




Mode of Operation 운영모드

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Mode of Operation

- A way of encrypting arbitrary-length messages using **block cipher** (3DES or AES)

- **64 bits block** (3DES) and **128 bits block** (AES) ⇒ 문제는 이 block의 크기가 작아.
→ message의 길이가 크면?
- How can we encrypt messages larger than the block length?



- Five (representative) modes


- Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode
- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
- Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode
- Output Feedback (OFB) mode
- Counter (CTR) mode

Padding


■ PKCS#7 padding block 단위의 암호화를 위한 규칙

○ Byte padding

- If $|m|$ is not a multiple of block size




- If $|m|$ is a multiple of block size




Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode (1)

■ ECB mode



Encryption



Decryption




Security issues:


- Patterns of plaintexts are preserved
 - Same plaintexts lead to same ciphertexts
- Attacker can exchange C_i blocks without knowing key K



Original



Encrypted using ECB mode




Encrypted using other modes


Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode (2)

■ Examples of attacking ECB mode

○ In payment file system




○ In ID/Password storage system(misguided example)




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode(1)

■ CBC mode



Encryption





Decryption

- Ciphertext = $(IV, C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N)$
- IV (initial vector) is chosen at random (randomized algorithm)
fresh IV 3/48.
- Same plaintexts lead to distinct ciphertexts
- Ciphertext must be longer than plaintext : $CT\text{-size} = PT\text{-size} + |IV|$
- Drawback is that encryption must be carried out sequentially

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode (2)

■ Error propagation on CBC mode




- What if a single bit error occurs in a plaintext (during encryption)?
 - The error is propagated
 - Can be used for Message Authentication Code (MAC) CBC-MAC
→ 단점은 잘못된 사용
- What if a single bit error occurs in a ciphertext (during transmission)?

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode (3)

✱ Warning: **IV** should be chosen at random in every encryption

- Attacker who can predict the IV can break CPA security!
- Similarly applied to the case when the same IV is used

■ Suppose (1) A can predict IV for next message (2) A does CPA attack




■ Bug in SSL/TLS 1.0

- IV for record #i is last CT block of record #(i-1)

$c'[0] = c[n-2]$ ~~from~~ midway
?? ~~other~~ Hawaii

CBC technicality: Nonce-based




- Key=(k_1 , k) and CT=(c[0], ..., c[3])
- What is difference between CBC and the above one?
- TLS: byte padding is used ($\text{pad} = \begin{bmatrix} n & n & n & \dots & n \end{bmatrix}$)
 - If no pad needed, add a dummy block

Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode

CFB mode

짧은 평문에서 사용.




- Only **encryption** function is necessary
- In some applications, **block size gets smaller** (e.g., ASCII 8-bit unit)
 - Less efficient than CBC mode (still sequentially)
- How is error propagation in plaintext and ciphertext?

에러는 평문과 암호문 모두에 전파된다. 에러는 C_i 이 register에 저장되면 에러가 전파된다.

Output Feedback (OFB) mode



OFB mode (as a stream cipher)



다시각각마다
IV를선택해따라
stream을만들수있다.
= stream cipher.

- Ciphertext = (IV, C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N)
- Only encryption function is necessary
 - Encryption(decryption) must be carried out **sequentially**
 - but, possible to prepare a stream in advance by using pre-processing
- How is error propagation in plaintext and ciphertext?


IV
↓
 T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n ← for stream

다들각각에만 해야.

Counter (CTR) mode

■ CTR mode (as a stream cipher)

The counter is incremented for each block.



Encryption

$IV + 1 \in \{1, 0\}^n$

○ Ciphertext = (IV, C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N), where $IV = CTR$

■ $IV \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is chosen at random

○ Only encryption function is used

■ Encryption (decryption) is **fully parallelized**

■ As with OFB, possible to generate a key stream in advance key stream 미리 생성 가능 = stream cipher 특징


○ Possible to decrypt the i-th block C_i without decrypting any block

다음 블록에 반대로.

Comparison: CBC vs. CTR

| | | CBC | CTR |
|---------------------|-----|---------------|--------------|
| building block | | PRP | PRF |
| as a stream cipher | | No | Yes |
| parallel processing | Enc | No | Yes |
| | Dec | Yes | Yes |
| error propagation | Enc | Yes | No |
| | Dec | Two blocks | No |
| dummy padding block | | Yes | No |
| 1 byte msgs | | 16x expansion | no expansion |

IV



(for CBC, dummy padding block can be solved using ciphertext stealing)

nonce-based CBC / nonce-based CTR

Security Summary

-
- P_1
 \downarrow
 $K \rightarrow E$
 \uparrow
 C_1

If F is a secure block cipher, then $\{\text{CBC}, \text{OFB}, \text{CTR}\}$ is secure against chosen-plaintext attack

- CPA

CCA



Q & A