

a) 2 countries h, f . 2 goods x, y . $i = h, f$

$$x_i = z_{xi} K_{ix}^\alpha L_{ix}^{1-\alpha}$$

$$y_i = z_{yi} K_{iy}^\beta L_{iy}^{1-\beta}$$

with $\beta > 0, \alpha > 0$

i) Firms Maximization problem. Let prices be p_x, p_y and r_i, w_i prices of land and K respectively

firm x

$$\max_{L, K} p_x z_{xi} K_{ix}^\alpha L_{ix}^{1-\alpha} - w_i L_{ix} - r_i K_{ix}$$

foC

$$[L_{ix}] (1-\alpha) p_x z_{xi} K_{ix}^\alpha L_{ix}^{-\alpha} = w_i$$

$$[K_{ix}] \alpha p_x z_{xi} K_{ix}^{\alpha-1} L_{ix}^{1-\alpha} = r_i$$

firm y

$$\max_{L, K} p_y z_{yi} K_{iy}^\beta L_{iy}^{1-\beta} - w_i L_{iy} - r_i K_{iy}$$

foC

$$[L_{iy}] (1-\beta) p_y z_{yi} K_{iy}^\beta L_{iy}^{-\beta} = w_i$$

$$[K_{iy}] \beta p_y z_{yi} K_{iy}^{\beta-1} L_{iy}^{1-\beta} = r_i$$

(i)

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} K_{ix}^{-1} L_{ix}^1 = \frac{r_i}{w_i}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{L_{ix}}{K_{ix}} = \frac{r_i}{w_i}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} = \frac{K_{ix}}{L_{ix}}$$

Similarly we get

$$\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{w_i}{r_i} = \frac{K_{iy}}{L_{iy}}$$

iii) We know that in equilibrium firms make 0 profits therefore

$$p_{xi} z_{xi} k_{ix}^{\alpha} l_{ix}^{1-\alpha} - w_i l_{ix} - r_i k_{ix} = 0$$

$$\rightarrow p_{xi} = \frac{w_i l_{ix} + r_i k_{ix}}{z_{xi} k_{ix}^{\alpha} l_{ix}^{1-\alpha}}$$

On the numerator we have

$$\begin{aligned} & (w_i l_{ix} + r_i k_{ix}) \frac{l_i}{l_i} \\ & w_i l_{ix} + r_i \frac{k_{ix}}{l_{ix}} l_i \\ & w_i l_{ix} + r_i \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right) l_i \\ & w_i l_{ix} + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} w_i l_i \\ & w_i l_{ix} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) \\ & \frac{w_i l_{ix}}{1-\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

Also we know that

$$x_i = z_{xi} k_{ix}^{\alpha} l_{ix}^{1-\alpha} \cdot \frac{l_{ix}^{\alpha}}{k_{ix}^{\alpha}}$$

$$x_i = z_{xi} \left(\frac{k_{ix}}{l_{ix}} \right)^{\alpha} l_{ix}$$

$$x_i = z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^{\alpha} l_{ix}$$

$$p_{xi} = \frac{w_i l_{ix}}{1-\alpha} \cdot \frac{1}{z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^{\alpha} l_{ix}}$$

$$p_{xi} = \frac{w_i l_{ix}}{(1-\alpha) z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^{\alpha} l_{ix}}$$

$$p_{xi} = \frac{w_i}{(1-\alpha) z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^{\alpha}}$$

Similarly

$$p_{yi} = \frac{w_i}{(1-\beta) z_{yi} \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^{\beta}}$$

Then

$$\frac{p_{xi}}{p_{yi}} = \frac{\frac{w_i}{(1-\alpha) z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^\alpha}}{\frac{w_i}{(1-\beta) z_{yi} \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^\beta}}$$

$$\frac{p_{xi}}{p_{yi}} = \frac{(1-\beta) z_{yi} \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^\beta}{(1-\alpha) z_{xi} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_i}{r_i} \right)^\alpha}$$

iv) What forces explain comparative advantages?

It depends on mainly 2 things, first which good uses one factor intensively this is (α, β) levels, and which factor is more abundant (K, L, endowments).

v) By FPE theorem by Samuelson, yes as long as they share the same Z and FPE doesn't occur.