

U.S. Re-Engagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Report of the Pakistan Study Group

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The U.S. -Pakistan relationship has gone through many vicissitudes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the “Most Allied Ally of the United States,” and another high point when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.”

It has also had low points when President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” in January 2018.

U.S. administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. Most at issue among policy makers in both countries in recent decades has been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, close embrace of China, and expanding nuclear arsenal.

Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives – economic and military – Pakistan would finally change those aspects of its policy that diverged from U.S. interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid, or the cutoff of aid has proved able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and policies framed by its security establishment.

Pakistan for its part has been upset as it believes that the country has offered a fair exchange to the U.S. for its aid by abetting U.S. strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.

Differing American and Pakistani Perspectives

Right from the start, the U.S. and Pakistan were like two partners always preoccupied with confronting different enemies and pinning different expectations to their association. Neither country has changed its core policies, nor have they given up the hope that the other will change. The two nations have parallel narratives of their shared experience.

Pakistan’s story runs something like this: The jihadist terrorism owes its existence to a joint cold war program gone awry and the U.S. needs to help Pakistan deal with the issue on Islamabad’s terms and on Pakistan’s timelines. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is the result of the U.S. being a fair-weather friend, withdrawing from South Asia except when it has needed Pakistani cooperation against Soviet communists or Al-Qaeda terrorists.

From Pakistan's standpoint, the U.S. does not show consistent interest in Pakistan's well-being. Pakistan would be willing to be an American strategic ally only if the U.S. understood and attended to its concerns about India's influence in the region and Pakistan's desire or even right to emerge as the pre-eminent power in its neighborhood.

American critics of Pakistan respond by pointing out that Pakistan has always pursued its own agenda, which too often collides with American interests. Yet it repeatedly seeks U.S. money and arms without keeping its commitments. The list of American grievances is long, not least that Pakistan undertook a nuclear program while promising the U.S. that it would refrain from building a weapon.

The U.S. had helped arm and train Mujahideen against the Soviets during the 1980s, but it was Pakistan's decision that kept these militants well-armed and sufficiently funded even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. From the American perspective, Pakistan's crackdown on terrorist groups even after 9/11 has been half-hearted at best.

Since Pakistan currently seems keen to re-engage with the United States, and the U.S. too perceives advantages in re-engagement, it may be time to get beyond airing their grievances and begin to build a relationship that serves the interests of both countries. There need not be complete convergence in the two countries' worldview to develop a positive partnership that enhances the security of Pakistan, South Asia, and the U.S.

Changing Circumstances

Several things have changed since the U.S.-Pakistan relationship over the last decade, most important of which are the emergence of the U.S.-India entente and the potential for peer rivalry between China and the U.S. From Pakistan's point of view, a few lessons have probably been learned from Afghanistan as well as from the blowback of Pakistan's support of militancy in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

There is also a geo-strategic competition, with Russian and Chinese participation, taking place on the Asian continental landmass that involves Pakistan and Afghanistan. This may be an opportune moment to lay the foundations of a sustainable relationship.

A modest, pragmatic relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, one not based on exaggerated expectations on both sides, would involve understanding that

- a) Pakistan and the U.S. will continue to see Afghanistan through different lens but can cooperate in maintaining peace in that country and alleviating its people's suffering.
- b) Attitudes toward India at both the elite and popular levels in Pakistan will, at best, change slowly.
- c) Public opinion in both the U.S. and Pakistan acts as constraints on bilateral relations.

- d) There is little the U.S. can do to induce Pakistan to change its overall strategic calculus, which is based on Pakistan's understanding of its security environment.
- e) The U.S. and Pakistan have divergent views on China.

Need for New Policy Ideas

The U.S. has tried both years of sustained engagement with large-scale aid and years of stopping aid carrots and using sticks, but Pakistan has not altered its policies. At the same time, Pakistan's close economic and political relationship with China is unlikely to diminish, and governments in Islamabad can be expected to retain expanded ties with Russia.

With these caveats in mind there is a need to find out what is attainable and if there can be a relationship based on mutual interest. We have seen the limits of relying on either inducements or threats to encourage greater cooperation. Moving forward, the two sides would benefit by developing a framework for pragmatic engagement.

It is important, however, to avoid overestimating the possibilities of, or demanding, a complete convergence of interests between Pakistan and the U.S. Instead of allowing existing differences to define the partnership, it may be time to recognize that both sides need to understand the other's interests so that they can then find a way to work on areas of mutual concern.

American policymakers need to also think of more options beyond either giving or denying vast amounts of aid to coerce Pakistan into changing its policies. Pakistan's leaders too, need to move beyond the fantasy that it is "critical" to America and so U.S. policymakers will always be focused on Pakistan.

There is also a need for acceptance within the Pakistani leadership that all of Pakistan's problems, especially terrorism and militancy, cannot be laid at the door of the U.S.

Areas of Shared Interest

U.S.-Pakistan policy has had a circular quality over the decades. While there are those in the country who do not view relations with Pakistan as important, it is possible things will change and Pakistan may once again figure prominently in American security interests. Therefore, it may be useful to think under what circumstances this might occur. What next crisis could occasion it and how we can constructively prepare for it by improving our relationship with Pakistan?

Historically, the U.S. walking away from the region has not worked out well for American interests. In its absence, developments took place where the U.S. came to regret that it lacked any ability to exert influence. Over the decade of the 1990s, Al Qaeda emerged with Pakistan's assistance as a global terrorist threat, the subcontinent went nuclear, and India and Pakistan engaged in armed conflict that could be resolved only through U.S. reengagement as mediator.

The form and level of engagement may be at issue, but it has been repeatedly shown that American security interests in South Asia cannot be served through benign neglect.

U.S.- Pakistan relations are often described as transactional in nature. However, a transactional relationship can also be sustainable and durable if both sides focus on areas where their core interests align. Pakistan, given its location and size, is never going to be irrelevant; the United States will continue to be a relevant actor in South Asia. So, we need to realize a normal relationship that is not petulant or dismissive for the day when we may need to build it up.

Pakistan is significant in terms of both the problems and the opportunities it can provide. Disengagement is not realistically an option, and publicly expressing indifference may also not be a good idea. There is a difference between knowing what is going on and keeping a finger on the pulse and understanding and engaging but not being as hands on as we have often tried to be in the past.

Maybe the time has come to recognize that Pakistan cannot be the close ally of yesteryears but is still an important country that is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in select areas. While Pakistan and the U. S. often fail to see eye-to-eye when it comes to Afghanistan, China, or India, they do share mutual interests in seeking stability in the region, combatting the problem of extremism, and averting armed conflict in nuclear South Asia. Relations need not be close or broadly based to achieve the goals sought by each side.

A Pakistan that is politically and economically stable, is democratic and protects the human rights of its citizens, fulfills its human development goals, and has good relations with its neighbors is of interest to the United States. Historically, the U.S. has been one of Pakistan's largest aid donors, not just on the security front, but in meeting economic and humanitarian needs as well. In the past, American financial and security assistance helped bolster Pakistan's defense capabilities and created the foundation for economic development, which unfortunately never happened.

The U.S. would benefit by appreciating that Pakistani society has changed over the last few decades. Much of American understanding of Pakistan is based on outmoded conceptions. There is a need for a greater understanding of how the society, the military, and the political system have evolved if we are to achieve successful engagement. All the while, the U.S. needs to avoid becoming too involved in Pakistan's domestic affairs.

As one of the world's most populous, majority Muslim countries, sitting at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia, and armed with nuclear weapons, Pakistan cannot and should not be ignored, isolated, or marginalized. U.S. security interests in the region, and the likely negative impact of U.S. disengagement from Pakistan are compelling reasons for American policymakers to consider new options in maintaining ties with this strategically important country.

It must also be borne in mind that, political differences notwithstanding, Pakistan's elite admires the United States and hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis have emigrated to the U.S. and are well integrated in American society. The large Pakistani diaspora, spread across the United States with large concentrations in Texas, New York, Illinois, and California normally play a positive role in bringing their adopted homeland and the country of their origin closer.

Security Cooperation

The strong security partnership during the Cold War may have helped Pakistan build its military and stand up to India but it also ended up creating a very narrow aperture for relations with the U.S. Further, in later years, as their divergences increased, lack of progress on a narrowly defined, security-driven, and transactional relationship ended up creating increasing acrimony between both sides.

For a long time, Afghanistan has dominated U.S.-Pakistan relations. With the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan can play a key role in ensuring a stable Afghanistan and in helping the U.S. curb extremist groups and blunt the ability of groups like Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP, also called ISIS) to use the country as a launching pad for future attacks.

Even with the killing of both Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the U.S. still has an interest in eliminating Al-Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist organizations in the region and beyond that seek to hurt the U.S. and its allies and partners. But just as Pakistan can be helpful in curbing these organizations, it can also hinder what we want to achieve.

The U.S. has long doubted Pakistan's commitment to act against militant extremist groups that operate from its soil, especially those that focus on India and Afghanistan. Regardless, the U.S. and Pakistan have often cooperated in sharing intelligence on Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi. The need for counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan has if anything increased with the loss of intelligence assets following the U.S. military withdrawal from the region.

While Pakistan has historically been reluctant to act against militant groups that operate on its soil, the fear of international isolation and its economic consequences has resulted in an improvement, even if limited, in its internal security and some progress toward acting against some militant groups that have threatened the Pakistani state itself. Pakistan has suffered from terrorism on its soil with millions of internally displaced people and there were over 80,000 casualties, civilian and military, between 2005-2013.

There was also likely a domestic political component where the civilian and military both wanted ways to deal with these groups. Public sentiment also played a role. In 2008 the military was keen on an accord with TTP – and several agreements were signed that fell

apart - but after the 2014 attack against an army school, there was leeway to conduct strikes. This resulted in the major army offensive, Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan.

Since 2018, Pakistan has been on the grey list of the U.N. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for its failure to adequately enforce measures to curb terrorist financing. While it is likely that Pakistan will finally be taken off that list, some monitoring by the U.S. and the international community will continue to be needed to assure Pakistan's compliance with FATF demands.

The U.S. has long had an interest in the security and safety of nuclear weapons and material in Pakistan, and specifically in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology and weaponry and nuclear escalation between Pakistan and India. With its growing arsenal of nuclear devices, the possible danger of extremist group penetration of nuclear facilities is of deep American interest. The military as the caretakers of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is a particular focus, namely that it retains its ability to protect the country's nuclear assets and maintain a reliable command and control system.

The China Factor

U.S. foreign policy appears to be in a realist moment where everything is being viewed through "the China construct." In such a context, especially post Afghanistan withdrawal, Pakistan's relationship with China has become a principal lens through which Washington views Pakistan. In this context, one thing the U.S. has in common with Pakistan is a desire to ensure Pakistan maintains a degree of sovereign autonomy over its actions. The U.S. prefers to see a Pakistan that is capable of independent decision-making and avoids becoming a Chinese proxy.

The U.S. need not have a zero-sum view of China's relations with Pakistan. For decades, U.S. has viewed Pakistan from the prism of its policy towards Afghanistan. It should now avoid viewing bilateral ties with Pakistan through a China lens. Instead, the U.S. could try to calibrate its relationship with Pakistan in such a way that improves Pakistan's bargaining power vis-à-vis China. Unlike in previous decades, the U.S. is the hedge for Pakistan, rather than the basket in which Pakistan is reluctant to put all its eggs – a role now assumed by China.

This presents an opportunity, but the U.S. needs to be realistic about the possibilities. For Pakistan to achieve the strategic autonomy that it claims to seek, it must strengthen its engagement with the U.S. For the time being, unfortunately, Washington shows reluctance to broaden the relationship and may unwittingly be driving Pakistan to closer reliance on China.

As the U.S. has stepped back, China has been investing even more in building relationships, not just in the economic or military realms but also the educational and cultural ones. This makes it imperative that Washington act to strengthen constituencies within Pakistan that champion ties with the U.S.

One such way could be to help build Pakistan's capacity for transparency and compliance when it comes to loans like those under CPEC. This would be akin to what the U.S. has done in Maldives, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.

India-Pakistan

The more U.S. equities in India increase, the more Pakistan becomes apprehensive. That Pakistan continues to see relations with India as a zero-sum game carries implications for U.S. relations with Pakistan. It is important to ensure that just as the U.S. saw Pakistan through the Afghanistan lens for the last two decades, that the mistake not be repeated, and that Pakistan is seen purely through the lens of U.S.-India relations or U.S. competition with China.

Pakistan has a vested interest in ensuring that the U.S. remain engaged with the region and ensure a robust U.S. role in preventing escalation of military hostilities. Even while it should be clear that the U.S. sees no role for itself as a mediator in Kashmir, the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis, and the 2022 accidental missile strike have shown that managing an India-Pakistan crisis, and preventing escalation remains a key American interest.

It should also be recognized that for Pakistanis, Kashmir remains an important and emotive issue and expecting that Pakistan would give up its position on Kashmir might amount to crossing a red line.

A major terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan-based militants – or some other type of precipitating event – could cause a wider conflict that has the potential to escalate to use of nuclear weapons.

After decades of trying to balance policies towards India and Pakistan, U.S. officials have now de-hyphenated relations. While that is the need of the hour, the U.S. should maintain robust engagement with each country based on respective merits yet be modest about its ability to bridge what divides them.

Economy & Aid

Pakistan is facing a massive economic crisis. Helping the country get through this crisis will be an enormous task and will take years, if not decades. There are powerful interests in Pakistan resistant to any reforms they see as coming at their expense. Yet there are signs that the Pakistani government under Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif is trying to move the country in the right direction by taking steps toward necessary structural reforms. These developments should be recognized and encouraged by the U.S. and the international community.

While expansion in commercial relations will need to be led and sustained by the private sector, any encouragement provided by the U.S. government would go a long way. Over the last few years Pakistan has pushed the policy of geo-economics and in the last few years the U.S. too has reciprocated by emphasizing business opportunities for large U.S.-based firms within Pakistan.

Interlocutors in the U.S. may believe that making further efforts to bolster the economic relationship has limited upside for Washington. This perspective is misplaced, especially in an increasingly multipolar world and a growing rivalry between the U.S. and China.

The U.S. is a vital economic partner for Pakistan, providing market access for Pakistani exports, capital in the form of foreign direct investment, and technical expertise critical to modernizing Pakistan's economy. In fiscal year 2022, Pakistan earned almost \$7 billion in export receipts from the U.S., with textiles being the largest sectoral contributor according to the State Bank of Pakistan.

The trade relationship is not just focused on exports: Pakistan imported over \$3 billion in goods from the U.S. in 2022, making it one of the most important sources of imports for the country. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from the U.S. also contributes immensely to modernizing Pakistan's economy: in fiscal year 2022, FDI inflows from the U.S. amounted to \$257 million, behind only China (\$706 million) and the Netherlands (\$305.8 million).

Over the decades, the U.S. has offered a lot of developmental and security assistance and investment to Pakistan. While the U.S. has viewed the aid as support to Pakistan, the Pakistani side often viewed it as having strings attached. There is presently little appetite in Washington for any generous aid programs to Pakistan, but it is important to continue providing Economic Support Funds and other relevant funding mechanisms.

American developmental assistance to Pakistan needs to be viewed from the lens of investment not for building influence but for enabling Pakistan to deal with its multiple challenges.

The recent disastrous floods have made it especially clear that there are several sectors – humanitarian aid, disaster management, improving water management, tackling air pollution, building climate change resilience - where USAID and allied agencies of the U.S. government should step up the allocation of funds to Pakistan.

Another sector where collaboration would serve both American and Pakistani goals, is clean energy. Pakistan is an ideal candidate for the State Department's Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI), whose aim is promotion of sound mining sector governance and securing resilient supply chains for critical energy minerals.

Technology

In recent years, the U.S., led by the Pakistani-American diaspora in Silicon Valley, has also played an integral role in providing access to capital and expertise to Pakistan's technology sector. Venture capitalists who have cut their teeth in the U.S. have emerged as a major catalyst in the country's burgeoning startup ecosystem, which cumulatively raised over \$365 million in 2021; this is more than all the past years combined.

The inflow of this capital is birthing the next generation of businesses in Pakistan, leading to a deepening of ties between the U.S. and Pakistan in the technology sector. As this ecosystem grows, collaboration between Pakistani and American technologists is only bound to grow, creating research, investment, and entrepreneurial linkages between the two countries in emerging and cutting-edge technologies.

The growth of the technology sector in Pakistan has also catalyzed a growth in the country's technology exports, which stand at almost \$2 billion a year. While country-specific data is not available for these exports, the U.S. is reportedly the largest market for Pakistan's technology exports; this is evidenced by the large and growing presence that companies like Afiniti have in the U.S.

According to the World Bank, one quarter of Pakistan's population uses the Internet. Broadband connectivity thus remains a challenge. In 2020, Google announced that it would invest \$10 billion to accelerate India's digital economy, provide free Wi-Fi in various locations, and provide access to the internet in local languages, not just English.

If Silicon Valley can be convinced of something similar for Pakistan that would greatly help. The strategic element would be to ensure Pakistan's broadband infrastructure is American, not Chinese. However, this would involve an investment of \$6 billion, which might require specific actions on Pakistan's part.

Democracy, Human rights

A politically stable, democratic Pakistan that upholds the rights of all its citizens has long been an American goal, one that is shared by most Pakistanis.

Pakistan has a long history of curbing dissent, of impeding the work of civil society organizations, and of suppressing media freedoms. Unfortunately, in recent years that has only worsened. U.S. policymakers, the U.S. administration, and civil society have taken a deep interest in this issue, especially when it comes to human rights, and protection of ethnic and religious minorities.

The U.S. Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has for years asked for Pakistan to be placed on the list of countries of particular concern. Pakistan needs to do more on this front and to guarantee rights to its own citizens, protect rights of its minorities, religious and ethnic.

The U.S. needs to continue its support for Pakistan's civil society, media and press, academia, and policy world. If this could also include increased legislative interactions, deepening of relations with political parties, state to state collaborations, local government to local government conversations, and broader links between civic groups in each country. This would provide additional venues for promoting the same goals.

There is a large and vibrant Pakistani American diaspora which is a huge asset to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. In addition, there are several U.S.-educated Pakistanis, in the media, academia, think tanks, civil service and even the uniformed military. Building on these networks to champion relations between the two countries would be useful.

Recommendations for a more nuanced U.S. policy on Pakistan

What this report seeks to do is carefully select from within a broader set of policy objectives which issues have the potential to improve bilateral relations. It is true that both the U.S. and Pakistan have worked together to combat the threat of terrorism. Yet their perceptions of the nature of this threat have diverged historically and often led to disappointment. To move forward, both sides would need to work with the other to find commonalities even if at the strategic level their interests diverge.

U.S. engagement with Pakistan would benefit if it were based on a realistic appraisal of Pakistan's policies, aspirations, and worldview. There is a need to acknowledge that inducements or threats will not result in securing change in Pakistan's strategic direction.

- It is not in American national security interests to isolate Pakistan or irreparably breach the relationship. A normalization of Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. remains in the U.S. national interest
- Decades of American efforts to strengthen Pakistan militarily have not resulted in Pakistan's changing its views on India. The cutting off of military ties, even educational and training endeavors, has had an adverse effect by preventing the U.S. from developing relationships with the rising officer ranks of the military. Maybe, it is time to understand that engagement should continue, even in the absence of large-scale military aid and transfer of equipment.
- Differing views on Afghanistan and presence of American and allied troops in that country led to counterterrorism conditions being placed on any military aid given to Pakistan. For years various agencies of the U.S. were divided over the nature and extent of Pakistan's support to the Afghan Taliban, but no one disputes that anymore.
- With American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the value of intelligence sharing to combat terrorism has grown and the two sides need to find a way to overcome suspicions and other obstacles that have impeded cooperation. The U.S. will need to keep an eye on terrorist groups, both domestic and global, and Pakistan

too needs to deal less selectively in addressing the threats posed by its militant extremist groups. The killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri shows that the U.S. has the capability to monitor, track, and kill a terrorist, but it is more expedient and less costly to have support of countries in the region.

- Sustaining US-Pakistan cooperation when it comes to weapons of mass destruction security is important. Going forward, security-related engagement including on nuclear should be done with more transparency. On principle, in light of the 'imported government' narrative, U.S. policy and any ensuing cooperation needs to be out in the open and as transparent as possible. Where there is shared interest, it needs to be clarified and codified in public ways that makes the civilian government and Army own the relationship, that will help disarm conspiracy theories and normalize this type of security engagement.
- There is a need to ensure open lines of communication between Pakistan and the U.S. and to build relations between officers in both countries. An important way to achieve this is through training programs and programs like IMET (International Military Education and Training), a low-cost program that has over time provided a large dividend in helping build relations between officers of both countries.
- The U.S. must continue efforts, including at multilateral forums, to remind Pakistan about the need to act against terrorist groups and individuals on its soil. Pakistan has long insisted that terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad or Lashkar-e-Taiba are too powerful and pervasive for the military establishment to challenge easily and that it needs time to act against them. The U.S. should work behind the scenes and in subtle ways pressure Pakistan to continue to crack down on these groups within its territory. Gulf Arab countries, too, must be encouraged to pressure Pakistan in changing its direction.
- It is in U.S. and allied interests to help Pakistan reduce its economic dependence on China. This can be done in multiple ways: Most desirable is through direct American investment along with investment by friendly countries, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan. The U.S. International Development Finance Cooperation (IDFC) is one U.S. government entity that can help identify projects in key industries where American firms with technological and economic advantages would benefit by collaborating with Pakistani counterparts. As previous noted, Pakistan should be invited to join the U.S. State Department's Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI).
- In 2008, U.S. and Pakistan had spoken of creating Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) which would help Pakistan and Afghanistan rebuild their economy. In 2021 some senators once again proposed the idea under the Pakistan-Afghanistan Economic Development Act to allow textile and apparel goods from these areas to enter the U.S. duty-free. The aim each time has been economic benefits to stabilize the region.

- U.S. funding in areas like gender and economic empowerment addressing environmental challenges, and helping small businesses, and encouraging entrepreneurship should also continue.
- Climate change is another area of mutual interest. In the case of Pakistan, it could become an economic opportunity as this could be a way for Pakistan to modernize its agricultural sector, have extra surplus for exports especially as there will always be a need for food security. This is also an opportunity for the U.S. to help Pakistan relieve its energy problems.
- The U.S. has an interest in supporting those in Pakistan striving to strengthen the country's democratic institutions and the rule of law. American foreign policy choices can be instrumental in influencing the outcome. U.S. strategic interests may be bound up with whether Pakistan values democratic values over those of illiberal and autocratic regimes.
- Without appearing to intrude in domestic politics, the U.S. must make clear where it stands in its respect for media freedom, right to dissent, protection of religious freedom, and the rights of civil society in Pakistan.
- Fellowships, training and mentoring programs, professional training and teaching opportunities should be available to Pakistani journalists, think tankers, academics, and civil society personnel.