

An introduction to Threshold PSI

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July 15, 2023

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What is threshold PSI

Threshold PSI is able to compute the elements that appear at least k times in n sets

Threshold PSI

There are n parties P_1, \dots, P_n where P_1 is the leader and $k \in [1, n - 1]$ denotes the threshold.

Input: For each $i \in [n]$, P_i inputs a set X_i of size m .

Output: For each $x \in X_1$, let $q_x = |\{i : x \in X_i \text{ for } i \in \{2, \dots, n\}\}|$. Then, output $Y = \{x \in X_1 : q_x \geq k\}$ to P_1 .

Simple approach

We can compute the result as follow

- 1 select subset $s \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and $|s| \geq k$
- 2 run multi-party PSI between X_j and get $X^s = \{x | x \in X_j, j \in s\}$
- 3 output $Y = \bigcap_{|s| \geq k, s \subseteq [n]} X^s$

The computation cost is at least $C_n^k + C_n^{k+1} + \dots + C_n^n$

inefficient and insecure !

Application

- Identifying High-Risk Individuals in the Spread of Disease
- Share ride
- Anonymous Voting and Consensus

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Efficient Linear Multiparty PSI and Extensions to Circuit/Quorum PSI

CCS 21

Preliminaries

Circuit-based PSI

The problem of circuit PSI was introduced in the 2 party setting and enables parties P_1 and P_2 , with their private input sets X and Y , respectively, to compute $f(X \cap Y)$, where f is any symmetric function

It allows to keep the intersection $X \cap Y$ secret from the parties while allowing to securely compute $f(X \cap Y)$

Applications: cardinality, set intersection sum and threshold cardinality/intersection

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Practical Multi-Party Private Set Intersection Protocols

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Preliminaries

Bloom Filters

A Bloom Filter, $BF = (BF[0], \dots, BF[j], \dots, BF[m-1])$ encodes a set S of length at most n into m bit string

chosen k hash function $h_i : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow [0, 1, \dots, m-1]$

for every $x \in S$, set $BF(h_i(x)) = 1$ where $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$, the other slot is **0**

Inverted Bloom Filter

for $j \in 0, 1, \dots, m-1$, set $IBF[j] = BF[j] + 1 \bmod 2$

Encrypted Bloom Filter

for $j \in 0, 1, \dots, m-1$, $EBF[j] = Enc_{pk}(BF[j])$, where pk is a public key of a secret key sk

Preliminaries

Threshold Paillier PKE

- (t,n) -threshold version of the Paillier's scheme
- Additive Homomorphism
- At least t shares of decryption can reconstruct the plaintext

Preliminaries

Kerschbaum et al. Secure Comparison Protocol, SCP

Given only their encrypted values $\text{Enc}(x_0)$ and $\text{Enc}(x_1)$ as input. The output is a single encrypted bit $\text{Enc}(b)$ and the encryption scheme is additive homomorphic (here is Paillier PKE)

In their protocol, \mathbb{Z}_p is represented by the upper half of the range $[0, p - 1]$ as negative, that is $[\lceil \frac{p}{2} \rceil, p - 1] \equiv [\lfloor -\frac{p}{2} \rfloor, -1]$

P_1 computes $(a_1^1, a_2^1, a_3^1) = (\text{Enc}(1), \text{Enc}(0), \text{Enc}(c))$ where

$$\text{Enc}(c) = (\text{Enc}(x_0)\text{Enc}(x_1))^{r_1}\text{Enc}(r_2) = \text{Enc}(r_1(x_0 - x_1) - r_2)$$

Preliminaries

For every party $P_i, 2 \leq i \leq t$, selects $r_2 < r_1$ and flips a coin $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$, sends (a_1^i, a_2^i, a_3^i) to P_{i+1} where

$$a_1^i = a_{1+b}^{i-1} \text{Enc}(0)$$

$$a_2^i = a_{2-b}^{i-1} \text{Enc}(0)$$

$$a_3^i = (a_3^{i-1})^{r_1} \text{Enc}(r_2)$$

All parties $P_i, 2 \leq i \leq t$, jointly decrypt a_t^3 to decide the result.

If $a_t^3 < 0$ then $a_t^1 = \text{Enc}(1)$, that is $[x_0 \leq x_1] = 1$, else $a_t^1 = \text{Enc}(0)$.

Main method

Local EBFs generation

Each client $P_i, 1 \leq i \leq t-1$

- 1 Computes their Bloom filter of their private data set S_i , where $1 \leq i \leq t-1$
- 2 Computes their encrypted Bloom filter EBF_i by encrypting each element of $BF_i[j]$ using pk
- 3 Forward their EBF_i to the server P_t

Result

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End

Thanks for your listening.