

The background of the image is a close-up, slightly blurred view of the European Union flag, featuring its characteristic blue color and twelve yellow stars arranged in a circle.

European Union

Berkeley Model
United Nations



LXIII
SIXTY-THIRD SESSION

Matt Nguyen
Danny Tuthill
Lilac Peterson



Hey Delegates!

Welcome to the European Union! You might not know it just yet, but you definitely picked the best committee at BMUN 63. Your EU Chairs—Danny, Lilac, and I—have spent the past year preparing our committee to ensure that you have an unforgettable conference weekend; thus, it goes without saying that we are incredibly excited to meet you all! Whether you are a novice or a seasoned veteran in international affairs, we promise that you will leave BMUN with a newfound perspective on prevailing global issues that confront policymakers today. The only request that we have in return is for you to challenge yourself to research as much as possible in advance and arrive prepared to debate the complexities of our topics on a professional level. And at this time, I have the distinct pleasure of introducing the individual members of your European Union dais for BMUN's 63rd Session.

My name is Matt Nguyen and I am a graduating Cal senior majoring in Political Science with concentrations in Public Law and International Relations and a dual minor in Public Policy and Education. To some extent, I'm what you might call an MUN grandpa: I have participated in MUN for the past 8 years—since my freshman year of high school, where I later served as an MUN Senior Teacher—and have attended 30 conferences as a delegate and 13 conferences as a Chair. During our 62nd Session, I also served as BMUN's Under-Secretary General of Research and the Head Chair of the U.S. Senate. For those of you just starting off, I highly encourage you to stick with MUN. Looking back, there is no doubt that MUN profoundly influenced my professional trajectory, public speaking skills, research abilities, and most importantly, the person I am today.

Aside from BMUN, I founded and teach an upper-division seminar on The Politics, Law, and Policy of Education Reform at Berkeley's Goldman School of Public Policy. I also support two research projects for our Law School and School of Public Policy where I investigate regulatory legislation and Congressional oversight of executive agency leaders. Last summer, I engaged in global affairs research at the University of Oxford. Outside of academics, I consult for several education nonprofits and serve as an Assistant Scoutmaster for the Boy Scout troop from which I earned Eagle Scout back in 2010.

Among others, I have formerly held positions with TFA, the lobbying firm Platinum Advisors, the SEC's Office of International Affairs, the Superior Court of California in Compton, and President Obama's 2012 campaign in North Carolina. Following graduation in May, I plan to attend law school and begin a career in appellate litigation, education policy, legal academia, or the U.S. foreign service.

Presently, I am taking the fall semester to work abroad for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development at the U.S. Mission to the EU in Brussels, Belgium.



Accordingly, I hope my holistic exposure to political institutions, international affairs, and the EU will contribute to the clarity and intellectual rigor that I expect to see from you during conference weekend.

Enough about myself, much more importantly, I am joined by two wonderful individuals, Danny Tuthill and Lilac Peterson. Leading up to BMUN 63 and especially during conference weekend, they will be invaluable resources for you during your research, position paper writing, and overall conference preparation. Beyond this, they are also integral members of the BMUN family and I cannot articulate just how honored I am to work alongside them for BMUN 63.

Truly the man, the myth, the legend. Danny Tuthill is currently a second-year student here at Cal. During his illustrious childhood, Danny would gaze longingly at the starry night sky and whisper to himself, “Wow.” This single observation inspired him to begin his current trajectory in pursuit of a double major in Applied Mathematics and Physics with a focus on Particle Physics, as well as a Minor in Scandinavian. After college, he intends to eventually earn his Ph.D. in Physics and become the next Bill Nye; so, if you want to start calling him Dr. Danny or Professor Tuts now, I highly encourage it.

This also constitutes Danny’s second year as an invaluable part of the BMUN Secretariat and one of my good friends. During our 62nd Session, he chaired the Security Council, served on the Special Events staff, volunteered with our Outreach program, attended BMUN’s 1st Annual Big Bear snowboarding trip, and painted his chest to support our soccer team, BMUN Rage. Though Danny did not participate in high school MUN, he was heavily involved in Model Congress.

Outside of BMUN, Danny snowboards for Cal’s Ski and Snowboard Team and performs acrobatics with the Cal Cirque du Soleil squad. In addition, he spent last summer as a camp counselor for an Astrophysics camp for middle and high school students and the summer before that developing oral and written fluency in Elvish. For reasons unknown—lost to living memory by the ravages of time—Danny holds the nickname Bilbo Baggins by other BMUNers. He is really stoked to meet everyone in February and wishes you all the best of luck in your conference preparation.

Our other awesome Vice-Chair, Lilac Peterson, is a first-year at UC Berkeley with an intended double major in Business Administration (or possibly Economics or Political Science) and Chinese. This 63rd Session will also mark her first year in BMUN. Along with chairing the EU, she also supports BMUN as a staff member for our Outreach program. Aside from her BMUN involvement, Lilac is part of Berkeley’s Ballroom team and she also volunteers for the campus radio station, 90.7 FM KALX.

During high school, Lilac’s extracurriculars culminated in her serving as Editor-in-Chief of her school’s newspaper and Captain of the varsity tennis team. Lilac also founded the Beijing Pen Pal Club, which developed more than 230 pen pals between her high school and two Beijing high schools. For the



past couple summers she hosted cultural exchange seminars at high schools throughout China, which focused on differences in American and Chinese education how China could learn from the U.S. model. Lilac's interest in Chinese reflects her half-Chinese background and fluency in all aspects of Mandarin. And, in 2012, Lilac interned in the District Office of Congresswoman Judy Chu, an experience which profoundly influenced her professional aspirations: this summer she plans to intern in Washington DC.

*In her free time she enjoys dancing salsa, playing tennis, hiking, and getting irrationally excited about her favorite TV shows, *Hannibal* and *Sherlock*. Given the recency of her trials and tribulations during the college admissions process as a new Cal Bear, Lilac is also an excellent resource for any questions about college applications and life as a freshman in college. Feel free to contact her about anything and everything at lpeterson@bmun.org if you have any questions!*

These open-door sentiments hold true for all of us. Danny would be stoked to talk with you about anything and everything including our topics, college, life of a hard science major, and how to be awesome at dtuthill@bmun.org. I am more than happy to answer all questions about our topics and committee as well as the world of Political Science and Pre-Law at mnguyen@bmun.org. We are all stoked to chat with you on the blog, review your papers, and meet you all in-person in February!

Best regards,

Matt Nguyen

Head Chair of the European Union

Berkeley Model United Nations, 63rd Session

Danny Tuthill

Vice-Chair of the European Union

Berkeley Model United Nations, 63rd Session

Lilac Peterson

Vice-Chair of the European Union

Berkeley Model United Nations, 63rd Session



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EU Foreign Relations with the Russian Federation

Historical Background

The historical foundations of Russo-European affairs are replete with endless complexity: for simplicity's sake, this section will focus on their foreign relations during World War II and the Cold War, both of which help contextualize the contemporary state of affairs between the two regional actors.

To begin, these first few paragraphs will consider World War II from the lens of Europe and the Soviet Union (also interchangeably referred to as Soviet Russia or the USSR).

Although at the time the EU had not yet been established and Russia existed under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the two managed a strategic relationship borne out of necessity at the height of World War II. In the early stages of the World War in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—a formal non-aggression treaty. This truce emerged in spite of the ideological antithesis Russian communism represented to Nazi fascism. As such, Hitler had always acknowledged that this Pact would evanesce as a temporary arrangement; he had already made military plans to invade the USSR after suppressing the Western Allies (Taylor, 2011).

Consequently, facing the long-term prospect of a two-front war against the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany sought to neutralize the threat from the western front by subduing France and overpowering the English in the Battle of Britain. However, failing to conquer England, Nazi Germany turned its sights to the east in Operation Barbarossa, breaching the Pact and invading the Soviet Union in 1941. This caused the USSR to align with the Allies and commence a two-front war, which played a major role in the Axis Powers' ultimate defeat.

As the Western Allies and the Soviets closed in on Germany, the race to Berlin became a competitive land-grab between the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism. Seized regions as far west as East Germany would eventually join the Warsaw Pact as Soviet satellite states; and by contrast, most western nations would integrate into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after receiving major financial infusions from the United States' Marshall Plan, which aimed to foster capitalism, rebuild major infrastructure, and reinvigorate their war-torn economies. As a result, with regards to Western European relations with the Soviet Union, the nascent seeds of the Cold War had already been sown well before WWII had even drawn to a close. As we will soon see, the ideological, economic, social, and geographical dichotomies between Europe and the Soviet Union in the Post-WWII era culminate in major implications for contemporary Russo-European foreign relations.



Having just inadequately condensed World War II history into three paragraphs, our next conversation will gravitate towards the European Community's relations with the USSR during the ensuing Cold War, which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Emanating from the territorial partition of Nazi Germany comprising much of Central and Eastern Europe by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, Western leaders characterized this geographic demarcation as an “iron curtain” isolating then-Soviet satellite states from the rest of Europe. This phenomenon is perhaps best exemplified by the infamous Soviet barrier restricting migration between West and East Berlin, known as the Berlin Wall. (National Museum of the USAF, 2009)

Beyond restrictions on human mobility and adversarial ideologies, Soviet occupation of the Eastern Europe also posed a potential nuclear threat due to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites the Soviet Union had placed in its satellite states (NRDC, 2001). Yet, both sides shared the blame for this security dilemma: British and French nuclear ICBM sites could reach deeply into Eastern Europe and, moreover, American ICBMs in Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey—all NATO members—had ranges that encompassed Moscow and other major Russian cities. (ILPI, 2012)

And yet, even more salient than security and geographic concerns, the bipolar balance of powers during the Cold War served as a consistent reminder of its ideological origins. To the Soviets, the West represented hegemonic imperialism and capitalism, the very antithesis of social progress—more primal Social Darwinist than liberating laissez-faire; and to some extent, they were not mistaken. On the other hand, Europe and the U.S. perceived the conflict as a philosophical juxtaposition between political autonomy and economic liberalism contrasted with totalitarian repression and economic stagnation.

Nevertheless in the latter years of the Cold War, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev would introduce domestic reforms—*perestroika* and *glasnost*—leading to unprecedented social, economic, and political liberalization across the Soviet Union. (Gorbachev, 1995) Among other causes, these domestic reforms facilitated mounting democratic independence movements in Eastern European Soviet satellite states, which culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. (U.S. Department of State, 2013)

By 1994, the newly established Russian Federation and the now-sovereign Eastern European states signed the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. (NATO, 2014) And by 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. This treaty emphasized that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.” (NATO, 2014) During this time, in the realms of political and economic affairs, a unified European



foreign policy aimed to support democratization and westernization in a debilitated Russia (Leonard et al, 2007), placing great emphasis on rapprochement in their foreign relations. (Rhodes, 1998)

And with this limited overview of WWII and Cold War history from the perspective of European relations with the Soviet Union, we have now finally arrived at contemporary relations between the EU and the Russian Federation.

Current Background

Having expounded upon a few of the relevant details regarding the historical backdrop of the EU's relations with Russia, the following paragraphs will illuminate some of the quintessential facets of their contemporary relations. Each will be discussed sequentially: (1) EU-Russia trade relations; (2) EU-Russia political relations, with a focus on the EU's post-Cold War expansion and Russia's response; (3) the EU's political disadvantages compared to Russia, including Russia's bilateral relations with member-states; and (4) the EU's policy towards Russia's foreign relations outside of Europe.

First, this paragraph articulates key aspects of Russia's trade relations with the EU. Today, the EU is Russia's largest trading partner and, in turn, Russia represents the EU's third largest importer. (EC Trade, 2014) Yet, most member-states' trade relations with Russia highlight alarming disparities: 70% of EU member-states imported at least €1 billion more from Russia than they exported, leading to significant trade deficits and trade dependency. (BBC, 2014) Compounding onto this trade imbalance, UNCTAD reports that Russia is the world's eighth largest investor economy: as such, many Russian corporations hold significant foreign direct investment (FDI) in major European industries. (BBC, 2014) By the same token, however, 75% of Russia's FDI originates from companies in the EU. (BBC, 2014) Note, a thorough discussion of EU-Russia energy relations appears in a case study later in this synopsis. Similarly, details surrounding EU-Russia sanctions are discussed in the case study on Ukraine.

Second, moving now from economic to political relations between Russia and the EU, the Russian Federation has reemerged as a major power in the global arena a little over two decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. (Trenin, 2006) But, the Europe did not remain static during this time; this interstitial period also heralded the "open door" expansion of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 with the ascension of many former Soviet satellite states to EU membership. (Hughes, 2006; Hamilton 2006; Trenin 2006) Incentivized by the economic advantages of the EU's signature aid programs (Christiansen et al, 2000)—Phare, Tacis, and Interreg—and the prospect of entering the EU's Single Market, which guaranteed the freedom of goods, services, people, and money across national borders, a dozen Eastern European nations joined the EU neighborhood. (EU, 2014)



These partnerships develop through the EU's two primary Europeanisation policies: the inclusive European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Lavenex, 2004; Averre, 2005; EEAS, 2014) and the exclusive invitation for EU membership. (Leonard et al, 2007; Trenin 2007; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012) Most recently, the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative has linked these two policies by integrating Eastern European countries—like Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine—politically and economically using Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). (EEAS, 2011) Many scholars and policymakers have dubbed the EaP, “enlargement-lite.”

From a political and security perspective, these Post-Soviet states also recognized the benefits of curtailing their close proximity to a fading—albeit paternalistic—world power, thereby leaving the Russian Federation ignored (Tymoshenko, 2007) and increasingly isolated. (Trenin, 2006) Where Europe believes its integration policies increase collective security in the region, by contrast, Moscow—adopting a neorealist perspective—perceives the enlargement of the European bloc as a threat to its relative power and thus international peace. (NATO, 2014)

Thus, to counter EU advances into what it has termed its “near abroad” sphere of influence, Russia has also played power geopolitics, using its vast economic and political influence to discourage Eastern European states from bolstering ties with the EU. Russia does this by holding a substantial portion of these nations’ debt, controlling their natural gas supply, fomenting domestic political dissent, and maintaining a powerful military presence in Belarus, Crimea (Ukraine), and Moldova among its vast array of operational bases across the former Soviet Union. (Varshalomidze and Ali, 2014)

Through the Belavezha Accords—a 1991 agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus disestablishing the Soviet Union—Russia’s first initiative under this near-abroad policy was to inaugurate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (Yeltsin Presidential Library, 2014) In fact, Russia originally intended for the CIS to become an intergovernmental model that rivaled the EU. (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012)

Despite the failure of the CIS to compete with the EU, Russia tried again with a more limited scope through the creation of a Eurasian Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community, and ultimately, the Eurasian Union (EEU) in May 2014. (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012; Michel 2014) This breadth of evidence suggests that Russia’s near abroad policy gravitates around its ability to nurture a viable alternative to EU membership for these Eastern European states. (EU Center of NC, 2008; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012) On the other hand, some scholars have insinuated that Putin’s EEU dreams more closely resemble the imperialist resurrection of the Soviet Union than a multilateral counterbalance to the European Union. (Michel, 2014)



As such, many European leaders have suggested that the EU must respond by reformulating the ENP's values-based agenda into distinctive foreign policies for each surrounding neighborhood, truly distinguishing between EU's priorities in Mediterranean states compared with those in Eastern Europe, especially in relation to Russia. (Averre, 2005; Edwards, 2006) Prior to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU had previously acknowledged Russia as a long-standing "strategic partner" such that their continued bilateral relations would be grounded in economic and security benefits for both parties. (EP, 2014)

Although a few transient comments like that of former EU President and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi have suggested that Russia could someday receive EU membership (Moscow News, 2008), the mainstream consensus throughout Russia and Europe is: first, it is very unlikely that the EU would ever extend the offer to Russia for obvious reasons; and second, even if invited, Russia would likely refuse for similarly obvious reasons. (Trenin, 2007) But while acknowledged that EU membership for Russia will never transpire, the ascension of other Eastern European states is ripe with possibilities.

Third, the next few paragraphs revolve around the institutional level challenges faced by the EU where Russia seems to possess and exploit its distinct practical advantages.

While the EU maintains domestic and foreign policy platforms based on normative European values, a combination of no-nonsense realpolitik, corporate clientelism, and plutocratic business interests pervade all aspects of Russia's policies. (Fish, 2005; Tassinari et al, 2006) When compared with Russia's, the EU's current population is over three times larger, its military ten times larger, and its economy fifteen times larger. (Leonard et al, 2007) In spite of this, Russia's power advantage in international relations comes from its national unity and ability to take decisive unilateral action, quintessential state-based attributes that the EU lacks. (Leonard et al, 2007) For example, while the EU's military spending since 2007 has decreased dramatically due to the financial crisis and fiscal austerity measures, Russia has doubled its military spending during that time. (*The Economist*, 2014)

Russia also simultaneously maintains robust bilateral relations with many EU member-states for their own strategic interests (EU Center of NC, 2008) thereby undermining the EU's unitary authority as a whole. (*The Economist*, 2014) In general, these individual member-states have applied a cost-benefit analysis to their foreign relations with Russia: most have largely turned the blind eye to more normative concerns such as Russia's human rights abuses (Lokshina, 2013; Lokshina, 2014) and political regression into semi-authoritarianism. (Fish, 2005; Lally and Englund, 2011) These member-states have instead focused on the economic benefits arising from trade interdependency. (Hughes, 2006)

As expected, the EU's has attempted time and time again to consolidate a unified policy towards Russia—consisting of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (EC Trade, 2014), the Common



Strategy on Russia from 1999-2004 (Haukkala, 2008), and the EU-Russia Four Common Spaces (EEAS, 2014; EEAS, 2014) among others. The EP has even developed an EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee to foster dialogue on a range of contemporary issues. (EP, 2014) Nevertheless, have argued that these nebulous policies have achieved minimal success in establishing a cohesive, long-term EU relationship paradigm for Russia. (Hughes, 2006; Tassinari et al, 2006)

Fourth, Russia's foreign relations outside of the EU—namely Syria, Iran, Georgia, and Ukraine—have also problematized the formation of a coherent EU policy regarding its eastern neighbor. In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss each in turn.

Russia's ongoing relationship with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's regime continues to perplex the EU. First and foremost remains Russia's implicit promise to veto any UNSC Resolutions endorsing UN or NATO intervention in Syria. Another related area of concern is Assad's violation of the Geneva Conventions through the use of sarin gas on civilian populations during the Syrian Civil War. (BBC, 2013) With its own dark history of chemical warfare during WWI and WWII, the EU has been consistently remained at the forefront of normative condemnation of such attacks. However, when United States President Barack Obama indicated that a "red line" had been crossed in Syria that would result in punitive NATO air strikes, most EU partners backed out. (Greenberg, 2014) By contrast, President Putin publically condemned the U.S. threat of military action (Putin, 2013) and brokered an agreement to the dismantle Syria's chemical weapon stockpile. (Fisher, 2013; Zampano, 2014)

But, Russian intervention in Syria is far from benign: in fact, Russia has actively supplied the Assad regime with advanced weaponry for use against the rebels. (NYT Editorial Board, 2013) This has been rather problematic for the EU given Syria's missile strikes on Turkish border cities, Turkey's long-standing status as a NATO member-state, and NATO's collective security obligations. (NATO, 2013)

In the same vein, Russian arms trade—both nuclear and conventional—with Iran has also struck a discordant tone with the West. Along with a history of vetoing UN sanctions against Iran for their pursuit of dual-use nuclear energy, Russia has also assisted Iran by supplying fissile materials, nuclear reactors, and the technical expertise of nuclear scientists. (Beehner, 2006) Even beyond this, Russia has also demonstrated its willingness to skirt around the prohibitions in existing UN, EU, and U.S. sanctions through bilateral trade with Iran. Conversely, Russia has also recently pushed Iran to enter the E3+3 talks to limit its nascent nuclear program following the 2013 election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. (BBC, 2014) Although still a work-in-progress, it is possible that future relations with Iran may become a foreign policy area where the EU and Russia will find common ground.



That said, common ground between Russia and the EU in international conflict resolution is not a wholly new phenomenon either: in 2008, the EU served as third-party mediator in the Russo-Georgian War. The War ignited when Georgia's military invaded the semi-autonomous South Ossetia in Georgia killing hundreds of civilians and Russian troops. (Forsberg and Seppo, 2010) As anticipated, Russia retaliated by taking control of several Georgian cities. What surprised everyone was the EU's rapid response in sending officials to mediate the conflict, establish a ceasefire, provide humanitarian aid, and support the territorial integrity of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Forsberg and Seppo, 2010)

Last, but certainly not least, the current crisis in Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea merit plentiful discourse on its centrality to Russo-EU relations. Given its importance to contemporary relations, we will flesh out this crisis more thoroughly in a case study later in this synopsis.

In sum, this section of our synopsis strove to present a holistic portrayal of the current state of the EU's foreign policy towards Russia by identifying and elaborating upon four major areas of significance that will together define the future of Russo-European relations.

International Involvement

Given our recent cursory overview of the European Union's historical and contemporary foreign relations with Russia, this section of our synopsis now calls attention to external actors whose relevance merits additional discussion. Beyond this, to fully understand the significance—or insignificance—of international institutions to the balance of powers, I highly encourage you to glance over the brief summary of international relations theory in our delegate blog.

Broadly, we identify three distinctive ideological camps which comprise the breadth of international involvement on this multifaceted topic: (1) pro-EU intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); (2) the neutral United Nations and non-partisan NGOs; and (3) pro-Russian international institutions. As a reminder, however, due to the insurmountable challenges posed by national sovereignty and the state-centric world order, you will see that very few of these organizations have pursued any radical action in the realm of Russo-European foreign affairs. In the following paragraphs, we explore each of these categories of IGOs and NGOs in turn.

Beginning with pro-EU institutions, their involvement in EU-Russia relations reflects the West's united response to Russia's recent policies both domestic and international; these organizations have heavily criticized Putin-led Russia. They have critiqued Russia's regression into semi-authoritarianism and the expected curbs on free elections, civil liberties, rule of law, and freedom of press (HRW, 2014). Organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Amnesty International, have sponsored



election observers (Eschenbaecher et al, 2012), reported on their violent retaliation to peaceful protests (Amnesty International, 2014), and investigated corporate clientelism (Tompson, 2007).

On the other hand, many of these organizations have also sought to inculcate Russia with liberal Western values, emphasizing the end of the Cold War and Russia's need to transition into a post-Soviet world order. During the early 1990s, Europe had hoped that Russia's invitation and involvement in the Group of 8 (G8) would tie Russia politically to the West and instill Western democratic values in this fledgling democracy. (Lukov, 2006) This is also the case for the European Union's support of Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in the late 2000s. (Gwertzman, 2011)

Another core strategy employed by the prominent Council of Europe (Harding, 2014), the OECD (Irish, 2014), and the G8 (Borger, 2014), the suspension of Russia's organizational membership and ascension talks have aimed censure Russia for their bellicose actions in Ukraine. With regards to the G8, this suspension was especially ironic given Russia's G8 presidency and preparations to host the June 2014 summit in Sochi. (RT, 2014) An enormous snub to Putin and the Kremlin, the now-G7 refused to attend the Sochi summit and instead held the conference at the EU capital in Brussels without inviting the Russian delegation and spent much of the gathering discussing the on-going crisis in Ukraine. (European Council, 2014) In spite of this, it seems very unlikely that Russia will be excluded from the Group of 20 (G20) summit in November 2014, a reality which underscores the Western and developing worlds' divisions over Russia's annexation of Crimea. (Finley, 2014)

Perhaps the most relevant discussion of a pro-European IGO is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance that shares twenty-one common member-states with the EU. When the Warsaw Pact disbanded in 1991, NATO aimed to carve a place for itself in the post-Cold War world by signing non-aggression treaties with Eastern Europe and Russia. NATO demonstrated its commitment to this ideal by conducting friendly joint-military exercises with the defense establishment in these former Soviet states (Sloan, 2005) and by founding the NATO-Russia Council. (NATO, 2014)

In 2009, responding to NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe (Peter, 2014), Russia's then-President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a regional security treaty that would crystallize NATO's current membership, thereby legally precluding further NATO expansion into the East. (Kühn, 2010)

Though these "Medvedev proposals" did not garner the support Russia had hoped would be necessary to propel it to ratification, it is still important to remember that, during this time, many across the world truly believed that NATO had outlived its usefulness for the West. (Bacevich, 2013) Unsurprisingly, this emergent perception was obliterated following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. With the current ceasefire failing to stop the fighting between Ukraine's military and Russian-



armed separatists, NATO has recently promised the deployment of a 4,000-strong rapid response force into Eastern Europe to build retaliatory capacity to preempt further escalation. Russia has predictably condemned NATO for this military doctrine, arguing that Western aggression has reinvigorated Cold War-esque tensions in the region without provocation. (Erlanger et al, 2014)

During the interim, however, NATO and Russia still maintained tense relations. Especially with the deployment of NATO's ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, Russia believed that a European BMD actively degraded the principles of mutually assured destruction (MAD); for if the EU and United States believed that they could use their BMD to avert a nuclear second-strike retaliation from Russia, they would be less deterred from activating their own arsenal in a preemptive strike. (NATO, 2014)

Given the above, it is evident that the involvement of pro-Western institutions has been relevant in shaping EU relations with Russia over the past half century and especially over the past year.

Sadly, the same relevance cannot be attributed to the United Nations, whose binding resolutions on the current crisis have been stymied by Russia's permanent veto power on the UN Security Council (UNSC). Co-sponsored by 42 UN member-states in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the March 2014 UNSC draft resolution S/2014/189 exemplifies Russia's use of the veto to obstruct the UNSC from taking a firm stance on the crisis in Ukraine. (UNSC, 2014)

Due to the UNSC's inaction on the crisis, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted A/RES/68/262, titled "Territory Integrity of Ukraine." (UNGA, 2014) During the discussion, UN representatives from several countries condemned the annexation of Crimea. When it became clear that the resolution would pass on a verbal yes-no vote, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin called for a roll call vote, presumably to track the countries whose votes would illustrate their proxy support of Ukraine and the West over Russia. As expected, the resolution's final vote tally symbolized the deep fractures in the international community between the anti-Russia camp (110 in favor), the pro-Russia camp (11 against), and, most importantly, the countries that wanted to avoid Russian ire (58 abstentions). (UNGA, 2014) It is important to acknowledge that UNGA has virtually no power to commit physical might—in the form of peacekeeping, observer missions, or sanction regimes—to respond to the ongoing conflict; as such, the resolution's passage serves a purely symbolic gesture.

By contrast, because it was an issue that would be politically toxic to obstruct, Russia acquiesced to the passage of S/RES/2166, a UNSC resolution which condemned the July 17th downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in Ukrainian airspace. (UNSC, 2014) Of significance, naming the party responsible for the surface-to-air missile strike is notably absent, likely a precondition to secure



Russia's agreement to refrain from vetoing the resolution even though incontrovertible evidence has confirmed that pro-Russia separatists orchestrated the attack.

But now, moving on to pro-Russian international organizations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) comprise two of the main regional actors aligned with Russia. In 1995, a few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the CSTO was founded to protect the collective security of its Central Asian member-states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. (Anderman et al, 2007) Yet, the West generally perceives this regional alliance as merely a tool to exert pressure on neighboring states and legitimize Russia's continued military presence in local "frozen" conflicts. (Anderman et al, 2007)

Where the CSTO focuses on regional security, in the economic realm, the EEU reigns supreme. Initiated in the midst of the Ukraine crisis in May 2014, the EEU is a free trade area between Russia, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan designed to rival and provide an alternative to the EU's common market. Part of what sparked the current crisis in Ukraine was then-President Yanukovych's decision to reject deeper association with the EU in favor of potentially joining the Russian-led EEU. Although the EEU is still in its nascent phases, the EEU is able to exert rather heavy economic pressure in the region and Putin has even described the EEU as representing "the best values of the Soviet Union" (RT, 2014)

Case Studies

1 | EU-Russia-Ukraine

by Lilac Peterson

It is safe to say that Russia-Ukraine foreign relations have remained strained ever since Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Especially given the critical events of recent months, EU relations with Russia have become indistinguishable from this geopolitical crisis.

To begin, the EU and Ukraine began negotiations for an Association Agreement (AA) in 2007. This AA was the first initiated between the EU and an Eastern Partnership (EaP) country. In March 2012, the EU and Ukraine finalized the AA and, in July 2012, both sides agreed on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as part of the AA. (EEAS, 2012) The delay in the DCFTA was due, in part, to Russian insistence that Ukraine need not to develop closer ties with the EU, but that they should instead join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union (CU). (Astrov, 2013)

On November 2013, Ukraine's pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych suspended the AA talks causing mass protests in the capital of Kiev. (Way, 2014) Yanukovych expressed skepticism towards the economic benefits the AA would bestow upon Ukraine and argued that Ukraine would



suffer if Russia retaliated against any deal made by Ukraine with other parties creating further “losses” from the investment that Ukraine needed to upgrade to EU standards. The EU though had a much more optimistic outlook, arguing that the AA would save Ukrainian business €500 million a year just in import duties, and increase Ukraine’s GDP by more than 6% in the long run. (Gotev, 2013)

In response to Yanukovych’s actions, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Council President Herman Van Rompuy still extended Ukraine an opportunity to sign the AA, but Yanukovych rejected Barroso and Van Rompuy’s offer at the EU-Ukraine summit in early 2014. In turn Barroso declared the “time of limited sovereignty is over”, and declined a counter-proposal for trilateral talks with Russia. (Gotev, 2013) As early as November 2013, Ukrainian protests against Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the AA became widespread and violent, with most clashes occurring in Kiev’s Independence Square. On February 21, 2014, after more than 500 causalities and 2000 wounded, the government and the leaders of the protest brokered a compromise for early December elections as well as significant changes to Ukraine’s constitution. The next day, Ukraine’s Parliament formally stripped Yanukovych of his powers, causing him to flee to Russia and leaving an interim government succeeded by current President Petro Poroshenko. This national revolution was dubbed “Euromaidan”.

Even to this day, both Yanukovych and the Kremlin still refuse to recognize this new government with Yanukovych speaking from Moscow, still proclaiming that despite his ousting in an allegedly illegitimate coup d'état, he remains the de jure leader of Ukraine.

Energized by Russia’s decision not to recognize the post-Yanukovych government, the Crimean Peninsula, located in the south of Ukraine—depending on which side you ask—either seceded from Ukraine and joined Russia, or was annexed by Russia from Ukraine. This distinction is extremely important as the former perspective embodies democratic self-determination and the latter represents a major breach in the international norms of sovereignty. Russia justified its territorial privileges over the region by underscoring the deep Russian heritage—cultural and linguistic—of the Crimean people and differing arguments exist to Crimea’s political and geostrategic relevance to Russia. (Taylor, 2014) Nevertheless, as evidenced by the UN General Assembly resolution on Crimea’s territorial integrity, it is clear that the global community has widely rejected Russian ownership of the region. (UNGA, 2014)

Since then, the conflict has spiraled towards even greater levels of chaos. In May 2014, pro-Russian separatists declared that the eastern Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk no longer belonged to Ukraine. Then, in July, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 was shot down by technologically advanced, surface-to-air missiles in the separatist Donbass region of Ukraine killing all 298 passengers onboard, many of whom were European. Though not entirely confirmed, most suspect that Russia



provided the separatists with this advanced weaponry in clear violation of international law, especially given the thousands of Russian troops stationed at the border and venturing into eastern Ukraine.

Despite the oppressive military might of Russia and the numerous fatalities of Euromaidan protesters who had championed democracy and closer relations with the EU, the EU's response began as mostly rhetorical with very little political might. The EU initially only condemned Yanukovych without taking any tangible steps, but EU involvement then increased to imposing targeted sanctions on Russia, only after Russia had annexed Crimea and sponsored a pro-Russian separatist war in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions were again strengthened after the MH17 incident. (Krasnodębska, 2014)

These sanctions placed limits on prominent Russian companies, such as weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov and energy firms Rosneft and Gazprom prohibiting them from raising long-term debt on European capital markets. (Weaver, 2014) Travel bans and asset freezes were also placed on leading members of Putin's inner circle and pro-Russia separatist leaders. (Weaver, 2014) These sanctions have been detrimental to the Russian economy. Although these sanctions are certainly not useless, economic methods may not solve the problem. (Fish, 2014)

2 | EU-Russia Energy Relations

by Danny Tuthill

The EU and Russia maintain mutual dependence on their bilateral energy trade. Russia delivers a large portion of the EU's energy supplies causing Russia to use exports as a strategic tool for coercion; however, a large portion of Russia's GDP comes from energy exports causing them to be reliant on EU trade. Despite this, some scholars have suggested that asymmetrical interdependence—with Russian companies holding the advantage—better characterizes their energy relations. (Hughes, 2006)

In terms of EU energy consumption, oil accounts for 37%, natural gas 24%, solid fuels 18%, nuclear power 14%, and renewables 7%. Of this energy consumption, Russian imports only account for about 7% overall. (Cameron, 2010) The EU imports 30% of its oil from Russia equaling 28% of EU oil consumption. The EU also imports 40.8% of its natural gas from Russia equaling more than 25% of gas consumption in the EU. (Tichý, 2012) According to CSIS, Germany's natural gas dependence on Russia is expected to double with the Nord Stream pipeline (Tymoshenko, 2007), thereby giving Russia even more leverage over the *de facto* nation-state guardian of the EU. (Larsson, 2008) In total, over 76% of the EU's total imports from Russia consist of energy products. (BBC, 2014; Hughes, 2006)

Thus, in terms of oil and natural gas consumption in the EU, Russia plays a big role; however, overall its role is reduced; however, this consumption is not evenly distributed throughout the EU. Many



of the most developed EU member-states use minimal Russian energy imports and could still persist even if Russia immediately ceased shipments. For example, Spain and Ireland receive no energy imports from Russia. (Cameron, 2010) For the newer EU nations, Russian energy imports can account for up to 100% of their energy needs giving Russia its blackmail weapon.

On the other side of the issue, the EU has an economic stranglehold on Russia. 65% of Russian exports are either crude oil or natural. Of this, 60% of Russian crude oil and 90% of Russian natural gas is exported to the EU. As of now, 75% to 80% of Russian exports are directly linked to the EU energy market. This energy sector of the Russian economy makes up 25% of the total economy and generates 30% of Russia's GDP. (Tichý, 2012) Therefore, just as the EU is heavily dependent on Russia for energy imports, Russia is heavily dependent on the EU for its business.

In this relation, Ukraine is extremely important, for 80% of crude oil and natural gas imported to the EU runs through pipelines under Ukraine. Recently Ukraine's state-owned energy firm, Naftogaz, has accumulated a \$2 billion debt to Russian energy giant Gazprom which holds a monopoly over the Russian energy industry. Naftogaz was also unwilling to pay Gazprom's new prices, following a cancelled discount leading to a 200% spike in prices. (Sharples, 2014) Thus, the EU is currently pursuing energy alternatives to avoid another energy crisis; if Gazprom stops gas and oil flow to Ukraine or some of Europe, there is no doubt that the EU's economy would be severely affected.

The first alternative being pursued is a "reverse flow" where the gas supplies in Western Europe are being sold to Ukraine via Poland for an increased price. The problem present in this alternative is the gas being sold to Ukraine is the gas bought from Gazprom. Gazprom is calling these sales illegal on the basis that the pipelines set up by Gazprom between Western Europe and Russia (flowing through Ukraine) are contractually only allowed to flow from East to West. (Sharples, 2014)

A second alternative is to remove Gazprom from the trade. New pipelines are being proposed by the EU that run from the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Central Asian Region. An example of these proposed pipelines is the Nabucco pipeline, which would supply gas from the Turkish border to Austria and avoid Russia completely. Another representative example is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also intended to bypass Russia. (Trenin, 2007) This pipeline cost £1.74 billion to construct but now funnels 1 million barrels from the Azerbaijan's oil reserves in the Caspian Sea to Turkey each day. (Tran, 2005)

A third alternative would be a switch from gas and oil dependence by the EU to renewable energy sources. The Renewable Energy Sources Directive passed in 2009 places the objective of reaching 20% of energy consumption in the EU through renewable sources. Also, 10% of energy consumption in the transit sector must be from renewable energy sources for each individual member



state. The European Renewable Energy Council estimated that without the directive, the EU following its normal development path would have reached 18.3% renewable energy consumption by 2020. Thus, with the directive in place, the EU has the ability to far surpass its goal of 20% by 2020. (EREC, 2014) With this potential switch to renewable sources in the near future, the EU's dependence on Russia will be greatly attenuated, thereby causing detrimental impacts on the Russian economy.

Questions to Consider

1. Compared to other EU member-states, what is distinct about your country's foreign relations with Russia? With regards to... Politics? Human rights? Energy? Trade? Agriculture? Etc.?
2. Does the conflict in Ukraine represent a new paradigm for the world order, a return to Cold War era power politics? Or, if this crisis is resolved, will relations return to "business-as-usual"?
3. If the crisis spirals out of control or another dispute arises, is the EU prepared to adopt stronger measures? Crippling sanctions, the use of armed forces? Can the EU transition to proactive policymaking to Russian aggression rather than reactionary?
4. Will the EU continue to rely on NATO for security in the European continent? Is NATO the right institution for collective security in Europe? What are the positives and drawbacks? What are the security implications for Europe if the United Kingdom votes to leave the EU?
5. Looking ahead, should the EU expand or modify its Eastern Partnership programme? Should it push ahead with the ratification of more AAs like it did with Moldova and Georgia?
6. How should the EU reduce energy dependency on Russia? Is this even necessary (logic: Russia needs EU payments as much as the EU needs Russia's energy exports)?



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The European Year for Development 2015

General Background

Before even beginning the conversation about the European Year for Development 2015, a crucial question we must ask ourselves is: what do we even mean by “development”? The answer is not as simple as we might initially presume.

To really dig deeply into this conundrum, a few more discerning questions might consist of some of the following: Is development entirely encapsulated by GDP growth? Socioeconomic uplift? Income equality? Declining rates of infant mortality? Preventing and curing epidemics? Industrialization? Urbanization? Modernization? Globalization? Democratization? Institutional capacity in the financial sector? Functional political institutions? A cessation in sectarian violence? Peace? Human rights? Water security? Food security? Energy security? Infrastructure? Crisis resilience? Environmental sustainability? Intergenerational equity? Or, is the term “development” encompassed by some, none, or all of the above?

If we are all being honest, neither I nor anyone else—including you, your parents, your teachers, my professors, President Obama, or Secretary General Ban Ki Moon—has the perfect answer to this question, and that is perfectly okay. Merely taking the time to ruminate over the profound complexities of development is much more important than the standard MUN impulse to feign an omniscient, two-sentence response when asked, “What is ‘development’?”

As such, before the European Union—or any national, intergovernmental, or even non-governmental institution for that matter—can promote and finance international development, we have to acknowledge that how we even define “development” will largely determine the sectors where we prioritize limited resources and expertise. Oftentimes, a major critique of foreign aid and “development” lie in the self-serving objectives of the countries that strategically provide these resources.

Keep these all of these considerations in mind as you conduct research, write your position papers, debate during conference, and create feasible resolutions: what aspect of development are you trying to solve? Clearly articulate what criteria your country perceives the EU’s role in development to be and enumerate your country’s intentions underlying their foreign development agenda.

Historical Background

Over the past fifty years, over \$1 trillion in aid has been transferred from the developed world to Africa. (Moyo, 2009) This is only one small example of the proliferation of foreign aid designed to spur economic development and humanitarian assistance to alleviate dire crises. And yet, some have argued that this aid has been misguided and detrimental to development. (Moyo, 2009; Economist, 2014)



Moreover, many even cite figures in the tens of billions for the amount of aid that has been laundered for unintended purposes. (Economist, 2014)

Although some nuanced distinctions can be drawn between donor states pursuing international development and allocating humanitarian assistance, the two institutions overlap very closely. Thus, our forthcoming immersion into the world of development must also coincide with the exploration and scrutiny of development aid and humanitarian assistance. Throughout this section, we will highlight the historical and contemporary discourses that shape foreign aid and international development.

The concept of international development as an instrument of good public policy gained traction with the success of the United States Marshall Plan designed to rebuild the European economy following World War II. But, when the international community—through instruments such as the World Bank, regional development agencies, and bilateral partnerships—tried to superimpose this development model onto developing countries, they encountered impediments they had not anticipated.

At the time, Western scholars and policymakers hypothesized that, by establishing the internal political, economic, and social preconditions for a free market economy, development assistance had the potential to activate heretofore underutilized per capita economic productivity and thereby alleviate poverty in the developing world. (Rostow, 1956) Supposedly, under this framework and with the help of international development financing, today's disenfranchised masses would amplify the developing world's demand for commercial products and become valuable geopolitical allies in the containment of communism, a win-win situation for the West. (Schraeder et al, 1998)

Notably for Europe, the prevailing problematics of development aid are somewhat personal. For many developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America, 19th and 20th century European colonialism and imperialism played an intrinsic role in decimating natural resources, exploiting human capital, disregarding human rights, and leaving weak governance characterized by corrupt authoritarian regimes and dominant military apparatuses. To some degree, the extent to which European colonialism has culminated in the degradation of institutions and social trust in much of the developing world has stymied many efforts for internal development over the last half-century.

Indeed, massive waves of decolonization and newfound independence throughout the 20th Century generated enormous power vacuums for autocrats to insert themselves into positions of power at the expense of the general public. Too inertial to challenge the status quo and, in fact, oftentimes finding the greediness of dictators friendly to the West to be more cooperative than relations with neutral or anti-Western democracies, the Western donor nations made little efforts during this time to ensure that development assistance reached its intended recipients, the impoverished citizens living



under these authoritarian regimes. Sadly, this prevailing legacy of bad governance within these recipient states continues to stifle the efficacious allocation of development assistance to this day. (Radalet, 2004)

To some extent, structural adjustment programs—or conditional loans—of the 1980s sought to allocate aid effectively by mandating privatization of domestic industries, open markets for international investors and exporters, and fiscal austerity (balancing budgets over spending on the social safety net for the poor). Proponents of structural adjustment justified their policies by arguing that these reforms would limit state control over domestic industries—which they believed to be the very manifestation of failed communist policies—and allow free market capitalism and labor productivity to thrive. But, instead of promoting growth and alleviating poverty, rapidly liberalized markets absent a skilled labor force in these developing nations gave multinational corporations (MNCs) full unimpeded access to exploit the citizenry and buy out the politicians, miring the country in gross levels of income inequality.

Moreover, during this time, though the United Nations and other regional bodies also allocated development assistance, bilateral North-South aid relationships remained the norm because they directly serve the donor nation's geopolitical interests. Indeed, though multilateral coordination is obviously preferable for the maximal coordination and efficiency of development assistance, European countries have historically treated their independent allocation of financial and technical assistance as a matter of national sovereignty. (Carbone, 2007) This is known as subsidiarity—one of the EU's foundational principles that policy devolution should always give precedence to the actions of individual EU member-states unless the policy can be better enacted on an EU-wide level. For context, an analogous policy framework exists for the U.S. federal government and the devolved governments of each State.

Fortunately, due to greater development challenges arising since then, many of the more detrimental features of subsidiarity have been cast aside in the development realm with the rise of the European Union and their values-based approach to foreign policy.

Current Background

Having considered the historical foundations of development assistance, we now turn our attention to the contemporary aspects of our topic from the perspective of the European Union.

Today, the EU provides €38 billion each year in internal development aid to less-developed regions in the EU. (BBC, 2014) Annually, the EU also allocates €7.5 billion in external development aid. (BBC, 2014) In total, the EU provides over 50% of the world's aid. (Carbone, 2007) The extent to which development consolidation and coordination is made possible emerged from the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. (EP, 2014) Of particular relevance to our topic, this unprecedented reform treaty inaugurated the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)—first



held by Lady Catherine Ashton (UK, S&D), and now by Federica Mogherini (Italy, S&D)—and established the HR-led European External Action Service (EEAS). (EP, 2014)

Even though the EEAS is still a budding EU agency, many scholars have argued that the broad European consensus surrounding international development epitomizes the EU's potential to act as a unified entity in the realm of international relations compared to its lackluster performance in consolidating other capacities, namely member-states' foreign and security policies. (Carbone, 2007) The other major EU agencies focused on development include the Directorate-Generals for Development and Cooperation EuropeAid (DEVCO) and Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO). Through these institutions, the EU's enumerated commitment for universal human rights, protection of minorities, good governance, democratic institutions, and robust civil society in recipient nations presently highlights incontrovertible preconditions for EU development assistance. (Richardson, 2002) These progressive criteria for allocating development assistance are articulated consistently across all EU institutions and in the 1953 European Convention on Human Rights, the 2005 European Consensus on Development (EUROPA, 2007), and the 2011 Agenda for Change (Tran, 2011).

However, rather than an equitable distribution of development funding in regions of the world with the highest development need, a disproportionate percentage of EU financial assistance flows into the “European neighborhood” where the EU has direct political, economic, and security interests. (BBC, 2007) Indeed, this appears to be characteristic of the EU’s current policy towards international affairs in general: maintain overarching foreign policy platforms on key issue areas of EU-wide concern but devolve to member-states when core EU interests are not at stake. For this surrounding region, development aid is drawn from the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI or ENPI), a fund which constitutes a vital element of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

Ostensibly, this continued reliance on subsidiarity seems at-odds with the rise of development coordination, the EU’s values-based foreign policy, and the EEAS. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the EU member-states all reside within democratic regimes where the current economic outlook is neutral at best and taxation for foreign aid must then be grounded upon tangible political, economic, or social benefits for their national constituencies. This explanation even helps to rationalize why a substantial portion of development assistance funding for regions outside of the European neighborhood goes to recipient countries with large diaspora communities in the donor nations. (Mohamoud, 2009)

But, just because a majority of the EU’s development assistance flows into the European neighborhood, that does not mean that the EU neglects the rest of the world. Rather, one of the most influential initiatives to shape EU development policy, the Cotonou Agreement, epitomizes a development treaty between the EU and 79 Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group states to ossify



certain important development priorities until 2020. (EC, 2014) This agreement gave preferential trade arrangements and development assistance to former colonies of Europe with the aim of invigorating “focal sectors” within these recipient nations. (EC, 2014) Of particular relevance, the 2010 revision of this treaty emphasized the EU’s fidelity in these ACP nations towards peace-building, public-private partnerships, and mounting global challenges like food security, climate change, HIV/AIDS, and sustainability. (EC, 2014) By virtue of the original Lomé Conventions, the EU’s foreign development aid for ACP countries is drawn from the European Development Fund. (EP, 2014)

For development assistance falling outside of the European neighborhood and the ACP countries, the EU pushes its values-based development agenda using the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Development Cooperation Instruments (DCIs). (EC, 2014) Where the EIB invests in profitable development enterprises worldwide (EIB, 2014), the DCIs disburse development aid—totaling €16.9 billion between 2007-2013—to support a vast array of development policy areas through collaboration with recipient nations on a bilateral basis and support for regional organizations, localities, NGOs, and other international partners of the EU. (EC, 2014)

Very recently, with the ascendance of President Jean-Claude Juncker (Luxembourg, EPP) at the helm of the European Commission, the entire organizational structure of the European Commission has been revolutionized with credence towards turning the EU into “A Stronger Global Actor”. As a result, development assistance now falls under the purview of the new Vice-President and HR Federica Mogherini, the new Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica (Croatia, S&D), and the new Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides (Cyprus, EPP). (EC, 2014) In her hearing before the European Parliament (EP) Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), HR Mogherini emphasized that one of her development priorities for Africa would be to change the paradigm so that “[we] work *with* Africa, not *in* Africa”. (Mogherini, 2014)

And in his hearing before the EP Committee on Development (DEVE), Commissioner Mimica noted a 98% success rate for the EU’s development projects, but a continued need to strengthen policy coherence between member-states to ensure the greatest impact for the EU’s foreign aid flows. (Mimica, 2014) This is known as policy coherence for development (PCD). (EP, 2014) Furthermore, he cited his justification for increasing the EU’s development aid flows by noting that 83% of Europeans support EU-led foreign aid, 70% subscribe to the notion that helping developing countries helps the EU as well, and 61% believe that EU development assistance should be increased. (Mimica, 2014) And finally, in his plans for the future of EU development assistance, Mimica noted that the 2015 shift from the MDGs to the SDGs would also herald the new EU-led era of sustainability-focused development frameworks.



Where the international community once misunderstood development funding for climate change mitigation instead of poverty alleviation as a zero-sum tug-of-war for fiscal support, policymakers have now begun to recognize that the two seemingly disparate dimensions of development actually function in concert, as exemplified by the recent prominence of the SDGs.,

The contemporary narrative for justifying the transition to the SDGs proceeds as follows. Building sustainability—environmental protection, biodiversity, habitat preservation, food and water security, natural resource management, etc.—will ultimately insulate the developing world from the imminent ramifications of anthropogenic climate change. Proponents believe that funding sustainability will have the greatest impact in stemming severe poverty by guaranteeing natural resource access for current and future generations. As such, this notion combined with the EU's firmly protectionist policies on conservation, the European Union has remained at the vanguard of the global movement in favor of sustainable development. (note: If you have any intellectual interest in developing a nuanced perspective of the different theories for assessing climate change and sustainable development, you are more than welcome to peruse my Oxford research on the topic at: <http://bit.ly/1xQqbJ3> [climate change mitigation] and <http://bit.ly/1xQqjIs> [sustainable development]. Enjoy!) (Nguyen, 2014; Nguyen, 2014)

Overall, our topic “The European Year for Development 2015” encompasses all of the concepts above: as the EU draws upon lessons from the past, strengthens its present agreements, and sets its sights on the future, what does the EU vision for development look like? What kind of priorities will the EU establish for the years ahead: tangible trade and development platforms for self-interested economic objectives, values-based development initiatives with an eye on advancing human rights and democracy, aspirational sustainability policies to confront climate change, or some combination of the above? And how will the EU solidify the political, economic, and social endorsement of the European public to transform these theoretical values into a tangible reality?

International Involvement

The European Union is obviously not alone in providing development assistance; myriad international organizations—both global, regional, and independent—also play an indispensable role in disseminating information, fundraising and financing, cultivating technical expertise, delivering results in the field, and collaborating with other agents of civil society and state institutions.

Out of all the institutions that promote international development, there is little doubt that the United Nations—since its inception in 1945—has been the most prominent in sponsoring, financing, and coordinating development aid and humanitarian assistance. Embedded into the very preamble of its founding charter, the UN pledged “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom... [and] employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social



advancement of all peoples.” To do so, the UN established its main development finance arm, the World Bank, in addition to myriad geographic and functional programmes. (UN, 1945)

As one of the six main UN bodies, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) oversees all of the commissions tasked with promoting development in distinct sectors, including: social development, sustainable development, population development, science/technology development, agricultural development, and industrial development, among others. (ECOSOC, 2014)

More specifically, the UN administers two main categories of development agencies: (1) those that focus on a particular geographic area—such as the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER); and (2) those that focus on overarching development themes. Some striking instances of the latter include the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). To optimize coordination and cooperation between these agencies and to acknowledge the crosscutting nature of development, the UN Development Group (UNDG) was established in 1997 with the objective of aggregating the 32 funds, programmes, and agencies for development. (UNDG, 2014)

Yet, all of these development initiatives are dwarfed by what some would argue is the UN’s signature achievement, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). (Bourguignon et al, 2010) Conceived in 2000 to streamline political will, financial support, and social awareness for the world’s greatest challenges (Bourguignon et al, 2010; UNDP, 2014), the MDGs have achieved universal acclaim as the gold standard for development and have culminated in major progress towards social uplift across the world. (Devarajan et al, 2002; DESA, 2014) Though the MDGs will “expire” at the end of 2015, the nascent SDGs will soon continue the legacy of advancing human dignity worldwide. However, on the other hand, many scholars have also critiqued the MDGs for picking the low-hanging fruit of easy-to-improve regions to officially fulfill MDG benchmarks while failing to address the dire situation in extremely impoverished and rural areas in these countries. (Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Clemens et al, 2007)

In 2005, over 100 countries participated to adopt the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. (OECD, 2008) The tenets of this non-binding agreement established five principles for the effective implementation of development assistance: (1) all nations take ownership of their national development priorities; (2) internal political reforms, international donors, and equitable development practices align to maximize foreign aid efficacy; (3) donor nations harmonize their assistance and work closely with recipient countries and NGOs to implement field missions and analyze the impact of their aid; (4) all countries maintain measurable benchmarks to ensure results; and (5) both sides remain accountable for honoring fiscal commitments. (OECD, 2008) By the 2008 review, some aspects of the Declaration



showed progress towards the 2010 benchmarks. On the other hand, many of the other ambitious goals failed to translate into positive results; and in fact, by 2011, only one metric had been fully realized.

United in responding to the obstacles confronting the Paris Declaration, the global community joined forces once again to sign the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), an unprecedented collaboration between the United Nations, other IGOs, and “more than 80 developing countries, all OECD donors, and some 3,000 civil society organizations from around the world.” (OECD, 2009) This document focused on capacity building (long-term self-sufficiency) in these developing countries and robust collaboration with civil society to engage citizens and communities, build democratic governance, enforce the rule of law, and hold development projects accountable. (OECD, 2009)

To demonstrate their commitment to development, the international community set 0.7% of each country’s GNI as the optimal level of official development assistance (ODA), although few countries have actually achieved this degree of ODA. (OECD, 2014) Regional development organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also pushed for increased aid flows to promote development projects.

Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is another prominent international organization focused on expanding development assistance and maximizing aid effectiveness. One of the OECD’s main development priorities is pro-poor growth, which argues that any successful approach to development requires socioeconomic uplift for the most destitute rather than merely absolute gains. (OECD, 2009) Comparable in membership to the EU, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is comprised of the following states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU institutions as a whole.

Case Studies

1 | The EU on the Ebola Crisis

by Lilac Peterson

Beginning in March 2014, the Ebola crisis has primarily afflicted Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. (CDC, 2014) According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as of November, there have been over 10,000 reported cases of Ebola and 5,000 deaths. (CDC, 2014) Previous outbreaks have been dwarfed by comparison. (CDC, 2014) The World Bank estimates that these affected countries will lose €5.7 billion in economic productivity in 2014 and—if the crisis persists—€19.5 billion in 2015. (Casinge, 2014) That being said, following her field mission to the West Africa region and subsequent diplomatic trip to the EU in October, U.S. Ambassador to the UN



Samantha Power emphasized that there are “the first tangible signs” that epidemic has reached an inflection point. And, due to the herculean efforts of health workers in West Africa and the robust U.S.-UK response, the region has begun to stabilize. (Power, 2014)

Contrary to expectations of a coordinated global response to this humanitarian disaster, most of the actual boots-on-the-ground activities have actually been unilateral with the UK taking the lead in Sierra Leone, the U.S. managing the outbreak in Liberia, and France overseeing operations in Guinea. At present, Ambassador Power noted that the situations in Sierra Leone and Liberia were beginning to be controlled while the crisis in Guinea is escalating due to the lack of structured command-control response in the country. (Power, 2014) By the same token, UK Prime Minister David Cameron recently declared that “other European countries [need] to do more.” (Kanter and Higgins, 2014)

To mitigate the detrimental effects of the crisis, the EU has provided humanitarian aid to these affected nations, with contributions from EU institutions and member-states totaling over €800 million. (ECHO, 2014) Similarly, the EU has also funneled funds for ground operations through NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Red Cross. The EU Health Commission will soon approve €25 million for pre-clinical research on an Ebola vaccine. (Casinge, 2014)

Moreover, the EC has established procedures for disbursing medical supplies and protective gear, has coordinated an air-bridge for the transportation of resources, and has streamlined the visa and travel procedures for medical evacuations (medevac) of infected EU and third-party health workers in West Africa. (EU Council, 2014) Although the EU has contributed significant humanitarian aid to the region, there has also been criticism that funds have not been specifically dedicated to long-term development assistance aimed at increasing the resilience of their debilitated healthcare infrastructure.

Outside of the EU, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently inaugurated the very first UN mission focused on a health crisis, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). Specifically, UNMEER has been tasked with managing coordination throughout the West African region, which is contrasted with the bilateral efforts of the U.S., UK, and France. (UNMEER, 2014)

Despite the scale of the outbreak, the EU has not instituted EU-wide travel restrictions, a populist policy prescription that is gaining political traction in the U.S. and in Europe. The EU’s open border policy—which allows unrestricted movement within Europe after proper screenings at airports and ports—may potentially increase member-states’ chances of Ebola exposure. (EUROPA, 2009)

Against the public rhetoric for travel bans, according to most scientists and public health experts, instituting travel restrictions will paradoxically result in more harm than good by exacerbating the crisis in West Africa and discouraging foreign health workers from volunteering. (Kanter and Higgins, 2014) Furthermore, illegalizing travel may actually increase the number of potentially infected



who utilize unofficial channels without proper screening, thereby reducing EU oversight over migration flows. (Kanter and Higgins, 2014) Lastly, as a moral prerogative, many have argued that travel bans are akin to abandoning one's citizens and denying their fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter.

Within the private sector, however, some European corporations have taken measures to restrict travel between West Africa and the EU. Recently, four European airlines—including Air France and British Airways—banned flights to Sierra Leone; three also banned flights to Liberia. (Eurosurveillance, 2014) Yet, in light of these restrictions, there is evidence of detrimental effects to both the economic and social stability of the afflicted nations. Within West Africa, these travel bans can cause shortages of food, energy, medical supplies and other essential aid.

Overall, despite the limited number of Ebola cases within EU borders, it is clear that the epidemic still greatly affects all aspects of international stability—security, political, economic, and social—in the EU's southern neighborhood.

2 | EU Foreign Aid to Myanmar

by Danny Tuthill

In 1962, Burma fell to a coup d'état that placed a military junta in power until March 2011. In 1990 an election was held but the junta refused to recognize the results causing the EU to place targeted sanctions on Myanmar restricting a large amount of aid and trade between member-states and Myanmar. (Bünte and Portela, 2012) On top of these sanctions, Myanmar joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997; however, the EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 was never extended to Myanmar due to the country's human rights situation. (Wu, 2013; ASEAN, 2014)

March 2011 saw the liberalization of the junta resulting in more freedom of press and the release of over 700 political prisoners including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. (Wu, 2013) The government also established an independent human rights commission and allowed for the creation of labor unions and striking. Due to these changes the EU lifted all of its sanctions except for the arms embargo and the withdrawal of trade preferences. (Bünte and Portela, 2012)

Prior to the reform, EU assistance was combined with NGO and UN aid on tackling structural poverty. With the government's reform, the EU expanded its aid greatly and has now enumerated the goal of helping “a legitimate, civilian government foster social and economic development.” (DEVCO, 2014) The aid first began with the establishment of an EU office in Yangon as well as a €150 million aid package for democratic reform and inclusive development initiatives. The package focuses on the social sectors of health, education, and livelihoods. (DEVCO, 2014) With this package EU aid to Myanmar has now surpassed €200 million. From November 13-15th, 2013, the first EU-Myanmar Task Force was headed by former Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs (Latvia, EPP). (DEVCO, 2014)



In the coming years, EU aid may be increased from €50 million per year to €90 million per year. (EC, 2013) Also being implanted in 2014 with €2 million in funding is the SWITCH-SMART program that promotes sustainable production of garments produced in Myanmar hoping to bolster small and medium enterprises within the nation. (EC, 2013)

Due to EU funded support of an education program in Myanmar implemented in 2013, over 600,000 children are now attending more than 4,000 primary schools as well as over 900,000 children have received essential learning packages. (EC, 2013) In harder-to-reach areas, 230,000 children under the age of five attended Early Childhood Development services. Finally 28,500 teachers received training in child-centered approaches. (EC, 2013)

The EU has also achieved great strides with civil society through NGOs such as the Non-State Actor program and Local Authorities (NSA/LA) and the Assistance to Uprooted People Program (AUP). (EC, 2013) Working with NSA/LA, the EU has helped to alleviate poverty through Burmese community-based services and small-scale development projects. AUP with EU support has spent €55 million to help protect displaced peoples from human rights abuses, improve living conditions and livelihood as well as promote reconciliation and conflict resolution. (EC, 2013)

In the coming years the EU hopes to foster growth and development, establish a democratic government, and reduce the poverty in Myanmar. If the aid packages continue work as successfully as they have been in the past two years, then EU aid may greatly help Myanmar to excel and become one of the stronger and more developed Southeast Asian nation.

Questions to Consider

1. What is ‘development’?
2. Check the political party affiliation of each of your country’s MEPs and the policy portfolio of your EU Commissioner. Does this affect how your country reacts to external development aid?
3. In which regions and sectors should development assistance be focused... in Europe? in the European neighborhood? Elsewhere? Why? If you could only choose 3-4 development projects for the EU to support, upon what rationale would it be based? Geostrategic interests? Economic interests? Values-based liberalization?
4. How much should the EU try to shape the upcoming SDGs? To what extent should the notion of sustainability determine which development objectives to prioritize or set aside? What other long-term principles can be established for confirming the efficacy of development projects?



5. What kind of framework can be developed for the EU's disbursement of humanitarian aid in crises like Ebola in West Africa or the Syrian refugee situation? Or should the EU devolve these elements of development to individual member-states?
6. To what extent should the EU coordinate or consolidate development spending internally within the EU? What about collaboration with close donor partners like the United States and NGOs?
7. How can the EU justify the proliferation of development aid to its 500 million constituents, and especially to the euroskeptics who won seats in the 2014 EP elections?



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