ISLAMIC RULE AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR AND PIOUS

Meyersson (2014)

Presented by "Alper Sukru Gencer"

New York University

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Overview

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- Turkey is a useful testing ground for evaluating the consequences of Islamic political representation as it has experienced Islamic party participation in the democratic process for a long period.
- In 1994, Turkey experienced a seismic political change when the pro-Islamic Refah Party became the second-largest party in terms of votes, giving political Islam unprecedented representation in the democratic system.

Turkey's Demographic Shift and Local Government

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- Although primary education is mandatory, significant gender inequalities remain, and Turkey ranked 121st out of 128 countries included in a recent Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum.
- The current mixed-sex education curriculum remains heavily influenced by its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and required students to forego wearing religious symbols in school, including the headscarf for women (by 2014)

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- By the mid-1990s, the party had struck a chord among a broader segment of Turkish voters by positioning itself as pro-Islamic, anti-West, and anti-establishment.
- As tensions between social groups escalated throughout the 1990s, educational facilities became one of several contended platforms where an increasingly concentrated mass of poorer and religiously conservative individuals found the content of, and restrictions to, education incongruous to their preferences.

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- Comparing municipal outcomes by whether an Islamic or secular mayor was elected is problematic as the assignment of mayor type is not random.
- The RD design is used to exploit a discontinuity in the treatment assignment to identify a causal effect.
- The main method employed in this paper is local linear regressions.

Main Data Description

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- Islamic parties received about 20% of the national vote share and won 329 mayoral seats in 1994.
- The forcing variable used in the RD design is defined as the difference in vote share between the largest Islamic party and the largest secular party, resulting in a cutoff point at zero.

Difference in Vote Share (2 Percentage Point)



Figure 1: The diagonal line is the hypothetical one-to-one relationship between the two variables in an election with only two parties.

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- Matching municipalities across time periods is done manually, and there is some loss of observations when combining the data set of the 1994 election and the 2000 census.

Summary Statistics

TABLE I

SUMMARY STATISTICS[a]

	Mayor Type			Difference
	All	Islamic	Secular	(2) – (3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Est.
	(S.D.)	(S.D.)	(S.D.)	(S.E.)
Main outcome variables				
Share women aged 15–20 with high school education	0.163	0.140	0.166	−0.026***
	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.006)
Share men aged 15–20 with high school education	0.192	0.196	0.192	0.004
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.005)
Main explanatory variable				
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.120	1.000	0.000	1.000
	(0.325)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Covariates				
Islamic vote share 1994	0.139	0.415	0.101	0.313***
	(0.154)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.007)
Number of parties receiving votes 1994	5.541	5.889	5.494	0.395**
	(2.192)	(3.019)	(2.050)	(0.131)
Log population in 1994	7.840	8.315	7.775	0.540***
	(1.188)	(1.767)	(1.070)	(0.071)
Population share below 19 in 2000	0.405	0.445	0.400	0.046***
	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.005)
Population share above 60 in 2000	0.092	0.073	0.095	−0.022***
	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.002)
Gender ratio in 2000	1.073	1.076	1.073	0.003
	(0.253)	(0.117)	(0.266)	(0.015)
Household size in 2000	5.835	6.445	5.752	0.693***
	(2.360)	(2.147)	(2.376)	(0.141)
District center	0.345	0.394	0.338	0.056
	(0.475)	(0.489)	(0.473)	(0.029)
Province center	0.023	0.067	0.017	0.050***
	(0.149)	(0.250)	(0.129)	(0.009)
Sub-metro center	0.022	0.076	0.014	0.062***
	(0.146)	(0.266)	(0.119)	(0.009)
Observations	2629	315	2314	2629

Density within the Vicinity (2%)



Figure 3: Density within the Vicinity (2%)

Density Test



(b) Density test

Figure 4: McCrary (2008) Density Test

Covariate Balance Test



Empirical Findings - 1

- Shares of 15-20 Years with High School Degree



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

Empirical Findings - 3

TABLE II

ISLAMIC RULE AND HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION[a]

Outcome	Completed High School in 2000								Enrollment
Age Cohort	15–20								15–30
Control Function	None		Linear				Quadratic	Cubic	Linear
Bandwidth	Global		$\hat{h}$		$\hat{h}/2$	$2\hat{h}$	$\hat{h}$	$\hat{h}$	$\hat{h}$
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Women									
Outcome mean	0.163	0.163	0.152	0.152	0.144	0.166	0.152	0.152	0.127
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.026***	0.012**	0.032***	0.028***	0.032***	0.022***	0.028***	0.043***	0.014***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.005)
Bandwidth	1.000	1.000	0.240	0.240	0.120	0.480	0.240	0.240	0.205
R^2	0.01	0.55	0.03	0.65	0.65	0.58	0.65	0.65	0.48
Observations	2629	2629	1020	1020	589	2049	1020	1020	904

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Figure 8: Estimates Based on Different Bandwidths

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- Reveals an RD estimate of a 3.2 percentage point treatment effect on female high school education in column 3, and is statistically significant at 1 percent

Sensitivity Analysis

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  - For men, sometimes positive and significant estimates, but most are smaller and less precise than those for women.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

TABLE V

HETEROGENEOUS RD TREATMENT EFFECTS[a]

Outcome	High School Attainment Among 15–20			
	Women		Men	
Sample	Above Median (1)	Below Median (2)	Above Median (3)	Below Median (4)
Panel A: Sample split at median literacy share				
Outcome mean	0.200	0.104	0.218	0.173
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.017	0.029***	0.010	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
p-value	0.362		0.834	
Bandwidth	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250
Observations	524	524	525	525
Panel B: Sample split at median share of religious buildings				
Outcome mean	0.140	0.161	0.191	0.198
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.036***	0.011	0.006	0.018*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
p-value	0.096		0.360	
Bandwidth	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250
Observations	517	517	518	518
Panel C: Sample split at median Islamic vote share				
Outcome mean	0.125	0.179	0.188	0.203
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.027***	−0.004	0.007	0.020
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.016)
p-value	0.077		0.470	
Bandwidth	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250
Observations	524	525	525	526

Figure 9: Baseline Model with Income Outcome

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  - Refah's policies helped to make extracurricular education facilities more amenable to religious conservatives, lowering the cost of participation for a sizable group of parents.
  - Neglect of the headscarf ban was a more direct barrier to female participation in education that Refah tackled by explicit unwillingness to enforce the ban.

Long Term Effects:

TABLE VII

RD TREATMENT EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC RULE ON EDUCATION IN 2011[a]

Outcome	High School				Unmarried	
Age Cohort	15–19		15–29		15–19	
Gender	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Global OLS						
Outcome mean	0.193	0.189	0.347	0.420	0.915	0.995
Model 1. Unconditional estimates						
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.021***	−0.007	−0.047***	−0.010	−0.002	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Model 2. Conditional estimates						
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.006	0.010*	0.010	0.022**	0.006	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Bandwidth	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	2338	2338	2338	2338	2338	2338
Panel B: Conditional local linear RD						
Outcome mean	0.186	0.182	0.334	0.415	0.912	0.995
Model 1. Bandwidth $= \hat{h}$						
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.017*	0.011	0.022**	0.027*	0.013**	−0.000
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Bandwidth	0.239	0.199	0.263	0.227	0.280	0.271
Observations	879	766	950	840	1009	976
Model 2. Bandwidth $= \hat{h}/2$						
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.033**	−0.007	0.032*	0.034**	0.008	−0.000
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Bandwidth	0.119	0.100	0.131	0.114	0.140	0.136
Observations	508	420	544	482	581	554
Model 3. Bandwidth $= 2\hat{h}$						
Islamic mayor	0.017**	0.013	0.021**	0.022*	0.008*	−0.000

Long Term Effects: Education

TABLE VIII

VOTING FOR ISLAMIC PARTIES AND FEMALE POLITICIANS[a]

Outcome	Islamic Party Vote Shares in Local and National Elections					Shares of Women in 2009 Municipal Council From		
Election Type	National	National	Local	National	Local	All	Islamic	Secular
Year	1999	2002	2004	2007	2009	Parties	Parties	Parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Global OLS								
Outcome mean	0.153	0.360	0.396	0.478	0.445	0.027	0.012	0.015
Model 1. Unconditional estimates								
Islamic mayor in 1994	0.175***	0.213***	0.068***	0.208***	0.157***	0.004	0.009**	−0.005*
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Joint p-value	0.046							
Model 2. Conditional estimates								
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.017	−0.027*	−0.005	−0.026**	0.017	0.005	0.002	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Joint p-value	0.046							
Bandwidth	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Observations	2540	2554	2659	2539	2355	2232	2232	2232

(*Continues*)

Figure 11: Long-Term Effects

Islamic Preferences and Women's Participation in Politics:

TABLE VIII—*Continued*

Outcome	Islamic Party Vote Shares in Local and National Elections					Shares of Women in 2009 Municipal Council From		
Election Type	National	National	Local	National	Local	All	Islamic	Secular
Year	1999	2002	2004	2007	2009	Parties	Parties	Parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B: Conditional local linear RD								
Outcome mean	0.224	0.444	0.434	0.570	0.523	0.031	0.018	0.012
Model 1. Bandwidth $= \hat{h}$								
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.019	−0.025	−0.017	−0.014	0.009	0.011**	0.005	0.008*
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Joint p-value	0.031							
Bandwidth	0.282	0.316	0.167	0.284	0.140	0.224	0.217	0.174
Observations	1128	1274	797	1139	592	799	785	660
Model 2. Bandwidth $= \hat{h}/2$								
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.037*	−0.013	−0.061*	−0.017	−0.024	0.016*	0.009	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Joint p-value	0.016							
Bandwidth	0.141	0.158	0.084	0.142	0.070	0.112	0.109	0.087
Observations	647	716	423	657	314	456	444	349
Model 3. Bandwidth $= 2\hat{h}$								
Islamic mayor in 1994	−0.024*	−0.030**	−0.011	−0.023*	0.047*	0.007*	0.007**	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Joint p-value	0.000							
Bandwidth	0.564	0.631	0.334	0.568	0.280	0.448	0.435	0.348
Observations	2390	2502	1415	2397	1024	1611	1562	1222

[a]The table reports results for outcomes from the five elections occurring in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2009. Columns 1–5 have Islamic vote shares as the outcome. Column 6 has the female share of municipal council members from all parties as the outcome, while columns 7 and 8 have the female shares of municipal council members from Islamic and secular parties, respectively. Panel A reports standard OLS estimates for the entire sample with (Model 1) and without (Model 2) controls. Panel B reports results from local linear RD specifications with covariates and bandwidth sizes $\hat{h}$, $\hat{h}/2$, and $2\hat{h}$ in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The bandwidth $\hat{h}$ is determined by the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) algorithm. All RD specifications include a linear control for the Islamic win margin on each

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