

# Unix (and Linux) Security

- ▶ Identification and Authentication
- ▶ Access Control
- ▶ Other security related things:
  - Devices, mounting filesystems
  - Search path
  - Race conditions
- ▶ NOTE: filenames may differ between OS/distributions

# Users

- ▶ Principals have unique UID
  - System cares about ID, not name
  - Several users can have different names but same ID. Then they are treated as the same.
- ▶ Superuser (root) has  $\text{UID} = 0$ 
  - There is only one superuser
- ▶ Stored in `/etc/passwd`
- ▶ Processes are subjects.

# UIDs for Processes


- ▶ Real user ID – The ID of the logged in principal
  - Can only be changed by root (effective user ID = 0) → this is how login works
- ▶ Effective user ID – The ID used for access control
  - Can be changed by root (effective user ID = 0) to anything
    - Used by processes with effective user ID = 0 when they temporarily access files as a less privileged user
  - Can be changed by anyone (any effective user ID) to real user ID
    - This process has to be able to get back to effective user ID = 0
- ▶ Same rules apply to group ID

# Groups

- ▶ Can not associate multiple user IDs with one file
  - We have to put users in groups if we want several users to have access to the file
- ▶ Every user belongs to a primary group.
- ▶ Older Unix: Can only be in one group at a time
- ▶ Newer Unix and Linux: Can be in several groups at the same time
  - New files are associated with current group ID of user
  - Process group ID is the current group ID of user running the process
- ▶ Change group (newgrp)
- ▶ Primary group given in /etc/passwd
- ▶ Other groups in /etc/group
  - A group can not belong to a group

```
users:x:100:  
Students:x:1000:alice,bob
```

# Authentication



- ▶ Salt is always used
- ▶ Hash function and salt will depend on OS
- ▶ We look at three variants

# Traditional crypt (Password Hashing)

- ▶ Design dates back to 1976
- ▶ Based on DES
- ▶ Password up to 8 characters, salt 12 bits
  - Take least significant 7 bits → 56 bit key
  - Encrypt zero string 25 times with DES
  - If bit  $i = 1$  in salt, swap bits  $i$  and  $i + 24$  in E-box output
  - Output  $12 + 64 = 76$  bits. Encode to 13 characters.
- ▶ **Problems:** Short passwords, short salts, constant cost (and fast function)

# Other Alternatives – MD5 crypt

- ▶ MD5 crypt
  - Developed for FreeBSD to avoid export restrictions and allow longer passwords (up to  $2^{64}$  bits)
  - Algorithm uses 1000 iterations → slow
  - Salt 12-48 bits
  - Output: \$1\$ 'salt' \$ 128 bit hash output
- ▶ **Problem:** Constant cost

# Other Alternatives – bcrypt

- ▶ Based on block cipher blowfish
- ▶ Password up to 72 characters, 128 bit random salt
- ▶ Internal loop with variable cost
- ▶ Output \$2a\$cost\$salt + 192 bit hash output
- ▶ Default in OpenBSD
- ▶ **All problems solved**





# Comparison

	DES crypt	MD5 crypt	bcrypt
Password length	max 8 chars	virtually any	max 72 chars
Salt length	12 bits	12-48 bits	128 bits
Variable cost	No	No	Yes
Eval/sec	8 000 000	140 000	500

- ▶ Eval/sec based on 3.4 GHz processor with 4 cores, approximate values given
- ▶ The given performance for bcrypt is for a cost of 8

# Final words on our password discussion

- ▶ "All problems solved" is kind of bullshit
- ▶ Some devices can be really fast to a low cost
  - With enough money they are really really really fast
  - Several instances can be implemented in parallel
- ▶ Can no longer compare
  - CPU – "needed" when verifying password
  - GPU, FPGA, ASIC – used by attackers
- ▶ Make this more fair by making hashing more difficult (costly) for GPUs, FPGAs and ASICs
- ▶ **Example:** scrypt – requires *memory* as well as CPU cycles



FPGA/ASIC



GPU

# The File `/etc/passwd`

- ▶ Store user (principal) information

Format:

```
Username:password:UID:GID:ID string:home directory:login shell
```

- ▶ File is world readable
- ▶ Example:

```
alice:x:1004:100:Alice:/home/alice:/bin/bash  
bob:x:1005:100:Bob:/home/bob:/bin/bash
```

# The File /etc/shadow

- ▶ Save passwords in a non-world readable file
  - Username
  - (hashed) password
  - Date of last change (days since Jan 1, 1970)
  - Minimum days between password changes (0 means anytime)
  - Maximum days of validity
  - Days in advance to warn user about change
  - Days account is active after password expired
  - Date of account disabling (days since Jan 1, 1970)
  - Last entry is reserved

```
alice:9SuDfhDz3112U:13920:30:180:7:2:14609:  
bob:IBDXWbkBirMfU:13920:0:99999:7:::
```

# Access Control

- ▶ **Discretionary access control** – owner of file can change permissions
- ▶ Three categories: User (owner), Group, Other (world)
- ▶ Three access rights: Read, Write, Execute

```
alice@home:>ls -l
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 2 alice Students 48 2008-02-13 16:36 directory
-rw-rw-r-- 1 alice Students 22 2008-02-13 16:37 file1
-rw-r--r-- 1 alice Students  9 2008-02-13 16:37 file2
```

## Other info from ls -l

Link counter, owner, group, size, date of last change, name

# Order of Checking

1. Owner
2. Group
3. Other

## Consequence:

if owner = r and other = rw then owner has no write permission

```
alice@home:>ls -l
total 0
-r--rw-rw- 1 alice Students 0 2008-02-13 16:52 file
alice@home:>echo hello > file
bash: file: Åtkomst nekas
```

```
bob@home:>ls -l
total 0
-r--rw-rw- 1 alice Students 0 2008-02-13 16:52 file
bob@home:>echo hello > file
bob@home:>■
```

# Permissions For Directories

- ▶ Read = list the directory
- ▶ Write = Delete, rename and insert files in directory
- ▶ Execute = access directory and access files in directory

```
alice@home:>ls -la
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x 2 alice Students 72 2008-02-14 05:19 .
drwxr-xr-x 8 alice Students 384 2008-02-14 05:19 ..
-rw-rw-rw- 1 alice Students 0 2008-02-14 05:19 file
alice@home:>rm file
rm: kan inte ta bort "file": Åtkomst nekas
```

```
alice@home:>ls -la
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 alice Students 72 2008-02-14 05:26 .
drwxr-xr-x 8 alice Students 384 2008-02-14 05:19 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 2008-02-14 05:26 file
alice@home:>rm -f file
alice@home:>■
```

# Change Permissions – chmod

- ▶ Used to change permissions on files
- ▶ Mnemonics can be used: **u**ser, **g**roup, **o**ther, **a**ll, **r**ead **w**rite **e**xecute.
- ▶ Examples:  
`chmod u+rw file`  
`chmod u=r file`  
`chmod a+rw file`  
`chmod u-w,g+r,o+r file`  
`chmod a-rwx,u+r file1 file2`



# Change Permissions – chmod

- ▶ Alternatively, numbers can be used.
- ▶ See each group of permissions as one number.
  - Read = 4
  - Write = 2
  - Execute = 1
- ▶ Example:

Sum gives permission

chmod 754 file



Read permission for others

Read and execute for group

Read, write and execute for user

```
alice@home:>chmod 754 file; ls -l file  
-rwxr-xr-- 1 alice Students 46 2008-02-13 12:02 file
```

# Setuid and Setgid (programs)

- ▶ Controlled invocation
- ▶ Effective ID of process is ID of program owner (usually root)
  - Here is the situation when RUID  $\neq$  EUID
- ▶ Used to temporarily change access rights
- ▶  $x$  is replaced by  $s$

```
alice@home:>ls -l
total 16
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root root 6378 2008-02-13 15:16 prog_setgid
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 6378 2008-02-13 14:58 prog_setuid
alice@home:>./prog_setuid &
[1] 12189
alice@home:>./prog_setgid &
[2] 12190
alice@home:>ps -C prog_setgid,prog_setuid -o pid,ruser,euser,rgroup,egroup,args
  PID RUSER   EUSER   RGROUP   EGROUP   COMMAND
12189 alice    root    Students Students ./prog_setuid
12190 alice    alice   Students root      ./prog_setgid
```

# Setuid and Setgid (Directories)

- ▶ Setuid on directory usually ignored
- ▶ Setgid on directory causes new files to get the same group as directory

```
alice@home:>ls -l
total 0
drwxr-s--- 2 alice root 48 2008-02-13 15:37 directory
alice@home:>cd directory; touch file; ls -l
total 0
-rw-r----- 1 alice root 0 2008-02-13 15:37 file
```

Without setgid, file would get the group which is current group ID for user (set by newgrp and defaults to primary group).

Allows users to share files more easily

# Important SUID Programs

- ▶ **/usr/bin/passwd**      change password
- ▶ **/usr/bin/at**              batch job submission
- ▶ **/bin/su**                  change UID program

```
alice@home:>ls -l /usr/bin/passwd /bin/su /usr/bin/at
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 31668 2006-04-23 08:48 /bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root trusted 43940 2006-05-02 09:47 /usr/bin/at
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root shadow 72836 2006-05-02 10:50 /usr/bin/passwd
```

*Setuid and setgid:*

chmod u+s file or chmod 4XXX file

chmod g+s file or chmod 2XXX file

# Sticky Bit

- ▶ Historically used to keep program code in memory when exiting program (still the case in, e.g. HP-UX)
- ▶ Now used to only let owner delete file
  - directory owner and superuser can also delete it

```
bob@home:>ls -la
totalt 0
drwxrwxr-t 2  alice Students 72 2008-02-13 16:17 .
drwxr-x--- 3  alice Students 80 2008-02-13 16:00 ..
-rw-rw-r-- 1  alice Students  0 2008-02-13 16:17 file
bob@home:>rm file
rm: kan inte ta bort "file": Operationen inte tillåten
bob@home:>ls -la
totalt 0
drwxrwxr-x 2  alice Students 72 2008-02-13 16:17 .
drwxr-x--- 3  alice Students 80 2008-02-13 16:00 ..
-rw-rw-r-- 1  alice Students  0 2008-02-13 16:17 file
bob@home:>rm file
bob@home:>■
```

- ▶ Typical example: the directory /tmp has sticky bit set

# Default Access Rights (umask)

- ▶ Control default permissions, stored in /etc/profile
- ▶ Override in ~/.profile or in prompt
- ▶ umask tells which permissions to **exclude** by default
- ▶ Access = full access AND NOT(umask)
  - Full access for programs and directories: 0777
  - Full access for files: 0666


```
alice@home:>umask 0027; mkdir directory; touch file; ls -l
total 0
drwxr-x--- 2 alice Students 48 2008-02-13 12:33 directory
-rw-r----- 1 alice Students 0 2008-02-13 12:33 file
```

# Change Owner and Group (chown and chgrp)

- ▶ chown is used to change the owner of a file (or directory)
- ▶ chgrp is used to change the group of a file (or directory)
  - chown can set group also
- ▶ **Possible problem:** A user creates a suid program and owner gets changed to root
- ▶ **Common solution:**
  - Only root can change owner and setuid and setgid bits are removed when owner is changed
  - Anyone can change group to a group they are member of, but setuid and setgid bits are removed when group is changed
- ▶ **Other solutions possible**
  - Let only root use chown, but preserve setuid and setgid bits
  - Let any user change owner on his/her own files, but remove setuid and setgid bits

# Unix security on the Man-Machine Scale

- ▶ Lack of "flexibility" puts it more to the machine end of the scale
- ▶ Limited to read, write and execute
  - E.g., "shutdown computer" does not exist but may exist in more user-focused environments
  - Can still be implemented though, using the basic access rights





# Example: Shutdown in Unix/Linux

- ▶ Shutdown can be done with
  - `/sbin/shutdown`
  - `/sbin/halt`
  - `/sbin/reboot`
- ▶ Only root can use these
- ▶ **Problem:** Allow some users to shutdown
- ▶ **Solution** (one of several):
  - Add group "shutdown" in `/etc/group`
  - Add users to this group  
`shutdown:x:1500:alice,bob`
  - Use `chown` or `chgrp` to change group of `/sbin/shutdown`  
`chown root:shutdown /sbin/shutdown` or `chgrp shutdown /sbin/shutdown`
  - Allow group shutdown to execute and set SUID bit since only root is allowed to execute this command  
`chmod u+s,g+x /sbin/shutdown`

# The inode

- ▶ Stores file information
- ▶ Directory contains filename and inode number

```
alice@home:>ls -i  
133143 file1 133144 file2 133145 file3 133143 file4
```



Note that file1 and file4  
points to the same  
inode

- ▶ inode contains e.g.:
  - Access rights
  - Owner (UID)
  - Group (GID)
  - Time of latest access, modification and change
  - Size of file
  - Pointers to block of data

# inode Information (stat)

- ▶ Some information about an inode can be found using `stat`

```
alice@home:>stat file
  File: "file"
  Size: 102          Blocks: 8          IO Block: 4096   normal fil
Device: 802h/2050d  Inode: 133060       Links: 1
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--)  Uid: ( 1004/  alice)   Gid: ( 1000/Students)
Access: 2009-02-03 12:30:50.000000000 +0100
Modify: 2009-02-03 12:12:00.000000000 +0100
Change: 2009-02-03 12:30:59.000000000 +0100
alice@home:>■
```

Size in bytes

Inode number

Last access

Access rights  
given to this file

Last  
modification of  
inode

Last  
modification of  
file

# Copy files


- ▶ Files can be copied in two ways
- ▶ `cp src dest`
  - Creates a new inode and new physical file owned by user running `cp`
- ▶ `ln target linkname`
  - Creates filename and pointer to target's inode. No new file is created.
  - When one filename is deleted the other is still there and the file is not deleted
  - `rm` subtracts the number of links in the inode by 1. If it becomes zero the corresponding data block is freed
- ▶ `ln -s target linkname`
  - Creates a symbolic link, not a real link
  - When opening symbolic link for reading or writing link is automatically dereferenced
  - If file is deleted, the symbolic link remains, pointing to nothing

# Race conditions

- ▶ Assume process "proc" with effective user ID = 0 writes to files in /tmp directory
  - Process creates e.g., /tmp/file and writes temporary data to this file
- ▶ What if malicious user creates /tmp/file as symbolic link to /etc/passwd?
  - The file /etc/passwd will be overwritten since "proc" has write access to this file
  - System is damaged
- ▶ **Race condition:** Who creates the file first

# Solutions To This Race Condition

- ▶ Create files with unpredictable filenames in /tmp
  - Still, attacker can try thousands of filenames and will succeed with probability  $> 0$
- ▶ Use `O_EXCL` flag when opening file
  - Then open fails if file already exists
- ▶ Check if file was opened through a symbolic link
  - Can be done with `lstat()`
- ▶ All of the above should be used



Function `mkstemp()`  
will do this

# Protection of devices

- ▶ Devices are treated as files
- ▶ **Example:** If you can read/write physical memory all access control is overruled!
- ▶ **/dev/mem** is the physical memory
- ▶ **/dev/kmem** is the virtual memory

# Mounting File Systems

- ▶ Different physical devices put under a single root “/”
- ▶ The mounted file system may contain unwelcome programs
  - nosuid – turn off SUID and SGID bits
  - noexec – no binaries can be executed
  - nodev – no devices can be accessed
  - ro – read-only
- ▶ UIDs and GIDs are local identifiers that need not be interpreted the same on different Unix systems
  - Use *global unique* identifiers



# Searchpath

- ▶ When executing programs, system needs to know where to look for it → PATH tells system where to look
- ▶ `PATH=. : $HOME/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:`
  - Programs can be located in current directory + 3 bin directories
  - Trojan horse
- ▶ Can be a bad idea to put your current directory in the search path (especially for programs executed by root)
- ▶ Alternatively, call program by full name

# TCP Wrapper (not included in course from 2015)

- ▶ `inetd` is a super-server daemon (starts other servers)
- ▶ Config file `inetd.conf` maps port numbers to programs

```
ftp      stream tcp nowait root  /usr/sbin/in.ftpd      in.ftpd
telnet   stream tcp nowait root  /usr/sbin/in.telnetd   in.telnetd
```

- ▶ Put intermediate program with access control and logging

```
ftp      stream tcp nowait root  /usr/sbin/tcpd         in.ftpd
telnet   stream tcp nowait root  /usr/sbin/tcpd         in.telnetd
```

- ▶ The TCP wrapper (`tcpd`) will have process name (`in.ftpd` and `in.telnetd`) and thus know where to go after security controls are done

# Network Access Control (not included in course from 2015)

- ▶ /etc/hosts.allow: (daemon, client) pair that is allowed access
- ▶ /etc/hosts.deny: (daemon, client) pair that is denied access

## Example

file: /etc/hosts.allow

```
ALL : localhost  
ALL : 192.168.1.2  
sshd : ALL EXCEPT .somedomain.com
```

file: /etc/hosts.deny

```
ALL : ALL
```

*Priority:*

1. Check hosts.allow
2. Check hosts.deny
3. Allow access

Compare with allow/deny  
in Windows!