thus our model provides a theoretical justification for use of income rank as instrument. Third, use of income rank as instrument treats the ascending bundles property as a maintained hypothesis. However, investigation of the ascending bundles property is of interest in its own right and we undertake this investigation below prior to estimating equation (5.8).

Summarizing, the discussion above, we have shown how to estimate the parameters of the model. The estimation procedure is flexible since it accommodates observed and unobserved components of public good provision and local amenities.

## 6 The Data Set

A natural starting point for the empirical implementation of the model would be to estimate the model using a cross sectional data set which includes detailed information about residential choices. Unfortunately, data sets that are available to the public do not include such detailed information. For example, the publicly available micro data sets (PUMS) provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census do not provide sufficient information to identify the exact residential choice of a household. This is done to guarantee the anonymity of households in the sample. Information about residential location may become available in the future via confidential provision of data through Census Data Centers. Such data would permit valuable additional testing of the


model. As we have shown in the previous sections, our estimation approach allows us to estimate the parameters of the underlying model without relying on a cross sectional data set of households and their locational choices. We only need community level data.

The data set used in the empirical analysis of the model is an extract of the 1980 Census. We focus on the Boston Metropolitan Area (BMA). The BMA was chosen for two reasons. First, in Massachusetts school districts and municipalities are generally coterminous, so we do not have to deal with overlapping political jurisdictions. Once we limit the search to Massachusetts, the choice of the Boston metropolitan area is obvious. Limiting the data to a single metropolitan area is important. Households can typically choose residence from among several alternative communities in a metropolitan area without changing their place of employment. Hence treating households as having endowed income is a reasonable approximation for households in a single metropolitan area. Second, the BMA consists of 17 major cities and 75 towns and townships, a total of 92 different municipalities. The size of the BMA is sufficient to provide a meaningful test of the underlying theory. The 92 communities vary substantially in size. The largest community, the city of Boston, has over 219,000 households while the smallest community, Carlisle, has 1028. One of the main tests for the general validity of the model is whether it can successfully replicate this diversity in observed community sizes. We also observe substantial stratification according

to income. The poorest community, Chelsea, has a median income (in 1980 dollars) of just over \$11,200 while the richest community, Weston, has a median income of \$47,646. We conclude that the BMA provides a combination of small, medium and large communities with large differences in observed characteristics. Hence it is a system of jurisdictions that should provide a fruitful proving ground for the model we wish to test.

## 6.1 The Quantiles of the Income Distribution

Figure 2: Estimated Quantiles



Notation: — median, - - 25% quantile, - . 75% quantile.

The summary files of the US Census provide a rich set of information at the

community level. In particular, these files include variables which report the number of households in 17 different income categories in each community. This information is sufficient to compute a close approximation of the empirical income distribution functions. Figure 2 provides information about estimated quantiles of the income distributions of the cities and townships in the BMA which constitute our sample.

The estimated quantiles provide a first test of the model. The model predicts that it should not matter whether we rank communities according to the median or any other quantile, i.e. the ranking of the communities should be invariant to the choice of the quantile. In our empirical analysis, we estimate the 25% and 75% quantiles in addition to the median to capture the dispersion of the income distribution. An inspection of Figure 2 shows that this ranking prediction of our model seems to hold in our data set. In general, the rankings according to the three quantiles are almost identical. The few deviations are well within the sum of the estimated standard errors of the adjacent communities. We conclude that our model passes this first test reasonably well.

It is of interest to note that the 25% quantiles of the lower income communities are very close in magnitude, i.e. the difference between the 25% quantile of Cambridge, the third poorest community in our sample, and the corresponding quantile of Everett, the 8th poorest community, is only approximately \$300. The sample also has the property that the center of the metropolitan area, the city of Boston, is almost at

the bottom of the ranking. Only Chelsea has a lower median income. Most of the medium sized communities (with the exception of Newton) are also in the lower third of the ranking. Most of the communities in the top of the ranking are small in size and have typically less than 5000 households. The three poorest communities house 25% of the population, the next 13 house another 25%, the next 27 house another 25% and the remaining 49 communities house the remaining quarter of the population.

## 6.2 Measuring Housing Prices

In order to test some of the stronger predictions of the spatial equilibrium model, we need housing prices. Unfortunately, housing prices per unit of housing services are not observed by the researcher. One solution to this problem is to estimate housing prices using data on housing values. Median housing values in the 92 communities are strongly positively correlated with median household income (0.85). However, this does not necessarily indicate that housing prices are also highly correlated since housing demand is subject to a strong income effect.

Given the parameterization of the household preferences, we can derive a simple expression that will permit us to infer needed information about housing prices from housing expenditures, income, and property tax rates, all of which we observe. From equation (5.8) and (4.5), we see that housing price enters our estimation equation only

through the term  $B p^{\eta+1}$ . Multiplying equation (4.2) with  $p$ , and using the identity  $p = (1+t)p^h$ , we obtain  $B p^{\eta+1} = (1+t)p^h h / y^\nu$ . The expression in the numerator,  $(1+t)p^h h$ , is the gross-of-tax annual implicit “user cost” of housing. We have data on market value of housing  $V_h$ . Following Poterba (1992), we calculate the user cost of housing for a house of market value  $V_h$  from the expression  $[(1-t_y)(i+t_j)+\zeta] V_h$  where  $t_y$  is the marginal income tax rate for a household with income  $y$ ,  $i$  is the nominal interest rate,  $\zeta$  is the sum of the risk premium for housing investments and the annual percentage rates of depreciation and maintenance less the annual rate of appreciation of house value. Integrating across the set of types  $\alpha$  in community  $j$  holding income constant at any  $y = y_i$ , we obtain:

$$P_j = B p_j^{\eta+1} = [(1-t_y)(i+t_j)+\zeta] E[V_h | y = y_i] / y_i^\nu \quad (6.1)$$

where we have introduced  $P_j$  to denote the expression for housing price that is required for estimating equation (5.8). The U.S. Census provides information about the joint distribution of income and housing value for each community, and this information can be used to calculate  $E[V_h | y = y_i]$  for any value of  $y_i$ . We have data on property taxes, and we have estimated  $\nu$  in the first stage. Thus we have all information required for calculating the expression in  $P_j$  in equation (6.1).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Using values for 1980 from Poterba (1992), we assume that maintenance and depreciation rates are each 0.02, the housing risk premium is 0.04, and the rate of inflation is 0.10. Thus we set  $\zeta = -0.02$ . Again following Poterba (1992), we set  $i = 0.1286$ . We set the marginal tax rate  $t_y = 0.15$ . We calculate the right-hand-side of equation (6.1) at income levels of \$17,500, \$25,000 and \$35,000. We then obtain constrained and unconstrained estimates of  $P_j$  using a least squares

While this procedure yields consistent estimates of housing prices provided that our model is correctly specified, it is subject to a number of limitations. It would be preferable to compute housing prices independently of the functional specification for the demand for housing. If we had a cross-sectional data set on housing transaction (prices and housing characteristics) for each community in the sample, we could run a hedonic regression to estimate housing prices for the set of communities. This would not only allow us to estimate a model with a much richer specification for housing demand including both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for housing. It would also give us the opportunity to test between different specifications for housing demand. Unfortunately, this kind of data is not available for the time period of our analysis, but future research will address this topic.

We estimate the price variable  $P_j$  defined above and Figure 3 reports estimated values of  $P_j$  which are not constrained to satisfy the ranking condition and estimated values of  $P_j$  that are constrained. Given values for  $\eta$ , we can infer the range of values for  $p_j$  from the  $P_j$ . For example, if we set  $\eta = -0.3$ , the price ratio between the poorest community and the richest community is roughly 3.5 indicating that there are significant price differences across communities. This reinforces the idea that communities not only differ with respect to median income levels but also with respect to housing prices as predicted by the underlying equilibrium model.<sup>10</sup>


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dummy variable estimator.

<sup>10</sup>While well within the confidence bounds from several studies, a housing price elasticity of -0.3



Figure 3: Estimated Housing Prices



Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium prices satisfy the “ascending bundles” property, i.e. housing prices should be monotonically increasing in the rank of the community. It would be surprising if estimated housing prices satisfied this condition perfectly. As it turns out, the unconstrained price estimates imply 815 rank violations. There are  $J(J - 1)/2$  pairwise comparisons between communities. With 92 communities in the sample, there are 4186 possible rank violations. Hence we find

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is at the low end of estimates found in the literature. Hanushek and Quigley (1980) estimate the price elasticity to be on the order of -0.4. Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) place it at around -0.7, and Goodman (1988, 1990) estimates values on the order of -0.4 to -0.45. The housing price differentials portrayed in Figure 3 would be larger if we used higher (absolute) values for  $\eta$ . However, we suspect that these differentials may overstate the actual price differences due to heterogeneity in housing demand not captured in our current model. Studying this will be a subject of future research.

that the unconstrained price estimates predict 81 % of all rankings correctly. We can also compute price estimates that satisfy the ranking requirement perfectly by imposing a number of inequality constraints in the estimation procedure. We find that constraints are binding for communities that have similar income levels, but they are rarely binding for communities that differ significantly in income.


Summarizing the results above, we find that the tendency of prices to ascend with community income provides some positive evidence for the general validity of our equilibrium model. However these price estimates are obtained under a number of plausible though restrictive assumptions about the demand for housing.

### **6.3 Measuring Public Good Provision and Amenities**

Measuring public good provision and community specific amenities also poses a substantial challenge. The two public goods that are likely of central concern in locational choices of most households are school quality and public safety. Both of these goods are not directly observed by the econometrician and hence must be measured by proxy variables. In our data set we have information on crime levels and expenditures on education. Figure 4 reports these variables.

The correlation between median income and the crime rate is -0.43. The strong negative correlation provides some support for the general validity of our model. Mea-

Figure 4: Public Goods



Notation: - - crime rates, — education expenditures.


asuring school quality is even more difficult. We would like a measure of value added per student or, failing that, some measure of average test scores in the school districts. However, these type of measures are not available for the time period of our analysis. Hence we must rely on expenditure data.<sup>11</sup> We observe education expenditures per household. The correlation between expenditures and median income is 0.74 in the sample.

As discussed in the previous section, the underlying spatial equilibrium model satisfies the “ascending bundles” property which implies that the ranking of the communities should be the same according to income, housing prices and public good

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<sup>11</sup>While it is natural to think that increasing expenditure yields improved educational outcome, the empirical evidence yields mixed support for this expectation.

Figure 5: Rank Violations



Number of rank violations as a function of  $\gamma$ .

provisions. In this paper, we assume that public good provision is multidimensional, but can be captured by an index function. This suggests that the index should satisfy this property at least as well as its components. Real data will most likely never satisfy the “ascending bundles” property completely. Nevertheless it is interesting to study how close the model describes what we observe in the data and to what extent the “ascending bundles” property is violated in the data. In order to provide some further evidence on the “ascending bundles” property for  $g$ , we compute the linear index

$$g_j = xedu_j + \gamma \text{ crime}_j \quad (6.2)$$

for a range of values for  $\gamma$ . For each value of  $\gamma$  we then compute the number of rank violations. The results of this exercise are illustrated in Figure 5. There is a broad range of values for  $\gamma$  which yield less than 900 rank violations out of a possible 4186 possible violations. Furthermore, the majority of these violations can be attributed a relative small number of communities. Thus the evidence suggests that our index with a suitable choice of  $\gamma$  is broadly consistent with the ascending bundles condition.

In addition to heterogeneity in public good provision, communities differ in other amenities. One interesting variable is the distance of the communities to the center of the metropolitan area, which plays a crucial role in numerous models in urban economics.<sup>12</sup> In our sample the correlation between median household income and distance to Boston is 0.31 which indicates that richer households tend to locate in the communities that are further away from the city. Population density is another amenity that may be valued by households. According to our model the boundaries of the communities are fixed and hence population density is endogenous. Although we don't exploit these predictions, it is interesting to see that communities vary substantially along this dimension. Future research might help to clarify whether population densities cause external effects. The correlation between median income and population density is -0.60 which seems to suggest that richer households prefer less

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<sup>12</sup>One example is the Muth-Mills model where distance to the center of the metropolitan area directly enters the utility function of the agents. For a discussion of these models see Straszheim (1987).

crowded communities. However, this does not necessarily imply a negative external effect since a pure income effect on housing demand implies that richer households will be able to afford houses with bigger lots which decreases the population density.

Summarizing the discussion above we find that a simple correlation analysis provides some evidence supporting the spatial equilibrium model. The next section reports the empirical findings of structural empirical analysis.

## 7 Empirical Results

### 7.1 Matching Income Quantiles

As discussed in the previous sections, it is useful to implement the estimation strategy sequentially. First we explore restrictions implied by the locational equilibrium by matching the observed quantiles of the income distributions across communities to their counterparts predicted by the model, as explained in Section 5. The second step of the estimation strategy then exploits boundary indifference conditions implied by rational locational choices to construct estimators for the remaining parameters. In the first stage of the estimation procedure, we can identify and estimate the parameters of the income distribution,  $\mu_{\ln(y)}$  and  $\sigma_{\ln(y)}$ , the correlation between income and

tastes,  $\lambda$ , the ratio of  $\rho/\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$ , and the income elasticity of housing,  $\nu$ .

Table 1 reports the estimated parameters and standard errors obtained in the first stage of the estimation procedure using the complete sample of 92 communities.

Table 1: Estimated Parameters I

parameters	estimates
$\mu_{\ln(y)}$	9.790 (0.002)
$\sigma_{\ln(y)}$	0.755 (0.004)
$\lambda$	-0.019 (0.031)
$\rho/\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$	-0.283 (0.013)
$\nu$	0.938 (0.026)
function value	0.0368
degrees of freedom	271

NOTE: Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.

In general we find that all parameter estimates have reasonable magnitudes. The estimated standard errors are small. The census data set has a large number of observations so that the estimated standard errors of the quantiles are small. However, the reported standard errors may understate the actual standard errors to some extent. The reported estimated standard errors do not control for some of the (numerical) approximations that are necessary for the implementation of the estimators. For example, we rely on linear approximation for points on the empirical income distribution that are not reported in our data set and we do not control for numerical

errors due to Monte Carlo integration, numerical differentiation, and numerical algorithms that are used to invert functions. These approximations notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the parameters are estimated with high precision.

The point estimates for  $\mu_{\ln(y)}$  and  $\sigma_{\ln(y)}$  are 9.79 and 0.755. The correlation coefficient between income and tastes for public goods,  $\lambda$ , is negative and equals -0.019. We have emphasized the central role of the single-crossing conditions in the theoretical model. The sign of the parameter  $\rho$  is key to determining whether the single-crossing conditions are satisfied. This parameter is negative and highly significant, confirming that our single-crossing assumption is satisfied. The income elasticity of housing,  $\nu$ , is 0.938 which indicates that the income elasticity of housing is relatively large. This finding corresponds to a large degree to what researchers generally find in partial equilibrium empirical analyses of housing markets.<sup>13</sup> We interpret this finding as important support for the validity of our model, especially since we have not exploited any information about housing markets that would constrain the value of the income elasticity in any way.

The value of the objective function (at the parameter estimates) multiplied with size of the data set gives us a standard J-statistic which can be interpreted as a general specification test. It rejects the model specification at any standard levels

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<sup>13</sup>Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) place the permanent income elasticity of housing demand somewhat over 0.8, Harmon (1988) places it at 1, and Haurin and Lee (1989) estimate 1.1. However, Goodman (1988, 1990) estimates values on the order of 0.35.




of significance. This indicates that our model fails to explain all the variation in the data. Given the large number of observations obtained in the Census, it would be remarkable if rejection did not occur. However, the rejection of the model is nonetheless instructive and leads us to analyze in greater detail the dimension on which our model fails.

To get a better understanding of how well the model fits the data we compare the estimated quantiles with the predicted quantiles for each community. The results of this comparison are illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the estimated and the predicted quantiles for the 92 communities. Note that the model fits the data reasonably well for most quantiles. The difference between estimated and predicted quantile is less than 10% in most cases, sometimes even much less than that. This is an astonishing result given the parsimonious parameterization of our model. The biggest discrepancy is between the predicted and estimated 25 % quantile of the low income communities. However, we conclude from this analysis that, on the whole, our model provides a good approximation for the observed income distributions in the sample.

Instead of focusing on quantiles, we can analyze the moments of the income distributions. Figure 7 plots estimated and predicted means and variances of income across communities in our sample. The findings are similar to those in Figure 6. There is significant income variation both within and across communities, and our


Figure 6: Predicted and Estimated Quantiles



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Notation: - - estimated by the Census, — predicted from our model.

Figure 7: Estimated and Predicted Means and Variances




model captures this variation relatively well with a small number of parameters.

The predicted income distribution from our model also fits well the distribution estimated from the U.S. Census, as demonstrated in Figure 8.

A nice feature of this analysis is that it allows us to investigate the role that preferences for public goods play in determining locational choices. One way to assess the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is to decompose the variance of income in the metropolitan area into within-community and between-community components. A simple calculation shows that the following decomposition

Figure 8: The Income Distribution of the BMA



of the variance holds:

$$\text{Var}(y) = \sum_{j=1}^J P(C_j) \text{Var}(y_j) + \sum_{j=1}^J P(C_j) [E(y_j) - E(y)]^2 \quad (7.1)$$

Dividing both sides of the equation by  $\text{Var}(y)$  yields the decomposition of the variance measured in percent. If there were no preference heterogeneity in the metropolitan population, we would have perfect income stratification, which implies that the first component would be small. Alternatively, if preference heterogeneity were large relative to income heterogeneity, there would be little income stratification across communities. Hence, the first component would be close to one and the second com-

ponent near zero. The magnitude of the first and the second components helps us evaluate the importance of taste heterogeneity relative to income heterogeneity as determinants of sorting across communities.

Based on the estimation results reported in Table 1, we find that the first component explains 89% of the income variation in the metropolitan area while the second term explains the remaining 11%. Thus 89% of the total variance of income in the metropolitan area is accounted for by within-community variance. Research on local public goods has emphasized income sorting across communities. Income sorting across communities is indeed important as the solid curve in Figure 2 reveals, but the decomposition of variance establishes that within-community variance is much greater than between community variance. This shows that we need more than just income heterogeneity to explain the observed income distributions within a Tiebout framework. To account for the income heterogeneity within communities in a Tiebout framework, heterogeneity in preferences is needed to yield commonality in desired public good levels across households within communities. One may be concerned that the results above are dominated by the city of Boston, since it is by far the biggest community in the sample. To address this issue, we compute the contribution of the city of Boston to the variance decomposition above. We find that only 14.9% of the variance of the metropolitan area is due to the city of Boston, and 85.1% to the remaining 91 communities. Thus a decomposition of the variance for the 91 commu-

nities yields only a slightly lower percentage due to within-community variance that is obtained when the city of Boston is included.<sup>14</sup>

Summarizing the results above, our model explains the observed variation in quantiles across communities reasonably well. The parameter estimates do not provide evidence against the validity of the model. The decomposition of income variance of the metropolitan area suggests that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for public goods is quite substantial.

## 7.2 Matching Public Good Levels

Next we turn to the estimation of the remaining structural parameters,  $\rho$ ,  $\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$ ,  $\mu_{\ln(\alpha)}$ ,  $\eta$  and  $\gamma$ . We demonstrate in Appendix B that all parameters are identified. As explained earlier in conjunction with equation (6.1), we exploit the structure of the housing demand function of our model to infer housing prices. Thus while  $\eta$  is technically identified, the identification of  $\eta$  is from nuances of the functional form rather than from information on housing expenditures. As a result we do not expect to estimate  $\eta$  with any degree of precision.

The first two estimators reported in Table 2 are NLLS estimators that ignore

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<sup>14</sup>Ioannides and Hardman (1997) find significant income heterogeneity in even quite small neighborhoods.

possible correlations between prices, expenditures and unobservables. Column I shows results obtained when we set  $\eta = -0.3$ . Column II reports results obtained when we also estimates  $\eta$ . Column III and IV report GMM estimators that use functions of the income rank of the communities as instrumental variables. The first (second) estimator sets  $\eta = -0.3$  ( $-0.5$ ). Column V reports results from a GMM estimator which uses functions of rank and also crime rates as instruments. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates, estimated standard errors, as well as the number of instruments used in estimation. All estimators use the housing price estimates which impose the ranking restriction as described in Section 6.2.

Table 2: Estimated Parameters II

	I	II	III	IV	V
	NLLS	NLLS	GMM	GMM	GMM
$\gamma$	-1.95 (1.88)	-1.97 (1.91)	-1.97 (4.95)	-2.08 (4.99)	-2.26 (1.12)
$\mu_{\ln(\alpha)}$	-2.48 (0.65)	-1.91 (2.87)	-3.11 (1.80)	-2.91 (1.38)	-3.36 (0.73)
$\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$	0.60 (0.19)	0.64 (0.58)	0.81 (0.34)	0.83 (0.38)	0.87 (0.24)
$\rho$	-0.17 (0.05)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.10)	-0.23 (0.11)	-0.25 (0.07)
$\eta$	-0.30 —	-0.70 (2.01)	-0.30 —	-0.50 —	-0.30 —
number of instruments	4	5	4	4	6

NOTE: Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses. The sample size is 92.

As expected, the point estimate of  $\eta$  is very imprecise, and the lack of precision in estimating  $\eta$  increases the standard errors of all parameters. We also find that the

estimates of  $\mu_{\ln(\alpha)}$  varies moderately with the choice of  $\eta$  while the estimates of the remaining parameters are not sensitive to the choice of  $\eta$ . The point estimates for  $\rho$  range between  $-0.17$  and  $-0.25$ .


Comparing the results between columns I and II and columns III through V we find that estimating the model using instrumental variables affects primarily the point estimates which characterize the distribution of the unobserved taste parameter  $\alpha$ . In particular, the GMM estimates imply a lower mean and a higher standard deviation for the distribution of  $\ln(\alpha)$ . The point estimates for  $\mu_{\ln(\alpha)}$  range from  $-1.91$  to  $-3.36$ . The estimates for  $\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$  are between  $0.6$  and  $0.87$ . This indicates that there is a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for public goods among households.

A convenient normalization of public good provision is to set the coefficient of education expenditures to be equal to one. We can freely scale public good provision by any constant without affecting the estimates of the underlying structural parameters. The public provision index is therefore by construction increasing in schooling expenditures. We find, as expected, that it is decreasing in the crime level. The estimate coefficient of the crime rate crime ranges from  $-1.95$  and  $-2.26$ . This means that a reduction in the crime rate by one point is equivalent to increasing the expenditures per capita on education by roughly two dollars. This result is intuitively appealing and reinforces the idea that there exists a trade-off between different amenities of the



communities. We saw earlier in Figure 5 that values of  $\gamma$  in this range give roughly the same number of rank violations, all achieving roughly the minimum number of rank violations.

Figure 9: Index of Public Good Provision



Notation: — linear index with  $\gamma = -1.97$ , - - predicted level of public good provision.

Figure 9 plots the estimated index of public good provision in each community. Our model predicts that rich communities provide a significantly higher levels of local public goods. The ratio of public good provision between the richest and the poorest community in our sample is approximately 5. We conclude that there is a significant amount of stratification among communities along this dimension.

## 8 Conclusions

In this paper, we have developed a new method for estimating spatial equilibrium models. We estimate the parameters of these model by matching quantiles of the income distributions and exploiting boundary indifference conditions implied by rational residential choices of households. We have argued that the methodology presented in this paper is applicable to a broad class of equilibrium models. We have also shown that our approach avoids some of the major problems that are caused by the mobility of households and the potential endogeneity of policy variables. The findings suggest that spatial models can replicate many of the empirical regularities observed in the data. While we should emphasize that our analysis relies on a number of restrictive assumptions, we consider the results as quite promising for future research in the area.


Since this framework is relatively new, experience with its performance is limited to communities in Boston with two local public goods (school quality and crime). Future research should address the question how robust the results of this study are to different data sets from different metropolitan areas. Furthermore, extensions to higher dimensional vectors of public good provision including environmental goods are interesting from a policy perspective. It would also be desirable to control for additional sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Another

focus of future research should be to extend the framework to include sorting across neighborhoods within large communities. This requires additional data on neighborhoods within communities, data that are available from the Census.

## A Proof of Proposition 1

The following proof is adapted from Epple and Platt (1998): Order the communities by increasing public expenditures,  $g_J > g_{J-1} > \dots > g_2 > g_1$ . Since the indirect utility,  $V(\cdot)$ , is increasing in  $g$  and decreasing in  $p$ , equilibrium prices must satisfy  $p_J > p_{J-1} > \dots > p_2 > p_1$ . Boundary Indifference (1) follows directly from the continuity of the indirect utility function and the fact that we have a continuum of agents.

Figure 10: The Single Crossing Property



To show (2) and (3), fix  $\alpha$ . The boundary indifference implies that a household with characteristics  $(\alpha, y_{j-1}(\alpha))$  is indifferent between  $(g_{j-1}, p_{j-1})$  and  $(g_j, p_j)$ . The single crossing property implies that a household with higher income than  $y_{j-1}(\alpha)$  (for example  $y$  in Figure 10) prefers the allocation  $(g_j, p_j)$  over  $(g_{j-1}, p_{j-1})$ . More

generally, this household will prefer  $(g_j, p_j)$  over any  $(g_i, p_i)$  with  $i < j$ . By the same argument, it can be shown that a household with a lower income than  $y_j(\alpha)$  (for example  $y$  in Figure 9) prefers  $(g_j, p_j)$  over any  $(g_i, p_i)$  with  $i > j$ , i.e. the following holds:

$$y > y_{j-1}(\alpha) \Rightarrow (g_j, p_j) \succ (g_i, p_i) \text{ for all } i < j$$

$$y < y_j(\alpha) \Rightarrow (g_j, p_j) \succ (g_i, p_i) \text{ for all } i > j$$

which implies (2) and (3).

## B Identification

The quantiles of the income distributions are implicitly defined by the following equation:

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\ln(\zeta_j(p))} \int_{K_{j-1} + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}}^{K_j + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} f(\ln(\alpha), \ln(y)) d\ln(\alpha) d\ln(y) = p P(C_j) \quad (\text{B.1})$$

Using the identity:

$$f(\ln(\alpha), \ln(y)) = f(\ln(y)) f(\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)) \quad (\text{B.2})$$

where under our assumptions

$$\ln(y) \sim N(\mu_{\ln(y)}, \sigma_{\ln(y)}^2) \quad (\text{B.3})$$

$$\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y) \sim N(\mu_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)}, \sigma_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)}^2) \quad (\text{B.4})$$

and

$$\mu_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)} = \mu_{\ln(\alpha)} + \lambda \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \frac{\ln(y) - \mu_{\ln(y)}}{\sigma_{\ln(y)}} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$\sigma_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)} = \sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

Hence, we can rewrite the equation above:

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\ln(\zeta_j(p))} f(\ln(y)) \left[ \int_{K_{j-1} + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}}^{K_j + \rho \frac{y^{1-\nu}-1}{1-\nu}} f(\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)) d\ln(\alpha) \right] d\ln(y) = p P(C_j) \quad (\text{B.7})$$

Let

$$\xi = \frac{\ln(\alpha) - \mu_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)}}{\sigma_{\ln(\alpha) | \ln(y)}} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

Then the following holds

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\ln(\zeta_j(p))} f(\ln(y)) \left[ \int_{Z_{j-1}(y)}^{Z_j(y)} \phi(\xi) d\xi \right] d\ln(y) = p P(C_j) \quad (\text{B.9})$$

where:

$$Z_j(y) = \Omega_j + \omega_1 \frac{y^{1-\nu} - 1}{1-\nu} + \omega_2 \ln(y) \quad (\text{B.10})$$

where

$$\Omega_j = \frac{K_j - \mu_{\ln(\alpha)} + \lambda \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \mu_{\ln(y)} / \sigma_{\ln(y)}}{\sqrt{1-\lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}} \quad (\text{B.11})$$

$$\omega_1 = \frac{\rho}{\sqrt{1-\lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}} \quad (\text{B.12})$$

$$\omega_2 = \frac{-\lambda}{\sqrt{1-\lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(y)}} \quad (\text{B.13})$$

It follows that the inner integral in the expression above will be invariant to any choice of  $(K_1, \dots, K_{J-1}, \mu_{\ln(\alpha)}, \mu_{\ln(y)}, \lambda, \sigma_{\ln(y)}, \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}, \rho)$  that leaves  $\Omega_1, \dots, \Omega_{J-1}, \omega_1$  and  $\omega_2$  unchanged. We know that  $\mu_{\ln(y)}$  and  $\sigma_{\ln(y)}$  are identified from the marginal distribution of income for the metropolitan area.  $\nu$  is identified from the nonlinearity in the boundary indifference locus. Consequently we, can identify in the first stage the “structural” parameters  $(\mu_{\ln(y)}, \sigma_{\ln(y)}, \nu)$  and the “reduced form” parameters  $\omega_1, \omega_2$  and  $\Omega_1, \dots, \Omega_J$ . Furthermore:

$$-\lambda \sqrt{1-\lambda^2} = \omega_2 \sigma_{\mu_{\ln(y)}} \quad (\text{B.14})$$

hence we conclude that  $\lambda$  is identified of  $\omega_2$

Consider the nonlinear regressions function derived in the paper:

$$\epsilon_j = x'_j \gamma - \left\{ g_1^\rho - \sum_{i=2}^j (Q_i - Q_{i-1}) \exp(-K_i) \right\}^{1/\rho} \quad (\text{B.15})$$

where

$$Q_i = e^{-\rho \frac{B p_1^{\eta+1} - 1}{1+\eta}} \quad (\text{B.16})$$

Suppose we observe prices and characteristics  $\{p_j, x_j\}_{j=1}^J$ . Additionally, we have first round estimates for  $(\mu_{\ln(y)}, \sigma_{\ln(y)}, \nu, \lambda)$  and the reduced form parameters  $\{\Omega_j\}_{j=1}^J$  and  $\omega_1$ . We also know that

$$\Omega_j = \frac{K_j - \mu_{\ln(\alpha)} + \lambda \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \mu_{\ln(y)} / \sigma_{\ln(y)}}{\sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}} \quad (\text{B.17})$$

which implies that

$$K_j = \mu_{\ln(\alpha)} - \lambda \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \mu_{\ln(y)} / \sigma_{\ln(y)} + (\sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}) \Omega_j \quad (\text{B.18})$$

or

$$K_j = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \Omega_j \quad (\text{B.19})$$

where  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are defined accordingly. Substituting equation (B.19) into equation



(B.15) yields the following nonlinear regression model:

$$\epsilon_j = x_j' \gamma - \left\{ g_1^\rho - \sum_{i=2}^j (Q_i - Q_{i-1}) \exp(-\beta_1 - \beta_2 \Omega_j) \right\}^{1/\rho} \quad (\text{B.20})$$

If we set the first component of the vector  $\gamma$  equal to one (which we can do since we can arbitrarily scale public good provision), it is clear from equations (B.16) and (B.20) that we can identify and estimate the following parameters in the second stage:  $\rho, \eta, B, \gamma, \beta_1, \beta_2$  plus the incidental parameter  $g_1$ . At the end of the second stage of the estimation procedure, we have therefore three reduced form parameters:  $\omega_1, \beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ . We still need to estimate two structural parameters:  $\mu_{\ln(\alpha)}, \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)}$ . First note that

$$\rho = \omega_1 \beta_2 \quad (\text{B.21})$$

and hence we should impose this equation as a constraint when estimating  $\rho$  and  $\beta_2$  in the second stage. The mapping from the two remaining reduced form parameters to the two structural parameters is given by:

$$\sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} = \frac{\beta_2}{\sqrt{1 - \lambda^2}} \quad (\text{B.22})$$

$$\mu_{\ln(\alpha)} = \beta_1 - \frac{\lambda \sigma_{\ln(\alpha)} \mu_{\ln(y)}}{\sigma_{\ln(y)}} \quad (\text{B.23})$$

which proves identification of all parameters.

Thus far we have assumed that we observe housing prices (or can estimate them consistently). Given our data set, that is not the case. Instead we have data on housing values. We know that the demand for housing implies that:

$$B p_j^{\eta+1} = \frac{p_j h_j}{y^\nu} \quad (\text{B.24})$$

the numerator of the right hand side is house value which we observe. The denominator depends on income which we observe, and the income elasticity of housing, which we have identified above. We can set  $B = 1$  since the scaling of housing is arbitrary. We can then estimate

$$P_j = p_j^{\eta+1} \quad (\text{B.25})$$

based on the empirical Engle curves as explained in Section 5. Consequently, we can express  $Q_j$  as:

$$Q_j = e^{-\rho \frac{P_j - 1}{1 + \eta}} \quad (\text{B.26})$$

we can then proceed as above show that all remaining parameters are identified.

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