

Security

bit.ly/HTML5Sec Interaktive Version der Präsentation!



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bit.ly/HTML5Sec Interaktive Version der Präsentation!

Ziel

Angriffsvektoren aufzeigen. Strategien besprechen. Mehr nicht!

Features

Neue Angriffsvektoren



Ein Formular

	Login
Password:	
Username:	

```
<form id="login" action="#">
    Username: <input type="text" name="username">
    Password: <input type="password" name="password">
    <input type="submit" value="Login">
</form>
```

Formaction

	Login
Password:	
Username: (

Klick mich!

```
<form id="login" action="#">
    Username: <input type="text" name="username">
    Password: <input type="password" name="password">
        <input type="submit" value="Login">
    </form>

<button type="submit" form="login" formaction="http://example.org">
        Klick mich!
</button>
```



Presto, WebKit, Gecko und sogar Trident 9





kann JavaScript enthalten!



Test

Business as usual

HTML5 es ist auch nicht schlimmer als HTML 4

» http://html5sec.org



Eingeschleuster JavaScript-Code



Oldies but Goldies

index.html?message=Daten gespeichert
index.html?message=<script>alert('XSS')</script>

```
<script>
    var message = $.url().param('message');
    if (message) {
        Notifier.success(message);
    }
</script>
```

Eval everywhere

Eval is evil

» Demo 1 2 3

OWASP

Open Web Application Security Project

XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet

<!-- Long UTF-8 Unicode encoding without semicolons -->
<IMG SRC="" oneroor="al&
#101rt('XSS');">

» Old IE Demo

XSS Vorbeugen

1.

Hier sollten dynamische Daten niemals verwendet werden

```
<script>HIER</script>
<!-- HIER -->
<div HIER="test"/>
<HIER href="test" />
<style>HIER</style>
```

2.

HTML escape dynamic data

<div>HTML ESCAPE</div>

```
\& \rightarrow \&
```

$$>$$
 \rightarrow >

"
$$\rightarrow$$
 "

Testen?

```
function htmlEncode(input) {
    return ($('<div/>').text(input).html());
var saveFormat = function () {
    var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);
    var txt = args.shift();
    $.each(args, function (i, item) {
        item = htmlEncode(item);
        txt = txt.replace("{" + i + "}", item);
    });
   return txt;
```

Testen!

```
describe("saveFormat", function () {
    var original = '\{0\} - \{1\} - \{2\}';
    it("should replace placeholders", function () {
        var expected = 'A - B - C';
        var formated = saveFormat(original, 'A', 'B', 'C');
        expect(formated).toEqual(expected);
    });
    it("should encode injected content", function () {
        var expected = 'A - <b&gt;TEST&lt;/b&gt; - C';
        var formated = saveFormat(original, 'A', '<b>TEST</b>', 'C');
        expect(formated).toEqual(expected);
    });
```

Test

Jasmine 1.3.1 revision 1354556913 finished in 0.004s

••

Passing 2 specs No try/catch ■

saveFormat should replace placeholders should encode injected content

» Demo

Moment...

```
describe("saveFormat", function () {
    var original = '<a title="{0}">Test</a>';

it("should replace quotes", function () {
    var expected = '<a title="&quot;">Test</a>';
    var formated = saveFormat(original, '"');
    expect(formated).toEqual(expected);
    });
});
```

Richtig testen!

```
Jasmine 1.3.1 revision 1354556913 finished in 0.005s

X

Failing 1 spec No try/catch

1 spec | 1 failing

SaveFormat should replace quotes.

Expected '<a title=""">Test</a>' to equal '<a title="&quot;">Test</a>'.

Error: Expected '<a title=""">Test</a>' to equal '<a title at new jasmine.ExpectationResult (http://johanneshoppe at null.toEqual (http://johanneshoppe.github.io/HTML5S at null.<anonymous> (http://johanneshoppe.github.io/HT at jasmine.Block.execute (http://johanneshoppe.github.at jasmine.Block.execute (http://johanneshoppe.github.at jasmine.Block.execute (http://johanneshoppe.github.at jasmine.github.at ja
```

» Demo

3.

Attribute escape dynamic data

```
<div attr="ATTRIBUTE ESCAPE"></div>
<!-- NIEMALS ohne quotes! -->
<div attr=ATTRIBUTE ESCAPE></div>
```

```
a-z A-Z 0-9 \rightarrow immun

, . - _ \rightarrow immun

Rest \rightarrow &#xHH;
```

4. DO NOT

JavaScript escape dynamic data

HTML parser runs before the JavaScript parser! you are doing it wrong

Das hier ist Alltag

UserList.cshtml / Kendo UI Template

```
# if(ID != 0) { #

<a href="javascript:DialogManager.ShowPartialDialog('@Url.Action("UserM anagement", "Management")', { userId : '#= htmlEncode(ID) #' }, {title: '#= htmlEncode(Alias) #'})"#= htmlEncode(Alias) #</a>

# } else { #

#= htmlEncode(Alias) #

# } #
```



Offensichtlich läuft beim Umgang mit Daten etwas prinzipiell falsch!

Storage



Egal

ob Cookies ob Session Storage ob Local Storage ob WebSQL

die Daten sind nicht vertrauenswürdig!

Resident XSS



richtig fies!

Vertraulichen Informationen gehören in die SERVER-Session!

Session Storage bevorzugen!

WebSQL

SQL Injection:

```
executeSql("SELECT foo FROM bar WHERE value=" + value);
```

Prepared Statement:

executeSql("SELECT foo FROM bar WHERE value=?", [value]);

Kommunikation



Mashups!

Loading...

JSON

```
{"hello": "world"}
```

JSON with Padding

```
<script>
    var foo = function(json) {
        $('#output').text(JSON.stringify(json, undefined, 2));
    };
</script>
<script src="http://search.twitter.com/search.json?q=%23dnc13&callback=foo"></script>
```

```
foo({"hello": "world"});
```

» Demo



JSONP

SOP

Same origin policy \rightarrow Not macht erfinderisch (JSONP)

CORS

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing → Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

WebSockets

do what you want



JS-Recon Shell of the Future



HTML5 based JavaScript Network Reconnaissance Tool

Port Scanning Network Scanning Discover My Private IP

Start IP Address: 192.84.113.1 End IP Address: 192.84.113.254 Port: 80 Scan

Protocol: Cross Origin Requests WebSockets

Note:

- * Tuned to scan fast internal networks. Scanning public/slow networks would require retuning.
- * Works only on the versions of FireFox, Chrome(recommended) and Safari that support CrossOriginRequests/WebSockets
- * Currently works on WINDOWS ONLY.

Intranet == Internet



Danke!



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» Sicherheit von Web-Anwendungen