

Impact Analysis of Botnet Infection on Networked Systems using Timed Automata

SYSC 5500
Group 8

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Outline

Brief Overview

- Previous Work

Extending the Botnet

- Major Changes
- Extension Efforts
- Hardware and OS limitations

Rebooting as a Solution

- Device Type 2 – Reboot Capable
- Why Rebooting?

Results

- Reboot Frequency
- “Active” vs “Stealthy” bots
- Network Speed Variation
- Next steps!

Previous Work

Modeling

- Modeling the Mirai botnet infrastructure and individual device behavior

Modeling Formalism


- Timed Automata

Modeling Tool

- UPPAAL 4.1.24

Objective

- Observing the behavior of individual entities in the botnet
- Perform experiments to examine the infection rate and generated network traffic



Major Changes

Extended Dictionary

- Bots now make use of the **full dictionary** of the **original Mirai codebase**
- Each device has a **pseudo-randomly generated ID** (IP, credentials) at the start

Modeling Workarounds

- **Extreme** state-space reduction
- **Compact** data structure
- Removal of a few **secondary committed states**

Target

- Extend the network to simulate **thousands of devices simultaneously**

Extension Efforts

Extending the Botnet

- Initial efforts focused on **extending the size** of the botnet by a **small margin**

20 Devices

- Simulations were **extremely fast**
 - Simulation time (10 runs): ~**2 seconds**
- **Very low** resource consumption
 - Verification memory: ~**17 MB/29 MB**
- **Very small** network; not representative of the IoT

100 Devices

- Simulations were **relatively fast**
 - Simulation time (10 runs): ~**3 minutes**
- **Very low** resource consumption
 - Verification memory: ~**157 MB/188 MB**
- **Small** network; still not representative of the IoT

Extension Efforts

Extending the Botnet

- Subsequent efforts emphasized creating networks of **over a hundred devices**

500 Devices

- Simulation times were **infeasible**
 - Simulation time (10 runs): ~ **11 hours**
- **Highest** resource consumption
 - Verification memory: ~ **3500 MB/3700 MB**
- A **good representation** of a small IoT network

250 Devices


- Simulations were still **rather slow**
 - Simulation time (10 runs): **75 minutes**
- **Moderate** resource consumption
 - Verification memory: ~ **580 MB/650 MB**
- The **best overall compromise** in terms of **simulation speed** and **network size**

We chose to use networks of 250 and 100 devices for most simulations

Limitations


Extending the Botnet

- Extending the network **beyond 500 devices** would **never work**



Hardware Limitations

- Verification memory: ~ 3500 MB/3800 MB -> **40%**
- Graphical simulator: ~ 3600 MB/4072 MB -> **44%**




OS Restrictions

- Only **32-bit version of UPPAAL** available for MS Windows
- The verifier can only access **at most 4 GB** of memory

We decided to leave extending the network further as part of our future work

Device type 2 – Reboot Capable



Why Rebooting?

Extending the Botnet

- Mirai lives in the **dynamic memory**; cleared when the device is **rebooted**
- Device **credentials must be changed** to prevent **secondary infection**

Target Clusters

- Devices that reboot either **periodically** or **manually** by the user
- Class **E1** - Devices with a **periodic battery (primary) replacement interval**
- Class **P0** – Devices that are **normally off** and only **reattached** to the network when needed

New Objective


- **Can rebooting prevent** the accumulation of a **large-enough botnet**?
- If so, what **rate of frequency** is needed to achieve such results?
- Is the rate **feasible**?

Simulation Parameters


Parameter	Default Value	Other values used
Number of devices	100	250, 500
Round Trip Delay	100ms	1s
Simulation time	1 day	1 week
Dictionary length	62	-
Percentage of devices with weak credentials	100%	-
Reboot frequency	Hourly	Daily, every 30 minutes, every 10 minutes, every 5 minutes
Duration of device reboot	60s	-
Percentage of time bots propagate malware	100%	50%, 10%, 1%
Proportion of “always connected” devices to rebooting devices	0:100	100:0

“Always-Connected” vs “Reboot Capable”

Botnet growth over time for networks of 100, 250, and 500 devices





100 device network with hourly rebooting



How does period affect botnet size?

- 100 device network
- 1 minute to reboot a device
- Once a device is infected, it only propagates malware

Reboot Frequency	Uptime	Average botnet size
Daily	99.93%	99.9%
Hourly	98.33%	97.8%
Every 30 minutes	96.67%	96.0%
Every 10 minutes	90%	89.6%
Every 5 minutes	80%	80.7%



“Active” vs “Stealthy” bots

- 100 device network
- 1 minute to reboot a device
- Vary the percentage of time a bot propagates malware

Percentage of time propagating malware	Percentage of time stealthing	Reboot Frequency	Average botnet size
100%	0%	Hourly	97.8%
50%	50%	Hourly	97.7%
10%	90%	Hourly	95.8%
1%	99%	Hourly	71.5%
100%	0%	Daily	99.9%
50%	50%	Daily	99.7%
10%	90%	Daily	99.4%
1%	99%	Daily	97.4%

How does network speed affect botnet size?

Reboot Frequency	Uptime	Average botnet size (100ms RTT)	Average botnet size (1s RTT)
Daily	99.93%	99.9%	99.0%
Hourly	98.33%	97.8%	95.6%
Every 30 minutes	96.67%	96.0%	92.1%
Every 10 minutes	90%	89.6%	76.3%
Every 5 minutes	80%	80.7%	46.9%

How does network speed affect botnet size?

Percentage of time propagating malware	Percentage of time stealthing	Reboot Frequency	Average botnet size (100ms RTT)	Average botnet size (1s RTT)
100%	0%	Hourly	97.8%	95.6%
50%	50%	Hourly	97.7%	93.2%
10%	90%	Hourly	95.8%	69.6%
1%	99%	Hourly	71.5%	0.0067%
100%	0%	Daily	99.9%	99.0%
50%	50%	Daily	99.7%	98.7%
10%	90%	Daily	99.4%	97.8%
1%	99%	Daily	97.4%	86.0%

Conclusion

- Rebooting and slowing the network down can reduce botnet size, but are **only effective at levels that would deteriorate functionality**
- The most effective strategy is to **change default credentials**
- A botnet's level of **stealthiness** can be **very high** before its ability to grow is **severely impacted**
- Even a botnet of relatively small size can still send **10 000s of messages** over a network **hourly**

Thank You!

Questions?