



# Advanced Card Systems Limited

Card and Reader Technologies

## REFERENCE MANUAL

### ACOS6 SAM





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### 1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to describe in detail the features and functions of the ACS Smart Card Operating System Version 6 Security Access Module (ACOS6-SAM) developed by Advanced Card System Ltd.

#### 1.1 Features

ACOS6-SAM provides the following features:

- Compliance with ISO 7816 Parts 1,2,3,4
- High baud rate switchable from 9600 to 14,400, 28,800, 57,600, 115,200 and 223,200 bps.
- Full 16 K of EEPROM memory for application data.
- Supports ISO7816 Part 4 file structures: Transparent, Linear fixed, Linear Variable, Cyclic.
- DES / Triple DES capability.
- Mutual authentication with session key generation.
- Secure Access Module pairs with ACOS2 and ACOS3.
- Stores and performs all key operations on ACOS2/3 including mutual authentication, encrypted PIN submission, secure messaging, and ePurse commands
- Multilevel secured access hierarchy.
- Anti-tearing done on file headers and PIN commands.

#### 1.2 Technical Specifications

The following are some technical properties of the ACOS6 card:

##### Electrical

- Operating at 5V DC +/-10% (Class A) and 3V DC +/-10% (Class B)
- Maximum supply current: <10 mA
- ESD protection: ≤ 4 KV

##### EEPROM

- Capacity: 16 Kbytes (16,384 bytes)
- EEPROM endurance: 100K erase/write cycles
- Data retention: 10 years

##### Environmental

- Operating temperature: -25 °C to 85 °C
- Storage temperature: -40 °C to 100 °C



### 1.3 Symbols and Abbreviations

3DES	Triple DES
AID	Application / Account Identifier
AMB	Access Mode Byte
AMDO	Access Mode Data Object
APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit
ATC	Account Transaction Counter
ATR	Answer To Reset
ATREF	Account Transaction Reference
COMPL	Bit-wise Complement
DEC(C, K)	Decryption of data C with key K using DES or 3DES
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DF	Dedicated File
ENC(P, K)	Encryption of data P with key K using DES or 3DES
EF	Elementary File
EF1	PIN File
EF2	KEY File
FCP	File Control Parameters
FDB	File Descriptor Byte
LCSI	Life Cycle Status Integer
LSb	Least Significant Bit
LSB	Least Significant Byte
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MF	Master File
MSb	Most Significant Bit
MSB	Most Significant Byte
RFU	Reserved for Future Use
SAC	Security Attribute – Compact
SAE	Security Attribute – Expanded
SAM	Security Authentication Module
SCB	Security Condition Byte
SCDO	Security Condition Data Object
SE	Security Environment
SFI	Short File Identifier
SM-MAC	MAC for Secure Messaging



TLV	Tag-Length-Value
TTREFc	Terminal Transaction Reference for Credit
TTREFd	Terminal Transaction Reference for Debit
UQB	Usage Qualifier Byte
	Concatenation

### 1.4 History of Modification

May 2006	ACOS6 SAM revision 1.0
November 2007	ACOS3 revision 4.00 - Enhancement added for up to 307.2 kbps communication support. - Expanded user storage capacity to 16 Kbyte. - Added bulk encryption with CBC.

### 1.5 Organization

This document is arranged in the following manner:

Section 2 gives a general overview of SAM functionality and application usage. It discusses the specialized SAM commands that this card supports.

Section 3 discusses the basic card management. The pre-customization of the COS and changing of basic card features including ATR, life cycle, etc, are described in that section.

Section 4 is about the card's file system. The card headers and what is contained in the internal security and purse files are discussed.

Section 5 is about the security of the card. The card security options, including file security, mutual authentication, secure messaging, and secure PIN submission is described.

Section 6 is the command reference of ACOS6-SAM commands.

Section 7 is the command reference of SAM specific commands.

Section 8 gives example of file system creation of how to personalize and program the ACOS6-SAM. This includes creating different types of files, adding security files, etc.

Section 9 is a reference of all ACOS6-SAM Status Codes.

Section 10 provides the different command flows and interaction with an ACOS2 or ACOS3 client card.


Section 11 is a quick start guide and examples of using the ACOS6-SAM as a SAM card.





### 2. ACOS6 SAM

ACOS6-SAM is designed to be used as a general cryptogram computation module or as the security authentication module for ACOS2 and ACOS3 client cards. The SAM card securely stores the cryptographic keys and use these keys to compute cryptograms for other applications or smart cards. Using this, the keys never leaves the SAM and the system security would be greatly enhanced. The SAM can also perform the authentication procedure and purse MAC computation for the ACOS2 or ACOS3 cards.



**Figure 1: ACOS6-SAM set-up**





The ACOS6-SAM can be deployed in any application for these purposes:

- To store and secure the application's DES/3DES master keys.
- To generate and derive application keys based on a set of master keys.
- To perform cryptographic functions with client smart cards.
- To use as a secured encryption module.

When used with ACOS2/ACOS3 client smart cards, ACOS6-SAM can perform the following functions:

- To initialize the ACOS client card with diversified keys based on the card's serial number.
- To perform mutual authentication process, and generate of session key.
- To perform secure messaging with ACOS2/3.
- To compute the MAC for the PURSE commands.

The programming method of ACOS6-SAM is different from ACOS2/ACOS3 cards. It is designed to conform to ISO7816 part 4 file system and command set. To get the application developer up to speed, we have included a quick start guide and sample personalization. The following subsections describe the specific SAM functions.

## 2.1 Diversify Key

This command computes the ACOS2/ACOS3 application key (*Target Key*), given the Master Key index and the client card's serial number. The result will be kept in ACOS6-SAM's memory and will not be divulged to the outside world.

ACOS6-SAM can compute the following diversified target keys:

- ACOS Terminal Key  $K_T$  (8 or 16 bytes)
- ACOS Card Key  $K_C$  (8 or 16 bytes)
- ACOS Session Key  $K_S$  (8 or 16 bytes)
- ACOS Secret Code  $S_C$  (8 bytes) ; may represent AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 AC5 PIN or IC
- ACOS Account Key  $K_{ACCT}$  (8 or 16 bytes) ; may represent Debit Key, Credit Key, Certify Key

This command can also load a non-diversified Target key to use for bulk encryption.

Note that the Master Keys or non-diversified Target key must be a 3DES key since single DES is considered insufficient for most security applications. Depending on the application, the diversified key can be used for single DES operations.

## 2.2 Encrypt

This command performs and returns Single / Triple DES encryption in ECB, CBC or MAC modes using an diversified key generated by the DIVERSIFY command or a static encryption key in the key file. DES mode and plain text data are supplied by the application.



### 2.3 Decrypt

This command performs and returns Single / Triple DES decryption in ECB or CBC modes using a diversified key that was generated by the DIVERSIFY command or a static encryption key in the key file. DES mode and ciphered text data are supplied by the application.

### 2.4 Prepare ACOS Authentication

This command helps the application perform Mutual Authentication with an ACOS2/ACOS3 card. The ACOS Card Key ( $K_C$ ) and Terminal Key ( $K_T$ ) must have been generated beforehand using the DIVERSIFY command.

The application simply passes the ACOS2/ACOS3 challenge data ( $RND_C$ ) to the SAM, and this command will return

$ENC(RND_C, K_T) || RND_T$

where ENC is 1DES or 3DES, as specified by application. The SAM will also generate the Terminal Random data  $RND_T$ . On success, the Session Key ( $K_S$ ) is also generated.

### 2.5 Verify ACOS Authentication

This command helps the application complete Mutual Authentication with an ACOS2/ACOS3 card. A successful call to the *Prepare ACOS Authentication* command is needed before using this command.

After a successful execution of AUTHENTICATE (and GET RESPONSE) command with the client card, the following data is returned to the application:

$ENC(RND_T, K_S)$

; where ENC is DES or 3DES, as specified by application.

Pass this data to ACOS6-SAM to check if the Session Key generated is correct and complete the mutual authentication process

### 2.6 Verify ACOS Inquire Account

This command helps the application verify the MAC returned by client card's INQUIRE ACCOUNT. The ACOS Purse Key (Credit, Debit, Revoke, or Certify keys) must have been generated beforehand using the DIVERSIFY command on the SAM.

This command makes sure that the PURSE information returned by the ACOS client card is authentic.



### 2.7 Prepare ACOS Account Transaction

This command helps the application perform PURSE commands (CREDIT, DEBIT) with an ACOS2/ACOS3 client card. The ACOS Purse Key (Credit, Debit, Revoke, or Certify keys) must have been generated beforehand using the DIVERSIFY command on the SAM.

This command will then generate the data (including the MAC) to be sent to the client card.

### 2.8 Generate Key

This command generates an application Key, based on a Master Key. It is generally used in personalization of client cards in which their application key(s) are based on a Master Key and the client card's serial number.

### 2.9 Verify ACOS Debit Certificate

This command helps the application verify the DEBIT CERTIFICATE returned by client ACOS3 card's DEBIT command. The ACOS Purse DEBIT Key must have been generated beforehand using the DIVERSIFY command on the SAM.

This command makes sure that the PURSE information returned by the ACOS3 client card is authentic, and that DEBIT to the card has indeed been executed.



### 3. Card Management

This section outlines the card level features and management functions.

#### 3.1 Anti Tearing

ACOS6-SAM uses an Anti Tearing mechanism in order to protect card from data corruption due to card tearing (i.e., card suddenly pulled out of reader during data update, or reader suffer mechanical failure during card data update). On card reset, ACOS3 looks at the Anti-Tearing fields and does the necessary data recovery. In such case, the COS will return the saved data to its original address in the EEPROM.

#### 3.2 Card Header Block

ACOS6-SAM is a card operating system that has 16K EEPROM. In its initial state (where no file exists), user can access the card header block by using read/write binary with the indicated address.

The Card Header Block contains information about the card. Some card commands' behavior depends on the information in this block. It resides in address EEC0 to EEEF of the EEPROM area using READ/WRITE BINARY. User can access this block only if MF is not present in the card.

It has the following fields and offset:

##### **EEC0 – EEC5: Card ID Number**

This is a 6-byte Serial number given by the Card Issuer (or Application Developer). It is used to assign a unique code to each issuer who requests for a unique code. Note that this is different from Card Serial number, which is a unique serial number per card already available in ACOS3 (See Section 6.14 – Get Card Info).

##### **EEC6: ATR Length**

If the application wants a customized ATR string, this field will hold the new ATR's length. The customized ATR's length must be > 0 and <= 32.

##### **EEC7: Card Life Cycle Fuse**

This field indicates the Life Cycle State of the card. If this byte is 0xFF, the card OS will allow user to erase the whole card's contents. At such state, the user is allowed to re-program the card's header block. Please refer to section 1.3 for more details on the card's Life Cycle Stages.

##### **EEC8 - EECA: Random Number Counter**

This field is used as a seed in generating random number or challenge data. This field increments every time a challenge data is generated.

##### **EECB: ACOS2 Record Numbering Mode**


For compatibility purposes, this field serves as the RECORD\_NUMBERING\_FLAG in ACOS2 (in file FF01). If bit5 is 0, record-based files will use index zero in referencing records, otherwise, it will use index one.

##### **EED0 – EEEF: Customized ATR**

This field will hold the customized ATR of the card OS. This field is valid if the ATR length (address EEC6) is > 0 and <= 32.



### 3.3 Card Life Stages



**Figure 2:** Card life stages

ACOS6 SAM has the following card stages:

1. Pre-Perso Stage
2. Perso Stage
3. User Stage

**Pre-Perso Stage** – is the initial stage. User is allowed to freely directly access all the card's memory (defined in section 1.1). The whole card's memory can be referenced by its physical address using the READ BINARY or UPDATE BINARY command.

User can personalize the Card's Header Block as he wishes. Card remains in this state as long as: (1) MF is not created; and (2) the *Card Life Cycle Fuse* (address *EEC7*) of the *Card Header Block* is 0xFF.

**Perso Stage** – card goes into this stage once the MF is successfully created and *Card Life Cycle Fuse* is not blown (still 0xFF). User can no longer directly access the card's physical memory as in the previous stage. User can create and test files created in the card as if in Operational Mode.

User can perform tests under this stage and may revert to the **Pre-Perso Stage** by using the CLEAR CARD command.

**User Stage** – is equivalent to the card's Operational Mode. Card goes into this stage once the MF is successfully created and *Card Life Cycle Fuse* is blown. And also can no longer return to the previous stages. The CLEAR CARD command is no longer operational.

#### Typical Development Steps of card:

1. User personalizes the card's header block using UPDATE BINARY.
2. User then creates his card file structure, starting with MF. DF's and EF's are created and the card's security design is tested at this stage. If design flaws are found, user can always return to stage 1 using the CLEAR CARD command.
3. Once the card's file and security design is final and tested, perform CLEAR CARD and blow the *Card Life Cycle Fuse* using the UPDATE BINARY command (write 0x00 to address 0xEEC7).
4. Card goes into Operational Mode, when the MF is created again. User can then re-construct his file system under this stage. Card can no longer go back to previous stages.



### 3.4 Answer To Reset

After a hardware reset (e.g. power up), the card transmits an Answer-to-Reset (ATR) in compliance with ISO7816 part 3, and it follows the same format as that of ACOS2. ACOS2 supports the protocol type T=0 in direct convention. The protocol function is not implemented.

The following is the default ATR. For full descriptions of ATR options see ISO 7816 part 3.

Parameter	ATR	Description
TS	3B	Direct Convention.
T0	BE	TA1, TB1, TD1 follows with 14 historical characters.
TA1	95	Capable of high-speed transfer.
TB1	00	No programming voltage required.
TD1	00	No further interface bytes follow.
14 Historical Characters		

The 14 historical characters are composed as the following:

Historical Characters	ATR	Description
T1	41	Indicates ACOS Card
T2	03	Major version
T3	00	Minor version
T4	00	} Not used. Compatible with ACOS2
T5	00	
T6	00	
T7	00	
T8	00	
T9	00	
T10	00	
T11	00	
T12	0x	Card Life Cycle Stage indicator: Bit1: 1=Perso (or pre-perso) Stage; 0=User Stage
T13	90	} Not used. Compatible with ACOS2
T14	00	

#### 3.4.1 Customizing the ATR

ACOS6-SAM's ATR can be customized the transmission speed or have specific identification information in the card. The new ATR must be compliant to ISO-7816 Part 3, otherwise the card may become unresponsive and non-recoverable at the next power-up or card reset. Therefore, it is only recommended to change T0 (lower nibble), TA1 and historical bytes.

The transmission speed is determined by the TA1 value in the ATR. More specifically, this field states the different clock rate conversion factor and baud rate adjustment factor. When a smart card reader powers up the card, it will read the ATR at a lower speed. It will then perform a Protocol and Parameters Selection (PPS) to negotiate a higher transmission rate with the card. Note that the actual baud rate will depend on the card reader's capability and its oscillator. Notice that although ACS has tested the card on all TA1 values with the major readers on the market, there are some readers that may have different timing and may not support the highest speed offered by ACOS6 SAM.



The following is the recommended changes to the ATR:

Parameter	Recommended ATR	Description
TS	3B	Direct Convention. <i>Important: keep this value.</i>
T0	Bx	TA1, TB1, TD1 follows with x historical characters. Changing the high nibble B is not recommended. See below for the low nibble for the historical byte.
TA1	16 96 19 18 95 94 93 92 11	The following are the reference baud rate* and their values: 307,200 bps 223,200 bps 192,000 bps 115,200 bps 111,600 bps 55,800 bps 27,900 bps 13,950 bps 9,600 bps
TB1	00	No programming voltage required.
TD1	00	No further interface bytes follow.
Historical bytes: Depends on x in T0, which can be 0 to 15 bytes (By setting T0 = B0 to BF respectively). Application developer can use these 15 bytes for personalized identifier information.		

\* Based on an external clock frequency of 3.5712 MHz

### For Example:

To change the card's ATR to ACOS2, perform the following commands before creating the MF.

; Set the desired ATR length to address 0xEEC6, say 13H

< 00 D6 EE C6 01 13

> 9000

; Set the ATR to address 0xEED0

< 00 D6 EE D0 13 3B BE 11 00 00 41 01 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00

> 9000






### 4. File System

This section explores the file system of the ACOS6 SAM smart card.

#### 4.1 Hierarchical File System

ACOS6-SAM is fully compliant to ISO 7816 Part 4 file system and structure. The file system is very similar to that of the modern computer operating system. The root of the file is the Master File (of MF). Each Application or group of data files in the card can be contained in a directory called a Dedicated File (DF). Each DF or MF can store data in Elementary Files (EF).

The ACOS6-SAM allows arbitrary depth DF tree structure. That is, the DFs can be nested. Please see Figure 3 below.



**Figure 3:** Example of hierarchy of DFs



### 4.2 File Header Data Structure

ACOS6-SAM organizes the user EEPROM area by files. Every file has a File Header, which is a block of data that describes the file's properties. Knowledge of the file header block will help the application developer accurately plan for the usage of the EEPROM space. The File Header Block consists of the following fields:

File Header	Number of bytes	Applies to
File Descriptor Byte	1	MF / DF / EF
Data Coded Byte	1	MF / DF / EF
File ID	2	MF / DF / EF
File Size	2	EF
Short File Identifier (SFI)	1	MF / DF / EF
Life Cycle Status Integer	1	MF / DF / EF
Security Attribute Compact Length	1	MF / DF / EF
Security Attribute Expanded Length	1	MF / DF / EF
DF Name Length / First Cyclic Record	1	MF / DF / EF
Parent Address	2	MF / DF / EF
Checksum	1	MF / DF / EF
Security Attribute Compact	0-8	MF / DF / EF
Security Attribute Expanded	0-32	MF / DF / EF
Security Environment File ID	2	MF / DF
FCI File ID	2	MF / DF
DF Name	16 max	MF / DF

Table 1: File Header Block

#### 4.2.1 File Descriptor Byte (FDB)

This field indicates the file's type. It can have the following values:

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0	Hex	File type
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	3F	MF
0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	38	DF
0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	<b>Working EF</b> Transparent (binary) EF Linear Fixed EF Linear Variable EF Cyclic EF
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	01	
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	02	
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	04	
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	06	
0	0	0	0	1	-	-	-	-	<b>Internal EF</b> Internal Linear Variable EF (or KEY EF) Internal Cyclic EF (Purse EF)
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0C	
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0E	

Table 2: File descriptor byte

The size of the File Header block varies depending on the file type. Other values of FDB are considered invalid.

#### 4.2.2 Data Coded Byte (DCB)

ACOS3 does not use this field. It is part of the header to comply with ISO-7816 part 4.

#### 4.2.3 File ID

This is a 16-bit field that uniquely identifies a file in the MF or a DF. Each file under a DF (or MF) must be unique. There are a few pre-defined File ID's. They are:



3F00 - Master File  
3FFF - Current DF  
FFFF - RFU

A file cannot have an ID of 3FFF and FFFF.

#### 4.2.4 File Size

This is a 16-bit field that specifies the size of the file. It does not include the size of the file header. For record-based EF's, the 1<sup>st</sup> byte indicates the maximum record length (MRL), while the 2<sup>nd</sup> indicates the number of records (NOR). For non record-based EF (Transparent EF), the 1<sup>st</sup> byte represents the high byte of the file size and the 2<sup>nd</sup> is the low-order byte. For DF's, this field is not used.

#### 4.2.5 Short File Identifier (SFI)

This is a 5-bit value that represents the file's Short ID. ACOS6-SAM allows file referencing through SFI. The last 5 bits of the File ID does not necessarily have to match this SFI. 2 files may have the same SFI under a DF. In such case, ACOS6-SAM will select the one created first.

#### 4.2.6 Life Cycle Status Integer (LCSI)

This byte indicates the life status of the file, as defined in ISO7816 part 4. It can have the following values:

b8	b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	B2	b1	Hex	Meaning
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	01	Creation state
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	03	Initialization state
0	0	0	0	0	1	-	1	05 or 07	Operational state (activated)
0	0	0	0	0	1	-	0	04 or 06	Operational state (deactivated)
0	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	0C to 0F	Termination state

Table 3: Life Cycle Status Byte

In Creation / Initialization states, all commands to the file will be allowed by the COS.  
In Activated state, commands to the file are allowed only if the file's security conditions are met.  
In Deactivated state, most commands to the file are not allowed by the COS.  
In Terminated State, all commands to the file will not be allowed by the COS.




Figure 4: Life cycle status integer



### 4.2.7 Security Attribute Compact Length (SAC Len)

This byte indicates the length of the SAC structure that is included in the file header below.

### 4.2.8 Security Attribute Expanded Length (SAE Len)

This byte indicates the length of the SAE structure that is included in the file header below.

### 4.2.9 DF Name Length / First Cyclic Record

If the file is a DF, this field indicates the length of the DF's Name.

If the file is a Cyclic EF, this field holds the index of the last-altered record.

Otherwise, this field is not used.

### 4.2.10 Parent Address

2 bytes indicating the physical EEPROM address of the file's parent DF.

### 4.2.11 Checksum

To maintain data integrity in the file header, a checksum is used by the COS. It is computed by XOR-ing all the preceding bytes in the header. Commands to a file will not be allowed if the file is found to have a wrong checksum.

### 4.2.12 Security Attribute Compact (SAC)

This is a data structure that represents security conditions for certain file actions. The data is coded in an "AM-SC" template as defined in ISO-7816. The maximum size of this field is 8 bytes. See Section 5.1.1 for more information.

### 4.2.13 Security Attribute Expanded (SAE)

This is a data structure that represents security conditions for certain card actions. The data is coded differently from SAC, and is also defined in ISO-7816. The maximum size of this field is 32 bytes. See Section 5.1.2 for more information.

For DF files, additional fields are included in the file header:

### 4.2.14 SE File ID (for DF only)

For DF, this field is made up of 2 bytes containing the File ID of one of its children. That file is known as the Security Environment File, which is processed internally by the COS.

### 4.2.15 FCI File ID (for DF only)

For DF, this field is made up of 2 bytes containing the File ID of one of its children. That file is known as the File Control Information File, which is processed internally by the COS.

### 4.2.16 DF Name (for DF only)

For DF, this field is the file's Long Name. Files can be selected through its long name - which can be up to 16 bytes.



### 4.3 Internal Security Files

The behavior of the COS will depend on the contents of the security-related internal files. When internal files are activated, its READ condition should be set to NEVER. Typically, a DF should have: (1) a Key File to hold PIN codes (referred as EF1) for verification, (2) a Key File to hold KEY codes (referred as EF2) for authentication, and (3) an SE file to hold security conditions.

A Key file is an Internal Linear Variable file. It may contain (1) PIN data structure or (2) KEY data structure.

#### 4.3.1 PIN Data Structure

The PIN is used for VERIFY command. The file that contains PIN records must have an SFI of 1. This file will be referred to as EF1. Each PIN record has the following structure:

	PIN Identifier Byte	Error Counter	PIN
Byte	1	1	16 (max)

**Table 4:** PIN Data Structure

**PIN Identifier Byte:** PIN Identifier Byte identifies the PIN number and various options of the

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0	Description
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	The PIN can be altered
-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	The PIN must be encrypted
-	1	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	The PIN is single DES (b5 = 1) or triple DES (b5 = 0)
-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	PIN Identifier

**Table 5:** PIN Identifier Byte

**Error Counter:** The error counter limits the number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts of PIN submission. This byte is split into two parts. The low nibble indicates the allowed number of retries ( $CNT_{Allowed}$ ) and the high nibble indicates the number of retries left ( $CNT_{Remaining}$ ).

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0
$CNT_{Remaining}$				$CNT_{Allowed}$			

**Table 6:** Error Counter Byte

Each unsuccessful attempt will decrement  $CNT_{Remaining}$ . A successful submission of the PIN number will reset the  $CNT_{Remaining}$  to the  $CNT_{Allowed}$ . If the lower nibble reaches zero, then the PIN is locked and further PIN submission is not possible.

If the error counter is 0xFF, then the error counter is not used and the PIN allows for unlimited number of retries. Hence, the maximum number of retries short of unlimited is 14 or 0x0E.

**PIN:** The PIN number whose length is between 1 and 16 bytes.

#### 4.3.2 Key data structure

Keys are used for authentication commands. The file that contains the key records must have an SFI of 2. This file will be referred to as EF2. Each KEY record has the following structure:

	Key ID	Key Type	Key Info	Algorithm Reference	Key
Byte	1	1	1, 2 or 3	1	8 or 16

**Table 7:** Key Data Structure



**Key ID:** The five LSb's uniquely identifies a key record. If the MSb = 1, the current key record is valid, else it is invalid.

**Key Type:** This byte indicates the key's capabilities; and also tells the OS how to interpret the Key Info filed.

Bit	Description
b7 - b3	RFU
b2	Key is cable of bulk encryption.
b1	Key is capable of internal authentication. Key Info contains <i>usage counter</i> .
b0	Key is capable of external authentication. Key Info contains <i>error counter</i> .

**Table 8:** Key Type Byte

*Internal authentication* keys are used for the terminal to authenticate the card. It can also be used by generate key command to generate diversified keys for client cards. Because internal authentication and generate key commands will output encryption results directly given an input. A usage limit can be set to ensure that the key cannot be cracked by cryptanalytic attacks. This is stated in the next section – Key Info.

*External authentication* keys are used for the card to authenticate the terminal. An error counter will ensure that an authorized terminal cannot keep on accessing the smart card.

A key can also be used to perform bulk encryption using ENCRYPT and DECRYPT commands. The *bulk encryption* bit (b2) must be enabled. Bulk encryption allows terminal to directly use the key to do encryption/decryption with plaintext and outputs the result without the key having to be diversified. This feature is useful for the applications that treat the SAM as an secured encryption engine. But it may not be desirable if that key is used for master key.

**Key Info:** This field depends on the Key Type field. It contains Retry or Usage Counter of the key. Depending on the Key Type field's bits, this field will hold the following: *Internal Authentication Usage Counter* (2 bytes) and *External Authentication Error Counter* (1 byte).

The Internal Authentication Usage Counter can limit the number of times a key can be used for internal authentication and generate diversified key. Each execution attempt of the mutual authentication procedure will decrement the usage counter. When the counter reaches zero, the key will become invalid. The counter is two bytes allowing a counter up to 65,534 (0xFFFE). If the counter is 0xFFFF, then the usage of the key is unlimited.

The External Authentication Error Counter is the same as PIN Error Counter. Please see Section 4.3.1 for more information.

If both internal and external authentication bits are set, 2 bytes of usage counter followed by retry counter are in the key info. Either usage counter or retry counter reach zero will render the key invalid.

**Algorithm Reference:** If bit 0 is zero, use triple DES. Else, use single DES.

**Key:** The single or triple DES key whose length must be 8 or 16 bytes respectively.

### 4.3.3 Security Environment File

A Security Environment (SE) File is an Internal Linear Variable EF that stores SE definitions. Every DF has a designated SE FILE, whose file ID is indicated in the DF's header block. See Section 0 for more information.



### 5. Security

File commands are restricted by the COS depending on the target file's (or current DF's) security Access Conditions. These conditions are based on PINs and KEYs being maintained by the system. Card Commands are allowed if certain PIN's or KEY's are submitted or authenticated.

Global PIN's are PINs that reside in a PIN EF (EF1) directly under the MF. Likewise, local Keys are KEYs that reside in a KEY EF (EF2) under the currently selected DF. There can be a maximum of: 31 Global PINs, 31 Local PINs, 31 Global Keys, and 31 Local Keys at a given time.

#### 5.1 File Security Attributes

Each file (MF, DF, or EF) has a set of security attributes set in its headers. There are two types of security attributes Security Attribute Compact (SAC) and Security Attribute Expanded (SAE).

##### 5.1.1 Compact (SAC)

The SAC is a data structure that resides in each file. It indicates what file actions are allowed on the file, and what conditions need to be satisfied for each action. It starts with the AM byte, followed by SC byte(s). The AM byte is bit- coded as follows:

	<b>b7</b>	<b>b6</b>	<b>b5</b>	<b>b4</b>	<b>b3</b>	<b>b2</b>	<b>b1</b>	<b>b0</b>
<b>For MF/DF</b>	Not used	Delete Self	Terminate	Activate	Deactivate	Create DF	Create EF	Delete child
<b>For EF</b>	Not used	Delete Self	Terminate	Activate	Deactivate	-	Update	Read

**Table 9:** Access Mode Byte

The number of "1" bits in the AM byte determines the number of SC byte(s) that follow. Bits that are "0" imply that the associated action to the file has no condition (free). Bits with "1" means that a corresponding SC byte exists in the SAC, and that the associated action is allowed only if the SC condition is satisfied.

The SC byte is interpreted as follows:

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0	Hex	Meaning
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	00	No condition (always)
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	FF	Never
-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0		RFU
-	-	-	-	Not all equal					Security environment identifier (SEID byte) from one to fourteen
-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1		RFU
0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		At least one condition
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		All conditions
-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-		Secure messaging

**Table 10:** Security Condition Byte





The SE record is found in the SE file - whose ID is specified in the current DF's header. If the SE file is not found, or has incompatible file attributes (internal LV, MRL, NOR, etc.), then the command is denied.

**Example:** a DF with SAC of **7D 02 03 04 FF FF 02** means:

AM: 7D -> has 6 "1" bits (01111101), 6 SC bytes follow; all file actions except "create child EF" is present, "create child EF" is therefore free;

SC: 02 03 04 FF FF 02

- allow Delete Self if SE#2 is satisfied
- allow Terminate if SE#3 is satisfied
- allow Activate if SE#4 is satisfied
- do not allow Deactivate
- do not allow Create child DF
- allow Delete Child DF if SE#2 is satisfied

### 5.1.2 Expanded (SAE)

The SAE is a data structure that resides in each file. It tells the COS whether or not to allow file commands to proceed. SAE is more general compared to SAC. The format of SAE is an access mode data object (AMDO) followed by one or more security condition data objects (SCDO).

<AMDO<sub>1</sub>><SCDO<sub>1</sub>> <AMDO<sub>2</sub>><SCDO<sub>2</sub>> ... <AMDO<sub>n</sub>><SCDO<sub>n</sub>>

The COS will check if the command (APDU) falls under the SAE's <AMDO> if it does it will check the corresponding <SCDO>.

**AMDO:** The value field of this data object specifies the command description: CLA INS P1 P2. The low nibble of the TAG indicates which command byte(s) follow:

b7	b6	b5	b4	b3	b2	b1	b0	Meaning
1	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	The command description includes
1	0	0	0	1	-	-	-	CLA
1	0	0	0	-	1	-	-	INS
1	0	0	0	-	-	1	-	P1
1	0	0	0	-	-	-	1	P2

**Table 11:** Access Mode Data Object (AMDO)

**SCDO:** May have the following Tags (and Length):



Tag	Length	Value	Meaning
90	00	-	Allow
97	00	-	Never
9E	1	SC Byte	SC Byte the same as SAC
A4	Var.	Authentication Template	Allow if AT condition is satisfied
A0	Var.	SC DO	One or more SC DO follows where at least 1 condition is met
AF	Var.	SC DO	One or more SC DO follows where all conditions are met

**Table 12:** Security Condition Data Object (SCDO)

**Example 1:** An SAE of: **86 02 22 F2 97 00** means:

<AMDO>: 86 02 22 F2 -> command with INS=22 and P1 =F2

<SCDO>: 97 00 -> never

Hence, the SAE tells the COS not to allow APDU commands with INS=22 and P1=F2

**Example 2:** An SAE of: **84 01 22 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 08** means:

<AMDO>: 84 01 22 -> command with INS=22

<SCDO>: A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 08 -> allow command if local PIN #81 is submitted

Hence, the SAE tells the COS to allow commands with INS=22 only if the local PIN#1 is verified.

\* In ACOS6-SAM, if one <AMDO> matches the command APDU, the COS will not check the subsequent <AMDO>'s.



### 5.2 Security Environment

Security conditions are coded in an SE File. Every DF has a designated SE FILE, whose file ID is indicated in the DF's header block. Each SE record has the following format:

<SE ID Template> <SE Authentication Template>

**SE ID Template:** The SE ID Template is a mandatory data object whose value states the identifier that is referenced by the SC byte of the SAC and SAE. The Tag is 0x80 with the length of 0x01.

**SE Authentication Template:** The Authentication Template (AT) defines the security condition that must be meant for this SE to be satisfied. The security conditions are either PIN or Key authentications.

The tag of AT is 0xA4 and its value contains one more data objects.

Tags recognized within AT:

Tag	Length	Meaning
83	01	It indicates the identifier of which Key or PIN to use. If its MSB is 1, use EF1 / EF2 under the currently selected DF. Otherwise, use the EF1 / EF2 under the MF.
95	01	Indicates what action to perform: Authenticate or Verify. The value of this tag has the following meaning: bit7 = AUTHENTICATE the referenced key in tag 83 bit3 = VERIFY the referenced PIN in tag 83

**Table 13:** Authentication Template Data Objects

**Example #1:** If the following record is specified in the SE File:

80 01 03 A4 09 83 01 84 83 01 81 95 01 80

It has the following meaning:

- The SE ID is 03 (SE#3).
- AT is: A4 09 83 01 84 83 01 81 95 01 80; This contains two 0x83 tags inside. This means:
  - allow command if local KEY 84 is authenticated;
  - allow command if local KEY 81 is authenticated;
- SE conditions are referenced by an SC byte (in the SAC field of the target file). If the SC byte's MSb is set, then allow command if both conditions are satisfied. If the SC byte's MSB is not set, allow command if at least one condition is satisfied.

**Example #2:** If the following record is specified in the SE File:

80 01 05 A4 09 83 01 84 83 01 01 95 01 88

It has the following meaning:

- The SE ID is 05 (SE#5);=.
- AT is: A4 09 83 01 84 83 01 81 95 01 88; contains 2 conditions inside it.
- 1st condition in AT is: 83 01 84 95 01 88 -> allow command if local KEY 84 is authenticated AND if local PIN 84 is verified;



- 2nd condition in AT is: 83 01 01 95 01 88 -> allow command if global KEY 81 is authenticated AND if global PIN 01 is verified;
- SE conditions are referenced by an SC byte (in the SAC field of the target file). If the SC byte's MSB is set, then allow command if both conditions are satisfied. If the SC byte's MSB is not set, allow command if at least one condition is satisfied.



### 5.3 Mutual Authentication

*Mutual Authentication* is a process in which both the card and the card-accepting device verify that the respective entity is genuine. A *Session Key* is the result of a successful execution of mutual authentication. The session key is only valid during a *session*. A session is defined as the time after a successful execution of the mutual authentication procedure and a reset of the card or the execution of another mutual authentication procedure.


ACOS6-SAM uses the same authentication mechanism as ACOS2. Hence it is backward compatible. As in ACOS2, the mutual authentication procedure involves two main commands, GET CHALLENGE and MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE. GET RESPONSE is also necessary after the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command.


#### 5.3.1 Mutual Authentication Procedure

To provide maximum flexibility, ACOS6-SAM can use two different pairs of DES keys: A *terminal key*  $K_T$  and a *card key*  $K_C$ . These pair of keys should both be onboard, and they both should either be 8 bytes (for single DES) or both 16 bytes (for triple DES)

A random number generator is onboard ACOS6-SAM to generate a *card random number*,  $RND_C$ , in response of the GET CHALLENGE command.

Please follow Figure 5 for the detailed steps of mutual authenticate procedure.





**Figure 5:** Mutual authentication procedure

In the procedure, the encryption, ENC, is either DES or 3DES depending on the Key used.

### 5.3.2 Session Key Computation

The Session Key is formed through Mutual Authentication between card and terminal. The Session Key's formula depends on the Algorithm Reference field of the KEY. If both Internal key (card key) and external key (terminal key) have Algorithm Reference field of 0, then a 16-byte session key will be formed (Triple DES), otherwise, the session key formed is 8 bytes long (Single DES).

For 16-byte session key  $K_S$ , triple DES is used and  $K_S$  is generated as follows:

$$K_S = K_{SL} || K_{SR}$$

Where  $K_{SL}$  is the first 8-byte (or the left half) of the session key:

$$K_{SL} = 3DES (3DES (RND_C, K_C), K_T)$$

And  $K_{SR}$  is the second 8-byte (or right half) of the session key:

$$K_{SR} = 3DES (RND_T, REV (K_T))$$

The variables are the same as that in Section 5.3.1. It is repeated here for completeness:

$RND_C$ : 8-byte Card challenge

$RND_T$ : 8-byte Terminal challenge

$K_C$ : 16-byte Card Key (if key length < 16, 0xFF will be padded)

$K_T$ : 16-byte Terminal Key (if key length < 16, 0xFF will be padded)

The operation  $REV (K_T)$  is the exchange of the left and right half of  $K_T$ . That is:

$$B7\ B6\ B5\ B4\ B3\ B2\ B1\ B0 \rightarrow B3\ B2\ B1\ B0\ B7\ B6\ B5\ B4$$

For 8-byte session key  $K_S$ , single DES is used and  $K_S$  is generated as follows:

$$K_S = DES (DES (RND_C, K_C) XOR RND_T, K_T)$$

The variables are the same as above except:

$K_C$ : 8-byte Card Key (if key length > 8, only the 1<sup>st</sup> 8 bytes will be used)

$K_T$ : 8-byte Terminal Key (if key length > 8, only the 1<sup>st</sup> 8 bytes will be used)



### 5.4 Secure Messaging

ACOS6-SAM supports *Secure Messaging for Authentication*. This secure messaging allows data and command that is transferred into the card and vice versa to be authenticated.

Data blocks sent from the sender to the recipient are appended with 4 bytes of MAC. The receiver then verifies the MAC before proceeding with the operation. Before performing SM, both parties must first have a session key by performing mutual authentication in Section 5.3.

Secure messaging applies to various ISO-in and ISO-out commands. The following is a list of those commands:

ISO-in	ISO-out
Create File Update Binary Update Record Append Record Activate File Deactivate File Terminate DF Terminate EF Delete File	Read Binary Read Record

**Table 14:** Secure Messaging Commands

#### 5.4.1 SM for ISO-in Command

In an original ISO-in command, the command data looks like this:

	CLA	IN	P	P	P3 = <i>n</i>	Command Data
Bytes	1	1	1	1	1	<i>n</i>

With SM, the following is the format of the ISO-in SM command:

	CLA*	IN	P	P	P3*	Command Data	MAC <sub>cmd</sub>
Bytes	1	1	1	1	1	<i>n</i>	4

The CLA\* in an SM command is 0x04. The P3\* field should be *n* plus 4 to accommodate the 4-byte MAC. The MAC<sub>cmd</sub> field is the result of the computation of the MAC operation for Secure Messaging (SM-MAC). SM-MAC is described in Section 5.4.3. The SM-MAC takes the following as input:

$$\text{MAC}_{\text{cmd}} = \text{SM-MAC} (\text{CLA}^* \text{ INS P1 P2 P3}^* \text{ CommandData Padding, } RND_C)$$

The *padding* is needed in SM-MAC to make the input to the DES algorithm align to a multiple of 8 bytes. The padding is a 0x80 byte followed by 0 to 7 0x00 to make the length of the data to be authenticated equal to a multiple of 8. If the data to be authenticated is in a multiple of 8, then a 0x80 byte is appended followed by 7 0x00 for the last block.

The *RND<sub>C</sub>* is the 8-byte card random number obtained by a GET CHALLENGE command. Prior to a call of an SM command, a new *RND<sub>C</sub>* is necessary. Therefore, each SM call must be preceded by a GET CHALLENGE command.

In ACOS3, the maximum P3\* for SM commands is 36. Therefore, the actual length of data being transmitted between terminal and card is 32 or less.





### 5.4.2 SM for ISO-out Command

For an ISO-out command, the command has this format:

CLA*	INS	P1	P2	P3*
1	1	1	1	1

The ISO-out command has CLA\* equal to 0x04. The P3\* field should be  $n$  (the size of the original data expected) plus 4 to accommodate the 4-byte MAC. Therefore, P3\* should be at least 4 bytes.

The following is the output of a successful execution of the command,

Response Data	MAC <sub>rsp</sub>	90 00
$n$	4	2


The MAC<sub>rsp</sub> field is the result of the computation of the SM-MAC and it takes the following as input.

$$\text{MAC}_{\text{rsp}} = \text{SM-MAC} (\text{CLA}^* \text{ INS P1 P2 P3}^* \text{ ResponseData Padding, } RND_C)$$

Padding and  $RND_C$  is the same as Section SM for ISO-in Command.

### 5.4.3 Computing the Secure Messaging MAC (SM-MAC)

The MAC for SM is computed using ISO/IEC 9797-1 CBC-MAC algorithm 3 (ANSI Retail MAC) with DES block cipher.



**Figure 6:** Secure messaging MAC

1. The Initial Vector  $RND_C$  is 8-byte Challenge Data generated by the card. Issue a GET CHALLENGE command prior to an SM command execution. The last 4 bytes of  $RND_C$  will be set to zeroes.
2. In each round of the DES encryption,  $K_{SL}$  is the left half of the session key  $K_S$  if  $K_S$  16 bytes long. If  $K_S$  is 8-byte long, then  $K_{SL}$  refers to  $K_S$ .




3. The APDU transmission block is MAC'ed in a group of 8-byte inputs. The last block is padded with 0x80 followed by zeroes. If the APDU block is a multiple of 8, the last block will then be: 0x80, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00.
4. After computation, the 4 MSB of SM-MAC is appended to the APDU block. That is used for transmission for the ISO-in or ISO-out command in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively.
5. After every computation of SM-MAC, the  $RND_C$  is invalidated. Application must get a new  $RND_C$  via GET CHALLENGE command.



### 5.5 Interaction between Security Conditions and Internal Security EFs

At first glance, the previous sections may seem unclear as to how the DF or working EFs interacts with different internal EFs (SE File, Key File, PIN File) to provide security for the files in question. Figure 5 provide an example of how all these files work together.

#### Current DF/MF:



**Figure 7:** Relationship between working EFs and internal security files

In this example, the current DF has an SE file of F0 00. Inside this SE file, all the security environments are defined for the current DF. SE ID #1 defines the security conditions that must be satisfied before the current DF can execute a create child EF/DF or delete child. SE ID #1 contains an AT template for both external authentication and user verification with key reference of 01. In the DF's key file and PIN file the record of 01 will define the key and PIN that must be satisfied before any create or delete file command can be called in this DF.

In the Working EF, the SAC in the file header has update security condition set with SE ID #3. When update record/binary command is called on this file, the card will check the SE ID number 3 and find the Authentication Template. It will then see that User Verification is needed using PIN ID of 02. Then, it will check if the PIN ID of 02 in the PIN file has been verified beforehand.




### 5.6 Encrypted Code Operations

Depending on the setting of the PIN records in EF1 (Section 4.3.1), a code (or a PIN) may be submitted encrypted using the session key generated by mutual authentication. This section describes how to submit and change codes using encryption.

#### 5.6.1 Submit Encrypted Code

If the setting in the PIN Identifier Byte of the PIN code to be submitted has b6 set, code submission must be encrypted. Depending on b5 of the PIN Identifier Byte, the PIN submission must be DES or 3DES. If  $K_S$  is only a DES key (i.e. 8 bytes), If b5 is set to 3DES, then the session key  $K_S$  must be 16-byte 3DES key or else, the PIN submission will not be possible. If b5 is set to DES and the session key  $K_S$  is 16-byte, the COS will only use the first 8-byte of the session key  $K_{SL}$  for PIN submission.

To submit the code  $C_i$  that has identifier  $i$ , the following procedure is executed after a session key  $K_S$  has been established:





**Figure 8:** Submit encrypted code procedure

In the procedure, the encryption, ENC, is either DES or 3DES depending on b5 of the PIN Identifier Byte.

#### 5.6.2 Change Encrypted Code

The PIN code can be changed during the activated state of the card if b7 of PIN Identifier Byte is set. If the PIN code requires encryption (b6 of PIN Identifier Byte is set), the following procedure is performed:





**Figure 9:** Change encrypted code procedure

In the procedure, the encryption, ENC, and decryption, DEC, is either DES or 3DES depending on b5 of the PIN Identifier Byte.



### 6. Commands

This section contains the command set of this card excluding the SAM specific commands. Most of these commands are defined in ISO7816 part 4.

#### 6.1 Create File

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	E0
P1	00
P2	00
P3	Length of Data
Data	FCP TLV of File to be created

The FCP TLV has tag of 0x62. Its Length is size of the template, and must be equal to (P3 – 2). The template has one or more of the following encapsulated TLV's:

Tag	Length	Value	MF	DF	Transparent	Linear	Linear	Cyclic	Key EF	Purse EF	Remarks
80	02	Size (in bytes) of the Transparent EF			O						If not specified, default is 0x0000
82	01	File Descriptor Byte (FDB)	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	Please refer to Section 4.2.1 for valid values
	02	FDB    DCB	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	If DCB is not specified, default is 0x00
	05	FDB    DCB    00    MRL    NOR				O	O	O	O	O	If MRL / NOR is not specified, default is 0x00
	06	FDB    DCB    00    MRL    00    NOR				O	O	O	O	O	If MRL / NOR is not specified, default is 0x00
83	02	File ID	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	Please refer to Section 4.2.3 for valid values
84	<= 10h	DF Long Name	O	O							
88	01	Short File ID	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	If not specified, the default is the 5 LSB of the File ID
8A	01	Life Cycle Stage Integer	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	If not specified, the default is 0x01. Refer to section 2.1.6 for valid values.
8C	<= 08	Security Attributes Compact	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	Please refer to Section 5.1.1 for more details
AB	<= 20h	Security Attributes Extended	O	O							Please refer to Section 5.1.2 for more details
8D	02	SE File ID	O	O							Please refer to Section 4.2.14 for more details
87	02	FCI File ID	O	O							Please refer to Section 4.2.15 for more details

M – Mandatory

O – Optional

Blank – encapsulated TLV will be ignored



The mandatory fields are: (1) File ID and (2) FDB. The newly created file will then be the Currently Selected EF/DF.

If duplicate tags are sent to the command, the latter one will be used.

Valid FDB values are: 3F (MF), 01 (Transparent EF), 02 (Linear Fixed EF), 04 (Linear Variable EF), 06 (Cyclic EF), 0x0C (Internal LV EF, or KEY EF), and 0x0E (Internal Cyclic EF, or Purse EF).

File ID's cannot be: 0xFFFF, 0x0000 and 0x3FFF.

Valid LCSI are: 01 (Creation); 03 (Initialization); 04 or 06 (Deactivated); 05 or 07 (Activated). LCSI having value  $\geq 08$  are considered Terminated.

The MF's file ID should always be 0x3F00, and should always be the 1<sup>st</sup> created file. You can create as many DF / EF files, and as many DF levels, as long as the card memory space holds. There cannot be duplicate File ID's / DF Names under a DF.

Please refer to section 5 of this document for examples on using this command.

### Return Status

6A86	Incorrect P1 / P2
6700	Wrong P3, must be consistent with the Length of the FCP TLV
6A80	Wrong FCP Tag - should be 0x62
	FCP contains invalid TLV's, unrecognized tags, or wrong length's in TLV's
	Creating MF, but MF already exists
	File ID is 3F00 but FDB is not MF or MF already exists
	Invalid File ID, FDB, SFI, LCSI, etc.
6283	Current DF is terminated/ deactivated
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6A89	File ID / DF Name already exists
6A84	Not enough free space in card to create file





### 6.2 Select File

CLA	00 - CLEAR mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	A4
P1	04 - if Data contains DF name and in CLEAR mode, else 00
P2	00
P3	00 - select MF, 02 - Data contains File ID (or in ACOS2 mode), else length of DF Name
Data	File ID or DF Name

Search Sequence for Target File ID is: current DF -> current DF's children -> current DF's parent -> current DF's siblings -> MF -> MF's children.

Search Sequence for Target DF Name is: current DF -> current DF's children -> current DF's parent

On success, in ACOS3 mode, SELECT FILE will return SW1 SW2 = 61XX. You can retrieve XX bytes (via GET RESPONSE command with P3 = XX) to get the FCI template of the selected file. The template complies with the TLV table defined in 4.1.

On success, in ACOS2 mode, SELECT FILE will return SW1 SW2 = 91nn, where nn the file index of the selected file. SW1 SW2 is 9000 if the selected file is a system ACOS2 file.

In ACOS2 mode, file searching only applies to the MF level.

#### Return Status

6283	Target file is blocked, but is selected
6982	Target file has wrong checksum in header
6986	No MF found in card
6A82	File not found
6A86	Invalid P1/P2
6700	Wrong P3, P3 not compatible to P1/P2
9000	System File selected successfully under ACOS2 mode.
91nn	User File selected successfully under ACOS2 mode.
61nn	File selected successfully under ACOS3 mode. Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 =NN in order to retrieve the file's FCI template



### 6.3 Read Binary

Reads out the contents of a Transparent File, given the file offset.

CLA	00 - Clear mode 04 - SM mode
INS	B0
P1	If MSb = 1, P1 holds SFI in 5 LSb, else P1 holds high offset
P2	Low offset
P3	Bytes to Read

If MF does not exist, READ BINARY allows you to directly read the EEPROM's contents. P1-P2 holds the physical address while P3 holds the number of bytes to read (please refer to section 1.1 for valid EEPROM physical addresses).

If MF exists, this command follows READ BINARY command specified in ISO7816 part 4.

#### Return Status

6282	Invalid offset
6283	Current DF is blocked or target EF is blocked
6700	Incorrect P3, length exceeds file size limit
6981	Wrong file type; target file must be TRANSPARENT EF
6982	Target file's header block has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6986	No EF selected
6A82	SFI not found
6B00	Invalid P1/P2, invalid SFI
6Cnn	Wrong P3; NN = maximum bytes available in file to read
6F00	Invalid physical address (when directly accessing EEPROM)



### 6.4 Update Binary

Writes data to a Transparent File, given the offset.

CLA	00 - Clear mode 04 - SM mode
INS	D6
P1	If MSb = 1, P1's 5 LSb holds SFI, else P1 holds high start offset
P2	Low start offset
P3	Number of Bytes to Update
Data	Bytes to Update

If MF does not exist, UPDATE BINARY allows you to directly write the EEPROM contents. P1-P2 holds the starting physical address of the card (please refer to section 3.1 for valid EEPROM physical addresses). If MF exists, this command follows UPDATE BINARY command specified in ISO7816 part 4.

#### Return Status

6282	Invalid offset
6283	Current DF is blocked, or target EF is blocked
6700	Incorrect P3, length exceeds file size limit
6981	Wrong file type; target file must be TRANSPARENT EF
6982	Target file's header block has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6986	No EF selected
6A82	SFI not found
6B00	Invalid P1/P2, or invalid SFI
6Cnn	Wrong P3; NN = maximum bytes available in file to update
6F00	Invalid physical address (when directly accessing the EEPROM), or write failure



### 6.5 Read Record

Reads out the contents of a record block from a Record-based EF.

CLA	00 - Clear mode; 04 - SM mode; 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	B2
P1	Record number (in ACOS2 mode) Record number (if P1 = 4 in ACOS3 mode)
P2	If 5 MSb <> 00000, it is SFI; 3 LSB: see below
P3	Bytes to Read

In ACOS3 mode, the last 3 bits of P2:

0 : reference 1st record

1 : reference last record

2 : reference next record

3 : reference previous record

4 : reference record indexed by P1

others : RFU

If the file's MRL or NOR field is zero, the COS will return 6A83 status code (record not found).

For Linear EF's, it is possible to have P3 < the EF's MRL.

#### Return Status

6283	Current DF is blocked, or Target EF is blocked
6700	Incorrect P3
6981	Wrong file type; target file must be RECORD-BASED EF
6982	Target file's header block has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6986	No DF selected, or no EF selected
6A82	SFI not found
6A83	Record not found, invalid record reference
6A86	Invalid P1/P2 in ACOS2 mode
6B00	Invalid P1/P2, invalid SFI in ACOS3 mode
6Cnn	Wrong P3, NN = maximum bytes available in file to read



### 6.6 Update Record

Writes contents of a record block in a Record-based EF.

CLA	00 - Clear mode 04 - SM mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	DC
P1	Record number (in ACOS2 mode) Record number (if P1 = 4 in ACOS3 mode)
P2	If 5 MSb <> 00000, it is SFI; 3 LSb: see below
P3	Number of Bytes to Write
Data	Bytes to Write

Last 3 bits of P2:

- 0 : reference 1st record
- 1 : reference last record
- 2 : reference next record
- 3 : reference previous record
- 4 : reference record indexed by P1

For Linear EF, P3 can be < the file's MRL.

#### Return Status

6283	Current DF is blocked, or Target EF is blocked
6700	Incorrect P3
6981	Wrong file type; target file must be RECORD-Based EF
6982	Target file's header block has wrong checksum, security condition not satisfied
6986	No DF selected, no EF selected
6A82	SFI not found
6A83	Record not found, invalid record reference
6A86	Invalid P1/P2 in ACOS2 mode
6B00	Invalid P1/P2, invalid SFI in ACOS3 mode
6Cnn	Wrong P3, NN = maximum bytes to write to record



### 6.7 Write Record

This command does exactly the same thing as UPDATE RECORD. It is included for ACOS2 compatibility.

CLA	00 - Clear mode 04 - SM mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	D2
P1	Record number (in ACOS2 mode) Record number (if P1 = 4 in ACOS3 mode)
P2	If 5 MSb <> 00000, it is SFI; 3 LSb: see below
P3	Number of Bytes to Write
Data	Bytes to Write



### 6.8 Append Record

Adds a record at the end of a Linear Variable EF.

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	E2
P1	00
P2	00
P3	Length of Data
Data	Data to be appended

This command applies only to Linear Variable EF. The new record will be written to the 1<sup>st</sup> record whose 1<sup>st</sup> byte is 0xFF (a record whose 1<sup>st</sup> byte is 0xFF is considered 'empty', and therefore is at the 'end' of the file). P3 can be less than the file's MRL, in such case; 0xFF will be padded to the new record.

#### Return Status

6283	Target file / current DF is blocked
6981	Target file is not Linear Variable EF
6982	Target file has wrong checksum in header
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6A83	Record not found
6986	No file selected
6A84	No more empty record in EF
6B00	Wrong P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3





### 6.9 Activate File

This command will activate the target file. Once activated, the file's security settings will take effect.

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	44
P1	00
P2	00
P3	02 – Activate the File whose ID is referenced by the DATA 00 – Activate the currently selected EF or DF
Data	File ID

This command activates the file referenced in DATA. User can activate the following files: (1) current DF and (2) child file of the current DF.

#### Return Status

6400	Target file is terminated
6982	Target file has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6A82	File referenced not found
6986	No file selected
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3, must be 2
6F00	EEPROM failure



### 6.10 Deactivate File

This command will invalidate or deactivate the target file. Once a file is deactivated, all commands (except ACTIVATE FILE) to the file will be rejected.

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	04
P1	00
P2	00
P3	02 – Deactivate the File whose ID is referenced by the DATA 00 – Deactivate the currently selected EF or DF
Data	File ID

This command deactivates the file referenced in DATA. User can deactivate the following files: (1) current DF and (2) child file of the current DF.

#### Return Status

6400	Target file is terminated
6982	Target file has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6A82	File referenced not found
6986	No file selected
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3, must be 2
6F00	EEPROM failure



### 6.11 Terminate DF

This command will irreversibly send the target DF to TERMINATED state. In such case, all commands to the file will be rejected.

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	E6
P1	00
P2	00
P3	02 – Terminate the DF File whose ID is referenced by the DATA 00 – Terminate the currently selected DF
Data	File ID

This command terminates the DF file referenced in DATA. User can terminate the following files: (1) current DF and (2) child DF file of the current DF.

#### Return Status

6400	Target file is terminated
6982	Target file has wrong checksum, security condition not satisfied
6A82	File referenced not found
6986	No file selected
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3, must be 2
6F00	Update failure
6981	File is not DF type



### 6.12 Terminate EF

This command will irreversibly send the target EF to TERMINATED state. In such case, all commands to the file will be rejected.

CLA	00 - Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	E8
P1	00
P2	00
P3	02 – Terminate the EF File whose ID is referenced by the DATA 00 – Terminate the currently selected EF
Data	File ID

This command terminates the EF file referenced in DATA. User can terminate the following files: (1) current EF and (2) child EF file of the current DF.

#### Return Status

6400	Target file is terminated
6982	Target file has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6A82	File referenced not found
6986	No file selected
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3, must be 2
6F00	Update failure
6981	File is not EF type



### 6.13 Delete File

This command will remove the target file from the card's EEPROM memory.

CLA	00 – Clear Mode 04 - SM Mode
INS	E4
P1	00
P2	00
P3	02 – Delete the File whose ID is referenced by the DATA 00 – Delete the currently selected DF or EF
Data	File ID

Delete File will work if the target file is the last file created in EEPROM memory area. ACOS3 will not allow deletion of a DF that has children

#### Return Status

6400	Target file is terminated
6982	Target file has wrong checksum, or security condition not satisfied
6A82	File referenced not found
6986	No file selected
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2
6700	Invalid P3, must be 2
6F00	EEPROM failure
6981	File is not EF type
6A80	Target DF file has children Target file is not the last file in memory



### 6.14 Get Card Info

This command returns card or file information of the ACOS3 card.

CLA	80
INS	14
P1	See options below
P2	
P3	

The following card information is available depending on the parameters of the command.

P1	P2	P3	Description
00	00	08	Returns card's unique serial number
01	00	00	Returns the number of files under the currently selected DF in SW1 SW2 = 90XX, where XX is the number of files.
02	xx	08	Returns file information of the P2 <sup>th</sup> file in the DF. The 8 bytes are: {FDB, DCB, FILE ID, FILE ID, SIZE or MRL, SIZE or NOR, SFI, LCSI};
04	00	06	Card returns the 6-byte Card ID Number (refer to Section 3.1).
05	00	00	Returns the size of EEPROM in the status word SW1SW2 = 90XX.
06	00	08	Returns the version number of the ACOS6 in the form of ACOS6 Revision XX YY ZZ (41 43 4F 53 06 XX YY ZZ <sub>H</sub> )

### Return Status

6700	Incorrect P3
6A80	Wrong P1/P2, data not available



### 6.15 Get Challenge

This command generates an 8-byte Challenge Data, to be used for authentication purposes.

CLA	00 - ACOS3 mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	84
P1	0
P2	0
P3	8

#### Return Status

6700	Incorrect P3
6A86	Wrong P1 / P2



### 6.16 Get Response

This command returns information available in the card OS, with regards to the previous command.

CLA	00 - ACOS3 mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	C0
P1	0
P2	0
P3	Bytes to receive

#### Return Status

6A86	Wrong P1 / P2
6Cnn	Incorrect P3, P3 must be nn
6985	No data available





### 6.17 Verify

This command is used to submit a PIN code to gain access rights.

CLA	00 - ACOS3 mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	20
P1	If ACOS2 mode: PIN ID: if MSb = 1, use Local PIN, else use Global PIN
P2	If ACOS3 mode: PIN ID: if MSb = 1, use Local PIN, else use Global PIN
P3	Length of PIN
Data	PIN

If the PIN is encrypted, its length should always be 8.

In ACOS2 mode, only Global PIN applies, and P3 should be 8.

Access rights achieved will be invalidated when a new DF is selected.

#### Return Status

6283	Current DF is blocked; EF1 is blocked
63Cn	Verify fail, n tries remaining
6700	Incorrect P3, does not match PIN length, must be <= 32
6981	EF1 has wrong FDB, EF1 is not a valid PIN file
6983	Referenced PIN is locked
6986	No DF selected
6A83	PIN ID referenced in P1 is not found in EF1
6A86	Invalid P1/P2
6A88	EF1 not found
6985	Session Key not valid, or not consistent with key DES mode (Session key is needed for encrypted PIN)



### 6.18 Change Code

This command allows you to change a PIN code in EF1.

CLA	00 - ACOS3 mode 80 - ACOS2 mode
INS	24
P1	If ACOS2 mode: PIN ID: if MSb = 1, use Local PIN, else use Global PIN
P2	If ACOS3 mode: PIN ID: if MSb = 1, use Local PIN, else use Global PIN
P3	20h or less, or 08 if PIN is encrypted or if in ACOS2 mode
Data	New PIN

This command will work only if you have successfully verified the PIN ID previously.

When PIN is encrypted, the new PIN in DATA must be decrypted with the Session Key. The length of encrypted PIN is always 8 bytes.

In ACOS2 mode, only Global PIN applies, and P3 should be 8.

#### Return Status

6283	DF is blocked; EF1 is blocked
6700	Incorrect P3, does not match KEY length must be <= 32
6981	EF1 has wrong FDB, EF1 is not a valid PIN file
6983	Referenced PIN is locked
6986	No DF selected
6A83	Referenced PIN ID not found in EF1
6A86	Invalid P1/P2
6A88	EF1 not found
6985	Session Key not valid, not consistent with key DES mode
6966	PIN_ALT of the PIN is disabled
6982	PIN not verified previously



### 6.19 Mutual Authentication

This command authenticates the referenced key(s) of the currently selected DF. Both internal and external authentication processes are performed. Access rights are gained if successful.

CLA	00 – ACOS3 mode 80 – ACOS2 mode
INS	82
P1	Key index of Card Key (Internal Key); if MSb=1, use local EF2 else use global EF2
P2	Key index of Terminal Key (External Key); if MSb=1, use local EF2 else use global EF2
P3	10h
Data	xDES (RNDc, Kt)    RNDt xDES may be Single DES or Triple DES; depending on the attributes of the keys used

On success, COS will return 0x6108. The result is: xDES (RNDt. Ks).

In ACOS2 mode, P1 and P2 should be 0x00. In such case, Card Key is the 1<sup>st</sup> record in global EF2 and Terminal Key is the 2<sup>nd</sup> record in global EF2.

Triple DES will be used if both Keys (referenced by P1 and P2) has ALGO field of 0x00. In this case, if either key's length is less than 16, 0xFF will be padded.

Single DES will be used if either Key (referenced by P1 and P2) has ALGO field not equal to 0x00. In this case, if either key's length is > 8, it will be truncated to 8 (i.e., by using the first 8 bytes only).

Please see Section 5.3 for a more detailed description of the process.

#### Return Status

6A87	KEY(s) referenced in P1/P2 not capable of Internal/External authentication
63Cn	Wrong Crypto Data, Operation Fail, n tries left for KEY
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 16
6983	Terminal KEY is locked or Card Key is locked
6985	GET CHALLENGE command not previously called
6A86	Invalid P1 / P2 in ACOS2 mode
6986	No DF selected
6283	Current DF is blocked, EF2 is blocked
6A88	EF2 not found
6A83	Key not found in EF2, key has invalid length
6981	Invalid EF2 (FDB, MRL, etc not consistent)
6108	Authentication OK



### 6.20 Clear Card

This command will set the card back to Pre-Perso Stage. It is available only if the card is in Perso Stage.

CLA	80
INS	30
P1	00
P2	00
P3	00

On success, the card's entire EEPROM memory will be erased (set to 0xFF). This command is only available if the card's header info field: Card Life Cycle Status (address 0xEEC7) is 0xFF.

### Return Status

6F00	Command not available
------	-----------------------



### 7. SAM Specific Commands

This section contains the SAM specific commands. For command flows of how to use these command please refer to Section 10.

#### 7.1 Generate Key

This command is to generate a diversified key to load into the ACOS2/3 card or other cards.

CLA	80
INS	88
P1	00
P2	Key index of Master Key to generate Derived Key
P3	8
Data	Serial Number

The master key must be capable of performing Internal Authenticate in its key type attribute.

To generate 16-byte 3DES key, first issue this command to generate the first 8 bytes of the 16-byte 3DES key. For the second part, bit-wise complement the plain text or serial number and issue this command again.

The 16-byte 3DES key will be:

DERIVED KEY = ENC (Serial Number, MasterKey) || ENC (COMPL (Serial Number), MasterKey)

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 0x08
6A83	Referenced key record not found in EF2
6981	Invalid EF2 (record size, file type, etc.)
6A88	EF2 not found
6283	Current DF is blocked; EF2 is blocked
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6A87	Referenced Master Key is not capable of 3-DES encryption
6108	Command completed, issue GET REPOSE to get the result



### 7.2 Diversify (or Load) Key Data

This command prepares the SAM card to perform ciphering operations by diversifying and loading the key. It takes the serial number and CBC initial vector as command data input.

CLA	80
INS	72
P1	Target Key: 1 – Secret Code ( $S_C$ ) 2 – Account Key ( $K_{ACCT}$ ) 3 – Terminal Key 4 – Card Key 5 – Bulk Encryption Key (Not diversified) 6 – Initial vector
P2	Index of Master Key: Bit7: 1 = local Key in current EF2; 0 = global KEY EF2 Bit6-Bit5: RFU Bit4-Bit0: Key Index
P3	If P1 = 1-4, 6, P3 = 8 If P1 = 5, P3 = 0
Data	If P1 = 1-4 Client card's Serial Number If P1 = 5, No command data. If P1 = 6, 8 byte DES/3DES CBC initial vector.

If P1 = 1 to 4, this command will generate a diversified Target Key by using this formula:

$$\text{DERIVED KEY} = \text{ENC}(\text{Serial Number}, \text{MasterKey}) \parallel \text{ENC}(\text{COMPL}(\text{Serial Number}), \text{MasterKey})$$

If subsequent commands use only single DES, the right half of DERIVED KEY would not be used.

If P1 = 5, the bulk encryption key will be loaded and it will not be diversified.

$$\text{DERIVED KEY} = \text{MasterKey}$$

The MasterKey in this case must have bulk encryption bit enabled in its Key Type attribute. This type of key is useful for using the SAM as an encryption engine. The data in P3 should be 0x00 or it will be ignored.

Note that the Master Keys or bulk encryption Target key must be a 3DES key since single DES is considered insufficient for most security applications. Depending on the application, the diversified key can be used for single DES operations.

If P1 = 6, the initial vector for CBC or MAC encryption is loaded. P2 value will be ignored. The initial vector is reset to all NULL bytes at card reset or whenever a non-SAM Command is called. The initial vector is changed after an CBC encryption/decryption command. When performing consecutive CBC encrypt/decrypt chaining, call this command once followed by consecutive CBC encrypt/decrypt commands. Call this command to reset the initial vector before a CBC encrypt/decrypt chain.



### Return Status

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Wrong P1, P1 must be 1 to 6
6700	Wrong P3, P3 must be 8 (or 0
6283	Current DF is blocked, or EF2 is blocked
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6A88	EF2 not found
6A83	Referenced Master Key in EF2 not found
6981	Invalid EF2 (FDB, MRL, etc not consistent)
6A87	Referenced KEY not capable of authentication
6983	Referenced Key is locked
9000	Target key generated, and ready in SAM memory



### 7.3 Encrypt

This command will encrypt data using DES or 3DES with either:

1. The session key created by the mutual authentication procedure with an ACOS2/3 card
2. A diversified secret code.
3. A bulk encryption key.
4. Encrypt the diversified secret code with the session key.

CLA	80																																			
INS	74																																			
P1	<table><tr><th>b7-b3</th><th>b2</th><th>b1</th><th>b0</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>-</td><td>ECB Mode</td></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>-</td><td>CBC Mode</td></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>-</td><td>MAC Mode</td></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0</td><td>Triple DES</td></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>1</td><td>Single DES</td></tr><tr><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>All other values - RFU</td></tr></table>	b7-b3	b2	b1	b0	Description	-	0	0	-	ECB Mode	-	0	1	-	CBC Mode	-	1	1	-	MAC Mode	-	-	-	0	Triple DES	-	-	-	1	Single DES	-	-	-	-	All other values - RFU
b7-b3	b2	b1	b0	Description																																
-	0	0	-	ECB Mode																																
-	0	1	-	CBC Mode																																
-	1	1	-	MAC Mode																																
-	-	-	0	Triple DES																																
-	-	-	1	Single DES																																
-	-	-	-	All other values - RFU																																
P2	<p>P2 is derived key in SAM set using Load Key function:</p> <p>1 – Encrypt Data with Session Key Ks 2 – Encrypt Data with Secret Code Sc 3 – Encrypt Data with Bulk Encryption Key 0 – return ENC (Sc, Ks)</p>																																			
P3	<p>If P2 = 1-3, multiple of 8 up to 128 bytes If P2 = 0, 0</p>																																			
Data	Plain text																																			

On success, the command will return SW = 61XX where XX indicate the length of the output is multiple of 8. Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 = XX to retrieve the result.

This command will compute a DES/3DES encryption using the derived key specified in P2, and the plain text command data. If DES mode is Single DES, the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the derived key will be ignored. The key diversification must first be performed with Diversify Key (See Section 7.2). If encrypting data with Ks, mutual authentication must also be done.

#### Return Status

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3
6A83	ACOS Target Key is not ready (use Diversify to generate the key)
61XX	Encryption is done, use GET RESPONSE to get the result





### 7.4 Decrypt

This command will decrypt data using DES or 3DES with either:

1. The session key created by the mutual authentication procedure with an ACOS2/3 card
2. A diversified secret code.
3. A bulk encryption key.
4. Decrypt the diversified secret code with the session key.

CLA	80				
INS	76				
P1	<b>b7-b3</b>	<b>b2</b>	<b>b1</b>	<b>b0</b>	<b>Description</b>
	-	-	0	-	ECB Mode
	-	-	1	-	CBC Mode
	-	-	-	0	Triple DES
	-	-	-	1	Single DES
	-	-	-	-	All other values - RFU
P2	P2 is derived key in SAM set using Load Key function:  1 – Decrypt Data with Session Key Ks 2 – Decrypt Data with Secret Code Sc 3 – Decrypt Data with Bulk Encryption Key 0 – return DEC (Sc, Ks)				
P3	If P2 = 1-3, multiple of 8 up to 128 bytes If P2 = 0, 0				
Data	Ciphertext				

On success, the command will return SW = 61XX where XX indicate the length of the output is multiple of 8. Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 = XX to retrieve the result.

This command will compute a DES/3DES decryption using the derived key specified in P2, and the ciphertext command data. If DES mode is Single DES, the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the derived key will be ignored. The key loading must first be performed with Load Key (See Section 7.2). If decrypting data with Ks, mutual authentication must also be done.

#### Return Status

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3
6A83	ACOS Target Key is not ready (use Diversify to generate the key)
61XX	Decryption is done, use GET RESPONSE to get the result



### 7.5 Prepare ACOS Authentication

This command would authenticate the SAM card (as the terminal) to the ACOS2/3 card. For more information, please see Section 10.2.

CLA	80
INS	78
P1	DES mode: LSb=0: Triple DES LSb=1: Single DES
P2	0
P3	8
Data	Card Challenge Data RNDc

On success, the command will return SW1 SW2 = 6110. Issue GET RESPONSE with P3 = 10h to get:

ENC (RNDc, Kt) || RNDt

; where ENC is Triple DES or Single DES; and RND<sub>T</sub> is generated by the SAM.

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 0x08
6A83	ACOS Key (KT or KC) is not ready (use Diversify to generate this key)
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6110	Command completed, issue GET REPONSE to get the result



### 7.6 Verify ACOS Authentication

This command would verify the ACOS2/3 card to the terminal. The Session Key  $K_s$  would also be generated internally. For more information, please see Section 10.2.

CLA	80
INS	7A
P1	DES mode: LSb=0: Triple DES LSb=1: Single DES
P2	0
P3	8
Data	DES ( $K_s$ , $RND_T$ )

On success, the command will return SW1 SW2 = 9000. This means that the Mutual Authentication with client card is successful, and the client card is authenticated.

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 0x08
6A83	ACOS-SAM Session Key or $RND_T$ are not ready. Use "Prepare ACOS Authentication" to build these keys.
6982	Data is incorrect
9000	Data is correct, ACOS Mutual Authentication is successful



### 7.7 Verify ACOS Inquire Account

This command would verify the ACOS2/3 card's Inquire Account purse command. It would verify that the MAC checksum returned by ACOS2/3 are correct with the SAM's diversified key. Please refer to Section 10.5.

CLA	80
INS	7C
P1	DES mode: Bit0=0: Triple DES Bit0=1: Single DES Bit1=1: ACOS INQ_AUT is enabled Bit2=1: ACOS INQ_ACC_MAC is enabled
P2	0
P3	0x1D
Data	Data Block returned by INQUIRE ACCOUNT of client ACOS card, see below

The Data Block to be sent to ACOS6-SAM has the following format:

Reference Data [4];

MAC [4];

Transaction Type;

Balance [3];

ATREF [6];

MAX BAL[3];

TTREFc[4];

TTREFd[4]

The 1<sup>st</sup> 4 bytes is the challenge data sent to INQUIRE ACCOUNT. While the succeeding bytes are returned by INQUIRE ACCOUNT. The command will then verify if MAC[4] is correct, based on the other data fields and the current ACCOUNT KEY  $K_{ACCT}$ .

On success, the command will return SW1 SW2 = 9000, meaning the client card's PURSE information is authentic and un-tampered.

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3
6A83	ACOS Key $K_S$ or $K_{ACCT}$ are not ready; use DIVERSIFY command to generate $K_{ACCT}$ ; if applicable, use "Prepare ACOS Authentication" to generate $K_S$ .
6F00	Data Block's MAC is incorrect
9000	Data Block's MAC is correct



### 7.8 Prepare ACOS Account Transaction

To create an ACOS2/3 Credit/Debit command, the MAC must be computed for ACOS2/3 to verified. Please refer to Section 10.7 and 10.8 for Debit and Credit respectively.

CLA	80
INS	7E
P1	DES mode: LSb=0: Triple DES LSb=1: Single DES Bit1=1: ACOS TRNS_AUT is enabled.
P2	E2: Credit E6: Debit
P3	0x0D
Data	Data Block

The Data Block to be sent to the SAM has the following format:

Amount(3) ; amount to CREDIT / DEBIT

TTREF(4) ; if P2 = E2, use TTREF<sub>C</sub>; if P2 = E6, use TTREF<sub>D</sub>

ATREF(6) ; this is the ATREF field returned by the INQUIRE ACCOUNT command

On success, SW1 SW2 = 610B, the Data block returned by SAM has the following format:

MAC [4];

Amount [3];

TTREF [4];

Then send this block to the client ACOS for DEBIT/CREDIT commands.

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 0x0D
6A83	ACOS Key K <sub>S</sub> or K <sub>ACCT</sub> are not ready; use DIVERSIFY command to generate K <sub>ACCT</sub> ; if applicable, use "Prepare ACOS Authentication" to generate K <sub>S</sub> .
610B	Command completed, issue GET REPONSE to get the result



### 7.9 Verify Debit Certificate

For ACOS3, if the DEBIT command has P1 = 1, a debit certificate is returned. The debit certificate can be checked by comparing the ACOS3 response to the result of this command.

CLA	80
INS	70
P1	DES mode: Bit0=0: Triple DES Bit0=1: Single DES Bit1=1: TRNS_AUT is enabled, the cipher with Session Key
P2	0
P3	0x14
Data	Data Block

Data Block format is:

MAC	4 bytes Debit Certificate returned by ACOS3 DEBIT command
AMOUNT	3 bytes Amount last debited from card
NEW BALANCE	3 bytes expected new balance after the DEBIT
ATREF	6 bytes ATREF used before the last DEBIT command
TTREF <sub>D</sub>	4 bytes TTREF <sub>D</sub> used in the last DEBIT command

#### Return Status:

6986	No DF selected
6A86	Invalid P1 or P2
6700	Incorrect P3, must be 0x14
6A83	ACOS Key K <sub>S</sub> or K <sub>ACCT</sub> are not ready; use DIVERSIFY command to generate K <sub>ACCT</sub> ; if applicable, use "Prepare ACOS Authentication" to generate K <sub>S</sub> .
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6F00	DEBIT CERTIFICATE is invalid
9000	Success, DEBIT CERTIFICATE is valid



### 8. Getting Started: Personalization of Card Header Block and File Creation

Below will demonstrate how to create a simple file system. Assuming the card still has no MF, and in Pre-Perso Stage.

Syntax for ISO-IN: **CLA INS P1 P2 P3** Data (SW1 SW2)

Syntax for ISO-OUT: **CLA INS P1 P2 P3** [Expected Data Result] (SW1 SW2)

; create MF with DCB = 0xFF

00 E0 00 00 0A 62 08 82 02 3F FF 83 02 3F 00 (9000)

; Create DF under MF: ID=4000, DCB=0x00, with SAC and SAE, SE file is 4003

00 E0 00 00 34 62 32 82 01 38 83 02 40 00 84 10 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8A 01 01 8C 08 7F 03 03 03 03 FF FF 03 AB 06 86 02 22 2A 97 00 8D 02 40 03 (9000)

; Under DF 4000, Create KEY FILE EF2: ID=4002, MRL=0x15, NOR=0x04 with SAC (read access = NEVER)

00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 82 05 0C 01 00 15 04 83 02 40 02 88 01 02 8A 01 01 8C 06 6B 03 FF FF FF FF (9000)

; initialize KEY Records in EF2, follow the KEY data structure

; all KEYS are initially set to 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00

; Keys 1, 2, 3 are external authenticate capable with counter = 0x55 (5 retries)

; while Key 4 is for internal authenticate with usage counter = 0xFFFF (unlimited)

00 DC 00 00 14 81 01 55 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

00 DC 00 02 14 82 01 55 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

00 DC 00 02 14 83 01 55 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

00 DC 00 02 15 84 02 FF FF 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; CREATE SE File: ID=4003, MRL=0x11, NOR=0x04 with SAC (read access = NEVER)

00 E0 00 00 18 62 16 82 05 0C 01 00 11 04 83 02 40 03 8A 01 01 8C 06 6B 03 FF FF FF FF (9000)

; initialize SE file, follow SE TEMPLATE STRUCTURE

; SE#1: external authentication of local key 1

00 DC 00 00 0B 80 01 01 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#2: external authentication of local key 2

00 DC 00 02 0B 80 01 02 A4 06 83 01 82 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#3: external authentication of local key 3

00 DC 00 02 0B 80 01 03 A4 06 83 01 83 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#4, external authentication of local keys 1 or 2 or 3

00 DC 00 02 11 80 01 04 A4 0C 83 01 81 83 01 82 83 01 83 95 01 80 (9000)

; Create Binary File: ID=4004, SIZE=0096, with SAC

00 E0 00 00 18 62 16 80 02 00 96 82 01 01 83 02 40 04 8A 01 01 8C 06 6E 03 FF FF FF FF (9000)

; Create Binary File: ID=4005, SIZE=0190, with SAC

00 E0 00 00 18 62 16 80 02 01 90 82 01 01 83 02 40 05 8A 01 01 8C 06 6E 03 FF FF FF 03 (9000)

; Create LF File: ID=4006, MRL=005C, NOR=0A, with SAC

00 E0 00 00 19 62 17 82 05 02 41 00 5C 0A 83 02 40 06 8A 01 01 8C 07 6F 03 FF FF 02 03 04 (9000)

; Create LF FILE: ID=4007, MRL=0024, NOR=0A, with SAC

00 E0 00 00 19 62 17 82 05 02 41 00 24 0A 83 02 40 07 8A 01 01 8C 07 6F 03 FF FF 01 03 04 (9000)

; DF 4000 is complete

; Go back to MF, expect SW1SW2 to be 61nn



00 A4 00 00 00 (61XX)

; Create next DF: 4100, SE file=4103, with SAC and SAE

00 E0 00 00 43 62 41 82 01 38 83 02 41 00 84 10 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8A 01  
01 8C 07 7D 02 02 02 FF FF 02 AB 16 86 02 22 F2 97 00 84 01 22 A0 0B 9E 01 01 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01  
08 8D 02 41 03 (9000)

; create PIN FILE EF1 4101: MRL=12h NOR=1, SFI=1

00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 82 05 0C 01 00 12 01 83 02 41 01 88 01 01 8A 01 01 8C 06 6B FF FF FF FF FF  
(9000)

; initialize PIN's to EF1

; PIN 1: 4 retries left, 4 max retries, PIN = 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00

00 E2 00 00 12 81 44 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; Create KEY FILE EF2 4102, MRL=16, NOR=6, SFI=2

00 E0 00 00 1C 62 1A 82 05 0C 41 00 16 06 83 02 41 02 88 01 02 8A 01 01 8C 07 6F FF FF FF 02 FF FF  
(9000)

; initialize KEY RECORDS TO EF2

; all keys are initially set to: 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00

; KEY 1, internal auth., usage counter=0x1234

00 DC 00 00 15 81 02 12 34 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; KEY 2, internal auth., usage counter=0x0000

00 DC 00 02 15 82 02 00 00 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; KEY 3, internal and external auth., usage counter=0x1234, retry counter=0x33 (3 tries)

00 DC 00 02 16 83 03 12 34 33 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; KEY 4, external auth., retry counter=0xFF (unlimited)

00 DC 00 02 14 84 01 FF 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; KEY 5, internal auth., usage counter=0xFF00

00 DC 00 02 15 85 02 FF 00 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; KEY 6, external auth., retry counter=0x88

00 DC 00 02 14 86 01 88 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 (9000)

; Create SE FILE 4103, MRL=27, NOR=05, SFI=3

00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 82 05 0C 01 00 27 05 83 02 41 03 88 01 03 8A 01 01 8C 06 6B FF FF FF FF FF  
(9000)

; initialize RECORD to SE

; SE#1: authenticate local key 3

00 DC 00 00 0B 80 01 01 A4 06 83 01 83 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#2: authenticate local key 4

00 DC 00 02 0B 80 01 02 A4 06 83 01 84 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#5; authenticate local key 86

00 DC 00 02 0B 80 01 05 A4 06 84 01 86 95 01 80 (9000)

; Create Transparent File 4104: size=0030, SFI=4

00 E0 00 00 1C 62 1A 80 02 00 30 82 01 01 83 02 41 04 88 01 04 8A 01 01 8C 07 6F FF FF FF FF FF 01  
(9000)

; Create Transparent File 4105, size=0064, SFI=5

00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 80 02 00 64 82 01 01 83 02 41 05 88 01 05 8A 01 01 8C 06 6E FF FF FF FF 02  
(9000)

; go back to MF

00 A4 00 00 00 (61XX)





```
; create DATA FILE 4305, SFI=5
```

```
00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 80 02 08 00 82 01 01 83 02 43 05 88 01 05 8A 01 01 8C 06 6E FF FF FF 01 01  
(9000)
```

```
; test TRANSPARENT file commands
```

```
; invalid P1/P2
```

```
00 B0 FF FF 00 (6B00)
```

```
00 B0 FF 00 00 (6B00)
```

```
; read 0x10 bytes, starting from offset 0000
```

```
00 B0 00 00 10 [FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF] (9000)
```

```
; update binary at offset 0x00, 0x20 bytes
```

```
00 D6 00 00 20 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC  
DD EE FF 00 (9000)
```

```
; update binary at offset 0x0100, 9 bytes
```

```
00 D6 01 00 09 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 (9000)
```

```
00 D6 07 80 08 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 (9000)
```

```
00 D6 07 F8 08 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 (9000)
```

```
; read binary, check if the data written are correct
```

```
00 B0 00 00 20 [11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB  
CC DD EE FF 00] (9000)
```

```
00 B0 01 00 09 [11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99] (9000)
```

```
00 B0 07 F8 08 [88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11] (9000)
```

The resulting file system will look like this:






Figure 10: File system example

### More Examples:

#### Cyclic File behavior

; Creating a Cyclic File with file ID=EF09, MRL=0A, NOR=03, R/W access allowed if SE#1 is satisfied

00 E0 00 00 12 62 10 83 02 EF 09 82 05 06 00 00 0A 03 8C 03 03 81 81 (9000)

; if we write 3 records

00 DC 00 00 0A 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 (9000)

00 DC 00 02 0A 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 (9000)

00 DC 00 02 0A 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 (9000)

; the 1<sup>st</sup> record is the last record written

00 B2 00 00 0A [33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33] (9000)

; reading the next record will wrap to file forward

00 B2 00 02 0A [11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11] (9000)

; reading the previous record will wrap the file back

00 B2 00 03 0A [33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33] (9000)

00 B2 00 03 0A [22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22] (9000)

#### Linear Variable behavior

; create LV EF0A, MRL=10, NOR=01, R/W access allowed if SE#1 is satisfied

00 E0 00 00 12 62 10 83 02 EF 0A 82 05 04 00 00 0A 01 8c 03 03 81 81 (9000)

; write and read the record

00 DC 00 00 0A AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA (9000)

00 B2 00 00 0A [AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA] (9000)

; write again

00 DC 00 00 03 11 22 33 (9000)

; read back the whole record. Unlike LF file, the whole record is erased first before writing 11 22 33

00 B2 00 00 0A [11 22 33 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF] (9000)



### 9. Status Code

#### SW1 SW2 Listing

9000	Command OK
61nn	Command OK, issue GET RESPONSE with P3=nn to retrieve data
6E00	Invalid CLA
6D00	Invalid INS, or unsupported INS
6700	Wrong P3
6982	Security condition not satisfied
6988	Wrong MAC is submitted In Secure Messaging
6985	MAC Computation error in Secure Messaging (Random number or Session Key not ready)
6966	Card is in Transport Stage, Submit Transport Code to enter ACOS3 mode
6A82	Card is in User Terminated state, will not accept command



### 10. SAM Scenarios

This section outlines the typical scenarios of using an ACOS6 SAM cards along with an ACOS2/3 client card. The ACOS6 SAM should already be loaded with a file system and keys similar to that of Section 11. This section will demonstrate how to personalize an ACOS2/3 card with personalized keys,

#### 10.1 Personalizing ACOS2/ACOS3 KEYS

You can use the ACOS6-SAM to set the diversified keys of ACOS2 / ACOS3. If the SAM has N Master keys, you can use them to generate your keys. In the example below, SAM Master Key<sub>i</sub> is used to generate ACOS Key<sub>j</sub>. If 3DES key is needed, please follow Section 7.1 to generate the first and second half of the 16-byte 3DES key by multiple issuance of this command.

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	< Select Issuer DF < 00 A4 00 00 02 < XX XX  < Submit Issuer PIN < 00 20 00 01 08 < XX XX...XX	
	Get Card Serial Number > (ACOS3) 80 14 00 00 08 >  (ACOS2) 80 A4 00 00 02 FF 00 >  (ACOS2) 80 B2 00 00 08 >	< Serial Number  < 9000  < Serial Number
Check if Issuer PIN is submitted;  Check if referenced master key is valid;  Compute Key 6108 >	< Generate KEYi < 80 88 00 K <sub>Mi</sub> 08 < Serial Number	



Generated Key >	< Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 08	
	Set KEYj > Write or append key record with KEYj >	



### 10.2 Mutual Authentication

The terminal will now use the SAM to compute the ACOS2/3 Session Key, and perform Mutual Authentication with the ACOS2/3 card. The SAM should know the Terminal Key and Card Key of the given ACOS2/3 since it is assumed that the keys are generated by the SAM.

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	Get Card Serial Number > (ACOS3) 80 14 00 00 08 >  (ACOS2) 80 A4 00 00 02 FF 00 >  (ACOS2) 80 B2 00 00 08 >	< Serial Number  < 9000  < Serial Number
Generate Card Key using Serial Number 9000 >	< Generate Card Key using Master Key <sub>I</sub> < Diversify (@K <sub>MI</sub> , Serial Number) < 80 72 04 # K <sub>MI</sub> , 08 < Serial Number	
Generate Terminal Key using Serial Number 9000 >	< Generate Terminal Key using Master Key <sub>J</sub> < Diversify (@K <sub>MJ</sub> , Serial Number) < 80 72 03 #K <sub>MJ</sub> 08 < Serial Number	
	Get Challenge > 80 84 00 00 08 >	< RNDc
1. Generate RNDt	< Prepare ACOS Authentication < 80 78 00 00 08 < RNDc	



<p>2. Compute</p> <p><math>R = 3DES(RND_c, K_t)</math></p> <p>3. Compute Session Key <math>K_s</math></p> <p><math>K_{sL} = 3DES(3DES(RND_c, K_c), K_t)</math></p> <p><math>K_{sR} = 3DES(RND_t, REV(K_t))</math></p> <p>4. Form Response Block =</p> <p><math>R \parallel RND_t</math></p> <p>6110 &gt;</p>		
<p><math>R \parallel RND_t</math> &gt;</p>	<p>&lt; Get Response</p> <p>&lt; 00 C0 00 00 10</p>	
	<p>Authenticate (<math>R, RND_t</math>) &gt;</p> <p>80 82 00 00 10 &gt; <math>R</math> &gt; <math>RND_t</math> &gt;</p>	<p>1. Compute <math>K_s</math></p> <p><math>K_{sL} = 3DES(3DES(RND_c, K_c), K_t)</math></p> <p><math>K_{sR} = 3DES(RND_t, REV(K_t))</math></p> <p>2. <math>R_1 = 3DES(RND_t, K_s)</math></p> <p>3. Get Response Block = <math>R_1</math></p> <p>&lt; 6108</p>
	<p>Get Response &gt;</p>	



	80 C0 00 00 08 >	
Check if R1 == DES (RNDt, Ks)  If OK, 9000 >	< Verify ACOS Authentication < 80 7A 00 00 08 < R1  Proceed if both Card and Terminal are Authenticated	< R1





### 10.3 Submit PIN (ciphered)

Assuming Mutual Authentication is already performed, and Session Key  $K_s$  is ready in SAM.

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	Get Card Serial Number >	< Serial Number
Compute SC using $K_{mi}$ and Serial Number	< Use SAM Master key to compute Secret Code < Diversify (@ $K_{mi}$ , Serial Number) < 80 72 01 # $k_{mi}$ 08 < Serial Number	
Compute $R = ENC(SC, K_s)$  6108 >	< Encrypt command < 80 74 00 00 00 00	
  R >	< Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 08	
	Submit encrypted PIN > 80 20 06 00 08 > R >	< 9000



### 10.4 Change PIN (ciphered)

- assuming Mutual Authentication is already performed, and Session Key Ks is ready in SAM.

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	Ask for Current PIN	
	Submit PIN > 80 20 06 00 08 > PIN >	< 9000
	Ask for new PIN	
Compute R = DEC (new PIN, Ks)  Get Response Block = R  6108 >	< Decrypt (@Ks, new PIN) < 80 76 00 01 08 < newPIN	
R >	< Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 08	
	Change PIN (R) > 80 24 00 00 08 > R >	< 9000



### 10.5 Secure Messaging


Secure Messaging is only supported by ACOS3 version 1.07 or above. Assuming Mutual Authentication is already performed, a 3DES Session Key  $K_s$  is ready in SAM, and  $RND_C$  memorized in the SAM. This section demonstrates how the terminal can initiate an ISO-IN command to the ACOS3 card with secure messaging and using ACOS6 SAM as the secured encryption engine.

See ACOS3 reference manual for more information about secure messaging.

SAM	Terminal	ACOS 3 v1.07 or above
	Terminal wish to send to ACOS3: 80 INS P1 P2 P3 <Cmd Data>	
Set Seq# as CBC initial vector 9000 >	<b>Encrypt command data</b>  Set Seq# = 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF AND $RND_C + 1$  Load Key Data to Load CBC Initial Vector. < 80 72 06 00 08 Seq#  Encrypt command with CBC option: < 80 74 02 01 XX <Cmd Data> Padding  Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 XX	Set Seq# = 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF AND $RND_C + 1$
Compute: <Enc Data> = $ENC_{CBC}(\text{<Cmd Data>}$ Padding, $K_s$ , Seq#) 61 XX>  <Enc Data> >	<b>Compute MAC for secure messaging</b>  < Load Key Data to Load CBC Initial Vector. < 80 72 06 00 08 Seq#  Set $P_i$ = Number of padding bytes used in Padding $P3^* = P3 + P_i + 9$ $L_{87} = P3 + P_i + 1$	
Set Seq# as CBC initial vector 9000 >		
MAC <sub>cmd</sub> =		



<p>SIGN<sub>CBC</sub>(89 04 8C INS P1 P2 87 L<sub>87</sub> Pi &lt;Enc Data&gt; Padding2, Ks, Seq#) 61 08&gt;</p> <p>MAC &gt;</p>	<p>Encrypt command with MAC option</p> <p>&lt; 80 74 06 01 XX 89 04 8C INS P1 P2 87 L<sub>87</sub> Pi &lt;Enc Data&gt; Padding2</p> <p>Get Response &lt; 00 C0 00 00 08</p>	
	<p><b>Send secure messaging command</b></p> <p>8C INS P1 P2 P3* 87 L<sub>87</sub> Pi &lt;Enc Data&gt; 8E 04 MAC<sub>Cmd</sub>&gt;</p> <p>Get Response 80 C0 00 00 0A &gt;</p>	<p>Verify MAC<sub>cmd</sub> Decrypt &lt;Enc Data&gt; Perform INS.</p> <p>Set Seq# ++ Compute MAC<sub>rsp</sub> = SIGN<sub>CBC</sub>(89 04 CLA* INS P1 P2 99 02 Sw1 Sw2 80 00 00 00 00 00, Ks, Seq#) &lt; 61 0A</p> <p>&lt; 99 02 Sw1Sw2 8E 04 MAC<sub>rsp</sub></p>
<p>Set Seq# as CBC initial vector 9000 &gt;</p> <p>Compute MAC<sub>rsp</sub>* = SIGN<sub>CBC</sub>(89 04 CLA* I NS P1 P2 99 02 Sw1</p>	<p><b>Verify MAC<sub>rsp</sub></b></p> <p>Load Key Data to Load CBC Initial Vector. &lt; 80 72 06 00 08 ++Seq#</p> <p>Encrypt command with MAC option &lt; 80 74 06 01 10 89 04 CLA* INS P1 P2 99 02 Sw1 Sw2 80 00 00 00 00 00, Ks, Seq#)</p>	



ENC<sub>CBC</sub>(data, key, initial vector) and SIGN<sub>CBC</sub>(data, key, initial vector) are CBC Encryption/MAC with data, key and initial vector as input.





### 10.6 Inquire Account

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	Get Card Serial Number >	< Serial Number
Generate Certify Key Kacct  $KacctL = 3DES(S_N, Km)$ $KacctR = 3DES(S_N, Km)$ 9000 >	< Diversify (@Km, Serial Number) < 80 72 02 #Km 08 < Serial Number	
	Inquire Account (@Kcrt) > 80 E4 02 00 04 > Ref >	< 6119
	Get Response > 80 C0 00 00 19 >	< MAC, TransType, Bal, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd,
Compute MAC from Kacct and Datain, then compare with MAC in Datain  $R = 3MAC(Data,$	< Verify Inquire Account < 80 7C 00 00 1D < Ref, MAC, TransType, Balance, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd [4]	



Kacct)  
If R == MAC  
9000 >





### 10.7 Debit

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2 / 3
	Get Card Serial Number >	< Serial Number
Generate Debit Key Kaact  $Kacctl = 3DES(SN, Km)$ $Kacctr = 3DES(SN, Km)$ 9000 >	< Diversify (@Km, Serial Number)	
	Inquire Account (@Kd) > 80 E4 00 00 04 > Ref >	< 6119
	Get Response > 80 C0 00 00 19 >	< MAC, TransType, Bal, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd,
++ATREF  Data = E6, Amount, TTREFd, ATREF, 0, 0  $R = 3MAC(Kacctl, Data)$  $R1 = R    Amount    TTREFd$	< Prepare ACOS Transaction < 80 7E 00 E6 0x0D < Amount, TTREFd, ATREF	





Response Block = R1 610B >		
R1 >	< Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 0B	
	Debit > 80 E6 01 00 0B > R1 >	< Perform Debit and return Debit Certificate < 6104
	Get Reponse> 80 C0 00 00 04>	< Debit Certificate
Check if DC is correct 9000 >	< Verify Debit Certificate < 00 70 00 00 04 < DC, AMT, New BAL, ATREF, TTREFd	



### 10.8 Credit

SAM	Terminal	ACOS2
	Get Card Serial Number >	< Serial Number
Generate Credit Key Kaact  $Kacctl = 3DES(SN, Km)$ $Kacctr = 3DES(SN, Km)$  9000 >	< Diversify (@Km, Serial Number)	
	Inquire Account (@Kd) > 80 E4 01 00 04 > Ref >	< 6119
	Get Response > 80 C0 00 00 19 >	< MAC, TransType, Bal, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd,
++ATREF  Data = E2, Amount, TTREFc, ATREF, 0, 0  R = MAC (Data, K acct)  R1 = R    Amount	< Prepare ACOS Transaction < 00 7E 00 E2 0D < Amount, TTREFd, ATREF	



# Advanced Card Systems Limited

ACOS6 SAM



TTREFc		
Get Response Block = R1		
610B >		
	< Get Response < 00 C0 00 00 0B	
R1 >	Credit > 80 E2 00 00 0B > R1 >	< 9000
	Perform Verify Inquire Account with Credit Key and new amount  Inquire Account (@Kc) > 80 E4 01 00 04 > Ref >	< 6119
	Get Response > 80 C0 00 00 19 >	< MAC, TransType, Bal, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd,
Compute MAC from Kacct and Datain, then compare with MAC in Datain  Data = Ref, Trans	< Verify Inquire Account < 00 7C 00 00 1D < Ref, MAC, TransType, Balance, ATREF, Max, TTREFc, TTREFd [4]	



Type, Bal, ATREF,  
00, 00, TTREFc,  
TTREFd

R = 3MAC (Data,  
Kacct)

If R == MAC  
9000 >





### 11. Quick Start Guide

This quick start guide is to help the application developer to get familiar with the ACOS6-SAM. In order to use the SAM card, first it has to be initialized. The initialization entails creating a file system on the card and loading a master key set. The application developer will first have to be familiarized with the ACOS6-SAM commands and file system. Then to design the file system and key set based on the application needs. To help the application developer shorten this process, this document aims to guide the user through the initialization and go through some of the authentication procedures.

#### 11.1 Sample Initialization Script

The included script works with ACS Script Tools and it initializes the card with a standard file structure and key set. Depending on the application needs, this script can be modified to suit the users' needs. The script will generate the following file system.




Figure 11: SAM sample script file system

The script listed below will generate the file system on a blank card. It is important to note that this script can be ran only once. Once the MF is created, it can not be removed unless the CLEAR CARD command is called and the card life cycle fuse (in Section 3.1) has not been set.

```
; create MF
00 E0 00 00 0E 62 0C 80 02 2C 00 82 02 3F FF 83 02 3F 00 (9000)

; Create EF1 to store the PIN
; FDB=0C, MRL=0A, NOR=3, READ=NONE, WRITE=IC
; READ=NEVER, WRITE=IC
00 E0 00 00 1B 62 19 83 02 FF 0A 88 01 01 82 06 0C 00 00 0A 00 03 8C 08 7F FF FF FF FF 27 27 FF
(9000)

; GLOBAL PINS
```



; change global PIN1 to diversify

00 DC 01 04 0A 01 88 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 (9000)

00 DC 02 04 0A 02 88 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 (9000)

00 DC 03 04 0A 03 88 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 (9000)

\*\*\*\*\*

; Create next DF DRT01: 4100

00 E0 00 00 2B 62 29 82 01 38 83 02 41 00 8A 01 01 8C 08 7F 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 8D 02 41 03 80 02 03

20 AB 0B 84 01 88 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 FF (9000)

; create PIN FILE EF1 4101

00 E0 00 00 1C 62 1A 82 05 0C 01 00 12 01 83 02 41 01 88 01 01 8A 01 01 8C 07 6F 03 03 03 03 03 03

(9000)

; APPEND RECORD TO EF1, define 1 PIN record in EF1

00 E2 00 00 0A 81 88 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 (9000)

; Create KEY FILE EF2 4102

00 E0 00 00 1D 62 1B 82 05 0C 41 00 16 03 83 02 41 02 88 01 02 8A 01 01 8C 08 7F 03 03 03 03 03 03

(9000)

; APPEND RECORD TO EF2, define 3 KEY records in EF2 - MASTER KEYS

; Maximum of 3 MASTERKEYS for this file

;1st Master key, key ID=81, key type=03 int/ext authenticate, usage counter=FF FF, retries=8:retries left=8,

;algo reference=00 (3DES), master key = change 11 .... 11 (16-bytes for 3DES)with your own key

00 E2 00 00 16 81 03 FF FF 88 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 (9000)

;2nd Master key, key ID=82, key type=02 internal authenticate, usage counter=FF FF,

;algo reference=00 (3DES), master key = change 11 .... 11 (16-bytes for 3DES)with your own key

00 E2 00 00 15 82 02 FF FF 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 (9000)

;3rd Master key, key ID=83, key type=01 external authenticate, retries=8:retries left=8,

;algo reference=01 (DES), master key = change 11 .... 11 (8 bytes for DES)with your own key

00 E2 00 00 0C 83 01 88 01 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 (9000)

; Create SE FILE 4103 - SE

00 E0 00 00 1D 62 1B 82 05 0C 01 00 27 05 83 02 41 03 88 01 03 8A 01 01 8C 08 7F 03 03 03 03 03 03

(9000)

; APPEND RECORD to SE

; SE#1

00 E2 00 00 0B 80 01 01 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 80 (9000)

; SE#2

00 E2 00 00 0B 80 01 02 A4 06 83 01 81 95 01 08 (9000)

; SE#3

00 E2 00 00 0B 80 01 03 A4 06 83 01 07 95 01 08 (9000)

\*\*\*\*\*

; Activate all files.

00 44 00 00 02 41 03 (9000)

00 44 00 00 02 41 02 (9000)

00 44 00 00 02 41 01 (9000)



; activate 4100 DF  
00 a4 00 00 00 (61xx)  
00 44 00 00 02 41 00 (9000)

.\*\*\*\*\*  
,



### 11.2 Example of Diversified Key Generation

The following is an example of how to use such SAM card with the above personalization and keyset to generate diversified keys to an end user card. This example will generate 3DES keys for card key and terminal key on a new ACOS3 card.

```
<SAM 00 A4 00 00 02 41 00
>SAM 61 2D
```

```
<SAM 00 20 00 01 08 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
>SAM 90 00
```

```
<CARD 80 14 00 00 08
>CARD 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C 90 00
```

```
;Generate Card key left half using SAM key 81
<SAM 80 88 00 81 08 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C
>SAM 61 08
```

```
<SAM 00 C0 00 00 08
>SAM 46 46 42 89 A2 DA 35 DA 90 00
```

```
;Generate Card key right half
<SAM 80 88 00 81 08 FD A8 BC E9 FC EE A6 C3
>SAM 61 08
```

```
<SAM 00 C0 00 00 08
>SAM 31 0C 4F E3 4B 35 39 9D 90 00
```

```
;Generate terminal key left half using SAM key 82
<SAM 80 88 00 82 08 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C
>SAM 61 08
```

```
<SAM 00 C0 00 00 08
>SAM 46 46 42 89 A2 DA 35 DA 90 00 (Same as Kt left half because key 81 and 82 are the same)
```

```
;Generate terminal key right half
<SAM 80 88 00 82 08 FD A8 BC E9 FC EE A6 C3
>SAM 61 08
```

```
<SAM 00 C0 00 00 08
>SAM 31 0C 4F E3 4B 35 39 9D 90 00
```

```
; Write to the ACOS3 card
<Card 80 20 07 00 08 41 43 4F 53 54 45 53 54
>Card 90 00
```

```
<Card 80 A4 00 00 02 FF 03
>Card 90 00
```

```
<Card 80 D2 02 00 08 46 46 42 89 A2 DA 35 DA
>Card 90 00 ; Kc left half
```

```
<Card 80 D2 03 00 08 46 46 42 89 A2 DA 35 DA
>Card 90 00 ; Kt left half
```





<Card 80 D2 0C 00 08 31 0C 4F E3 4B 35 39 9D ; Kc right half  
>Card 90 00

<Card 80 D2 0D 00 08 31 0C 4F E3 4B 35 39 9D ; Kt right half  
>Card 90 00



### 11.3 Example of Mutual Authentication with SAM

The following is a mutual authentication example showing how the ACOS6-SAM interacts with an ACOS3 card. Remember that the 3DES options register must be set in ACOS3 Personalization File FF 02 in order for this to work.

```
<SAM 00 A4 00 00 02 41 00  
>SAM 61 2D
```

```
<SAM 00 20 00 01 08 12 12 12 12 12 12 12  
>SAM 90 00
```

```
<CARD 80 14 00 00 08  
>CARD 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C 90 00
```

```
<SAM 80 72 03 82 08 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C  
>SAM 90 00
```

```
<SAM 80 72 04 81 08 02 57 43 16 03 11 59 3C  
>SAM 90 00
```

```
<CARD 80 84 00 00 08  
>CARD FA 1E 9B 9B 6E C5 1C F4 90 00
```

```
<SAM 80 78 00 00 08 FA 1E 9B 9B 6E C5 1C F4  
>SAM 61 10
```

```
<SAM 00 C0 00 00 10  
>SAM 52 C0 49 28 D4 02 CB 95 54 D1 A2 24 3C F0 28 D9 90 00
```

```
<CARD 80 82 00 00 10 52 C0 49 28 D4 02 CB 95 54 D1 A2 24 3C F0 28 D9  
>CARD 61 08
```

```
<CARD 80 C0 00 00 08  
>CARD 05 48 E3 8D 21 EB 6A E2 90 00
```

```
<SAM 80 7A 00 00 08 05 48 E3 8D 21 EB 6A E2  
>SAM 90 00
```