You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
When a user uses a multihop route that involves a non-whitelisted token as the first route tokenOut, the transaction is reverted. This should not happen. Even if this involves routing through potentially rogue tokens, it entails a sophisticated attack by a rogue operator.
In the opposite case, a rogue trader could route through a whitelisted-tokenOut-pair first, to then purchase a non-whitelisted token. This defies the scope of the token whitelist, so we either fix it or we remove the token whitelist entirely. At that point, we should keep track of owned tokens in an indexed mapping.
When a user uses a multihop route that involves a non-whitelisted token as the first route tokenOut, the transaction is reverted. This should not happen. Even if this involves routing through potentially rogue tokens, it entails a sophisticated attack by a rogue operator.
In the opposite case, a rogue trader could route through a whitelisted-tokenOut-pair first, to then purchase a non-whitelisted token. This defies the scope of the token whitelist, so we either fix it or we remove the token whitelist entirely. At that point, we should keep track of owned tokens in an indexed mapping.
The affected code part can be found here
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: