Update 03_p02_ch14_3.md

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@@ -48,33 +48,33 @@ Now, as a necessarily practical affair, any propositional exchange dey require a
 
 Last last, e go dey equally impossible to engage in argumentation, if man nor dey allowed to appropriate in addition to man body oda scarce means thru homesteading, i.e., by putting dem to use before someone else does, or if such means nor dey defined for objective, physical terms.
 
-For if no one had the right to control anything at all, except his own body, then we would all cease to exist and the problem of justifying norms—as well as all other human problems—simply would not exist. The fact that one is alive presupposes the validity of property rights to other things. No one who is alive could argue otherwise.
+For if nobody get de right to control anytin at all, except e own body, den we go all cease to exist and de problem of justifying norms—as well as all oda human problems—simply nor go exist. De fact say person dey alive presupposes dd validity of property rights to oda things. Nobody wey dey alive fit argue odawise.
 
-And if a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over such goods by homesteading, by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular physical resource before anyone else had done so, but instead late-comers were assumed to have ownership claims to things, then literally *no one would be allowed to do anything with anything at any time* unless he had the prior consent of all late-comers. Neither we nor our forefathers nor our progeny could survive or will survive if we were to follow this rule. Yet in order for any person—past, present or future—to argue anything it must evidently be possible to survive. And in order for us to do this, property rights cannot be conceived of as timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of people concerned. Rather, property rights must necessarily originate through action at definite places and times for specific acting individuals. Otherwise, it would be impossible for anyone to say anything at a definite tine and place and for someone else to reply. To assert that the first-user-first-owner rule of private property can be ignored or is unjustified implies a contradiction. One’s assertion of this proposition presupposes one’s existence as a physically independent decision-making unit at a given point in time, and the validity of the homesteading principle as an absolute principle of property acquisition.
+And if person nor acquire de right of exclusive control over such goods by homesteading, by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular physical resource before anybody else done am, but instead late-comers come dey assumed to get ownership claims to tins, then literally *nobody go dey allowed to do anytin wit anytin at any time* unless he get de prior consent of all late-comers. Neither we nor our forefathers nor our progeny fit survive or go survive if we dey allowed to follow dis rule. Yet in order for any person—past, present or future—to argue anytin e must clearly dey possible to survive. And in order make we fit do am, property rights nor fit dey conceived of as timeless and nonspecific regarding de number of people concerned. Rather, property rights gats necessarily originate thru action at definite places and times for specific acting individuals. Odawise, e go dey impossible for anybody to say anytin at a definite tine and place and for someone else to reply. To assert say de first-user-first-owner rule of private property fit dey ignored or dey unjustified implies a contradiction. Person assertion of dis proposition presuppose person existence as a physically independent decision-making unit at a given point in time, and de validity of de homesteading principle as an absolute principle of property acquisition.
 
-Economics, or in Mises’s terminology praxeology, and its status as a nonhypothetical, a priori true social science is derived from the axiom of action.[^35]
+Economics, or for Mises’s terminology praxeology, and e level as a nonhypothetical, a priori true social science dey derived from the axiom of action.[^35]
 
-[^35]: See on the following Mises, *Human Action*, chap. IV; Rothbard, *Man Economy, and State*, chap. 1; idem, “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics,” in Edwin Dolan, ed., *The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976); Hoppe, *Praxeology and Economic Science*; also Lionel Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
+[^35]: Check for de following Mises, *Human Action*, chap. IV; Rothbard, *Man Economy, and State*, chap. 1; idem, “Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics,” in Edwin Dolan, ed., *The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976); Hoppe, *Praxeology and Economic Science*; also Lionel Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1982).
 
-With every action an actor pursues a goal, and whatever his goal may be, the fact that it is pursued by an actor reveals that he places a relatively higher value on it than on any other goal of action he could conceive of at the start of his action.
+Wit every action an actor dey pursue a goal, and whateva e goal fit be, de fact say e dey pursued by an actor reveals say e dey place a relatively higher value on am dan on any oda goal of action he fit conceive of at de start of e action.
 
-In order to achieve this goal an actor must interfere or decide not to interfere (which is also an interference) at an earlier point in time to produce a later result, and this interference implies the use of some scarce means (at least those of the actor’s body, its standing room, and the time used by the interference).
+In order to achieve dis goal an actor gat to interfere or decide not to interfere (wey be also interference) at an earlier point in time to produce a later result, and dis interference dey imply de use of some scarce means (at least dose of de actor body, e standing room, and de time used by de interference).
 
-These means must also have value for an actor—a value derived from that of the goal—because the actor must regard their employment as necessary in order to achieve the goal effectively. Further, actions can only be performed sequentially and always involve making a choice, i.e., taking up one course of action which at some given point in time promises the most highly valued result to the actor and excluding at the same time the pursuit of other, less valued goals.
+Dis means also needs to get value for an actor—a value wey dey derived from dat of de goal—bcos de actor must regard dia employment as necessary in order to achieve de goal effectively. Further, actions fit only dey performed sequentially and dey always involve making a choice, i.e., taking up one course of action wey at some given point in time dey promise de most highly valued result to de actor and excluding at de same time de pursuit of oda, less valued goals.
 
-In addition, when acting an actor not only invariably aims to substitute a more for a less satisfactory state of affairs and demonstrates a preference for higher over lower values; he also invariably considers when in the future his goals will be reached and demonstrates a universal preference for earlier over later results. Since every action requires time and man must occasionally consume something, time is always scarce. Hence, present or earlier results are, and invariably must be, valued more highly than future or later ones, and man will only exchange a present value against a future one if he thereby anticipates *increasing* his future well-being.
+In addition, wen acting an actor nor dey only invariably aim to substitute a more for a less satisfactory state of affairs and demonstrate a preference for higher over lower values; he dey also invariably consider wen for de future e goals go deyreached and demonstrate a universal preference for earlier over later results. Since every action dey requires time and man gat ti occasionally consume sometin, time always dey scarce. Hence, present or earlier results dey, and invariably gats dey, valued more highly dan future or later ones, and man go only exchange  present value against a future one if he for de process anticipate *increasing* e future well-being.
 
-Furthermore, as a consequence of having to choose and give preference to one goal over another, of not being able to realize all goals simultaneously, and of being constrained by time preference, each and every action implies the incurrence of costs, i.e., the forsaking of the value attached to the most highly valued alternative goal that cannot be realized or whose realization must be postponed because the means necessary to effect it are bound up in the production of another, even more highly valued goal.
+Furthermore, as a consequence of having to choose and give preference to one goal over anoda, of not being able to realize all goals simultaneously, and of being constrained by time preference, each and every action dey imply de incurrence of costs, i.e., dd forsaking of de value attached to de most highly valued alternative goal wey nor fit dey realized or wey e realization gats dey postponed bcos de means necessary to effect am dey bound up for de production of anoda, even more highly valued goal.
 
-Finally, it is implied in our knowledge of what it is to act, that at its starting point every goal of action must be considered worth more to the actor than its cost and capable of yielding a profit, i.e., a result whose value is ranked higher than that of the foregone opportunities. However, every action is also invariably threatened by the possibility of a loss if in retrospect an actor finds that contrary to expectations the result actually achieved has a lower value than the relinquished alternative would have had.
+Finally, e dey implied for our knowledge of wetin e be to act, dat for e starting point every goal of action gats dey considered worth more to de actor dan e cost and capable of yielding a profit, i.e., a result wey e value dey ranked higher dan dat of de foregone opportunities. Howeva, every action also dey invariably threatened by de possibility of a loss if in retrospect an actor find out say contrary to expectations de result actually achieved get lower value dan de relinquished alternative for get.
 
-All of these categories which we know to be the very heart of economics—values, means, choice, preference, time preference, cost, profit and loss—are implied in the axiom of action. Like the axiom itself, they incorporate nonhypothetically true knowledge. Any attempt to disprove this knowledge would itself have to be an action, aimed at a goal, requiring means, excluding other courses of action, incurring costs, subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal, and thus leading to a profit or a loss.
+All of dese categories wey we know to be de very heart of economics—values, means, choice, preference, time preference, cost, profit and loss—dey implied for de axiom of action. Like de axiom itself, dem dey incorporate nonhypothetically true knowledge. Any attempt to disprove dis knowledge go itself gat to be action, aimed at a goal, requiring means, excluding oda courses of action, incurring costs, subjecting dd actor to de possibility of achieving or not achieving de desired goal, and so leading to a profit or a loss.
 
-All true economic propositions, and this is what the Austrian conception of economics is all about, can be deduced by means of formal logic from this incontestably true material knowledge regarding the meaning of action and its categories. More precisely, all true economic theorems consist of: (a) an understanding of the meaning of action; (b) a situation or situational change—assumed to be given or identified as being given—and described in terms of action-categories; and (c) a logical deduction of the consequences—again in terms of such categories—which result for an actor from this situation or situational change. For instance, the law of marginal utility, one of the most basic laws of economics, follows from our indisputable knowledge of the fact that every actor always prefers what satisfies him more over what satisfies him less, plus the assumption that he is faced with an increase in the supply of a good (a scarce means) whose units he regards as of equal serviceability by one additional unit. From this it follows with logical necessity that this additional unit can only be employed as a means for the removal of an uneasiness that is deemed less urgent than the least valuable goal previously satisfied by a unit of such a good.
+All true economic propositions, and dis na wetin de Austrian conception of economics dey all about, fit dey deduced by means of formal logic from dis incontestably true material knowledge regarding de meaning of action and e categories. More precisely, all true economic theorems dey consist of: (a) an understanding of de meaning of action; (b) a situation or situational change—assumed to dey given or identified as being given—and described in terms of action-categories; and (c) a logical deduction of de consequences—again in terms of data kind categories—wey result for an actor from dis situation or situational change. For instance, de law of marginal utility, one of de most basic laws of economics, follows from our indisputable knowledge of de fact say every actor dey always prefer wetin go satisfy am more over wetin go  satisfy am less, plus de assumption say he dey faced wit an increase for de supply of a good (a scarce means) wey de units he dey regard as of equal serviceability by one additional unit. From dis e follow wit logical necessity say dis additional unit fit only dey employed as a means for de removal of an uneasiness wey dey  deemed less urgent dan de least valuable goal previously satisfied by a unit of such a good.
 
-The combination of ethics as implied in the axiom of argumentation and of economics as implied in that of action yields what might be called Austrian welfare economics.[^36]
+De combination of ethics as e dey implied for de axiom of argumentation and of economics as implied for dat of action yields wetin fit dey called Austrian welfare economics.[^36
 
-[^36]: See also Murray N. Rothbard, *Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics* (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper Series no. 3, 1977); idem, *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977); idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” *Cato Journal* 1, no. 2 (1981); Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*; idem, “*Man, Economy, and Liberty*: Review Essay,” *Review of Austrian Economics* 4 (1990).
+[^36]: Also check Murray N. Rothbard, *Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics* (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper Series no. 3, 1977); idem, *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977); idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” *Cato Journal* 1, no. 2 (1981); Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*; idem, “*Man, Economy, and Liberty*: Review Essay,” *Review of Austrian Economics* 4 (1990).
 
 If and insofar as actors choose to act in accordance with the indisputably valid principle of the private property ethic, social welfare—defined in terms of Pareto-optimality—will invariably be optimized: A person’s original appropriation of unowned resources, as demonstrated by this very action, increases his utility or welfare (at least *ex ante*). At the same time, it makes no one worse off because in appropriating them he takes nothing away from others. Obviously, others could have homesteaded these resources, too, if only they had perceived them as scarce, and hence, valuable. However, they did not do so, which demonstrates that they attached no value to them whatsoever, and thus they cannot be said to have lost any utility on account of this act. Proceeding from this basis, any further act of production utilizing homesteaded resources is equally Pareto-optimal on demonstrated preference grounds, provided only that it does not uninvitedly impair the physical integrity of the resources homesteaded or produced with homesteaded means by others. Finally, every voluntary exchange starting from this basis must also be regarded as a Paretooptimal change because it can only take place if both parties expect to benefit from it.