

Gödelian Explorations

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Preface

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1 Modal Logic and Binary Relations

Relation Domain		
total	$\forall x \forall y Rxy$	All possible arrows exist.
empty	$\forall x \forall y \neg Rxy$	There are no arrows.
vacuous	$\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow x = y)$	Only loops are arrows.
Serial		
serial (right)	$\forall x \exists y Rxy$	Every element is a tail of an arrow.
serial (left)	$\forall x \exists y Ryx$	Every element is a target of an arrow.
Reflexive		
totally reflexive	$\forall x Rxx$	All elements have loops.
weakly reflexive	$\forall x [\exists y (Rxy \vee Ryx) \rightarrow Rxx]$	Targets and tails have loops.
irreflexive	$\forall x \neg Rxx$	There aren't any loops.
co-reflexive	$\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Rxx)$	Any tail has a loop.
non-reflexive	Neither reflexive nor irreflexive	
Symmetric		
symmetric	$\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$	All arrows are double arrows.
asymetric	$\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow \neg Ryx)$	No arrow is a double arrow.
antisymmetric	$\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxy \wedge Ryx \rightarrow x = y)$	Only loops are double arrows.
non-symmetric	Neither symmetric nor asymmetric	
Transitive		
transitive	$\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxy \wedge Ryz \rightarrow Rxz)$	Any indirect path has a shortcut.
intransitive	$\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxy \wedge Ryz \rightarrow \neg Rxz))$	No indirect path has a shortcut.
non-transitive	Neither transitive nor intransitive	
Euclidean		
Euclidean (right)	$\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxy \wedge Rxz \rightarrow Ryz)$	Anyone's beloveds love themselves and one another.
Euclidean (left)	$\forall x \forall y \forall z (Ryx \wedge Rzx \rightarrow Ryz)$	Anyone's lovers love themselves and one another

2 ‘Must’ and ‘Might’ — The Modal Logic of Necessity and Possibility

2.1 MODES OF TRUTH AND MODAL LOGICS

Historically, notions like *necessity*, *possibility*, *impossibility*, and *contingency* were thought of as modes of truth or ways in which a proposition could be true or false. *Modal logic* began as the study of the logic of these modes of truth.

Aristotle, in Chapter 9 of *De Interpretatione*, discusses modality in his famous example of the sea battle. Suppose the sea battle will be fought tomorrow. Then it was true yesterday that it would be fought tomorrow. So if all past truths are necessarily true, then it is necessarily true now that the battle will be fought tomorrow. A similar argument holds on the supposition that the sea battle will not be fought tomorrow. Aristotle proposed solving this problem of *logical fatalism* by denying that future contingent propositions have definite truth-values.

Using the ‘ \Box ’ for ‘it is necessary that’, the principle that all necessary truths are in fact

$$\Box P \rightarrow P, \tag{T}$$

but adding its converse that all truths are necessary truths:

$$P \rightarrow \Box P \tag{V}$$

collapses the notions of truth and necessary truth.

Medieval philosophers, concerned with such theological issues as articulating the nature of the Trinity, appealed to such modal notions as essence and accident, contingency and necessity in their labyrinthine theological reflections.¹ Akin to the problem is logical fatalism is the problem of *theological fatalism*: the problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Saint Augustine (354–430) in his treatise *On the Free Choice of Will* considers an argument for *theological fatalism* proposed by Evodius. Evodius argued that “God foreknew that man would sin, that which God foreknew must necessarily come to pass.” We may set forth this argument for theological fatalism for a particular case as follows:

If God knew that Adam would sin, then, necessarily Adam sinned.
God knew that Adam would sin (because God is omniscient).
Therefore, Adam necessarily sinned.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (part I, chapter 67) criticized this kind of argument as resting on an amphiboly. The critical first premise “if God knew Adam would sin, then, necessarily, Adam sinned” is ambiguous between

- (1a) It is necessarily the case that if God knows that Adam will sin then Adam will sin.
- (1b) If God knows that Adam will sin, then it is necessary that Adam will sin.

Aquinas called (1a) the *necessity of the consequence* contrasting it with (1b) the *necessity of the consequent*. Using the ‘ \Box ’ to abbreviate ‘it is necessary that’, the difference between these two can be made more perspicuous with symbols:

$$\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \tag{1a}$$

$$(P \rightarrow \Box Q) \tag{1b}$$

¹ The theological, if not the political, roots Great Schism of 1054, which can be traced back to a disagreement about the modalities of the Persons of the Trinity. The Nicean Creed (325) uses the term *homoousios* (from the Greek *homo* = ‘same’ and *ousios* = ‘essence’ or ‘substance’), in contrast to *homoiousios* (from the Greek *homoi* = ‘similar’) making the solitary *i* the jot and tittle of Nicean Creedal Orthodoxy. The Greek Church preferred the latter term since the former had been used by the Syrian Bishop of Antioch to espouse *modal monarchism*, the heresy that the Heavenly Father, Resurrected Son and Holy Spirit are not three distinct Persons, but are rather different *modes* or *aspects* of one monadic God perceived by believers as distinct persons. The Latin Church adopted the former siding with Athanasius against the heretic Arius, who denied that Jesus was co-equal and co-eternal with the Father. The Second Council of Nicea (381), among other changes, inserted the word *filioque* (from the Latin *filio* = the son, and *que* = “and”) into the Nicean-Constantinopolitan Creed and the Latin mass. In Latin theology, the three Persons of the Trinity are logically distinguished by the formal relations of “proceeding from” citing such proof texts as Phil. 1:9, Titus 3:6, Acts 2:33. Orthodox theology, citing the words of Jesus in proof texts such John 15:26, regarded the insertion of *filioque* into the Nicean-Constantinopolitan creed, is as Semi-Sabellianism. The great church historian Pelikan (1988: 90) opined: “If there is a special circle of the inferno described by Dante reserved for historians of theology, the principal homework assigned to that subdivision of Hell for at least the first several eons of eternity may well be a thorough study of all the treatises... devoted to the inquiry: Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father only, as Eastern Christendom contends, or from both the Father and the Son as the Latin Church teaches?” In 1989 Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Demetrius knelt together in Rome and recited the Nicene Creed without the *filioque*.

Pelikan, J. 1988. *The melody of theology: A philosophical dictionary*. Harvard University Press.

Solving the famous theological problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom may turn on exposing ambiguities of this sort.

Perhaps the most famous theological application of modal logic is Saint Anselm’s modal ontological argument. According to Saint Anselm (1033–1109), it follows from God’s nature that it is necessary that God exists if God exists at all. Moreover, this conditional itself, being a conceptual truth, is itself necessarily true. We then have the following argument:

Necessarily, if God exists, then God necessarily exists.
It is possible that God exists.
Therefore, God (actually) exists.

Using ‘ \diamond ’ for ‘it is possible that’, the above argument can be symbolized:

$$\Box(G \rightarrow \Box G). \quad \diamond G \quad \therefore G \tag{2}$$

The question of whether Anselm’s argument is valid became a precise question when various systems of modal logic were proposed and developed in the 1960s.

Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), the inventor (or discoverer) of modern predicate-quantifier logic, relegated modality to autobiographical information about the speaker, and for many years logicians only investigated extensional logic.

One of the most puzzling validities, at least to the beginning logical students is known as *Lewis’s Dilemma*:

$$P \wedge \neg P \rightarrow Q,$$

which states “*a contradiction implies anything*”². This implication follows from the inference rules of simplification, addition, and *modus tollendo ponens*³, which are themselves not particularly puzzling.

² Or “*ex falso quodlibet*”, in Latin.

³ “*mode that denies by affirming*”

1.	<i>Show</i>	$P \wedge \neg P \rightarrow Q$	6, CD
2.		$P \wedge \neg P$	Assume (CD)
3.		P	2, S
4.		$\neg P$	2, S
5.		$P \vee Q$	3, ADD
6.		Q	5, 4 MTP

The following theorems are known as the *paradoxes of material implication*:

\rightarrow law of denying the antecedent	$\neg P \rightarrow (P \rightarrow Q)$	(T18)
\rightarrow law of affirming the consequent	$Q \rightarrow (P \rightarrow Q)$	(T2)
\rightarrow conditional excluded middle	$(P \rightarrow Q) \vee (Q \rightarrow \neg Q)$	(T58)
\rightarrow Consequentia Mirabilis, “admirable consequence” [Cantor’s Δ ?]	$(\neg P \rightarrow P) \rightarrow P$	(T114)

C. I. Lewis investigated modal logic in order to find a stricter form of the conditional which would not result in such paradoxes. Lewis defined *strict implication* $P \Rightarrow Q$ (read “*P strictly implies Q*”) by combining modality with the truth-functional conditional:

$$P \Rightarrow Q \quad := \quad \Box(P \wedge \neg Q),$$

or alternatively,

$$P \Rightarrow Q \quad := \quad \Box(P \rightarrow Q).$$

The notion of strict implication was characterized by such axioms as:

The philosopher Leibniz (1646–1716) explicitly invoked that language of possible worlds to explain the difference between necessary and contingent truths. What is logically or necessarily true are those truths true in *all* possible worlds, whereas a contingent truth is one that is true in *some* possible worlds.

Drawing upon this logical connection between universal and existential quantification and the modal notions of necessity and possibility, we obtain a modal version of the classical Aristotelian Square of Opposition and the duality of modal laws known as the laws of modal negation.




Figure 2.1: AN ARISTOTELIAN DIAMOND OF OPPOSITION

In the modern development of modal logic, logicians noticed that a host other phenomena—such as deontic notions of obligation and permissibility, epistemic notions of knowledge and belief, as well as temporal operators—share these logical relations and hence can be represented as modal logics.

In *deontic logic*, \Box is read “it is morally obligatory that” and \Diamond is read “it is morally permissible that”. Kant’s maxim that “ought implies can”, that is, whatever is obligatory is permissible, is captured by modal axiom **(D)**:

$$\Box P \rightarrow \Diamond P. \quad (\mathbf{D})$$

In *epistemic logic*, \Box is read for some subject S “it is known that” and \Diamond is read “it is believed that”. Some modal axioms for epistemic logic that have been considered include:

$\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q)$	(K)	← logical omniscience
$\Box P \rightarrow P$	(T)	← law of affirming the consequent
$\Box P \rightarrow \Box \Box P$	(4)	← law of affirming the consequent
$\neg \Box P \rightarrow \Box \neg \Box P$	(E)	← law of affirming the consequent

The axiom **(K)** expresses logical omniscience insofar as this axiom requires that the knowledge of an agent is closed under *modus ponens*; and hence such knowers know all the logical consequences of their knowledge.

Axiom **(T)** states the truism that whatever is known is true. Notice that this axiom would be too strong for deontic logic insofar as an action’s being obligatory doesn’t imply that the agent actually performs that action.

Axiom **(4)** expresses a high degree of *positive introspective knowledge*: if someone knows P , then she knows that she knows that P . Axiom **(E)** on the other hand, expresses a high degree of *negative introspective knowledge*: if someone doesn’t know that P , then he knows he doesn’t know P . This axiom is

💡 A Classical Theorem, but in Intuitionism

Theorem. There exist two irrational numbers x and y such that x^y is irrational.

Proof. Consider

$$\sqrt{2}^{\left(\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}\right)} = \sqrt{2}^{\left(\sqrt{2} \cdot \sqrt{2}\right)} = \sqrt{2}^2 = 2,$$

which is rational.

The number $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is either rational or irrational.

- If it's rational, then $x = y = \sqrt{2}$ are both irrational yet x^y is rational.
- If $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is irrational, then $x = \sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ and $y = \sqrt{2}$ are both irrational and x^y is rational.

Either way, there exists x and y such that x^y is rational. □

Intuitionists reject this classical argument by separation of cases because it does not actually construct the numbers x and y such that xy is irrational. The idea behind intuitionistic logic is that the connectives are reinterpreted as involving a kind of provability.

In case you're curious, it is actually known that $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is irrational, due to the [Gelfond–Schneider theorem](#) which verifies that it usually takes significantly more effort to convince an intuitionistic mathematicians than a classical one.

contrary to the experience of Socrates: as the gadfly of Athens, Socrates found through his questioning that many of his fellow Athenians did not know what they were talking about but also didn't know that they didn't know. The gadfly of Athens believed his vocation was to sting his fellow Athenians into the awareness they were own ignorance, a service for which they did not always show adequate appreciation.

The *temporal logic* or Diodorian temporal logic was studied by the logician A. N. Prior (1914–1969). To model temporal language, we introduce a pair of modal operators for the future and a pair of modal operators for the past.

□	It <i>is always going</i> [i.e., in <i>all</i> futures] to be the case that
◇	It <i>will</i> > [i.e., in <i>some</i> future] be the case that
□	It <i>has always been</i> [i.e., in <i>all</i> pasts] the case that
◇	It <i>was once</i>] [i.e., in <i>some</i> past or “ <i>once upon a time</i> ”] the case that

The axioms for minimal tense logic include version of Axiom **(K)** for the two necessity operators:

$\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$

Whatever has always followed from what always has been, always has been.

(K□)

$\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$

Whatever will always follow from what always will be, always will be.

(K□)

It also contains two axioms concerning the interaction of the past and future that has the form of the so-called Brouwersche axiom with alternating valences:

$\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$

What is, will always have been

(B□◇)

$\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$

What is, has always been going to happen

(B□◇)

Becker, Oskar. 1930. Zur logik der modalitäten.

The Brouwersche **(B)** axiom was so-named by the logician Oskar Becker (Becker 1930) after the charismatic Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer (1881–1966), who championed a philosophy of mathematics known as *intuitionism*. It happens that when the \Diamond can be paraphrased as $\Diamond\neg\Diamond$, the resulting axiom has the form of the acceptable form of double negation in intuitionistic logic:

$\varphi \rightarrow \neg\Diamond\neg\Diamond\varphi$

(B)

According to intuitionism, mathematical objects do not exist as eternal Platonic objects but are constructions in intuition. Intuitionists read the propositional connectives as involving not merely truth, but proof, and so they rejected such classical forms of reasoning as *reductio ad absurdum* and theorems such as the *law of excluded middle*. Intuitionists reject the following mathematical proof.

Around the 1970s it was noticed that the famous incompleteness theorems (Gödel 1931) were propositional in character and that their logic could be captured in propositional modal logic. These modal provability logics added to Axiom **(K)** the following axiom, known as the Gödel-Löb axiom or also the well-ordering axiom.

$\Box(\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \Box\varphi$

(W)

Modal Provability Logics proliferated from the 1950s–1970s, but the genesis of the idea goes back to a short note of Gödel (1933b) in which he noted that intuitionistic truth is defined in terms of proof since provability is a kind of necessity. The above axiom can be read as a kind of soundness theorem.

if it is provable that φ being provable implies it is true, then φ is provable.

Gödel, Kurt. 1931. Über formal unentscheidbare sätze der principia mathematica und verwandter systeme i. *Monatshefte für Mathematik Und Physik* 38. 173–198.

Gödel, Kurt. 1933b. The present situation in the foundations of mathematics. *Collected Works* 3. 45–53.

Later we will show how to use a modal provability logic to exhibit the propositional logic of key parts of Gödel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems.

In contemporary logic, modal logic has grown beyond these philosophical origins and is at the interface of a number of disciplines including the studies information flow and dynamics, game theory, and computability.

Exercises

- (1) Symbolize the following modal arguments.
- (A) Eratosthenes must either be in Syene or Alexandria. Eratosthenes cannot be in Syene. Therefore, Eratosthenes must be in Alexandria.

(B) Assume that justice can be defined as paying your debts and telling the truth. Then it is *morally obligatory* for Cephalus to comply to a madman’s request that Cephalus return a borrowed sword and that Cephalus tell the truth about the whereabouts of a friend whom the madman wants to kill with the sword. However, if this act is *morally obligatory*, then it is *morally permissible*. However, it is *morally impermissible* (or *morally forbidden*) for Cephalus to comply. So it isn’t *morally obligatory* for Cephalus to comply. Justice, therefore, cannot be defined as paying your debts and telling the truth.

(C) It is conceivable that I am having experiences qualitatively identical to those I am having now on the supposition that I am being deceived by an evil genius. If that is conceivable, then I do not have indubitable knowledge that the external world exists.
- (2) Johan van Benthem (Van Benthem 2010: 12) was asked to symbolize the philosophical claim that “nothing is absolutely relative”. He came up with the following:

$$\neg \Box (\Diamond \varphi \wedge \Diamond \neg \varphi).$$

Use familiar equivalences from propositional logic and the modal negation laws to show that this symbolization is equivalent to

$$\Box \Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \varphi \qquad \textbf{(M)}$$

Van Benthem, Johan. 2010. *Modal logic for open minds*. Stanford, CA: Centre for the Study of Language & Information.

← *McKinsey’s Axiom*

- (3) Match the following symbolizations with the best corresponding translation below.

symbolization	translation
$\Diamond \Box P$	<i>It was always the case that it will sometime be the case that P.</i>
$\Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond P$	<i>It will sometime be the case that it was once the case that P.</i>
$\Box \Diamond P$	<i>Whatever will always be, will be.</i>
$\Diamond \Diamond P$	<i>Once upon a time, it was always the case that P.</i>

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7 POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS

Kripke, Saul. 1959. A completeness theorem in modal logic. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 24(1). 1–14. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2964568>

Kripke, Saul. 1963. Semantical analysis of modal logic i normal modal propositional calculi. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly* 9(5-6). 67–96. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.19630090502>

⁴ set-theoretic size issues?

The Leibnizian idea of characterizing necessity and possibility in terms of truth in all or some possible worlds was given an elegant formalization by (Kripke 1959; 1963) when he was only a teenager. According to Leibniz, a sentence is *necessary* if it is true in *every* possible world, and a sentence is *possible* if it is true in *some* possible world. Kripke showed that by placing very natural conditions on a relation of *relative possibility* or *accessibility* on a set of possible worlds, the various systems of modal logic could be validated.

Intuitively, a possible world tells us for each sentence letter whether it is true or false in that world. Stripping away inessentials, we can represent a possible world by a subset of sentence letters. A *modal structure* \mathbb{M} is an ordered triple $\langle W, R, \alpha \rangle$, where W is a set⁴ of possible worlds, $R \subseteq W \times W$ is a relation known as the *accessibility relation* or the *relative possibility relation*, and α is a distinguished element of W known as the *actual world*.

We can exhaustively characterize the notion of

$$\beta \models \varphi,$$

the *truth of a sentence in a possible world* β , by

(4) If φ is a sentence letter S , then

$$\beta \models S \iff S \in \beta,$$

i.e. S is a member of β ;

(5) If φ is $\neg\psi$, then

$$\beta \models \neg\psi \iff \beta \not\models \psi,$$

i.e., it is not the case that $\beta \models \psi$;

(6) (a) If φ is $(\psi \wedge \chi)$, then

$$\beta \models (\psi \wedge \chi) \iff \beta \models \psi \ \& \ \beta \models \chi,$$

i.e., both $\beta \models \psi$ and $\beta \models \chi$;

(b) If φ is $(\psi \vee \chi)$, then

$$\beta \models (\psi \vee \chi) \iff \beta \models \psi \parallel \beta \models \chi,$$

i.e., either $\beta \models \psi$ or $\beta \models \chi$, or both;

(c) If φ is $(\psi \rightarrow \chi)$, then

$$\beta \models (\psi \rightarrow \chi) \iff \beta \models \psi \implies \beta \models \chi,$$

i.e., if $\beta \models \psi$ then $\beta \models \chi$, or either $\beta \not\models \psi$ or $\beta \models \chi$?;

(d) If φ is $(\psi \leftrightarrow \chi)$, then

$$\beta \models (\psi \leftrightarrow \chi) \iff \beta \models \psi \iff \beta \models \chi,$$

i.e., $\beta \models \psi$ if and only if $\beta \models \chi$;

Finally, the law clause gives the Leibnizian truth conditions for necessity and possibility:

(7) (a) If φ is $\Box\psi$, then

$$\beta \models \Box\psi \iff \forall \gamma \in W. \beta R \gamma \implies \beta \models \psi,$$

i.e., ψ is true in *all* possible worlds γ , possible-relative to β ;

(b) If φ is $\Diamond\psi$, then

$$\beta \models \Diamond\psi \iff \exists \gamma \in W. \beta R \gamma \implies \beta \models \psi,$$

i.e., ψ is true in *some* possible worlds γ , possible-relative to β ;

This completes the definition of truth in a model for modal propositional logic. Using this definition of truth, we can now define what it means for a sentence to be *semantically valid*:

$$\models \varphi \text{ (i.e., } \varphi \text{ is semantically valid)} \iff \forall \alpha \in W. \alpha \models \varphi.$$

Next, we obtain different systems of modal logic when various conditions are placed on the accessibility or relative possibility relation R . We say that a relation R is a *series* if R is serial; R is a *reflexivity* if R is totally reflexive; R is a *similarity* if R is totally reflexive and symmetric; R is a *partial ordering* if R is totally reflexive and transitive; R is an *equivalence relation* if R is totally reflexive and euclidean. It turns out that the axioms of modal logic discussed above are validated when natural conditions are imposed on the accessibility or relative possibility relation R .

Table 2.3: Properties of Accessibility

D	$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi$	serial	$\forall\alpha. \exists\beta. \alpha R \beta$
T	$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$	reflexive	$\forall\alpha. \alpha R \alpha$
B	$\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$	symmetric	$\forall\alpha. \forall\beta. (\alpha R \beta \Rightarrow \beta R \alpha)$
4	$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$	transitive	$\forall\alpha\forall\beta. \forall\gamma. (\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \beta R \gamma \Rightarrow \alpha R \gamma)$
5	$\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$	euclidean	$\forall\alpha. \forall\beta. \forall\gamma. (\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \alpha R \gamma \Rightarrow \beta R \gamma)$

Systems of modal logic are *normal* when everything derivable from necessary truths is itself necessary. This will be the case if the rule of *modus ponens* and axiom **(K)** are valid:

$$\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q). \quad (\mathbf{K})$$

Axiom **K** expresses the intuition that *necessary truths imply only necessary truths*.

We can conveniently summarize the above systems of modal logic in a chart. The various modal systems can be characterized by the axioms that are valid in them. The smallest normal modal logic system **K** contains axiom **K**. The four most famous modal logics are system **(T)** named after the Gödel–Feys–von Wright modal logic to model tautologies, system **S4** and **S5**, named after C. I. Lewis’s axioms for strict implications, and the unduly neglected Brouwersche system **B**, named by Becker after the intuitionist L. E. J. Brouwer due to the characteristic axiom’s similarity to intuitionistic double negation. All these systems contain **K** and **T**. The system **D** is a weaker system than **T**, containing axioms **K** and **D**, is named for deontic logic.

Notice that relationships of containment among the modal systems follow from the logic of relations. Axiom **B** requires that R be symmetric and **4** requires that R be transitive. System **S5** with axioms **T** and **E** require R to be an equivalence relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric, and transitive); hence, **S5** could also be specified by requiring axioms **T**, **4**, and **B** to be valid. Therefore, **S5** contains **S4** and **B**, neither of which contains the other. Systems **S5**, **S4** and **B** all contain system **T**, which contains **D**.

A convenient way of describing these modal logics is by their *Lemmon code* listing the axioms valid in them. For example, **S5** = **KTE** = **KT4B** = **KD4B**. We can represent these containment relations in a diagram in which downward paths represent containment.

Table 2.4: Modal Axioms and Accessibility

D	Deontic Logic	D	$\Box P \rightarrow \Diamond P$	KD	seriality
T	Gödel-Feys-von Wright Tautology	T	$\Box P \rightarrow P$	KT	reflexivity
B	Brouwersche System	B	$P \rightarrow \Box\Diamond P$	KTB	similarity
S4	Lewis’ Strict Implication System	4	$\Box P \rightarrow \Box\Box P$	KT4	partial ordering




Figure 2.2

Logical Containment of the Modal Systems

S5	Lewis' Strict Implication System 5	E	$\diamond P \rightarrow \Box \diamond P$	KTE	equivalence relation
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Various deontic modal systems can also be characterized by their axioms (*Lemmon code*).

Table 2.5: Lemmon Codes for Deontic Modal Systems

System T	KT	Deontic D	KD
System B	KTB		
System S4	KT4	Deontic S4	KD4
System S5	KTE = KT4B = KD4B		

The logical relationships among the above systems of modal logic can be set forth in a diagram (due to Krister Segerberg who omits **KD5** and **K45**). As before, a modal logic is included in another if it is connected to it, directly or indirectly, by an upward path. The second diagram is a more elaborate **PICASSOS' ELECTRIC CHAIR** that includes deontic modal logics.




Figure 2.3: Hasse–Picasso Diagrams for Systems of Modal Logic




Figure 2.4
Accessibility Represented by Directed Graphs

One way to visualize how the conditions on the accessibility relation validate their respective axioms is using the definitions of ‘ \Box ’ and \diamond in terms of possible worlds and use directed graphs from Chapter IV to represent the accessibility relation R . Here the accessibility relation $\alpha R \beta$ (read “ β is possible relative to α ” or “ β is accessible to α ”) is represented by an arrow from a circle representing possible world α to a circle representing possible world β .

We can, using the directed graphs from the theory of relations, translate properties of accessibility relations into geometric properties of directed graphs. Symmetry, for example, requires that all accessibility arrows are double arrows. Reflexivity requires that every world be accessible to itself and so every world has a loop, which is a special case of a double arrow. Seriality requires that every world is a tail of an arrow. Transitivity requires that for every indirect path of accessibility from α to β and from β to γ , there is a direct path from α to γ . Being euclidean and serial is equivalent to being an equivalence

relation, that is, being reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Expressing R in terms of love and worlds in terms of persons, we have the following intuitive translations:

Table 2.6: Relational Properties of Directed Graphs

serial	$\forall\alpha. \exists\beta. \alpha R \beta$	Everyone is a lover.
reflexive	$\forall\alpha. \alpha R \alpha$	Everyone is a self-lover.
symmetric	$\forall\alpha. \forall\beta. (\alpha R \beta \Rightarrow \beta R \alpha)$	All love is requited; all love is mutual.
transitive	$\forall\alpha. \forall\beta. \forall\gamma. (\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \beta R \gamma \Rightarrow \alpha R \gamma)$	Love is transitive.
euclidean	$\forall\alpha. \forall\beta. \forall\gamma. (\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \alpha R \gamma \Rightarrow \beta R \gamma)$	All beloveds of the same lover, love each other and themselves.

Using the definition of truth in a modal system set forth above, we can rigorously demonstrate that if R is transitive, then axiom 4 is valid. This demonstration is carried out in the meta-language. We use the symbols ‘ \forall ’, ‘ \exists ’, ‘ $\&$ ’, ‘ \Rightarrow ’ and ‘ \in ’ in the meta-language for ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘and’, ‘if... then’, and ‘is an element of’, respectively. Once the truth clauses are unpacked, the logical demonstration is no more complicated than a derivation in the theory of relations.

Listing 2.1

Montague-style Semantic Derivation of Transitivity Validating Axiom 4

1.	Show R is transitive $\Rightarrow \models (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi)$	3, CD
2.	$\forall\alpha \forall\beta \forall\gamma (\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \beta R \gamma \Rightarrow \alpha R \gamma)$	Assume (CD), def. transitive
3.	Show $\models (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi)$	24, DD
4.	Show $\forall\alpha \in W. (\models_\alpha \Box\varphi \Rightarrow \models_\alpha \Box\Box\varphi)$	5, UD
5.	Show $\models_\alpha \Box\varphi \Rightarrow \models_\alpha \Box\Box\varphi$	8, CD
6.	$\models_\alpha \Box\varphi$	Assume (CD)
7.	$\forall\beta \in W. (\alpha R \beta \Rightarrow \models_\beta \varphi)$	6, truth-def. \Box
8.	Show $\models_\alpha \Box\Box\varphi$	23, DD
9.	Show $\forall\beta \in W. (\alpha R \beta \Rightarrow \models_\beta \Box\varphi)$	10, UD
10.	Show $\alpha R \beta \Rightarrow \models_\beta \Box\varphi$	12, CD
11.	$\alpha R \beta$	Assume (CD)
12.	Show $\models_\beta \Box\varphi$	22, DD
13.	Show $\forall\gamma \in W. (\beta R \gamma \Rightarrow \models_\gamma \varphi)$	14, UD
14.	Show $\beta R \gamma \Rightarrow \models_\gamma \varphi$	16, CD
15.	$\beta R \gamma$	Assume CD
16.	Show $\models_\gamma \varphi$	22, DD
17.	$\alpha R \beta \ \& \ \beta R \gamma$	11, 15 ADJ
19.	$\alpha R \gamma$	18, 17 MP
20.	$\alpha R \gamma \Rightarrow \models_\gamma \varphi$	7, UI
21.	$\models_\gamma \varphi$	20, 19 MP
22.	$\models_\beta \Box\varphi$	12, truth-def. \Box
23.	$\models_\alpha \Box\Box\varphi$	9, truth-def. \Box
24.	$\models (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi)$	4, def. \models (logical consequence)

The above semantic derivation can be visualized graphically to prove the above result contrapositively. We will show that if

$$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$$

is false, then the accessibility relation cannot be transitive. Axiom (4) fails when its antecedent φ is true but its consequent $\Box\varphi$ is false in α . By modal negation, $\neg\Diamond\Diamond\varphi$ is equivalent to $\Diamond\Diamond\neg\varphi$.

So both $\Box\varphi$ and $\Diamond\Diamond\neg\varphi$ are true in some possible world α . Eliminating the first \Diamond , we have that in some possible world β accessible to α (i.e. $\alpha R \beta$), $\Diamond\neg\varphi$ is true. Applying the definition of truth for \Diamond again, we have that for some world γ accessible to β (i.e. $\beta R \gamma$), $\neg\varphi$ is true in γ . Notice that the transitivity of the accessibility relation R would require that γ be accessible to α , which would contradict that $\Box\varphi$. The invalidity of Axiom (4) implies the failure of the transitivity of the accessibility relation R . Stating this result contrapositively, if the accessibility relation R is transitive, then axiom (4) is valid.




Figure 2.5: Kripke–Mar Diagram for Transitivity of R Validating Axiom (4)

The semantic demonstration together with the graphic proof using directed graphs support one another in building our intuitions for modal logic. The graphic proofs are satisfying because of their simplicity and ability to make the critical step visually perspicuous. On the other hand, the semantic proof is satisfying insofar as the explicit definitions of \Box , \Diamond , \models are shown to work elegantly and precisely with our natural deduction systems using the quantifier logic with UD, UI, EI, EG and the theory of relations. We will use the directed graphs in the context of discovering new axioms and the semantic proofs in the context of justifying that these axioms correspond to imposing requirements on the accessibility relation.

Exercises

TODO... too many graphics... need some rest today...

3 Gödel’s Second Incompleteness theorem

Gödel informally explained his First Incompleteness Theorem noting that the analogy to the antinomy of the Liar “leaps to the eye (GCW-I, 149)”. Whereas the Liar sentence asserts of itself that it is *untrue*, the Gödel sentence says of itself that it is *unprovable* in a precisely specified formal system such as *Principia Mathematica*.

Gödel further remarks that *any* epistemological antinomy can be used to motivate his proof but chooses the Richard Paradox, which we discussed in Chapter 1. Gödel’s choice was prescient: the Berry Paradox is a simplification of the Richard Paradox, and can be used to elegantly prove the First Incompleteness Theorem showing its connection with Chaitin’s interpretation Gödel Incompletehes in terms of algorithmic randomness.

GÖDEL’S FIRST INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM: if a formal system is consistent and its axiom system has enough arithmetic so that its theorems can be listed by some mechanical procedure, then there exists an *undecidable* sentence in that formal system, which is therefore *incomplete*.⁵

3.1 Provability Modal Logics

Elegant proofs of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem were discovered in *modal provability logics*, which emerged from the 1950s-1970s. These logics were anticipated by (Gödel 1933a) “*An interpretation of intuitionistic propositional calculus*.” Gödel’s insight was that intuitionistic *truth* was characterized in terms of *proof*, which is a kind of *necessity*, and so modal axioms could be used to formalize the *properties of provability*:

Table 3.1: Properties of Provability

(T)	$\Box P \rightarrow P$	What is provable is _____.
(K)	$\Box (P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q)$	Whatever follows from what is provable is _____.
(4)	$\Box P \rightarrow \Box \Box P$	What is provable is provably _____.

(Henkin 1952) posed the intriguing question whether the *positive* Gödelian sentence “I am *provable*” is provable. (Löb 1955) answered Henkin’s question in the affirmative by showing that Peano Arithmetic proves a counterpart to Löb’s Axiom:

(L)	$\Box (\Box P \rightarrow P) \rightarrow \Box P$	Löb’s Axiom restricts (T) to what is provable.
-----	--	--

- A Gödel-Löb modal probability logic (GL) results from adding (L) to (K) and
1. the rule of *necessitation* or *universal derivation* [UD] (*i.e.*, if $\mathbf{GL} \vdash P$ then $\mathbf{GL} \vdash \Box P$),
 2. *modus ponens* [MP]
 3. a rule for proving all *tautologies* or the KM2 system of natural deduction.

Note: adding axiom (4) turns out to be redundant. In 1975 Howard de Jongh proved that Axiom (4) is derivable from Löb’s axiom and (K) using the substitution of ‘ $\Box P \wedge P$ ’ for ‘ P ’.

⚠ *Principia Mathematica:*

G : G is not provable in system PM.

⁵ The formal system is also essentially incomplete, *i.e.*, one can add the undecidable Gödel sentence as a new axiom and the resulting system will have a new undecidable sentence, which is also undecidable in the original system.




Figure 3.1
Gödel, Kurt. 1933a. Eine interpretation des intuitionistischen aussagenkalküls. *Ergebnisse Eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums* 4. 39–40.

Henkin, Leon. 1952. The consistency of the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum-hypothesis with the axioms of set theory. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 17(3). 207–208. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2267706>

Löb, M.H. 1955. Solution of a problem of leon henkin. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 20(2). 115–118. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2266895>

A *provability system* consists minimal modal logic **K** with the additional axiom

$$(\mathbf{w}) \quad \Box(\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \Box\varphi.$$

⁶ At the Tenth International Tbilisi Symposium on Language, Logic and Computation in 2013, one of the speakers referred to this theorem as part of the folklore of the field not realizing that de Jongh was in the audience.

Theorem 3.1 (Howard de Jongh, 1970s). ⁶ *Axiom (4) holds in the Gödel-Lob Provability Logic.*

Proof. Replacing φ by $(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)$ in Axiom **(W)** we obtain

$$\Box(\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi).$$

□

It happens that the lemma

$$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box(\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)$$

is derivable in minimal modal logic **K** (see exercises below).

It therefore follows that

$$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)$$

and hence by **(T)**,

$$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi.$$

3.2 Exercises

Listing 3.1

Exercise Lemma

1.	<i>Show</i> $\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box(\varphi \rightarrow (\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)))$	
2.	$\Box\varphi$	Assume (_____)
3.	$\Box(\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)$	Axiom (L)
4.	<i>Show</i> $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow (\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)))$	5, _____
5.	<i>Show</i> $\varphi \rightarrow (\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi))$	7, _____
6.	φ	Assume (_____)
7.	<i>Show</i> $\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box\varphi \wedge \varphi$	11, _____
8.	$\Box(\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi)$	Assume (_____)
9.	$\Box\Box\varphi \wedge \Box\varphi$	distribution \Box/\wedge
10.	$\Box\varphi$	9, S
11.	$\Box\varphi \wedge \varphi$	10, 6 ADJ

Next comes the Löb-Gödel Theorem, which we shall call the “Magical Modal Mystery Tour”⁷:

Now we may obtain a modal version of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Gödel’s famous arithmetical version of the Liar G intuitively says, “I am not provable”:

$$G \leftrightarrow \sim\Box G.$$

Note the consistency of Peano Arithmetic may be formulated as: $\sim\Box(1 = 2)$ (von Neumann) or $\sim\Box(0 \neq 0)$.

We can sketch an elegant proof in modal provability logic of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. First, we have a modal counterpoint to the *fixed-point theorem* that yields the *Gödel sentence*:

$$\models G \leftrightarrow \sim\Box G.$$

In his letter, von Neumann noted that the consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA) can be expressed by the formula that $(1 = 2)$ is not provable:

$$\text{Cons(PA)} := \sim\Box(1 = 2).$$

⁷ van Benthem [2010], p. 245 describes this theorem “as a piece of ‘magical’ modal reasoning that has delighted generations.”

Listing 3.2
Exercise “Löb-Gödel Theorem”

1.	$\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$	Assumption (T)
2.	$\vdash \sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	Gödel's Fixed-Point Theorem
3.	<i>Show</i> φ	20, _____
4.	<i>Show</i> $\Box \sigma$	16, _____
5.	<i>Show</i> $\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi$	14, _____
6.	$\Box \sigma$	Assume (_____)
7.	<i>Show</i> $\Box [\sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)]$	8, _____
8.	$\sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	2, Gödel's Fixed-Point Theorem
9.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	7, T81, IE, MD, S, Axiom (K), MP
10.	$\Box (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	9, 6, _____
11.	$\Box \Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box \varphi$	10, Axiom (_____), MP
12.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box \Box \sigma$	Axiom (_____)
13.	$\Box \varphi$	12, 6 _____, 11 _____
14.	φ	13, (_____)
15.	$(\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \sigma$	2, _____
16.	σ	15, 5 _____
17.	$\sigma \rightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	2, _____
18.	σ	4, (_____)
19.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi$	17, 18 _____
20.	φ	19, 4 _____

Now the gist of the First Incompleteness Theorem is the demonstration that:

$$\text{if } \vdash G \leftrightarrow \sim \Box G, \text{ then } \vdash \sim \Box (1 = 2) \rightarrow \sim \Box G.$$

By the fixed-point theorem, $\sim \Box G$ is *logically equivalent* to G , so we have $\vdash \sim \Box 1 = 2 \rightarrow G$:




Figure 3.2

By the rule of necessitation, we may prefix a \Box and then distribute, using (K), the over the conditional:

$$\vdash \Box \sim \Box (1 = 2) \rightarrow \Box G.$$

According to the First Incompleteness Theorem, the provability of the Gödel sentence implies the inconsistency of the system, so:




Figure 3.3

In short, we have

$$\vdash \Box \neg \Box (1 = 2) \rightarrow \Box (1 = 2),$$

which, by contraposition, yields

$$\vdash \neg \Box (1 = 2) \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \Box (1 = 2).$$

Since $\neg \Box (1 = 2)$, by definition, is $\text{Cons}(\text{PA})$, we have

GÖDEL’S SECOND INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM. ($\text{Cons}(\text{PA}) \rightarrow \neg \Box \text{Cons}(\text{PA})$), *i.e.*, if Peano Arithmetic is *consistent*, then it cannot prove its own *consistency*.

In a lecture to a joint meeting of the Mathematical Association of America and the American Mathematical Society, Gödel summarized the significance of his result for Hilbert’s program: the hope of finding “...a proof for freedom from contradiction undertaken by Hilbert and his disciples” had “vanished entirely in view of some recently discovered facts. It can be shown quite generally that there can exist no proof of the freedom of contradiction of a formal system S which could be expressed in terms of the formal system S itself” (Gödel 1933b, GCW-III, p. 52).

Gödel, Kurt. 1933b. The present situation in the foundations of mathematics. *Collected Works* 3. 45–53.

3.3 Solution to Problems

Listing 3.3

Solution to Exercise Lemma

1.	<i>Show</i> $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \rightarrow (\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi)))$	3, CD
2.	$\Box \varphi$	Assume (CD)
3.	$\Box (\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi)$	Axiom (L)
4.	<i>Show</i> $\Box (\varphi \rightarrow (\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi)))$	5, ND
5.	<i>Show</i> $\varphi \rightarrow (\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi))$	7, CD
6.	φ	Assume (CD)
7.	<i>Show</i> $\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \varphi \wedge \varphi$	11, CD
8.	$\Box (\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi)$	Assume (CD)
9.	$\Box \Box \varphi \wedge \Box \varphi$	8, (K), MP
10.	$\Box \varphi$	9, S
11.	$\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi$	10, 6 ADJ

Listing 3.4

Solution to Exercise “Löb-Gödel Theorem”

1.	$\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$	Assumption (T)
2.	$\vdash \sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	Gödel’s Fixed-Point Theorem
3.	<i>Show</i> φ	20, DD
4.	<i>Show</i> $\Box \sigma$	16, ND
5.	<i>Show</i> $\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi$	14, CD
6.	$\Box \sigma$	Assume (CD)
7.	<i>Show</i> $\Box [\sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)]$	8, ND
8.	$\sigma \leftrightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	2, Gödel’s Fixed-Point Theorem
9.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	7, T81, IE, MD, S, Axiom (K), MP
10.	$\Box (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	9, 6, MP
11.	$\Box \Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box \varphi$	10, Axiom (K), MP
12.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \Box \Box \sigma$	Axiom (4)
13.	$\Box \varphi$	12, 6 MP, 11 MP
14.	φ	13, (T)
15.	$(\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \sigma$	2, BC
16.	σ	15, 5 MP
17.	$\sigma \rightarrow (\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi)$	2, BC
18.	σ	4, (T)
19.	$\Box \sigma \rightarrow \varphi$	17, 18 MP
20.	φ	19, 4 MP

Appendix

Sachertorte at Café Reichsrat

Classically, logic has been thought of as the study of *deductive proof* or *derivations*. In the last few decades, however, a more dynamic view of logical reasoning has emerged. Rational agents perform many cognitive reasoning tasks other than making deductions from a given set of premises. Common sense reasoning includes reasoning about the beliefs, knowledge, and logical reasoning of other agents. Reasoning is not just the construction of static derivations but dynamical events involving the flow of information based on public statements and inferences that can be made on the basis of what others know or don’t know. The following puzzle illustrates this usefulness of this kind of dynamic meta-epistemological reasoning.

The date was August 26, 1930. Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl and Friedrich Waismann met with Gödel for *Sachertore* and Viennese coffee at Café Reichsrat. Gödel was excited to share with his friends his discovery. This meeting a the café was about one month before the Second *Tagung for Erkenntnishlehre der exackten Wissenschaften* to be held in Königsberg in September, where Gödel would make the first public announcement of his revolutionary result, the (First) Incompleteness Theorem.

Although his associates from the Vienna Circle—Rudolf, Herbert, and Friedrich—could sense an under-current of excitement in Kurt’s manner, his cautious and measured remarks were deeper than they could, or were willing, to grasp, at that time. Rudolf decided to change the subject. “When is your birthday, Kurt?” he inquired. Gödel thought for a moment and wrote down a napkin a list of 10 dates for all to see:

January 14	January 15	January 18
March 14	March 23	
April 18	April 28	
May 15	May 22	May 28

Kurt said, “My birthday is one of these.” Then taking a couple more napkins, he jotted down the *month* of his birthday and gave it to Herbert. On the other he jotted down the *date* of his birthday and gave it to Friedrich. Neither Herbert nor Friedrich could see what was written on each other’s napkin.

“Can you prove when my birthday is?” Kurt asked Herbert. The following conversation ensued.

HERBERT: I *don’t know* when your birthday is, but I *know* Friedrich *doesn’t know* either.

FRIEDRICH: I *didn’t know* at first, but now I *do know*!

HERBERT: Then I also *know* when Kurt’s birthday is!

RUDOLF, who heard the exchange, correctly deduced Kurt’s birthday. How did he do this? You may assume everyone is an *ideal logician*: they are not lying or confused and are capable of making logically accurate inferences on the basis of the information disclosed.



Solution to the *Sachertore* at Café Reichsrat Puzzle

First arrange the list of possible birthdays in a matrix by month and by day:

		FRIEDRICH				
HERBERT	January	14	15	18		
	March	14			23	
	April			18		28
	May		15		22	28

Our first clue is that:

HERBERT said, “I don’t know when your birthday is, but I know FRIEDRICH doesn’t know either.”

HERBERT, of course, doesn’t know since he’s only been given the month. However, Hebert’s *publicly announcing* that he *knows* that FRIEDRICH doesn’t *know* gives everyone some new information.

Rudolf *deduces* that Hebert has been given neither the months of March nor May. Why? Because each those months have unique dates, namely, 22 and 23. If FRIEDRICH had been given either of these dates, he would have been able immediately to deduce Kurt’s birthday. Since HERBERT says he *knows* this is not the case, Rudolf can deduce that HERBERT has *not* been given either March or May.

		FRIEDRICH				
HERBERT	January	14	15	18		
	March	14			23	
	April			18		28
	May		15		22	28

Our second clue is that:

FRIEDRICH said, “I didn’t know originally, but now I do!”

Since Friedrich says he now *knows* Kurt’s birthday, Rudolf may deduce that Friedrich has *not* been given the date of the 18th, the date is common to the months not yet been eliminated—January and April.

		FRIEDRICH				
HERBERT	January	14	15	18		
	March	14			23	
	April			18		28
	May		15		22	28

The last clue is that:

HERBERT said, “Then I also know when Kurt’s birthday is!””

Since Herbert now *knows* when Kurt’s birthday is too, the month given to Herbert cannot be January since in that case, *two* possible dates would been remaining *after* the 18th was eliminated.

		FRIEDRICH				
HERBERT	January	14	15	18		
	March	14			23	
	April			18		28
	May		15		22	28

Having eliminated the months of May and June, and then the date of the 18th and then the month of January, Rudolf deduces that Kurt’s birthday is April 28th.

		FRIEDRICH				
HERBERT	January	14	15	18		
	March	14			23	
	April			18		28
	May		15		22	28

💡 N.B.

Gödel’s birthday is actually April 28th (1906), and the date of his death is January 14th (1978). Einstein’s birthday is on March 14th (1879), a date which will be important for the beginning of the public recognition of Gödel’s achievements, and the date of his death is April 18th (1955), a date that will mark the beginning of Gödel’s increasing intellectual isolation at IAS. This puzzle is based on one published in the *New York Times*.