More stuff on games

More stuff

- Caching states
- Canonical forms
- •Game Theory

Complete Unrolling

Sometimes games can be completely converted from extensive form to a table of moves and values.

Complete Unrolling of TTT

explore full tree, hashing

Canonical Forms

- many games have symmetries
 - player a or player b
 - Rotation of board
 - Mirror image of board
- Storing board in a canonical form will lessen memory and computational requirements
 - Can the board be converted to an integer?
 - comparison becomes faster "="

the 8 equivalence permutations

Canonical form for TTT

```
"(defun canform (board)
" (num2board (loop for perm in *allperms*
" minimize (board2num (shuffle board perm))))

"(defun shuffle (board perm)
" (loop for x in perm collect (nth x board)))

"(defun board2num (board)
" (loop for x in board as i from 0 as j = 1 then (* 3 j) sum (* j (+ x 1))))

"(defun num2board (num)
" (loop for i from 0 to 8 as j = num then (floor (/ j 3)) collect (1- (mod j 3))))
```

Caching

- Each time you do a search, you are recalculating a lot of boards and heuristics
- •Find a way to keep some of those around to avoid re-calculation

Memoization (Norvig P 275)

```
**Caches the results of a function in a hash table.
**(defun memo (fn name)
** (let ((table (make-hash-table :TEST #'EQUAL)))
** (setf (get name 'memo) table)
** #'(lambda (x)
** (multiple-value-bind (val found-p)
** (gethash x table)
** (if found-p
** val
** (setf (gethash x table)(funcall fn x)))))))
**(defun memoize (fn-name)
** (setf (symbol-function fn-name)(memo (symbol-function fn-name) fn-name)))
```

Canonical explore

- (defun cangetmoves (board)
- (Unless (OR (WINP1 BOARD)(WINP1 (VECINV BOARD)))
- (remove-duplicates
- (loop for i from 0 to 8 when (zerop (nth i board))
- collect (canform (loop for x in board as j from 0
- collect (if (eql i j) 1 x))))
- :test #'equal)))

•

- (defun canexplore (board &aux substuff)
- (setq substuff (vecinv (cangetmoves board)));;get next boards
- (cond ((null substuff) (score board));;no moves, return score
- (t (loop for bd in substuff maximize;;return max of -opponent
- (- (canexplore bd))))))
- (memoize 'canexplore) ;;;use hash table
- (canexplore 1 (init-board)) ;;fill up hashtable

With Canonical forms and memoization of EXPLORE...


Only 765 boards of TTT

What about Game Theory?

- Al has not focused on "Game Theory"
 - Why? Minsky was made sick of it at Princeton in 1950's!
- Mathematical Model of Decisionmaking
 - under adversary
 - with cooperation
- Zermelo, 1923
- Von Neumann, 1934
- Nash 1950 (Nash Equilibria)
- Field of Mathematical Economics.

What is a two-player game in normal form?

Each player chooses a move and receives a payoff based on others decisions



In a zero sum game, the sum of payoffs to all players, is zero.

What is a two-player game in normal form?

 Each player simultaneously chooses a move (e.g. row or column) and receives a payoff based on other's choices

Concepts: pure strategy vs mixed strategy

Concept: Nash Equilbrium

Strategies

- pure strategy
 - Player always chooses the same row or col
- Mixed Strategy
 - player uses a probability distribution of choices.

pure vs mixed

- Pure and Mixed Strategy
- A pure strategy is each of the definite courses of action that a player can choose.
- •A mixed strategy is a strategy in which the course of action is randomly chosen from one of the pure strategies in the following way:
- •Each pure strategy is assigned some probability, indicating the relative frequency with which that pure strategy will be played.
- •The specific strategy used in any given play of the game can be selected using some appropriate random device.
- Expected Value E
- •If each of the n payoffs, s1, s2, ..., sn will occur with the probabilities p1, p2, ..., pn, respectively, then the average, or expected value E, is given by:

E = p1 s1 + p2 s2 + ... + pn sn

Nash Equilibrium

- John Nash taught at Brandeis for a few years.
- Won Nobel Prize in Economics in 1980
- Got a movie made "Brilliant Mind"
- Famous Proof:
 - For all zero sum games of n players, there exists an equilibrium of mixed strategies.

Implications of Nash Equilibria?

- Laissez Faire economics does not work but leads to oligarchy or monopoly
- Our understanding of evolution as dog-eatdog is sadly mistaken
- Markets need central government oversight to prevent monopoly rent-seeking (e.g. microsoft, google, adobe, facebook)

Value of Game Theory

- Extensive Literature
 - Game of Chicken
 - International relations
 - MAD Nuclear Strategy
 - evolution of cooperation
 - positive sum games
 - Prisoner's dilemma's
 - Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith)
 - Hawks vs Doves
 - Markets, bidding games
 - Organization and Team theory

Prisoner Dilemma

- •Most games we think of are "zero-sum"
- Cooperative and Altruistic Games can be Positive Sum

prisoner dilemma	cooperate	defect	
cooperate		3 3	0 5
defect		5 0	1 1

 Iterated prisoners dilemma is basis for many studies and theories in artificial life

Axelrod's Tournaments

- Robert Axelrod of UMich collected small computer programs from experts to play IPD in tournaments.
 - Its a dilemma because the Nash equilbrium is to always defect back propagated from the finite number of iterations
 - Each player gets 1 point per iteration.
 - However if they cooperate, they each get 3 points per iteration

basic strategies

- (defun tft (histyou histme)
- (if histyou (car histyou) 'c))
- (defun alld (histyou histme) 'd)
- (defun allc (histyou histme) 'c)
- (defun majority (histyou histme)
- (if histyou (if (>= (loop for x in histyou count (eq 'c x))
- (/ (length histyou) 2)) 'c 'd)
- 'c))

Tit for Tat

- submitted by Anatole Rapaport
 - First Cooperate
 - then play what your opponent played last move.
- A very simple simple strategy with minimal memory
- Won the tournament

more strategies

- (defun pick (seq)
- "Pick a random element out of a sequence."
- (and seq (nth (random (length seq)) seq)))
- (defun mixed (histyou histme) (pick (list 'c 'd)))
- (defun pavlov (histyou histme)
- (if histyou (if (> (table (car histme)(car histyou)) 2)
- (car histme)
- (if (eq (car histme) 'c) 'd 'c)) 'c))

play 2 strategies

- (defun play (p1 p2 & optional (n 100) & aux temp)
- (let ((hist1 nil)(hist2 nil))
- (loop for i from 1 to n do
- (setf temp (funcall p1 hist2 hist1))
- (push (funcall p2 hist1 hist2) hist2)
- (push temp hist1))
- (list (score hist1 hist2)(score hist2 hist1))))

scoring the game

- (defun score (hist1 hist2) ;;score for player 1
- (loop for h1 in hist1 as h2 in hist2 sum
- (table h1 h2)))
- (defun table (h1 h2)
- (cond ((and(eq h1 'c)(eq h2 'c)) 3)
- ((and(eq h1 'd)(eq h2 'd)) 1)
- ((and(eq h1 'c)(eq h2 'd)) 0)
- ((and(eq h1 'd)(eq h2 'c)) 5)))

round robin tournament

- (defun tourn (strategies)
- (loop for strat1 in strategies collect
- (loop for strat2 in strategies sum (car (play strat1 strat2)))))

(tourn '(tft allc alld majority pavlov mixed))

• ; (1545 1350 1408 1536 1512 1422)