SALUS SECURITY

DEC 2025

# CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

DEPINSIM

# Overview

## Project Summary

- Name: DePinSIM - Token
- Platform: IoTeX
- Language: Solidity
- Repository:
  - https://github.com/DePinSIM/DepinsimTokenContract
- Audit Range: See Appendix - 1

# Project Dashboard

## Application Summary

| | |
|---|---|
| **Name** | DePinSIM - Token |
| **Version** | v2 |
| **Type** | Solidity |
| **Dates** | Dec 29 2025 |
| **Logs** | Dec 27 2025; Dec 29 2025 |

## Vulnerability Summary

| | |
|---|---|
| **Total High-Severity issues** | 0 |
| **Total Medium-Severity issues** | 0 |
| **Total Low-Severity issues** | 2 |
| **Total informational issues** | 2 |
| **Total** | 4 |

## Contact

E-mail: support@salusec.io

# Risk Level Description

| | |
|---|---|
| **High Risk** | The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users. |
| **Medium Risk** | The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact. |
| **Low Risk** | The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances. |
| **Informational** | The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth. |

# Content

# Introduction

## 1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (https://t.me/salusec), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

## 1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

## 1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issue

# Findings

## 2.1 Summary of Findings

| ID | Title | Severity | Category | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Missing vesting parameter validation may lock tokens beyond the intended end | Low | Data Validation | Resolved |
| 2 | Release() allows zero-amount releases, producing meaningless events | Low | Business Logic | Resolved |
| 3 | Redundant zero-address check for initialOwner | Informational | Redundancy | Resolved |
| 4 | Use of floating pragma | Informational | Configuration | Resolved |

## 2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

### 1. Missing vesting parameter validation may lock tokens beyond the intended end

| Severity: Low | Category: Data Validation |
| --- | --- |
| Target:<br>- contracts/TokenVesting.sol | |

### Description

In the TokenVesting contract, `createVestingSchedule()` does not validate the relationship between `cliffDuration`, `duration`, and `slicePeriodSeconds`. If `cliffDuration > duration`, then `cliff = start + cliffDuration` becomes later than `start + duration`.

contracts/TokenVesting.sol:L44-L81

```
function createVestingSchedule(...) external onlyOwner {
   require(beneficiary != address(0), "beneficiary is zero");
   require(duration > 0, "duration is zero");
   require(amount > 0, "amount is zero");
   require(slicePeriodSeconds >= 1, "slice < 1");
   require(getWithdrawableAmount() >= amount, "insufficient balance");

   bytes32 vestingScheduleId = computeNextVestingScheduleIdForHolder(beneficiary);
   uint64 cliff = start + cliffDuration;
  ...
}
```

Since `computeReleasableAmount` returns 0 when `block.timestamp < cliff`, beneficiaries may be unable to release any tokens even after the vesting "end" (`start + duration`) is reached. Similarly, if `slicePeriodSeconds > duration`, vesting may not progress during the vesting window (releasable amount stays 0) until the final "fully vested" branch is hit, which is often unintended.

### Recommendation

Add parameter validation in `createVestingSchedule()`, e.g.: `require(cliffDuration <= duration, "cliff > duration");`, `require(slicePeriodSeconds <= duration, "slice > duration");`

### Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit 3f2b482.

## 2. Release() allows zero-amount releases, producing meaningless events

| Severity: Low | Category: Business Logic |
| --- | --- |
| Target:<br>- contracts/TokenVesting.sol | |

## Description

`release(vestingScheduleId, amount)` allows `amount == 0`. This results in a successful call that updates no state but emits a `Released(vestingScheduleId, 0)` event, creating unnecessary on-chain noise and potentially confusing off-chain indexing/analytics and frontends.

contracts/TokenVesting.sol:L83-L98

```
function release(bytes32 vestingScheduleId, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {
   VestingSchedule storage vesting = vestingSchedules[vestingScheduleId];
   require(vesting.initialized, "not initialized");
   require(msg.sender == vesting.beneficiary || msg.sender == owner(), "not
authorized");

   uint256 releasableAmount = computeReleasableAmount(vesting);
   require(releasableAmount >= amount, "not releasable");
   ...
   emit Released(vestingScheduleId, amount);
}
```

## Recommendation

Reject zero-amount releases.

## Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit 3f2b482.

# 2.3 Informational Findings

### 3. Redundant zero-address check for initialOwner

| Severity: Informational | Category: Redundancy |
| --- | --- |
| Target:<br>- contracts/DEPINSIMToken.sol | |

## Description

The `initialize()` function validates `initialOwner != address(0)`. However, the project uses `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable v5.x`, where `__Ownable_init(initialOwner)` already reverts with `OwnableInvalidOwner(address(0))` when `initialOwner` is the zero address. Therefore, the extra `require(initialOwner != address(0))` is redundant and does not provide additional safety.

contracts/DEPINSIMToken.sol:L37-L48

```
function initialize(address initialOwner) public initializer {
    __ERC20_init("DEPINSIM Token", "ESIM");
    __ERC20Burnable_init();
    __ERC20Pausable_init();
    __Ownable_init(initialOwner);
    __UUPSUpgradeable_init();

    require(initialOwner != address(0), "Owner cannot be zero address");

    // Mint 1 billion tokens (1,000,000,000 * 10^18)
    _mint(initialOwner, 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** decimals());
}
```

## Recommendation

Remove the redundant code.

## Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit 3f2b482.

## 4. Use of floating pragma

| Severity: Informational | Category: Configuration |
| --- | --- |
| Target:<br>- All | |

## Description

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.22;
```

For example, the `DEPINSIMTokenContract` uses a floating compiler version ^0.8.22.

Using a floating pragma ^0.8.22 statement is discouraged, as code may compile to different bytecodes with different compiler versions. Use a locked pragma statement to get a deterministic bytecode. Also use the latest Solidity version to get all the compiler features, bug fixes and optimizations.

## Recommendation

It is recommended to use a locked Solidity version throughout the project. It is also recommended to use the most stable and up-to-date version.

## Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit 3f2b482.

# Appendix

## Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit eccf9ed:

| File | SHA-1 hash |
| --- | --- |
| DEPINSIMToken.sol | 9f8dff7002054e38da78e181ad97c9f94bbf6544 |
| TokenVesting.sol | 68dc0778a66abe1d366ede7da49b73b1376c7981 |