Bump github.com/tendermint/tendermint from 0.33.2 to 0.33.6

[dependabot]

Bumps github.com/tendermint/tendermint from 0.33.2 to 0.33.6.

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/tendermint/tendermint's releases.

v0.33.6 (WARNING: ALPHA SOFTWARE)

https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#v0336

v0.33.5 (WARNING: ALPHA SOFTWARE)

https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/v0.33.x/CHANGELOG.md#v0335

v0.33.4 (WARNING: ALPHA SOFTWARE)

https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/v0.33.x/CHANGELOG.md#v0334

v0.33.3 (WARNING: ALPHA SOFTWARE)

https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/v0.33.x/CHANGELOG.md#v0333

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/tendermint/tendermint's changelog.

v0.33.6

July 2, 2020

This security release fixes:

Denial of service

Tendermint 0.33.0 and above allow block proposers to include signatures for the wrong block. This may happen naturally if you start a network, have it run for some time and restart it without changing the chainID. (It is a misconfiguration to reuse chainIDs.) Correct block proposers will accidentally include signatures for the wrong block if they see these signatures, and then commits won't validate, making all proposed blocks invalid. A malicious validator (even with a minimal amount of stake) can use this vulnerability to completely halt the network.

Tendermint 0.33.6 checks all the signatures are for the block with +2/3 majority before creating a commit.

False Witness

Tendermint 0.33.1 and above are no longer fully verifying commit signatures during block execution - they stop after +2/3. This means proposers can propose blocks that contain valid +2/3 signatures and then the rest of the signatures can be whatever they want. They can claim that all the other validators signed just by including a CommitSig with arbitrary signature data. While this doesn't seem to impact safety of Tendermint per se, it means that Commits may contain a lot of invalid data.

This was already true of blocks, since they could include invalid txs filled with garbage, but in that case the application knew that they are invalid and could punish the proposer. But since applications didn't--and don't-- verify commit signatures directly (they trust Tendermint to do that), they won't be able to detect it.

This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on the LastCommitInfo sent in BeginBlock, which includes which validators signed. For instance, Gaia incentivizes proposers with a bonus for including more than +2/3 of the signatures. But a proposer can now claim that bonus just by including arbitrary data for the final -1/3 of validators without actually waiting for their signatures. There may be other tricks that can be played because of this.

Tendermint 0.33.6 verifies all the signatures during block execution.

Please note that the light client does not check nil votes and exits as soon as 2/3+ of the signatures are checked.

All clients are recommended to upgrade.

... (truncated)

Commits

• 606d0a8 changelog: tweak 0.33.6 entry
• cefeab0 update changelog and bump version
• 8ccfdb9 consensus: Do not allow signatures for a wrong block in commits
• 5e52a6e types: verify commit fully
• e22acc0 prepare v0.33.5 RC2
• d9c2f01 proto: add proto files for ibc unblock (#4853) (#4906)
• 64c7771 lite2: fix pivot height during bisection
• e406025 p2p: return masked IP (not the actual IP) in addrbook#groupKey
• 69b6e0e rpc/core: do not lock ConsensusState mutex
• e8b4226 rpc: refactor lib folder (#4836)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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