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SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION



La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños

Berkeley Model United Nations



¡Hola Delegados!

¡Bienvenidos a la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños! My name is Brett Buckingham, and I will be your Head Chair for Berkeley Model United Nation 64's Spanish bilingual committee: the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Created in 2011, CELAC is an intergovernmental union that encompasses 33 countries from the Latin American and Caribbean region. Excluding the United States and Canada, CELAC's constitution reflects a collective demand for a greater degree of regional sovereignty and a break from the long history of colonialism and imperialism that has shaped the regional political economy for centuries. Over the course of the past decade or so, Latin America has witnessed the rise of many left-leaning and populist leaders that envision a new era in the region's diplomatic and economic relations. Their current efforts to develop policy solutions to confront the most pressing issues make CELAC an ideal committee by which to engage debate about the opportunities and limitations characterizing development efforts in Latin America.

This year, I am excited to introduce a slight change in the format of the committee. Delegates will assume the roles of given countries' specific heads of state, debating the selected topics as the presidents and prime ministers that are currently animating the political discourse in the region and driving policy formations at the national and international levels. These personalized roles should encourage delegates to examine more closely how politicians are framing (in rhetoric) issues and their proposed solutions to them, while comparing and contrasting which policies are actually being implemented (in practice) and how the effects of those policies align with or contradict the goals outlined formally by CELAC. In addition to this new feature, CELAC is one of the most unique and challenging committees at BMUN because half of the debate will be conducted in Spanish. Our first topic, which deals with extractive industries and export-based economies, will be debated in English; the second topic on foreign direct investment (or inversiones extranjeras directas) will be in Spanish. Participation in this committee will provide an unparalleled opportunity to improve your bilingual abilities by engaging in a high level of debate concerning issues that are essential to economic and social development strategies throughout Latin America. I would like to emphasize that delegates with all levels of Spanish proficiency are welcome – CELAC will be a learning opportunity for all, and as you will see, your chairs are all at different Spanish speaking abilities as well!

I am very excited to meet you all during conference weekend in March and learn from all of the research you've done on your countries and leaders! Please feel free to contact me at any time prior to conference with your questions, comments or concerns at ops@bmun.org.

Nos vemos!

Brett Buckingham

Head Chair of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States



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Introduction of the Dais

Brett Buckingham, Head Chair:

My name is Brett Buckingham and I am this is my fourth year as part of the BMUN Secretariat, and my third year as a chair of the Spanish bilingual committee. I am in my fifth and final year at UC Berkeley, where I have majored in Human and Economic Geography and developed my primary academic interests in international political economy, development theory and practice, and natural resource management. In addition to my involvement in BMUN on campus, I have served as President of Delta Phi Epsilon, Cal's only professional fraternity dedicated to careers in international affairs. I am also currently writing an honors thesis in the Geography Department on the political-economic and social implications of climate change related flooding in the Bolivian Amazon. My particular interest has been inspired by a range of professional and personal experiences. In the spring of 2014, I interned with the U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, where I worked on projects ranging from immigration-related issues to public affairs programming and political economic research. I stayed in La Paz through the summer to serve as an intern with the United Nations Development Programme, conducting research on climate change adaptation and disaster risk management strategies currently being deployed at the municipal level throughout Bolivia. In the fall of 2014, I studied abroad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where I continued to build a curriculum focused on the relationship between development and the environment. My year abroad deepened my understanding of the range of challenges facing Latin America, and peaked my interest in the role of international institutions in confronting them. I look forward to sharing this interest and learning from each other when we meet next March! Nos vemos!

Adrián Hernández, Vice Chair:

What's up, delegates?! As you may (or not) know, my name is Adrian Hernandez-Morales and I am currently a second year in Berkeley. I hope that by the time that you read this my life will be a little bit more together, but for now I'm afraid I cannot tell you what career I'm pursuing. However, I can give it a shot and say that I'll probably be double-majoring in Rhetoric and Political Economy. In terms of my background, I can say that I'm originally from Tijuana, Baja California (México), where I lived until the age of 15. However, because Tijuana was not the most habitable place in the world at that moment in time, I began to study High School in San Diego. Four years later, I found myself here in the Bay Area. Just in case you were curious, my family has moved back to Tijuana now... No, I do not have a profound background of legit experience like Brett does; Nor am I as cool as Jane is... but those are things that I try to work towards. Meanwhile, over the summer I worked with La Casa del Migrante, in Tijuana, which is a center of services for those who immigrate to the city and who lack shelter or food supplies. Also, it is important to point out that most of them have the intentions of immigrating into the United States (legally or illegally), and so we try to accommodate them with legal processes or job employment in order for them to find better opportunities and become self-sustainable. Finally, I did not do MUN in High School,



which might mean that some of you are more experienced in the processes of Committee than I am, but I feel that I have the passion and drive to learn more about the topics and to help you pave the way towards a good set of Resolutions.

Jane Kim, Vice Chair:

Hello everyone! My name is Jane Kim, and I am one of the vice chairs for CELAC this year. I am a first year, so this is my first time as BMUN Secretariat as well as my first time as vice chair in this committee. My intended path is pre-law with a Spanish minor, and I am currently interested in International Relations and Legal Studies as potential majors. I hope to study human rights violation, international, or immigration law in law school and also make Spanish my third language. I am passionate about helping those who cannot afford legal support or do not have the resources to help them throughout the legal process. I joined BMUN because I fell in love with its purpose: outreach, learning, and service. Beyond BMUN, I work for EDGE Youth Leadership Seminar, a non-profit leadership organization that hosts free seminars for high school sophomores. I attended EDGE as a high sophomore, fell in love with its mission, and have been working various positions since then. I volunteered as junior and senior leader, working directly with the students and other leaders. This year, I will be taking on a more indirect role, working in the backstage in planning for this year's seminar. Before I came to Berkeley, I captained and coached my high school's speech and debate team, conducted and instructed the orchestra, and went to El Salvador this past March on an immersion trip. At El Salvador, I gained first hand knowledge of post-civil war culture and environment. With these culminating experiences, I developed a deeper, well-rounded perception of what I can be and do as a new student at Berkeley. Throughout the next couple of years of my time here, I hope to study abroad in Latin America and gain an even a deeper knowledge of issues prevalent in Latin America in addition to immersing myself in its rich culture. I am very excited for this year's conference and look forward to meeting and getting to know you!



Introduction to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

"A union of Latin American countries is the weapon against imperialism. It is necessary to create a regional body that excludes the United States and Canada. ...Where there are U.S. military bases that do not respect democracy, where there is a political empire with his blackmailers, with its constraints, there is no development for that country, and especially there is no social peace and, therefore, it is the best time for prime ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean to gestate this great new organization without the United States to free our peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean."

Evo Morales, President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, February
2010 (USA International Business Publications 2013)

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is an intergovernmental union comprised of 33 nations from the western hemisphere. It serves as a platform for dialogue and political consensus building between governments from throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region on political, economic, social and environmental issues. Since its formation in December of 2011 with the Declaration of Caracas, CELAC has been charged with advancing the integration of the regional political economy and serving as a unified and independent presence, unsubordinated to foreign interests, in the global political arena. It succeeded the Rio Group, another union of 24 regional governments, established in 1986 ("Community").

Central to CELAC's mission is the notion of regional sovereignty. Deliberately excluding the United States, Canada and European territories, it stands as an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS) which, created in 1948 in the wake of the Second World War, has been criticized by many in Latin America as being unfairly dominated by the interests of Washington, D.C. Based in an appreciation of the region's



long history of colonialism and the ways in which uneven global structures of power continue to influence the regional political economy, CELAC has emerged as part of a broad range of efforts in recent years to reduce the region's dependence on foreign powers and strengthen internal efforts to achieve sustainable and democratic economic and social development.

CELAC has been critiqued on several fronts. Its absence of a permanent Secretariat raises important questions about the ability of the organization to hold members accountable and create legitimately binding decisions that can facilitate the degree of regional transformation it envisions. The United States has vocalized its concern about the ideological integrity of the organization; in 2014, the United States said CELAC was “betraying democracy” by lending diplomatic support to Cuba (“Washington” 2014). Perhaps most importantly are the identifiable contradictions that animate CELAC's economic, social and environmental goals. Despite many CELAC leaders' outspoken criticism of neo-imperialism and neoliberalism (an economic philosophy that prioritizes market liberalization, privatization and austerity as means to achieve economic growth), many countries have witnessed an increased reliance on resource extractivism for exportation and foreign investment. Thus, a critical examination of the tension between the discourse of regional sovereignty and development on the one hand, and the realities of development practice “on the ground” on the other, is essential to grasping the limitations and opportunities that characterize Latin America's contemporary political economy.

The focus of the Berkeley Model United Nations' simulation of CELAC will be to grapple with this apparent contradiction. Delegates will – as representations of nations' heads of state – debate two distinct but interrelated topics: the expansion of extractive industry and the continued role of foreign direct investment in the region. Our discussion will allow us to more deeply understand what regional sovereignty does mean in terms of development practice as well as what it can mean in the context of today's modern, globalized political economy. In elucidating the contradictions between the abstract discourse of sovereignty and anti-imperialism and actual development practice in the region, we will attempt to identify spaces of genuinely transformative politics (i.e., is



the state the most effective agent for economic development and social change? or private sector leadership and investment? popular social movements?).



Topic 1: Extractive Industry and Export-Based Political Economy

“Latin America was a European business.”

Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America* (1997:24)

I. Topic Background

The global economy over the past decade has been defined in part by a spike in the prices of nonrenewable resources. Home to the largest source of metals and second greatest source of oil on the planet, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries have received heightened attention from the extractive sector and faces important questions about how to manage natural resources and achieve sustainable economic development. Recent reports (Cruz Vieyra 2014:xxxix) show that:

- LAC is the most important place for global investors in the extractive sector, representing one-third of the world’s mineral investment portfolio.
- Nine countries (i.e., Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) provide approximately 10 percent of global oil production, 5 percent of natural gas, 15 percent of gold, 45 percent of silver, and 40 percent of copper. Providing about 60 percent of these countries’ total exports, the revenue yielded from extractive industries comprise nearly one-third of total government income.
- Within the first quarter of 2014 alone, LAC generated more than 10 million barrels of oil and 800 million cubic meters of natural gas daily.

Extractivism may be broadly defined as the process by which raw materials are removed from the earth for sale and purchase on the market. It is widely regarded as an important tool of economic development, as national governments are positioned to generate money for investment in infrastructure, job creation and social services by



levying taxes on the industry. However, it is often the case that the local communities who are directly impacted by the extractive activity suffer from the corruption, social conflict and environmental degradation that extractivism can bring (xiii). In the ongoing debate about how to best improve the management of extractive industries, many national governments and development institutions, including the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, have focused efforts on making extractive activities more transparent and accountable. Other critiques inform a more radical overhaul of the industry: they claim that extractivism fundamentally limits long-term economic growth, leads to dependence on exportation, heightens vulnerability to corporate appropriation of revenues, and deepens social inequalities.

In order to evaluate the obstacles and possibilities characterizing contemporary extractivism, as well as the left-wing ideological movement to support an alternative development paradigm, it is first necessary to situate Latin America's relationship with extractive industry in a broader history of European colonialism and Cold War geopolitics.

From the outset, the LAC region was made subservient to foreign markets. The Spanish and Portuguese conquest of much of the "New World" (North and South America) was driven by the abundance of the region's gold and silver deposits, particularly those in the Mexican plateau and the Andean highlands. The technological developments of the European Renaissance (which included major advancements in navigation and military force) partly explains Europe's ultimate domination over the native civilizations of the Americas. Bacteria and viruses (smallpox, tetanus, yellow fever, etc.) simultaneously worked to decimated vast portions of the original populations, weakening their ability to resist colonial efforts (Galeano, 15-18). By the mid-seventeenth century silver constituted more than 99 percent of mineral exports from Spanish America (22).

The vast majority of these primary resources, and the wealth they represented, was exported to Europe. European royalty and colonial elites benefited from the exploitation of the region's resources and labor, while the original civilizations were left impoverished. The poverty of the native populations was profitable. The newly generated wealth was invested back in Europe where it sparked economic and social



development (ultimately laying the foundations for the industrial revolution), while capital investments in Latin America were directed the construction of churches and the consolidation of new lands, benefiting the foreigners' society exclusively. The colonial powers had no interest in developing the colonies' internal economies or investing in the technical or cultural development of the existing populations (30-31). In fact, economic development in the colonies was systematically discouraged. For example, because processing raw materials in Brazil threatened the competitiveness of its own industry, the Portuguese crown took steps to destroy manufacturing development in Brazil: sugar refineries were banned in 1715, opening new roads in the mining region was criminalized in 1729, and looms and spinning mills were ordered to be burned to the ground in 1785 (56).

This highly unequal social and economic relationship between Europe and its colonies was analyzed by historian Andre Gunder Frank. His dependency theory departs from the observation that Latin America's most impoverished nations are those which had the closest links to European colonialism and enjoyed periods of impressive economic activity. Despite being one of the greatest producers of wealth on the planet, their economies crashed when European powers abandoned the region (32). The imposition of an extractivist economy involved the displacement and employment of large portions of the population in the mining industry. Countless people were killed through the system of forced labor, and pre-existing agricultural communities structured by a collective farming system was effectively dismantled (43). Gunder Frank claims, therefore, that the "underdevelopment" of Latin America was a consequence of development elsewhere.

Similar development patterns persisted through the nineteenth and twentieth century. During this time, the United States supplanted Europe as the major regional power. The U.S. economy grew increasingly dependent on foreign supplies of raw materials. Its investments in Latin America, half of which were dedicated to the extraction of petroleum and minerals, were of utmost importance (135). Instead of the government acting as an explicit colonial power, however, corporations based in the U.S., in agreement with foreign national governments, acquired rights to multitude of mineral deposits throughout the region and exported the resources to the U.S. While these



investments kept the North American economy stable and productive, it engendered political instability throughout Latin America. Consider as examples:

Starting in the mid-nineteenth century in Peru, Britain discovered and began financing the exportation of vast deposits of guano (seabird excrement rich in nitrogen, ammonia, phosphates and alkaline salts) in large quantities to be sold on in European markets as fertilizer. The Peruvian elite spent the profits extravagantly, and by 1868 Peru's expenditures exceeded the value of its sales. When the finite supply of the resource was depleted within years, Peru could no longer pay off the heavy debt it had accumulated to Britain, who had financed loans for the extraction and exportation of the Peruvian resource. While Peru thought it was independent during its economic boom, its dependency on Britain was ultimately exposed. Nitrate fields further south in the then-Bolivian territory of Antofagasta were also subject to political violence as a result of European demand for the resource. When Bolivia decided to raise taxes on the extraction of the resource, the Chilean army (who had strong corporate interests in the region) seized control of the province permanently. The region, which had served as a buffer mediating geopolitical tensions between Peru, Bolivia and Chile, became the center of conflict. The War of the Pacific erupted in 1879 and lasted until 1883. Chile's military victory had significant impacts on the Peruvian and Bolivian economy, which lost its most important resources and consequently experienced a paralyzing outflow of foreign capital. What's more, though unknown at the time, Bolivia lost the most important copper mine to date located in the forfeited territory, Chuquibambilla (139-40).

This victory gave Chile a global monopoly on nitrates, propelling its economy for years to come. Nitrate and iodine exports from the conquered territories represented half of the country's income by the turn of the twentieth century. Simultaneously, British investments in Chile tripled, accumulating the nitrates below market price; by the 1880s Chile was exporting three-quarters of all its exports to Britain (140-141). Chilean President José Manuel Balmaceda, adopting a state-led developmentalist approach (prioritizing investment in local industries, public services, education, etc.), nationalized the nitrate industry in 1888 and refused to sell state-owned nitrate fields to Britain. When civil war erupted in the country shortly after, the British financed the rebels who ultimately defeated Balmaceda. British enterprise reasserted its hold on Chilean



extractivism. As Galeano observes, “Chile functioned as an appendage of the British economy: the biggest supplier of fertilizer to the European market had no right to its own life” (142-43). Chile’s economy remained undiversified and structurally dependent on one resource. This had disastrous consequences: when the Haber process (which produces nitrates by fixing nitrogen from the air) was perfected by scientists in Europe, demand for nitrate plummeted and Chile’s economy was devastated.

Copper became Chile’s next main export, and the United States its primary importer. The majority of U.S. investments in the country, totalling more than \$400 million, went to the extraction and exportation of copper. Corporate giants Anaconda and Kennecott, while profiting an estimated \$4 billion, only re-invested around \$800 million back into the country as the copper was processed in plants overseas. In 1970, President Salvador Allende announced that he would nationalize the copper mines in efforts to reclaim the profits for the people of Chile (144). Allende was overthrown in a U.S.-backed military coup in 1973.

The domination of many Latin American economies by foreign interests strengthened with the rise of neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s. During this time, international financial institutions imposed free-market economic reforms throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. This wave of deregulation, privatization and austerity bore severe consequences for many economies in the region, leading to domestic depression and worsened social conditions while undermining the legitimacy of democratic governments (Canak, 1). The historical conditions that enabled this period of economic and social transformation should be noted.

After the Great Depression of the 1930s, the regional economy made a conscious move away from stringent economic liberalism and export-oriented policies that had characterized much of the nineteenth century and toward state-led developmentalism. This approach to economic development prioritized state intervention in the economy by establishing public sector enterprise and subsidizing national industries (10). In years following the Second World War, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), an agency of the United Nations, reasoned that the region’s “underdevelopment” could be improved with import substitution industrialization policies that aimed to reduce dependence on foreign goods and support the development



of domestic production, achieving more sustainable and sovereign national economies (11).

Easy access to private loans and high inflation throughout the 1970s encouraged many developing countries to assume large amounts of debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to finance development projects. (These multilateral institutions, established under the leadership of the U.S. and Britain following their victory in World War II, were created to reorganize and stabilize the international monetary system.) Overall, public debt in the Third World increased from \$75.1 billion in 1970 to \$634.4 billion in 1983 (20). However, with the advent of the financial crisis in the 1980s (starting with the near collapse of Mexico's economy in 1982), bank lending terms tightened and a credit crisis emerged, ultimately magnifying the quantity of debt while diminishing debtor nations' capacity to payback their loans. The IMF and the World Bank assumed the role of auditor and financial disciplinarian. They, along with transnational banks and governments in advanced capitalist nations, responded by renegotiating loans and enforcing austerity measures as means to maintain capital flows coming from the Third World (in 1987, this net outflow was as much as of \$29 billion). They formulated a range of policy "conditions" to which nations were required to adhere in order to access new credit to finance pre-existing loans. The policies imposed on borrower nations encouraged free-market exchange oriented toward production for export, including (19):

- Devaluation
- Reduced public spending
- Elimination of public subsidies
- Wage restraint
- Increased interest rates and taxes related to demand curbs
- Elimination of state-owned or -supported enterprises and greater access for foreign investment
- Reform of protection for local industries, export promotion and application of new foreign exchange to the debt service.



This widespread imposition of free-market policies is known as structural adjustment. Instead of pursuing their own national development policies, debtor nations were forced to prioritize debt payment and save money. While from 1976-1979 there had been a net flow of \$52 billion in investments into Latin America, from 1983-1986 there was a net outflow of \$113 billion (22). From 1979 to 1983 per capita real expenditures on health declined by nearly 60 percent and on education spending by 59 percent. Thus, many argue that structural adjustments severely diminished Latin American countries' national sovereignty while paralyzing development efforts that would actually improve the living standards of its population. The dramatic retraction of social spending pushed large portions of Latin American society into poverty, whose precarious positions are evident to this day. The political, economic and social consequences were manifold (70):

- Increasing unemployment
- Heightened income inequality
- Diminishing real average incomes
- Increasing malnutrition (particularly for children)
- Increasing labor force participation of women and children
- Worsening crime rates
- Changing internal migration (rural-urban migration or urbanization) and emigration patterns

The rise of left-leaning governments throughout Latin America in the twenty-first century (also known as the “pink tide”) must be understood as a response to the social and economic crises that neoliberalism and the history of colonialism produced. Centuries of unequal development between Europe/the U.S. and Latin America, as well as growing divisions between Latin America’s elite and laboring poor, have made the platforms of wealth distribution, social investment, and regional sovereignty highly attractive.

The wave of leftist popular movements has taken varied forms. Some countries have explicitly deployed the discourse of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, pursuing the development of a regional political economy that is largely independent from the



circuits of global capital. This “Bolivarian Revolution” has been popularized by late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who was an outspoken advocate of pro-poor, redistributive socialist policies. Other countries have combined state-led developmentalist and free-market economic policies. This has been perhaps most clearly embodied in the Workers Party (PT) of Brazil, which has focused simultaneously on redistributive socialism in addition to private enterprise and global capital investments. Despite differences between specific national projects, the region’s contemporary leftist governments represent a historic attempt to remedy the historical legacy of fragmentation and underdevelopment and construct an alternative regional political economic order based on social policies that seek to redistribute wealth and establish greater independence from the Global North (Chodor 2015).

It is important to interrogate, then, the ways in which this political transformation has – or has not – translated into meaningful economic and social change. Tackling this question necessarily involves reconciling the fact that the extractivist model of development continues to prevail throughout the region and is increasing in economic importance in many countries. Research must critically engage the dissonance between political discourse and the actual policies that are implemented, determine if and how extractivist practices are different today than they were in the past, and ask if the prioritization of this type of development activity strengthens or weakens CELAC’s mandate for regional sovereignty and sustainability in general.

II. Past UN/Relevant Regional Organization & International Action

The question of how to improve governance of natural resource extraction has been the source of debate among national governments and development institutions throughout the region. Extractive industry and questions of resource management have been at the core of many contemporary social conflicts in Latin America. Conflicts often arise when local communities are excluded from the benefits of the resources extracted from their land.



CELAC's third summit was held in Belén, Costa Rica in January of 2015. The 2015 Plan of Action elaborated at this meeting outlines broad development goals and concerns. Among other focuses, CELAC nations agreed to ensure that development strategies address the issues of labor conditions, corruption, citizen participation, and science and technology innovation ("Plan de Acción" 2015). The manner in which these concerns are addressed in the form of public policy, however, may vary widely depending on the country, its history, and its current leader's approach to natural resource management and development more generally. In its 2014 Plan of Action, CELAC specifically determined that, with regards to "productive and industrial development," member states are to ("Plan de Acción" 2014:9):

"Identify the most favorable policies for developing productive and industrial integration in coordination between public and private stakeholders to accelerate inclusive, strong and sustainable industrial development, according to the needs and possibilities of each country in order to gradually transform areas, production structure of the region, and increase productivity and efficiency. Incorporating higher value-added activities and intensity in knowledge to improve its international insertion and reduce the gap in productivity, competitiveness and income with the developed world, through greater regional cooperation and integration, both productive and commercially."

When forming policies about extractive industries, it is important to reflect on CELAC's vision of development defined by this document.

Many development institutions argue that transparency should define efforts to improve extractive activity. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an international organization, of which several Latin American countries are members, that aims to improve the accountability and transparency of resource extraction. It forms partnerships between governments, companies and civil society networks throughout the region as means to ensure that information regarding the money made and spent by involved public and private entities is fully disclosed. EITI can be seen to serve an



important function in the industry, as it purports to facilitate communication and collaboration between these different stakeholders. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has also prioritized transparency at the fore of its development work concerning extractive industries. They similarly argue that transparency is essential to ensuring fair and equitable economic growth based on natural resources. They claim that citizens should hold governments and corporations accountable, minimize regulatory loopholes and inefficiencies, and ensure equitable distribution and public resources (Cruz Vieyra 2014).

More left-leaning governments, while surely agreeing that transparency and accountability are essential to natural resource management, have implemented more drastic reforms on extractive industry. Many countries in the region have nationalized oil and gas industries, among others. For example, since 2006, Bolivian President Morales has placed the country's gas fields, oil refineries, pension funds, telecommunications, and main hydroelectric power plants under state control (Achtenburg 2012, Prada 2006). In 2012, Argentine President Kirchner announced that her administration would nationalize oil company YPF in a move toward what she framed as "energy sovereignty" ("Flogging" 2013). Brazil, starting with President da Silva, structured the industry such that all foreign investments have to engage in partnerships with the state-owned oil company Petrobras, which maintains majority ownership of the country's resources. He did not, however, expropriate international companies (Miller Llana 2012). In contrast, other countries have opened the way for further privatization in extractive industries. For example, a 2008 reform introduced by Mexican President Calderón's opened the door to increased foreign private investment in the country's oil and hydrocarbons industry (Ribano Seelke 2015).

The Red Latinoamericana sobre las Industrias Extractivas developed a proposal for joint policies between the CELAC and the European Union regarding extractive industries. The argue that the following concerns should guide policy formation throughout the region ("Proposals" 2014):



- Rights of local peoples and the protection of human rights: ensuring free, prior and informed consent to public and private investments in the territories of indigenous peoples and traditional communities
- Transparency and accountability: passing legislation to ensure companies share all information regarding revenue and spending, joining the EITI
- Labor rights: formalizing employment and upholding labor rights throughout the supply chain in extractive industries
- Sustainable territorial management: strengthening system of protected areas
- Macroeconomic health: diversifying export portfolio, improving expertise of energy development planning

The United Nations Development Program has detailed a specific strategy concerning the sustainable and equitable management of extractive industries. It provides an extensive list of possible policy actions, which are classified under the categories of supporting (1) participatory legislation, policy and planning framework, (2) people-centered exploration and extraction, (3) prudent revenue collection and management, and (4) investments in human, physical, and social capital to replenish depletion of nonrenewable resources (UNDP 2012). This list provides a sense of the range of policies that may be selected and implemented by countries to improve the management of their natural resources. It is the task of leaders throughout Latin America to identify potential solutions such as these that are coherent with their respective ideologies about how to achieve sustainable economic and social development.

III. Case Studies

Vivir Bien

Vivir Bien – or “Living Well” – is a development model that the administration of Evo Morales has pursued in Bolivia since he was elected in 2006. It is a new paradigm grounded in the ancestral ideals of Andean culture. Originating from an indigenous worldview, it explicitly opposes the neoliberal economic philosophy and extractivism, which are understood as the structural causes of the contemporary ecological crisis. Its



goal is to have a harmonious style of living that excludes high-levels of consumerism, destruction of the environment and all of the exploitative measures that the capitalist system endorses; it may be summarized as a new valorization of communal forms of living, rather than submitting the purpose of civilization to the well-being of humankind alone. There is thus a shift of focus from the search for development from a human-centered perspective, to a search for a holistic coexistence of humans with the rest of Mother Earth. Vivir Bien has redefined many political and economic initiatives at the heart of a new Political Constitution of the State (CPE) that seeks a “civilizational alternative” to capitalism, modernism and development. It has established a set of environmental ethics as well as new forms of sovereignty amongst villages that have come to be guide development in the Plurinational State of Bolivia – at least in terms of political discourse.

The CPE, which was approved in the popular referendum of January 2009, attempts to orientate Vivir Bien towards new models of governance and development characterized by a plurinational model within the state, an “autonomic” territorial model, and a new economic model of plural economy with a social and communal base. In addition, the Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development to Living Well (Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien) states that, in order to realize “living well,” everyone must act collectively and in solidarity through political, cultural, economic and ecologic dimensions towards a harmony with Mother Earth and the rest of its components. It is necessary to mention that all these desires of reform spring from waves of decolonization, efforts to eliminate social hierarchies and halt environmental degradation.

All of the aforementioned ideals lead to the necessity of building new public policies that divert from the capitalist economic model that the Global North, namely the United States, has imposed throughout the world historically. Instead, a democratic and juridical pluralism of indigenous entities, as well as new approaches towards international relations that differ from the traditions of the nation-states, must be established to effectively implement Vivir Bien in today’s global political economy. However, despite Morales’ ideology, his administration has presided over the implementation of policies that contradict this anti-neoliberalist sentiment. One of these is the increased



extractivism that Bolivia has undertaken in the recent years. Although Bolivia's economy has had an average yearly increase of over 5% due to the favorable prices of its exportations of raw materials – such as natural gas and mining – it seems to have continued the nation's dependence on the extraction of natural resources for export. Furthermore, one-third of the fiscal income of Bolivia comes from the extractive rent of mining products or hydrocarbons, which indicates a high dependency on these sources and the need to generate new forms of internal and sustainable incomes.

Another case that highlights the paradoxical nature of the discourse of *Vivir Bien* is the conflict between the Bolivian government and many indigenous groups about the construction of a highway through the indigenous territory and federally protected land of the Indigenous Territory National Park Isodoro Secure (TIPNIS). The planned project, which has been proposed by the Morales in order to create a transnational transportation corridor that proponents claim will facilitate greater development in numerous villages, which will consequently be granted access to the highway. This initiative has been the source of great controversy in the country, and has called into question the actual development vision that Bolivia has versus the political development deployed by its leaders. There is constant tension between the idea that indigenous sectors have in regards to development, which may be characterized as more environmental-friendly, and what other rural and urban sectors conceptualize in their agendas, a more neoliberal vision that very much disregards the conservation of natural resources. Whereas many see this project another step towards self-sustainability and advancement in the global economy, other sectors of the population who are in disagreement with the project claim that it violates the rights vested in them under the plurinational nation. They argue that the government has acted indifferently towards indigenous people in many of the important decision that shape the future of Bolivia.

Finally, in 2015, the Bolivian government has authorized a number of companies to explore natural gas and oil on previously protected areas. Morales has justified this action by emphasizing the economic demand for new reserves. In the process, he has threatened to expel all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the country that vocalize criticism of this development of the hydrocarbon industry. Many indigenous communities and organizations have pushed against the presidential decree, reaffirming



their vision of progress based in a more environmental-friendly path towards development that will respect the rights of Mother Earth. However, Morales affirmed in a public speech that Bolivians were not going to become the “rangers” of the global developed economies, and that they, like the North Americans, also “have the obligation to explore what we have available.” Every company that wishes to explore these newly opened areas is required to pay 1% of their investment to affected communities. As a response, many of legal measures have taken place, specifically regarding the violation of Convention ILO 169, demanding legislators to consult indigenous tribes about any of the projects that might carry the risk affecting their lifestyles. Demonstrating a strong intolerance to those opposing his plans, it seems like Morales did not intend to include the voices of indigenous peoples.



Questions to Consider

1. What is different about extractive industry (e.g., specific resources of focus and approaches to resource management) today than extraction of the 16th or early 20th centuries in Latin America and the Caribbean region in general? How has the management of natural resources in your country changed throughout its history (e.g., during colonialism and neoliberalism)?
2. What is the significance of extractive industry in your country's contemporary political economy? What resources are subject to extractivism and how is extractivism conducted and managed – are private or nationalized/state-owned companies responsible for extractive activity? Are the majority or natural resources processed within your country or exported overseas? What are your country's primary trade partners in terms of natural resources?
3. Identify how the notions of development, sustainability and regional sovereignty are framed in the political discourse of your country's head of state. Is her or his rhetoric coherent with the realities of development on the ground (i.e., the actual laws and policies implemented in terms of natural resource management and extractivism)?
4. How can natural resources in your country be governed so as to produce and distribute wealth in an equitable and environmentally conscious way? Does the prioritization of this type of development activity strengthen or weaken CELAC's mandate for regional sovereignty and sustainability in general – should there be concern that extractivism and export-based economy makes your country dependent on one industry and the foreign countries that purchase them?



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Tema 2: La Inversión Extranjera Directa

I. Trasfondo del tema

Según la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), la inversión extranjera directa (IED) es un tipo de inversión transfronteriza en donde un inversor de alguna economía en particular (el “inversor directo”) establece un interés o relación a largo plazo con una empresa dentro de la economía de un país distinto (la “empresa de inversión extranjera”) (“OECD Benchmark” 2008:17). En otras palabras, es una manera en la cual la corporación de determinado país controla la propiedad o influye en la gestión de algún negocio empresarial extranjero. En efecto, es común que la relación entre empresas sea lo suficientemente cercana como para que el inversor directo esencialmente controle la inversión empresarial directa; por lo cual se explica por qué el flujo de IED es un indicativo del grado de presencia extranjera en dada economía (22). Asimismo, cabe mencionar que la la ración de transacciones de IED entrantes o salientes respecto al PIB puede revelar el grado de globalización que dicha economía ejerce. Por ejemplo, un país con una alta proporción de flujo de IED en relación con su Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) indica un grado significativo de integración económica y dependencia financiera con mercados externos. Estas cifras también indican el grado de atracción que una economía o industria en particular tiene ante intereses extranjeros durante cierto periodo de tiempo (34).

Existen muchos motivos por los cuales algunos gobiernos de países en desarrollo han empeñado sus esfuerzos en atraer IED. Primeramente, flujos entrantes de IED tienen la cualidad de auxiliar economías endeudadas al asistirles en balancear sus pagos a corto plazo. Para comprender esto, es necesario señalar que muchos países adquieren una cantidad considerable de préstamos provenientes de instituciones tales como el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) y el Banco Mundial (BM). Además, tratados bilaterales de inversiones (TBI), tratados de libre comercio (TLC) y acuerdos internacionales de inversión (AII) – arreglados primordialmente por Estados Unidos, La Unión Europea, y, dentro de los últimos años, China e India – facilitan el flujo de IED al disminuir las restricciones regulatorias y al abrir nuevas áreas de inversión (“Foreign” 2008:26). Estos



acuerdos pueden resultar en el financiamiento de importantes proyectos de desarrollo que conllevan al crecimiento del PIB, así como a innovaciones tecnológicas que incrementan las capacidades productivas y los ingresos de corporaciones a largo plazo (“OECD Benchmark” 2008:20). No obstante, debe hacerse notar que el PIB no es una medida de distribución de bienes y que no necesariamente refleja las condiciones de vivienda del ciudadano promedio.

Los mercados de desarrollo de América Latina y del Caribe, así como la abundancia de recursos naturales, son elementos geopolíticos que hacen de la inversión un acto conveniente. Para muchos países, la IED es un componente clave para el desarrollo económico; en efecto, en el caso de países pequeños, las IED pueden constituir un gran porcentaje del PIB. Tal es el caso de algunas entidades caribeñas, en donde estas cifras de IED pueden llegar a alcanzar hasta el 10 por ciento del PIB del país puesto en cuestión. Por otro lado, en países más extensos, como lo son Brasil y México, constituye alrededor de 1.5 a 2 por ciento. Sin embargo, en el 2014, flujos de IED a América Latina y el Caribe disminuyeron un 16 por ciento en comparación de años previos, lo cual constituye aproximadamente USD \$159 billiones (CEPAL 2015:10). Estas cifras representan una disminución mayor a la caída global (alrededor del 7 por ciento), así como a la de países en pleno surgimiento, las cuales experimentaron un incremento promedio de alrededor de 5 por ciento. Esta tendencia puede atribuirse a la ralentización económica de la región y a la caída en los precios de comodidades exportadas, las cuales, una vez combinadas, han contribuido a un desalentamiento en inversiones domésticas-mercantiles. La distribución de IED entre sectores de la economía también ha presentado transiciones en los últimos años. En el 2014, mientras que la proporción de IED dirigida al sector de servicios incrementó un 48 por ciento, la cantidad invertida en extracción de recursos naturales cayó de 24 a 17 por ciento. Incluso en países que dependen de industrias extractivistas - como lo son Bolivia, Colombia y Ecuador - la cantidad de IED dirigida hacia estas industrias disminuyó. Este fenómeno puede ser atribuido a la caída de minerales que ha ocurrido en los últimos años, lo cual es análogo a la reducción de inversiones mineras e hidrocarburos que han sido previstas debido a la caída en los precios de los productos de estas industrias. Del mismo modo, inversiones en fabricaciones han caído un 36 por ciento, mientras que cifras inversionistas ascendentes



van siendo dirigidas hacia campos de tecnología; con un 60 por ciento de las IED en la región destinadas hacia sectores medio-altos y altos de tecnología (11). Sin embargo, éstas varían, dependiendo del país que está puesto en cuestión. Actualmente, aproximadamente la mitad del lucro que ha resultado como producto de inversiones en América Latina y el Caribe está siendo reinvertido en las mismas economías, mientras que el 50 por ciento restante está retornando a manos extranjeras. La rentabilidad de IED se ha encallado en 5 por ciento (11).

En particular, son 4 los países en los cuales la inversión extranjera directa se ha enfocado en sectores extractivistas; estos son: Perú, Colombia, Guatemala y Panamá. Por ejemplo, en Colombia, la IED alcanzó un 92 por ciento (USD \$13.234 billones) en el 2011, con inversiones petroleras incrementando, e inversiones mineras disminuyendo. En Perú, en contraste con el 2010, ha tenido un aumento de 5 por ciento, donde la mayoría fue direccionada hacia el sector minero, mientras que Guatemala ha tenido un incremento del 22 por ciento en IED durante el mismo periodo de tiempo (Flórez 2013). Los gobiernos pueden llegar a beneficiarse de la IED en industrias extractivistas al generar ingresos públicos a través de regalías y pago de impuestos sobre el lucro de corporaciones. Estas ganancias pueden utilizarse para financiar servicios sociales - tales como asistencia médica y educación - o para construcciones de infraestructura; elementos importantes para el desarrollo económico y social. No obstante, a pesar del crecimiento que la IED puede exhibir, algunas políticas, tales como la desregulación y la privatización a gran escala, dan cabida a empresas multinacionales para evadir una gran porción de pagos tributarios. Asimismo, precisamente porque muchos países perciben la IED como un instrumento para el desarrollo económico, estos ofrecen tasas de impuesto rebajadas - o exención de impuestos en su totalidad - como método para atraer capital extranjero. Además, existen casos donde corporaciones cabildean (a través de procesos legales e ilegales) para aplazar o erradicar sus deudas fiscales (Flórez 2013). Tomando como ejemplo la privatización del gas natural y el petróleo de Bolivia en 1996, el mandato que el FIM hizo a Bolivia de ofrecer incentivos financieros a empresas extranjeras (principalmente estadounidenses y europeas) encauzó hacia la venta de la compañía estatal YPFB a ser vendida por USD \$835. Posterior a esta transacción, las compañías participantes sólo pagaron alrededor de 18 por ciento del precio del



mercado en impuestos por una gran cantidad de gas natural y petróleo que extrajeron. Así pues, aunque es el caso de que dichas inversiones conllevaron a una expansión general en producción, el gobierno Boliviano no se benefició en términos del reparto de los ingresos producidos por ésta. (Carin 2006).

Al mismo tiempo, es necesario comprender el impacto que las prácticas inversionistas de corporaciones transnacionales han provocado en el medio ambiente, debido a que las diferencias entre sectores económicos resaltan particularidades en el modo en que éstas afectan el medio ambiente. Por ejemplo, prácticas de industrias extractivistas tienen mayores repercusiones ambientales porque son intensivos en gases de invernadero, y son responsables por la degradación de muchos recursos naturales que asimismo entran en conflicto con intereses locales - los cuales son rurales o indígenas en su mayoría. Las industrias del acero, papel y pulpa, y de productos químicos son emisores fuertes y contaminantes, por lo tanto, IED tiene la capacidad de causar efectos desastrosos si se concentra en estos sectores (CEPAL 2015:13). Algunos métodos que podrían funcionar para mitigar el impacto de estas prácticas son la imposición de regulaciones gubernamentales a los cuerpos privados, así como las iniciativas voluntarias dentro de estas mismas corporaciones. Sin embargo, los empeños corporativos que reflejan una responsabilidad social con el medio ambiente tienden a ser criticados por el público al considerarlas meras estrategias de mercadotecnia. Cabe mencionar que el papel que el capital extranjero juega para la preservación del medio ambiente es uno de controversia, ya que, por ejemplo, CEPAL ha proclamado que las economías Latinoamericanas y Caribeñas necesitarán un número significativo de inversiones para llegar a ser ambientalmente sostenible. Concluye que “el sector privado necesitará hacer mayores contribuciones en países en desarrollo, y las corporaciones transnacionales serán objeto clave en su proceso de transformación, ya que éstas poseen una gran cantidad de bienes en América Latina y el Caribe, y además cuentan con los medios tecnológicos e institucionales necesarios para fortalecer la sostenibilidad” (CEPAL 2015:13).

Además, la IED dirigida hacia la infraestructura y energía renovable puede funcionar como suplemento para la inversión doméstica y de este modo contribuir a un desarrollo sostenible, aunque tales empeños pueden tener resultados inconsistentes. La IED es una manera importante para la transferencia de tecnología verde de países



desarrollados a países en desarrollo, incluyendo América Latina y el Caribe, ya que gran parte de la investigación en estos campos es llevada a cabo por empresas Transnacionales de países desarrollados. CEPAL recomienda que los gobiernos deberían asegurar de que la IED promuevan políticas coherentes y que no caigan en conflicto con políticas de energía, transportación, desarrollo urbano e industrias, puesto que estas últimas son herramientas importantes para aminorar el riesgo de degradación ambiental (14).

A pesar de todo, concepciones sobre el papel de capital extranjero en relación con asuntos domésticos han sufrido numerosos cambios en los últimos años. A través de América Latina y el Caribe, nuevas estrategias y actitudes han surgido como reacción a este fenómeno, poniendo en alto cuestiones relevantes que polemizan el punto al cual las IED deben ser bienvenidas dentro de los impulsos de desarrollo económico, y sobre cómo éstas deberían ser gestionadas por el Estado. En cualquier caso, mientras que algunas naciones se han empeñado en profundizar su integración junto con entidades poderosas tales como los Estados Unidos, otras han enaltecido medidas regulatorias cuya intención es proteger sus industrias domésticas de la competencia que corporaciones extranjeras pueden representar. En muchos casos, como en el de Argentina, Bolivia y Venezuela, industrias han sido completamente nacionalizadas por el Estado - bloqueando absolutamente la posibilidad de cualquier inversión IED.

II. Acciones pasadas de la CELAC

Mientras que muchos países Latinoamericanos de inclinación izquierdista han asegurado que el establecimiento de lazos económicos continuos con los Estados Unidos es una amenaza para la soberanía regional, muchos otros han comenzado a establecer inversiones e intercambios cercanos con otras entidades de poder, tales como China y la Unión Europea. A fin de comprender esta tendencia, es importante analizar qué tipo de IED son benéficas para los diferentes sectores y actores involucrados (gobiernos, corporaciones y sociedad civil), y si en realidad los orígenes de la IED afectan fundamentalmente la capacidad de los países para realizar sus metas de desarrollo equitativo y sostenible (por ejemplo, si IED es más sostenible, o “más amigable” si son provenientes de China, en contraposición de los Estados Unidos).



Relaciones con los Estados Unidos

La retórica que muchos jefes de Estado pertenecientes al CELAC despliegan en las conferencias de alto nivel deja algo en claro: Los Estados Unidos deben dejar de entrometerse con los asuntos de la región. En la conferencia del 2015, en Costa Rica, los miembros proclamaron la Declaración Política de Belén, la cual se opone a cualquier intervención Estadounidense en el continente, llama a la finalización del embargo de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba, así como a las sanciones recientes impuestas sobre Venezuela (“Political Declaration”).

No obstante, a pesar de las políticas y acciones históricas y contemporáneas que han hecho de los Estados Unidos un poder global poco popular, es innegable pensar que su fuerza económica es capaz de apoyar a industrias en desarrollo a través de sus inversiones. Aunque muchas naciones en la región permanezcan rígidamente opuestas a iniciar un acuerdo de comercio con los Estados Unidos, América Latina es una de las regiones más cercanas a sus asuntos comerciales. Son once los países de la región que han acordado en estipular tratados de libre comercio bilaterales y plurilaterales, formando de tal manera más de tres cuartos del comercio total con esta región. Estos tratados incluyen: el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN), el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio República Dominicana-América Central (RD-ALCAC), y tratados bilaterales con Chile, Perú, Panamá, y Colombia (Hornbeck 2014:1). En cuanto a IED en sí misma, ha habido una integración en crecimiento entre los Estados Unidos y países CELAC. La IED estadounidense en América Latina y el Caribe incrementó un 83 por ciento entre el 2000 y el 2012. Cincuenta por ciento de estas inversiones fueron dirigidas exclusivamente a México y Brasil. Financiamiento, minería, venta en masa, y fabricación, han demostrado ser los sectores que han atraído la mayoría de la inversión extranjera. Por otro lado, IED de América Latina y el Caribe hacia Estados Unidos ha incrementado un 43 por ciento en el mismo periodo de tiempo (ibid., 8).



Relaciones con la Unión Europea

CELAC ha servido como la plataforma por la cual países Latinoamericanos y Caribeños se comprometen con la Unión Europea. Ambos bloques regionales se reúnen aproximadamente cada dos años, y por lo tanto sólo han habido dos conferencias de alto nivel; una en el 2013 y la otra en el 2015. Las juntas sirven para fortalecer el diálogo político sobre un número de problemáticas, incluyendo crecimiento sostenible, educación, asuntos de seguridad, y cambio climático. La Unión Europea es responsable por las contribuciones más altas de IED en países CELAC, con un total de inversión de €505.7 billones en el 2013 (más que Rusia, China e India combinados). Mientras tanto, inversiones de CELAC en la Unión Europea totalizaron €135.5 billion en el 2013. Actualmente, existen 26 de 33 países CELAC que han alcanzado tratados de comercio con la UE. Faltan los países de MERCOSUR (incluyendo Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay y Venezuela), Cuba y Bolivia. La UE argumenta que los tratados de libre comercio son esenciales para la supervivencia de una economía cada vez más globalizante. Es por eso que el capital de Europeo es dirigido hacia una variedad de campos de inversión (“Facts and figures” 2015):

- Crecimiento económico: La UE le provee a CELAC con maquinaria, equipo de transporte y productos químicos; CELAC exporta en su mayoría productos agrícolas y materias primas.
- Ayuda Humanitaria: En el 2014, la UE contribuyó más de €48 millones para financiar ayuda humanitaria, de los cuales el 24 por ciento fue dirigido hacia iniciativas de preparación ante desastres naturales.
- Acción climática y de Energía: Mientras que el 53 por ciento de los abastecimientos de energía de la UE son importados, consumiendo alrededor de €400 billones, muchos de los miembros de CELAC son exportadores de energía. En el 2013, 4.6% de las importaciones de petróleo, 1.2% de sus importaciones de gas natural y 9% de su gas natural licuado provino de América Latina.
- Educación e investigación: La UE financia cierto número de programas de intercambio a través de los cuales se les otorga a estudiantes e investigadores de América Latina la oportunidad de estudiar en universidades Europeas. El



- propósito de tales iniciativas es el de favorecer el intercambio de conocimiento, y promover alianzas entre las dos regiones.
- Seguridad y la lucha contra el narcotráfico: El Mecanismo UE-CELAC de coordinación y cooperación en materia de drogas es un foro bi-regional que opera con el propósito de aseverar el interés común de contrarrestar la producción de narcóticos y el tráfico de estos. La Cooperación en política de drogas entre América Latina y la Unión Europea (COPOLAD), fundada completamente por la UE (€6.6 millones asignados para el 2011-2015) fue establecido para consolidar equipos nacionales y ofrecer apoyo a políticas para reforzar el Mecanismo UE-CELAC de coordinación y cooperación en materia de drogas.

Relaciones con China

Inversión Extranjera Directa de China en América Latina se ha incrementado, aunque su proporción aún sea pequeña comparada con la de Estados Unidos. Casi 13 por ciento del total de IED que opera China se dirige a América Latina; en efecto, algunas cifras estimadas prevén que para el 2015, China contará con USD \$500 billones en comercio y USD \$250 billones en inversiones. Actualmente, China está involucrada en el financiamiento de un número de proyectos de desarrollo, tales como la construcción de un Canal en Nicaragua, y el contrato de construcciones ferroviarias en México. En Venezuela, Perú y México, la mayoría de las inversiones son dirigidas hacia la producción de minerales y petróleo, además de las construcciones que trabajan con infraestructura. IED Chinas también han sido direccionadas en la industria agrícola.

Similar al caso de la Unión Europea, China utiliza CELAC como plataforma para comprometerse con la región diplomáticamente. Durante la primera junta de CELAC-China en Enero del 2015, en Beijing, los partidos acordaron en adoptar el Plan de Cooperación China-Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños. Este acuerdo incluye, entre otras estipulaciones, la promoción continua de comercio e inversiones entre las dos regiones a USD \$500 mil millones, y elevar las acciones de las inversiones por lo menos a USD \$250 mil millones en la próxima década. Asimismo, se ha depositado un énfasis en los sectores de tecnología y la producción de bienes de valor agregado (“Plan de



Cooperación” 2015). El propósito es el de desarrollar una cooperación más fuerte entre los sectores mineros y energéticos, incluyendo la investigación y el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías y usos sostenibles de recursos naturales (Hornbeck 2014).

Cabe mencionar que la cantidad de dinero siendo invertido en la región no implica necesariamente que el pueblo latinoamericano está siendo beneficiado como consecuencia. Inversiones Chinas no han resultado en un compromiso significativo con abastecedores locales ni en un aumento en operaciones dentro de cadenas de valor mundiales.

Las estrategias de inversión de China incrementarán competencia comercial con EEUUA. Mientras que China afirma que sus intereses en América Latina son meramente económicos, muchos especulan que su involucramiento creciente en la región refleja un empeño por suplantar la influencia estadounidense. Sin embargo, funcionarios públicos rechazan la idea de que el involucramiento de China en América Latina y el Caribe esté vinculada con su política exterior de 1999, en donde el país hizo un empeño deliberado de invertir en el extranjero para obtener acceso a materia prima. Además, muchos sugieren que algunos países Latinoamericanos y Caribeños ya están, en efecto, bajo una dependencia con las inversiones Chinas. Finalmente, existe la preocupación de que ciertas naciones que dependen de industrias extractivistas y de sus riquezas en recursos naturales perderán sus fuentes de ingresos primarios una vez que el abastecimiento de recursos naturales haya sido agotado (“The Heat”).

III. Caso práctico: la IED en Brasil

Actualmente, Brasil es el principal receptor de inversiones en América Latina, y el quinto destino de flujos entrantes mundialmente. Algunas de las características que hacen de este país un candidato preponderante en el ámbito inversionista son: su mercado de casi 200 millones de habitantes, su economía en plena expansión, un fácil acceso a materia prima, así como una economía diversificada que la hace menos vulnerable que sus homólogos latinoamericanos frente a las crisis internacionales.



Así pues, las principales naciones que constituyen la fuente de flujo entrante a Brasil son Estados Unidos, España y Bélgica, las cuales mayormente están enfocadas en sectores que abarcan las finanzas, el petróleo, gas natural y las telecomunicaciones. En efecto, en el 2014, el país amazónico fue recipiente de 62 mil 495 millones de dólares que tomaron la forma de inversiones extranjeras directas. Estas cifras representan casi el triple de lo que México captó apenas el año pasado, en el 2013 (22 mil 795 millones de dólares). De estos 62 mil 495 millones de dólares, aproximadamente 14% fueron orientados hacia servicios financieros, mientras que otro 12% fue invertido en Industria química – a la par con el porcentaje en Industria bebestible.

Inversión Extranjera Directa	2012	2013	2014
Flujo de IED entrante (millones de USD)	65.272	63.996	62.495
Provisión de IED (millones de USD)	743.964	747.891	754.769
Número de inversiones greenfield***	488	378	341
IED entrantes (en % de la FBCF****)	13,4	12,8	13,3
Provisión de IED (en % del PIB)	30,8	31,3	32,1

Interpretaciones empíricas indican que existe una fuerte relación entre inversión extranjera y el crecimiento del PIB per cápita (Producto Interno Bruto), en donde, “por cada aumento en los flujos de inversión en 1% con respecto al PIB, el PIB per cápita se incrementa a una tasa superior a 1% de la que se presentaría en ausencia de los flujos capitales”. Asimismo, existe un aumento en capital que supera el flujo de inversión inicial y que no puede ser repatriado – o de lo contrario se daría una disminución en el capital que existía previamente. Cabe mencionar que un factor que la IED propicia es el desarrollo del mercado doméstico al dar entrada con productos diferenciados que, al promover competencia, reducen los precios del producto general. También se impulsa la



innovación de recursos tecnológicos que es, del mismo modo, producto de la competencia o de exportaciones provenientes de otras naciones; así como la disminución de barreras de entrada hacia el mercado.

Aunque indudablemente se esperan numerosos beneficios que dimanen directamente de la IED, también existen muchas repercusiones a largo plazo que permanecen latentes y que resultan dañinos para la economía nacional. Por ejemplo, con la política a favor de la IED que Brasil ha tomado en los últimos 15 años, observamos que una cantidad de barreras en contra de inversiones extranjeras han sido eliminadas, particularmente en la bolsa de valores. Del mismo modo, al contar con el apoyo del Banco de Desarrollo de Brasil (BNDES) un gran número de compañías públicas han sido privatizadas para promover la competencia. Como consecuencia, es frecuente que empresas transnacionales entren a la nación de inversión careciendo de compromisos con la economía local, por lo cual, a falta de incentivo y coerción, llegan a mantener un vínculo mínimo con ésta. Por la misma razón, los contratistas de las empresas no invierten en entrenar a los empleados locales - de este modo venciendo uno de los mayores beneficios de la IED - y en su lugar exportan empleados del extranjero.

Siendo sustituidos muchos de estos empleados (normalmente en el sector agro-industrial), muchos son forzados a inmigrar a las ciudades, en donde el desempleo y la pobreza no son resultados poco comunes para el ciudadano reemplazado. De la misma forma, en lugar de innovar el sector doméstico, las empresas transnacionales tienden a simplemente importar los productos de maquinaria para su uso exclusivo, y dejar de lado el desarrollo nacional. Tal es el modo en el cual muchos de los beneficios que atraen las IED se derrotan a sí mismas por evasiones por parte del sector privado extranjero.

Cabe mencionar que se plantea una problemática cuando incorporamos la cantidad de lucro repatriado al origen de la empresa, puesto que en ocasiones se presenta una pérdida incomparable con el porcentaje demandado por las regulaciones financieras de la nación. Del mismo modo, la cantidad de impuestos que se cobran a la empresa en comparación con el lucro que se obtiene con sus prácticas pueden resultar insignificantes, e inclusive contraproducentes para la economía nacional, especialmente considerando que la incapacidad de las empresas locales de competir con los nuevos participantes del



mercado encauza al desaliento de inversiones del sector privado doméstico y a la pérdida de empleos ya existentes.

En efecto, podría concluirse que la IED puede ser tan benigna como maligna para una economía nacional, puesto que, en el empeño por atraer, se ceden numerosas concesiones que disminuyen la soberanía del Estado ante entidades extranjeros que al mismo tiempo potencian el estancamiento económico. Es por eso que Brasil debe encarrilar la política financiera de su país hacia la dirección en la cual exista un incremento continuo del PIB y mejora en las condiciones de vida del ciudadano, más sin perder su autoridad ni su poder gubernamental dentro de sus fronteras.



Preguntas para reflexionar

1. ¿Actualmente qué sectores de la economía de tu país recibe la mayor parte de IED? ¿Cuáles han sido las tendencias a largo plazo en cuanto a la inversión extranjera directa en tu país? ¿Han cambiado los comportamientos de los inversores y las industrias que reciben la mayoría de las inversiones a largo plazo? Si es así, ¿cómo han afectado la región?
2. ¿Cuáles han sido las consecuencias de diferentes políticas de IED incorporadas por naciones izquierdistas y proteccionistas (Venezuela y Bolivia), moderadas (Brasil) y aquellas que se inclinan por el libre comercio (México)? ¿Cómo interpretan estas naciones el papel de IED en relación con desarrollo económico e ideas de soberanía regional y nacional?
3. Dadas las dinámicas de la economía política de tu país, ¿en qué maneras la IED apoya o amenaza sus metas de desarrollo? ¿Rechaza tu país ciertos participantes de inversiones extranjeras directas (China, EEUUA o UE)? ¿Es la IED fundamentalmente contradictoria con las políticas/ideologías de tu país?
4. Desarrolla una o dos proposiciones que reflejen la posición de tu país y que se encuentre en relación con el papel que la IED juega con la economía política de tu país.



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