

SALUS SECURITY

SEP 2025



# CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

BITWAY LABS

# Overview

## Project Summary

- Name: Bitway Token
- Platform: EVM-compatible chains
- Language: Solidity
- Repository:
  - <https://github.com/bitwaylabs/evm-contracts/tree/main>
- Audit Range: See [Appendix - 1](#)

## Project Dashboard

### Application Summary

|         |                          |
|---------|--------------------------|
| Name    | Bitway Token             |
| Version | v2                       |
| Type    | Solidity                 |
| Dates   | Sep 13 2025              |
| Logs    | Sep 12 2025; Sep 13 2025 |

### Vulnerability Summary

|                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Total High-Severity issues   | 0 |
| Total Medium-Severity issues | 0 |
| Total Low-Severity issues    | 2 |
| Total informational issues   | 5 |
| Total                        | 7 |

## Contact

E-mail: [support@salusec.io](mailto:support@salusec.io)

## Risk Level Description

|                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| <b>High Risk</b>     | The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users. |
| <b>Medium Risk</b>   | The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.                  |
| <b>Low Risk</b>      | The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.                          |
| <b>Informational</b> | The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.  |

# Content

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>Introduction</b>  | <b>4</b>  |
| 1.1 About SALUS  | 4         |
| 1.2 Audit Breakdown  | 4         |
| 1.3 Disclaimer   | 4         |
| <b>Findings</b>  | <b>5</b>  |
| 2.1 Summary of Findings  | 5         |
| 2.2 Notable Findings   | 6         |
| 1. Centralization risk with initial token distribution             | 6         |
| 2. Lack of testing   | 7         |
| 2.3 Informational Findings   | 8         |
| 3. Duplicate Imports   | 8         |
| 4. Function Visibility Overly Permissive                           | 9         |
| 5. Lack of Security Contact Information for Responsible Disclosure | 10        |
| 6. Missing zero address checks                                     | 11        |
| 7. Use of floating pragma  | 12        |
| <b>Appendix</b>  | <b>13</b> |
| Appendix 1 - Files in Scope  | 13        |

# Introduction

## 1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (<https://t.me/salusec>), Twitter ([https://twitter.com/salus\\_sec](https://twitter.com/salus_sec)), or Email ([support@salusec.io](mailto:support@salusec.io)).

## 1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

## 1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

# Findings

## 2.1 Summary of Findings

| ID | Title   | Severity      | Category        | Status       |
|----|---|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1  | <a href="#">Centralization risk with initial token distribution</a> | Low           | Centralization  | Acknowledged |
| 2  | <a href="#">Lack of testing</a>                                     | Low           | Configuration   | Acknowledged |
| 3  | Duplicate Imports   | Informational | Redundancy      | Acknowledged |
| 4  | Function Visibility Overly Permissive                               | Informational | Code Quality    | Acknowledged |
| 5  | Lack of Security Contact Information for Responsible Disclosure     | Informational | Configuration   | Acknowledged |
| 6  | Missing zero address checks   | Informational | Data Validation | Acknowledged |
| 7  | Use of floating pragma  | Informational | Configuration   | Acknowledged |

## 2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

| 1. Centralization risk with initial token distribution                              |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| Severity: Low   | Category: Centralization |
| Target: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- contracts/BitwayToken.sol</li></ul> |                          |

### Description

contracts/BitwayToken.sol:L 19 - L24

```
constructor(  
    uint256 totalSupply,  
    address treasury  
) ERC20("Bitway Token", "BTW") ERC20Permit("Bitway Token") {  
    mint(treasury, totalSupply);  
}
```

When the contract is deployed, `\$BTW` is sent to one account. This account then has full control over the token distribution. If it is an EOA account, any compromise of its private key could drastically affect the project – for example, attackers could manipulate the price of `\$BTW` on the DEX if they gain access to the private key.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to transfer tokens to a multi-sig account and promote transparency by providing a breakdown of the intended initial token distribution in a public location.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

## 2. Lack of testing

Severity: Low

Category: Configuration

Target:

- test/BitwayToken.js

### Description

Currently, while a test file is present, it lacks any meaningful content, and the existing functionalities have not been validated against the expected behavior. This absence of proper testing increases the risk of undiscovered defects or regressions, which in turn may compromise the overall security, reliability, and maintainability of the contract. Comprehensive and well-structured test coverage is strongly recommended to ensure robust verification of critical functionalities.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to increase the test coverage.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.



## 2.3 Informational Findings

### 3. Duplicate Imports

Severity: Informational

Category: Redundancy

Target:

- contracts/BitwayToken.sol

### Description

In the `BitwayToken` contract, a duplicate import instance was found:

The `BitwayToken.sol` file imports `ERC20.sol` which is already imported as a result of importing `ERC20Permit.sol`.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to remove duplicate import statements and explicitly import ERC20 while importing ERC20Permit to improve the overall clarity and readability of the code base.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

## 4. Function Visibility Overly Permissive

Severity: Informational

Category: Code Quality

Target:

- contracts/BitwayToken.sol

### Description

The `burn()` function in the contract is declared with broader visibility than necessary (public instead of external). Overly permissive visibility can expose internal logic to unintended callers, increase the attack surface, and slightly increase gas costs. Functions intended to be called externally only do not need public visibility and could be declared external to better communicate intended usage and optimize gas.

contracts/BitwayToken.sol:L30 - L32

```
function burn(uint256 value) public {  
    _burn(_msgSender(), value);  
}
```

### Recommendation

Consider changing the visibility of the above function.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

## 5. Lack of Security Contact Information for Responsible Disclosure

Severity: Informational

Category: Configuration

Target:

- contracts/BitwayToken.sol

### Description

The contract `BitwayToken` does not specify a security contact point. Including a designated security contact (such as an email address or ENS name) in the contract's NatSpec header facilitates responsible vulnerability disclosure. This makes it easier for external researchers to quickly reach the appropriate team in the event a vulnerability is identified, helping minimize the time window between discovery and mitigation. The Ethereum community has begun standardizing this practice using the `@custom:security-contact` tag, adopted by tools such as OpenZeppelin Wizard and ethereum-lists.

### Recommendation

Consider adding a NatSpec comment at the top of the contract with a `@custom:security-contact` field pointing to the preferred disclosure channel.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

## 6. Missing zero address checks

Severity: Informational

Category: Data Validation

Target:

- contracts/BitwayToken.sol

### Description

It is considered a security best practice to verify addresses against the zero address during initialization or setting. However, this precautionary step is absent for address variables `treasury`.

contracts/BitwayToken.sol:L19 - L24

```
constructor(  
    uint256 totalSupply,  
    address treasury  
) ERC20("Bitway Token", "BTW") ERC20Permit("Bitway Token") {  
    _mint(treasury, totalSupply);  
}
```

### Recommendation

Consider adding zero address checks for address variables `treasury`.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

## 7. Use of floating pragma

Severity: Informational

Category: Configuration

Target:

- contracts/BitwayToken.sol

### Description

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
```

The `BitwayToken` uses a floating compiler version `^0.8.20`.

Using a floating pragma `^0.8.20` statement is discouraged, as code may compile to different bytecodes with different compiler versions. Use a locked pragma statement to get a deterministic bytecode. Also use the latest Solidity version to get all the compiler features, bug fixes and optimizations.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to use a locked Solidity version throughout the project. It is also recommended to use the most stable and up-to-date version.

### Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

# Appendix

## Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit [42ea743](#):

| File                      | SHA-1 hash                               |
|---------------------------|--|
| contracts/BitwayToken.sol | 8aab6792bb7e201ace2973484d53e9f56d41a413 |