

SALUS SECURITY

APR 2025



CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

NUTX

Overview

Project Summary

- Name: NUTX - Token
- Platform: EVM-compatible chains
- Language: Solidity
- Audit Range: See [Appendix - 1](#)

Project Dashboard

Application Summary

Name	NUTX - Token
Version	v2
Type	Solidity
Dates	Apr 29 2025
Logs	Apr 28 2025; Apr 29 2025

Vulnerability Summary

Total High-Severity issues	0
Total Medium-Severity issues	0
Total Low-Severity issues	1
Total informational issues	2
Total	3

Contact

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Risk Level Description

High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.

Content

Introduction	4
1.1 About SALUS	4
1.2 Audit Breakdown	4
1.3 Disclaimer	4
Findings	5
2.1 Summary of Findings	5
2.2 Notable Findings	6
1. Missing events for burnFrom() function	6
2.3 Informational Findings	7
2. Use of floating pragma	7
3. Missing two-step transfer ownership pattern	8
Appendix	9
Appendix 1 - Files in Scope	9

Introduction

1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (<https://t.me/salusec>), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Category	Status
1	Missing events for burnFrom() function	Low	Logging	Acknowledged
2	Use of floating pragma	Informational	Configuration	Acknowledged
3	Missing two-step transfer ownership pattern	Informational	Business logic	Acknowledged

2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

1. Missing events for burnFrom() function	
Severity: Low	Category: Logging
Target: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- NUTX.sol	

Description

Events allow capturing the changed parameters so that off-chain tools/interfaces can register such changes that allow users to evaluate them. Missing events do not promote transparency and if such changes immediately affect users' perception of fairness or trustworthiness, they could exit the protocol causing a reduction in protocol users.

In the NUTX contract, the event is lacking in the `burnFrom()` function.

contracts/CheckinSocial.sol:L202-L204

```
function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) public virtual {
    uint256 currentAllowance = allowance(account, _msgSender());
    require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds allowance");
    unchecked {
        _approve(account, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount);
    }
    _burn(account, amount);
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to emit events for the `burnFrom()` function.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

2.3 Informational Findings

2. Use of floating pragma

Severity: Informational

Category: Configuration

Target:

- NUTX.sol

Description

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.19;
```

The NUTX contract uses a floating compiler version ^0.8.19.

Using a floating pragma ^0.8.19 statement is discouraged, as code may compile to different bytecodes with different compiler versions. Use a locked pragma statement to get a deterministic bytecode. Also use the latest Solidity version to get all the compiler features, bug fixes and optimizations.

Recommendation

It is recommended to use a locked Solidity version throughout the project. It is also recommended to use the most stable and up-to-date version.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

3. Missing two-step transfer ownership pattern

Severity: Informational

Category: Business logic

Target:

- NUTX.sol

Description

The NUTX contract uses a custom function `_setOwner()` and `setAdmin()` which is a simple mechanism to transfer the ownership not supporting a two-step transfer ownership pattern. This simpler mechanism can be useful for quick tests, but projects with production concerns are likely to outgrow it. Transferring ownership is a critical operation and this could lead to transferring it to an inaccessible wallet or renouncing the ownership, e.g. mistakenly.

NUTX.sol:L558-L562,L580-L583

```
function _setOwner(address newOwner) private {
    address oldOwner = _owner;
    _owner = newOwner;
    emit OwnershipTransferred(oldOwner, newOwner);
}
function setAdmin(address _newAdmin) external onlyAdmin() {
    require(_newAdmin != address(0));
    adminAddress = _newAdmin;
}
```

Recommendation

Consider using the [Ownable2Step](#) contract from OpenZeppelin instead.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

Appendix

Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following file:

File	SHA-1 hash
NUTX.sol	3b5582062591051f26a5a2c1f92af85c82a905c1