
SECURITY

Kettle Mystery Box Security Review



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1. About SBSecurity

SBSecurity is a duo of skilled smart contract security researchers. Based on the audits conducted and numerous vulnerabilities reported, we strive to provide the absolute best security service and client satisfaction. While it's understood that 100% security and bug-free code cannot be guaranteed by anyone, we are committed to giving our utmost to provide the best possible outcome for you and your product.

Book a Security Review with us at <u>sbsecurity.net</u> or reach out on Twitter <u>@Slavcheww.</u>

2. Disclaimer

A smart contract security review can only show the presence of vulnerabilities **but not their absence**. Audits are a time, resource, and expertise-bound effort where skilled technicians evaluate the codebase and their dependencies using various techniques to find as many flaws as possible and suggest security-related improvements. We as a company stand behind our brand and the level of service that is provided but also recommend subsequent security reviews, on-chain monitoring, and high whitehat incentivization.

3. Risk classification

	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: High	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: Medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: Low	Medium	Low	Low

3.1. Impact

- High leads to a significant loss of assets in the protocol or significantly harms a group of users.
- **Medium** leads to a moderate loss of assets in the protocol or some disruption of the protocol's functionality.
- Low funds are not at risk

3.2. Likelihood

- High almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or highly incentivized.
- Medium only conditionally possible, but still relatively likely.
- Low requires specific state or little-to-no incentive.

3.3. Action required for severity levels

- High Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed).
- Medium Should fix.
- Low Could fix.



4. Executive Summary

Kettle Mystery Box contracts have been audited through the <u>Hyacinth</u> platform.

Overview

Project	Kettle Mystery Box	
Repository	Private	
Commit Hash	fdde845685849c9aa75cfd68951c961 78466d634	
Resolution	300e25379e5cfe593ff2a429c02c800 39b6f0370	
Timeline	June 10, 2025	

Scope

MysteryBoxV2.sol

MysteryBoxRegistry.sol

Issues Found

Critical Risk	0
High Risk	0
Medium Risk	1
Low/Info Risk	0
Governance Risk	0



5. Findings

5.1. Medium severity

5.1.1. Mystery boxes can be griefed

Severity: Medium Risk

Description: Due to missing onlyOwner modifiers in the registerMysteryBox and unregisterMysteryBox functions of the MysteryBoxRegistry:

```
function registerMysteryBox(address mysteryBox) public {
    _isMysteryBox[mysteryBox] = true;
    emit BoxRegistered(mysteryBox, true);
}

function unregisterMysteryBox(address mysteryBox) public {
    _isMysteryBox[mysteryBox] = false;
    emit BoxRegistered(mysteryBox, false);
}
```

Anyone can use the functions to toggle the mystery boxes. If they're unregistered onlyMysteryBox, which is being used in the track functions, will be reverting, preventing the users from minting and revealing their prizes:

```
function mint(address minter) external {
    ...MORE CODE
    // Register the box with the registry
    registry.trackBox(tokenId, minter);
}

function trackBox(
    uint256 tokenId,
    address minter
) external onlyMysteryBox {//<----
    emit BoxTracked({
        boxContract: msg.sender,
        tokenId: tokenId,
        minter: minter
    });
}</pre>
```

Recommendation: Apply the onlyOwner modifier and set the new mystery boxes before their mint time opens.

Resolution: Fixed

