

Can Stereotypes-based Interventions in Beliefs about Out-group Reduce Partisan Animosity?

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October 31, 2023

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- **Methodology:**

- ① **Empirically-Derived Intervention Strategy:**

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 - ③ Disentangling causal mechanisms by directly intervening beliefs on the most divisive issues and stereotypical positions

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- Red-Hair is the most **representative type** (*the exemplar*) that most agents can easily recall and associate with being Irish (**stereotypical**).

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of outgroup members do not support the stereotypical position.

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- Only use the issues that $Pr(Extreme|OtherGroup) < 50\%$ to boost the effectiveness

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- **Outcomes:** Partisan animosity and affective polarization

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
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5 Information to challenge outgroup stereotypes:

$(100 - Pr(Str. Disagree|Gov) * 100) = 100 - 15.2 = 84.8\%$ of Government supporters believe there are some forms of violence against women.



Treatment Arm - 2



Figure: An example Facebook news article post on Turkey being the first country to revoke the Istanbul Convention.

Treatment

258

21 Comments 10 Shares



Like



Share

View more 45 Comments



Mesut Baltacı Bence kadınlarımız için daha fazla toplumsal özgürlük sağlanmalı. Kızlarımız da annelerimiz de tamamen özgürce kamusal hayatta yer alabilmeli. Kadınlarımızın yetenekleri ve potansiyelleriyle dolu olduğunu gösterelim, onları daha fazla destekleyelim.

12

Like · Reply · 1h



Mevlüt Demir Bakın, toplumsal özgürlük elbette önemli, ama kadınlarımızın korunmasını kaldırmak da riskli olabilir. İşte böyle, kadınlarımızı korumak için var olan düzenlemeleri kaldırmadan da özgürlüğü destekleyebiliriz. Benim endişem, bu korumaların kaldırılmasının kadınlarımızı güçsüzleştirilebilmesi. Eğer adımlar atacaksak, dengeli ve ihtiyatlı olmalıyız.

9

Like · Reply · 1h

Figure: Example responses. Both individuals suggest they support the Istanbul Convention. They have different reasons.

Treatment




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


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- ② Treatment prompted on a crowded Facebook page with many other posts

- **Goal:** Long terms effects of Exposure:
 - Recruitment for a two-week experiment
 - daily exposure to non-stereotypical and non-extremist outgroup YouTube videos

Appendix

According to Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey (2020)

- High social distance:
 - 75% did not want their child to marry outgroup members
 - 72% did not want to do business with outgroup members
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- Widespread political intolerance
 - 34% objected to outgroup members undertaking political roles
 - 48% gave consent to phone tapping of the outgroup members