

Can Exposure to Atypical Non-Extremist Out-Group Platforms Reduce Partisan Animosity?

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 - What is the causal mechanism between beliefs about others and partisan animosity?

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 - **H2:** Exposure → less confidence and higher cognitive effort when evaluating issue positions into social categories

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- **Mediators:** Beliefs about the distribution of outgroup ideology
- **Outcomes:** Partisan animosity, affective polarization, perceived beliefs about out-group

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Treatment

Haber
Yesterday at 4:45am · 🌐

İstanbul Sözleşmesi'ni fesheden ilk ülke Türkiye oldu.



👍👍👍 258 21 Comments 10 Shares

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View more 45 Comments

15 Mesut Battacı: Bence kadınılarımız için daha fazla toplumsal özgürlük sağlanmalı. Kızlarımız da annelerimiz de tamamen özgürce kamusal hayatta yer alabilmek. Kadınılarımızın yetenekleri ve potansiyelleriyle dolu olduğunu gösterebiliriz, onları daha fazla destekleyelim.

👍👍👍 12

Like Reply 1h

10 Mevlüt Demir: Bakın, toplumsal özgürlük elbette önemli, ama kadınılarımızın korunmasını kaidirmek da riskli olabilir. İşte böyle, kadınılarımızı korumak için var olan düzenlemeleri kaldırmadan da özgürlüğü destekleyebiliriz. Benim endişem, bu korumaların kaldırılmasının kadınılarımızı güçsüzleştirilmesini. Eğer adımlar atarsak, dengeli ve ihtiyatlı olmayız.

👍👍👍 6

Like Reply 1h

15 Mesut Battacı: Haklısın Mevlüt Demir. Elbette kadınılarımızın güvenliği ve korunması da önemli. Ama aynı zamanda, kadınılarımızı daha fazla sosyal özgürlük verenken bu korumaları göz ardı etmemeliyiz. Onları güçlendirecek, eğilecek ve destekleyecek adımlar atmamız gerekiyor. Böylece güçlü ve özgür kadınılarımızı daha güçlü bir Türkiye yaratırız.

👍👍👍 7

Like Reply 1h

10 Mevlüt Demir: Aynen Dedğin gibi, denge önemli. Kadınılarımızın korunmasını sağlayarak, aynı zamanda onların da sosyal hayatta özgürce yer almasını desteklemeliyiz. Özgürlüğü kısıtlamadan, kadınılarımızı güçlendirecek politikaları düşünmeliyiz. Hep birlikte daha iyi bir gelecek için çalışalım!

👍👍👍 6

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- Dictator game: Money allocation
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④ **Cognitive Load:** Asking them to remember a 5-digit number in mind before treatment

- **Goal:** Long terms effects of Exposure:
 - Recruitment for a two-week experiment
 - daily exposure to non-stereotypical and non-extremist outgroup YouTube videos

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According to Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey (2020)

- High social distance:
 - 75% did not want their child to marry outgroup members
 - 72% did not want to do business with outgroup members
 - 67% did not want their children to play with the children of outgroup members
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 - To the supporters of their party: patriotic (87%), working to the benefit of the country (86%), honorable (85%), open-minded (84%), smart (83%), and generous (80%),
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- Widespread political intolerance
 - 34% objected to outgroup members undertaking political roles
 - 48% gave consent to phone tapping of the outgroup members