Report: Sherlock 1 Report (Local)
Scope: Protocol and Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
Issue H-1: RewardsManager doesn't delete old bucket snapshot info on unstaking |
High | Fixed |
| Issue H-2: Anyone who approved quote tokens to a pool can be forced to take | High | Fixed |
Issue H-3: CryptoPunks NFTs may be stolen via deposit frontrunning |
High | Fixed |
Issue H-4: scaledQuoteTokenAmount isn't updated to be collateral sell value in the quote token constraint case of _calculateTakeFlowsAndBondChange |
High | Fixed |
Issue H-5: removeCollateral miss bankrupcy logic and can make future LPs sharing losses with the current ones |
High | Fixed |
| Issue H-6: Executing funded standard proposals can be prevented by a proposal slate with duplicate proposals | High | Fixed |
Issue H-7: ERC721Pool's mergeOrRemoveCollateral allows to remove collateral while auction is clearable |
High | Fixed |
Issue H-8: Remaining collateral used by ERC721Pool is missed in Auctions take and bucketTake return structures |
High | Fixed |
Issue H-9: moveQuoteToken() can cause bucket to go bankrupt but it is not reflected in the accounting |
High | Fixed |
Issue H-10: ERC721Pool's take will proceed with truncated collateral amount and full debt when borrower's collateral is fractional |
High | Fixed |
| Issue H-11: The deposit / withdraw / trade transaction lack of expiration timestamp check and slippage control | High | Fixed |
Issue M-1: Buypunk function of Cryptopunks in ERC721Pool is used incorrectly |
Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-2: ERC721Pool taker callback misreports quote funds whenever there was collateral amount rounding |
Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-3: Anyone can transfer approved LP tokens |
Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-4: Incorrect MOMP calculation in neutral price calculation |
Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-5: Extraordinary proposals can receive more tokens than eligible | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-6: Claiming rewards from a future not yet existing epoch prevents claiming rewards for those epochs later on | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-7: Calculating new rewards is susceptible to precision loss due to division before multiplication | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-8: Claiming accumulated rewards while the contract is underfunded can lead to a loss of rewards | Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-9: Incorrect Validation in Pool.sol#transferLPs lead to a DOS attack |
Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-10: Adversary can grief kicker by frontrunning kickAuction call with a large amount of loan |
Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-11: Settled collateral of a borrower aren't available for lenders until borrower's debt is fully cleared | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-12: Deposits are eliminated before currently unclaimed reserves when there is no reserve auction | Medium | No fix, Docs updated |
| Issue M-13: Flashloan end result isn't controlled | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-14: Interest rates can be raised above the market as a griefing, disabling the pool | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-15: Interest rate for pool is bounded wrongly | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-16: Auction timers following liquidity can fall through the floor price causing pool insolvency | Medium | No fix, Docs updated |
| Issue M-17: If borrower or kicker got blacklisted by asset contract their collateral or bond funds can be permanently frozen with the pool | Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-18: user can drawDebt that is below dust amount |
Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-19: Quadratic voting tally done wrong | Medium | Fixed |
Issue M-20: CryptoKitty and CryptoFighter NFT can be paused, which block borrowing / repaying / liquidating action in the ERC721Pool when borrowers still forced to pay the compounding interest |
Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-21: Minting an NFT with a position on the same bucket as a previously minted NFT changes its deposit time | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-22: Memorializing an NFT position on the same bucket of a previously memorialized NFT locks redemption | Medium | Fixed |
Report: Trail Of Bits Report
Scope: Protocol and Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| TOB-AJNA-1: Solidity compiler optimizations can be problematic | Undetermined | No fix (contracts exceed spurious dragon limit) |
TOB-AJNA-2: findIndexAndSumOfSums ignores global scalar |
Informational | No fix, improved invariant testing |
| TOB-AJNA-3: Incorrect inflator arithmetic in view functions | Low | Fixed |
| TOB-AJNA-4: Interest rates can become extreme, allowing DoS attacks | Medium | Fixed |
| TOB-AJNA-5: Older versions of external libraries are used | Informational | OZ updated to 4.8.2 in contracts repo. PRBMaths not updated (requires code change) |
| TOB-AJNA-6: Extraordinary proposal can be used to steal extraordinary amounts of Ajna | High | Fixed |
TOB-AJNA-7: findMechanismOfProposal function could shadow an extraordinary proposal |
Low | Fixed |
TOB-AJNA-8: Array lengths are not checked in LP allowance update functions |
Low | Fixed |
| Description |
|---|
UPDATE_CLAIM_REWARD state var should be constant |
Check for 0x address in RewardsManager constructor |
| Use consistent variable and function naming conventions |
| Ensure that comments in code always reflect the code’s intended behavior |
| Use defined helper functions instead of duplicating code |
Emit event when Flashloan taken |
| In Funding.sol#L117 perform check for an invalid proposal outside the loop |
Report: Quantstamp Report | Quantstamp Certificate
Scope: Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| AJN-1: Delegate Rewards Calculation Takes Into Account All Funding Voters | High | Fixed |
| AJN-2: Locked Funds Due to Non-Executable Proposals | High | Fixed |
| AJN-3: Impact of Unaccounted Delegation Rewards on Treasury and GBC Calculation | High | Fixed |
| AJN-4: Gas Usage / Loop Concerns | Low | Acknowledged |
| AJN-5: Missing Input Validation | Low | Fixed |
| AJN-6: Inconsistent Time Period | Low | Fixed |
| AJN-7: Zero ERC20 Transfer | Low | Fixed |
| AJN-8: Old Version of Solidity | Informational | Fixed |
| AJN-9: Multiple Possible 0-1 Knapsack Solutions, but only the First One Gets Accepted | Informational | Fixed |
| AJN-10: Outdated Proposal Hashing Function | Informational | Fixed |
| AJN-11: Greedy Contract | Informational | Acknowledged |
| AJN-12: Extraordinary Funding Proposal Success Condition Discrepancies | Undetermined | Fixed |
| AJN-13: Success of the Extraordinary Funding Is Susceptible to Treasury Balance Variability | Undetermined | Fixed |
Report: Prototech Report
Scope: Protocol Contracts
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| PROTOTECH-37: Position Manager allows for stealing all LPs | Critical | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-57: Collateral Can Be Extracted Without Redeeming LP Shares | High | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-42: General Recommendation: Rounding In Favor of the Interacting User Is Dangerous | High | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-39: Pools round against themselves and in favor of borrower | High | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-46: Unsafe casts in KickerActions | Medium | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-18: Missing Scaling for ERC-721 Pools’ Quote Token on repayment | Medium | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-55: Extremely large debt positions could prevent new borrowers to a pool while severely limiting existing borrowers | Low | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-53: Large position size may discourage kicking because of the resulting large bond size | Low | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-51: Limitations on NFT subset pool size | Low | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-50: TokenIdsAllowed returns false for eligible Collection Pool NFT’s | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-49: .decimals() is an optional feature of ERC20 | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-45: Revert after instead of on expire_ | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-44: Unsafe Casts In RewardsManager | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-43: PositionManager.moveLiquidity() May Leave Internal State Inconsistent | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-38: Loan Origination Fee Has Extreme Values At High Interest Rates | Low | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-20: New Borrower Debt overcounted with < 18 decimal Quote Tokens | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-19: removeCollateral can be used to bypass dust protection check in addCollateral | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-17: Non-18 Decimal Quote Token Debt cannot be FULLY repaid as expected | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-16: Any Address Can Execute memorializePositions For Another Address | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-14: Correction to Meaningful Deposit for In-Auction Debt Neglects Inflator | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-12: Below-LUP Deposit Fee Has Extreme Values At High Interest Rates | Low | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-56: Think through the various implications block.timestamp and network downtime | Informational | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-52: Streamline NFT Collection Pool Creation | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-35: Code Improvement: consider implementing isValidSignature directly | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-33: isValidSignature doesn’t check for well formed signature | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-32: Code clean up - RewardsManager Reentrancy Guard | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-31: Code Redundancy: ERC721 is inherited multiple times in PositionManager | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-29: Code Inconsistency: PermitERC721 uses require where elsewhere custom errors are adopted | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-27: ERC Compliance: PermitERC721 and PositionManager implementations doesn’t match with ERC-4494 | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-26: Reserve Auction DOS Attack | Informational | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-25: Unit Tests & non-18 decimals tokens | Informational | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-23: Solidity Version: consider 0.8.16-0.8.18 for deployment | Informational | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-47: Avoid param structs/tuples on external functions | Informational | Fixed |
| Finding | Category | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| PROTOTECH-54: Consider checking token id sort order in the pool | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-48: Consider granularizing Info functions | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged |
| PROTOTECH-36: Consider removing redundant check in PermitERC721 | Gas Optimization | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-28: Consider using block.chainid instead of inline assembly chainid | Gas Optimization | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-21: bytes32ToString can be improved to reduce gas costs | Gas Optimization | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-34: Informational Non-security Code Changes/Recommendations | Code Quality | Fixed |
| PROTOTECH-59: Consider declaring RAY constant directly | Code Quality | Fixed |
Report: Code4rena Report (Local)
Scope: Core Position & Rewards Manager and Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
Note: Grant fund extraordinary mechanism and move staked liquidity functionalities were reevaluated and removed
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| H-01: PositionManager's moveLiquidity can freeze funds by removing destination index even when the move was partial | High | Fixed |
| H-02: PositionManager's moveLiquidity can set wrong deposit time and permanently freeze LP funds moved | High | Fixed |
| H-03: Position NFT can be spammed with insignificant positions by anyone until rewards DoS | High | Fixed |
| H-04: Delegation rewards are not counted toward granting fund | High | Fixed |
| H-05: Incorrect calculation of the remaining updatedRewards leads to possible underflow error | High | Fixed |
| H-06: The lender could possibly lose unclaimed rewards in case a bucket goes bankrupt | High | Acknowledged |
| H-07: User can exponentially increase the value of their position through the memorializePositions function | High | Fixed |
| H-08: Claiming accumulated rewards while the contract is underfunded can lead to a loss of rewards | High | Fixed |
| H-09: User can avoid bankrupting by calling PositionManager.moveLiquidity where to index is bankrupted index | High | Fixed |
| H-10: missing isEpochClaimed validation | High | Fixed |
| H-11: RewardsManager fails to validate pool_ when updating exchange rates allowing rewards to be drained | High | Fixed |
| M-01: It is possible to steal the unallocated part of every delegation period budget | Medium | Fixed |
| M-02: Delegate rewards system is unfair to delegates with less tokens and reduces decentralization | Medium | Fixed |
| M-03: _updateBucketExchangeRateAndCalculateRewards reward calculation accuracy loss | Medium | Fixed |
| M-04: Potential unfair distribution of Rewards due to MEV in updateBucketExchangeRatesAndClaim | Medium | Acknowledged |
| M-05: Calculating new rewards is susceptible to precision loss due to division before multiplication | Medium | Fixed |
| M-06: An Optimizer Bug in PositionManager.getPositionIndexesFiltered | Medium | Fixed |
| M-07: StandardFunding.screeningVote function and ExtraordinaryFunding.voteExtraordinary function when block.number equals respective start block and when block.number is bigger than respective start block can result in different available votes for same voter | Medium | Fixed |
| M-08: The voting thresholds in Ajna's Extraordinary Funding Mechanism can be manipulated to execute proposals below the expected threshold | Medium | Fixed |
| M-09: Adversary can prevent the creation of any extraordinary funding proposal by frontrunning proposeExtraordinary() | Medium | Fixed |
| M-10: Unsafe casting from uint256 to uint128 in RewardsManager | Medium | Fixed |
| M-11: StandardFunding.fundingVote should not allow users who didn't vote in screening stage to vote | Medium | Fixed |
| M-12: Governance attack on Extraordinary Proposals | Medium | Fixed |
| M-13: PositionManager & PermitERC721 Failure to comply with the EIP-4494 | Medium | Fixed |
| M-14: PositionManager.moveLiquidity could revert due to underflow | Medium | Fixed |
| QA-1: CHALLENGE_PERIOD_LENGTH, DISTRIBUTION_PERIOD_LENGTH, FUNDING_PERIOD_LENGTH, AND MAX_EFM_PROPOSAL_LENGTH ARE HARDCODED BASED ON 7200 BLOCKS PER DAY | QA | Acknowledged |
| QA-2: AMBIGUITY IN StandardFunding._standardProposalState FUNCTION | QA | Fixed |
| QA-3: ExtraordinaryFundingProposal.votesReceived IN ExtraordinaryFunding CONTRACT IS uint120 INSTEAD OF uint128 | QA | Fixed |
| QA-4: CALLING ExtraordinaryFunding.proposeExtraordinary AND StandardFunding.proposeStandard FUNCTIONS CAN REVERT AND WASTE GAS | QA | Acknowledged |
| QA-5: CODE COMMENT IN ExtraordinaryFunding._extraordinaryProposalSucceeded FUNCTION CAN BE INCORRECT | QA | Fixed |
| QA-6: CODE COMMENT FOR CHALLENGE_PERIOD_LENGTH CAN BE MORE ACCURATE | QA | Fixed |
| QA-7: SETTING support TO 1 WHEN voteParams_.votesUsed < 0 IS FALSE IN StandardFunding._fundingVote FUNCTION IS REDUNDANT | QA | Acknowledged |
| QA-8: REDUNDANT EXECUTION OF if (sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast > type(uint128).max) revert InsufficientVotingPower() IN StandardFunding._fundingVote FUNCTION | QA | Fixed |
| QA-9: InvalidVote ERROR CAN BE MORE DESCRIPTIVE | QA | Acknowledged |
| QA-10: UNDERSCORES CAN BE ADDED FOR NUMBERS | QA | Fixed |
| QA-11: uint256 CAN BE USED INSTEAD OF uint | QA | Fixed |
| QA-12: SPACES CAN BE ADDED FOR BETTER READABILITY | QA | Fixed |
| G-1: Use calldata instead of memory for function arguments that do not get mutated | Gas | Fixed |
| G-2: State variables can be cached instead of re-reading them from storage | Gas | Fixed |
| G-3: Refactor internal function to avoid unnecessary SLOAD | Gas | Fixed |
| G-4: Using storage instead of memory for structs/arrays saves gas | Gas | Fixed |
| G-5: Avoid emitting storage values | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-6: Multiple accesses of a mapping/array should use a storage pointer | Gas | Fixed |
| G-7: Multiple address mappings can be combined into a single mapping of an address to a struct, where appropriate | Gas | Fixed |
| G-8: Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-9: Use do while loops instead of for loops | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-10: Use assembly to perform efficient back-to-back calls | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-11: Refactor event to avoid emitting data that is already present in transaction data | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-12: Refactor event to avoid emitting empty data | Gas | Acknowledged |
| G-13: Sort array offchain to check duplicates in O(n) instead of O(n^2) | Gas | Acknowledged |
Report: Sherlock 2 Report (Local)
Scope: Protocol and Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
| Finding | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| Issue H-1: Pool's kickWithDeposit misses liquidation debt check | High | Fixed |
| Issue H-2: kickWithDeposit removes the deposit without HTP pool state check | High | Fixed |
| Issue H-3: moveQuoteToken updates pool state using intermediary LUP, biasing pool's interest rate calculations | High | Fixed |
| Issue H-4: Settlement can be called when auction period isn't concluded, allowing HPB depositors to game bad debt settlements | High | Fixed |
| Issue H-5: LUP is not recalculated after adding kicking penalty to pool's debt, so kick() updates the pool state with an outdated LUP | High | Fixed |
| Issue H-6: Debt write off can be prohibited by HPB depositor by continuously allocating settlement blocking dust deposits in the higher buckets | High | Fixed |
| Issue M-1: Lenders lose interests and pay deposit fees due to no slippage control | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-2: Due to excessive HTP check moveQuoteToken can be unavailable for big deposits | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-3: Limit index isn't checked in repayDebt, so user control is void | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-4: LenderActions's moveQuoteToken can create a total debt undercoverage | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-5: Wrong Inflator used in calculating HTP to determine accrualIndex in accrueInterest | Medium | Fixed |
| Issue M-6: KickerActions uses wrong check to prevent Kickers from using deposits below LUP for KickWithDeposit | Medium | Fixed |
Report: FPS & SF Report Local
Scope: Position Manager, Rewards Manager(since depriciated) and Grant Coordination Fund Contracts
| Findings | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| L-01: getDelegateReward Does Not Account for Voter's Screening Votes | Low | Fixed |
| L-02: UpdateExchangeRate Event Can Be Emitted With Indexes That Weren’t Updated | Low | Fixed |
| I-01: AlreadyVoted Error Is Unused | Informational | Fixed |
| I-02: GrantFund: Potential Tally Incompatibility | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-03: GrantFund Script: Misleading Transfer Suggestion | Informational | Fixed |
| I-04: Deleting Structs with Internal Mappings Does Not De | lete Underlying Mapping Data | Informational |
| I-05: BurnWrapper: Is ERC20Burnable required | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-06: Missing Documentation of External Calls In PositionManager Functions | Informational | Fixed |
| I-07: PositionManager: Missing Tests of ERC721 Pools | Informational | Fixed |
| I-08: Increase Usability by Removing poolSubsetHash_ Requirement for Most Pools | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-01: Unnecessary Check and Storage Usage For Surplus Update Status | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-02: Absolute Value Function Does Not Support All Input Values and Can Be Optimized | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-03: Redundant Check in _updateBucketExchangeRates | Informational | Fixed |
| Gas-04: RewardsManager: Reliance on nested helpers obfuscates code duplication | Informational | Fixed |
| Gas-05: BurnWrapper: Unnecessary Constructor Parameter | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-06: Convert _nextId from uint176 to uint256 | Informational | Acknowledged |
Report: Kirill Report (Local)
Scope: Protocol Contracts
| Findings | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| H-01: Large borrowers bear a substantial economic risk of spurious liquidations | High | Acknowledged |
| M-01: Reserve auction starting price calculation contradicts the whitepaper | Medium | Fixed |
M-02: Positions with threshold price below MIN_PRICE cannot be kicked |
Medium | Fixed |
| M-03: ERC20 pool creation may be grieved by frontrunners | Medium | Acknowledged |
| M-04: Bond reward amount implicitly depends on the order of takes | Medium | Fixed |
M-05: addCollateral allows to manipulate LUP and bypass deposit fee |
Medium | Fixed |
| M-06: Dust collateral checks may lead to unexpected reverts in external integrations | Medium | Acknowledged |
M-07: Liquidation of positions with bad debt can cause losses for HPB depositors |
Medium | Fixed |
| L-01: Dust checks for quote tokens are inconsistent | Low | Fixed |
| L-02: Some unit tests are not properly executed | Low | Fixed |
L-03: Redundant call to ecrecover in PermitERC721 |
Low | Acknowledged |
| L-04: PermitERC721 allows replay attacks | Low | Acknowledged |
L-05: maxQuoteToken_ parameter in _lpToQuoteToken is redundant |
Low | Fixed |
L-06: Outdated prb-math external dependency |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-07: Unbounded storage list iteration in getDeployedPoolsList |
Low | Fixed |
| L-08: Reserve auction kick condition can be simplified | Low | Fixed |
| L-09: Inconsistency between auction curve price calculations | Low | Acknowledged |
L-10: Missing boundary check on auctionPrice |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-11: _rebalanceTokens does nothing in ERC721Pool::take |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-12: Confusing rounding in _indexOf |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-13: Non-optimal takeReserves in case Ajna token is also the quote token in the pool |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-14: Error-prone logic in memorializePositions |
Low | Acknowledged |
| L-15: Bucket bankruptcy checks are inconsistent | Low | Acknowledged |
L-16: Unassigned return value in findIndexAndSumOfSum |
Low | Acknowledged |
L-17: kickReserveAuction uses outdated pool state |
Low | Acknowledged |
I-01: Precompute value of PRBMathSD59x18.log2(FLOAT_STEP_INT) |
Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-02: Simplify EMAs weight calculation | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-03: Unused error and event definitions | Informational | Fixed |
I-04: Assembly optimization in lsb |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-05: Gas optimization in _auctionPrice |
Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-06: Unnecessary cap for unutilized deposit fee | Informational | Fixed |
I-07: Simplify _getCollateralDustPricePrecisionAdjustment |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-08: Simplify index boundary checks in _priceAt |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-09: Redundant SSTORE in ERC721Pool::repayDebt |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-10: Reimplement ERC721::removeCollateral using LenderActions.removeMaxCollateral |
Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-11: Miners / validators / sequencers are able to manipulate block timestamps to extract MEV | Informational | Acknowledged |
I-12: Simplify condition in _updateT0Debt2ToCollateral |
Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-13: Maths usage optimization | Informational | Acknowledged |
I-14: Redundant checks in prefixSum |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-15: Redundant pool_ function parameter in PositionManager |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-16: Redundant return values in findIndexAndSumOfSum |
Informational | Acknowledged |
I-17: Duplicated lpToQuoteTokens computation in _removeMaxDeposit |
Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-18: Unused local variables | Informational | Fixed |
Report: Certora Report (Local)
Scope: Protocol Contracts
| Findings | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| H-01: A manipulation on LUP and HTP can drain the reserves in favor of an attacker | High | Fixed |
| L-01: Calculation of the repay-amount in bucketTake() is not bounded as intended | Low | Fixed |
| L-02: A deposit take can lead to HTP crossing the LUP | Low | Acknowledged |
| L-03: MoveQuoteTokens can lose small amount of deposits, pushing LUP below HTP in an edge case | Low | Acknowledged |
| I-01: Lender may raise HTP to steal interest rewards from lender buckets under LUP | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-02: An attacker can kick everyone in the system, forcing lenders into a risk/gamble | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-03: Minimal borrow amount mitigation could be avoided by first depositor | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-04: Minimal borrow amount mitigation could be somewhat bypassed | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-05: positionIndexes and positions aren’t deleted when deleting positionTokens | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-06: TakerActions.sol TakerLocalVars.factor is unused | Informational | Fixed |
| I-07: Use string.concat() or bytes.concat() instead of abi.encodePacked | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-08: Default Visibility for constants | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-09: Event is never emitted | Informational | Acknowledged |
| I-10: Change uint to uint256 | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-01: State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-02: uint256 to bool mapping: Utilizing Bitmaps to save on Gas | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-03: Increments/decrements can be unchecked in for-loops | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Gas-04: ++i costs less gas compared to i++ or i += 1 | Informational | Acknowledged |
Report: Sherlock 3 Report (Local)
Scope: Protocol Contracts
| Findings | Severity | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| H-1: Reserves can be stolen by settling artificially created bad debt from them | High | Fixed |
| M-1: Wrong auctionPrice used in calculating BPF to determine bond reward (or penalty) | Medium | Fixed |
| M-2: Incorrect implementation of BPF leads to kicker losing rewards in a take action | Medium | Disputed |
| M-3: HPB may be incorrectly bankrupt due to use of unscaled value in _forgiveBadDebt | Medium | Fixed |
| M-4: First pool borrower pays extra interest | Medium | Fixed |