



Exploratory study: filling in the knowledge gaps and identifying strengths and challenges in the effectiveness of the EU Member States' minimum income schemes

Country Fiche – France--

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Exploratory study: filling in the knowledge gaps and identifying strengths and challenges in the effectiveness of the EU Member States' minimum income schemes

Country Fiche - France

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Summary

Three minimum income schemes are discussed here, as follows.

- The active solidarity income (RSA) is the main device which ensures a minimum income. By the end of June 2021, including spouses and dependent children, nearly 3,9 million people were covered by the RSA – 5,7% of the French population. Beneficiaries are required to follow a type of guidance/accompaniment which is defined according to a prior assessment – either focused on employment (carried out within the public employment service) or a more social one carried out by local authorities (101 “conseils départementaux”), throughout social workers. This accompaniment can be delegated to local social organisations. From the point of view of governance, local authorities manage the system, with different approaches and different financial investments between them. The rates of exit from the RSA and the rates of return to work remain low. A better co-ordination of actors at the local level is currently being sought through pilot projects aimed at creating a ‘public service for integration and employment’.
- The specific solidarity allowance (ASS) is the state-funded scheme which takes over, under certain conditions, when job-seekers reach the end of their entitlement to unemployment benefits. ASS recipients are monitored by the public employment service as part of the usual support it provides to all job-seekers. This concerns around 350,000 people per year.
- Finally, the activity bonus is a means-tested top-up to salaries which is paid to employees and civil servants aged over 18, on request and under certain conditions. It acts as an employment incentive for people with low incomes. It is not tied to any particular activation measure. Still by the end of June 2021, nearly 8,9 million people were covered by the activity bonus, including spouses and children (some of them can be covered by both this bonus activity and by the active solidarity income). This represents 13% of the French population.

The following sections, first, outline the features of the MI support in place; secondly, describe the eligibility criteria and coverage and consider the adequacy of the financial support provided and the links with other benefits; thirdly, examine the extent of integration with labour market measures to help those supported into employment; fourthly, consider the access provided for the people concerned to social services; fifthly, summarise the governance mechanisms in place; and, finally, review the evidence on the impact on reducing poverty and assisting beneficiaries to find work.

An annex outlines the underlying situation in terms of the relative number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion and the changes that have occurred over recent years, as well as the characteristics of the people concerned – their gender, age, employment status, education level, country of birth and the structure of the households in which they live. As such, it provides the context in which MI support is operating and indicates the groups on which support needs to be targeted.

1 Description of national schemes providing minimum income support

The main minimum income scheme in France is the **active solidarity income** (*revenu de solidarité active – RSA*), created by Law No 2008-1249 of 1 December 2008¹. Its purpose is “to provide its beneficiaries with adequate means of existence, in order to fight against poverty, encourage the exercise or return to a professional activity and help the social integration of the beneficiaries”². It replaces previous social benefits, including the RMI (*revenu minimum d’insertion*) which was created in 1988.

¹ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000019860428>

² *Idem*.

Originally, the RSA consisted of two parts: the 'RSA base' (*RSA socle*); and the 'RSA activity' (*RSA activité*), which supplemented income from activity, aimed at encouraging employment. As of 1 January 2016, the RSA activity as well as another employment incentive scheme – the employment bonus (*prime pour l'emploi*) – were replaced by a new scheme, the **activity bonus** (*prime d'activité*)³.

The **specific solidarity allowance** (*allocation de solidarité spécifique* – **ASS**), for its part, is paid to job-seekers when they have exhausted their unemployment rights. It is defined by the labour code⁴.

The ASS ceases in a certain number of situations, in particular in the event of the resources required exceeding the ceilings, an absence of job-search, the failure to follow paid training or the resumption of an activity not consistent with the receipt of ASS. People can in these cases make a request to benefit from the RSA.

1.1 Eligibility

Anyone residing in France permanently, whose household has resources below a certain threshold of guaranteed income, is entitled to the **RSA** under certain conditions defined in the social action and families code⁵. This includes refugees but not asylum-seekers, though there is a specific allowance for these (*allocation pour demandeur d'asile*). It also includes homeless people so long as a social centre provides a domicile for them.

In order to be eligible for the RSA, claimants must: 1) be aged over 25 – although the RSA is open, under certain conditions, to people aged 18-24 if they are single parents or have at least two years of professional activity during the last three years ; 2) be French or have held a residence permit authorising work for at least five years (this condition is not applicable to refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, stateless persons, and foreigners holding a residence card or a residence permit provided for by treaties and international agreements and conferring equivalent rights); 3) not be a pupil, student or trainee; and 4) not be on parental or sabbatical leave, unpaid leave or on stand-by.

There was a significant debate in 2020-21 on the eligibility of young people under 25 for the RSA, in the context of the way COVID-19 emphasised youth poverty and difficulties in accessing the job market⁶. Many NGOs and academics campaigned for the inclusion of young people as beneficiaries of the RSA⁷. On 2 November 2021, the government announced the establishment of a youth engagement contract (*contrat d'engagement jeunes*) for all young people under 26 without training or employment for several months, and under 29 when disabled. The government insisted that it should not be conceived of as a universal minimum income for young people, but as financial compensation granted to the young people targeted who enrol on a path of integration. They will receive 15-20 hours of support per week to help them find a job or training. An allowance of up to €500 per month (under resources conditions) may be paid subject to income thresholds, attendance and acceptance of activity offers made. This measure will come into force in March 2022⁸.

³ Law No 2015-994 of 17 August 2015 relating to social dialogue and employment: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000031046061>.

⁴ Article 5423-1 of the labour code: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000038951963.

⁵ Sub-section 1: Conditions for entitlement (Articles L262-2 to L262-12).

⁶ Parents need to take care of children below the age of 25, under the civil code Articles 371-2: "Each of the parents contributes to the support and education of the children in proportion to their resources, those of the other parent, as well as the needs of the child."

⁷ Cf. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/12/01/pouvoir-beneficier-du-rsa-des-18-ans-une-necessite-enc-es-temps-de-crise_6061722_3232.html

⁸ <https://www.gouvernement.fr/lancement-du-contrat-d-engagement-jeune-jusqu-a-500-eu-par-mois>

The amount of the RSA depends on the resources of applicants and of the members of their households (i.e. all the people filling out a single tax return: for example, civil partner, husband, wife and dependent children). The amount of the RSA is equal to the difference between the lump sum fixed by decree and the total of the household's resources⁹. The amount of resources taken into account is the monthly average of the resources received during the three months preceding the request. The amount of the RSA is therefore calculated each trimester after the first request, based on the households' income evolution.

Regarding COVID-19-related changes, for all those who fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the RSA in September or October 2020, there was a one-off supplementary payment of €150 per adult and €100 for each dependent child.

The **ASS** guarantees a minimum income for active people who have exhausted their ordinary unemployment benefits. Claimants must be fit for work and should perform positive and repeated acts to find a job or start / take over a business. Regarding previous activity, claimants must have worked for at least five years (full time or part time) during the 10 years before the end of the last employment contract. If they have ceased activity to raise a child, the five years are reduced by one year per child up to a limit of three years.

There is no explicit age condition, but claimants should not fulfil the conditions for drawing a full pension (age 62). There is no nationality condition, but foreigners must be legally resident in France. In 2021, their monthly resources must not exceed €1,183.70 for single people or €1,860.10 for households. The amount considered is the average of the previous 12 months of the total resources received before the month of the request¹⁰.

The **activity bonus** is a 'top-up' income supplement in cases of low earnings from work. To be eligible, claimants must: be older than 18; live in France on a settled basis; and exercise a professional activity. Their monthly work income must be below a threshold, which depends on the family composition (see 1.3 Adequacy, for details). The income taken into account in calculating the amount of the activity bonus includes beneficiaries' salaries and their taxable income (income from capital and property). A series of social benefits are considered, such as unemployment benefits, family or housing allowances, retirement pension, disability pension, and alimony. Childcare allowances are not included.

1.2 Coverage

1.94 million households benefited from the **RSA** in France by the end of June 2021. Including spouses and dependent children, 3.88 million people were covered, or 5.7% of the French population¹¹. 58% of beneficiaries were single people without children, and 32% of beneficiary households were single-parent families. Couples (with or without children) were therefore in the minority. Half (54%) of beneficiaries were women. 83% had been receiving the RSA for two years or more, and 49% for five years or more. Most (96%) were aged 25-64. Those aged 25-29 were particularly over-represented (17% of beneficiaries, compared with 8% in the whole of the French population).

⁹ A long list of resources is taken into account in calculating the right to the RSA, among which are income from salaried and non-salaried activity, exceptional resources (e.g. sale of a house), invested capital, rents, certain allowances or social benefits, and unemployment benefits. See: <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F24585>.

¹⁰ The resources taken into account are the claimant's resources subject to income tax.

¹¹ Data from: *Minima sociaux et prestations sociales : Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution*, Panorama de la DREES (Chapter 23 on RSA), 2020: https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/drees_-_pano_-_minima_sociaux_-_assemblage_-_bat_-_210920.pdf.

By the end of June 2021, 18% of households receiving RSA also benefited from the activity bonus, as it is possible to combine both benefits.

Geographical data show a close link between the number of RSA recipients and the number of registered unemployed people. The correlation coefficient between the share of RSA beneficiaries in the population of a local authority area (*département*) and the unemployment rate is 0.95. The correlation is also very high with the number of people in poverty (income below 60% of the median): in mainland France, it is 0.80¹².

It is difficult to detail coverage in terms of different income groups for each of these minimum income schemes. The research department of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (DREES) publishes data on all 'social minima' (grouping several minimum income schemes), including the RSA, ASS, and other benefits for certain categories of people¹³. At the end of 2019, 10% of the population were covered by these social minima (including spouses and dependants). In 2019, for all French households, these social minima represented 1.7% of disposable income, and the activity bonus 0.5%¹⁴. For households in the bottom income decile, the social minima represented 17.6% of disposable income, and the activity premium 2.6%. For households at risk of poverty (below 60% of national median income – €1,063 in 2018), the social minima represented 13.8% of disposable income, and the activity bonus 2.7%.

The DREES also uses another indicator of poverty, in terms of living conditions. The indicator 'poverty rate in living conditions' addresses the notion of poverty through the deprivation and difficulties experienced by households. 27 difficulties are covered, across four dimensions: budgetary constraints, late payments, consumption restrictions, and housing difficulties. At the end of 2018, around two-thirds of RSA (68%) and ASS (63%) beneficiaries were poor in terms of living conditions¹⁵. This represented 46% of the recipients of the activity bonus.

In 2017, for households at risk of poverty, the average initial income before transfers was €785 and their disposable income after transfers (including all social benefits¹⁶) was €1,188. The social minima, as defined above, including in particular the RSA and ASS, corresponded to an average transfer of €155 per poor household. The activity bonus corresponded to an average transfer of €32¹⁷.

Regarding non-take-up, the latest data concerning the **RSA** date from a 2011 survey¹⁸. The RSA at that time consisted of a base part, corresponding to the current RSA, and an activity part, merged in 2016 with the employment bonus to create the activity bonus. According to this survey, in the last quarter of 2010 the take-up rate for the RSA was on average 50%: 64% among those eligible for the RSA base only, 67% among

¹² *Idem*.

¹³ Namely, the allowance for disabled adults (AAH), minimum old-age allowances (ASV and ASPA), supplementary disability allowance (ASI), asylum-seeker allowance (ADA), temporary waiting allowance (ATA), solidarity income (RSO), widowhood allowance (AV), and equivalent replacement retirement allowance (AER-R).

¹⁴ Data from : *Minima sociaux et prestations sociales : Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution*, Panorama de la DREES, 2020: https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/drees_-_pano_-_minima_sociaux_-_assemblage_-_bat_-_210920.pdf.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 98.

¹⁶ That is: all social minima (including RSA and ASS), family and housing allowances, activity bonus.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 28.

¹⁸ Domingo P., Pucci M. (2012), Les non-recourants au RSA, L'E-ssentiel, n°124, juillet 2012, Cnaf; Rapport final, Comité national d'évaluation du RSA, décembre 2011, Annex 1 « Le non-recours au RSA et ses motifs », Domingo P., Pucci M. (Cnaf). <https://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/114000721.pdf>. https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/1_Le_non-recours_au_rSa_et_ses_motifs.pdf

Also see « Le non-recours aux prestations sociales. Mise en perspective et données disponibles », Les dossiers de la Drees, Ministry of Health and social affairs, 2020. <https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/dd57.pdf>

those eligible for both the RSA base and RSA activity, and 32% among those eligible for the RSA activity alone. It was thus estimated that nearly 1.7 million people eligible for the RSA (base or activity) in the last quarter of 2010 were not beneficiaries, resulting in an undistributed amount of around €432 million. Lack of knowledge, refusal of assistance, misunderstanding about the RSA on the part of those eligible essentially explains non-take-up. In the survey, only marginal numbers of those eligible mentioned a low financial interest in the service or the fear of losing related rights as reasons for non-take-up.

The DREES evaluation of the **activity bonus** carried out in 2017 – one year after its implementation – estimated a take-up rate of 73%. This level of non-take-up (27%) was much lower than that in 2011 for the RSA activity. These figures have not been

updated since, and in particular not since the sharp increase in the activity bonus decided by decree at the start of 2019. The statistics¹⁹ show a sharp increase in the number of beneficiaries of the activity bonus from the end of 2018 following the announcement of a revaluation of the bonus on 1 January 2019, which according to the DREES²⁰ could suggest that the non-take-up rate is falling, even though the revaluation enlarged the basis of potential claimants.

A new DREES evaluation²¹ explains that a third of eligible households do not use the RSA on average each quarter and a fifth on a long-term basis. There is now new information about the activity bonus in this evaluation.

There are no data concerning the take-up rate of the **ASS**, as observed in a report from the National Assembly²².

The complexity of access to the French social benefit system has been underlined by various reports. This complexity can lead to non-take-up²³. A study recently showed the difficulty of applying for the RSA, as it is now required preferentially to make the request online²⁴.

1.3 Adequacy

The amount of the RSA is calculated, for each household, by taking the differential between: 1) a lump sum whose level varies according to the composition of the household and the number of dependent children; and 2) all of the household's resources, excluding those limited by law.

The fraction of the professional income of household members and the lump sum are fixed by decree. The amounts are revised once a year by decree, according to the evolution of consumer prices.

In 2022, the RSA is equal to €575 per month in gross terms (the RSA is not taxable) for single people without children; €863 per month for couples without children; €1,036 per

¹⁹ <http://www.caf.fr/presse-institutionnel/recherche-et-statistiques/publications/prime-d-activite-conjoncture>

²⁰ « Le non-recours aux prestations sociales. Mise en perspective et données disponibles », Les dossiers de la Drees, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2020, p. 23. <https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/dd57.pdf>

²¹ Mesurer régulièrement le non-recours au RSA et à la prime d'activité : méthode et résultats | Direction de la recherche, des études, de l'évaluation et des statistiques (solidarites-sante.gouv.fr)

²² L'évaluation des politiques publiques en faveur de l'accès aux droits sociaux, Committee for public policy assessment and control of the National Assembly, 2016, <https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-info/i4158.asp>

²³ Cloarec-Le Nabour C. and Damon J., "The right service for adjusted services and support", report to the Prime Minister, September 2018. https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2018/09/rapport_de_christine_cloarec-le_nabour_et_julien_damon_sur_la_juste_prestation.pdf

²⁴ Deville C., *Les chemins du droit. Dematerialization of the RSA and distance from the state of the rural working classes*, PhD Dissertation, 2019.

month for couples with one child; and €1,209 per month for couples with two children. For single parents, the amount was €863 per month for one child, and €1,036 per month for two children²⁵. For any additional children or household members, the increase for each was €230 per month.

The amounts are adjusted each year in April according to the annual variation in the national price index²⁶. The amount for single people without children slightly increased from €565.34 in 2021 to €575.52 in 2021.

The amounts payable are reviewed each quarter. The payment is made continuously for three months (usually paid on the 5th of each month). After three months, a new declaration and request must be made to obtain an adjustment and/or extension. The claimant makes a declaration of honour with respect to the correctness of the information provided on the printout of the claim and transfers of supporting documents to the investigating bodies. The latter may verify the information submitted, by requesting the claimant to produce new documentary evidence or by obtaining information from tax authorities, social security institutions, and bodies dealing with supplementary pensions or unemployment insurance.

The amount of the **ASS** depends on the level of recipients' resources. Beneficiaries can receive an allowance at the full rate or at a reduced rate, depending on the amount of their resources. The daily amount is currently €16.91 in gross terms (the ASS is taxable) or €507.30 per month (base: 30 days) for single people with resources below €676.40 per month; €1,183.70 minus claimants' monthly resources for single people with resources between €676.40 and €1,183.70 per month. For couples with resources below €1,352.80 per month the amount is €507.30 per month. For couples with resources between €1,352.80 per month and €1,860.10 per month, the amount is €1,860.10 minus claimants' monthly resources.

For recipients, the ASS is reviewed and renewable every six months; but job-seekers must make their declaration of activity monthly, so it is possible that their allowance undergoes changes according to their declarations of activity.

The amount of the daily ASS allowance is set each year by decree²⁷.

Regarding COVID-19-related changes, for all those who fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the ASS in September or October 2020, there was a one-off supplementary payment of €150 per adult and €100 for each dependent child.

The amount of the **activity bonus** is calculated considering the following.

- On the one hand, a lump sum which varies according to household composition and numbers of dependent children²⁸, to which must be added 61% of households' professional income. This amount may be increased through 'individual bonuses', taking into account the professional income of each worker.
- On the other hand, households' resources²⁹.

²⁵ There are possible increases if the person becomes a single parent after a life event, such as a separation or the spouse's death. This increase is limited in time. If the event occurs after the dependent child turns 3, the increase lasts 12 months and must be paid during the 18 months following the date of the event. If the event occurs before the dependent child turns 3, the increase lasts until the child turns 3. The amounts in this case are: €726 (single pregnant woman), €968 (1 child), €1,210 (2 children), and €241 per additional child.

²⁶ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043459557>

²⁷ It is currently equal to €16.91. This amount was set by decree No 2021-523 of 29 April 2021.

²⁸ The increase is the following: 50% for the first additional person, 30% per additional person, 40% per additional person beyond the third person if the household has more than two children or dependent people under 25, with the exception of the spouse/co-habiting person.

²⁹ To recap, the amount of the activity bonus = (lump sum, possibly increased + 61% of professional income + individual bonuses) – the household resources taken into account.

The lump sum is revalued each year in April according to the annual variation in the consumer price index between March of year N-1 and March of the year N³⁰.

The lump sum was equal to €563.68 in 2022. Regarding the above-mentioned possibility of individual bonuses, each household member with a professional activity can obtain a bonus which varies according to their monthly professional income (average over the previous three months). This individual bonus is due if the average monthly salary is greater than €623.63. The amount of the bonus increases with income. The parameters are fixed by a decree³¹: for each worker within the household, the bonus is zero when their monthly professional income is less than or equal to 59 times the minimum wage. Beyond that, it grows proportionately up to a maximum of 120 times the minimum wage. For example, it is €19.43 for a monthly income of €700 and €164.04 if income is over €1,1,268.40.

The amount of the activity bonus changes on a yearly basis and is indexed for inflation, just as the RSA. The last increase occurred in 2022. No specific adaptation has been made in response to COVID-19.

It should be noted that the activity bonus targets a population with lower incomes than the former schemes it has replaced. It relies on a more restricted target than them³².

The level of income support for the different household types can also be expressed as a percentage of the national at-risk-of-poverty threshold, the national extreme at-risk-of-poverty threshold (40% of median) and the gross minimum wage (of a single earner)³³. One can see that the level of the minimum guaranteed income – the RSA for a single person – corresponds to half the poverty threshold and a little more than one third of the gross minimum wage. For a couple with two children, it corresponds to half the poverty threshold and a little more than two thirds of the gross minimum wage.

As regards the effects of these minimum income schemes on poverty alleviation, one has to consider together all the social minima – that is, the RSA, ASS, and several other specific allowances. According to a 2021 DREES study, social minima reduced the poverty rate by 1.7 points in 2018. The activity bonus reduced it by a further 1.1 points. The effect on the intensity of poverty (the relative gap between the median standard of living of the poor population and the poverty line) was even greater. Social minima,

³⁰ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043459270>

³¹ Decree No 2018-1197 of 21 December 2018 relating to the exceptional revaluation of the activity bonus. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000037846000/>

³² Evaluation report of the activity bonus, Ministry of Solidarity and Health, 2017. https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport_d_evaluation_prime_d_activite.pdf

³³ See the following table:

		Nominal terms (2022) €	% threshold poverty 2019 (60%)	% extreme poverty threshold (40%) 2019	% gross minimum wage (2020)
RSA	Single person	576	51	77	36
	Single – 1 child	863	59	89	55
	Couple – no children	863	51	77	55
	Couple – 1 child	1,036	nd	nd	66
	Couple – 2 children	1,209	51	65	76
	Couple – 3 children	1,439	nd	nd	91
ASS	Single person, resources <€676, or couple resources <€1,352	507.30	46	69	33

taken all together, reduced this intensity by 7.5 points (compared with a situation before social redistribution)³⁴.

1.4 Links with other benefits

In addition, RSA beneficiaries can benefit from several other rights, under certain conditions³⁵: universal health protection (*protection universelle maladie* – Puma) or complementary solidarity health (C2S). The C2S allows any person, with settled residence in France for more than three months, to benefit from free complementary health.

They can also benefit from housing allowances, and reductions in housing taxes, audio-visual fees, and social telephony charges. They may also be able to access other forms of local assistance, such as reduced prices or free access to certain services (such as transport or school meals), depending on the measures taken by the local authorities and the services concerned.

It is possible to receive both the RSA and the ASS³⁶. In this case, the amount of the RSA is reduced by the amount of the ASS. Similarly, under certain conditions and depending on claimants' resources, the RSA can be combined with the activity bonus.

2017 DREES data indicate the cumulative effect of these minimum income schemes and additional social benefits³⁷. All these benefits represent 41% of the disposable income of households at risk of poverty (compared with 6% for all French households). It was seen above that the social minima represent 13% of disposable income for such households and the activity bonus less than 3%. In addition, family benefits represent 11%, and housing allowances 14%.

Family benefits help reduce the risk of poverty by 2% and the intensity of poverty by more than 6%. Housing allowances help reduce the risk of poverty by 2% and the intensity of poverty by over 6.5%.

2 Links with labour market activation

This section will mainly focus on the links between the **RSA** and labour market activation. Beneficiaries of the RSA are subject to activation measures ('rights and duties') when they are job-seekers or when their average income from professional activity is less than €500 per month. The same rights and duties apply to beneficiaries and their spouses or co-habiting partners. 99% of beneficiaries are concerned by these measures.

The RSA is managed in France at the level of the local authority (departmental council). When RSA beneficiaries are subject to such 'rights and duties' measures, their situation is examined by the departmental council. On the basis of an assessment, the most appropriate support is determined. This is called 'orientation'; that is, RSA beneficiaries

³⁴ Cabannes, P.-Y., Lucile Richet-Mastain, L. (dir.), Calvo, M. (co-ord.) *et al.* (2020, septembre). *Minima sociaux et prestations sociales – Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution* – Édition 2020. Paris, France: DREES, coll. Panoramas de la DREES-social, p. 40.

³⁵ <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F20237>

³⁶ The RSA can be combined with several types of income or other social benefits depending on the situation. It therefore can be combined with the ASS. This is paid by *Pôle Emploi* and can be paid under the conditions seen above, regarding the claimant (registered job-seeker with no rights left to unemployment insurance, salaried activity of at least five years during the previous 10 years).

³⁷ Cabannes, P.-Y., Lucile Richet-Mastain, L. (dir.), Calvo, M. (co-ord.) *et al.* (2020, septembre). *Minima sociaux et prestations sociales – Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution* – Édition 2020. Paris, France: DREES, coll. Panoramas de la DREES-social, in particular Chap. 3 "The effects of social and fiscal transfers on the reduction of monetary poverty".

are oriented towards different types of support. According to 2020 data gathered by the DREES, 83% are effectively oriented towards a specific type of support³⁸.

Two different types of support are on offer, as follows.

- Vocational guidance: the objective is to find a job. The support is in principle entrusted to the public employment service (PES) – most often to the *Pôle Emploi*.
- Social orientation: the first step is to resolve those personal social difficulties that are a problem in finding a job;

In any cases, these distinctions remain formal, as both vocational guidance and social orientation are usually proposed.

In both cases, the departmental council is responsible for implementation which it can delegate to social NGOs, social services in local authorities, or training centres

In total, among those who are oriented towards one of these types of support, 42% are oriented towards the *Pôle Emploi* agencies (i.e. vocational guidance) and 58% towards another support organisation (either social or socio-professional support)³⁹. RSA beneficiaries must go to the organisation chosen by the departmental council. When the beneficiaries are oriented towards the PES, they are obliged to register at the PES and undertake the actions necessary for professional integration. In the case of a social or socio-professional orientation, if after one year of support the beneficiary has not been redirected to the PES, his situation must be re-examined by the multidisciplinary team.

Beneficiaries subject to 'rights and duties' sign an individualised contract, either with *Pôle emploi* or with another organization (such as the departmental council, organisations of the PES except *Pôle emploi*, or other non PES organisations)

On the one hand, beneficiaries oriented towards *Pôle emploi* have to sign a personalised project for access to employment (*parcours personnalisé d'accompagnement vers l'emploi* – PPAE). The PPAE represents the general engagement contract that any job-seeker signs when registering at *Pôle emploi*. RSA beneficiaries therefore do not sign a specific activation contract, different from other job-seekers. As part of this support, and based on the personalised project, the PES advisor may use various tools and services, such as access to job offers (in particular to subsidised jobs targeting RSA beneficiaries), access to qualifying training, and advice on job search.

On the other hand, beneficiaries may sign a reciprocal engagement contract (*contrat d'engagements réciproques* – CER) if they are followed by another organisation and not by *Pôle emploi*. This contract defines the actions they must take to justify their integration efforts with their support organisation. In practice, only half of these beneficiaries (47% in 2020) sign such a contract. The fact that the other half did not sign a contract is generally due to a lack of means in terms of support (administration staff and financial resources for implementation). This is regularly pointed out as a failure in the management of the RSA⁴⁰.

Reports have pointed out the insufficient guidance of RSA beneficiaries towards employment, for those oriented towards social guidance. According to the summary report of the consultation on the public integration and employment service in December 2020⁴¹, the support is not focused enough on employment. This report points out a

³⁸ <https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/communique-de-presse/rsa-les-beneficiaires-depuis-moins-de-6-mois-plus-orientes-en-2020-when-2019>

³⁹ See the infography: https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-12/2020_infographie_minima.pdf.

⁴⁰ M. Klein, C. Pitollat, L'accompagnement des bénéficiaires du RSA, report to the Prime Minister, August 2018, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/184000587.pdf>.

⁴¹ Rapport de synthèse de la concertation sur le service public de l'insertion et de l'emploi, Décembre 2020 https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport-concertation-spie_decembre_2020.pdf.

'professional culture' on the part of the actors that is too focused on social barriers rather than employability. According to this report, the proportion (43%) of benefit recipients oriented towards *Pôle Emploi* in 2018 is insufficient. Similarly, the insufficient emphasis on job-search measures is pointed out for those oriented towards social or socio-professional guidance (i.e. the remaining 57% of beneficiaries). Only a quarter of CERs thus provide for action linked to job search.

The public policy evaluation report of the *Cour des Comptes*, published in December 2021, mentions the same obstacles and difficulties. Only four beneficiaries out of 10 covered by the rights and duties, benefit from the support and the contractualization of the commitments made. Although the beneficiaries of the benefit are accompanied by other services (NGOs, local missions), this rate is relatively low and does not seem to meet the initial objective of the RSA.

The percentage of people referred shows a level of referrals that is too far from the target of 100% of those subject to rights and obligations. The rate of orientation in 2019 is 82% at the national level. It is 48% for people who have been receiving benefits for less than six months, 75% for people who have been receiving benefits for six months to a year, and it reaches only 88% for people who have been receiving RSA for five years or more, revealing a base of people who have not been oriented in the long term.

Communication difficulties between the various actors are the main obstacles to orienting beneficiaries within a reasonable timeframe. As for the quality of referrals, this depends essentially on the pathways proposed by the territories, without any relation to the socio-economic characteristics.

If beneficiaries do not respect the rights and duties framework, sanctions can be applied following an examination of the situation by a multidisciplinary team. It is the department that sets the penalties in case of non-compliance with the contract, or even in the event of non-signing of a contract (for example if a beneficiary has not taken steps to register for *Pôle Emploi* or to sign a CER, following the orientation stage). From a statistical point of view, the existence of these sanctions can indeed lead to an increase in the number of CERs signed and in the claimants' mobilization, but at the same time it can have a negative effect in terms of non-take-up⁴².

3 Links to social services and integrated provision of targeted social services

The initial orientation leads to some beneficiaries being directed towards support provided by *Pôle emploi* (42% of them) or other organisations of the PES (6%), and the remainder towards support provided by the departmental council or other non PES organisations (52%). Each type of support, however, combines measures relating to the search for employment with other measures with a more social purpose.

Concerning the PES, four types of support are offered by *Pôle Emploi* to all job-seekers, with different levels of intensity. The most intensive are provided more often to RSA beneficiaries than to all job-seekers: 24% benefit from 'enhanced support' (compared with 16%). This type of support involves a reduced number of clients for *Pôle Emploi* caseworkers (on average in 2014: 56 clients). By contrast, RSA beneficiaries less often have 'follow-up support', which is the least intensive, than all those registered with *Pôle Emploi* (17% against 33%; average casework 181 clients). Among RSA beneficiaries, the most intensive forms of support are more often provided to those with the lowest qualifications or who have recently registered with *Pôle Emploi*.

In 2013, the PES also created a type of support known as 'global support'. This support method is targeted at job-seekers encountering obstacles (social, economic, etc.) in their search for employment (not necessarily RSA recipients). It is based on the

⁴² Chareyron S., R. Le Gall, Y. L'Horty. Droits et devoirs du RSA: l'impact des contrôles sur la participation des bénéficiaires, Rapport de recherche TEPP, 2021. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03240760/document>

assessment of job-seekers made by PES advisors (to be distinguished from the 'orientation' assessment made by social workers, as seen above). The principle is that of PES advisors and social workers from the departmental council working as pairs. *Pôle Emploi* advisors help define the return-to-work project to enhance the skills of the job-seeker in relation to their project and employment opportunities. Social advisors help beneficiaries find solutions to deal with financial, administrative, or legal difficulties related to housing, health, or mobility. *Pôle Emploi* advisors and social workers determine with beneficiaries the nature and frequency of the appointments (which depend on their personal situation). In 2020, this support concerned 90,000 job-seekers who are also RSA beneficiaries.

Concerning the beneficiaries not oriented towards *Pôle emploi* but towards other organisations, the accompagnement is based on a CER. It stipulates the rights and duties of beneficiaries and can be reassessed when their situation changes (e.g., moving house, or the end of vocational training). The content of the measures contained in the CER mainly have a social aim: 36% of the contracts contain at least one action concerning access to healthcare, 23% at least one action concerning the family and parenthood (family support, or childcare), and 14% at least one action concerned with access to housing/rehousing⁴³. Some of the actions to be implemented by beneficiaries nevertheless focus on employment integration: 22% of CERs contain at least one measure on employment integration, and 13% contain at least one measure aimed at finding activities, internships or training that promote the acquisition of vocational skills.

This work assumes close co-ordination between social actors at the local level. Social workers who follow beneficiaries can rely on other actors, for example in the field of health or housing. In practice, this occurs but there are local differences.

4 Governance mechanisms

Administration of the **RSA** is entrusted to local authorities. Each authority is responsible for: financing the RSA (partly from own funds, partly from contributions provided to them by the state); leading and managing accompagnement and support measures; controlling, and ensuring adherence to, reciprocal commitments; and fighting fraud. The family allowance funds, namely the CAFs (*caisses d'allocations familiales*) and the MSA (*mutualité sociale agricole*), receive, register, and examine requests; calculate entitlements; pay out the RSA; and ensure financial control.

This decentralised policy suffers from funding problems, with many local authorities struggling to fund the system – in particular because of COVID-19, as the number of beneficiaries has risen sharply, with no increase in revenue to match (although this issue already existed). In this context, since 2022, in Seine Saint-Denis and Pyrénées-Orientales, the management of the RSA has been entrusted to the state for a five-year experiment because of the authorities' difficulties in financing the RSA. Another experiment will be carried out from 2023, and for four years in which local authorities can request to take part until June 2022. It should also be noted that the RSA is nationalised in some overseas local authorities with a high number of recipients (Guyana, Mayotte, Réunion). There are legal conflicts between some local authorities and the state, the former claiming financial compensation from the latter in court⁴⁴.

Each local authority elaborates an integration plan which sets out the main lines and orientations of social support for RSA beneficiaries. At the more local level there might

⁴³ 2017 DREES data. See Cabannes, P.-Y., Lucile Richet-Mastain, L. (dir.), Calvo, M. (co-ord.) *et al.* (2020, septembre). *Minima sociaux et prestations sociales – Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution* – Édition 2020. Paris, France: DREES, coll. Panoramas de la DREES-social, in particular Chap. 32 "Orientation and accompagnement of RSA beneficiaries" <https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2021-03/32-13.pdf>

⁴⁴ "Le RSA fait vaciller les finances départementales [RSA shakes departmental finances]", *La Gazette des communes*, 30 October 2020 <https://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/703590/le-rsa-fait-vaciller-les-finances-departementales/>

be territorial integration pacts which bring together all those actors involved in integration and support who participate in the local integration plan. There also are PLIEs (local plans for integration and employment), which cover the guidance and follow-up of beneficiaries, in close co-operation with the local authority; local social centres and NGOs are entrusted with social integration plans, while the PES (*Pôle Emploi*) is in charge of professional integration plans.

Regarding the monitoring and evaluation of the RSA, each year, the DREES publishes detailed national and departmental results, relying on a large and exhaustive survey. The DREES also organises a statistical census of all the data on RSA beneficiaries each month and their socio-demographic data⁴⁵. In addition, each local authority should regularly evaluate its own integration policy.

The **ASS** is a tax-financed benefit, which takes over when people exhaust their entitlement to unemployment benefits financed by unemployment insurance. Funding is provided by the state solidarity fund. The management is carried out by the PES (*Pôle Emploi*). The *Pôle Emploi* manages all administrative and monitoring procedures on its own. The DREES organises a statistical statement of all the data on ASS beneficiaries each month and of the socio-demographic data of beneficiaries. In its annual panorama report on 'social minima and social benefits', it devotes a page to detailing the characteristics of people receiving the ASS, their geographical distribution, the number of employees, and the amount of the allowance. It mobilises several sources: *Pôle Emploi*, the INSEE employment survey, and the 'national inter-regime sample of recipients of additional income from activity and social minima' (ENIACRAMS).

The **activity bonus** is paid out by family allowance funds (CAFs or MSA) but its general funding comes from the state. There is no specific service delivery, as no provision of service is involved; and the activity bonus, which is an automatic top-up income, does not involve any activation measure. It is monitored and evaluated by the DGCS, the DREES and the National Family Allowance Funds (CNAF).

5 Impact of minimum income schemes

The activation measures can be assessed by reference to their outcomes in terms of exits from minimum income schemes⁴⁶. The exit rate from a social minimum thus measured depends on the general context of the labour market, the nature of the minimum income scheme, and people's profiles and distance from employment, which is partly reflected in the type of service received (type of orientation and type of support).

Out of 100 beneficiaries of the **RSA** at the end of 2019, 75 still received it at the end of 2019; 4 received another social minimum without touching the RSA; and 21 left the social minima schemes. Among those leaving, 14 received the activity bonus and 3 received unemployment benefit (1 received both).

Out of 100 recipients of the **ASS** at the end of 2017, 67 still received it at the end of 2018; 3 received the RSA (without receiving the ASS); 2 received the disability allowance; and 28 no longer received social minima. 5 of them received unemployment benefit and 7 the activity bonus.

⁴⁵ <https://data.drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/explore/dataset/donnees-mensuelles-sur-les-prestations-de-solidarite/information>, https://data.drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/explore/dataset/336_minima-social-rsa-et-prime-d-activite/information

⁴⁶ The data in this part rely on: « Minima sociaux et prestations sociales. Ménages aux revenus modestes et redistribution. » Panorama de la DREES, 2020. https://drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-10/drees_-_pano_-_minima_sociaux_-_assemblage_-_bat_-_210920.pdf, "Chap. 21: Exit out of 'social minima'"

Since 2011, the exit rates after one year from the RSA have varied between 23% and 26%. The exit rate from social minima is higher for recipients of the ASS. Since 2014, it has fluctuated between 27% and 28%.

Exits from social minima can be of various kinds. Some beneficiaries take paid employment⁴⁷. This was the case for 52% of ASS beneficiaries in 2016. The greater employment experience of recipients of this benefit could explain the fact that they more often have a salaried job when they exit the minimum income scheme. In addition, the ability to combine a job with the ASS is time-limited⁴⁸ (unlike the RSA), which automatically contributes to increasing the share of those having a job among those leaving the ASS.

Among the quarter of RSA beneficiaries at the end of 2015 who had exited at the end of 2016, 45% had a salaried job (including 15% on permanent contracts and 17% employed full time).

In addition, another quarter of RSA beneficiaries, and 28% of ASS beneficiaries, who left the social minima in 2016 were registered with the *Pôle Emploi* at the end of 2016, without having a salaried job. This might have been the result of a change in family situation, resuming a job for a short period, taking up self-employment, an increase in the income of other household members, or administrative aspects.

In terms of individual characteristics, the younger RSA and ASS beneficiaries are, the more they exit from the social minima. In addition, the longer the spell in the social minima, the lower the probability of leaving. Thus, 40% of RSA beneficiaries and 47% of ASS beneficiaries at the end of 2017 who had received benefits for less than a year exited at the end of 2018. These rates fell, to 29% and 34% respectively, for those who had received benefits for at least one year at the end of 2017; and it fell further, to around 18%, for those who had received benefits for at least four years. Finally, it fell to 8% for those receiving benefits for at least nine years.

In terms of the sustainability of people's new-found independence of support, more than half of RSA beneficiaries who exited the scheme remained outside it for at least five years – 13% of all RSA beneficiaries.

Various reports have pointed out the inadequacies of support for RSA beneficiaries and the insufficient results in terms of returning to work⁴⁹. The consultation report on the public employment and integration service in 2020 also highlighted this⁵⁰. It underlined the disparities between local authorities in terms of the quality of support and resources dedicated to support. It pointed to cases of long delays in obtaining a first assessment and then regular appointments. In addition, as already mentioned above, not all beneficiaries are effectively committed to a CER. Although there are exits out of the RSA as noted above, the rate of return to work remains low, estimated at 12% per year.

In order to improve the effectiveness of the accompaniment work and the outcomes, the government launched in 2018 a national strategy for preventing and fighting against poverty, one measure of which was the creation of a public integration and employment

⁴⁷ This is not necessarily a resumption of employment insofar as some of these beneficiaries could already have a job at the end of the previous year: in these situations, leaving the social minima may correspond to an increase in hourly wages or in the number of hours worked.

⁴⁸ At the end of the three months of accumulation, the ASS is interrupted in favour of the activity bonus if the beneficiary meets the conditions.

⁴⁹ M. Klein, C. Pitollat, L'accompagnement des bénéficiaires du RSA, report to the Prime minister, August 2018, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/184000587.pdf>. Cloarec-Le Nabour C. and Damon J., "The right service for adjusted services and support", report to the Prime Minister, September 2018. https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2018/09/rapport_de_christine_cloarec-le_nabour_et_julien_damon_sur_la_juste_prestation.pdf

⁵⁰ Rapport de synthèse de la concertation sur le service public de l'insertion et de l'emploi, Décembre 2020. https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport-concertation-spie_decembre_2020.pdf

service (*service public de l'insertion et de l'emploi* – SPIE). This might lead to important reforms in terms of the organisation and management of service support for the beneficiaries of minimum income schemes, more specifically the RSA. At the end of 2021, this was under deployment with 80 department Councils out of a hundred.

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
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7 Annex

Figure 1. AROPE indicator and components, France, 2015-2020 (%)




Note: The line for "Total: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion" indicates the trend for overall population, while the other lines show the figures for individuals aged 0-64. Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps01n], [ilc_li02], [ilc_mdspd11] and [ilc_lvhl11n]. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- In 2020, the share of total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) in France stood at 18.9%, while that of those aged 0-64 was higher at 20.4%, reflecting the lower risk among those aged 65 and over. Over the period 2015-2019, there was relatively little change in the share of those aged 0-64 at risk, while the share of the total at risk increased slightly, as the risk rose among those aged 65 and over.
- Most of the people aged 0-64 at risk of poverty or social exclusion (14.7 % of the age group) had household disposable income of below 60% of the median (I.e. they were at risk of poverty). The rate remained virtually unchanged over the period 2015-2019.
- Less than half (43%) of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion lived in households with very low work intensity in 2020 (8.8% of those aged 0-64). The share of the total aged under 65 living in such households declined between 2015 to 2019 (by around 1 percentage point).
- Only just over a third (35%) of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion were affected by severe material and social deprivation (7.2% of those aged 0-64). This share of those under 65 affected increased slightly between 2015 to 2019.

Figure 2. *Division of people aged 0-64 at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age group, France, 2015-2020 (%)*




Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years. Figures below the percentage figures in the bars show the ratios of the share at risk to the share of the age group in total population, which indicate the relative likelihood of the age group being at risk.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps01n], own calculation. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- More women than men aged 0-64 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2020 (52% of the total). Women also made up a slightly larger share of total population, but it still the case that women were more likely to be at risk than men. This was also the case over the previous 5 years.
- Older people aged 65 and over are much less likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than those in younger age groups, these accounting for only 14% of the total at risk in 2020. The likelihood of being at risk rose significantly between 2015 and 2019, reinforcing the tendency for the number of people of this age to increase and pushing up their share of the total at risk.
- Children under 18 are more likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than adults, while those aged 18-24 are significantly more likely to be so than older age groups, these two groups making up over a third of the total at risk in 2020 (24% and 10%, respectively).
- Those aged 55-64 were slightly more likely to be at risk in 2020 than those aged 30-54, though this does not seem to have been the case for much of the period 2015-2019.

Figure 3. *Division of people aged 18-64 at risk of poverty or social exclusion by most frequent economic activity status, France, 2015-2020 (%)*




Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years. Figures below the percentage figures in the bars show the ratios of the share at risk to the share of the age group in total population, which indicate the relative likelihood of the age group being at risk.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps02n] and [ilc_lvhl02], own calculation. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- People aged 18-64 not in work have a considerably higher likelihood of being at risk of poverty or social exclusion than those in employment and made up 64% of the total at risk in 2020.
- Among those in employment, the self-employed have a much higher likelihood of being at risk than employees. Though their relatively small numbers mean that they accounted for only 8% of the total at risk in 2020.

Figure 4. Division of people aged 18-64 at risk of poverty or social exclusion by education level, France, 2015-2020 (%)




Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years. Figures below the percentage figures in the bars show the ratios of the share at risk to the share of the age group in total population, which indicate the relative likelihood of the age group being at risk.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps04n] and [ilc_lvps04], own calculation. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- People aged 18-64 with only basic schooling (ISCED 1 and 2) are far more likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than those with higher education levels and despite their relatively small numbers they made up just over a third (34%) of the total at risk in 2020. This share was much the same in the previous 5 years.
- Among those with higher education levels, those with tertiary education (ISCED 65-8) were much less likely to be at risk than those with upper secondary education level (ISCED 3 and 4, though they still accounted for 19% of the total at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2020.

Figure 5. Division of people aged 18-64 in at risk of poverty or social exclusion by country of birth, France, 2015-2020 (%)




Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years. Figures below the percentage figures in the bars show the ratios of the share at risk to the share of the age group in total population, which indicate the relative likelihood of the age group being at risk.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps06n] (Data downloaded on 14/02/2022) and EU-SILC microdata, own calculation.

- People aged 18-64 born outside of the EU are considerably more likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than those born in France, making up over a quarter (26%) of the total at risk in 2020.
- Both the AROPE rate among people born outside the EU and their share of the total aged 18-64 at risk increased significantly over the period 2015-2019.

Figure 6. Division of people in at risk of poverty or social exclusion by household type, France, 2015-2020 (%)



Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years.. Figures below the percentage figures in the bars show the ratios of the share at risk to the share of the age group in total population, which indicate the relative likelihood of the age group being at risk.

Note that the chart does not include all household types. In particular, it excludes those aged under 65 living in a household with three or more adults without children, who are difficult to distinguish in the published data.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_peps03n] and [ilc_lvps02], own calculation. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- People aged under 65 living alone are much more likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than others. This applies especially to those living alone with children, who made up 17% of the total at risk in 2020.
- Couples with 1-2 children have much the same likelihood of being at risk of poverty or social exclusion than couples aged under 65 without children, both being considerably lower than for other household types.
- Couple with 3 children or more, by contrast, have a significantly higher risk than the average, making up 19% of the total at risk in 2020.

Table 1. At risk of poverty rate before and after social transfers, excluding old age benefits, for those aged 0-64, France, 2015-2020

	Before social transfers, excl. old-age benefits (%)	After social transfers (%)	Effect of social transfers on atrop rate (%-point change)
2015	26.8	14.8	-12.0
2016	26.6	14.9	-11.7
2017	27.0	14.5	-12.5
2018	27.3	14.6	-12.7
2019	26.4	14.6	-11.8
2020	29.4	14.7	-14.7

Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_li02] and [ilc_li10]. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

- Social transfers had the effect of reducing the at-risk-of-poverty (arop) rate by around 15 percentage points in 2020, cutting the number at risk by half, slightly more than in the preceding 5 years (around 45%).

Table 2. At risk of poverty rate and persistent at risk of poverty rate for those aged 18-64, France, 2015-2020

	At risk of poverty rate (%)	Persistent at risk of poverty rate (%)	Persistent rate as % of annual rate
2015	13.4	8.1	60.4
2016	13.3	7.4	55.6
2017	12.8	7.3	57.0
2018	12.8	6.5	50.8
2019	13.3	7.0	52.6
2020	13.5	8.8	65.2

Note: Break in the series in 2020, so the data for this year are not directly comparable with those for earlier years.

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC indicators [ilc_li02] and [ilc_li21]. Data downloaded on 14/02/2022.

Almost two-thirds (65%) of people of working age (18-64) at risk of poverty in 2020 were at persistent risk, i.e. they were consistently at risk for a number of years rather than being at risk for only one year, or temporarily. This is more than over the preceding 5 years, when the proportion was between 50% and 60%.

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