BPF as a fundamentally better dataplane

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BPF, a general purpose engine



Minimal instruction set architecture with two major design goals:



1) Low overhead when mapping to native code, in particular: x86-64, arm64



2) Must be verifiable for safety by the kernel at program load time.



Kernel provides framework of building blocks and attachment points.



Is BPF a generic virtual machine? No.



Is BPF a fully generic instruction set? No.



It's an instruction set with C calling convention in mind.



Why? Kernel is written in C and BPF needs to efficiently interact with the kernel. Approx 150 BPF kernel helpers, 30 maps.



BPF: 114 instructions, 11 registers

x86-64: 2000+ instructions, 16 registers



LLVM is able to translate "BPF-restricted" C into BPF instructions.



How far off is "BPF" C from generic C?



BPF has seen major advances such as BPF-2-BPF function calls, bounded loops, global variables, static linking, BTF, up to 1 Mio instructions / program, ...



This already allows for solving a *lot* of interesting production issues.

Few hand-picked examples next ...





Example: DoS via packet of death



Packet hash in network stack's RX path used for many things (e.g. to steer traffic among CPUs).



Packet hash from NIC might have less entropy, not covering L4 headers or encaps. Kernel recalculates in SW.



net: flow_dissector: fail on evil iph->ihl

We don't validate iph->ihl which may lead a dead loop if we meet a IPIP skb whose iph->ihl is zero. Fix this by failing immediately when iph->ihl is evil (less than 5).

This issue were introduced by commit ec5efe7946280d1e84603389a1030ccec0a767ae (rps: support IPIP encapsulation).

```
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
```

(Bug exposed for 2 years, hit many production kernels in meantime.)



Typical (traditional) workflow:



Wait until the fix hits stable kernels.



Then wait until distros backport it to their own kernels. Test it and ...



... then successively rollout new kernel into production, steering traffic away from live nodes for reboot.



Traditional tooling like netfilter would not have protected nodes since hash can be retrieved much earlier.



A BPF-based workflow has 2 options:



1) Drop these bogus packets right in the driver at XDP layer with BPF



BPF program can be atomically added in XDP while live traffic is flowing.



No need to wait for distro kernels.

No reboot / service disruption required.

Kernel upgrade can be planned without pressure later.



2) Replace kernel's flow dissector with BPF



BPF program doing the packet parsing.

Tailored to the production use case, that is, only parse what is *really* needed.



No bogus packet access, loops, etc, given safety checked by BPF verifier. Also rolled out atomically & without service disruption.



Improving kernel's scalability and extensibility with BPF

Improving kernel's scalability/extensibility with BPF



Cloud native example: co-location of service load balancer with regular user workloads on every node.


Improving kernel's scalability/extensibility with BPF



Moving load balancing from legacy subsystems to BPF at XDP layer reduces CPU cost significantly, and achieves DPDK speeds.

Improving kernel's scalability/extensibility with BPF








Same for firewalling policies for inbound packets. Freed up CPU cycles can then be spent on user workloads instead.




DDoS packet drop performance (higher is better)











... all with BPF on upstream kernel drivers.

No busy-polling CPUs. No user-kernel

boundary crossing.




And with reusing kernel infrastructure such as fib tables via BPF. (Instead of bypassing everything.)



BPF / XDP service load balancers: Katran, Cilium, Unimog




A BPF-based dataplane also helps for policy enforcement or moving traffic in and out of containers or Pods.






BPF program attached to cgroup v2 in this case. Enables fine-grained, scalable per Pod policies. No packet NAT for load balancing.












Low-latency net ns switch into Pod from BPF. Automatic L2 resolution for traffic from Pod. Both directions now avoid host stack.




TCP_SENDFILE performance, single stream, v5.10 (higher is better)



Xeon E3-1240, 3.4 GHz each (4 cores, HT off), back to back via nfp, IRQs pinned to CPUs, tuned with profile network-throughput From Pod ns: netperf -H <remote-pod-ip> -t TCP_SENDFILE -T0,0 -P0 -s2 -l 60 -D 2 -f g



TCP_RR performance, single session, v5.10 (higher is better)



Xeon E3-1240, 3.4 GHz each (4 cores, HT off), back to back via nfp, IRQs pinned to CPUs, tuned with profile network-latency From Pod ns: percpu_netperf <remote-pod-ip> (https://github.com/borkmann/netperf_scripts/blob/master/percpu_netperf)




Lock-less rate-limiting on multi-queue via BPF and Earliest Departure Time (EDT).



BPF classifies network traffic to Pod and then sets packet departure time based on user defined bandwidth rate.




FQ qdisc schedules packet under this time constraint.





Transmission latency (lower is better)



 $99p \rightarrow 10x$ latency reduction

95p → **20x latency reduction** 50p



There are many more examples such as BPF implemented TCP congestion control, custom TCP header options, ...

TCP CUBIC

```
void BPF STRUCT OPS(bictcp cong avoid, struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked)
        struct tcp sock *tp = tcp sk(sk);
        struct bictcp *ca = inet csk ca(sk);
        if (!tcp is cwnd limited(sk))
                return;
        if (tcp in slow start(tp)) {
                if (hystart && after(ack, ca->end seg))
                        bictcp hystart reset(sk);
                acked = tcp slow start(tp, acked);
                if (!acked)
                        return:
        bictcp update(ca, tp->snd cwnd, acked);
        tcp cong avoid ai(tp, ca->cnt, acked);
 u32 BPF STRUCT OPS(bictcp recalc ssthresh, struct sock *sk)
        const struct tcp sock *tp = tcp sk(sk);
        struct bictcp *ca = inet csk ca(sk);
        ca->epoch start = 0; /* end of epoch */
        /* Wmax and fast convergence */
        if (tp->snd cwnd < ca->last max cwnd && fast convergence)
                ca->last max cwnd = (tp->snd cwnd * (BICTCP BETA SCALE + beta))
                        / (2 * BICTCP BETA SCALE);
        else
                ca->last max cwnd = tp->snd cwnd;
        return max((tp->snd cwnd * beta) / BICTCP BETA SCALE, 2U);
```

```
static void bictcp cong avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked)
        struct tcp sock *tp = tcp sk(sk);
       struct bictcp *ca = inet csk ca(sk);
        if (!tcp is cwnd limited(sk))
                return;
        if (tcp in slow start(tp)) {
                if (hystart && after(ack, ca->end seq))
                        bictcp hystart reset(sk);
                acked = tcp slow start(tp, acked);
                if (!acked)
                        return;
       bictcp update(ca, tp->snd cwnd, acked);
        tcp cong avoid ai(tp, ca->cnt, acked);
static u32 bictcp recalc ssthresh(struct sock *sk)
        const struct tcp sock *tp = tcp sk(sk);
       struct bictcp *ca = inet csk ca(sk);
       ca->epoch start = 0; /* end of epoch */
        /* Wmax and fast convergence */
       if (tp->snd cwnd < ca->last max cwnd && fast convergence)
                ca->last max cwnd = (tp->snd cwnd * (BICTCP BETA SCALE + beta))
                        / (2 * BICTCP BETA SCALE);
        else
                ca->last max cwnd = tp->snd cwnd;
       return max((tp->snd cwnd * beta) / BICTCP BETA SCALE, 2U);
```



Short turnaround time to experiment, develop and deploy changes; safety checked, stable API in contrast to kernel modules.



Allows to interoperate and extend feedback with data from other BPF programs.



And *simplifies* control plane too when BPF used in multiple subsystems. Less overall dependencies and moving parts.



Extended BPF has been around for 6 years by now, yet it feels the potential is so huge that we're still just at the very beginning.


Future: Tiny core kernel enriched with BPF





Thanks! Questions?





BPF as dataplane ...

fully programmable
highly scalable
safety verified
solving production issues