

# French Attitudes on Climate Change, Carbon Taxation and other Climate Policies

Thomas Douenne<sup>a</sup>, Adrien Fabre<sup>a,\*</sup>

*<sup>a</sup>Paris School of Economics; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris, France.*

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## Abstract

This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in detail the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better

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\*Corresponding author

*Email addresses:* `thomas.douenne@psemail.eu` (Thomas Douenne),  
`adrien.fabre@psemail.eu` (Adrien Fabre)

access to science could foster support for climate policies.

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## 1. Introduction

The French government is currently facing a two-sided challenge on climate policies. On the one hand, the protest of the Yellow Vests that originated in November 2018 against the planned doubling in the carbon tax — from 44.6 to 86.2€/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2022 — led the government to halt the increasing trajectory that started at 7€/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2014. On the other hand, a large campaign called “Affaire du siècle” started in December 2018 against its inaction for the environment, gathering over two millions signatories in a month. It is so far unclear how the tension between these two a priori antagonistic objectives will be resolved. In particular, one may wonder whether the two movements involve distinct groups with opposite interests, or rather reflect a commonly perceived inadequacy of the solution proposed by the government to address the climate threat.

This paper aims to understand French perceptions over the carbon tax and other climate policies. It builds on a new survey conducted on a sample of 3,002 respondents representative of the French population. Our survey contains questions to assess respondents’ knowledge about change change (CC) and their perceptions over its causes and consequences. As the paper was primarily motivated by the failed attempt to increase the French carbon tax, we examine in detail attitudes towards this instrument. We propose to respondents a Tax & Dividend policy, i.e. a carbon tax whose revenue would be returned lump-sum uniformly to all adults. This policy differs from the one proposed by the government, since the revenue would have been used to fund the general budget instead. We identify respondents’ expected winners and losers, and the per-

ceived problems and benefits of this instrument. We devote particular attention  
 25 to the issue of mobility that appears critical in the current debate. We then  
 turn to the support for a carbon tax with alternative uses of the revenue, such  
 as more targeted transfers, earmarking, and double-dividend strategies. We  
 also study the support for other climate policies, including norms and other  
 Pigouvian taxes, and local policies for urban transport. Finally, we identify the  
 30 determinants of attitudes over both climate change and climate policies, as well  
 as the link between the two.

For a general presentation of attitudes over climate change, we suggest [Whit-](#)  
[marsh & Capstick \(2018\)](#), while for a more specific review on their trends and  
 determinants, we redirect to [Breachin \(2010\)](#) and [Ziegler \(2017\)](#). Our paper  
 35 contributes mainly to a growing literature on the political economy of climate  
 policies. As an entry point to previous related studies, refer to [Maestre-Andrés](#)  
[et al. \(2019\)](#) who review the perceptions of climate policies, [Drews & van den](#)  
[Bergh \(2016\)](#) who review the determinants of their support, and to [Carattini](#)  
[et al. \(2018\)](#) for a comprehensive overview on attitudes over the carbon tax.

40 A large extent of the literature has focused on the carbon tax. Using a post-  
 electoral survey in Switzerland, [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) finds that political leaning,  
 education and self-interest are correlated with acceptance. Subsequent literature  
 has confirmed the importance of self-interest (e.g. [Fischer et al., 2011](#); [Baranzini](#)  
[& Carattini, 2017](#)) although [Kallbekken & Sælen \(2011\)](#) find that perception of  
 45 the tax' effectiveness and its distributive properties play a larger role in Norway.  
 The critical role of the tax' effectiveness has been confirmed by numerous con-

tributions that pointed out the higher acceptance of taxes whose revenue was earmarked towards green investments (e.g. [Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011](#); [Baranzini & Carattini, 2017](#)). Similarly, studies have confirmed that people tend to prefer more progressive schemes ([Brannlund & Persson, 2012](#); [Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015](#)) and more targeted revenue recycling ([Kallbekken et al., 2011](#)). In a companion paper ([Douenne & Fabre, 2019](#)) based on the same survey, we show that French people reject the carbon tax because of biased beliefs over its properties, but if convinced about their own gain, the environmental effectiveness and the progressivity of the mechanism, they would largely approve it. Among the potential barriers to the implementation of carbon taxation, [Kallbekken & Aasen \(2010\)](#) emphasize the importance of the availability of alternatives to fossil fuels. When these alternatives are lacking or not easily affordable, carbon taxation is perceived as just a pretext to increase taxes ([Dresner et al., 2006](#); [Klok et al., 2006](#)). Finally, as shown by [Harring & Jagers \(2013\)](#), trust in politicians is also a key factor for carbon tax acceptance, which relates to the recent findings of [Rafaty \(2018\)](#) who shows that higher political distrust is associated with weaker climate policies.

While a lot of attention has recently been put on carbon taxation, fewer studies have investigated attitudes towards other climate policies. Yet, as highlighted by [Stern & Stiglitz \(2017\)](#) and [Stiglitz \(2019\)](#) a single price instrument may not be the best response to climate change in a second-best world. The main factors driving people's preferences between various policies appear to be their degree of coercion, the behavior targeted by the policy ([de Groot &](#)

70 [Schuitema, 2012](#)), and the perceived cost. It follows that subsidies are in general preferred over taxes (e.g. [Tobler et al., 2012](#); [Cherry et al., 2017](#)), and more voluntary measures over hard regulations ([Attari et al., 2009](#)). The present paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of perceptions and attitudes towards CC, carbon taxation and other climate policies in a  
75 country that has recently experienced a carbon tax increase and a large debate ensuing. As it is based on an unusually large sample representative of the French population, the paper also goes further than previous studies in identifying the heterogeneity in people’s attitudes over climate policies.

Section 2 presents the survey. Section 3 describes attitudes towards climate  
80 change. Section 4 focuses on tax & dividend policies, its perceptions, and the reasons explaining the low support for this policy. Section 5 studies the support for alternative revenue recycling mechanisms as well as for other climate policies. Section 6 examines the heterogeneity in attitudes expressed in the previous sections and characterize their determinants. Section 7 concludes. Finally,  
85 further material can be found in appendix and online Appendix.

## 2. The survey

### 2.1. Presentation of the survey

We collected 3002 responses in February and March 2019 through the survey company Bilendi. This company maintains a panel of French respondents  
90 to whom they can email survey links. Respondents are paid 3€ if they fully complete the survey. The respondents who choose to respond are first filtered

through some screening questions which ensure that the final sample is representative along six socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age (5 brackets), education (4), socio-professional category (8), size of town (5), and region (9). The quotas are relaxed by 5% to 10% relative to actual proportions. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows that our sample is still extremely representative. Nonetheless, observations are weighted to correct small differences between sample and population proportions. The median time for completion of the survey was 19 minutes.

The full survey in French can be seen [online](#),<sup>1</sup> the questions analyzed are translated in Appendix D, and the code is available on [github](#). Figure 1 presents in a diagram the sequence of questions.




Figure 1: Diagram of the sequence of questions.

The survey starts by asking for households' socio-demographics and energy usage. The distribution of answers are much in-line with official statistics, as

<sup>1</sup>[preferences-pol.fr/doc\\_q.php#\\_e](http://preferences-pol.fr/doc_q.php#_e)

105 shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Then, we describe Tax & Dividend reforms where the revenues of an increase in the French carbon tax by 50€/tCO<sub>2</sub> are redistributed uniformly to all adults. We first allocate respondents randomly to a sectoral Tax & Dividend reform, which concerns either gas and domestic fuel (i.e. housing energy), or gasoline and diesel (i.e. transportation energy).  
 110 Respondents are asked to estimate their reaction to price changes, the reaction of French people, and how much purchasing power they would gain or lose from the policy. To this end, exact price variations and the amount transferred are provided, and respondents can choose among answers given in different brackets. Then, we study perceptions and support for a Tax & Dividend on both  
 115 sectors combined, before and after providing new information to the respondents. This new information is either that the policy is progressive, or whether their household would win or lose some purchasing power through the reform. Before providing information, we let respondents pick the categories of losers and winners from the reform; and after the information, they choose the benefits and the problems associated with this reform. We study these perceptions  
 120 of the policy in the present paper, but please refer to our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019) for details and analyses on the other questions about Tax & Dividend reforms.

## 2.2. Eliciting attitudes

125 After inquiring about the support for Tax & Dividend, we ask respondents to assess on a Likert scale different ways to recycle the revenues of a carbon tax. On another Likert scale, we examine opinions on other climate policies, notably



new norms or Pigouvian taxes. We then measure respondents' knowledge about climate change by asking for its origin (anthropogenic or natural), its causes (in terms of gases and activities), which region it will most affect (between India and the European Union), and what reduction of emissions is needed by 2050 to respect the  $+2^{\circ}\text{C}$  target. At the same time, we assess attitudes over climate change by asking respondents about the frequency with which they talk about it, the gravity of its consequences, the generations it will severely affect, and the entities responsible for its occurrence. We continue by surveying if and how climate change influences one's decision to have a child, under which conditions one would be ready to change their lifestyle to fight climate change, and whether one would be ready to adopt a sustainable lifestyle if policies were aligned to this goal. We also ask questions about diesel taxation. Then, we evaluate the respondents access to public transport, their mobility habits, and if there is room for changing these habits. Finally, we ask for their political preferences, including their positioning in relation to the Yellow Vests. The survey ends with a text box where the respondents can leave a comment.

### 3. Attitudes over Climate Change

To fully understand the root motivations to the support or rejection of climate policies, we first analyze the knowledge and perceptions over CC, as well



Figure 2: Perceived cause of climate change.




Figure 3: Perceived factors of climate change.

as the reaction that people expect to address this phenomenon. As the paper focuses on explaining attitudes over policies, we relegate to online Appendix 1 some figures and some results from other surveys.

### 150 3.1. Knowledge

As shown in Figure 2, knowledge that CC is anthropogenic is widespread (72%) and the share who do not believe in climate change (CC) is marginal (4%). The level of knowledge on the anthropogenic origin of CC is similar to that of other Western countries (Leiserowitz, 2007; Lee et al., 2015; Stokes et al., 2015):  
 155 it is 66% in the U.S. (Gallup, 2019) for example. At the same time, knowledge about climate science appears limited. Although 77% of people correctly tick “CO<sub>2</sub>” as a greenhouse gas (GhG), Figure 3 shows that almost as many people tick particulate matter (39%) as methane (48%). Admittedly, understanding the impacts of activities is more useful than erudition about chemical factors,  
 160 but here again, knowledge is quite low. We assess such awareness using pairs of comparable activities whose GhG footprint differ by a factor 20 (beef steak




Figure 4: Perceived GhG emission p.c. required in 2050 to limit global warming to  $+2^{\circ}\text{C}$  (in  $\text{tCO}_2\text{eq/yr}$ ), given that it is now 10.

vs. pasta, plane vs. train) or whose footprint are similar (nuclear vs. wind power).<sup>2</sup> We ask whether it is true that one activity emits 20 times more GhG than the other, as a way to express precisely that one is “much more” polluting than the other. For each pair, around half of the sample is correct. The bulk of respondents pick two correct answers out of three (44%), but more get them all wrong (19%) than all right (15%).

Not only do most people fail to fully understand the factors and consequences of CC, but they also fail to grasp the degree of reaction needed to tackle it. When informed that “each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of  $\text{CO}_2$  per year” and asked what the figure should be in 2050 to “hope to contain global warming to  $+2^{\circ}\text{C}$  in 2100 (if all countries did the same)”, 59% answer 5 or more (see Figure 4). Only 17% select a correct answer: 0, 1 or 2 (see Appendix B for why these are correct).

Millner & Ollivier (2016) propose several mechanisms to explain people’s lack of understanding about climate change: in addition to the difficulty of grasping gradual changes, they emphasize the complexity of drawing a causal link between diffuse causes and distant consequences.<sup>3</sup> Failing to assimilate

<sup>2</sup>Appendix B.1 details how the figures were obtained.

<sup>3</sup>Actually, even MIT students struggle with this (Stermann, 2008).




Figure 5: Entities perceived responsible for climate change.




Figure 6: Perceived gravity of climate change.

the underlying channels may blur the link between people’s own behavior and  
 180 consequences for the climate. Thus, we can wonder if people understand who  
 would have to make the mitigation effort in a sustainable scenario, i.e. who is  
 responsible for CC.

### 3.2. Perceptions

As shown in Figure 5, 63% acknowledge that “each one of us” is responsible  
 185 for CC, and less people ascribe the responsibility to “certain foreign countries”  
 (47%), “the richest” (42%), or any other agent. Not only do people seem lucid  
 concerning the agents causing CC, but a vast majority also foresees worrying  
 consequences if humanity does nothing to limit it. Figure 6 shows that 19%  
 see the impacts as “cataclysmic, humankind would disappear”, 18% as “disas-  
 190 trous, lifestyles would be largely altered”, 28% as “grave, because there would be




Figure 7: Respondent could change their lifestyle under a condition.

more natural disasters”, while only 11% think damages would be “small, because humans would be able to live with it” or “insignificant, or even beneficial”.

Overall, these results indicate that most people understand the fundamentals of climate issues, including the root causes and the scale of the problem, but that only a minority has thought of CC deeply enough to comprehend its factors and the pathways to tackle it. 195

### 3.3. The Reaction Needed

Given that many people may not realize the extent of the transition needed to reach sustainability, and that others may be discouraged precisely by the sheer magnitude of such a transition, we can wonder how willing people are to contribute to its success. An encouraging finding for the transition is that 65% are “willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and make sure to use almost no gasoline, diesel nor kerosene)”, assuming that “all 200

states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a  
 205 transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining  
 that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely”,  
 while only 17% answer “No” (the others do not take a side). While the phrasing  
 removes most grounds against a change in lifestyle, we inquire under which  
 conditions people would be willing to adopt such a change (see Figure 7). 82%  
 210 of respondents would be willing to change their lifestyle under at least one of  
 the three conditions proposed: sufficient financial resources, an alignment of  
 policies to this goal, or an adjustment of others’ behavior (about 45% each).

Finally, a substantial fraction of people incorporates ecological constraints  
 in their life choices. Indeed, 15% call themselves ecologist (the most picked  
 215 political identity outside of the left-right spectrum, see Appendix E), 23% claim  
 they already adopted a sustainable way of life, and 20% say the CC “has had or  
 will have an influence in their decision to have a child”.

#### 4. Attitudes over Carbon Tax and Dividend

Most French people are aware and concerned about climate change and claim  
 220 to be willing to exert efforts to fight it. Yet, the government’s attempt to  
 introduce a carbon tax to deal with French emissions resulted in a widespread  
 popular protest. To understand this paradox, we investigate the preferences  
 over a Tax & Dividend policy: an increase of 50€/tCO<sub>2</sub> in the current French  
 carbon tax, with a uniform lump-sum redistribution of the additional revenue  
 225 to all adults. This policy differs from the official one whose revenue was mostly

used to fund the general budget. Respondents are given the associated increase in energy prices so that the direct costs are salient: +13% (resp. +15%) for gas (resp. domestic fuel), and +0.11€ (resp. +0.13€) for a liter of gasoline (resp. diesel). They are also told that the transfer would amount to 110€ per adult annually.

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#### 4.1. Widespread rejection

French people would largely reject the proposed policy. Only 10% of our respondents declare they would approve it, while 70% say they would not (see Figure 8). As shown in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019), this rejection can be explained by erroneous perceptions about the policy's out- come, such as an overestimation of its impact on one's purchasing power. For instance, 30% of people who use neither gas nor domestic fuel believe their household would lose from an equally redistributed increase in taxes on these goods. Interestingly, the salience of costs appears critical in people's answer. At a later stage of the survey, we ask respondents whether they would agree to increase the carbon tax if the revenue was returned to all households, without mentioning the impact on prices. The question is asked along with a package of other environmental policies (see section 5). In this case — where the benefits are more salient than the costs — we find a much higher approval rate of 37%. Another survey conducted in March 2019 (OpinionWay, 2019) assesses acceptance for a reintroduction of the carbon tax increase in 2021. They find intermediary results with an approval rate of 21%.

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The low level of acceptance observed partly results from recent events. In




Figure 8: Approval of Tax &amp; Dividend.

July 2018, [ADEME \(2018\)](#) found that 48% of French people thought it was  
 250 desirable to increase the carbon tax, a figure similar to those of other countries  
 ([Brechin, 2010](#)). The discrepancy between 2018 and 2019 can be explained  
 by the “campaign effect” highlighted by [Anderson et al. \(2019\)](#): support for a  
 carbon tax decreases substantially after it enters the public debate. Indeed, the  
 French carbon tax was brought under the spotlight in the end of 2018, after  
 255 high oil prices triggered the Yellow Vests movement.

#### 4.2. *Perceived winners and losers*

Figure 9 represents the share of respondents who expect different household  
 categories to win or lose from the policy. Income appears to be the most crit-  
 ical divide, with a non-monotonic relationship. 30% of respondents expect the  
 260 richest to win while only 2% think they would lose. On the contrary, 40% more  
 people think that the poorest would lose rather than win, a difference even  
 higher for the middle class — the category most expected to lose — at 53%. To  
 half of respondents, we framed the question about winners and losers specifically  
 in terms of “purchasing power”. The objective was to see if some categories were  
 265 commonly seen as losing in welfare although they could gain in monetary terms,  
 or conversely. The results look very much alike for both formulations, except  
 that the shares of people expecting poorer households to gain (5.8%) and richer



households to lose (0.9%) are significantly larger when asked in terms of purchasing power: 10.2% and 2.1%, respectively (see online Appendix 2). Overall, respondents perceive the Tax & Dividend as regressive. As shown by a large body of literature (e.g. [West & Williams, 2004](#); [Bento et al., 2009](#); [Williams et al., 2015](#)), and more specifically in our companion paper ([Douenne & Fabre, 2019](#)), these beliefs are at odds with the true distributive effects of this proposed policy.

Beyond the income dimension, people tend to identify city dwellers as potential winners from the Tax & Dividend (third position at 19%), while rural and peri-urban households are rather expected to lose (third position at 34%). We also see that people report on average more categories for expected losers than winners: 1.74 vs. 1.16. The high ranks of “no one” for winners (second) and of “everyone” for losers (fourth) further suggest that respondents do not see our policy as a zero-sum game.

#### 4.3. *Perceived pros and cons*

Previous studies have highlighted that distributive effects are a critical determinant of carbon tax acceptance (e.g. [Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011](#); [Brannlund & Persson, 2012](#); [Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015](#)). When asked about the problems associated with the Tax & Dividend, the main response is that the tax would penalize rural households (47%). Interestingly, this concern comes before the threat that the tax could penalize the poorest (sixth position with 29%), although more people report the poorest as a category of people expected to lose. The second and third concerns are that the policy is simply a pretext to increase

taxes (43%) — a worry documented by [Dresner et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Klok et al. \(2006\)](#) — and that it would be ineffective to reduce pollution (37%). Related to this last point is the perceived lack of alternatives, seen as insufficient or too expensive (31%). This problem has been previously stressed by [Kallbekken & Aasen \(2010\)](#) in a focus group study: people do not see the point of taxing fossil fuels if they cannot substitute for other technologies. This last reason is stated as frequently as concerns over the impact on one’s own purchasing power (fourth with 31%). As shown in [Douenne & Fabre \(2019\)](#), self-interest largely affects acceptance of the Tax & Dividend, but this concern could sound too egoistic when stated in a direct way. While previous studies have pointed out concerns over the negative impact of carbon taxation on the economy (e.g. [Thalmann, 2004](#); [Carattini et al., 2017](#)), this problem comes last (14%) and does not seem to represent an important obstacle for public support in the current context.

Respondents are suggested to pick at most three answers among both problems and benefits. On average, respondents pick 2.36 problems — and 53% pick at least 3 — against 1.14 benefits, excluding the most popular: “None of these reasons” (44%). This option comes far ahead of the second and third, “fight climate change” (30%) and “reduces negative impact of pollution on health” (27%). Still, environmental benefits are much more cited than economic ones. This result is likely due to people’s pessimism about the outcome of the policy, but it might also reflect the limited importance given to economic consequences of the carbon tax, as already suggested by problems commonly cited.

#### 4.4. Consumption and mobility constraints

The perceived problems identified above suggest a rationale for people's opposition towards carbon taxation: if people think the tax is ineffective, because their consumption is constrained and affordable alternatives are lacking, then taxing carbon can be perceived as a pretext to increase taxes. 315

##### 4.4.1. Perceived elasticities

In order to understand to what extent people feel constrained with respect to their energy consumption, we elicit their subjective price elasticity for transport and domestic energies. We adopt the phrasing of [Baranzini & Carattini \(2017\)](#) and ask the expected decrease in energy consumption that would follow an increase in prices. To avoid dealing with small percentages, which people usually find more difficult to compare, we ask for the reaction to a 30% increase in the price of heating (or equivalently, an increase of 0.50€ per liter in fuel prices). 320

Although sufficiently high to foster a significant response on demand, these changes are realistic in the medium run, and should not lead people to report long-term elasticities. Respondents may select their answer among 5 brackets. They are asked to estimate their own reaction as well as that of French people. 325

Figure 11 presents the results. 330

54% (resp. 61%) of respondents consider that such an increase in prices would not lead them to reduce their transport (resp. domestic) energy consumption. This expected inelastic behavior is mainly due to mobility constraints for transport (64% of cases) while it mostly reflects a non-fossil heating type for housing (61%). Excluding people reporting inelastic behavior because of in- 335

significant initial consumption, about 40% of people feel constrained and expect to not lower their consumption following price increases. Still, respondents perceive transport fuel price elasticity of French people at  $-0.45$  on average, and their own elasticity at a consistent  $-0.36$  (after re-weighting by fuel expenditures). Concerning housing energy, aggregate and personal subjective elasticities are respectively  $-0.43$  and  $-0.33$ . Overall, these subjective elasticities compare well to the ones found in the literature for French households, although they are slightly over-estimated (in absolute value) for housing.<sup>4</sup>

#### 4.4.2. Mobility and public transport

To assess the level of dependence on automobiles, which we include as a determinant for preferences in Section 6, we study mobility habits and access to public transport. Figure 12 indicates that 65% of employed people drive to work, and that car usage is even more common for grocery shopping or leisure activities. This figure is confirmed by the national transport survey [ENTD \(2008\)](#) conducted by Insee and analyzed in [Pappalardo et al. \(2010\)](#), which reveals that a majority still uses a car for trips of 1 to 2 km. Even though 73% live within a 10 minute walk to a public transit stop (Figure 13), coverage and frequency of public transport is often too low (Figure 14) to compete with the speed, comfort, and flexibility of automobiles. Indeed, 58% of those who commute by car declare that they could neither substitute it with public transport

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<sup>4</sup>For transports, estimates from the literature lie around  $-0.4$  ([Clerc & Marcus, 2009](#); [Bureau, 2011](#); [Douenne, 2018](#)). For housing, the values are lower, typically around  $-0.2$  ([Douenne, 2018](#); [Clerc & Marcus, 2009](#)).

nor walking or cycling, and only 15% could use one of these alternative without major difficulties (Figure 15). Further evidence indicates that the lack of alternatives is a main factor for car usage, besides apparent taste for a vehicle that remains a symbol of freedom. Figure 16 shows that 52% of respondents state that supply of public transport where they live is “insufficient” or “decent, but should be increased”, while 40% find it “satisfactory” or “limited, but sufficient”. From this perspective, “green public investments and carbon taxes appear to be complementary, and in the timing of climate policy it would be justified to carry out the former before implementing the latter”, as Bureau et al. (2019) suggest. Alongside an increase in the supply of alternatives, climate policies could also address the demand for mobility, e.g. by revitalizing town centers and limiting urban sprawl.

## 5. Attitudes over Other Policies

The previous section has shown that our Tax & Dividend was largely rejected by French people. As climate policies are urgently needed, it appears necessary to assess whether other designs and instruments would be met with a higher support. This section first examines public opinion about several alternative uses for the carbon tax revenue and then turns to other environmental and climate policies.

### 5.1. Preferred Revenue Recycling

We asked respondents to what extent they would accept an increase in the carbon tax for different uses of the revenue. As the exact cost of the tax was not

specified, the benefits of the revenue recycling were made relatively more salient, which explains higher acceptance rates compared to our Tax & Dividend. Still,  
 380 this question enables to compare answers relative to one another.

#### *5.1.1. Investments in energy transition*

Figure 17 reports people's responses to each proposed scenario. Overall, the preferred revenue recyclings are investments in the energy transition. This result is consistent with various papers showing that earmarking the revenue of  
 385 the tax for environmental purposes largely increases public support (for a review of the literature, see for instance Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Carattini et al., 2018). As people tend to see carbon taxation as effective only if it finances green investments (Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011), these policies legitimize the implementation of a tax and increase its acceptance. In addition, the large  
 390 approval for a policy investing in non-polluting transport can be explained by people's desire for mobility alternatives, the lack of which was identified as an important problem with our Tax & Dividend (see section 4).

#### *5.1.2. Transfers to households*

While previous literature has shown that distributive concerns matter for  
 395 carbon tax approval, the common tool proposed by economists to address this issue — lump-sum transfers — is not met with resounding support. Out of the nine proposed mechanisms, the standard flat recycling comes last (with 37% approval), and a transfer targeted to the bottom 50% comes seventh (46%). Consistent with our previous finding that people are concerned that the carbon

tax may penalize rural and peri-urban households, the preferred “lump-sum” transfer is the one targeted to people constrained with respect to their consumption of petroleum products (fifth with 55% approval). These results echo the findings of [Kallbekken et al. \(2011\)](#) who showed that people tend to prefer more narrowly targeted revenue recycling, possibly because of distributional concerns.

The relatively low support for compensation mechanisms should however not be understood as a lack of concern about purchasing power or distributive effects. As shown in section 4, the distributive properties of lump-sum transfers are not well understood. Perhaps surprisingly, the second preferred mechanism for revenue recycling is a reduction in the VAT rate (61% approval). The main rationales for this support are the benefits to one’s purchasing power and the perceived distributive effects. As the VAT is known to be a regressive tax, people may perceive it fair to compensate an increase in the regressive carbon tax with a decrease in the VAT. Although such a mechanism would be less favorable to poorer households — who spend less in VAT in absolute value, and would therefore receive less than from a uniform transfer — it may not be perceived as such.

### *5.1.3. Double dividend and public deficit*

The last two options propose to use the carbon tax revenue to reduce social contributions, or the public deficit. These mechanisms come respectively in sixth and eighth position with 51% and 44% of approval. These results can be linked to the low level of concern regarding the impact of a carbon tax on the economy

documented in section 4. They are also consistent with previous focus group studies (e.g. Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010), including in France where Deroubaix  
 425 & Lévêque (2006) found that people did not understand why the revenue of an environmental tax reform should be used to tackle unemployment.

## 5.2. Other Instruments

Under a binding acceptability constraint, alternative instruments become relevant, even if Pigouvian taxes may be more cost-effective (e.g. Goulder &  
 430 Parry, 2008). To elicit people’s preferred environmental policies, we ask respondents whether they would support eight different propositions. To make these questions easier to answer, the exact mechanisms and their associated costs and benefits are unspecified. The answers reported should therefore be taken cautiously as people could change their mind once faced with clear trade-offs. Still,  
 435 this exercise is informative about people’s first reactions to different proposals.

### 5.2.1. Other Pigouvian taxes

Figure 18 shows that among the eight options, the most strongly supported is a tax on kerosene (70% of “Yes” including 41% of “Yes, completely”). The main rationale could be a broadly perceived effectiveness of the tax if people view  
 440 aviation as an important source of emissions, and the distributive effect of such policy since richer people fly more.<sup>5</sup> In sharp contrast, only 17% of our survey respondents approve a tax on red meat, a policy ranked second-to-last. One

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<sup>5</sup>In France in 2008, people in the top income decile travelled by plane about seven times more than the bottom 50% of the income distribution (Pappalardo et al., 2010). Furthermore, kerosene’s emissions are taxed only through the EU-ETS, hence at a far lower rate than diesel and gasoline. This discrepancy has been highlighted in the public debate.



could explain this lower acceptance rate by the belief that such policy would be ineffective, as we have shown in section 3 that less than half of respondents know that beef has a high carbon footprint. Additional reasons for its rejection could be the perceived negative impact on purchasing power, and the feeling that the policy is too coercive and targets a behavior difficult to change (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012). Overall, this evidence confirms that people are not opposed to Pigouvian taxes per se, and that acceptance varies significantly depending on the target and the perceived outcome of the instrument.

### 5.2.2. Norms

Among all proposed instruments, the two most approved are norms. 72% and 70% of respondents declared being in favor of stricter standards for the insulation of new buildings and for the pollution of new vehicles, respectively. It is unclear to what extent people are aware of the “hidden costs” of such policies. For instance, fuel economy standards in the US have been estimated to be three to six times more costly than a tax on gasoline for similar abatement levels (Jacobsen, 2013), and as possibly more regressive (Jacobsen, 2013; Davis & Knittel, 2019; Levinson, 2019). The exact properties of these instruments are of course specific to their design, but it is likely that their popularity partly reflects the underestimation of their costs.

For urban transport policies as well, standards are preferred to price instruments. While the prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers comes fourth on the list of preferred options with 44% approval, the introduction of urban tolls comes last with only 14%. In a survey on urban road pricing, Jones (1998)

identifies the main deterrent for these mechanisms. While some are specific to congestion charges, the other perceived problems are very much alike those identified for our Tax & Dividend: ineffectiveness, unfairness and the feeling that it is just another tax.

### 470 5.2.3. Diesel taxation

The strong opposition of the Yellow Vests against energy taxes did not only lead the government to reverse the planned carbon tax trajectory. The additional tax increases initially scheduled for diesel — to catch-up with the currently higher rates imposed on gasoline despite diesel’s high social cost from air pollution — have also been abandoned.<sup>6</sup> In our survey, we ask respondents whether 475 they would therefore accept an increase in diesel tax to catch up with that of gasoline. As illustrated by Figure 19, 59% of respondents answer they would not, while 29% say they would (12% “PNR”). Among the 57% of households who own a diesel vehicle, the opposition augments to 80%. The geographic difference 480 is also striking as 73% of rural households would be opposed, vs. only 40% of those living in the Paris agglomeration. As shown in our online Appendix 3.1, these two determinants appear as the most important divides with respect to diesel taxation.

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<sup>6</sup>Three increases of +0.026€/L were initially scheduled for January 2019, 2020 and 2021.

## 6. Determinants of Attitudes

To understand what factors foster environmentally-friendly attitudes, we explore the socio-demographic determinants of attitudes over CC, the correlations between knowledge and perception of CC, and how these attitudes over CC as well as socio-demographics shape preferences for policies. 485

### 6.1. Attitudes over climate change

Table I shows the main socio-demographic determinants of different attitudes towards CC: the knowledge that CC is anthropogenic (columns 1-3), an index of knowledge about CC (4) and the perception that CC is “disastrous” or “cataclysmic” (5-6). To build the index of knowledge, we aggregate different variables corresponding to the different kinds of knowledge about CC identified by Kiel & Rost (2002) (see also Hoppe et al., 2018, for a summary). 490

We first compute a score for the question asking the emission target p.c. required to limit CC (see section 3.1). Denoting  $t$  as the respondent’s answer (from 0 to 10 tCO<sub>2</sub>/yr), we define the score as:

$$\text{score emission target} = \begin{cases} 3 & \text{if } t \leq 2 \\ 2 & \text{if } t \in [3; 4] \\ 1 & \text{if } t \in [5; 6] \\ 0 & \text{if } t \geq 7 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

and we then aggregate this score with other answers:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{knowledge} = & 3 \cdot \text{CC anthropogenic} - 2 \cdot \text{CC doesn't exist} \\ & + \text{score factors} + \text{score emission target} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

500 where “score factors” is the sum of correct answers to factors of CC (see Figure 3), and the two first variables in the formula are dummies. The relative weights of the variables correspond to the loadings of a one-factor analysis, ensuring that our index captures the most determinant elements of knowledge.<sup>7</sup> The original index ranges from  $-2$  (no respondent) to  $+13$  (22 respondents),  
 505 and has quartiles of 6, 8 and 9. In the regressions, we normalize this index by subtracting the mean (7.6) and dividing by the standard deviation (2.5). Finally, we run OLS regressions of the three attitudes over CC on various socio-demographics, household characteristics, and political orientation. We report only the most relevant variables, but describe the entire list of covariates in  
 510 Appendix C.1. We confirm that logistic regressions yield similar results (see online Appendix 5).

The best predictors of attitudes over CC corresponds to political orientation, and in particular identifying as an ecologist, one’s positioning towards the Yellow Vests, and left-right leaning. Political orientation shapes attitudes in  
 515 a consistent manner: being ecologist, more left-wing or less supportive of the Yellow Vests is always associated with higher “concern over CC”, i.e. better

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<sup>7</sup>See online Appendix 4 for more details.

Table I: Determinants of attitudes towards climate change (CC).

	CC is anthropogenic			Knowledge about CC	CC is disastrous	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	0.032** (0.013)			0.137*** (0.028)	0.051*** (0.014)	
Ecologist	0.135*** (0.024)			0.404*** (0.053)	0.192*** (0.027)	
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.098*** (0.033)			-0.142** (0.071)	-0.093*** (0.036)	
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.038* (0.022)			-0.100** (0.048)	-0.051** (0.024)	
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.098*** (0.024)			-0.223*** (0.051)	-0.061** (0.026)	
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.207*** (0.043)			-0.498*** (0.093)	-0.105** (0.047)	
Left-right: Extreme-left	0.111** (0.056)		0.109 (0.077)	0.295** (0.122)	0.075 (0.062)	0.005 (0.084)
Left-right: Left	0.074*** (0.027)		0.070 (0.046)	0.137** (0.059)	0.099*** (0.030)	-0.025 (0.051)
Left-right: Center	0.013 (0.030)		0.039 (0.044)	0.093 (0.065)	0.021 (0.033)	-0.089* (0.048)
Left-right: Right	-0.029 (0.029)		-0.017 (0.045)	-0.039 (0.062)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.143*** (0.049)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.014 (0.034)		-0.019 (0.055)	-0.117 (0.074)	0.025 (0.037)	-0.086 (0.060)
Diploma: <u>CAP</u> or <u>BEP</u>	0.040* (0.022)		0.033 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)
Diploma: <u>Baccalauréat</u>	0.065** (0.027)		0.115*** (0.028)	0.145** (0.058)	0.030 (0.029)	0.133*** (0.031)
Diploma: Higher	0.086*** (0.027)		0.159*** (0.027)	0.266*** (0.059)	0.096*** (0.030)	0.240*** (0.030)
Diploma $\times$ Left-right			-0.005 (0.008)			-0.005 (0.009)
Diploma $\times$ Left-right: Indeterminate			0.013 (0.014)			-0.027* (0.015)
Age: 25 – 34	0.050 (0.041)	-0.030 (0.032)		0.128 (0.089)	0.021 (0.045)	
Age: 35 – 49	0.002 (0.041)	-0.088*** (0.029)		0.092 (0.089)	0.032 (0.045)	
Age: 50 – 64	0.009 (0.044)	-0.092*** (0.029)		0.069 (0.096)	-0.032 (0.049)	
Age: $\geq$ 65	-0.106** (0.053)	-0.197*** (0.029)		-0.052 (0.114)	-0.092 (0.058)	
Income (k€/month)	-0.008 (0.008)			-0.018 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.009)	
Sex: Male	-0.023 (0.018)			0.156*** (0.039)	-0.004 (0.020)	
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.004 (0.008)			-0.003 (0.017)	0.006 (0.009)	
Frequency of public transit	0.016** (0.007)			0.045*** (0.016)	0.007 (0.008)	
Additional covariates	✓			✓	✓	
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R <sup>2</sup>	0.104	0.021	0.037	0.156	0.118	0.048

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

knowledge and higher pessimism. Interest into politics (measured on a scale “almost not”/“a little”/“a lot”) also leads to higher concern, but to a lesser extent. Two observations on the left-right leaning deserve comment. First, the 40% of people indeterminate relative to this spectrum (see Appendix E for the descriptive statistics) have attitudes close to the center-right. Second, the variations predicted in the dependent variables are as high across the Yellow Vests positionings as across the traditional left-right spectrum. For instance, knowledge about CC is ceteris paribus lower by 0.50 standard deviation (s.d.) for people part of the movement than for those who oppose it, which is comparable to the spread of 0.41 s.d. between extreme-right and extreme-left people (4).

Two socio-demographics are also consistently related to attitudes over CC: age and level of education. On average, the younger and the more educated one is, the more one is concerned by CC. People aged 18-24 may appear to have slightly lower knowledge and lower pessimism than people of prime age ceteris paribus, in columns (1,4,5); but this is because their concern is mostly captured by the employment status modality “student”, not shown in the table. Overall, the generation with the least concern is undeniably those aged over 65. For instance, without any control, they are 20 percentage points (p.p.) less likely to believe that CC is anthropogenic than young adults (2) — though most of this effect is explained by a lower level of education (1). Another finding is that men have a higher knowledge than women by 0.16 s.d. ceteris paribus (4), but their perception of the severity of CC is virtually the same (5). Finally, other characteristics have smaller or even insignificant effects.

Although the determinants we find are broadly consistent with those elicited 540  
in the literature (Upham et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 2011; ADEME, 2018),<sup>8</sup> we  
do not encounter the political polarity which characterizes the United States.  
Indeed, Kahan et al. (2012) argue that American people “tend to form per-  
ceptions of societal risks that cohere with values characteristic of groups with  
which they identify” (this is the cultural cognition thesis), rather than through 545  
an assessment of the scientific evidence they encounter (the science comprehen-  
sion thesis). It is crucial to know whether people neglect climate science in  
such a way, as this would mean that a media campaign would have little effect  
on people’s assimilation of climate science. Kahan et al. (2012) and McCright  
& Dunlap (2011) provide evidence for cultural cognition by showing that ed- 550  
ucation has little effect on perceived risk or knowledge about CC, while the  
interaction between education and political orientation has a significant effect.<sup>9</sup>  
We assess whether such interaction appears in the French context, by studying  
the interaction between the higher degree obtained and the left-right political  
leaning (columns 4, 6). We find no significant interaction, and obtain the same 555  
nil result when replacing the traditional left-right scale by the Yellow Vests posi-  
tioning, and/or the higher degree by knowledge about CC (see online Appendix  
6). This lack of evidence suggests that the public debate over CC is less po-

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<sup>8</sup>See also Capstick et al. (2015) for trends in attitudes.

<sup>9</sup>Funk & Kennedy (2016) also report that Republicans are equally distrustful of climate scientists’ integrity whatever their level of education, while the distrust vanishes for Democrats with higher degrees. The mechanism of the interaction is documented by Ehret et al. (2018) and Van Boven et al. (2018): people form beliefs through partisan cues, by adopting views expressed by political figures of the party they identify and rejecting positions from the other party.

larized in France than in the US,<sup>10</sup> and that the knowledge and perception of  
 560 many French people could change with better access to information over CC.

Figure 20 gives a sense of the shift in the perception and support for climate policies that could follow an information campaign, as it shows the correlations between attitudes over CC, climate policies, and socio-demographics. Knowledge is highly correlated with the perceived gravity of CC (correlation of 0.43),  
 565 and both of these variables are in turn well correlated with the readiness to adopt an ecological lifestyle and to the number of climate policies (of Figure 18) supported (correlations around 0.3). The acceptance of our Tax & Dividend is less correlated with attitudes (at 0.1-0.2), as the support for this policy is already low. Still, the positive correlation between knowledge and support for  
 570 other climate policies is an encouraging prospect for an information campaign about CC and even more so since we did not find evidence that partisanship would lead to the dismissal of scientific discourse. Finally, as previously seen, diploma and age are quite correlated with attitudes, though these correlations are below those between attitudes over CC and over policies, at 0 to 0.2.

## 575 6.2. Attitudes over policies

To better understand the heterogeneity in people's support, we regress several indicators of attitudes towards climate policies on respondents' characteristics. Table II reports the results for the acceptance of our Tax & Dividend (columns 1-2) and the readiness to adopt an ecological lifestyle (6) in the case

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<sup>10</sup>A finding reminiscent of Ziegler (2017), who studies Germany.



that the richest were contributing, efforts were shared globally, and alternatives were developed. We also use the eight policies proposed in Figure 18 in our dependent variables: column 3 studies the share of policies approved while column 4 features the preference for norms vs. taxes within the policies. Similarly, column 5 uses six measures of Figure 17 to define an index of preference for earmarking vs. transfers. Indexes for these preferences are constructed as follows:

$$\text{Norms vs. taxes} = \sum_{p \in \text{norms}} \text{score}_p - \sum_{p \in \text{taxes}} \text{score}_p \quad (3)$$

where the score of each measure corresponds to a grade between  $-2$  (for a “Not at all” answer) and  $2$  (for “Yes, completely”). We proceed similarly for earmarking vs. transfers, and describe the categorization of measures in Appendix C.2. Again, we normalize these two indexes by subtracting the mean ( $2.8$  for norms vs. taxes,  $1.4$  for earmarking vs. transfers) and dividing by the standard deviation ( $3.3$  and  $3.1$  respectively). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in online Appendix provide the analysis of the determinants of acceptance for each of the eight policies and nine revenue recycling. The results are overall very similar to those provided by the more synthetic indicators presented here.

As suggested by the correlation matrix of section 6.1, knowledge about CC and the conviction that it would be disastrous positively affect the approval of climate policies, ceteris paribus. Excluding the (endogenous) variables describ-

Table II: Determinants of attitudes towards climate policies

	Acceptance of Tax & dividend		Share of policies approved	Norms vs. taxes	Earmarking vs. transfers	Ecological lifestyle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Knowledge about CC	0.029*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.005)	0.024 (0.020)	0.131*** (0.020)	0.103*** (0.009)
CC is disastrous	0.022 (0.018)	0.037** (0.018)	0.081*** (0.010)	0.125*** (0.040)	0.156*** (0.039)	0.142*** (0.018)
Interest in politics (0 to 2)	-0.019 (0.013)		0.034*** (0.007)	-0.010 (0.029)	0.053* (0.028)	0.026** (0.013)
Ecologist	0.126*** (0.024)		0.082*** (0.013)	-0.134** (0.056)	0.249*** (0.054)	0.149*** (0.025)
Yellow Vests: PNR	-0.021 (0.032)		-0.052*** (0.018)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.110 (0.071)	-0.079** (0.033)
Yellow Vests: understands	-0.144*** (0.022)		-0.029** (0.012)	-0.056 (0.050)	-0.091* (0.049)	-0.013 (0.022)
Yellow Vests: supports	-0.222*** (0.023)		-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.131** (0.053)	-0.142*** (0.052)	-0.023 (0.024)
Yellow Vests: is part	-0.214*** (0.043)		-0.084*** (0.023)	-0.252*** (0.097)	-0.175* (0.095)	-0.037 (0.043)
Left-right: Extreme-left	-0.040 (0.056)		0.025 (0.031)	-0.285** (0.127)	0.167 (0.124)	0.047 (0.056)
Left-right: Left	0.072*** (0.027)		-0.005 (0.015)	-0.137** (0.061)	0.002 (0.060)	0.028 (0.027)
Left-right: Center	0.051* (0.030)		0.011 (0.016)	-0.051 (0.068)	0.051 (0.066)	0.095*** (0.030)
Left-right: Right	-0.022 (0.028)		0.008 (0.016)	0.030 (0.065)	0.064 (0.063)	0.005 (0.029)
Left-right: Extreme-right	-0.041 (0.034)		-0.028 (0.018)	0.055 (0.077)	0.009 (0.075)	0.014 (0.034)
Diploma (1 to 4)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.009)
Age: 25 – 34	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.099*** (0.032)	-0.023 (0.022)	0.038 (0.093)	-0.159* (0.090)	0.032 (0.041)
Age: 35 – 49	-0.047 (0.040)	-0.089*** (0.030)	-0.017 (0.022)	0.189** (0.092)	-0.002 (0.089)	0.039 (0.041)
Age: 50 – 64	-0.054 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.024)	0.322*** (0.100)	-0.058 (0.097)	0.049 (0.044)
Age: $\geq 65$	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.100*** (0.032)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.370*** (0.118)	-0.056 (0.115)	0.008 (0.052)
Income (k€/month)	0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.014 (0.018)	0.031* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.008)
Sex: Male	-0.053*** (0.018)	-0.074*** (0.017)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.039)	-0.063*** (0.018)
Size of town (1 to 5)	0.019** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.0002 (0.004)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.008)
Frequency of public transit	-0.003 (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)	0.024*** (0.007)
Additional covariates	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002	3,002
R <sup>2</sup>	0.150	0.051	0.226	0.081	0.121	0.202

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted variables are Yellow Vests: opposes, Age : 18 – 24 and Left-right: Indeterminate. Additional covariates are defined in

ing political orientation, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. would induce a lower likelihood to reject Tax & Dividend by 5 p.p. (column 2). The effect of these variables is even stronger when considering the share of policies approved: controlling for socio-demographics, an increase in knowledge by 1 s.d. is associated with an additional approval of 6 p.p. while the conviction that CC is disastrous increases it by 9 p.p. (see online Appendix 3.4). Beyond the strong correlation we previously found, these results confirm that increasing climate awareness could significantly increase the support for climate policies.

Besides attitudes over CC, the two most critical determinants appear to be one's affiliation as an ecologist and one's position towards the Yellow Vests. All else equal, ecologists are more likely to accept Tax & Dividend by 13 p.p., and more willing to approve other environmental policies by about 8 p.p. Conversely, holding other variables constant, people supporting the Yellow Vests are 22 p.p. more likely to reject Tax & Dividend relative to those opposed to the movement. As shown in column 3, higher affinity with the Yellow Vests is also associated with less support for other climate policies. Ecologists (resp. the Yellow Vests supporters) being more (resp. less) favorable to environmental policies and spending, their relative preference for earmarking vs. transfers is higher (resp. lower) than average, while for both groups the relative preference for norms vs. taxes is lower than average. Also, ecologists' attitudes towards environmental policies translate into a higher willingness to adopt an ecological lifestyle (by 15 p.p.), but the opposite does not hold true for the Yellow Vests.

Although this could signal some warm glow,<sup>11</sup> it also suggests that their strong rejection of environmental policies does not simply reflect lower concerns about the environment. Rather, the conditions of fairness embedded in our question could be critical for Yellow Vests to accept sacrifices. Their rejection could also  
 625 reflect a deeper rejection of policies in general, due to a high distrust in the government — documented in [Algan et al. \(2019\)](#). This interpretation echoes the recent findings of [Rafaty \(2018\)](#), who shows that perceptions of corruption and political distrust negatively affect the stringency of climate policies. Finally, although the heterogeneity in responses is significant between these two groups,  
 630 the ranking of the preferred option remains consistent: on average, both ecologists and supporters of the Yellow Vests favor norms over taxes and earmarking over transfers.

A parallel message from Table II is that the standard left-right spectrum is not the most relevant to understand attitudes towards environmental policies.  
 635 None of our five left-right dummy variables are significantly correlated with the share of policies approved, and overall, attitudes vary much less along the left-right spectrum than along the Yellow Vests cleavage. That being said, Tax & Dividend is still significantly more supported by people from the left (+7 p.p.) and the center (+5 p.p.) than by those indeterminate. This is in line with the  
 640 literature (see e.g. [Bornstein & Lanz 2008](#); [McCright et al. 2013](#) or [Dreus & van den Bergh 2016](#) for a review). Without controlling for other variables, we find

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<sup>11</sup>Here, “warm glow” refers to one’s unintentional strategy to overestimate their virtue in order to derive satisfaction.

that people that are most likely to accept the Tax & Dividend in France are the ones affiliated with the center (+9 p.p. relative to “Indeterminate”), and the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-15 p.p., see online Appendix 3.4), which may be driven by their respective support or rejection of the current government who tried to increase the carbon tax. Our results also show that people from the extreme-left and the center are the most likely to approve other environmental policies (+7 p.p.), while the least likely are those on the extreme-right (-6 p.p.). Still, these differences become small and not statistically significant when covariates are included.

Besides political attitudes, we also observe heterogeneity in people’s responses along socio-demographic lines. As in attitudes over CC, age plays a role, as 18-24 are about 10 p.p. more likely to accept the Tax & Dividend (column 2). Still, controlling for knowledge, political attitudes and other variables, this effect is reduced by half. Similarly, more educated people tend to be more open to environmental policies (as previously found by [Thalmann, 2004](#)), but this effect becomes insignificant once age dummies are included as covariates. Furthermore, we find little effect of income on attitudes towards climate policies, a result that confirms that of [Thalmann \(2004\)](#) in Switzerland. Using our full set of controls, the most significant variables differ from the main factors of attitudes over CC: these significant variables are size of town (city dwellers being more favorable to environmental policies, as in [Thalmann, 2004](#)), and sex (males being less favorable). Although men have a higher knowledge about CC than women on average, this does not translate into higher pessimism (see

section 6.1), and it even coincides with lower support for climate policies. This phenomenon is consistent with the findings of Stern et al. (1993) and Hampel et al. (1996) that women are more attentive to links between the environment and things they value, even if they share the same values and beliefs as men. Difference in perception of CC's impact on oneself could explain women's higher support for climate policies, even given a lower factual knowledge.

## 7. Conclusion

Despite a social movement against the carbon tax, French people appear mostly aware and concerned about climate change. Their rejection should therefore not be taken as a low willingness to act for the environment, but rather as a perceived inadequacy between current carbon taxation and the fight for the climate. Our results identify several barriers — distributive concerns, inefficacy and lack of alternatives — that could be partly alleviated with specific complementary policies. In particular, French people favor investments in green infrastructures that provide them with alternatives and foster the energy transition. They also appear willing to accept certain norms as well as Pigouvian taxes if these target specific behaviors (or populations) such as air travel. The heterogeneity in people's attitudes is significant, but the relative ranking of the different policy options are in general consistent across groups of population, suggesting the following paths towards a successful ecological transition.

First and foremost, a massive and long-lasting information campaign could be launched to improve knowledge about climate change and climate policies.

Indeed, higher knowledge is clearly associated with higher concern for CC and higher support for climate policies. Second, as people mostly favor policies that provide alternatives to fossil fuels, the government could develop such policies as a substitute to a carbon tax: investments, subsidies, and regulations in favor of public transport, cleaner vehicles and thermal insulation, etc. Third, a tax and dividend restricted to kerosene could serve as a learning example as kerosene taxation is popular.<sup>12</sup> Last but not least, a more cost-effective carbon tax should later complement these policies, as people get convinced by the objective of carbon neutrality and by the government's commitment towards this goal.

But to successfully introduce a carbon tax, it is important to build public trust in politicians ([Harring & Jagers, 2013](#); [Rafaty, 2018](#)) and to correct the inequities of the tax. As such, it is no surprise if political trust is among the highest in the country that first introduced a carbon tax, Sweden ([Klenert et al., 2018](#)). It is no coincidence either if the 1991 Swedish tax was part of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system, the popular “reform of the century”, resulting from a dialogue with all stakeholders ([Sternier, 2014](#)).

The French government is willing to build such a democratic consensus, as it has just launched an assembly to tackle climate change composed of 150 citizens randomly drawn. Nevertheless, it will remain challenging to reintroduce a carbon-tax in the short-run, since French people's beliefs about carbon taxation are largely biased, and these biases are well anchored (as shown in our

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<sup>12</sup>[Murray & Rivers \(2015\)](#) document an increase in the support of the carbon tax following its implementation in British Columbia.

companion paper, [Douenne & Fabre 2019](#)). In a nutshell, market imperfections, distributive effects and political acceptability concerns all call for a combination  
710 of different types of climate policies rather than a single price signal ([Stern & Stiglitz, 2017](#); [Stiglitz, 2019](#)). The French context seems to call for a focus on the former to make the latter politically acceptable.

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# Appendices

## A. Raw data

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## B. Sources on GhG emissions

### B.1. Carbon footprints

*Plane vs. train.* Given that French electricity mix is decarbonized at 93%<sup>13</sup>, the carbon footprint of highspeed train is actually more than 20 times lower than that of an interior flight of the same distance. Hence, we chose Bordeaux - Nice as our case study as the train connection makes a big detour by Paris. Thus, we obtain an emission of 10 kg of CO<sub>2</sub> by train as compared to 180 kg by plane. Our source for train is the French railroad company, [SNCF](#), and is consistent with data aggregated by the official agency [ADEME](#). For the flight, our source is a [carbon footprint calculator](#). Another calculator provides almost the same result, so we preferred this figure rather than a higher figure from a third calculator.

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*Nuclear vs. wind.* AR5 from [IPCC](#) and [Pehl et al. \(2017\)](#) show that nuclear power plants and wind turbines have similar carbon footprint, at 10 gCO<sub>2</sub>eq/kWh (for comparison, it is 500 for gas combined cycle).

945

*Beef vs. pasta.* [Poore & Nemecek \(2018\)](#) show that median beef carbon footprint is 60 kgCO<sub>2</sub>eq/kg (more precisely, 30 kgCO<sub>2</sub>eq per 100g of protein and

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<sup>13</sup>Cf. [RTE - Bilan électrique 2018](#) (p. 32).

Table A.3: Sample characteristics: quotas stratas.

	<u>Population</u>	Sample
<b>gender</b>		
woman	<u>0.52</u>	0.53
man	<u>0.48</u>	0.47
<b>age</b>		
18-24	<u>0.12</u>	0.11
25-34	<u>0.15</u>	0.11
35-49	<u>0.24</u>	0.24
50-64	<u>0.24</u>	0.26
>65	<u>0.25</u>	0.27
<b>profession</b>		
farmer	<u>0.01</u>	0.01
independent	<u>0.03</u>	0.04
executive	<u>0.09</u>	0.09
intermediate	<u>0.14</u>	0.14
employee	<u>0.15</u>	0.16
worker	<u>0.12</u>	0.13
retired	<u>0.33</u>	0.33
inactive	<u>0.12</u>	0.11
<b>education</b>		
No diploma or <u>Brevet</u>	<u>0.30</u>	0.24
<u>CAP or BEP</u>	<u>0.25</u>	0.26
<u>Baccalauréat</u>	<u>0.17</u>	0.18
<u>Higher</u>	<u>0.29</u>	0.31
<b>size of town</b>		
rural	<u>0.22</u>	0.24
<20k	<u>0.17</u>	0.18
20-99k	<u>0.14</u>	0.13
>100k	<u>0.31</u>	0.29
Paris area	<u>0.16</u>	0.15
<b>region</b>		
<u>IDF</u>	<u>0.19</u>	0.17
<u>Nord</u>	<u>0.09</u>	0.10
<u>Est</u>	<u>0.13</u>	0.12
<u>SO</u>	<u>0.09</u>	0.09
<u>Centre</u>	<u>0.10</u>	0.12
<u>Ouest</u>	<u>0.10</u>	0.10
<u>Occ</u>	<u>0.09</u>	0.09
<u>ARA</u>	<u>0.12</u>	0.13
<u>PACA</u>	<u>0.09</u>	0.09

Table A.4: Households' characteristics.

	Population	Sample
<b>Household composition (mean)</b>		
Household size	<u>2.36</u>	2.38
Number of adults	<u>2.03</u>	1.93
c.u.	<u>1.60</u>	1.61
<b>Energy source (share)</b>		
Gas	<u>0.42</u>	0.36
Fuel	<u>0.12</u>	0.09
<b>Accommodation size (m<sup>2</sup>)</b>		
mean	<u>97</u>	96
p25	<u>69</u>	66
p50	<u>90</u>	90
p75	<u>120</u>	115
<b>Distance traveled by car (km/year)</b>		
mean	<u>13,735</u>	15,328
p25	<u>4,000</u>	4,000
p50	<u>10,899</u>	10,000
p75	<u>20,000</u>	20,000
<b>Fuel economy (L/100 km)</b>		
mean	<u>6.39</u>	7.25
p25	<u>6</u>	5
p50	<u>6.5</u>	6
p75	<u>7.5</u>	7

SOURCES: Matched BdF; except for number of adults (ERFS) and domestic fuel ([CEREN](#)).

200g of protein per kg); while the carbon footprint of wheat pasta is 1.3 kgCO<sub>2</sub>eq/kg (0.5 kgCO<sub>2</sub>eq per 1000 kcal of protein and 2695 kcal per kg).

Given that a beef steak [weighs 100-125g](#), its carbon footprint is twenty times 950 that of two servings of pasta of 125g each.

## B.2. Current and target emissions

French consumption-based yearly GhG emissions amounted in 2014 to 712 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq, i.e. 10.8 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq p.c., and are roughly stable in recent years ([CGDD](#), [2019](#)). To stop climate change and stabilize the GhG concentration in the atmo- 955

sphere, it is required to meet zero net emissions. To meet the Paris agreement, [France National Low-Carbon Strategy](#) aims to achieve carbon (i.e. GhG) neutrality by 2050 ([CGDD, 2015](#)). Given carbon sinks estimated at 85 Mt<sub>2eq</sub> for 2050 (mainly forest and soil), this strategy requires to reach gross emissions of  
 960 about 1 tCO<sub>2eq</sub> p.c. at this date. Admittedly, less stringent scenarios may still allow to keep global warming below +2°C in 2100 with good probability — even considering the same burden share for France — by relying more heavily on net negative emissions after 2070 through carbon capture and storage. For this reason, we consider a range of answers as correct for the French target emission  
 965 in 2050: from 0 to 2 tCO<sub>2eq</sub> p.c.

## C. Details on main regressions

### *C.1. Control variables*

Our regression Tables [I](#) and [II](#) display only the most relevant variables, but — when specified — the following additional covariates are included as controls:

970 **Socio-demographics:** respondent's income; household's income; employment status (9 categories); socio-professional category (8 categories); region of France (10 categories); household size; number of people above 14; number of adults; single; number of c.u.; smokes; favored medium for news (5 categories).

975 **Political orientation:** conservative; liberal; humanist; patriot; apolitical.

**Energy and exposure to policies:** heating energy: gaz; heating energy: domestic fuel; accomodation size; annual distance travelled by car; fuel economy; type of fuel: diesel; type of fuel: gasoline; number of vehicles; simulated net gain from Tax & Dividend; opinion on public transports; mode of commuting transport.

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### *C.2. Measures for relative preferences*

We constructed the two indexes of section 6.2 using the following measures:

**Norms:** insulation standards; pollution standards; roadworthiness standards; prohibition of polluting vehicles.

**Taxes:** kerosene; red meat; urban tolls; climate fund.

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**Earmarking:** renovation; renewables; non polluting transport.

**Transfers:** to bottom half; to all; to constrained households.

## **D. Questionnaire**

Hereafter, we only describe questions of the survey that are used in the present paper. The other questions are described and analyzed in our companion paper (Douenne & Fabre, 2019). Words that appear in bold were actually in both bold and underlined in the respondents' questionnaire.

990

*Socio-demographics.*

1. What is your postal code?
- 995 2. What is your gender (in the sense of civil status)?  
Female; Male
3. What is your age group?  
18 to 24 years old; 25 to 34 years old; 35 to 49 years old; 50 to 64 years old;  
65 years old or more
- 1000 4. What is your employment status?  
Permanent; Temporary contract; Unemployed; Student; Retired; Other  
active; Inactive
5. What is your socio-professional category? (Remember that the unemployed  
are active workers).  
1005 Farmer; Craftsperson, merchant; Independent; Executive; Intermediate  
occupation; Employee; Worker; Retired; Other Inactive
6. What is your highest degree?  
No diploma; Brevet des collèges; CAP or BEP [secondary]; Baccalaureate;  
Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG, schools of health and social training...); Bac  
1010 +3 (licence...) [bachelor]; Bac +5 or more (master, engineering or business  
school, doctorate, medicine, master, DEA, DESS...)
7. How many people live in your household? Household includes: you, your  
family members who live with you, and your dependents.



8. What is your net **monthly** income (in euros)? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc. 1015
9. What is the net **monthly** income (in euros) **of your household**? **All income** (before withholding tax) is included here: salaries, pensions, allowances, APL [housing allowance], land income, etc.
10. In your household how many people are 14 years old or older (**including yourself**)? 1020
11. In your household, how many people are over the age of majority (**including yourself**)?

*Energy characteristics.*

12. What is the surface area of your home? (in m<sup>2</sup>) 1025
13. What is the heating system in your home?  
Individual heating; Collective heating; PNR (Don't know, don't say)
14. What is the main heating energy source in your home?  
Electricity Town gas; Butane, propane, tank gas; Heating oil; Wood, solar, geothermal, aerothermal (heat pump); Other; PNR (Don't know, don't say) 1030
15. How many motor vehicles does your household have?  
None; One; Two or more
16. [Without a vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven in the last 12 months?

1035 17. [One vehicle] What type of fuel do you use for this vehicle?

Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other

18. [One vehicle] What is the average fuel economy of your vehicle? (in Liters per 100 km)

1040 19. [One vehicle] How many kilometers have you driven with your vehicle in the last 12 months?

20. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your main vehicle?

Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other

21. [At least two vehicles] What type of fuel do you use for your second vehicle?

Electric or hybrid; Diesel; Gasoline; Other

1045 22. [At least two vehicles] What is the average fuel economy of all your vehicles? (in Liters per 100 km)

23. [At least two vehicles] How many kilometers have you driven with all your vehicles in the last 12 months?

*Partial reforms [transport / housing]. (...)*

1050 24. If fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter, by how much would **your household** reduce its fuel consumption?

0% - [I already consume almost none / I am already not consuming]; 0% -

[I am constrained on all my trips / I will not reduce it]; From 0% to 10%;

From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30% - [I would change my

1055 travel habits significantly / I would change my consumption significantly]

25. In your opinion, if [fuel prices increased by 50 cents per liter / gas and heating oil prices increased by 30%], by how much would **French people** reduce their consumption on average?

From 0% to 3%; From 3% to 10%; From 3% to 10%; From 10% to 20%; From 20% to 30%; More than 30%

1060

*Tax & Dividend: initial.*

26. The government is studying an increase in the carbon tax, whose revenues would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income. This would imply:

- an increase in the price of gasoline by 11 cents per liter and diesel by 13 cents per liter; 1065
- an increase of 13% in the price of gas, and 15% in the price of heating oil;
- an annual payment of 110€ to each adult, or 220€ per year for a couple.

(...)

1070

27. [ [empty] / Scientists agree that a carbon tax would be effective in reducing pollution.] Do you think that such a measure would reduce pollution and fight climate change?

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

28. In your opinion, which categories would lose [ [blank] / purchasing power] with such a measure? (Several answers possible) 1075

No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people;  
Rural or peri-urban people; Some French people, but not a particular income  
category; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

- 1080 29. In your opinion, what categories would gain purchasing power with such a measure? (Several answers possible)

No one; The poorest; The middle classes; The richest; All French people;  
Urban dwellers; Some French people, but not a particular income category;  
PNR (Don't know, don't say)

- 1085 *Tax & Dividend: after knowledge.* We always consider the same measure. (...)

30. Why do you think this measure is beneficial? (Maximum three responses)

Contributes to the fight climate change; Reduces the harmful effects of  
pollution on health; Reduces traffic congestion; Increases my purchasing  
power; Increases the purchasing power of the poorest; Fosters France's  
 1090 independence from fossil energy imports; Prepares the economy for  
tomorrow's challenges; For none of these reasons; Other (specify):

31. Why do you think this measure is unwanted? (Maximum three answers)

Is ineffective in reducing pollution; Alternatives are insufficient or too  
expensive; Penalizes rural areas; Decreases my purchasing power; Decreases  
 1095 the purchasing power of some modest households; Harms the economy and  
employment; Is a pretext for raising taxes; For none of these reasons; Other  
(specify):

(...)

*Attitudes over other policies.*

32. In which cases would you be in favor of increasing the carbon tax? I would 1100  
be in favor if the tax revenues were used to finance...\_

- (a) a payment to the 50% poorest French people (those earning less than 1670€ per month)
- (b) a payment to all French people
- (c) a compensation for households forced to consume petroleum products 1105
- (d) a decrease in social contributions
- (e) a decrease in VAT
- (f) a decrease in the public deficit
- (g) the thermal renovation of buildings
- (h) renewable energy (wind, solar, etc.) 1110
- (i) clean transport

Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not at all

33. Please select "A little" (test to check that you are attentive).

Not at all; A little; A lot; Completely; PNR (Don't know, don't say) 1115

34. Would you support the following environmental policies?

- (a) A tax on kerosene (aviation)
- (b) A tax on red meat

- (c) Stricter standards on the insulation of new buildings
- 1120 (d) Stricter standards on the pollution of new vehicles
- (e) Stricter standards on pollution during roadworthiness tests
- (f) The prohibition of polluting vehicles in city centers
- (g) The introduction of urban tolls
- (h) A contribution to a global climate fund

1125 Yes, absolutely; Yes, rather; Indifferent or Don't know; No, not really; No, not at all

35. For historical reasons, diesel is taxed less than gasoline. Would you be in favor of raising taxes on diesel to catch up with the level of taxation on gasoline?

1130 Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

*Attitudes over climate change.*

36. How often do you talk about climate change?

Several times a month; Several times a year; Almost never; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

1135 37. In your opinion, climate change...

is not a reality; is mainly due to natural climate variability; is mainly due to human activity; PNR (Don't know, don't say).

38. Which of the following elements contribute to global warming? (Several answers possible)

CO<sub>2</sub>; Methane; Oxygen; Particulate matter

1140

39. In your opinion, which of the following statements are true? (Several answers possible).

Consuming one beef steak emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases than eating two servings of pasta.; Electricity produced by nuclear power emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases than electricity produced by wind turbines.; A seat in a Bordeaux - Nice journey emits about 20 times more greenhouse gases by plane than by high speed train.

1145

40. In your opinion, how would the effects of climate change be, if humanity did nothing to limit it?

Insignificant, or even beneficial; Small, because humans would be able to live with it; Grave, because there would be more natural disasters; Disastrous, lifestyles would be largely altered; Cataclysmic, humankind would disappear; PNR(Don't know, don't say)

1150

41. In which of these two regions do you think will climate change have the worst consequences?

1155

The European Union; India; As much in both

42. In your opinion, in France, which generations will be seriously affected by climate change? (Several answers possible)

People born in the 1960s; People born in the 1990s; People born in the 2020s; People born in the 2050s; None of the four

1160

43. In your opinion, who is responsible for climate change? (Several possible

choices)

Each of us; The richest; Governments; Some foreign countries; Past generations; Natural causes

- 1165 44. Currently, each French person emits on average the equivalent of 10 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per year.

In your opinion, how much must this figure be reduced to by 2050 in order to hope to contain global warming to +2°C in 2100 (if all countries did the same)? In 2050, we should emit at most...

1170

0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10 tons

45. Has climate change had or will it have an influence on your decision to make a child (or children)?\_

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

- 1175 46. [If Yes] Why does climate change influence your decision to have a child (or children)? (Several answers possible).

Because I don't want my child to live in a devastated world.; Because each additional human being aggravates climate change.

47. Would you be willing to change your lifestyle to fight climate change? (Several answers possible)

1180

Yes, if policies went in this direction; Yes, if I had the financial means; Yes, if everyone did the same; No, only the richest people have to change their way of life; No, it is against my personal interest; No, I think climate change



is not a real problem; I have already adopted a sustainable way of life; I try,  
but I have trouble changing my habits

1185

48. Assuming that all states in the world agree to firmly fight climate change, notably through a transition to renewable energy, by making the richest contribute, and imagining that France would expand the supply of non-polluting transport very widely; would you be willing to adopt an ecological lifestyle (i.e. eat little red meat and ensure to use almost no gasoline, diesel or kerosene)?

1190

Yes; No; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

*Access to public transport and mobility habits.*

49. How many minutes walk is it to the nearest public transit stop? (To simplify, you can use the conversion 1 km = 10 min walk).

1195

in min: ; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

50. How often does the nearest public transport pass? (excluding school buses)

Less than three times a day; Between four times a day and once an hour;

Once or twice an hour; More than three times an hour; PNR (Don't know,

don't say)

1200

51. What do you think about the availability of public transport where you live?

It is...

Satisfactory; Suitable, but should be increased; Limited, but sufficient;

Insufficient; PNR (Don't know, don't say)

1205 52. What mode of transportation do you mainly use for each of the following trips?

- (a) Home - work (or studies)
- (b) Grocery shopping
- (c) Leisure (excluding holidays)

1210 Car; Public transport; Walking or cycling; Two-wheeled vehicle; Carpooling;  
Not concerned

53. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work using public transport?

Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No;

1215 PNR (Don't know, don't say)

54. [If Car selected for Work] Would it be possible for you, without changing your home or workplace, to travel from home to work by walking or cycling?

Yes, it would not be very difficult for me; Yes, but it would bother me; No;

PNR (Don't know, don't say)

1220 *Politics and media.*

55. How much are you interested in politics?

Almost not; A little; A lot

56. How would you define yourself? (Several answers possible)

Extreme left; Left; Center; Right; Extreme right; Liberal; Conservative;

1225 Humanist; Patriot; Apolitical; Ecologist

57. How do you keep yourself informed of current events? Mainly through...

Television; Press (written or online); Social networks; Radio; Other

58. What do you think of the Yellow Vests? (Several answers possible)

I am part of them; I support them; I understand them; I oppose them; PNR

(Don't know, don't say)

1230

*Open field.*

59. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, comments or suggestions in the field below.

#### **E. Who are the Yellow Vests**




Figure 9: Perceived winners and losers from Tax & Dividend




Figure 10: Perceived benefits and problems from Tax &amp; Dividend




Figure 11: Perceived aggregate and own elasticities.




Figure 12: Mode of transportation by activity.




Figure 13: Walking distance to the nearest stop, in minutes.




Figure 14: Frequency of public transport at the nearest stop.




Figure 15: Among those who commute to work by car, possibility to change the transportation mode, depending on the alternative.




Figure 16: Supply of public transport where the respondent lives.




Figure 17: Approval of a carbon tax if its revenue finances...




Figure 18: Approval of different climate policies.




Figure 19: Approval of a catching-up of the diesel tax.






Figure 20: Correlations between attitudes over climate change, climate policies and socio-demographics (in %).

Table E.5: Positioning towards Yellow Vests, per category.

	Opposed	Understands	Supports	Is part	PNR
Extreme-left (2%)	6%	26%	51%	12%	5%
Left (20%)	17%	36%	36%	5%	7%
Center (13%)	49%	30%	15%	2%	6%
Right (16%)	40%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Extreme-right (9%)	11%	28%	47%	10%	5%
Indeterminate (40%)	19%	32%	30%	4%	13%
Liberal (5%)	48%	26%	18%	2%	6%
Conservative (2%)	22%	28%	30%	10%	11%
Humanist (11%)	21%	35%	29%	5%	10%
Patriot (8%)	21%	27%	39%	7%	6%
Apolitical (21%)	21%	31%	32%	4%	12%
Ecologist (15%)	17%	39%	27%	5%	12%
Rural (21%)	20%	31%	34%	6%	9%
<20k (17%)	24%	28%	34%	6%	9%
20-100k (14%)	22%	33%	32%	4%	9%
>100k (31%)	29%	34%	26%	3%	8%
Paris (17%)	28%	33%	25%	4%	11%
No diploma or Brevet (30%)	21%	29%	34%	5%	10%
CAP or BEP (24%)	23%	28%	36%	6%	7%
Baccalauréat (17%)	22%	35%	29%	4%	11%
Higher (29%)	32%	8%	36%	21%	3%
Age: 18–24 (12%)	23%	34%	27%	4%	12%
Age: 25–34 (15%)	21%	33%	28%	7%	11%
Age: 35–49 (24%)	25%	32%	29%	5%	9%
Age: 50–64 (24%)	21%	32%	36%	4%	7%
Age: $\geq 65$ (25%)	32%	30%	28%	3%	7%
Income decile: 1	25%	33%	26%	3%	14%
Income decile: 2	18%	31%	35%	5%	11%
Income decile: 3	17%	31%	32%	7%	12%
Income decile: 4	15%	33%	37%	6%	9%
Income decile: 5	21%	29%	36%	5%	8%
Income decile: 6	26%	33%	29%	6%	7%
Income decile: 7	25%	36%	28%	4%	7%
Income decile: 8	31%	31%	28%	3%	8%
Income decile: 9	39%	32%	20%	3%	6%
Income decile: 10	47%	29%	15%	3%	6%
Female (52%)	21%	34%	29%	5%	12%
Male (48%)	29%	30%	31%	5%	6%
Average	25%	32%	30%	5%	9%

NOTE: The percentages in parenthesis express the weighted share of each category from our sample.