

Manuscript Details

Manuscript number	ECOLEC_2019_1021_R1
Title	French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon Taxation and other Climate Policies
Article type	Research paper

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in detail the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better access to science could foster support for climate policies.

Keywords	Climate Policy; Carbon tax; Preferences; Acceptability; France
Manuscript category	Analysis
Corresponding Author	Adrien FABRE
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Order of Authors	Adrien FABRE, Thomas Douenne
Suggested reviewers	Vrnmm Nchnmm, Steffen Kallbekken, Stefan Drews

Submission Files Included in this PDF

File Name [File Type]

Response to editors - French Attitudes.pdf [Cover Letter]

Response to reviewer #1 - French_Attitudes.pdf [Response to Reviewers]

Response to reviewer #2 - French_Attitudes.pdf [Response to Reviewers]

Highlights - French Attitudes over Climate Change and Climate Policies.pdf [Highlights]

Revision - French Attitudes.pdf [Manuscript File]

conflict_interest.pdf [Conflict of Interest]

Révision - Online Appendix - French Attitudes.pdf [e-Component]

Revision - Review - French Attitudes.pdf [e-Component]

Submission Files Not Included in this PDF

File Name [File Type]

main.tex [LaTeX Source File]

CO2_tax_acceptability.bib [LaTeX Source File]

plainnat_no_url_no_note.bst [LaTeX Source File]

Images_EPS.zip [Figure]

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Response to the Editors
*French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon
Taxation and other Climate Policies*

Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre*

September 16, 2019

Dear Editors,

We would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to revise our paper. Your comments have stimulated us in implementing changes to the paper that we hope you will consider as significant improvements. Below we respond to each of your comments and to each of the reviewers' comments in detail. We replicate them (in italic) and add our reply item by item. We hope you will find our answers clear and satisfactory.

Kind regards,

Thomas Douenne & Adrien Fabre

I have received feedback from two reviewers, please see their comments below. The editors strongly support their arguments, including the lack of focus raised by Reviewer 1 and the call for a better review of the existing literature raised by Reviewer 2. In addressing their comments, I would kindly ask you to focus and not increase the length of the manuscript, as it already is a rather long – if not too long – manuscript including text, figures, tables and references.

In rewriting our manuscript, we ensured not to increase its length. The text now includes 7916 words against 7927 in the initial version. Following the

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suggestion of the second reviewer, we added two paragraphs to review the literature in introduction. However, we have greatly shortened section 3 (on attitudes over CC) as suggested by the first reviewer, which significantly decreased the manuscript size. The trimming of section 3 allowed to improve the focus of the paper on climate policies, even more so that we adopted a new narrative and now explain that section 3 is here to help understanding people's root motivations for accepting or rejecting climate policies. To further shorten our text, we also decided to remove section 5.2.4 on shale gas, as we think little new insights could be derived from it.

From an editorial perspective I would further like to add the following points:
1. Please carefully check your highlights. They include typos, grammar mistakes and are not expressed in good English language.

We are thankful for pointing out these grammar and spelling mistakes. We removed the unnecessary comma in the first highlight, which becomes *French people have limited knowledge about climate change but worry about it..* We corrected the grammar mistake in the second highlight (it is now *They prefer ... to* instead of *... than*). We improved the formulation of the fourth one (*Improving knowledge is predicted to increase ecological attitudes and concern.* instead of *... concern and ecological attitudes*). We also noticed that the fifth highlight could appear ambiguous: *Political leaning does not interact with knowledge to shape perceptions as in the US.* and reformulated it as *Unlike in the US, partisanship does not interact with education to shape perceptions..* We had the highlights double-checked by a native English speaker, but if some mistakes remain, we would be pleased to correct them. We also made sure that they respect the limit of 85 characters including spaces.

2. Please thoroughly check the whole manuscript regarding English language and precision of terms. For example, the last sentence of the abstract does not really make sense in relation to the topic of your paper: what do you mean by: "...could foster support for ecology."? Wrong translation? Your focus is climate policies, not ecology.

We had the whole manuscript double-checked by a native English speaker. However, some typos remained (e.g. *does not reflects* instead of *does not reflect*) and the terms chosen were sometimes imprecise (an academic kind of mistake that our native speaker could hardly notice). Thanks to your observations as well as those of the reviewers, we were able to correct typos and correct the terminology (see the responses to reviewers). For example, we replaced *foster support for ecology* by *foster support for climate policies*. After a thorough proof-reading of the last manuscript, we also spotted other English mistakes

(e.g. a missing plural, “its” instead of “their”, etc.). We now hope that there is no remaining mistake nor imprecision.

3. Your references section needs careful checking. Many references are incomplete, e.g., volumes and page numbers missing for journal papers.

We initially used a bibtex bibliographic style which does not display some required fields, like volumes and page numbers. We replaced it by a standard bibliographic style and all the references seem now complete.

4. Footnote 5 is strangely separated in two parts.

This unfortunate layout is now avoided.

5. Please carefully follow the journal’s guidelines for the resubmission of revised manuscripts, available online as part of the Guide for Authors.

We thank you for this reminder. With this revised form of the manuscript, please be reassured that we checked every item of the guide for author and that we now comply with all of them. That being said, the main manuscript provided has the final layout, as we did for the original submission. We also provide a manuscript in a “review” style from elsevier’s latex style (single column, wide margins and 1.5-spaced) as a complement. However, the latter one seems to us quite impractical to read (e.g. some figures appear at the end), while the main manuscript we provide helps the publisher understands where the figures should be placed, and the reviewers did not complained about the formatting last time.

Please note that all the figures of the manuscript are single-column fitting images.

Response to Reviewer #1
*French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon
Taxation and other Climate Policies*

Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre*

September 16, 2019

Dear Reviewer,

We are grateful for the time you spent reviewing our work and for your very relevant comments, which helped us improve the paper. We have taken into consideration each of them. Please find below the answers to these comments.

Kind regards,

Thomas Douenne & Adrien Fabre

Summary

This paper examines perceptions and attitudes related to climate change and climate policy in France. It draws on a large representative survey and analyzes a wide range of survey questions.

General comments

This is (probably) the first academic opinion paper investigating French attitudes to climate policy after the Yellow Vest protests. Thus, it is a timely contribution and I believe it will be of interest to many readers. The survey sample is large, which gives confidence that sampling error is minimal. I also assume here that the statistical analysis is well conducted (except for one issue, see below). The

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insights, in particular regarding the dimensions of climate policy, are a useful contribution to the literature. In my view, the major shortcoming of the paper is that it lacks focus. 24 figures and 12 tables (counting also the Appendix) is a lot to digest for the reader in a single paper. As follows, I will give some suggestions to achieve more focus, as well as comment on some other issues.

My main suggestion is to shorten section 3 about climate change attitudes. Here you present many results about various perceptions and attitudes, without motivating why you do so. For example, in Figure 6 you present results regarding “Perceived date of birth of first generation severely affected by CC”. Although you mention the result also in one line in the text, you do not further discuss it or use it in the subsequent analysis, e.g. as a predictor of climate policy attitudes. Nor did you provide a (theoretical or other) motivation why we should care about this construct. I could mention other examples here.

More generally, I believe that climate change perceptions have been analyzed much more than perceptions and attitudes related to climate policy. I believe your main novelty lies in the analysis of attitudes to carbon taxes and other climate policies. By shortening (or even deleting) section 3, you could devote more attention to the discussion of the results related to climate policy. Now you do this rather briefly in section 4-6.

We are grateful that you point out this lack of focus. In order to focus on the main contributions of the paper, we followed your first advice and shortened section 3. We removed three figures (including the one you mentioned), some paraphrasing as well as a few references to the literature. We shifted part of this material to our online Appendix, as we think it could potentially be useful for some readers. Most importantly, we reworked the narrative of the paper so as to highlight the causal order of the presentation, and to emphasize that our goal is to present attitudes on climate policies (see for example the introduction to section 3). This way, section 3 now appears as an introductory section that explains the root motivations of French people.

We hesitated to remove section 3 altogether from the main text, and to put it to an online Appendix. Finally, we decided not to do so, for three reasons: 1. we think that our figures are significant contributions of the paper; 2. our paper is constructed in a causal order where presenting attitudes over CC seems necessary to understand the motivations for accepting or rejecting climate policies; 3. we use some questions presented in section 3 in section 6. That being said, we are still open to relegate section 3 to an online Appendix and put the parts of section 3 necessary to section 6 at the beginning of the latter.

Moreover, with so many results, I would also expect a conclusion section that summarizes a bit more and answers the “So what does it all mean” question. A last comment about the conclusion is that I found it a bit odd to finish the paper

with a “takeaway” from the carbon tax in Sweden, after you dedicated the entire paper to the French case. I’m not recommending against drawing comparisons, but perhaps not in the final sentence.

You are right to point out that our conclusion stated too briefly the paper’s findings. We now provide a more developed summary of the main results. We also link these results to the paradox we started with in introduction, and show how they enable to understand both the opposition towards the carbon tax, and people’s willingness to tackle climate change. Doing so, the paper explicitly answers the question it initially asks.

Furthermore, it was indeed unfortunate that our last sentence was about Sweden. We followed your advice, and now we conclude with a specific analysis of the French context, including some thoughts from economic analysis.

Apart from focus, I have one methodological concern with respect to the construction of the knowledge score in section 6.1. I believe it is common to test the reliability of such indexes / scores, for example by estimating the Cronbach alpha of the included items. I would recommend to consult a recent paper by Hoppe et al. (2018) which discusses different ways of measuring people’s knowledge about climate change. Perhaps there are alternative ways of constructing this index, which may influence your subsequent regression results.

Moreover, I have some doubts about some items used for the knowledge score. Can we really count the view of India being more affected by climate change than the EU as “knowledge” but not as “perception”? Does it not depend on what one thinks of as “impacts”? Are responses to such a question not driven rather by what some researchers call “psychological distance” of climate change?

Admittedly, the construction of our knowledge index was not properly justified, and we are glad that you point out this issue as it allows us to improve the rigor and quality of our work. To define our index on a sound basis, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (with one factor), and used the factor loadings to define the relative weights of the components of our index. As it turns out, the *region most affected* does not enter the factor that explains the higher share of common variance, consistently with your intuition. Furthermore, the weights appear very close to those of our previous index, as the correlation between the old and the new index is 0.98. You can now find more details on our methodology in section 4 of our online Appendix.

On another note, we are grateful that you gave us the reference of Hoppe et al. (2018) because this paper provides an excellent overview of the issues around indexes of knowledge about CC. Notably, they explain that knowledge about CC is multidimensional, and refer to Kiel & Rost (2002) to detail the different aspects of knowledge about CC. As we now explain at the beginning of section 6.1, the different questions we aggregate reflect the different types of knowledge of CC they identify. While the Cronbach’s α would be meaningful to assess

the reliability of an index measuring each of these dimensions individually, this statistic is not meant to assess an index multidimensional by nature. Thus, Tobler, Visschers & Siegrist (JEP, 2012) reach high reliability for their scales that measure each dimension of perceptions of CC individually, but they do not measure the Cronbach's α of their aggregation. Indeed, when we do so, we find a Cronbach's α as low as 0.25, precisely because we capture different aspects of knowledge in our index. This confirms that knowledge of CC is multidimensional.

Instead of aggregating the different dimensions of knowledge, one could include the different components of our index in the regressions. Yet, the robustness check we added in online Appendix (section 4) indicates that replacing our index by any of its component has virtually no effect on the other determinants of the support for climate policies. We therefore think it is better to keep the more synthetic index in the main text. Meanwhile, this analysis taught us that the driver of the knowledge as a determinant is the question on the existence and anthropogenic nature of CC.

Minor comments

Before explaining in details how we took into accounts these “minor comments”, we would like to thank you for the time you took to point them out.

· *Style: better avoid “to do so” 2x in one paragraph of the introduction*

We replaced the two occurrences, as none was necessary. More precisely, we replaced *To do so, we conducted a new survey on a sample of 3,002 respondents representative of the French population* by *It builds on a new survey conducted on a sample of 3,002 respondents representative of the French population*, and we simplified *To do so, we propose* in *We propose*.

· *Line 56: You write that France “recently experienced a carbon tax increase”, although before you said it was planned but canceled. Is this contradictory?*

You are right to remark that our treatment of the history of the carbon tax was insufficient to grasp the French political situation. In the very first paragraph (second sentence), we thus added the precision that the tax had an increasing trajectory *that started at 7€/tCO₂ in 2014*. We hope this short mention will suffice to understand why, at the end of the introduction, we say that France “recently experienced a carbon tax increase” (it grew from 30.5 to 44.6€/tCO₂ on 2018, January 1st. for example). However, if the text remains

unclear despite our addition, we are ready to replace *recently experienced a carbon tax increase and a large debate ensuing.* by *recently experienced a large debate on carbon taxation.*

· The term “primings” in Figure 1 is unclear.

It is true that we sometimes employed lingo that many readers would not know. Herewith “priming”, which designates a particular information that is randomly displayed to the respondents to induce them to answer in a certain way, and hence measure their reaction to this information or use it for causal inference. We removed this term from Figure 1. Indeed, doing otherwise would presumably require to detail what the primings were, and what effects we found, an analysis that we conduct in our companion paper (“Disentangling Beliefs from Preferences over the French Carbon Tax”). As the primings had negligible effects on all the attitudes dealt with in the present paper, it would presumably be an unnecessary complication to introduce them to the reader.

· In Figure 3 and in the text you use the term “anthropic”. I would say the term “anthropogenic” is more common.

Indeed. We corrected this Gallicism accordingly.

· Figure 8: “perceived responsible” sounds a bit odd. Perhaps better “responsibility”.

Indeed. We replaced the legend by *Entities perceived responsible* rather than using *responsible* as a substantive. We would be please to modify again the formulation if it is not idiomatic yet.

· Figure 19: did nobody reply “insufficient”? Because I see no red bar.

We thank you for notifying this issue: the color of the legend did not match the color of the Figure. This is now corrected.

· Figure 24: What does “number of policies” mean here?

Truly, this label could not be understood without the main text. In order to make our Figure self-contained, we replaced *Number of policies* by *# of policies supported*, hoping that the notation “#” is common enough that the reader will understand it without further explanation.

· *Table 2: I kind of expected that you would also examine the determinants of the approval of carbon taxes with different revenue uses, probably in a separate table. But perhaps you have a reason why you did not do this.*

As it would take significant space (typically a one page table), we originally decided to present these results in a synthetic way with our dependent variable “earmarking vs transfer”. However, we understand that some readers are interested in these results, and we now provide them in the online Appendix (section 3).

· *Final suggestion: Perhaps mention “carbon tax” somehow in the title.*

We followed your suggestion and have changed the title to *French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon Taxation and other Climate Policies*. We agree that this should better signal the contribution of the paper. If you find this new title too long we could go back to the previous one. Indeed, we would like to keep *climate change* in the title as this is one of the contributions of the paper. In particular, we believe that the simultaneous analysis of attitudes towards climate change and climate policies matters, and can be of interest for the readers of this journal.

Literature Hoppe, I., Taddicken, M., & Reif, A. (2018). What do people know about climate change — and how confident are they? On measurements and analyses of science related knowledge. Journal of Science Communication (Jcom), 17(3): A01, pp. 1-26. doi:10.22323/2.17030201.

Again, we thank you for this reference that we added to bring support to the construction of our “knowledge of CC” index (cf. *supra*, our response to your last “general” comment).

Response to the Reviewer #2
*French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon
Taxation and other Climate Policies*

Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre*

September 16, 2019

Dear Reviewer,

We are grateful for the time you spent reviewing our work and for your very relevant comments, which helped us improve the paper. We have taken into consideration each of them. Please find below the answers to these comments.

Kind regards,

Thomas Douenne & Adrien Fabre

The article describes the attitude towards different climate change policies in France in relation to a large set of socio-economic variables and other household characteristics based on survey data. It analyzes which socio-economic indicators are correlated with different attitudes and, based on this, gives recommendations on how to further advance climate change policies in France. The authors pay particular attention to the Yellow Vest movement. The survey consists of answers from 3002 respondents and seems to represent the French population well.

This article treats a highly policy relevant and up-to-date topic in a systematic and accessible fashion. It sheds light on the underexplored topic of which

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climate policy designs are acceptable to the general public and comes to new policy recommendations for the French case. I would recommend the publication of this article, after the points mentioned below are addressed accordingly.

** Introduction (p.2. from line 44): Here I would strongly suggest a literature review that is a bit more extensive. Maybe two or three additional paragraphs that summarize the main results found by other studies. Most of the relevant studies are already cited in later sections, but in a rather dispersed way that does not give much of an overview. Additional relevant literature is reviewed for example in: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2019.1639490>*

We thank you for this suggestion and for sharing the reference to the very recent Maestre-Andrés et al (2019). We initially thought reviewing the literature in introduction would be redundant given that we cite these papers in the text. Still, it is true that gathering the main references at the beginning is useful for the readers as it gives a stand point from which the paper's contributions are better highlighted.

We included your excellent suggestion in the literature review (of literature reviews) that we already had. Then, we added two paragraphs (containing more than twenty references): one reviews the literature on attitudes over carbon taxation, and the other reviews the literature over climate policies in general.

** line 151 and also in the rest of the document. I would strongly suggest to use the word anthropogenic instead of anthropic. See also: <https://wikidiff.com/>*

Thank you for this correction. We corrected this Gallicism accordingly.

** line 249: please define the concept of "warm glow" in this context*

Following a suggestion of the other reviewer, we shortened section 3 and thus removed the sentence in question. However, there is another occurrence of "warm glow" later in the text (in section 6.2). Thus, we defined the expression in the following footnote: *Here, "warm glow" refers to one's unintentional strategy to overestimate their virtue in order to derive satisfaction.*

** line 570: "...are usually less cost effective than Pigouvian taxation". There are situations in which this is not necessarily the case. See for example: Goulder, Hafstead, Williams 2016 General Equilibrium Impacts of a Federal Clean Energy Standard. If there are additional distributional constraints, other climate change policies might be also more efficient (Stiglitz, 2019, EER, already*

cited in your manuscript).

We are grateful that you give us this reference. This result is very interesting, and we were not aware of it. We rephrased the sentence accordingly: it is now *Under a binding acceptability constraint, alternative instruments become relevant, even if Pigouvian taxes may be more cost-effective (e.g. Goulder & Parry; 2008) (instead of Although economists have shown that alternative instruments are usually less cost-effective than Pigouvian taxes (e.g. Goulder & Parry; 2008), they may become relevant in a context where there is a binding acceptability constraint.)*. We are ready to cite the enlightening reference you provided, but it does not appear necessary given the reformulation we propose.

** page 11 Table I: - Why is "extreme left" not included in column (3) and (6)? - Please include Yellow Vests: opposed. This is quite an interesting variable and you also explicitly refer to it on page 12 in line 724.*

We thank you for pointing out an unfortunate specification in the regressions (3) and (6) of Table I. The reason why "Extreme-left" did not appear there is that *Left-right* is in numeric type (in $[-2; +2]$) in its interaction with *Diploma*, which led to the exclusion of "Left-right: Indeterminate" from the analysis, so "Extreme-left" took its role of omitted modality. We modified the definition of (the numerical) *Left-right* to impute the mean value of *Left-right* (0.15) to those who are *Indeterminate*. We also included another interaction, between *Diploma* and *Indeterminate*, to make sure that the coefficient of the interaction of interest (*Left-right* \times *Diploma*) remains unchanged. Now, the number of observations is 3,002 in columns (3) and (6) (instead of 1,813), and "Indeterminate" has replaced "extreme-left" as the omitted modality.

Concerning your second comment, we prefer to take "Yellow Vests: opposes" as the omitted modality (rather than, say, "PNR"), because it is a modality at one extreme of the attitudes, and it allows to compare the other modalities with respect to this extreme case. For example, this choice allows one to read directly from Table I the relative effect of being part of the movement relative to opposing it, as shown in (what was) line 724.

Besides, reworking on this Table made us notice a mistake: *Knowledge* had not been normalized in regression (4), contrarily to what was written in the text. Fortunately, this mistake did not affect the statistical significance of the coefficients nor their relative magnitudes. Even the absolute value of the coefficients reported in the text were correct (but inconsistent with the Table). The Table has now been corrected, and we apologize for this mistake.

** line 869: There is more recent literature on trust and climate policy support. see for example Rafaty, R. (2018). Perceptions of Corruption, Political*

Distrust, and the Weakening of Climate Policy. Global Environmental Politics, 18(3), pp. 106-129.

We thank you again for this reference that we missed, although it seems the most up-to-date paper on the topic. As we already cite extensively Drews & van der Bergh (2016) in the paper, we replaced this occurrence of that reference by the one you suggest. The sentence becomes *This interpretation echoes the recent findings of Rafaty (2018), who shows that perceptions of corruption and political distrust negatively affect the stringency of climate policies.* (instead of *This interpretation echoes a large literature on the importance of trust for climate policies' support, as reviewed in Drews & van der Bergh (2016).*).

* line 883: please cite additional literature here. For example Ziegler, A. (2017) *Political orientation, environmental values, and climate change beliefs and attitudes: An empirical cross country analysis. Energy Econ. 63, 144–153.* Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S. & Kroll, S. (2017). *Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 85, 193–204.*

First, we want to disclose a serious mistake of ours regarding these lines (about the correlation between political leaning and support for climate policies). Due to a typo in the code (“Left” was the omitted modality instead of “Indeterminate”), our Table II and corresponding analysis were flawed in the original manuscript (this did not affect other coefficients than political leaning nor other Tables). Consistently with the literature, we now *do* find that people from the left have higher support for climate policies.

We adopt your suggestion and cite two supplementary papers to substantiate this finding: Bornstein & Lanz (2007) for Switzerland and Mc Cright et al. (2013) for the U.S. We have the impression that the references you suggest are slightly less connected to this issue, as they concern respectively climate change rather than climate policies, and worldviews rather than political leaning.

That being said, we found both of these papers highly interesting. We realized that Ziegler (2017) was of particular relevance for our paragraph on the importance of the political polarization in climate attitudes, in France relative to the U.S. Thus, we now refer to Ziegler (2017) in footnote 10. With respect to Cherry et al (2017), the paper does not explore the left/right cleavage but its results on worldviews and the comparison between preferences for different instruments are interesting, so we cite it in our introductory literature review.

* line 886-890: please refer to Table 2.3.

We modified the sentence accordingly: *Without controlling for other variables, we find that people that are most likely to accept the Tax & Dividend in France are the ones affiliated with the center (+9 p.p. relative to “Indeterminate”), and the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-15 p.p., see online Appendix, Table 3.4), which may be driven by their respective support or rejection of the current government who tried to increase the carbon tax.*

** line 946: What does “this policy” refer to - dividends or kerosene taxation or the combination?*

Admittedly, our sentence was ambiguous. We removed the ambiguity by rephrasing it *Third, a tax and dividend restricted to kerosene could serve as a learning example as kerosene taxation is popular.* (instead of ... *as this policy is popular.*).

Typos:

We would like to thank you for your effort at pointing out our (too many) typos. We corrected all of them.

** abstract: “studies in details” should be “studies in detail”*

** page 3 line 133: “it will severely effect” should be “affect”*

** line 329: “thought is was desirable” should be “it”*

** line 852: “consistently” should be consistent*

** line 861: “does not simply reflects from lower...” should this be “does not simply reflect lower” ?*

** line 885: “that people most likely” should be “that people that are most likely”?*

** line 957-962: There is something wrong with this sentence and it also is too long.*

We acknowledge that the end of the conclusion was poorly redacted, and that it was unfortunate that the last sentence was about Sweden (as pointed out by the other reviewer). Thus, we rewrote the conclusion entirely, and we split the sentence in question. It is now *As such, it is no surprise if political*

trust is among the highest in the first country to introduce a carbon tax, Sweden (Klenert et al., 2018). It is no coincidence either if the 1991 Swedish tax was part of a comprehensive re-structuring of the tax system, the popular “reform of the century”, resulting from a dialogue with all stakeholders (Stern, 2014). instead of Sweden was the first country to introduce a carbon tax, and it is no coincidence if political trust is among the highest (Klenert et al., 2018) and if the 1991 Swedish tax was part of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system, the popular “reform of the century” (Stern, 2014). A last takeaway of the Swedish example is that a dialogue with all stakeholders can help building a consensus and finding fair solutions, and may be key to decarbonization.

Highlights of *French Attitudes over Climate Change and Climate Policies*

- French people have limited knowledge about climate change but worry about it.
- They prefer green investments or regulations to a tax and dividend.
- Distributive effects and lack of alternatives prevent carbon tax acceptance.
- Improving knowledge is predicted to increase concern and attitudes on climate change.
- Unlike in the US, partisanship does not interact with education to shape perceptions.

French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon Taxation and other Climate Policies

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Abstract

This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in detail the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better access to science could foster support for climate policies.

Keywords: Climate Policy; Carbon tax; Preferences; Acceptability; France

JEL classification. D78; H23; Q54; Q58

1. Introduction

The French government is currently facing a two-sided challenge on climate policies. On the one hand, the protest of the Yellow Vests that originated in November 2018 against the planned doubling in the carbon tax — from 44.6 to 86.2€/tCO₂ in 2022 — led the government to halt the increasing trajectory that started at 7€/tCO₂ in 2014. On the other hand, a large campaign called “Affaire du siècle” started in December 2018 against its inaction for the environment, gathering over two millions signatories in a month. It is so far unclear how the tension between these two *a priori* antagonistic objectives will be resolved. In particular, one may wonder whether the two movements involve distinct groups with opposite interests, or rather reflect a commonly perceived inadequacy of the solution proposed by the government to address the climate threat.

This paper aims to understand French perceptions over the carbon tax and other climate policies. It builds on a new survey conducted on a sample of 3,002 respondents representative of the French population. Our survey contains questions to assess respondents’ knowledge about change change (CC) and their perceptions over its causes and consequences. As the paper was primarily motivated by the failed attempt to increase the French carbon tax, we examine in detail attitudes towards this instrument. We propose to respondents a Tax & Dividend policy, i.e. a carbon tax whose revenue would be returned lump-sum uniformly to all adults. This policy differs from the one proposed by the government, since the revenue would have been used to fund the general budget instead. We identify respondents’ expected winners and losers, and the per-

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ceived problems and benefits of this instrument. We devote particular attention to the issue of mobility that appears critical in the current debate. We then turn to the support for a carbon tax with alternative uses of the revenue, such as more targeted transfers, earmarking, and double-dividend strategies. We also study the support for other climate policies, including norms and other Pigouvian taxes, and local policies for urban transport. Finally, we identify the determinants of attitudes over both climate change and climate policies, as well as the link between the two.

For a general presentation of attitudes over climate change, we suggest [Whitmarsh & Capstick \(2018\)](#), while for a more specific review on their trends and determinants, we redirect to [Brechin \(2010\)](#) and [Ziegler \(2017\)](#). Our paper contributes mainly to a growing literature on the political economy of climate policies. As an entry point to previous related studies, refer to [Maestre-Andrés et al. \(2019\)](#) who review the perceptions of climate policies, [Drews & van den Bergh \(2016\)](#) who review the determinants of their support, and to [Carattini et al. \(2018\)](#) for a comprehensive overview on attitudes over the carbon tax.

A large extent of the literature has focused on the carbon tax. Using a post-electoral survey in Switzerland, [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) finds that political leaning, education and self-interest are correlated with acceptance. Subsequent literature has confirmed the importance of self-interest (e.g. [Fischer et al., 2011](#); [Baranzini & Carattini, 2017](#)) although [Kallbekken & Sælen \(2011\)](#) find that perception of the tax' effectiveness and its distributive properties play a larger role in Norway. The critical role of the tax' effectiveness has been confirmed by numerous contributions that pointed out the higher acceptance of taxes whose revenue was earmarked towards green investments (e.g. [Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011](#); [Baranzini & Carattini, 2017](#)). Similarly, studies have confirmed that people tend to prefer more progressive schemes ([Brannlund & Persson, 2012](#); [Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015](#)) and more targeted revenue recycling ([Kallbekken et al., 2011](#)). In a companion paper ([Douenne & Fabre, 2019](#)) based on the same survey, we show that French people reject the carbon tax because of biased beliefs over its properties, but if convinced about their own gain, the environmental effectiveness and the progressivity of the mechanism, they would largely approve it. Among the potential barriers to the implementation of carbon taxation, [Kallbekken & Aasen \(2010\)](#) emphasize the importance of the availability of alternatives to fossil fuels. When these alternatives are lacking or not easily affordable, carbon taxation is perceived as just a pretext to increase taxes ([Dresner et al., 2006](#); [Klok et al., 2006](#)). Finally, as shown by [Harring & Jagers \(2013\)](#), trust in politicians is also a key factor for carbon tax acceptance, which relates to the recent findings of [Rafaty \(2018\)](#) who shows that higher political distrust is associated with weaker climate policies.

While a lot of attention has recently been put on carbon taxation, fewer studies have investigated attitudes to-

wards other climate policies. Yet, as highlighted by [Stern & Stiglitz \(2017\)](#) and [Stiglitz \(2019\)](#) a single price instrument may not be the best response to climate change in a second-best world. The main factors driving people's preferences between various policies appear to be their degree of coercion, the behavior targeted by the policy ([de Groot & Schuitema, 2012](#)), and the perceived cost. It follows that subsidies are in general preferred over taxes (e.g. [Tobler et al., 2012](#); [Cherry et al., 2017](#)), and more voluntary measures over hard regulations ([Attari et al., 2009](#)). The present paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of perceptions and attitudes towards CC, carbon taxation and other climate policies in a country that has recently experienced a carbon tax increase and a large debate ensuing. As it is based on an unusually large sample representative of the French population, the paper also goes further than previous studies in identifying the heterogeneity in people's attitudes over climate policies.

Section 2 presents the survey. Section 3 describes attitudes towards climate change. Section 4 focuses on tax & dividend policies, its perceptions, and the reasons explaining the low support for this policy. Section 5 studies the support for alternative revenue recycling mechanisms as well as for other climate policies. Section 6 examines the heterogeneity in attitudes expressed in the previous sections and characterize their determinants. Section 7 concludes. Finally, further material can be found in appendix and online Appendix.

2. The survey

2.1. Presentation of the survey

We collected 3002 responses in February and March 2019 through the survey company Bilendi. This company maintains a panel of French respondents to whom they can email survey links. Respondents are paid 3€ if they fully complete the survey. The respondents who choose to respond are first filtered through some screening questions which ensure that the final sample is representative along six socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age (5 brackets), education (4), socio-professional category (8), size of town (5), and region (9). The quotas are relaxed by 5% to 10% relative to actual proportions. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows that our sample is still extremely representative. Nonetheless, observations are weighted to correct small differences between sample and population proportions. The median time for completion of the survey was 19 minutes.

The full survey in French can be seen [online](#),¹ the questions analyzed are translated in Appendix D, and the code is available on [github](#). Figure 1 presents in a diagram the sequence of questions.

¹preferences-pol.fr/doc_q.php#_e




Figure 1: Diagram of the sequence of questions.

The survey starts by asking for households' socio-demographics and energy usage. The distribution of answers are much in-line with official statistics, as shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Then, we describe Tax & Dividend reforms where the revenues of an increase in the French carbon tax by 50€/tCO₂ are redistributed uniformly to all adults. We first allocate respondents randomly to a sectoral Tax & Dividend reform, which concerns either gas and domestic fuel (i.e. housing energy), or gasoline and diesel (i.e. transportation energy). Respondents are asked to estimate their reaction to price changes, the reaction of French people, and how much purchasing power they would gain or lose from the policy. To this end, exact price variations and the amount transferred are provided, and respondents can choose among answers given in different brackets. Then, we study perceptions and support for a Tax & Dividend on both sectors combined, before and after providing new information to the respondents. This new information is either that the policy is progressive, or whether their household would win or lose some purchasing power through the reform. Before providing information, we let respondents pick the categories of losers and winners from the reform; and after the information, they choose the benefits and the problems associated with this reform. We study these perceptions of the policy in the present paper, but please refer to our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019) for details and analyses on the other questions about Tax & Dividend reforms.

2.2. Eliciting attitudes

After inquiring about the support for Tax & Dividend, we ask respondents to assess on a Likert scale different ways to recycle the revenues of a carbon tax. On another Likert scale, we examine opinions on other climate policies, notably new norms or Pigouvian taxes. We then measure respondents' knowledge about climate change by asking for its origin (anthropogenic or natural), its causes (in terms of gases and activities), which region it will most affect (between India and the European Union), and what reduction of emissions is needed by 2050 to respect the +2°C target. At the same time, we assess attitudes over climate change by asking respondents about the frequency with

which they talk about it, the gravity of its consequences, the generations it will severely affect, and the entities responsible for its occurrence. We continue by surveying if and how climate change influences one's decision to have a child, under which conditions one would be ready to change their lifestyle to fight climate change, and whether one would be ready to adopt a sustainable lifestyle if policies were aligned to this goal. We also ask questions about diesel taxation. Then, we evaluate the respondents access to public transport, their mobility habits, and if there is room for changing these habits. Finally, we ask for their political preferences, including their positioning in relation to the Yellow Vests. The survey ends with a text box where the respondents can leave a comment.

3. Attitudes over Climate Change

To fully understand the root motivations to the support or rejection of climate policies, we first analyze the knowledge and perceptions over CC, as well as the reaction that people expect to address this phenomenon. As the paper focuses on explaining attitudes over policies, we relegate to online Appendix 1 some figures and some results from other surveys.

3.1. Knowledge

As shown in Figure 2, knowledge that CC is anthropogenic is widespread (72%) and the share who do not believe in climate change (CC) is marginal (4%). The level of knowledge on the anthropogenic origin of CC is similar to that of other Western countries (Leiserowitz, 2007; Lee et al., 2015; Stokes et al., 2015): it is 66% in the U.S. (Gallup, 2019) for example. At the same time, knowledge about climate science appears limited. Although 77% of people correctly tick "CO₂" as a greenhouse gas (GhG), Figure 3 shows that almost as many people tick particulate matter (39%) as methane (48%). Admittedly, understanding the impacts of activities is more useful than erudition about chemical factors, but here again, knowledge is quite low. We assess such awareness using pairs of comparable activities whose GhG footprint differ by a factor 20 (beef steak vs. pasta, plane vs. train) or whose footprint are similar (nuclear vs. wind power).² We ask whether it is true that one activity emits 20 times more GhG than the other, as a way to express precisely that one is "much more" polluting than the other. For each pair, around half of the sample is correct. The bulk of respondents pick two

²Appendix B.1 details how the figures were obtained.




Figure 2: Perceived cause of climate change.




Figure 3: Perceived factors of climate change.




Figure 4: Perceived GhG emission p.c. required in 2050 to limit global warming to +2°C (in tCO₂eq/yr), given that it is now 10.

correct answers out of three (44%), but more get them all wrong (19%) than all right (15%).

Not only do most people fail to fully understand the factors and consequences of CC, but they also fail to grasp the degree of reaction needed to tackle it. When informed that “each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of CO₂ per year” and asked what the figure should be in 2050 to “hope to contain global warming to +2°C in 2100 (if all countries did the same)”, 59% answer 5 or more (see Figure 4). Only 17% select a correct answer: 0, 1 or 2 (see Appendix B for why these are correct).




Figure 5: Entities perceived responsible for climate change.

Millner & Ollivier (2016) propose several mechanisms to explain people’s lack of understanding about climate change: in addition to the difficulty of grasping gradual changes, they emphasize the complexity of drawing a causal link between diffuse causes and distant consequences.³ Failing to assimilate the underlying channels may blur the link between people’s own behavior and consequences for the climate. Thus, we can wonder if people understand who would have to make the mitigation effort in a sustainable scenario, i.e. who is responsible for CC.

³Actually, even MIT students struggle with this (Stermann, 2008).




Figure 6: Perceived gravity of climate change.




Figure 7: Respondent could change their lifestyle under a condition.

3.2. Perceptions

As shown in Figure 5, 63% acknowledge that “each one of us” is responsible for CC, and less people ascribe the responsibility to “certain foreign countries” (47%), “the richest” (42%), or any other agent. Not only do people seem lucid concerning the agents causing CC, but a vast majority also foresees worrying consequences if humanity does nothing to limit it. Figure 6 shows that 19% see the impacts as “cataclysmic, humankind would disappear”, 18% as “disastrous, lifestyles would be largely altered”, 28% as “grave, because there would be more natural disasters”, while only 11% think damages would be “small, because humans would be able to live with it” or “insignificant, or even beneficial”.

Overall, these results indicate that most people understand the fundamentals of climate issues, including the root causes and the scale of the problem, but that only a minority has thought of CC deeply enough to comprehend its factors and the pathways to tackle it.

3.3. The Reaction Needed

Given that many people may not realize the extent of the transition needed to reach sustainability, and that others may be discouraged precisely by the sheer magnitude of such a transition, we can wonder how willing people are to contribute to its success. An encouraging finding for the transition is that 65% are “willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and make sure to use almost no gasoline, diesel nor kerosene)”, assuming that “all states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely”, while only 17% answer “No” (the others do not take a side). While the phrasing removes most grounds against a change in lifestyle, we inquire under which conditions

people would be willing to adopt such a change (see Figure 7). 82% of respondents would be willing to change their lifestyle under at least one of the three conditions proposed: sufficient financial resources, an alignment of policies to this goal, or an adjustment of others' behavior (about 45% each).

Finally, a substantial fraction of people incorporates ecological constraints in their life choices. Indeed, 15% call themselves ecologist (the most picked political identity outside of the left-right spectrum, see Appendix E), 23% claim they already adopted a sustainable way of life, and 20% say the CC "has had or will have an influence in their decision to have a child".

4. Attitudes over Carbon Tax and Dividend

Most French people are aware and concerned about climate change and claim to be willing to exert efforts to fight it. Yet, the government's attempt to introduce a carbon tax to deal with French emissions resulted in a widespread popular protest. To understand this paradox, we investigate the preferences over a Tax & Dividend policy: an increase of 50€/tCO₂ in the current French carbon tax, with a uniform lump-sum redistribution of the additional revenue to all adults. This policy differs from the official one whose revenue was mostly used to fund the general budget. Respondents are given the associated increase in energy prices so that the direct costs are salient: +13% (resp. +15%) for gas (resp. domestic fuel), and +0.11€ (resp. +0.13€) for a liter of gasoline (resp. diesel). They are also told that the transfer would amount to 110€ per adult annually.

4.1. Widespread rejection

French people would largely reject the proposed policy. Only 10% of our respondents declare they would approve it, while 70% say they would not (see Figure 8). As shown in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019), this rejection can be explained by erroneous perceptions about the policy's outcome, such as an overestimation of its impact on one's purchasing power. For instance, 30% of people who use neither gas nor domestic fuel believe their household would lose from an equally redistributed increase in taxes on these goods. Interestingly, the salience of costs appears critical in people's answer. At a later stage of the survey, we ask respondents whether they would agree to increase the carbon tax if the revenue was returned to all households, without mentioning the impact on prices. The question is asked along with a package of other environmental policies (see section 5). In this case — where the benefits are more salient than the costs — we find a much higher approval rate of 37%. Another survey conducted in March 2019 (OpinionWay, 2019) assesses acceptance for a reintroduction of the carbon tax increase in 2021. They find intermediary results with an approval rate of 21%.




Figure 8: Approval of Tax & Dividend.

The low level of acceptance observed partly results from recent events. In July 2018, ADEME (2018) found that 48% of French people thought it was desirable to increase the carbon tax, a figure similar to those of other countries (Brehin, 2010). The discrepancy between 2018 and 2019 can be explained by the "campaign effect" highlighted by Anderson et al. (2019): support for a carbon tax decreases substantially after it enters the public debate. Indeed, the French carbon tax was brought under the spotlight in the end of 2018, after high oil prices triggered the Yellow Vests movement.

4.2. Perceived winners and losers

Figure 9 represents the share of respondents who expect different household categories to win or lose from the policy. Income appears to be the most critical divide, with a non-monotonic relationship. 30% of respondents expect the richest to win while only 2% think they would lose. On the contrary, 40% more people think that the poorest would lose rather than win, a difference even higher for the middle class — the category most expected to lose — at 53%. To half of respondents, we framed the question about winners and losers specifically in terms of "purchasing power". The objective was to see if some categories were commonly seen as losing in welfare although they could gain in monetary terms, or conversely. The results look very much alike for both formulations, except that the shares of people expecting poorer households to gain (5.8%) and richer households to lose (0.9%) are significantly larger when asked in terms of purchasing power: 10.2% and 2.1%, respectively (see online Appendix 2). Overall, respondents perceive the Tax & Dividend as regressive. As shown by a large body of literature (e.g. West & Williams, 2004; Bento et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2015), and more specifically in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019), these beliefs are at odds with the true distributive effects of this proposed policy.

Beyond the income dimension, people tend to identify city dwellers as potential winners from the Tax & Dividend (third position at 19%), while rural and peri-urban households are rather expected to lose (third position at 34%). We also see that people report on average more categories for expected losers than winners: 1.74 vs. 1.16. The high ranks of "no one" for winners (second) and of "everyone" for losers (fourth) further suggest that respondents do not see our policy as a zero-sum game.

4.3. Perceived pros and cons

Previous studies have highlighted that distributive effects are a critical determinant of carbon tax acceptance




Figure 9: Perceived winners and losers from Tax & Dividend




Figure 10: Perceived benefits and problems from Tax & Dividend

(e.g. Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011; Brannlund & Persson, 2012; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015). When asked about the problems associated with the Tax & Dividend, the main response is that the tax would penalize rural households (47%). Interestingly, this concern comes before the threat that the tax could penalize the poorest (sixth position with 29%), although more people report the poorest as a category of people expected to lose. The second and third concerns are that the policy is simply a pretext to increase taxes (43%) — a worry documented by Dresner et al. (2006) and Klok et al. (2006) — and that it would be ineffective to reduce pollution (37%). Related to this last point is the perceived lack of alternatives, seen as insufficient or too expensive (31%). This problem has been previously stressed by Kallbekken & Aasen (2010) in a focus group study: people do not see the point of taxing fossil fuels if they cannot substitute for other technologies. This last reason is stated as frequently as concerns over the impact on one's own purchasing power (fourth with 31%). As shown in Douenne & Fabre (2019), self-interest largely affects acceptance of the Tax & Dividend, but this concern could sound too egoistic when stated in a direct way. While previous studies have pointed out concerns over the negative impact of carbon taxation on the economy (e.g. Thalmann, 2004; Carattini et al., 2017), this problem comes last (14%) and does not seem to represent an important obstacle for public support in the current context.

Respondents are suggested to pick at most three answers among both problems and benefits. On average, respondents pick 2.36 problems — and 53% pick at least 3 — against 1.14 benefits, excluding the most popular: “None of these reasons” (44%). This option comes far ahead of the second and third, “fight climate change” (30%) and “reduces negative impact of pollution on health” (27%). Still, environmental benefits are much more cited than economic ones. This result is likely due to people's pessimism about the outcome of the policy, but it might also reflect the limited importance given to economic consequences of the carbon tax, as already suggested by problems commonly cited.

4.4. Consumption and mobility constraints

The perceived problems identified above suggest a rationale for people's opposition towards carbon taxation: if people think the tax is ineffective, because their consumption is constrained and affordable alternatives are lacking, then taxing carbon can be perceived as a pretext to increase taxes.

4.4.1. Perceived elasticities

In order to understand to what extent people feel constrained with respect to their energy consumption, we elicit their subjective price elasticity for transport and domestic energies. We adopt the phrasing of Baranzini & Carattini (2017) and ask the expected decrease in energy




Figure 11: Perceived aggregate and own elasticities.

consumption that would follow an increase in prices. To avoid dealing with small percentages, which people usually find more difficult to compare, we ask for the reaction to a 30% increase in the price of heating (or equivalently, an increase of 0.50€ per liter in fuel prices). Although sufficiently high to foster a significant response on demand, these changes are realistic in the medium run, and should not lead people to report long-term elasticities. Respondents may select their answer among 5 brackets. They are asked to estimate their own reaction as well as that of French people. Figure 11 presents the results.

54% (resp. 61%) of respondents consider that such an increase in prices would not lead them to reduce their transport (resp. domestic) energy consumption. This expected inelastic behavior is mainly due to mobility constraints for transport (64% of cases) while it mostly reflects a non-fossil heating type for housing (61%). Excluding people reporting inelastic behavior because of insignificant initial consumption, about 40% of people feel constrained and expect to not lower their consumption following price increases. Still, respondents perceive transport fuel price elasticity of French people at -0.45 on average, and their own elasticity at a consistent -0.36 (after re-weighting by fuel expenditures). Concerning housing energy, aggregate and personal subjective elasticities are respectively -0.43 and -0.33 . Overall, these subjective elasticities compare well to the ones found in the literature for French households, although they are slightly over-estimated (in absolute value) for housing.⁴

⁴For transports, estimates from the literature lie around -0.4 (Clerc & Marcus, 2009; Bureau, 2011; Douenne, 2018). For housing, the values are lower, typically around -0.2 (Douenne, 2018; Clerc & Marcus, 2009).




Figure 12: Mode of transportation by activity.




Figure 13: Walking distance to the nearest stop, in minutes.




Figure 14: Frequency of public transport at the nearest stop.

4.4.2. Mobility and public transport

To assess the level of dependence on automobiles, which we include as a determinant for preferences in Section 6, we study mobility habits and access to public transport. Figure 12 indicates that 65% of employed people drive to work, and that car usage is even more common for grocery shopping or leisure activities. This figure is confirmed by the national transport survey [ENTD \(2008\)](#) conducted by Insee and analyzed in [Pappalardo et al. \(2010\)](#), which reveals that a majority still uses a car for trips of 1 to 2 km. Even though 73% live within a 10 minute walk to a public transit stop (Figure 13), coverage and frequency of public transport is often too low (Figure 14) to compete with the speed, comfort, and flexibility of automobiles. Indeed, 58% of those who commute by car declare that they could neither substitute it with public transport nor walking or cycling, and only 15% could use one of these alternative without major difficulties (Figure 15). Further evidence indicates that the lack of alternatives is a main factor for car usage, besides apparent taste for a vehicle that remains a symbol of freedom. Figure 16 shows that 52% of respondents state that supply of public transport where they live is “insufficient” or “decent, but should be increased”, while 40% find it “satisfactory” or “limited, but sufficient”. From this perspective, “green public investments and carbon taxes appear to be complementary, and in the timing of climate policy it would be justified to carry out the former before implementing the latter”, as




Figure 15: Among those who commute to work by car, possibility to change the transportation mode, depending on the alternative.




Figure 16: Supply of public transport where the respondent lives.

Bureau et al. (2019) suggest. Alongside an increase in the supply of alternatives, climate policies could also address the demand for mobility, e.g. by revitalizing town centers and limiting urban sprawl.

5. Attitudes over Other Policies

The previous section has shown that our Tax & Dividend was largely rejected by French people. As climate policies are urgently needed, it appears necessary to assess whether other designs and instruments would be met with a higher support. This section first examines public opinion about several alternative uses for the carbon tax revenue and then turns to other environmental and climate policies.

5.1. Preferred Revenue Recycling

We asked respondents to what extent they would accept an increase in the carbon tax for different uses of the revenue. As the exact cost of the tax was not specified, the benefits of the revenue recycling were made relatively more salient, which explains higher acceptance rates compared to our Tax & Dividend. Still, this question enables to compare answers relative to one another.

5.1.1. Investments in energy transition

Figure 17 reports people's responses to each proposed scenario. Overall, the preferred revenue recyclings are investments in the energy transition. This result is consistent with various papers showing that earmarking the revenue of the tax for environmental purposes largely increases public support (for a review of the literature, see for instance Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Carattini et al., 2018). As people tend to see carbon taxation as effective only if it finances green investments (Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011), these policies legitimize the implementation of a tax and increase its acceptance. In addition, the large approval for a policy investing in non-polluting transport can be explained by people's desire for mobility alternatives, the lack of which was identified as an important problem with our Tax & Dividend (see section 4).

5.1.2. Transfers to households

While previous literature has shown that distributive concerns matter for carbon tax approval, the common tool proposed by economists to address this issue — lump-sum transfers — is not met with resounding support. Out of the nine proposed mechanisms, the standard flat recycling comes last (with 37% approval), and a transfer targeted to the bottom 50% comes seventh (46%). Consistent with our previous finding that people are concerned that the carbon tax may penalize rural and peri-urban households, the preferred “lump-sum” transfer is the one targeted to people constrained with respect to their consumption of petroleum products (fifth with 55% approval). These results echo the findings of Kallbekken et al. (2011) who




Figure 17: Approval of a carbon tax if its revenue finances...

showed that people tend to prefer more narrowly targeted revenue recycling, possibly because of distributional concerns.

The relatively low support for compensation mechanisms should however not be understood as a lack of concern about purchasing power or distributive effects. As shown in section 4, the distributive properties of lump-sum transfers are not well understood. Perhaps surprisingly, the second preferred mechanism for revenue recycling is a reduction in the VAT rate (61% approval). The main rationales for this support are the benefits to one's purchasing power and the perceived distributive effects. As the VAT is known to be a regressive tax, people may perceive it fair to compensate an increase in the regressive carbon tax with a decrease in the VAT. Although such a mechanism would be less favorable to poorer households — who spend less in VAT in absolute value, and would therefore receive less than from a uniform transfer — it may not be perceived as such.

5.1.3. Double dividend and public deficit

The last two options propose to use the carbon tax revenue to reduce social contributions, or the public deficit. These mechanisms come respectively in sixth and eighth position with 51% and 44% of approval. These results can be linked to the low level of concern regarding the impact of a carbon tax on the economy documented in section 4. They are also consistent with previous focus group studies (e.g. Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010), including in France where Deroubaix & Lévêque (2006) found that people did not understand why the revenue of an environmental tax reform should be used to tackle unemployment.

5.2. Other Instruments

Under a binding acceptability constraint, alternative instruments become relevant, even if Pigouvian taxes may be more cost-effective (e.g. Goulder & Parry, 2008). To elicit people's preferred environmental policies, we ask respondents whether they would support eight different




Figure 18: Approval of different climate policies.

propositions. To make these questions easier to answer, the exact mechanisms and their associated costs and benefits are unspecified. The answers reported should therefore be taken cautiously as people could change their mind once faced with clear trade-offs. Still, this exercise is informative about people's first reactions to different proposals.

5.2.1. Other Pigouvian taxes

Figure 18 shows that among the eight options, the most strongly supported is a tax on kerosene (70% of “Yes” including 41% of “Yes, completely”). The main rationale could be a broadly perceived effectiveness of the tax if people view aviation as an important source of emissions, and the distributive effect of such policy since richer people fly more.⁵ In sharp contrast, only 17% of our survey respondents approve a tax on red meat, a policy ranked second-to-last. One could explain this lower acceptance rate by the belief that such policy would be ineffective, as we have shown in section 3 that less than half of respondents know that beef has a high carbon footprint. Additional reasons for its rejection could be the perceived negative impact on purchasing power, and the feeling that the policy is too coercive and targets a behavior difficult to change (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012). Overall, this evidence confirms that people are not opposed to Pigouvian taxes *per se*, and that acceptance varies significantly depending on the target and the perceived outcome of the instrument.

5.2.2. Norms

Among all proposed instruments, the two most approved are norms. 72% and 70% of respondents declared being in favor of stricter standards for the insulation of new buildings and for the pollution of new vehicles, respectively. It is unclear to what extent people are aware of the “hidden costs” of such policies. For instance, fuel economy standards in the US have been estimated to be

three to six times more costly than a tax on gasoline for similar abatement levels (Jacobsen, 2013), and as possibly more regressive (Jacobsen, 2013; Davis & Knittel, 2019; Levinson, 2019). The exact properties of these instruments are of course specific to their design, but it is likely that their popularity partly reflects the underestimation of their costs.

For urban transport policies as well, standards are preferred to price instruments. While the prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers comes fourth on the list of preferred options with 44% approval, the introduction of urban tolls comes last with only 14%. In a survey on urban road pricing, Jones (1998) identifies the main deterrent for these mechanisms. While some are specific to congestion charges, the other perceived problems are very much alike those identified for our Tax & Dividend: ineffectiveness, unfairness and the feeling that it is just another tax.

5.2.3. Diesel taxation

The strong opposition of the Yellow Vests against energy taxes did not only lead the government to reverse the planned carbon tax trajectory. The additional tax increases initially scheduled for diesel — to catch-up with the currently higher rates imposed on gasoline despite diesel's high social cost from air pollution — have also been abandoned.⁶ In our survey, we ask respondents whether they would therefore accept an increase in diesel tax to catch up with that of gasoline. As illustrated by Figure 19, 59% of respondents answer they would not, while 29% say they would (12% “PNR”). Among the 57% of households who own a diesel vehicle, the opposition augments to 80%. The geographic difference is also striking as 73% of rural households would be opposed, vs. only 40% of those living in the Paris agglomeration. As shown in our online Appendix 3.1, these two determinants appear as the most important divides with respect to diesel taxation.

6. Determinants of Attitudes

To understand what factors foster environmentally-friendly attitudes, we explore the socio-demographic determinants of attitudes over CC, the correlations between knowledge and perception of CC, and how these attitudes over CC as well as socio-demographics shape preferences for policies.

⁶Three increases of +0.026€/L were initially scheduled for January 2019, 2020 and 2021.




Figure 19: Approval of a catching-up of the diesel tax.

⁵In France in 2008, people in the top income decile travelled by plane about seven times more than the bottom 50% of the income distribution (Pappalardo et al., 2010). Furthermore, kerosene's emissions are taxed only through the EU-ETS, hence at a far lower rate than diesel and gasoline. This discrepancy has been highlighted in the public debate.

6.1. Attitudes over climate change

Table I shows the main socio-demographic determinants of different attitudes towards CC: the knowledge that CC is anthropogenic (columns 1-3), an index of knowledge about CC (4) and the perception that CC is “disastrous” or “cataclysmic” (5-6). To build the index of knowledge, we aggregate different variables corresponding to the different kinds of knowledge about CC identified by Kiel & Rost (2002) (see also Hoppe et al., 2018, for a summary).

We first compute a score for the question asking the emission target p.c. required to limit CC (see section 3.1). Denoting t as the respondent’s answer (from 0 to 10 tCO₂/yr), we define the score as:

$$\text{score emission target} = \begin{cases} 3 & \text{if } t \leq 2 \\ 2 & \text{if } t \in [3; 4] \\ 1 & \text{if } t \in [5; 6] \\ 0 & \text{if } t \geq 7 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

and we then aggregate this score with other answers:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{knowledge} = & 3 \cdot \text{CC anthropogenic} - 2 \cdot \text{CC doesn't exist} \\ & + \text{score factors} + \text{score emission target} \quad (2) \end{aligned}$$

where “score factors” is the sum of correct answers to factors of CC (see Figure 3), and the two first variables in the formula are dummies. The relative weights of the variables correspond to the loadings of a one-factor analysis, ensuring that our index captures the most determinant elements of knowledge.⁷ The original index ranges from -2 (no respondent) to $+13$ (22 respondents), and has quartiles of 6, 8 and 9. In the regressions, we normalize this index by subtracting the mean (7.6) and dividing by the standard deviation (2.5). Finally, we run OLS regressions of the three attitudes over CC on various socio-demographics, household characteristics, and political orientation. We report only the most relevant variables, but describe the entire list of covariates in Appendix C.1. We confirm that logistic regressions yield similar results (see online Appendix 5).

The best predictors of attitudes over CC corresponds to political orientation, and in particular identifying as an ecologist, one’s positioning towards the Yellow Vests, and left-right leaning. Political orientation shapes attitudes in a consistent manner: being ecologist, more left-wing or less supportive of the Yellow Vests is always associated with higher “concern over CC”, i.e. better knowledge and higher pessimism. Interest into politics (measured on a scale “almost not”/“a little”/“a lot”) also leads to higher concern, but to a lesser extent. Two observations on the left-right leaning deserve comment. First, the 40% of people indeterminate relative to this spectrum (see Appendix E for the descriptive statistics) have attitudes close to the center-right. Second, the variations predicted in the dependent

variables are as high across the Yellow Vests positionings as across the traditional left-right spectrum. For instance, knowledge about CC is *ceteris paribus* lower by 0.50 standard deviation (s.d.) for people part of the movement than for those who oppose it, which is comparable to the spread of 0.41 s.d. between extreme-right and extreme-left people (4).

Two socio-demographics are also consistently related to attitudes over CC: age and level of education. On average, the younger and the more educated one is, the more one is concerned by CC. People aged 18-24 may appear to have slightly lower knowledge and lower pessimism than people of prime age *ceteris paribus*, in columns (1,4,5); but this is because their concern is mostly captured by the employment status modality “student”, not shown in the table. Overall, the generation with the least concern is undeniably those aged over 65. For instance, without any control, they are 20 percentage points (p.p.) less likely to believe that CC is anthropogenic than young adults (2) — though most of this effect is explained by a lower level of education (1). Another finding is that men have a higher knowledge than women by 0.16 s.d. *ceteris paribus* (4), but their perception of the severity of CC is virtually the same (5). Finally, other characteristics have smaller or even insignificant effects.

Although the determinants we find are broadly consistent with those elicited in the literature (Upham et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 2011; ADEME, 2018),⁸ we do not encounter the political polarity which characterizes the United States. Indeed, Kahan et al. (2012) argue that American people “tend to form perceptions of societal risks that cohere with values characteristic of groups with which they identify” (this is the cultural cognition thesis), rather than through an assessment of the scientific evidence they encounter (the science comprehension thesis). It is crucial to know whether people neglect climate science in such a way, as this would mean that a media campaign would have little effect on people’s assimilation of climate science. Kahan et al. (2012) and McCright & Dunlap (2011) provide evidence for cultural cognition by showing that education has little effect on perceived risk or knowledge about CC, while the interaction between education and political orientation has a significant effect.⁹ We assess whether such interaction appears in the French context, by studying the interaction between the higher degree obtained and the left-right political leaning (columns 4, 6). We find no significant interaction, and obtain the same nil result when replacing the traditional left-right scale by the Yellow Vests positioning, and/or the higher degree by

⁸See also Capstick et al. (2015) for trends in attitudes.

⁹Funk & Kennedy (2016) also report that Republicans are equally distrustful of climate scientists’ integrity whatever their level of education, while the distrust vanishes for Democrats with higher degrees. The mechanism of the interaction is documented by Ehret et al. (2018) and Van Boven et al. (2018): people form beliefs through partisan cues, by adopting views expressed by political figures of the party they identify and rejecting positions from the other party.

⁷See online Appendix 4 for more details.

Table I: Determinants of attitudes towards climate change (CC).

	CC is anthropogenic			Knowledge about CC	CC is disastrous	
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(5)	(6)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.032** (0.013)			0.137*** (0.028)	0.051*** (0.014)	
Ecologist	0.135*** (0.024)			0.404*** (0.053)	0.192*** (0.027)	
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.098*** (0.033)			-0.142** (0.071)	-0.093*** (0.036)	
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.038* (0.022)			-0.100** (0.048)	-0.051** (0.024)	
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.098*** (0.024)			-0.223*** (0.051)	-0.061** (0.026)	
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.207*** (0.043)			-0.498*** (0.093)	-0.105** (0.047)	
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.111** (0.056)		0.109 (0.077)	0.295** (0.122)	0.075 (0.062)	0.005 (0.084)
Left-right: Left	0.074*** (0.027)		0.070 (0.046)	0.137** (0.059)	0.099*** (0.030)	-0.025 (0.051)
Left-right: Center	0.013 (0.030)		0.039 (0.044)	0.093 (0.065)	0.021 (0.033)	-0.089* (0.048)
Left-right: Right	-0.029 (0.029)		-0.017 (0.045)	-0.039 (0.062)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.143*** (0.049)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.014 (0.034)		-0.019 (0.055)	-0.117 (0.074)	0.025 (0.037)	-0.086 (0.060)
Diploma: <u>CAP</u> or <u>BEP</u>	0.040* (0.022)		0.033 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)
Diploma: <u>Baccalauréat</u>	0.065** (0.027)		0.115*** (0.028)	0.145** (0.058)	0.030 (0.029)	0.133*** (0.031)
Diploma: Higher	0.086*** (0.027)		0.159*** (0.027)	0.266*** (0.059)	0.096*** (0.030)	0.240*** (0.030)
Diploma \times Left-right			-0.005 (0.008)			-0.005 (0.009)
Diploma \times Left-right: Indeterminate			0.013 (0.014)			-0.027* (0.015)
Age: 25 – 34	0.050 (0.041)	-0.030 (0.032)		0.128 (0.089)	0.021 (0.045)	
Age: 35 – 49	0.002 (0.041)	-0.088*** (0.029)		0.092 (0.089)	0.032 (0.045)	
Age: 50 – 64	0.009 (0.044)	-0.092*** (0.029)		0.069 (0.096)	-0.032 (0.049)	
Age: \geq 65	-0.106** (0.053)	-0.197*** (0.029)		-0.052 (0.114)	-0.092 (0.058)	
Income (k€/month)	-0.008 (0.008)			-0.018 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.009)	
Sex: Male	-0.023 (0.018)			0.156*** (0.039)	-0.004 (0.020)	
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.004 (0.008)			-0.003 (0.017)	0.006 (0.009)	
Frequency of public transit	0.016** (0.007)			0.045*** (0.016)	0.007 (0.008)	
Additional covariates	✓			✓	✓	
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.104	0.021	0.037	0.156	0.118	0.048

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Interaction term is computed using numeric variables. Omitted modalities are: Yellow Vests: opposes, Left-right: Indeterminate, Diploma: Brevet or no diploma, Age: 18 – 24. Additional covariates are defined in [C.1](#).

knowledge about CC (see online Appendix 6). This lack of evidence suggests that the public debate over CC is less polarized in France than in the US,¹⁰ and that the knowledge and perception of many French people could change with better access to information over CC.

Figure 20 gives a sense of the shift in the perception and support for climate policies that could follow an information campaign, as it shows the correlations between attitudes over CC, climate policies, and socio-demographics. Knowledge is highly correlated with the perceived gravity of CC (correlation of 0.43), and both of these variables are in turn well correlated with the readiness to adopt an ecological lifestyle and to the number of climate policies (of Figure 18) supported (correlations around 0.3). The acceptance of our Tax & Dividend is less correlated with attitudes (at 0.1-0.2), as the support for this policy is already low. Still, the positive correlation between knowledge and support for other climate policies is an encouraging prospect for an information campaign about CC and even more so since we did not find evidence that partisanship would lead to the dismissal of scientific discourse. Finally, as previously seen, diploma and age are quite correlated with attitudes, though these correlations are below those between attitudes over CC and over policies, at 0 to 0.2.




Figure 20: Correlations between attitudes over climate change, climate policies and socio-demographics (in %).

6.2. Attitudes over policies

To better understand the heterogeneity in people’s support, we regress several indicators of attitudes towards climate policies on respondents’ characteristics. Table II reports the results for the acceptance of our Tax & Dividend (columns 1-2) and the readiness to adopt an ecological

lifestyle (6) in the case that the richest were contributing, efforts were shared globally, and alternatives were developed. We also use the eight policies proposed in Figure 18 in our dependent variables: column 3 studies the share of policies approved while column 4 features the preference for norms vs. taxes within the policies. Similarly, column 5 uses six measures of Figure 17 to define an index of preference for earmarking vs. transfers. Indexes for these preferences are constructed as follows:

$$\text{Norms vs. taxes} = \sum_{p \in \text{norms}} \text{score}_p - \sum_{p \in \text{taxes}} \text{score}_p \quad (3)$$

where the score of each measure corresponds to a grade between -2 (for a “Not at all” answer) and 2 (for “Yes, completely”). We proceed similarly for earmarking vs. transfers, and describe the categorization of measures in Appendix C.2. Again, we normalize these two indexes by subtracting the mean (2.8 for norms vs. taxes, 1.4 for earmarking vs. transfers) and dividing by the standard deviation (3.3 and 3.1 respectively). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in online Appendix provide the analysis of the determinants of acceptance for each of the eight policies and nine revenue recycling. The results are overall very similar to those provided by the more synthetic indicators presented here.

As suggested by the correlation matrix of section 6.1, knowledge about CC and the conviction that it would be disastrous positively affect the approval of climate policies, *ceteris paribus*. Excluding the (endogenous) variables describing political orientation, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. would induce a lower likelihood to reject Tax & Dividend by 5 p.p. (column 2). The effect of these variables is even stronger when considering the share of policies approved: controlling for socio-demographics, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. is associated with an additional approval of 6 p.p. while the conviction that CC is disastrous increases it by 9 p.p. (see online Appendix 3.4). Beyond the strong correlation we previously found, these results confirm that increasing climate awareness could significantly increase the support for climate policies.

Besides attitudes over CC, the two most critical determinants appear to be one’s affiliation as an ecologist and one’s position towards the Yellow Vests. All else equal, ecologists are more likely to accept Tax & Dividend by 13 p.p., and more willing to approve other environmental policies by about 8 p.p. Conversely, holding other variables constant, people supporting the Yellow Vests are 22 p.p. more likely to reject Tax & Dividend relative to those opposed to the movement. As shown in column 3, higher affinity with the Yellow Vests is also associated with less support for other climate policies. Ecologists (resp. the Yellow Vests supporters) being more (resp. less) favorable to environmental policies and spending, their relative preference for earmarking vs. transfers is higher (resp. lower) than average, while for both groups the relative preference

¹⁰A finding reminiscent of Ziegler (2017), who studies Germany.

Table II: Determinants of attitudes towards climate policies

	Acceptance of Tax & dividend		Share of policies approved	Norms vs. taxes	Earmarking vs. transfers	Ecological lifestyle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Knowledge about CC	0.029*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.024 (0.020)	0.131*** (0.020)	0.103*** (0.009)
CC is disastrous	0.022 (0.018)	0.037** (0.018)	0.081*** (0.010)	0.125*** (0.040)	0.156*** (0.039)	0.142*** (0.018)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	-0.019 (0.013)		0.034*** (0.007)	-0.010 (0.029)	0.053* (0.028)	0.026** (0.013)
Ecologist	0.126*** (0.024)		0.082*** (0.013)	-0.134** (0.056)	0.249*** (0.054)	0.149*** (0.025)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.021 (0.032)		-0.052*** (0.018)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.110 (0.071)	-0.079** (0.033)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.144*** (0.022)		-0.029** (0.012)	-0.056 (0.050)	-0.091* (0.049)	-0.013 (0.022)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.222*** (0.023)		-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.131** (0.053)	-0.142*** (0.052)	-0.023 (0.024)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.214*** (0.043)		-0.084*** (0.023)	-0.252*** (0.097)	-0.175* (0.095)	-0.037 (0.043)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.040 (0.056)		0.025 (0.031)	-0.285** (0.127)	0.167 (0.124)	0.047 (0.056)
Left-right: Left	0.072*** (0.027)		-0.005 (0.015)	-0.137** (0.061)	0.002 (0.060)	0.028 (0.027)
Left-right: Center	0.051* (0.030)		0.011 (0.016)	-0.051 (0.068)	0.051 (0.066)	0.095*** (0.030)
Left-right: Right	-0.022 (0.028)		0.008 (0.016)	0.030 (0.065)	0.064 (0.063)	0.005 (0.029)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.041 (0.034)		-0.028 (0.018)	0.055 (0.077)	0.009 (0.075)	0.014 (0.034)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.009)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.099*** (0.032)	-0.023 (0.022)	0.038 (0.093)	-0.159* (0.090)	0.032 (0.041)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.047 (0.040)	-0.089*** (0.030)	-0.017 (0.022)	0.189** (0.092)	-0.002 (0.089)	0.039 (0.041)
Age: 50 – 64	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.024)	0.322*** (0.100)	-0.058 (0.097)	0.049 (0.044)
Age: ≥ 65	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.100*** (0.032)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.370*** (0.118)	-0.056 (0.115)	0.008 (0.052)
Income (k€/month)	0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.014 (0.018)	0.031* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.008)
Sex: Male	-0.053*** (0.018)	-0.074*** (0.017)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.039)	-0.063*** (0.018)
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.019** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.0002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.008)
Frequency of public transit	-0.003 (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)	0.024*** (0.007)
Additional covariates	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.150	0.051	0.226	0.081	0.121	0.202

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are Yellow Vests: opposes, Age : 18 – 24 and Left-right: Indeterminate. Additional covariates are defined in [C.1](#).

for norms vs. taxes is lower than average. Also, ecologists' attitudes towards environmental policies translate into a higher willingness to adopt an ecological lifestyle (by 15 p.p.), but the opposite does not hold true for the Yellow Vests. Although this could signal some warm glow,¹¹ it also suggests that their strong rejection of environmental policies does not simply reflect lower concerns about the environment. Rather, the conditions of fairness embedded in our question could be critical for Yellow Vests to accept sacrifices. Their rejection could also reflect a deeper rejection of policies in general, due to a high distrust in the government — documented in [Algan et al. \(2019\)](#). This interpretation echoes the recent findings of [Rafaty \(2018\)](#), who shows that perceptions of corruption and political distrust negatively affect the stringency of climate policies. Finally, although the heterogeneity in responses is significant between these two groups, the ranking of the preferred option remains consistent: on average, both ecologists and supporters of the Yellow Vests favor norms over taxes and earmarking over transfers.

A parallel message from Table II is that the standard left-right spectrum is not the most relevant to understand attitudes towards environmental policies. None of our five left-right dummy variables are significantly correlated with the share of policies approved, and overall, attitudes vary much less along the left-right spectrum than along the Yellow Vests cleavage. That being said, Tax & Dividend is still significantly more supported by people from the left (+7 p.p.) and the center (+5 p.p.) than by those indeterminate. This is in line with the literature (see e.g. [Bornstein & Lanz 2008](#); [McCright et al. 2013](#) or [Drews & van den Bergh 2016](#) for a review). Without controlling for other variables, we find that people that are most likely to accept the Tax & Dividend in France are the ones affiliated with the center (+9 p.p. relative to "Indeterminate"), and the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-15 p.p., see online Appendix 3.4), which may be driven by their respective support or rejection of the current government who tried to increase the carbon tax. Our results also show that people from the extreme-left and the center are the most likely to approve other environmental policies (+7 p.p.), while the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-6 p.p.). Still, these differences become small and not statistically significant when covariates are included.

Besides political attitudes, we also observe heterogeneity in people's responses along socio-demographic lines. As in attitudes over CC, age plays a role, as 18-24 are about 10 p.p. more likely to accept the Tax & Dividend (column 2). Still, controlling for knowledge, political attitudes and other variables, this effect is reduced by half. Similarly, more educated people tend to be more open to environmental policies (as previously found by [Thalmann, 2004](#)), but this effect becomes insignificant once age dummies are included as covariates. Furthermore, we find little effect of

income on attitudes towards climate policies, a result that confirms that of [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) in Switzerland. Using our full set of controls, the most significant variables differ from the main factors of attitudes over CC: these significant variables are size of town (city dwellers being more favorable to environmental policies, as in [Thalmann, 2004](#)), and sex (males being less favorable). Although men have a higher knowledge about CC than women on average, this does not translate into higher pessimism (see section 6.1), and it even coincides with lower support for climate policies. This phenomenon is consistent with the findings of [Stern et al. \(1993\)](#) and [Hampel et al. \(1996\)](#) that women are more attentive to links between the environment and things they value, even if they share the same values and beliefs as men. Difference in perception of CC's impact on oneself could explain women's higher support for climate policies, even given a lower factual knowledge.

7. Conclusion

Despite a social movement against the carbon tax, French people appear mostly aware and concerned about climate change. Their rejection should therefore not be taken as a low willingness to act for the environment, but rather as a perceived inadequacy between current carbon taxation and the fight for the climate. Our results identify several barriers — distributive concerns, inefficacy and lack of alternatives — that could be partly alleviated with specific complementary policies. In particular, French people favor investments in green infrastructures that provide them with alternatives and foster the energy transition. They also appear willing to accept certain norms as well as Pigouvian taxes if these target specific behaviors (or populations) such as air travel. The heterogeneity in people's attitudes is significant, but the relative ranking of the different policy options are in general consistent across groups of population, suggesting the following paths towards a successful ecological transition.

First and foremost, a massive and long-lasting information campaign could be launched to improve knowledge about climate change and climate policies. Indeed, higher knowledge is clearly associated with higher concern for CC and higher support for climate policies. Second, as people mostly favor policies that provide alternatives to fossil fuels, the government could develop such policies as a substitute to a carbon tax: investments, subsidies, and regulations in favor of public transport, cleaner vehicles and thermal insulation, etc. Third, a tax and dividend restricted to kerosene could serve as a learning example as kerosene taxation is popular.¹² Last but not least, a more cost-effective carbon tax should later complement these policies, as people get convinced by the objective of carbon neutrality and by the government's commitment towards this goal.

¹¹Here, "warm glow" refers to one's unintentional strategy to overestimate their virtue in order to derive satisfaction.

¹²[Murray & Rivers \(2015\)](#) document an increase in the support of the carbon tax following its implementation in British Columbia.

But to successfully introduce a carbon tax, it is important to build public trust in politicians (Harring & Jagers, 2013; Rafaty, 2018) and to correct the inequities of the tax. As such, it is no surprise if political trust is among the highest in the country that first introduced a carbon tax, Sweden (Klenert et al., 2018). It is no coincidence either if the 1991 Swedish tax was part of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system, the popular “reform of the century”, resulting from a dialogue with all stakeholders (Stern, 2014).

The French government is willing to build such a democratic consensus, as it has just launched an assembly to tackle climate change composed of 150 citizens randomly drawn. Nevertheless, it will remain challenging to reintroduce a carbon-tax in the short-run, since French people’s beliefs about carbon taxation are largely biased, and these biases are well anchored (as shown in our companion paper, Douenne & Fabre 2019). In a nutshell, market imperfections, distributive effects and political acceptability concerns all call for a combination of different types of climate policies rather than a single price signal (Stern & Stiglitz, 2017; Stiglitz, 2019). The French context seems to call for a focus on the former to make the latter politically acceptable.

Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Mouez Fodha, Fanny Henriët and Katheline Schubert for their comments and their help to get funding. We also thank Stefano Carattini, Mathias Lé, seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics, an anonymous referee of the FAERE Working Paper series and two anonymous referees of this journal. We are thankful to Christina Hobbs for the proof-reading. We would also like to show our gratitude to Stefanie Stantcheva, Michael I. Norton and the Harvard Business School for allowing us to use their Qualtrics account. We are grateful to Christina Hobbs for the proof-reading. We acknowledge financial support from the Cepremap, EUR PGSE (ANR-17-EURE-0001), ANR (ANR16-CE03-0011), and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne economics doctoral school (ED 465).

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Appendices

A. Raw data

B. Sources on GhG emissions

B.1. Carbon footprints

Plane vs. train. Given that French electricity mix is decarbonized at 93%¹³, the carbon footprint of highspeed train is actually more than 20 times lower than that of an interior flight of the same distance. Hence, we chose Bordeaux - Nice as our case study as the train connection makes a big detour by Paris. Thus, we obtain an emission of 10 kg of CO₂ by train as compared to 180 kg by plane. Our source for train is the French railroad company, [SNCF](#), and is consistent with data aggregated by the official agency [ADEME](#). For the flight, our source is a [carbon footprint calculator](#). [Another calculator](#) provides almost the same result, so we preferred this figure rather than a higher figure from a [third calculator](#).

Nuclear vs. wind. AR5 from [IPCC](#) and [Pehl et al. \(2017\)](#) show that nuclear power plants and wind turbines have similar carbon footprint, at 10 gCO₂eq/kWh (for comparison, it is 500 for gas combined cycle).

Beef vs. pasta. [Poore & Nemecek \(2018\)](#) show that median beef carbon footprint is 60 kgCO₂eq/kg (more precisely, 30 kgCO₂eq per 100g of protein and 200g of protein per kg); while the carbon footprint of wheat pasta

Table A.3: Sample characteristics: quotas stratas.

	Population	Sample
gender		
woman	0.52	0.53
man	0.48	0.47
age		
18-24	0.12	0.11
25-34	0.15	0.11
35-49	0.24	0.24
50-64	0.24	0.26
>65	0.25	0.27
profession		
farmer	0.01	0.01
independent	0.03	0.04
executive	0.09	0.09
intermediate	0.14	0.14
employee	0.15	0.16
worker	0.12	0.13
retired	0.33	0.33
inactive	0.12	0.11
education		
No diploma or <u>Brevet</u>	0.30	0.24
<u>CAP</u> or <u>BEP</u>	0.25	0.26
<u>Baccalauréat</u>	0.17	0.18
Higher	0.29	0.31
size of town		
rural	0.22	0.24
<20k	0.17	0.18
20-99k	0.14	0.13
>100k	0.31	0.29
Paris area	0.16	0.15
region		
<u>IDF</u>	0.19	0.17
<u>Nord</u>	0.09	0.10
<u>Est</u>	0.13	0.12
<u>SO</u>	0.09	0.09
<u>Centre</u>	0.10	0.12
<u>Ouest</u>	0.10	0.10
<u>Occ</u>	0.09	0.09
<u>ARA</u>	0.12	0.13
<u>PACA</u>	0.09	0.09

is 1.3 kgCO₂eq/kg (0.5 kgCO₂eq per 1000 kcal of protein and 2695 kcal per kg). Given that a beef steak [weighs 100-125g](#), its carbon footprint is twenty times that of two servings of pasta of 125g each.

B.2. Current and target emissions

French consumption-based yearly GhG emissions amounted in 2014 to 712 MtCO₂eq, i.e. 10.8 tCO₂eq p.c., and are roughly stable in recent years ([CGDD, 2019](#)). To stop climate change and stabilize the GhG concentration in the atmosphere, it is required to meet zero net

¹³Cf. [RTE - Bilan électrique 2018](#) (p. 32).

Table A.4: Households' characteristics.

	Population	Sample
Household composition (mean)		
Household size	2.36	2.38
Number of adults	2.03	1.93
c.u.	1.60	1.61
Energy source (share)		
Gas	0.42	0.36
Fuel	0.12	0.09
Accommodation size (m²)		
mean	97	96
p25	69	66
p50	90	90
p75	120	115
Distance traveled by car (km/year)		
mean	13,735	15,328
p25	4,000	4,000
p50	10,899	10,000
p75	20,000	20,000
Fuel economy (L/100 km)		
mean	6.39	7.25
p25	6	5
p50	6.5	6
p75	7.5	7

SOURCES: Matched BdF; except for number of adults (ERFS) and domestic fuel (CEREN).

emissions. To meet the Paris agreement, [France National Low-Carbon Strategy](#) aims to achieve carbon (i.e. GhG) neutrality by 2050 (CGDD, 2015). Given carbon sinks estimated at 85 Mt_{2eq} for 2050 (mainly forest and soil), this strategy requires to reach gross emissions of about 1 tCO_{2eq} p.c. at this date. Admittedly, less stringent scenarios may still allow to keep global warming below +2°C in 2100 with good probability — even considering the same burden share for France — by relying more heavily on net negative emissions after 2070 through carbon capture and storage. For this reason, we consider a range of answers as correct for the French target emission in 2050: from 0 to 2 tCO_{2eq} p.c.

C. Details on main regressions

C.1. Control variables

Our regression Tables I and II display only the most relevant variables, but — when specified — the following additional covariates are included as controls:

Socio-demographics: respondent's income; household's income; employment status (9 categories); socio-professional category (8 categories); region of France (10 categories); household size; number of people above

14; number of adults; single; number of c.u.; smokes; favoured medium for news (5 categories).

Political orientation: conservative; liberal; humanist; patriot; apolitical.

Energy and exposure to policies: heating energy: gaz; heating energy: domestic fuel; accommodation size; annual distance travelled by car; fuel economy; type of fuel: diesel; type of fuel: gasoline; number of vehicles; simulated net gain from Tax & Dividend; opinion on public transports; mode of commuting transport.

C.2. Measures for relative preferences

We constructed the two indexes of section 6.2 using the following measures:

Norms: insulation standards; pollution standards; roadworthiness standards; prohibition of polluting vehicles.

Taxes: kerosene; red meat; urban tolls; climate fund.

Earmarking: renovation; renewables; non polluting transport.

Transfers: to bottom half; to all; to constrained households.

D. Questionnaire

Hereafter, we only describe questions of the survey that are used in the present paper. The other questions are described and analyzed in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019). Words that appear in bold were actually in both bold and underlined in the respondents' questionnaire.

Socio-demographics.

1. What is your postal code?
2. What is your gender (in the sense of civil status)?
Female; Male
3. What is your age group?
18 to 24 years old; 25 to 34 years old; 35 to 49 years old; 50 to 64 years old; 65 years old or more
4. What is your employment status?
Permanent; Temporary contract; Unemployed; Student; Retired; Other active; Inactive
5. What is your socio-professional category? (Remember that the unemployed are active workers).
Farmer; Craftsperson, merchant; Independent; Executive; Intermediate occupation; Employee; Worker; Retired; Other Inactive

6. What is your highest degree?
No diploma; Brevet des collèges; CAP or BEP [secondary]; Baccalaureate; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG, schools of health and social training...); Bac +3 (licence...) [bachelor]; Bac +5 or more (master, engineering or business school, doctorate, medicine, master, DEA, DESS...)
7. How many people live in your household? Household includes: you, your family members who live with you, and your dependents.
8. What is your net **monthly** income (in euros)? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc.
9. What is the net **monthly** income (in euros) **of your household**? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc.
10. In your household how many people are 14 years old or older (**including yourself**)?
11. In your household, how many people are over the age of majority (**including yourself**)?
- Energy characteristics.*
12. What is the surface area of your home? (in m²)
13. What is the heating system in your home?
Individual heating; Collective heating; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
14. What is the main heating energy source in your home?
Electricity Town gas; Butane, propane, tank gas; Heating oil; Wood, solar, geothermal, aerothermal (heat pump); Other; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
15. How many motor vehicles does your household have?
None; One; Two or more
16. [Without a vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven in the last 12 months?
17. [One vehicle] What type of fuel do you use for this vehicle?
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other
18. [One vehicle] What is the average fuel economy of your vehicle? (in Liters per 100 km)
19. [One vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven with your vehicle in the last 12 months?
20. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your main vehicle?
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other
21. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your second vehicle?
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other
22. [At least two vehicles] What is the average fuel economy of all your vehicles? (in Liters per 100 km)
23. [At least two vehicles] How many kilometers have you driven with all your vehicles in the last 12 months?
- Partial reforms [transport / housing]. (...)*
24. If fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter, by how much would **your household** reduce its fuel consumption?
0% - [I already consume almost none / I am already not consuming]; 0% - [I am constrained on all my trips / I will not reduce it]; From 0% to 10%; From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30% - [I would change my travel habits significantly / I would change my consumption significantly]
25. In your opinion, if [fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter / gas and heating oil prices increased by 30%], by how much would **French people** reduce their consumption on average?
From 0% to 3%; From 3% to 10%; From 3% to 10%; From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30%
- Tax & Dividend: initial.*
26. The government is studying an increase in the carbon tax, whose revenues would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income. This would imply:
- an increase in the price of gasoline by 11 cents per liter and diesel by 13 cents per liter;
 - an increase of 13% in the price of gas, and 15% in the price of heating oil;
 - an annual payment of 110€ to each adult, or 220€ per year for a couple.
- (...)
27. [empty] / Scientists agree that a carbon tax would be effective in reducing pollution.] Do you think that such a measure would reduce pollution and fight climate change?
Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
28. In your opinion, which categories would lose [[blank] / purchasing power] with such a measure? (Several answers possible)
No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people; Rural or peri-urban people; Some French people, but not a particular income category; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

29. In your opinion, what categories would gain purchasing power with such a measure? (Several answers possible)
No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people; Urban dwellers; Some French people, but not a particular income category; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Tax & Dividend: after knowledge. We always consider the same measure. (...)

30. Why do you think this measure is beneficial? (Maximum three responses)
Contributes to the fight climate change; Reduces the harmful effects of pollution on health; Reduces traffic congestion; Increases my purchasing power; Increases the purchasing power of the poorest; Fosters France's independence from fossil energy imports; Prepares the economy for tomorrow's challenges; For none of these reasons; Other (specify):

31. Why do you think this measure is unwanted? (Maximum three answers)
Is ineffective in reducing pollution; Alternatives are insufficient or too expensive; Penalizes rural areas; Decreases my purchasing power; Decreases the purchasing power of some modest households; Harms the economy and employment; Is a pretext for raising taxes; For none of these reasons; Other (specify):

(...)

Attitudes over other policies.

32. In which cases would you be in favor of increasing the carbon tax? I would be in favor if the tax revenues were used to finance..._

- (a) a payment to the 50% poorest French people (those earning less than 1670€ per month)
- (b) a payment to all French people
- (c) a compensation for households forced to consume petroleum products
- (d) a decrease in social contributions
- (e) a decrease in VAT
- (f) a decrease in the public deficit
- (g) the thermal renovation of buildings
- (h) renewable energy (wind, solar, etc.)
- (i) clean transport

Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not at all

33. Please select "A little" (test to check that you are attentive).
Not at all; A little; A lot; Completely; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

34. Would you support the following environmental policies?

- (a) A tax on kerosene (aviation)
- (b) A tax on red meat
- (c) Stricter standards on the insulation of new buildings
- (d) Stricter standards on the pollution of new vehicles
- (e) Stricter standards on pollution during roadworthiness tests
- (f) The prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers
- (g) The introduction of urban tolls
- (h) A contribution to a global climate fund

Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not at all

35. For historical reasons, diesel is taxed less than gasoline. Would you be in favor of raising taxes on diesel to catch up with the level of taxation on gasoline?
Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Attitudes over climate change.

36. How often do you talk about climate change?
Several times a month; Several times a year; Almost never; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

37. In your opinion, climate change...
is not a reality; is mainly due to natural climate variability; is mainly due to human activity; PNR (Don't know, don't say).

38. Which of the following elements contribute to global warming? (Several answers possible)
CO₂; Methane; Oxygen; Particulate matter

39. In your opinion, which of the following statements are true? (Several answers possible).
Consuming one beef steak emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases than eating two servings of pasta.; Electricity produced by nuclear power emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases than electricity produced by wind turbines.; A seat in a Bordeaux - Nice journey emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases by plane than by high speed train.

40. In your opinion, how would the effects of climate change be, if humanity did nothing to limit it?
Insignificant, or even beneficial; Small, because humans would be able to live with it; Grave, because there would be more natural disasters; Disastrous, lifestyles would be largely altered; Cataclysmic, humankind would disappear; PNR(Don't know, don't say)

41. In which of these two regions do you think will climate change have the worst consequences?
The European Union; India; As much in both

42. In your opinion, in France, which generations will be seriously affected by climate change? (Several answers possible)

People born in the 1960s; People born in the 1990s; People born in the 2020s; People born in the 2050s; None of the four

43. In your opinion, who is responsible for climate change? (Several possible choices)

Each of us; The richest; Governments; Some foreign countries; Past generations; Natural causes

44. Currently, each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of CO₂ per year.

In your opinion, how much must this figure be reduced to by 2050 in order to hope to contain global warming to +2°C in 2100 (if all countries did the same)? In 2050, we should emit at most...

0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10 tons

45. Has climate change had or will it have an influence on your decision to make a child (or children)?

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

46. [If Yes] Why does climate change influence your decision to have a child (or children)? (Several answers possible).

Because I don't want my child to live in a devastated world.; Because each additional human being aggravates climate change.

47. Would you be willing to change your lifestyle to fight climate change? (Several answers possible)

Yes, if policies went in this direction; Yes, if I had the financial means; Yes, if everyone did the same; No, only the richest people have to change their way of life; No, it is against my personal interest; No, I think climate change is not a real problem; I have already adopted a sustainable way of life; I try, but I have trouble changing my habits

48. Assuming that all states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely; would you be willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and ensure to use almost no gasoline, diesel or kerosene)?

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Access to public transport and mobility habits.

49. How many minutes walk is it to the nearest public transit stop? (To simplify, you can use the conversion 1 km = 10 min walk).

in min: ; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

50. How often does the nearest public transport pass? (excluding school buses)

Less than three times a day; Between four times a day and once an hour; Once or twice an hour; More than three times an hour; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

51. What do you think about the availability of public transport where you live? It is...

Satisfactory; Suitable, but should be increased; Limited, but sufficient; Insufficient; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

52. What mode of transportation do you mainly use for each of the following trips?

(a) Home - work (or studies)

(b) Grocery shopping

(c) Leisure (excluding holidays)

Car; Public transport; Walking or cycling; Two-wheeled vehicle; Carpooling; Not concerned

53. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work using public transport?

Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

54. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work by walking or cycling?

Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Politics and media.

55. How much are you interested in politics?

Almost not; A little; A lot

56. How would you define yourself? (Several answers possible)

Extreme left; Left; Center; Right; Extreme right; Liberal; Conservative; Humanist; Patriot; Apolitical; Ecologist

57. How do you keep yourself informed of current events? Mainly through...

Television; Press (written or online); Social networks; Radio; Other

58. What do you think of the Yellow Vests? (Several answers possible)

I am part of them; I support them; I understand them; I oppose them; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Open field.

59. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, comments or suggestions in the field below.

E. Who are the Yellow Vests

Table E.5: Positioning towards Yellow Vests, per category.

	Opposed	Understands	Supports	Is part	PNR
Extreme-left (2%)	6%	26%	51%	12%	5%
Left (20%)	17%	36%	36%	5%	7%
Center (13%)	49%	30%	15%	2%	6%
Right (16%)	40%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Extreme-right (9%)	11%	28%	47%	10%	5%
Indeterminate (40%)	19%	32%	30%	4%	13%
Liberal (5%)	48%	26%	18%	2%	6%
Conservative (2%)	22%	28%	30%	10%	11%
Humanist (11%)	21%	35%	29%	5%	10%
Patriot (8%)	21%	27%	39%	7%	6%
Apolitical (21%)	21%	31%	32%	4%	12%
Ecologist (15%)	17%	39%	27%	5%	12%
Rural (21%)	20%	31%	34%	6%	9%
<20k (17%)	24%	28%	34%	6%	9%
20-100k (14%)	22%	33%	32%	4%	9%
>100k (31%)	29%	34%	26%	3%	8%
Paris (17%)	28%	33%	25%	4%	11%
No diploma or Brevet (30%)	21%	29%	34%	5%	10%
CAP or BEP (24%)	23%	28%	36%	6%	7%
Baccalauréat (17%)	22%	35%	29%	4%	11%
Higher (29%)	32%	8%	36%	21%	3%
Age: 18–24 (12%)	23%	34%	27%	4%	12%
Age: 25–34 (15%)	21%	33%	28%	7%	11%
Age: 35–49 (24%)	25%	32%	29%	5%	9%
Age: 50–64 (24%)	21%	32%	36%	4%	7%
Age: ≥ 65 (25%)	32%	30%	28%	3%	7%
Income decile: 1	25%	33%	26%	3%	14%
Income decile: 2	18%	31%	35%	5%	11%
Income decile: 3	17%	31%	32%	7%	12%
Income decile: 4	15%	33%	37%	6%	9%
Income decile: 5	21%	29%	36%	5%	8%
Income decile: 6	26%	33%	29%	6%	7%
Income decile: 7	25%	36%	28%	4%	7%
Income decile: 8	31%	31%	28%	3%	8%
Income decile: 9	39%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Income decile: 10	47%	29%	15%	3%	6%
Female (52%)	21%	34%	29%	5%	12%
Male (48%)	29%	30%	31%	5%	6%
Average	25%	32%	30%	5%	9%

NOTE: The percentages in parenthesis express the weighted share of each category from our sample.

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Dear editors,

We have no conflict of interest to disclose.

Sincerely,

Thomas Douenne & Adrien Fabre

Supplementary material to *French Attitudes over Climate Change, the Carbon Tax and Other Climate Policies*

Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre*

Contents

1 Additional results on attitudes over climate change	1
2 Test different wording for winners and losers	3
3 Additional specifications for determinants of attitudes	4
4 Construction of the knowledge index	8
5 Logit regressions for determinants	10
6 Robustness for the absence of cultural cognition effect	12

1 Additional results on attitudes over climate change

1.1 Perceptions

The looming threat of CC already seems to impact people’s behavior. Indeed, 20% say the CC “has had or will have an influence in their decision to have a child”. Among them, 37% justify it “because each additional human aggravates climate change”, and 86% because they “don’t want [their] child to live in a devastated world”. This result echoes a survey from [ADEME \(2018\)](#) which shows that 63% of French people think that “living conditions will be extremely harsh” in France in 50 years and that 57% do not think CC “will be limited to acceptable levels by the end of the century”. Such concern is not limited to France, as [Funk & Kennedy \(2016\)](#) document that 75% of American are concerned by CC. Nor is it recent, as Eurobarometer surveys cited by [Whitmarsh & Capstick \(2018\)](#) found that more than three-quarters of respondents were already worried about climate change in 1988, rising to almost nine in ten by 1992.

Despite — or perhaps due to — widespread hopelessness, 34% almost never talk about CC (Figure [1.1](#)). 27% talk about CC several times per month, which can give a sense of the share of people who regularly engage in long-term thinking. The relatively low amount of discussion around an issue largely perceived as a serious threat may be understood as a way to flee from one’s moral duty and to protect one’s lifestyle. Indeed, as a recent literature has shown, people tend to discard information perceived as bad news and display what [Sharot et al. \(2011\)](#) call “unrealistic optimism in front of reality”. [Whitmarsh & Capstick \(2018\)](#) relate another strategy of avoidance: the general

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tendency to discount one’s own contribution to causing CC and identify causes of CC primarily with other people or countries.




Figure 1.1: Frequency at which respondents talk about climate change.

One can wonder if this blindness to the causes is mirrored by a sentiment that oneself will not be impacted. This does not seem to be the case on a spatial dimension. Indeed, Figure 1.2 shows that although five times more people (correctly¹) believe that India will face more serious climate impacts than the European Union, 65% still think that both regions will face as much damage. Yet, the evidence is mild regarding the time dimension, as 45% of American think that “global warming will pose a serious threat to [them] or [their] way of life in [their] lifetime” (Gallup, 2019) while 62% of French people think that the first generation seriously affected by CC is yet to be born (Figure 1.3).² Interestingly, a delay of one generation as the first (perceived as) affected by CC is significantly associated with a lower knowledge index by 0.1 standard deviation. This finding may indicate that learning is partly motivated by perceived personal prejudice.

1.2 The Reaction Needed

Kallbekken & Aasen (2010) report that “a poll of 22,000 respondents from 21 countries found that 83% say it will be necessary to make lifestyle and behavioural changes to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (Globescan and PIPA, 2007).” Other French representative surveys find similar results for the reaction needed and indicate which efforts people are most ready to make. BVA (2011) indicates that, to save energy, 76% plan to “change their consumption habits” and 61% plan works in their accomodation. In the U.S., 52% already think they “do a good job at protecting the environment” Gallup (2019). However, ADEME (2018) shows that the efforts people are making or could easily make are also the least efficient to reduce GhG emissions: most people cite waste sorting (89%) or buying seasonal vegetables (87%), but fewer mention walking or cycling (55%) or using public transport (49%) instead of driving.

Logically, 62% thus think that “only legislative constraint is effective in making a successful transition and forcing everyone to change their consumption habits” (OpinionWay, 2019). The extent to which people support such legislation is documented by Bréchon et al. (2019): 50% favour the protection of the environment at the expense of the economy and employment. In the U.S., Gallup surveys show that this prioritization depends largely on the economic conditions, in accordance with Brulle et al. (2012) and Shum (2012): the figure is 65% in 2019 but was 38% in 2010.

¹See e.g. vulnerability indexes (Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2012; Guillaumont, 2015; Closset et al., 2018).

²We assume here that both countries are comparable.




Figure 1.2: Perceived region where climate change impacts will be the most serious.




Figure 1.3: Perceived date of birth of first generation severely affected by CC.

2 Test different wording for winners and losers

Table 2.1: Effect of defining winners/losers in terms of purchasing power

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Poors expected to win (1)	City dwellers expected to win (2)	Rich expected to lose (3)	Rural expected to lose (4)
Constant	0.058*** (0.007)	0.207*** (0.010)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.352*** (0.012)
In purchasing power	0.045*** (0.010)	−0.029** (0.014)	0.015*** (0.005)	−0.014 (0.017)
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.007	0.001	0.003	0.0002

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3 Additional specifications for determinants of attitudes

Table 3.1: Determinants of attitudes towards diesel taxation

	Acceptance increase in diesel taxation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Knowledge on CC	0.046*** (0.008)			
Ecologist	0.082*** (0.023)			
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.041 (0.030)		-0.068** (0.034)	
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.099*** (0.021)		-0.134*** (0.023)	
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.188*** (0.022)		-0.289*** (0.024)	
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.163*** (0.040)		-0.300*** (0.045)	
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.082 (0.052)			0.076 (0.060)
Left-right: Left	0.033 (0.025)			0.025 (0.024)
Left-right: Center	0.016 (0.028)			0.081*** (0.029)
Left-right: Right	-0.045* (0.027)			-0.060** (0.026)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.030 (0.031)			-0.180*** (0.033)
Size of town: -20k	-0.001 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)		
Size of town: 20-100k	0.013 (0.027)	0.016 (0.027)		
Size of town: +100k	0.068*** (0.025)	0.106*** (0.022)		
Size of town: Paris	0.083** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.026)		
Diesel	-0.371*** (0.023)	-0.474*** (0.016)		
Gasoline	0.153*** (0.022)			
Number vehicles	-0.022 (0.019)			
Frequency of public transit	0.001 (0.007)			
Additional covariates	✓			
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.357	0.271	0.054	0.018

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

Table 3.2: Determinants of attitudes towards carbon tax revenue recycling

	Non-polluting transports	VAT cut	Renewable energies	Renovation of buildings	Transfer constrained hh.	Reduction soc. contri.	Transfer poor hh.	Reduction pub. deficit	Transfer all hh.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Knowledge on CC	0.127*** (0.025)	-0.050* (0.026)	0.132*** (0.025)	0.099*** (0.025)	0.051* (0.026)	-0.064** (0.026)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.074** (0.029)
CC is disastrous	0.298*** (0.049)	0.085 (0.052)	0.275*** (0.050)	0.247*** (0.049)	0.151*** (0.052)	0.109** (0.053)	0.102* (0.057)	0.105** (0.052)	0.078 (0.057)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.031 (0.035)	-0.115*** (0.038)	-0.003 (0.036)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.096** (0.038)	-0.073* (0.041)	-0.079** (0.038)	-0.068* (0.041)
Ecologist	0.310*** (0.068)	-0.036 (0.073)	0.436*** (0.069)	0.262*** (0.068)	0.055 (0.072)	-0.085 (0.073)	0.183** (0.078)	-0.024 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.079)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.156* (0.089)	-0.041 (0.096)	-0.256*** (0.091)	-0.171* (0.090)	-0.140 (0.095)	-0.189** (0.096)	0.032 (0.104)	-0.318*** (0.095)	-0.129 (0.104)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.039 (0.061)	0.262*** (0.066)	-0.106* (0.062)	-0.016 (0.061)	0.091 (0.065)	0.007 (0.066)	0.127* (0.071)	-0.096 (0.065)	-0.094 (0.071)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.271*** (0.065)	0.141** (0.070)	-0.346*** (0.066)	-0.243*** (0.065)	-0.098 (0.069)	-0.166** (0.070)	-0.043 (0.076)	-0.321*** (0.069)	-0.277*** (0.076)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.306*** (0.118)	0.272** (0.127)	-0.370*** (0.120)	-0.211* (0.119)	0.022 (0.126)	-0.112 (0.127)	-0.023 (0.137)	-0.297** (0.125)	-0.345** (0.137)
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.066 (0.154)	0.162 (0.166)	0.066 (0.157)	0.223 (0.155)	0.043 (0.164)	-0.195 (0.166)	0.180 (0.179)	-0.216 (0.164)	-0.399** (0.179)
Left-right: Left	0.085 (0.074)	-0.079 (0.080)	0.145* (0.076)	0.089 (0.075)	0.074 (0.079)	-0.097 (0.080)	0.301*** (0.086)	-0.099 (0.079)	-0.065 (0.087)
Left-right: Center	0.038 (0.082)	-0.162* (0.088)	0.021 (0.084)	0.137* (0.083)	0.083 (0.087)	-0.093 (0.089)	0.054 (0.095)	0.105 (0.087)	-0.100 (0.096)
Left-right: Right	0.048 (0.079)	-0.013 (0.085)	0.058 (0.080)	0.084 (0.079)	0.072 (0.084)	0.090 (0.085)	-0.134 (0.092)	0.160* (0.084)	0.051 (0.092)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.212** (0.093)	-0.041 (0.100)	-0.106 (0.095)	-0.147 (0.094)	-0.186* (0.099)	-0.013 (0.100)	-0.209* (0.108)	-0.172* (0.099)	-0.095 (0.108)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.027 (0.026)	0.016 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.026)	-0.047* (0.027)	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.026)	0.011 (0.029)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.285** (0.113)	-0.105 (0.121)	-0.270** (0.115)	-0.101 (0.113)	-0.096 (0.120)	-0.120 (0.121)	-0.308** (0.131)	-0.261** (0.120)	0.244* (0.131)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.167 (0.112)	-0.083 (0.120)	-0.109 (0.114)	0.057 (0.112)	-0.023 (0.119)	0.014 (0.120)	-0.283** (0.130)	-0.202* (0.119)	0.096 (0.130)
Age: 50 – 64	-0.015 (0.121)	0.032 (0.130)	-0.038 (0.124)	0.122 (0.122)	0.178 (0.129)	0.166 (0.131)	-0.053 (0.141)	-0.176 (0.129)	0.129 (0.141)
Age: ≥ 65	-0.010 (0.143)	-0.034 (0.154)	-0.034 (0.146)	0.217 (0.144)	0.215 (0.152)	0.130 (0.154)	0.028 (0.166)	-0.140 (0.152)	0.111 (0.166)
Income (k€/month)	0.025 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.023)	0.014 (0.022)	0.013 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.084*** (0.025)	0.008 (0.023)	0.054** (0.025)
Sex: Male	-0.151*** (0.049)	-0.183*** (0.053)	-0.183*** (0.050)	-0.132*** (0.049)	-0.190*** (0.052)	-0.221*** (0.053)	-0.161*** (0.057)	-0.132** (0.052)	-0.108* (0.057)
Size of town (1 to 5)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.005 (0.023)	0.004 (0.022)	0.003 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.019 (0.023)	0.029 (0.025)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.025)
Frequency of public transit	0.025 (0.020)	-0.026 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.0001 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.024)
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.125	0.066	0.129	0.095	0.060	0.058	0.120	0.053	0.064

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

Table 3.3: Determinants of attitudes towards specific climate policies

	Norms for buildings (1)	Norms for new vehicles (2)	Tax on kerosene (3)	Prohibition pol. vehicles (4)	Norms for old vehicles (5)	Contribution climate fund (6)	Tax on red meat (7)	Urban tolls (8)
Knowledge on CC	0.155*** (0.022)	0.186*** (0.022)	0.130*** (0.024)	0.118*** (0.025)	0.100*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.025)	0.118*** (0.023)	0.027 (0.023)
CC is disastrous	0.175*** (0.043)	0.360*** (0.043)	0.105** (0.047)	0.246*** (0.050)	0.252*** (0.047)	0.271*** (0.050)	0.160*** (0.046)	0.092** (0.046)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.117*** (0.031)	0.115*** (0.031)	0.245*** (0.034)	0.022 (0.036)	0.003 (0.034)	0.041 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.033)	0.027 (0.033)
Ecologist	0.141** (0.059)	0.160*** (0.059)	0.263*** (0.065)	0.317*** (0.069)	0.233*** (0.066)	0.288*** (0.069)	0.480*** (0.063)	0.267*** (0.064)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.151* (0.078)	-0.084 (0.078)	-0.203** (0.086)	-0.104 (0.091)	-0.127 (0.087)	-0.086 (0.091)	0.012 (0.083)	-0.213** (0.084)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.103* (0.053)	0.041 (0.059)	-0.162*** (0.062)	-0.139** (0.059)	-0.113* (0.062)	0.069 (0.057)	-0.224*** (0.058)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.071 (0.057)	-0.178*** (0.057)	0.201*** (0.062)	-0.285*** (0.066)	-0.294*** (0.063)	-0.291*** (0.066)	0.059 (0.061)	-0.365*** (0.061)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.147 (0.104)	-0.447*** (0.103)	0.171 (0.113)	-0.573*** (0.121)	-0.456*** (0.115)	-0.536*** (0.120)	-0.107 (0.111)	-0.324*** (0.112)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.076 (0.135)	-0.174 (0.135)	0.007 (0.148)	-0.191 (0.157)	-0.051 (0.150)	0.267* (0.157)	0.199 (0.144)	-0.017 (0.146)
Left-right: Left	0.009 (0.065)	-0.067 (0.065)	-0.070 (0.071)	-0.084 (0.076)	-0.110 (0.072)	0.226*** (0.076)	-0.007 (0.070)	0.056 (0.070)
Left-right: Center	0.062 (0.072)	-0.017 (0.072)	0.111 (0.079)	-0.043 (0.084)	0.029 (0.080)	-0.047 (0.084)	0.028 (0.077)	0.110 (0.078)
Left-right: Right	-0.046 (0.069)	-0.036 (0.069)	-0.048 (0.076)	-0.021 (0.080)	0.003 (0.077)	-0.047 (0.080)	-0.114 (0.074)	0.009 (0.074)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.013 (0.082)	-0.064 (0.082)	0.007 (0.089)	-0.215** (0.095)	-0.262*** (0.090)	-0.329*** (0.095)	-0.236*** (0.087)	-0.180** (0.088)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.030 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.017 (0.024)	0.044* (0.025)	0.015 (0.024)	-0.037 (0.025)	0.011 (0.023)	0.016 (0.023)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.012 (0.099)	-0.066 (0.099)	0.223** (0.108)	0.051 (0.115)	-0.015 (0.109)	-0.174 (0.115)	-0.199* (0.105)	-0.016 (0.106)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.014 (0.098)	0.087 (0.098)	0.319*** (0.107)	0.130 (0.114)	-0.060 (0.109)	-0.227** (0.114)	-0.419*** (0.105)	-0.155 (0.106)
Age: 50 – 64	0.096 (0.106)	0.145 (0.106)	0.427*** (0.116)	0.173 (0.124)	0.090 (0.118)	-0.368*** (0.123)	-0.423*** (0.113)	-0.199* (0.114)
Age: ≥ 65	0.080 (0.125)	0.123 (0.125)	0.447*** (0.137)	0.275* (0.146)	0.210 (0.139)	-0.483*** (0.145)	-0.394*** (0.134)	-0.109 (0.135)
Income (k€/month)	0.029 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.025 (0.021)	0.040* (0.022)	0.038* (0.021)	0.039* (0.022)	0.004 (0.020)	0.046** (0.020)
Sex: Male	-0.120*** (0.043)	-0.114*** (0.043)	0.057 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.050)	-0.132*** (0.047)	-0.216*** (0.050)	-0.136*** (0.046)	-0.002 (0.046)
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.003 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.041** (0.020)	0.020 (0.022)	0.018 (0.021)	0.038* (0.022)	0.049** (0.020)	-0.029 (0.020)
Frequency of public transit	0.013 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.040** (0.020)	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.052*** (0.019)	-0.036* (0.019)
Additional covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.086	0.165	0.117	0.164	0.176	0.173	0.147	0.118

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

Table 3.4: Determinants of attitudes towards climate policies, additional specifications

	Share of policies (1)	Tax & dividend (2) (3)	
Knowledge on CC	0.057*** (0.005)		
CC is disastrous	0.090*** (0.010)		
Diploma (1 to 4)	0.006 (0.004)		
Age: 25 – 34	–0.039** (0.018)		
Age: 35 – 49	–0.019 (0.017)		
Age: 50 – 64	0.005 (0.017)		
Age: ≥ 65	0.045** (0.018)		
Income (k€/month)	0.003 (0.002)		
Sex: Male	–0.008 (0.009)		
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.008** (0.004)		
Frequency of public transit	0.017*** (0.004)		
Left-right: Extreme-left		0.072** (0.033)	–0.065 (0.057)
Left-right: Left		0.040*** (0.013)	0.031 (0.022)
Left-right: Center		0.071*** (0.015)	0.090*** (0.026)
Left-right: Right		0.029** (0.014)	–0.037 (0.024)
Left-right: Extreme-right		–0.061*** (0.018)	–0.155*** (0.031)
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.143	0.018	0.017

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

4 Construction of the knowledge index

We synthesize the different dimensions of knowledge proposed by Kiel & Rost (2002) and summarized by Hoppe et al. (2018) using our questions on the existence and anthropogenic origin of CC (corresponding to the causal knowledge), on the region most affected (effects), as well as our scores on the emission target (basic), greenhouse gases (basic) and on activities responsible for CC (action-related).

From an exploratory factor analysis (fitted using the maximum likelihood method), we find the factor which explains the highest share of common variance, and report it in Table 4.1. We use the factor loadings hereby obtained to define the relative weights of the components of our index of knowledge, and we round them for readability purpose. The rounding has virtually no effect on the result, as the correlation between our index and the factor obtained is 0.999. For information, the correlations between the different components of our index, including our index itself, are reported on Figure 4.1.

Moreover, Table 4.2 shows that the determinants of Tax & Dividend are robust to the choice of the *knowledge* variable: if we replace our index by any of its component, the coefficients of the other determinants are virtually unchanged. Interestingly, this analysis indicates that it is the knowledge on the existence and the anthropogenic nature of CC that drives the effect of overall knowledge, justifying a higher weight for these two components. Finally, we could reproduce this robustness check for the other dependent variable of Table II, and also by replacing the independent variable *knowledge* in Table I, and we would again see that the other coefficients are essentially unaffected.

Table 4.1: Factor loadings and weights chosen for different dimensions of knowledge on CC

Variable	GhG	Activities	Exists	Anthropogenic	Target	Region
Loading	.212	.182	.398	.601	.200	.000
Weight	1	1	2	3	1	0




Figure 4.1: Correlations between different variables of knowledge on CC.

Table 4.2: Robustness of the determinants of Tax & Dividend Acceptance To Knowledge Variables

	Tax & dividend					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Knowledge on CC	0.029*** (0.009)					
CC is Anthropogenic		0.068*** (0.019)				
CC Exists			0.115** (0.051)			
Score GhG				0.002 (0.009)		
Score Activities					0.005 (0.009)	
Score Target proximity						0.015* (0.008)
Ecologist	0.126*** (0.024)	0.130*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.134*** (0.024)	0.132*** (0.024)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.021 (0.032)	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.144*** (0.022)	-0.144*** (0.022)	-0.146*** (0.022)	-0.146*** (0.022)	-0.145*** (0.022)	-0.146*** (0.022)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.222*** (0.023)	-0.222*** (0.023)	-0.226*** (0.023)	-0.228*** (0.023)	-0.227*** (0.023)	-0.227*** (0.023)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.214*** (0.043)	-0.215*** (0.043)	-0.218*** (0.043)	-0.226*** (0.042)	-0.225*** (0.043)	-0.225*** (0.042)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.040 (0.056)	-0.038 (0.056)	-0.028 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.056)	-0.037 (0.056)
Left-right: Left	0.072*** (0.027)	0.072*** (0.027)	0.075*** (0.027)	0.075*** (0.027)	0.074*** (0.027)	0.075*** (0.027)
Left-right: Center	0.051* (0.030)	0.053* (0.030)	0.052* (0.030)	0.053* (0.030)	0.053* (0.030)	0.054* (0.030)
Left-right: Right	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.022 (0.028)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.041 (0.034)	-0.044 (0.034)	-0.046 (0.034)	-0.045 (0.034)	-0.044 (0.034)	-0.045 (0.034)
Sex: Male	-0.053*** (0.018)	-0.047*** (0.018)	-0.046*** (0.018)	-0.048*** (0.018)	-0.049*** (0.018)	-0.048*** (0.018)
Additional covariates	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.150	0.151	0.149	0.147	0.147	0.148

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are the same as in Table II.

5 Logit regressions for determinants

Table 5.1: Determinants of attitudes towards climate change (CC) with logit regressions.

	CC is anthropogenic			CC is disastrous	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.034*** (0.013)			0.045*** (0.014)	
Ecologist	0.144*** (0.021)			0.186*** (0.027)	
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.097*** (0.036)			-0.069** (0.034)	
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.034 (0.023)			-0.040* (0.024)	
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.101*** (0.025)			-0.052** (0.025)	
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.196*** (0.047)			-0.079* (0.044)	
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.121** (0.047)		0.079 (0.071)	0.070 (0.064)	0.006 (0.088)
Left-right: Left	0.088*** (0.025)		0.050 (0.045)	0.104*** (0.030)	-0.006 (0.053)
Left-right: Center	0.011 (0.030)		0.009 (0.044)	0.030 (0.032)	-0.072 (0.048)
Left-right: Right	-0.031 (0.029)		-0.032 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.138*** (0.048)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.012 (0.034)		-0.025 (0.056)	0.023 (0.038)	-0.081 (0.062)
Diploma: <i>CAP</i> or <i>BEP</i>	0.042** (0.020)		0.039* (0.021)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.026)
Diploma: <i>Baccalauréat</i>	0.063*** (0.024)		0.111*** (0.024)	0.025 (0.029)	0.121*** (0.030)
Diploma: Higher	0.093*** (0.025)		0.165*** (0.024)	0.095*** (0.031)	0.234*** (0.030)
Diploma × Left-right			-0.010 (0.008)		-0.004 (0.009)
Diploma × Left-right: Indeterminate			0.005 (0.015)		-0.024 (0.016)
Age: 25 – 34	0.048 (0.042)	-0.040 (0.041)		0.018 (0.047)	
Age: 35 – 49	-0.008 (0.043)	-0.113*** (0.035)		0.026 (0.045)	
Age: 50 – 64	0.005 (0.045)	-0.116*** (0.034)		-0.036 (0.047)	
Age: ≥ 65	-0.095* (0.057)	-0.228*** (0.035)		-0.087 (0.056)	
Income (k€/month)	-0.011 (0.008)			-0.010 (0.009)	
Sex: Male	-0.024 (0.018)			0.003 (0.019)	
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.006 (0.008)			0.007 (0.008)	
Frequency of public transit	0.012 (0.007)			0.007 (0.008)	
Additional covariates	✓			✓	
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Interaction term is computed using numeric variables. Omitted modalities are: *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Left-right: Indeterminate*, *Diploma: Brevet or no diploma*, *Age: 18 – 24*.

Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

Table 5.2: Determinants of attitudes towards climate policies with logit regressions.

	Tax & dividend		Share of policies	Ecological lifestyle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Knowledge on CC	0.029*** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.092*** (0.010)
CC is disastrous	0.023 (0.017)	0.035* (0.018)	0.081*** (0.020)	0.137*** (0.018)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	-0.019 (0.013)		0.032** (0.014)	0.028** (0.013)
Ecologist	0.107*** (0.025)		0.077*** (0.028)	0.173*** (0.023)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.022 (0.028)		-0.054 (0.036)	-0.087** (0.034)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.117*** (0.018)		-0.025 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.022)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.207*** (0.019)		-0.050* (0.026)	-0.020 (0.024)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.177*** (0.028)		-0.080* (0.047)	-0.026 (0.042)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.035 (0.055)		0.022 (0.065)	0.083 (0.055)
Left-right: Left	0.070*** (0.027)		-0.003 (0.030)	0.039 (0.027)
Left-right: Center	0.051* (0.029)		0.013 (0.033)	0.096*** (0.028)
Left-right: Right	-0.022 (0.027)		0.009 (0.032)	0.010 (0.028)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.076** (0.034)		-0.023 (0.039)	0.010 (0.033)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.039 (0.038)	-0.079*** (0.028)	-0.024 (0.048)	0.032 (0.042)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.067** (0.026)	-0.015 (0.046)	0.051 (0.040)
Age: 50 – 64	-0.043 (0.040)	-0.078*** (0.027)	-0.002 (0.049)	0.059 (0.042)
Age: ≥ 65	-0.066 (0.046)	-0.074*** (0.028)	0.001 (0.058)	0.016 (0.051)
Income (k€/month)	0.0002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
Sex: Male	-0.051*** (0.017)	-0.070*** (0.017)	-0.027 (0.020)	-0.066*** (0.018)
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.008)
Frequency of public transit	-0.006 (0.007)	0.012* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.023*** (0.008)
Additional covariates	✓		✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Average marginal effects are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Omitted variables are *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Age : 18 – 24* and *Left-right: Indeterminate*. Additional covariates are defined in Appendix C.

6 Robustness for the absence of cultural cognition effect

Table 6.1: Robustness of the absence interaction on perceived effects between political orientation and knowledge.

	CC is disastrous		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Constant	0.404*** (0.035)	0.510*** (0.056)	0.458*** (0.017)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.049 (0.041)		-0.021 (0.033)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.013 (0.034)		0.001 (0.023)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.020 (0.051)		0.002 (0.023)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.049 (0.079)		0.024 (0.044)
Left-right: Left		-0.004 (0.059)	
Left-right: Center		-0.071 (0.060)	
Left-right: Right		-0.119** (0.060)	
Left-right: Extreme-right		-0.054 (0.063)	
Diploma: <i>CAP</i> or <i>BEP</i>	-0.029 (0.024)		
Diploma: <i>Baccalauréat</i>	0.109*** (0.027)		
Diploma: Higher	0.203*** (0.024)		
Knowledge CC		0.174*** (0.011)	0.188*** (0.009)
Diploma \times Yellow Vests	-0.001 (0.009)		
Knowledge CC \times Left-right		-0.007 (0.009)	
Knowledge CC \times Yellow Vests			0.001 (0.010)
Observations	3,002	1,813	3,002
R ²	0.039	0.138	0.145

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Interaction term is computed using numeric variables. Omitted modalities are: *Yellow Vests: opposes*, *Left-right: Extreme-left*, *Diploma: Brevet or no diploma*.

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French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon Taxation and other Climate Policies

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Abstract

This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in detail the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better access to science could foster support for climate policies.

Keywords: Climate Policy; Carbon tax; Preferences; Acceptability; France

JEL classification. D78; H23; Q54; Q58

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1. Introduction

The French government is currently facing a two-sided challenge on climate policies. On the one hand, the protest of the Yellow Vests that originated in November 2018 against the planned doubling in the carbon tax — from 44.6 to 86.2€/tCO₂ in 2022 — led the government to halt the increasing trajectory that started at 7€/tCO₂ in 2014. On the other hand, a large campaign called “Affaire du siècle” started in December 2018 against its inaction for the environment, gathering over two millions signatories in a month. It is so far unclear how the tension between these two a priori antagonistic objectives will be resolved. In particular, one may wonder whether the two movements involve distinct groups with opposite interests, or rather reflect a commonly perceived inadequacy of the solution proposed by the government to address the climate threat.

This paper aims to understand French perceptions over the carbon tax and other climate policies. It builds on a new survey conducted on a sample of 3,002 respondents representative of the French population. Our survey contains questions to assess respondents’ knowledge about change change (CC) and their perceptions over its causes and consequences. As the paper was primarily motivated by the failed attempt to increase the French carbon tax, we examine in detail attitudes towards this instrument. We propose to respondents a Tax & Dividend policy, i.e. a carbon tax whose revenue would be returned lump-sum uniformly to all adults. This policy differs from the one proposed by the government, since the revenue would have been used to fund the general budget instead. We identify respondents’ expected winners and losers, and the perceived problems and benefits of this instrument. We devote particular attention to the issue of mobility that appears critical in the current debate. We then turn to the support for a carbon tax with alternative uses of the revenue, such as more targeted transfers, earmarking, and double-dividend strategies. We also study the support for other climate policies, including norms and other Pigouvian taxes, and local policies for urban transport. Finally, we identify the determinants of attitudes over both climate change and climate policies, as well

as the link between the two.

For a general presentation of attitudes over climate change, we suggest [Whitmarsh & Capstick \(2018\)](#), while for a more specific review on their trends and determinants, we redirect to [Brehin \(2010\)](#) and [Ziegler \(2017\)](#). Our paper contributes mainly to a growing literature on the political economy of climate policies. As an entry point to previous related studies, refer to [Maestre-Andrés et al. \(2019\)](#) who review the perceptions of climate policies, [Drews & van den Bergh \(2016\)](#) who review the determinants of their support, and to [Carattini et al. \(2018\)](#) for a comprehensive overview on attitudes over the carbon tax.

A large extent of the literature has focused on the carbon tax. Using a post-electoral survey in Switzerland, [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) finds that political leaning, education and self-interest are correlated with acceptance. Subsequent literature has confirmed the importance of self-interest (e.g. [Fischer et al., 2011](#); [Baranzini & Carattini, 2017](#)) although [Kallbekken & Sælen \(2011\)](#) find that perception of the tax' effectiveness and its distributive properties play a larger role in Norway. The critical role of the tax' effectiveness has been confirmed by numerous contributions that pointed out the higher acceptance of taxes whose revenue was earmarked towards green investments (e.g. [Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011](#); [Baranzini & Carattini, 2017](#)). Similarly, studies have confirmed that people tend to prefer more progressive schemes ([Brannlund & Persson, 2012](#); [Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015](#)) and more targeted revenue recycling ([Kallbekken et al., 2011](#)). In a companion paper ([Douenne & Fabre, 2019](#)) based on the same survey, we show that French people reject the carbon tax because of biased beliefs over its properties, but if convinced about their own gain, the environmental effectiveness and the progressivity of the mechanism, they would largely approve it. Among the potential barriers to the implementation of carbon taxation, [Kallbekken & Aasen \(2010\)](#) emphasize the importance of the availability of alternatives to fossil fuels. When these alternatives are lacking or not easily affordable, carbon taxation is perceived as just a pretext to increase taxes ([Dresner et al., 2006](#); [Klok et al., 2006](#)). Finally, as shown by [Harring & Jagers \(2013\)](#), trust in politicians is also a key factor for carbon tax acceptance, which relates to the recent findings of

Rafaty (2018) who shows that higher political distrust is associated with weaker climate policies.

While a lot of attention has recently been put on carbon taxation, fewer
 65 studies have investigated attitudes towards other climate policies. Yet, as highlighted by Stern & Stiglitz (2017) and Stiglitz (2019) a single price instrument may not be the best response to climate change in a second-best world. The main factors driving people’s preferences between various policies appear to be their degree of coercion, the behavior targeted by the policy (de Groot &
 70 Schuitema, 2012), and the perceived cost. It follows that subsidies are in general preferred over taxes (e.g. Tobler et al., 2012; Cherry et al., 2017), and more voluntary measures over hard regulations (Attari et al., 2009). The present paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of perceptions and attitudes towards CC, carbon taxation and other climate policies in a
 75 country that has recently experienced a carbon tax increase and a large debate ensuing. As it is based on an unusually large sample representative of the French population, the paper also goes further than previous studies in identifying the heterogeneity in people’s attitudes over climate policies.

Section 2 presents the survey. Section 3 describes attitudes towards climate
 80 change. Section 4 focuses on tax & dividend policies, its perceptions, and the reasons explaining the low support for this policy. Section 5 studies the support for alternative revenue recycling mechanisms as well as for other climate policies. Section 6 examines the heterogeneity in attitudes expressed in the previous sections and characterize their determinants. Section 7 concludes. Finally,
 85 further material can be found in appendix and online Appendix.

2. The survey

2.1. Presentation of the survey

We collected 3002 responses in February and March 2019 through the survey company Bilendi. This company maintains a panel of French respondents
 90 to whom they can email survey links. Respondents are paid 3€ if they fully

complete the survey. The respondents who choose to respond are first filtered through some screening questions which ensure that the final sample is representative along six socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age (5 brackets), education (4), socio-professional category (8), size of town (5), and region (9). The quotas are relaxed by 5% to 10% relative to actual proportions. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows that our sample is still extremely representative. Nonetheless, observations are weighted to correct small differences between sample and population proportions. The median time for completion of the survey was 19 minutes.

The full survey in French can be seen [online](#),¹ the questions analyzed are translated in Appendix D, and the code is available on [github](#). Figure 1 presents in a diagram the sequence of questions.




Figure 1: Diagram of the sequence of questions.

The survey starts by asking for households' socio-demographics and energy usage. The distribution of answers are much in-line with official statistics, as shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Then, we describe Tax & Dividend reforms where the revenues of an increase in the French carbon tax by 50€/tCO₂ are redistributed uniformly to all adults. We first allocate respondents randomly

¹preferences-pol.fr/doc_q.php#_e

to a sectoral Tax & Dividend reform, which concerns either gas and domestic fuel (i.e. housing energy), or gasoline and diesel (i.e. transportation energy).
 110 Respondents are asked to estimate their reaction to price changes, the reaction of French people, and how much purchasing power they would gain or lose from the policy. To this end, exact price variations and the amount transferred are provided, and respondents can choose among answers given in different brackets. Then, we study perceptions and support for a Tax & Dividend on both
 115 sectors combined, before and after providing new information to the respondents. This new information is either that the policy is progressive, or whether their household would win or lose some purchasing power through the reform. Before providing information, we let respondents pick the categories of losers and winners from the reform; and after the information, they choose the benefits and the problems associated with this reform. We study these perceptions
 120 of the policy in the present paper, but please refer to our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019) for details and analyses on the other questions about Tax & Dividend reforms.

2.2. Eliciting attitudes

125 After inquiring about the support for Tax & Dividend, we ask respondents to assess on a Likert scale different ways to recycle the revenues of a carbon tax. On another Likert scale, we examine opinions on other climate policies, notably new norms or Pigouvian taxes. We then measure respondents' knowledge about climate change by asking for its origin (anthropogenic or natural), its causes (in
 130 terms of gases and activities), which region it will most affect (between India and the European Union), and what reduction of emissions is needed by 2050 to respect the +2°C target. At the same time, we assess attitudes over climate change by asking respondents about the frequency with which they talk about it, the gravity of its consequences, the generations it will severely affect, and
 135 the entities responsible for its occurrence. We continue by surveying if and how climate change influences one's decision to have a child, under which conditions one would be ready to change their lifestyle to fight climate change, and whether

one would be ready to adopt a sustainable lifestyle if policies were aligned to this goal. We also ask questions about diesel taxation. Then, we evaluate the respondents access to public transport, their mobility habits, and if there is room for changing these habits. Finally, we ask for their political preferences, including their positioning in relation to the Yellow Vests. The survey ends with a text box where the respondents can leave a comment.

3. Attitudes over Climate Change

To fully understand the root motivations to the support or rejection of climate policies, we first analyze the knowledge and perceptions over CC, as well as the reaction that people expect to address this phenomenon. As the paper focuses on explaining attitudes over policies, we relegate to online Appendix 1 some figures and some results from other surveys.

3.1. Knowledge

As shown in Figure 2, knowledge that CC is anthropogenic is widespread (72%) and the share who do not believe in climate change (CC) is marginal (4%). The level of knowledge on the anthropogenic origin of CC is similar to that of other Western countries (Leiserowitz, 2007; Lee et al., 2015; Stokes et al., 2015): it is 66% in the U.S. (Gallup, 2019) for example. At the same time, knowledge about climate science appears limited. Although 77% of people correctly tick “CO₂” as a greenhouse gas (GhG), Figure 3 shows that almost as many people tick particulate matter (39%) as methane (48%). Admittedly, understanding the impacts of activities is more useful than erudition about chemical factors, but here again, knowledge is quite low. We assess such awareness using pairs of comparable activities whose GhG footprint differ by a factor 20 (beef steak



Figure 2: Perceived cause of climate change.




Figure 3: Perceived factors of climate change.

vs. pasta, plane vs. train) or whose footprint are similar (nuclear vs. wind power).² We ask whether it is true that one activity emits 20 times more GhG than the other, as a way to express precisely that one is “much more” polluting
 165 than the other. For each pair, around half of the sample is correct. The bulk of respondents pick two correct answers out of three (44%), but more get them all wrong (19%) than all right (15%).

Not only do most people fail to fully understand the factors and consequences of CC, but they also fail to grasp the degree of reaction needed to tackle it. When
 170 informed that “each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of CO₂ per year” and asked what the figure should be in 2050 to “hope to contain global warming to +2°C in 2100 (if all countries did the same)”, 59% answer 5 or more (see Figure 4). Only 17% select a correct answer: 0, 1 or 2 (see Appendix B for why these are correct).

175 [Millner & Ollivier \(2016\)](#) propose several mechanisms to explain people’s lack of understanding about climate change: in addition to the difficulty of grasping gradual changes, they emphasize the complexity of drawing a causal link between diffuse causes and distant consequences.³ Failing to assimilate

²Appendix B.1 details how the figures were obtained.

³Actually, even MIT students struggle with this ([Stermann, 2008](#)).




Figure 4: Perceived GhG emission p.c. required in 2050 to limit global warming to +2°C (in tCO₂eq/yr), given that it is now 10.




Figure 5: Entities perceived responsible for climate change.




Figure 6: Perceived gravity of climate change.

the underlying channels may blur the link between people’s own behavior and consequences for the climate. Thus, we can wonder if people understand who would have to make the mitigation effort in a sustainable scenario, i.e. who is responsible for CC.

3.2. Perceptions

As shown in Figure 5, 63% acknowledge that “each one of us” is responsible for CC, and less people ascribe the responsibility to “certain foreign countries” (47%), “the richest” (42%), or any other agent. Not only do people seem lucid concerning the agents causing CC, but a vast majority also foresees worrying consequences if humanity does nothing to limit it. Figure 6 shows that 19%




Figure 7: Respondent could change their lifestyle under a condition.

see the impacts as “cataclysmic, humankind would disappear”, 18% as “disas-
 190 trous, lifestyles would be largely altered”, 28% as “grave, because there would be
 more natural disasters”, while only 11% think damages would be “small, because
 humans would be able to live with it” or “insignificant, or even beneficial”.

Overall, these results indicate that most people understand the fundamentals
 of climate issues, including the root causes and the scale of the problem, but
 195 that only a minority has thought of CC deeply enough to comprehend its factors
 and the pathways to tackle it.

3.3. The Reaction Needed

Given that many people may not realize the extent of the transition needed
 to reach sustainability, and that others may be discouraged precisely by the
 200 sheer magnitude of such a transition, we can wonder how willing people are
 to contribute to its success. An encouraging finding for the transition is that
 65% are “willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and
 make sure to use almost no gasoline, diesel nor kerosene)”, assuming that “all
 states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a
 205 transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining

that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely”, while only 17% answer “No” (the others do not take a side). While the phrasing removes most grounds against a change in lifestyle, we inquire under which conditions people would be willing to adopt such a change (see Figure 7). 82% of respondents would be willing to change their lifestyle under at least one of the three conditions proposed: sufficient financial resources, an alignment of policies to this goal, or an adjustment of others’ behavior (about 45% each).

Finally, a substantial fraction of people incorporates ecological constraints in their life choices. Indeed, 15% call themselves ecologist (the most picked political identity outside of the left-right spectrum, see Appendix E), 23% claim they already adopted a sustainable way of life, and 20% say the CC “has had or will have an influence in their decision to have a child”.

4. Attitudes over Carbon Tax and Dividend

Most French people are aware and concerned about climate change and claim to be willing to exert efforts to fight it. Yet, the government’s attempt to introduce a carbon tax to deal with French emissions resulted in a widespread popular protest. To understand this paradox, we investigate the preferences over a Tax & Dividend policy: an increase of 50€/tCO₂ in the current French carbon tax, with a uniform lump-sum redistribution of the additional revenue to all adults. This policy differs from the official one whose revenue was mostly used to fund the general budget. Respondents are given the associated increase in energy prices so that the direct costs are salient: +13% (resp. +15%) for gas (resp. domestic fuel), and +0.11€ (resp. +0.13€) for a liter of gasoline (resp. diesel). They are also told that the transfer would amount to 110€ per adult annually.

4.1. Widespread rejection

French people would largely reject the proposed policy. Only 10% of our respondents declare they would approve it, while 70% say they would not (see




Figure 8: Approval of Tax & Dividend.

Figure 8). As shown in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019), this rejection can be explained by erroneous perceptions about the policy’s outcome, such as an overestimation of its impact on one’s purchasing power. For instance, 30% of people who use neither gas nor domestic fuel believe their household would lose from an equally redistributed increase in taxes on these goods. Interestingly, the salience of costs appears critical in people’s answer.

At a later stage of the survey, we ask respondents whether they would agree to increase the carbon tax if the revenue was returned to all households, without mentioning the impact on prices. The question is asked along with a package of other environmental policies (see section 5). In this case — where the benefits are more salient than the costs — we find a much higher approval rate of 37%. Another survey conducted in March 2019 (OpinionWay, 2019) assesses acceptance for a reintroduction of the carbon tax increase in 2021. They find intermediary results with an approval rate of 21%.

The low level of acceptance observed partly results from recent events. In July 2018, ADEME (2018) found that 48% of French people thought it was desirable to increase the carbon tax, a figure similar to those of other countries (Brechin, 2010). The discrepancy between 2018 and 2019 can be explained by the “campaign effect” highlighted by Anderson et al. (2019): support for a carbon tax decreases substantially after it enters the public debate. Indeed, the French carbon tax was brought under the spotlight in the end of 2018, after high oil prices triggered the Yellow Vests movement.

4.2. Perceived winners and losers

Figure 9 represents the share of respondents who expect different household categories to win or lose from the policy. Income appears to be the most crit-

ical divide, with a non-monotonic relationship. 30% of respondents expect the richest to win while only 2% think they would lose. On the contrary, 40% more people think that the poorest would lose rather than win, a difference even higher for the middle class — the category most expected to lose — at 53%. To half of respondents, we framed the question about winners and losers specifically in terms of “purchasing power”. The objective was to see if some categories were commonly seen as losing in welfare although they could gain in monetary terms, or conversely. The results look very much alike for both formulations, except that the shares of people expecting poorer households to gain (5.8%) and richer households to lose (0.9%) are significantly larger when asked in terms of purchasing power: 10.2% and 2.1%, respectively (see online Appendix 2). Overall, respondents perceive the Tax & Dividend as regressive. As shown by a large body of literature (e.g. [West & Williams, 2004](#); [Bento et al., 2009](#); [Williams et al., 2015](#)), and more specifically in our companion paper ([Douenne & Fabre, 2019](#)), these beliefs are at odds with the true distributive effects of this proposed policy.

Beyond the income dimension, people tend to identify city dwellers as potential winners from the Tax & Dividend (third position at 19%), while rural and peri-urban households are rather expected to lose (third position at 34%). We also see that people report on average more categories for expected losers than winners: 1.74 vs. 1.16. The high ranks of “no one” for winners (second) and of “everyone” for losers (fourth) further suggest that respondents do not see our policy as a zero-sum game.

4.3. *Perceived pros and cons*

Previous studies have highlighted that distributive effects are a critical determinant of carbon tax acceptance (e.g. [Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011](#); [Brannlund & Persson, 2012](#); [Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015](#)). When asked about the problems associated with the Tax & Dividend, the main response is that the tax would penalize rural households (47%). Interestingly, this concern comes before the threat that the tax could penalize the poorest (sixth position with 29%), al-

though more people report the poorest as a category of people expected to lose.

290 The second and third concerns are that the policy is simply a pretext to increase taxes (43%) — a worry documented by [Dresner et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Klok et al. \(2006\)](#) — and that it would be ineffective to reduce pollution (37%). Related to this last point is the perceived lack of alternatives, seen as insufficient or too expensive (31%). This problem has been previously stressed by [Kallbekken &](#)

295 [Aasen \(2010\)](#) in a focus group study: people do not see the point of taxing fossil fuels if they cannot substitute for other technologies. This last reason is stated as frequently as concerns over the impact on one’s own purchasing power (fourth with 31%). As shown in [Douenne & Fabre \(2019\)](#), self-interest largely affects acceptance of the Tax & Dividend, but this concern could sound too egoistic

300 when stated in a direct way. While previous studies have pointed out concerns over the negative impact of carbon taxation on the economy (e.g. [Thalmann, 2004](#); [Carattini et al., 2017](#)), this problem comes last (14%) and does not seem to represent an important obstacle for public support in the current context.

Respondents are suggested to pick at most three answers among both prob-

305 lems and benefits. On average, respondents pick 2.36 problems — and 53% pick at least 3 — against 1.14 benefits, excluding the most popular: “None of these reasons” (44%). This option comes far ahead of the second and third, “fight climate change” (30%) and “reduces negative impact of pollution on health” (27%). Still, environmental benefits are much more cited than economic ones.

310 This result is likely due to people’s pessimism about the outcome of the policy, but it might also reflect the limited importance given to economic consequences of the carbon tax, as already suggested by problems commonly cited.

4.4. *Consumption and mobility constraints*

The perceived problems identified above suggest a rationale for people’s op-

315 position towards carbon taxation: if people think the tax is ineffective, because their consumption is constrained and affordable alternatives are lacking, then taxing carbon can be perceived as a pretext to increase taxes.

4.4.1. Perceived elasticities

In order to understand to what extent people feel constrained with respect to their energy consumption, we elicit their subjective price elasticity for transport and domestic energies. We adopt the phrasing of Baranzini & Carattini (2017) and ask the expected decrease in energy consumption that would follow an increase in prices. To avoid dealing with small percentages, which people usually find more difficult to compare, we ask for the reaction to a 30% increase in the price of heating (or equivalently, an increase of 0.50€ per liter in fuel prices). Although sufficiently high to foster a significant response on demand, these changes are realistic in the medium run, and should not lead people to report long-term elasticities. Respondents may select their answer among 5 brackets. They are asked to estimate their own reaction as well as that of French people. Figure 11 presents the results.

54% (resp. 61%) of respondents consider that such an increase in prices would not lead them to reduce their transport (resp. domestic) energy consumption. This expected inelastic behavior is mainly due to mobility constraints for transport (64% of cases) while it mostly reflects a non-fossil heating type for housing (61%). Excluding people reporting inelastic behavior because of insignificant initial consumption, about 40% of people feel constrained and expect to not lower their consumption following price increases. Still, respondents perceive transport fuel price elasticity of French people at -0.45 on average, and their own elasticity at a consistent -0.36 (after re-weighting by fuel expenditures). Concerning housing energy, aggregate and personal subjective elasticities are respectively -0.43 and -0.33 . Overall, these subjective elasticities compare well to the ones found in the literature for French households, although they are slightly over-estimated (in absolute value) for housing.⁴

⁴For transports, estimates from the literature lie around -0.4 (Clerc & Marcus, 2009; Bureau, 2011; Douenne, 2018). For housing, the values are lower, typically around -0.2 (Douenne, 2018; Clerc & Marcus, 2009).

4.4.2. *Mobility and public transport*

345 To assess the level of dependence on automobiles, which we include as a determinant for preferences in Section 6, we study mobility habits and access to public transport. Figure 12 indicates that 65% of employed people drive to work, and that car usage is even more common for grocery shopping or leisure activities. This figure is confirmed by the national transport survey ENT

350 (2008) conducted by Insee and analyzed in Pappalardo et al. (2010), which reveals that a majority still uses a car for trips of 1 to 2 km. Even though 73% live within a 10 minute walk to a public transit stop (Figure 13), coverage and frequency of public transport is often too low (Figure 14) to compete with the speed, comfort, and flexibility of automobiles. Indeed, 58% of those who com-

355 mute by car declare that they could neither substitute it with public transport nor walking or cycling, and only 15% could use one of these alternative without major difficulties (Figure 15). Further evidence indicates that the lack of alternatives is a main factor for car usage, besides apparent taste for a vehicle that remains a symbol of freedom. Figure 16 shows that 52% of respondents state

360 that supply of public transport where they live is “insufficient” or “decent, but should be increased”, while 40% find it “satisfactory” or “limited, but sufficient”. From this perspective, “green public investments and carbon taxes appear to be complementary, and in the timing of climate policy it would be justified to carry out the former before implementing the latter”, as Bureau et al. (2019) suggest.

365 Alongside an increase in the supply of alternatives, climate policies could also address the demand for mobility, e.g. by revitalizing town centers and limiting urban sprawl.

5. Attitudes over Other Policies

The previous section has shown that our Tax & Dividend was largely rejected

370 by French people. As climate policies are urgently needed, it appears necessary to assess whether other designs and instruments would be met with a higher support. This section first examines public opinion about several alternative

uses for the carbon tax revenue and then turns to other environmental and climate policies.

5.1. Preferred Revenue Recycling

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We asked respondents to what extent they would accept an increase in the carbon tax for different uses of the revenue. As the exact cost of the tax was not specified, the benefits of the revenue recycling were made relatively more salient, which explains higher acceptance rates compared to our Tax & Dividend. Still, this question enables to compare answers relative to one another.

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5.1.1. Investments in energy transition

Figure 17 reports people's responses to each proposed scenario. Overall, the preferred revenue recyclings are investments in the energy transition. This result is consistent with various papers showing that earmarking the revenue of the tax for environmental purposes largely increases public support (for a review of the literature, see for instance Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Carattini et al., 2018). As people tend to see carbon taxation as effective only if it finances green investments (Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011), these policies legitimize the implementation of a tax and increase its acceptance. In addition, the large approval for a policy investing in non-polluting transport can be explained by people's desire for mobility alternatives, the lack of which was identified as an important problem with our Tax & Dividend (see section 4).

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5.1.2. Transfers to households

While previous literature has shown that distributive concerns matter for carbon tax approval, the common tool proposed by economists to address this issue — lump-sum transfers — is not met with resounding support. Out of the nine proposed mechanisms, the standard flat recycling comes last (with 37% approval), and a transfer targeted to the bottom 50% comes seventh (46%). Consistent with our previous finding that people are concerned that the carbon tax may penalize rural and peri-urban households, the preferred “lump-sum”

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transfer is the one targeted to people constrained with respect to their consumption of petroleum products (fifth with 55% approval). These results echo the findings of [Kallbekken et al. \(2011\)](#) who showed that people tend to prefer more narrowly targeted revenue recycling, possibly because of distributional concerns.

The relatively low support for compensation mechanisms should however not be understood as a lack of concern about purchasing power or distributive effects. As shown in section 4, the distributive properties of lump-sum transfers are not well understood. Perhaps surprisingly, the second preferred mechanism for revenue recycling is a reduction in the VAT rate (61% approval). The main rationales for this support are the benefits to one's purchasing power and the perceived distributive effects. As the VAT is known to be a regressive tax, people may perceive it fair to compensate an increase in the regressive carbon tax with a decrease in the VAT. Although such a mechanism would be less favorable to poorer households — who spend less in VAT in absolute value, and would therefore receive less than from a uniform transfer — it may not be perceived as such.

5.1.3. Double dividend and public deficit

The last two options propose to use the carbon tax revenue to reduce social contributions, or the public deficit. These mechanisms come respectively in sixth and eighth position with 51% and 44% of approval. These results can be linked to the low level of concern regarding the impact of a carbon tax on the economy documented in section 4. They are also consistent with previous focus group studies (e.g. [Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010](#)), including in France where [Deroubaix & Lévêque \(2006\)](#) found that people did not understand why the revenue of an environmental tax reform should be used to tackle unemployment.

5.2. Other Instruments

Under a binding acceptability constraint, alternative instruments become relevant, even if Pigouvian taxes may be more cost-effective (e.g. [Goulder &](#)

Parry, 2008). To elicit people’s preferred environmental policies, we ask respondents whether they would support eight different propositions. To make these questions easier to answer, the exact mechanisms and their associated costs and benefits are unspecified. The answers reported should therefore be taken cautiously as people could change their mind once faced with clear trade-offs. Still, this exercise is informative about people’s first reactions to different proposals.

5.2.1. Other Pigouvian taxes

Figure 18 shows that among the eight options, the most strongly supported is a tax on kerosene (70% of “Yes” including 41% of “Yes, completely”). The main rationale could be a broadly perceived effectiveness of the tax if people view aviation as an important source of emissions, and the distributive effect of such policy since richer people fly more.⁵ In sharp contrast, only 17% of our survey respondents approve a tax on red meat, a policy ranked second-to-last. One could explain this lower acceptance rate by the belief that such policy would be ineffective, as we have shown in section 3 that less than half of respondents know that beef has a high carbon footprint. Additional reasons for its rejection could be the perceived negative impact on purchasing power, and the feeling that the policy is too coercive and targets a behavior difficult to change (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012). Overall, this evidence confirms that people are not opposed to Pigouvian taxes *per se*, and that acceptance varies significantly depending on the target and the perceived outcome of the instrument.

5.2.2. Norms

Among all proposed instruments, the two most approved are norms. 72% and 70% of respondents declared being in favor of stricter standards for the insulation of new buildings and for the pollution of new vehicles, respectively. It is unclear to what extent people are aware of the “hidden costs” of such

⁵In France in 2008, people in the top income decile travelled by plane about seven times more than the bottom 50% of the income distribution (Pappalardo et al., 2010). Furthermore, kerosene’s emissions are taxed only through the EU-ETS, hence at a far lower rate than diesel and gasoline. This discrepancy has been highlighted in the public debate.

policies. For instance, fuel economy standards in the US have been estimated to be three to six times more costly than a tax on gasoline for similar abatement levels (Jacobsen, 2013), and as possibly more regressive (Jacobsen, 2013; Davis & Knittel, 2019; Levinson, 2019). The exact properties of these instruments
 460 are of course specific to their design, but it is likely that their popularity partly reflects the underestimation of their costs.

For urban transport policies as well, standards are preferred to price instruments. While the prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers comes fourth on the list of preferred options with 44% approval, the introduction of urban
 465 tolls comes last with only 14%. In a survey on urban road pricing, Jones (1998) identifies the main deterrent for these mechanisms. While some are specific to congestion charges, the other perceived problems are very much alike those identified for our Tax & Dividend: ineffectiveness, unfairness and the feeling that it is just another tax.

470 5.2.3. Diesel taxation

The strong opposition of the Yellow Vests against energy taxes did not only lead the government to reverse the planned carbon tax trajectory. The additional tax increases initially scheduled for diesel — to catch-up with the currently higher rates imposed on gasoline despite diesel’s high social cost from air pollution — have also been abandoned.⁶ In our survey, we ask respondents whether
 475 they would therefore accept an increase in diesel tax to catch up with that of gasoline. As illustrated by Figure 19, 59% of respondents answer they would not, while 29% say they would (12% “PNR”). Among the 57% of households who own a diesel vehicle, the opposition augments to 80%. The geographic difference
 480 is also striking as 73% of rural households would be opposed, vs. only 40% of those living in the Paris agglomeration. As shown in our online Appendix 3.1, these two determinants appear as the most important divides with respect to diesel taxation.

⁶Three increases of +0.026€/L were initially scheduled for January 2019, 2020 and 2021.

6. Determinants of Attitudes

To understand what factors foster environmentally-friendly attitudes, we explore the socio-demographic determinants of attitudes over CC, the correlations between knowledge and perception of CC, and how these attitudes over CC as well as socio-demographics shape preferences for policies. 485

6.1. Attitudes over climate change

Table I shows the main socio-demographic determinants of different attitudes towards CC: the knowledge that CC is anthropogenic (columns 1-3), an index of knowledge about CC (4) and the perception that CC is “disastrous” or “cataclysmic” (5-6). To build the index of knowledge, we aggregate different variables corresponding to the different kinds of knowledge about CC identified by Kiel & Rost (2002) (see also Hoppe et al., 2018, for a summary). 490
495

We first compute a score for the question asking the emission target p.c. required to limit CC (see section 3.1). Denoting t as the respondent’s answer (from 0 to 10 tCO₂/yr), we define the score as:

$$\text{score emission target} = \begin{cases} 3 & \text{if } t \leq 2 \\ 2 & \text{if } t \in [3; 4] \\ 1 & \text{if } t \in [5; 6] \\ 0 & \text{if } t \geq 7 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

and we then aggregate this score with other answers:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{knowledge} = & 3 \cdot \text{CC anthropogenic} - 2 \cdot \text{CC doesn't exist} \\ & + \text{score factors} + \text{score emission target} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where “score factors” is the sum of correct answers to factors of CC (see Figure 3), and the two first variables in the formula are dummies. The relative weights of the variables correspond to the loadings of a one-factor analysis, 500

ensuring that our index captures the most determinant elements of knowledge.⁷
 The original index ranges from -2 (no respondent) to $+13$ (22 respondents),
 505 and has quartiles of 6, 8 and 9. In the regressions, we normalize this index
 by subtracting the mean (7.6) and dividing by the standard deviation (2.5).
 Finally, we run OLS regressions of the three attitudes over CC on various socio-
 demographics, household characteristics, and political orientation. We report
 only the most relevant variables, but describe the entire list of covariates in
 510 Appendix C.1. We confirm that logistic regressions yield similar results (see
 online Appendix 5).

The best predictors of attitudes over CC corresponds to political orienta-
 tion, and in particular identifying as an ecologist, one's positioning towards the
 Yellow Vests, and left-right leaning. Political orientation shapes attitudes in
 515 a consistent manner: being ecologist, more left-wing or less supportive of the
 Yellow Vests is always associated with higher "concern over CC", i.e. better
 knowledge and higher pessimism. Interest into politics (measured on a scale "al-
 most not"/"a little"/"a lot") also leads to higher concern, but to a lesser extent.
 Two observations on the left-right leaning deserve comment. First, the 40% of
 520 people indeterminate relative to this spectrum (see Appendix E for the descrip-
 tive statistics) have attitudes close to the center-right. Second, the variations
 predicted in the dependent variables are as high across the Yellow Vests posi-
 tionings as across the traditional left-right spectrum. For instance, knowledge
 about CC is ceteris paribus lower by 0.50 standard deviation (s.d.) for people
 525 part of the movement than for those who oppose it, which is comparable to the
 spread of 0.41 s.d. between extreme-right and extreme-left people (4).

Two socio-demographics are also consistently related to attitudes over CC:
 age and level of education. On average, the younger and the more educated one
 is, the more one is concerned by CC. People aged 18-24 may appear to have
 530 slightly lower knowledge and lower pessimism than people of prime age ceteris
paribus, in columns (1,4,5); but this is because their concern is mostly captured

⁷See online Appendix 4 for more details.

Table I: Determinants of attitudes towards climate change (CC).

	CC is anthropogenic			Knowledge about CC	CC is disastrous	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.032** (0.013)			0.137*** (0.028)	0.051*** (0.014)	
Ecologist	0.135*** (0.024)			0.404*** (0.053)	0.192*** (0.027)	
Yellow Vests: PNR	−0.098*** (0.033)			−0.142** (0.071)	−0.093*** (0.036)	
Yellow Vests: understands	−0.038* (0.022)			−0.100** (0.048)	−0.051** (0.024)	
Yellow Vests: supports	−0.098*** (0.024)			−0.223*** (0.051)	−0.061** (0.026)	
Yellow Vests: is part	−0.207*** (0.043)			−0.498*** (0.093)	−0.105** (0.047)	
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.111** (0.056)		0.109 (0.077)	0.295** (0.122)	0.075 (0.062)	0.005 (0.084)
Left-right: Left	0.074*** (0.027)		0.070 (0.046)	0.137** (0.059)	0.099*** (0.030)	−0.025 (0.051)
Left-right: Center	0.013 (0.030)		0.039 (0.044)	0.093 (0.065)	0.021 (0.033)	−0.089* (0.048)
Left-right: Right	−0.029 (0.029)		−0.017 (0.045)	−0.039 (0.062)	−0.023 (0.032)	−0.143*** (0.049)
Left-right: Extreme-right	−0.014 (0.034)		−0.019 (0.055)	−0.117 (0.074)	0.025 (0.037)	−0.086 (0.060)
Diploma: <u>CAP</u> or <u>BEP</u>	0.040* (0.022)		0.033 (0.023)	−0.004 (0.049)	−0.014 (0.025)	−0.010 (0.025)
Diploma: <u>Baccalauréat</u>	0.065** (0.027)		0.115*** (0.028)	0.145** (0.058)	0.030 (0.029)	0.133*** (0.031)
Diploma: Higher	0.086*** (0.027)		0.159*** (0.027)	0.266*** (0.059)	0.096*** (0.030)	0.240*** (0.030)
Diploma × Left-right			−0.005 (0.008)			−0.005 (0.009)
Diploma × Left-right: Indeterminate			0.013 (0.014)			−0.027* (0.015)
Age: 25 – 34	0.050 (0.041)	−0.030 (0.032)		0.128 (0.089)	0.021 (0.045)	
Age: 35 – 49	0.002 (0.041)	−0.088*** (0.029)		0.092 (0.089)	0.032 (0.045)	
Age: 50 – 64	0.009 (0.044)	−0.092*** (0.029)		0.069 (0.096)	−0.032 (0.049)	
Age: ≥ 65	−0.106** (0.053)	−0.197*** (0.029)		−0.052 (0.114)	−0.092 (0.058)	
Income (k€/month)	−0.008 (0.008)			−0.018 (0.017)	−0.012 (0.009)	
Sex: Male	−0.023 (0.018)			0.156*** (0.039)	−0.004 (0.020)	
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.004 (0.008)			−0.003 (0.017)	0.006 (0.009)	
Frequency of public transit	0.016** (0.007)			0.045*** (0.016)	0.007 (0.008)	
Additional covariates	✓			✓	✓	
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.104	0.021	0.037	0.156	0.118	0.048

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

by the employment status modality “student”, not shown in the table. Overall, the generation with the least concern is undeniably those aged over 65. For instance, without any control, they are 20 percentage points (p.p.) less likely
 535 to believe that CC is anthropogenic than young adults (2) — though most of this effect is explained by a lower level of education (1). Another finding is that men have a higher knowledge than women by 0.16 s.d. *ceteris paribus* (4), but their perception of the severity of CC is virtually the same (5). Finally, other characteristics have smaller or even insignificant effects.

540 Although the determinants we find are broadly consistent with those elicited in the literature (Upham et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 2011; ADEME, 2018),⁸ we do not encounter the political polarity which characterizes the United States. Indeed, Kahan et al. (2012) argue that American people “tend to form perceptions of societal risks that cohere with values characteristic of groups with
 545 which they identify” (this is the cultural cognition thesis), rather than through an assessment of the scientific evidence they encounter (the science comprehension thesis). It is crucial to know whether people neglect climate science in such a way, as this would mean that a media campaign would have little effect on people’s assimilation of climate science. Kahan et al. (2012) and McCright
 550 & Dunlap (2011) provide evidence for cultural cognition by showing that education has little effect on perceived risk or knowledge about CC, while the interaction between education and political orientation has a significant effect.⁹ We assess whether such interaction appears in the French context, by studying the interaction between the higher degree obtained and the left-right political
 555 leaning (columns 4, 6). We find no significant interaction, and obtain the same nil result when replacing the traditional left-right scale by the Yellow Vests posi-

⁸See also Capstick et al. (2015) for trends in attitudes.

⁹Funk & Kennedy (2016) also report that Republicans are equally distrustful of climate scientists’ integrity whatever their level of education, while the distrust vanishes for Democrats with higher degrees. The mechanism of the interaction is documented by Ehret et al. (2018) and Van Boven et al. (2018): people form beliefs through partisan cues, by adopting views expressed by political figures of the party they identify and rejecting positions from the other party.

tioning, and/or the higher degree by knowledge about CC (see online Appendix 6). This lack of evidence suggests that the public debate over CC is less polarized in France than in the US,¹⁰ and that the knowledge and perception of many French people could change with better access to information over CC.

Figure 20 gives a sense of the shift in the perception and support for climate policies that could follow an information campaign, as it shows the correlations between attitudes over CC, climate policies, and socio-demographics. Knowledge is highly correlated with the perceived gravity of CC (correlation of 0.43), and both of these variables are in turn well correlated with the readiness to adopt an ecological lifestyle and to the number of climate policies (of Figure 18) supported (correlations around 0.3). The acceptance of our Tax & Dividend is less correlated with attitudes (at 0.1-0.2), as the support for this policy is already low. Still, the positive correlation between knowledge and support for other climate policies is an encouraging prospect for an information campaign about CC and even more so since we did not find evidence that partisanship would lead to the dismissal of scientific discourse. Finally, as previously seen, diploma and age are quite correlated with attitudes, though these correlations are below those between attitudes over CC and over policies, at 0 to 0.2.

6.2. Attitudes over policies

To better understand the heterogeneity in people's support, we regress several indicators of attitudes towards climate policies on respondents' characteristics. Table II reports the results for the acceptance of our Tax & Dividend (columns 1-2) and the readiness to adopt an ecological lifestyle (6) in the case that the richest were contributing, efforts were shared globally, and alternatives were developed. We also use the eight policies proposed in Figure 18 in our dependent variables: column 3 studies the share of policies approved while column 4 features the preference for norms vs. taxes within the policies. Similarly, column 5 uses six measures of Figure 17 to define an index of preference

¹⁰A finding reminiscent of Ziegler (2017), who studies Germany.

585 for earmarking vs. transfers. Indexes for these preferences are constructed as follows:

$$\text{Norms vs. taxes} = \sum_{p \in \text{norms}} \text{score}_p - \sum_{p \in \text{taxes}} \text{score}_p \quad (3)$$

where the score of each measure corresponds to a grade between -2 (for a “Not at all” answer) and 2 (for “Yes, completely”). We proceed similarly for earmarking vs. transfers, and describe the categorization of measures in Appendix C.2.
 590 Again, we normalize these two indexes by subtracting the mean (2.8 for norms vs. taxes, 1.4 for earmarking vs. transfers) and dividing by the standard deviation (3.3 and 3.1 respectively). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in online Appendix provide the analysis of the determinants of acceptance for each of the eight policies and nine revenue recycling. The results are overall very similar to those provided by
 595 the more synthetic indicators presented here.

As suggested by the correlation matrix of section 6.1, knowledge about CC and the conviction that it would be disastrous positively affect the approval of climate policies, *ceteris paribus*. Excluding the (endogenous) variables describing political orientation, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. would induce a
 600 lower likelihood to reject Tax & Dividend by 5 p.p. (column 2). The effect of these variables is even stronger when considering the share of policies approved: controlling for socio-demographics, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. is associated with an additional approval of 6 p.p. while the conviction that CC is disastrous increases it by 9 p.p. (see online Appendix 3.4). Beyond the strong
 605 correlation we previously found, these results confirm that increasing climate awareness could significantly increase the support for climate policies.

Besides attitudes over CC, the two most critical determinants appear to be one’s affiliation as an ecologist and one’s position towards the Yellow Vests. All else equal, ecologists are more likely to accept Tax & Dividend by 13 p.p.,
 610 and more willing to approve other environmental policies by about 8 p.p. Conversely, holding other variables constant, people supporting the Yellow Vests

Table II: Determinants of attitudes towards climate policies

	Acceptance of Tax & dividend		Share of policies approved	Norms vs. taxes	Earmarking vs. transfers	Ecological lifestyle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Knowledge about CC	0.029*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.024 (0.020)	0.131*** (0.020)	0.103*** (0.009)
CC is disastrous	0.022 (0.018)	0.037** (0.018)	0.081*** (0.010)	0.125*** (0.040)	0.156*** (0.039)	0.142*** (0.018)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	-0.019 (0.013)		0.034*** (0.007)	-0.010 (0.029)	0.053* (0.028)	0.026** (0.013)
Ecologist	0.126*** (0.024)		0.082*** (0.013)	-0.134** (0.056)	0.249*** (0.054)	0.149*** (0.025)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.021 (0.032)		-0.052*** (0.018)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.110 (0.071)	-0.079** (0.033)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.144*** (0.022)		-0.029** (0.012)	-0.056 (0.050)	-0.091* (0.049)	-0.013 (0.022)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.222*** (0.023)		-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.131** (0.053)	-0.142*** (0.052)	-0.023 (0.024)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.214*** (0.043)		-0.084*** (0.023)	-0.252*** (0.097)	-0.175* (0.095)	-0.037 (0.043)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.040 (0.056)		0.025 (0.031)	-0.285** (0.127)	0.167 (0.124)	0.047 (0.056)
Left-right: Left	0.072*** (0.027)		-0.005 (0.015)	-0.137** (0.061)	0.002 (0.060)	0.028 (0.027)
Left-right: Center	0.051* (0.030)		0.011 (0.016)	-0.051 (0.068)	0.051 (0.066)	0.095*** (0.030)
Left-right: Right	-0.022 (0.028)		0.008 (0.016)	0.030 (0.065)	0.064 (0.063)	0.005 (0.029)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.041 (0.034)		-0.028 (0.018)	0.055 (0.077)	0.009 (0.075)	0.014 (0.034)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.009)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.099*** (0.032)	-0.023 (0.022)	0.038 (0.093)	-0.159* (0.090)	0.032 (0.041)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.047 (0.040)	-0.089*** (0.030)	-0.017 (0.022)	0.189** (0.092)	-0.002 (0.089)	0.039 (0.041)
Age: 50 – 64	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.024)	0.322*** (0.100)	-0.058 (0.097)	0.049 (0.044)
Age: ≥ 65	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.100*** (0.032)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.370*** (0.118)	-0.056 (0.115)	0.008 (0.052)
Income (k€/month)	0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.014 (0.018)	0.031* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.008)
Sex: Male	-0.053*** (0.018)	-0.074*** (0.017)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.039)	-0.063*** (0.018)
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.019** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.0002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.008)
Frequency of public transit	-0.003 (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)	0.024*** (0.007)
Additional covariates	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R ²	0.150	0.051	0.226	0.081	0.121	0.202

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are Yellow Vests: opposes, Age : 18 – 24 and Left-right: Indeterminate. Additional covariates are defined in

are 22 p.p. more likely to reject Tax & Dividend relative to those opposed to the movement. As shown in column 3, higher affinity with the Yellow Vests is also associated with less support for other climate policies. Ecologists (resp. 615 the Yellow Vests supporters) being more (resp. less) favorable to environmental policies and spending, their relative preference for earmarking vs. transfers is higher (resp. lower) than average, while for both groups the relative preference for norms vs. taxes is lower than average. Also, ecologists' attitudes towards environmental policies translate into a higher willingness to adopt an ecological 620 lifestyle (by 15 p.p.), but the opposite does not hold true for the Yellow Vests. Although this could signal some warm glow,¹¹ it also suggests that their strong rejection of environmental policies does not simply reflect lower concerns about the environment. Rather, the conditions of fairness embedded in our question could be critical for Yellow Vests to accept sacrifices. Their rejection could also 625 reflect a deeper rejection of policies in general, due to a high distrust in the government — documented in [Algan et al. \(2019\)](#). This interpretation echoes the recent findings of [Rafaty \(2018\)](#), who shows that perceptions of corruption and political distrust negatively affect the stringency of climate policies. Finally, although the heterogeneity in responses is significant between these two groups, 630 the ranking of the preferred option remains consistent: on average, both ecologists and supporters of the Yellow Vests favor norms over taxes and earmarking over transfers.

A parallel message from Table II is that the standard left-right spectrum is not the most relevant to understand attitudes towards environmental policies. 635 None of our five left-right dummy variables are significantly correlated with the share of policies approved, and overall, attitudes vary much less along the left-right spectrum than along the Yellow Vests cleavage. That being said, Tax & Dividend is still significantly more supported by people from the left (+7 p.p.) and the center (+5 p.p.) than by those indeterminate. This is in line with the

¹¹Here, “warm glow” refers to one’s unintentional strategy to overestimate their virtue in order to derive satisfaction.

literature (see e.g. [Bornstein & Lanz 2008](#); [McCright et al. 2013](#) or [Drews & van den Bergh 2016](#) for a review). Without controlling for other variables, we find that people that are most likely to accept the Tax & Dividend in France are the ones affiliated with the center (+9 p.p. relative to “Indeterminate”), and the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-15 p.p., see online Appendix 3.4), which may be driven by their respective support or rejection of the current government who tried to increase the carbon tax. Our results also show that people from the extreme-left and the center are the most likely to approve other environmental policies (+7 p.p.), while the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-6 p.p.). Still, these differences become small and not statistically significant when covariates are included.

Besides political attitudes, we also observe heterogeneity in people’s responses along socio-demographic lines. As in attitudes over CC, age plays a role, as 18-24 are about 10 p.p. more likely to accept the Tax & Dividend (column 2). Still, controlling for knowledge, political attitudes and other variables, this effect is reduced by half. Similarly, more educated people tend to be more open to environmental policies (as previously found by [Thalmann, 2004](#)), but this effect becomes insignificant once age dummies are included as covariates. Furthermore, we find little effect of income on attitudes towards climate policies, a result that confirms that of [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) in Switzerland. Using our full set of controls, the most significant variables differ from the main factors of attitudes over CC: these significant variables are size of town (city dwellers being more favorable to environmental policies, as in [Thalmann, 2004](#)), and sex (males being less favorable). Although men have a higher knowledge about CC than women on average, this does not translate into higher pessimism (see section 6.1), and it even coincides with lower support for climate policies. This phenomenon is consistent with the findings of [Stern et al. \(1993\)](#) and [Hampel et al. \(1996\)](#) that women are more attentive to links between the environment and things they value, even if they share the same values and beliefs as men. Difference in perception of CC’s impact on oneself could explain women’s higher support for climate policies, even given a lower factual knowledge.

7. Conclusion

Despite a social movement against the carbon tax, French people appear mostly aware and concerned about climate change. Their rejection should therefore not be taken as a low willingness to act for the environment, but rather
 675 as a perceived inadequacy between current carbon taxation and the fight for the climate. Our results identify several barriers — distributive concerns, inefficacy and lack of alternatives — that could be partly alleviated with specific complementary policies. In particular, French people favor investments in green infrastructures that provide them with alternatives and foster the energy tran-
 680 sition. They also appear willing to accept certain norms as well as Pigouvian taxes if these target specific behaviors (or populations) such as air travel. The heterogeneity in people’s attitudes is significant, but the relative ranking of the different policy options are in general consistent across groups of population, suggesting the following paths towards a successful ecological transition.

685 First and foremost, a massive and long-lasting information campaign could be launched to improve knowledge about climate change and climate policies. Indeed, higher knowledge is clearly associated with higher concern for CC and higher support for climate policies. Second, as people mostly favor policies that provide alternatives to fossil fuels, the government could develop such policies as
 690 a substitute to a carbon tax: investments, subsidies, and regulations in favor of public transport, cleaner vehicles and thermal insulation, etc. Third, a tax and dividend restricted to kerosene could serve as a learning example as kerosene taxation is popular.¹² Last but not least, a more cost-effective carbon tax should
 695 later complement these policies, as people get convinced by the objective of carbon neutrality and by the government’s commitment towards this goal.

But to successfully introduce a carbon tax, it is important to build public trust in politicians (Harring & Jagers, 2013; Rafaty, 2018) and to correct the inequities of the tax. As such, it is no surprise if political trust is among the

¹²Murray & Rivers (2015) document an increase in the support of the carbon tax following its implementation in British Columbia.

highest in the country that first introduced a carbon tax, Sweden ([Klenert et al., 2018](#)). It is no coincidence either if the 1991 Swedish tax was part of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system, the popular “reform of the century”, resulting from a dialogue with all stakeholders ([Stern, 2014](#)). 700

The French government is willing to build such a democratic consensus, as it has just launched an assembly to tackle climate change composed of 150 citizens randomly drawn. Nevertheless, it will remain challenging to reintroduce a carbon-tax in the short-run, since French people’s beliefs about carbon taxation are largely biased, and these biases are well anchored (as shown in our companion paper, [Douenne & Fabre 2019](#)). In a nutshell, market imperfections, distributive effects and political acceptability concerns all call for a combination of different types of climate policies rather than a single price signal ([Stern & Stiglitz, 2017](#); [Stiglitz, 2019](#)). The French context seems to call for a focus on the former to make the latter politically acceptable. 705 710

Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Mouez Fodha, Fanny Henriët and Katheline Schubert for their comments and their help to get funding. We also thank Stefano Carattini, Mathias Lé, seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics, an anonymous referee of the FAERE Working Paper series and two anonymous referees of this journal. We are thankful to Christina Hobbs for the proof-reading. We would also like to show our gratitude to Stefanie Stantcheva, Michael I. Norton and the Harvard Business School for allowing us to use their Qualtrics account. We are grateful to Christina Hobbs for the proof-reading. We acknowledge financial support from the Cepremap, EUR PGSE (ANR-17-EURE-0001), ANR (ANR16-CE03-0011), and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne economics doctoral school (ED 465). 715 720

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Table A.3: Sample characteristics: quotas stratas.

	Population	Sample
gender		
woman	0.52	0.53
man	0.48	0.47
age		
18-24	0.12	0.11
25-34	0.15	0.11
35-49	0.24	0.24
50-64	0.24	0.26
>65	0.25	0.27
profession		
farmer	0.01	0.01
independent	0.03	0.04
executive	0.09	0.09
intermediate	0.14	0.14
employee	0.15	0.16
worker	0.12	0.13
retired	0.33	0.33
inactive	0.12	0.11
education		
No diploma or <u>Brevet</u>	0.30	0.24
<u>CAP or BEP</u>	0.25	0.26
<u>Baccalauréat</u>	0.17	0.18
<u>Higher</u>	0.29	0.31
size of town		
rural	0.22	0.24
<20k	0.17	0.18
20-99k	0.14	0.13
>100k	0.31	0.29
Paris area	0.16	0.15
region		
<u>IDF</u>	0.19	0.17
<u>Nord</u>	0.09	0.10
<u>Est</u>	0.13	0.12
<u>SO</u>	0.09	0.09
<u>Centre</u>	0.10	0.12
<u>Ouest</u>	0.10	0.10
<u>Occ</u>	0.09	0.09
<u>ARA</u>	0.12	0.13
<u>PACA</u>	0.09	0.09

Table A.4: Households' characteristics.

	Population	Sample
Household composition (mean)		
Household size	<u>2.36</u>	2.38
Number of adults	<u>2.03</u>	1.93
c.u.	<u>1.60</u>	1.61
Energy source (share)		
Gas	<u>0.42</u>	0.36
Fuel	<u>0.12</u>	0.09
Accommodation size (m²)		
mean	<u>97</u>	96
p25	<u>69</u>	66
p50	<u>90</u>	90
p75	<u>120</u>	115
Distance traveled by car (km/year)		
mean	<u>13,735</u>	15,328
p25	<u>4,000</u>	4,000
p50	<u>10,899</u>	10,000
p75	<u>20,000</u>	20,000
Fuel economy (L/100 km)		
mean	<u>6.39</u>	7.25
p25	<u>6</u>	5
p50	<u>6.5</u>	6
p75	<u>7.5</u>	7

SOURCES: Matched BdF; except for number of adults (ERFS) and domestic fuel ([CEREN](#)).

Appendices

A. Raw data

930

B. Sources on GhG emissions

B.1. Carbon footprints

Plane vs. train. Given that French electricity mix is decarbonized at 93%¹³, the carbon footprint of highspeed train is actually more than 20 times lower than that of an interior flight of the same distance. Hence, we chose Bordeaux

935

¹³Cf. [RTE - Bilan électrique 2018](#) (p. 32).

- Nice as our case study as the train connection makes a big detour by Paris. Thus, we obtain an emission of 10 kg of CO₂ by train as compared to 180 kg by plane. Our source for train is the French railroad company, [SNCF](#), and is consistent with data aggregated by the official agency [ADEME](#). For the flight,
 940 our source is a [carbon footprint calculator](#). Another calculator provides almost the same result, so we preferred this figure rather than a higher figure from a
 third calculator.

Nuclear vs. wind. AR5 from [IPCC](#) and [Pehl et al. \(2017\)](#) show that nuclear power plants and wind turbines have similar carbon footprint, at 10
 945 gCO₂eq/kWh (for comparison, it is 500 for gas combined cycle).

Beef vs. pasta. [Poore & Nemecek \(2018\)](#) show that median beef carbon footprint is 60 kgCO₂eq/kg (more precisely, 30 kgCO₂eq per 100g of protein and 200g of protein per kg); while the carbon footprint of wheat pasta is 1.3 kgCO₂eq/kg (0.5 kgCO₂eq per 1000 kcal of protein and 2695 kcal per kg).
 950 Given that a beef steak [weighs 100-125g](#), its carbon footprint is twenty times that of two servings of pasta of 125g each.

B.2. Current and target emissions

French consumption-based yearly GhG emissions amounted in 2014 to 712 MtCO₂eq, i.e. 10.8 tCO₂eq p.c., and are roughly stable in recent years ([CGDD](#),
 955 [2019](#)). To stop climate change and stabilize the GhG concentration in the atmosphere, it is required to meet zero net emissions. To meet the Paris agreement, [France National Low-Carbon Strategy](#) aims to achieve carbon (i.e. GhG) neutrality by 2050 ([CGDD, 2015](#)). Given carbon sinks estimated at 85 Mt₂eq for 2050 (mainly forest and soil), this strategy requires to reach gross emissions of
 960 about 1 tCO₂eq p.c. at this date. Admittedly, less stringent scenarios may still allow to keep global warming below +2°C in 2100 with good probability — even considering the same burden share for France — by relying more heavily on net negative emissions after 2070 through carbon capture and storage. For this

reason, we consider a range of answers as correct for the French target emission in 2050: from 0 to 2 tCO₂eq p.c.

965

C. Details on main regressions

C.1. Control variables

Our regression Tables I and II display only the most relevant variables, but — when specified — the following additional covariates are included as controls:

Socio-demographics: respondent's income; household's income; employment status (9 categories); socio-professional category (8 categories); region of France (10 categories); household size; number of people above 14; number of adults; single; number of c.u.; smokes; favored medium for news (5 categories).

970

Political orientation: conservative; liberal; humanist; patriot; apolitical.

975

Energy and exposure to policies: heating energy: gaz; heating energy: domestic fuel; accomodation size; annual distance travelled by car; fuel economy; type of fuel: diesel; type of fuel: gasoline; number of vehicles; simulated net gain from Tax & Dividend; opinion on public transports; mode of commuting transport.

980

C.2. Measures for relative preferences

We constructed the two indexes of section 6.2 using the following measures:

Norms: insulation standards; pollution standards; roadworthiness standards; prohibition of polluting vehicles.

Taxes: kerosene; red meat; urban tolls; climate fund.

985

Earmarking: renovation; renewables; non polluting transport.

Transfers: to bottom half; to all; to constrained households.

D. Questionnaire

Hereafter, we only describe questions of the survey that are used in the
 990 present paper. The other questions are described and analyzed in our companion
 paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019). Words that appear in bold were actually in
 both bold and underlined in the respondents' questionnaire.

Socio-demographics.

1. What is your postal code?
- 995 2. What is your gender (in the sense of civil status)?
Female; Male
3. What is your age group?
18 to 24 years old; 25 to 34 years old; 35 to 49 years old; 50 to 64 years old;
65 years old or more
- 1000 4. What is your employment status?
Permanent; Temporary contract; Unemployed; Student; Retired; Other
active; Inactive
5. What is your socio-professional category? (Remember that the unemployed
 are active workers).
 1005 Farmer; Craftsperson, merchant; Independent; Executive; Intermediate
occupation; Employee; Worker; Retired; Other Inactive
6. What is your highest degree?
No diploma; Brevet des collèges; CAP or BEP [secondary]; Baccalaureate;
Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG, schools of health and social training...); Bac
 1010 +3 (licence...) [bachelor]; Bac +5 or more (master, engineering or business
school, doctorate, medicine, master, DEA, DESS...)

7. How many people live in your household? Household includes: you, your family members who live with you, and your dependents.
8. What is your net **monthly** income (in euros)? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc. 1015
9. What is the net **monthly** income (in euros) **of your household**? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc.
10. In your household how many people are 14 years old or older (**including yourself**)? 1020
11. In your household, how many people are over the age of majority (**including yourself**)?

Energy characteristics.

12. What is the surface area of your home? (in m²) 1025
13. What is the heating system in your home?
Individual heating; Collective heating; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
14. What is the main heating energy source in your home?
Electricity Town gas; Butane, propane, tank gas; Heating oil; Wood, solar, geothermal, aerothermal (heat pump); Other; PNR (Don't know, don't say) 1030
15. How many motor vehicles does your household have?
None; One; Two or more
16. [Without a vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven in the last 12 months?
17. [One vehicle] What type of fuel do you use for this vehicle? 1035
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other

18. [One vehicle] What is the average fuel economy of your vehicle? (in Liters per 100 km)
19. [One vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven with your vehicle in the last 12 months?
20. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your main vehicle?
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other
21. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your second vehicle?
Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other
22. [At least two vehicles] What is the average fuel economy of all your vehicles? (in Liters per 100 km)
23. [At least two vehicles] How many kilometers have you driven with all your vehicles in the last 12 months?

Partial reforms [transport / housing]. (...)

24. If fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter, by how much would **your household** reduce its fuel consumption?
0% - [I already consume almost none / I am already not consuming]; 0% - [I am constrained on all my trips / I will not reduce it]; From 0% to 10%; From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30% - [I would change my travel habits significantly / I would change my consumption significantly]
25. In your opinion, if [fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter / gas and heating oil prices increased by 30%], by how much would **French people** reduce their consumption on average?
From 0% to 3%; From 3% to 10%; From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30%

Tax & Dividend: initial.

26. The government is studying an increase in the carbon tax, whose revenues would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income. This would imply:

- an increase in the price of gasoline by 11 cents per liter and diesel by 13 cents per liter; 1065
- an increase of 13% in the price of gas, and 15% in the price of heating oil;
- an annual payment of 110€ to each adult, or 220€ per year for a couple.

(...)

1070

27. [[empty] / Scientists agree that a carbon tax would be effective in reducing pollution.] Do you think that such a measure would reduce pollution and fight climate change?

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

28. In your opinion, which categories would lose [[blank] / purchasing power] with such a measure? (Several answers possible) 1075

No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people; Rural or peri-urban people; Some French people, but not a particular income category; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

29. In your opinion, what categories would gain purchasing power with such a measure? (Several answers possible) 1080

No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people; Urban dwellers; Some French people, but not a particular income category; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Tax & Dividend: after knowledge. We always consider the same measure. (...) 1085

30. Why do you think this measure is beneficial? (Maximum three responses)
Contributes to the fight climate change; Reduces the harmful effects of pollution on health; Reduces traffic congestion; Increases my purchasing

power; Increases the purchasing power of the poorest; Fosters France's
 1090 independence from fossil energy imports; Prepares the economy for
 tomorrow's challenges; For none of these reasons; Other (specify):

31. Why do you think this measure is unwanted? (Maximum three answers)
 Is ineffective in reducing pollution; Alternatives are insufficient or too
 expensive; Penalizes rural areas; Decreases my purchasing power; Decreases
 1095 the purchasing power of some modest households; Harms the economy and
 employment; Is a pretext for raising taxes; For none of these reasons; Other
 (specify):

(...)

Attitudes over other policies.

1100 32. In which cases would you be in favor of increasing the carbon tax? I would
 be in favor if the tax revenues were used to finance..._

- (a) a payment to the 50% poorest French people (those earning less than
1670€ per month)
- (b) a payment to all French people
- 1105 (c) a compensation for households forced to consume petroleum products
- (d) a decrease in social contributions
- (e) a decrease in VAT
- (f) a decrease in the public deficit
- (g) the thermal renovation of buildings
- 1110 (h) renewable energy (wind, solar, etc.)
- (i) clean transport

Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not
 at all

33. Please select "A little" (test to check that you are attentive).
 1115 Not at all; A little; A lot; Completely; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

34. Would you support the following environmental policies?

- (a) A tax on kerosene (aviation)
- (b) A tax on red meat
- (c) Stricter standards on the insulation of new buildings
- (d) Stricter standards on the pollution of new vehicles
- (e) Stricter standards on pollution during roadworthiness tests
- (f) The prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers
- (g) The introduction of urban tolls
- (h) A contribution to a global climate fund

1120

Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not at all

1125

35. For historical reasons, diesel is taxed less than gasoline. Would you be in favor of raising taxes on diesel to catch up with the level of taxation on gasoline?

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

1130

Attitudes over climate change.

36. How often do you talk about climate change?

Several times a month; Several times a year; Almost never; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

37. In your opinion, climate change...

1135

is not a reality; is mainly due to natural climate variability; is mainly due to human activity; PNR (Don't know, don't say).

38. Which of the following elements contribute to global warming? (Several answers possible)

CO₂; Methane; Oxygen; Particulate matter

1140

39. In your opinion, which of the following statements are true? (Several answers possible).

Consuming one beef steak emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases than eating two servings of pasta.; Electricity produced by nuclear power emits
 1145 about 20 times more greenhouse gases than electricity produced by wind turbines.; A seat in a Bordeaux - Nice journey emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases by plane than by high speed train.

40. In your opinion, how would the effects of climate change be, if humanity did nothing to limit it?

1150 Insignificant, or even beneficial; Small, because humans would be able to live with it; Grave, because there would be more natural disasters; Disastrous, lifestyles would be largely altered; Cataclysmic, humankind would disappear; PNR(Don't know, don't say)

41. In which of these two regions do you think will climate change have the worst consequences?

1155 The European Union; India; As much in both

42. In your opinion, in France, which generations will be seriously affected by climate change? (Several answers possible)

People born in the 1960s; People born in the 1990s; People born in the 2020s;
 1160 People born in the 2050s; None of the four

43. In your opinion, who is responsible for climate change? (Several possible choices)

Each of us; The richest; Governments; Some foreign countries; Past generations; Natural causes

- 1165 44. Currently, each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of CO₂ per year.

In your opinion, how much must this figure be reduced to by 2050 in order to hope to contain global warming to +2°C in 2100 (if all countries

did the same)? In 2050, we should emit at most...

1170

0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10 tons

45. Has climate change had or will it have an influence on your decision to make a child (or children)?_

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

46. [If Yes] Why does climate change influence your decision to have a child (or children)? (Several answers possible).

1175

Because I don't want my child to live in a devastated world.; Because each additional human being aggravates climate change.

47. Would you be willing to change your lifestyle to fight climate change? (Several answers possible)

1180

Yes, if policies went in this direction; Yes, if I had the financial means; Yes, if everyone did the same; No, only the richest people have to change their way of life; No, it is against my personal interest; No, I think climate change is not a real problem; I have already adopted a sustainable way of life; I try, but I have trouble changing my habits

1185

48. Assuming that all states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely; would you be willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and ensure to use almost no gasoline, diesel or kerosene)?

1190

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

Access to public transport and mobility habits.

49. How many minutes walk is it to the nearest public transit stop? (To simplify, you can use the conversion 1 km = 10 min walk).

1195

in min: ; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

50. How often does the nearest public transport pass? (excluding school buses)
Less than three times a day; Between four times a day and once an hour;
Once or twice an hour; More than three times an hour; PNR (Don't know,
1200 don't say)
51. What do you think about the availability of public transport where you live?
It is...
Satisfactory; Suitable, but should be increased; Limited, but sufficient;
Insufficient; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
- 1205 52. What mode of transportation do you mainly use for each of the following trips?
- (a) Home - work (or studies)
- (b) Grocery shopping
- (c) Leisure (excluding holidays)
- 1210 Car; Public transport; Walking or cycling; Two-wheeled vehicle; Carpooling;
Not concerned
53. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work using public transport?
Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No;
1215 PNR (Don't know, don't say)
54. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work by walking or cycling?
Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No;
PNR (Don't know, don't say)
- 1220 *Politics and media.*
55. How much are you interested in politics?
Almost not; A little; A lot

56. How would you define yourself? (Several answers possible)

Extreme left; Left; Center; Right; Extreme right; Liberal; Conservative;
Humanist; Patriot; Apolitical; Ecologist

1225

57. How do you keep yourself informed of current events? Mainly through...

Television; Press (written or online); Social networks; Radio; Other

58. What do you think of the Yellow Vests? (Several answers possible)

I am part of them; I support them; I understand them; I oppose them; PNR
(Don't know, don't say)

1230

Open field.

59. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, comments or suggestions in the field below.

E. Who are the Yellow Vests




Figure 9: Perceived winners and losers from Tax & Dividend




Figure 10: Perceived benefits and problems from Tax & Dividend




Figure 11: Perceived aggregate and own elasticities.




Figure 12: Mode of transportation by activity.




Figure 13: Walking distance to the nearest stop, in minutes.




Figure 14: Frequency of public transport at the nearest stop.




Figure 15: Among those who commute to work by car, possibility to change the transportation mode, depending on the alternative.




Figure 16: Supply of public transport where the respondent lives.




Figure 17: Approval of a carbon tax if its revenue finances...




Figure 18: Approval of different climate policies.




Figure 19: Approval of a catching-up of the diesel tax.




Figure 20: Correlations between attitudes over climate change, climate policies and socio-demographics (in %).

Table E.5: Positioning towards Yellow Vests, per category.

	Opposed	Understands	Supports	Is part	PNR
Extreme-left (2%)	6%	26%	51%	12%	5%
Left (20%)	17%	36%	36%	5%	7%
Center (13%)	49%	30%	15%	2%	6%
Right (16%)	40%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Extreme-right (9%)	11%	28%	47%	10%	5%
Indeterminate (40%)	19%	32%	30%	4%	13%
Liberal (5%)	48%	26%	18%	2%	6%
Conservative (2%)	22%	28%	30%	10%	11%
Humanist (11%)	21%	35%	29%	5%	10%
Patriot (8%)	21%	27%	39%	7%	6%
Apolitical (21%)	21%	31%	32%	4%	12%
Ecologist (15%)	17%	39%	27%	5%	12%
Rural (21%)	20%	31%	34%	6%	9%
<20k (17%)	24%	28%	34%	6%	9%
20-100k (14%)	22%	33%	32%	4%	9%
>100k (31%)	29%	34%	26%	3%	8%
Paris (17%)	28%	33%	25%	4%	11%
No diploma or Brevet (30%)	21%	29%	34%	5%	10%
CAP or BEP (24%)	23%	28%	36%	6%	7%
Baccalauréat (17%)	22%	35%	29%	4%	11%
Higher (29%)	32%	8%	36%	21%	3%
Age: 18–24 (12%)	23%	34%	27%	4%	12%
Age: 25–34 (15%)	21%	33%	28%	7%	11%
Age: 35–49 (24%)	25%	32%	29%	5%	9%
Age: 50–64 (24%)	21%	32%	36%	4%	7%
Age: ≥ 65 (25%)	32%	30%	28%	3%	7%
Income decile: 1	25%	33%	26%	3%	14%
Income decile: 2	18%	31%	35%	5%	11%
Income decile: 3	17%	31%	32%	7%	12%
Income decile: 4	15%	33%	37%	6%	9%
Income decile: 5	21%	29%	36%	5%	8%
Income decile: 6	26%	33%	29%	6%	7%
Income decile: 7	25%	36%	28%	4%	7%
Income decile: 8	31%	31%	28%	3%	8%
Income decile: 9	39%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Income decile: 10	47%	29%	15%	3%	6%
Female (52%)	21%	34%	29%	5%	12%
Male (48%)	29%	30%	31%	5%	6%
Average	25%	32%	30%	5%	9%

NOTE: The percentages in parenthesis express the weighted share of each category from our sample.