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workspaceapps.go
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workspaceapps.go
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package coderd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
"cdr.dev/slog"
"github.com/coder/coder/coderd/database"
"github.com/coder/coder/coderd/httpapi"
"github.com/coder/coder/coderd/httpmw"
"github.com/coder/coder/coderd/rbac"
"github.com/coder/coder/coderd/tracing"
"github.com/coder/coder/codersdk"
"github.com/coder/coder/site"
)
const (
// This needs to be a super unique query parameter because we don't want to
// conflict with query parameters that users may use.
//nolint:gosec
subdomainProxyAPIKeyParam = "coder_application_connect_api_key_35e783"
// redirectURIQueryParam is the query param for the app URL to be passed
// back to the API auth endpoint on the main access URL.
redirectURIQueryParam = "redirect_uri"
// appLogoutHostname is the hostname to use for the logout redirect. When
// the dashboard logs out, it will redirect to this subdomain of the app
// hostname, and the server will remove the cookie and redirect to the main
// login page.
// It is important that this URL can never match a valid app hostname.
appLogoutHostname = "coder-logout"
)
// nonCanonicalHeaders is a map from "canonical" headers to the actual header we
// should send to the app in the workspace. Some headers (such as the websocket
// upgrade headers from RFC 6455) are not canonical according to the HTTP/1
// spec. Golang has said that they will not add custom cases for these headers,
// so we need to do it ourselves.
//
// Some apps our customers use are sensitive to the case of these headers.
//
// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/18495
var nonCanonicalHeaders = map[string]string{
"Sec-Websocket-Accept": "Sec-WebSocket-Accept",
"Sec-Websocket-Extensions": "Sec-WebSocket-Extensions",
"Sec-Websocket-Key": "Sec-WebSocket-Key",
"Sec-Websocket-Protocol": "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol",
"Sec-Websocket-Version": "Sec-WebSocket-Version",
}
type workspaceAppAccessMethod string
const (
workspaceAppAccessMethodPath workspaceAppAccessMethod = "path"
workspaceAppAccessMethodSubdomain workspaceAppAccessMethod = "subdomain"
)
// @Summary Get applications host
// @ID get-applications-host
// @Security CoderSessionToken
// @Produce json
// @Tags Applications
// @Success 200 {object} codersdk.GetAppHostResponse
// @Router /applications/host [get]
func (api *API) appHost(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host := api.AppHostname
if host != "" && api.AccessURL.Port() != "" {
host += fmt.Sprintf(":%s", api.AccessURL.Port())
}
httpapi.Write(r.Context(), rw, http.StatusOK, codersdk.GetAppHostResponse{
Host: host,
})
}
// workspaceAppsProxyPath proxies requests to a workspace application
// through a relative URL path.
func (api *API) workspaceAppsProxyPath(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
workspace := httpmw.WorkspaceParam(r)
agent := httpmw.WorkspaceAgentParam(r)
if api.DeploymentConfig.DisablePathApps.Value {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
Title: "Unauthorized",
Description: "Path-based applications are disabled on this Coder deployment by the administrator.",
RetryEnabled: false,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return
}
// We do not support port proxying on paths, so lookup the app by slug.
appSlug := chi.URLParam(r, "workspaceapp")
app, ok := api.lookupWorkspaceApp(rw, r, agent.ID, appSlug)
if !ok {
return
}
appSharingLevel := database.AppSharingLevelOwner
if app.SharingLevel != "" {
appSharingLevel = app.SharingLevel
}
authed, ok := api.fetchWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw, r, workspaceAppAccessMethodPath, workspace, appSharingLevel)
if !ok {
return
}
if !authed {
_, hasAPIKey := httpmw.APIKeyOptional(r)
if hasAPIKey {
// The request has a valid API key but insufficient permissions.
renderApplicationNotFound(rw, r, api.AccessURL)
return
}
// Redirect to login as they don't have permission to access the app and
// they aren't signed in.
httpmw.RedirectToLogin(rw, r, httpmw.SignedOutErrorMessage)
return
}
// Determine the real path that was hit. The * URL parameter in Chi will not
// include the leading slash if it was present, so we need to add it back.
chiPath := chi.URLParam(r, "*")
basePath := strings.TrimSuffix(r.URL.Path, chiPath)
if strings.HasSuffix(basePath, "/") {
chiPath = "/" + chiPath
}
api.proxyWorkspaceApplication(proxyApplication{
AccessMethod: workspaceAppAccessMethodPath,
Workspace: workspace,
Agent: agent,
App: &app,
Port: 0,
Path: chiPath,
}, rw, r)
}
// handleSubdomainApplications handles subdomain-based application proxy
// requests (aka. DevURLs in Coder V1).
//
// There are a lot of paths here:
// 1. If api.AppHostname is not set then we pass on.
// 2. If we can't read the request hostname then we return a 400.
// 3. If the request hostname matches api.AccessURL then we pass on.
// 5. We split the subdomain into the subdomain and the "rest". If there are no
// periods in the hostname then we pass on.
// 5. We parse the subdomain into a httpapi.ApplicationURL struct. If we
// encounter an error:
// a. If the "rest" does not match api.AppHostname then we pass on;
// b. Otherwise, we return a 400.
// 6. Finally, we verify that the "rest" matches api.AppHostname, else we
// return a 404.
//
// Rationales for each of the above steps:
// 1. We pass on if api.AppHostname is not set to avoid returning any errors if
// `--app-hostname` is not configured.
// 2. Every request should have a valid Host header anyways.
// 3. We pass on if the request hostname matches api.AccessURL so we can
// support having the access URL be at the same level as the application
// base hostname.
// 4. We pass on if there are no periods in the hostname as application URLs
// must be a subdomain of a hostname, which implies there must be at least
// one period.
// 5. a. If the request subdomain is not a valid application URL, and the
// "rest" does not match api.AppHostname, then it is very unlikely that
// the request was intended for this handler. We pass on.
// b. If the request subdomain is not a valid application URL, but the
// "rest" matches api.AppHostname, then we return a 400 because the
// request is probably a typo or something.
// 6. We finally verify that the "rest" matches api.AppHostname for security
// purposes regarding re-authentication and application proxy session
// tokens.
func (api *API) handleSubdomainApplications(middlewares ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Step 1: Pass on if subdomain-based application proxying is not
// configured.
if api.AppHostname == "" || api.AppHostnameRegex == nil {
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
return
}
// Step 2: Get the request Host.
host := httpapi.RequestHost(r)
if host == "" {
if r.URL.Path == "/derp" {
// The /derp endpoint is used by wireguard clients to tunnel
// through coderd. For some reason these requests don't set
// a Host header properly sometimes in tests (no idea how),
// which causes this path to get hit.
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Could not determine request Host.",
})
return
}
// Steps 3-6: Parse application from subdomain.
app, ok := api.parseWorkspaceApplicationHostname(rw, r, next, host)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceAgentKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", app.WorkspaceName, app.AgentName)
chiCtx := chi.RouteContext(ctx)
chiCtx.URLParams.Add("workspace_and_agent", workspaceAgentKey)
chiCtx.URLParams.Add("user", app.Username)
// Use the passed in app middlewares before passing to the proxy app.
mws := chi.Middlewares(middlewares)
mws.Handler(http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
workspace := httpmw.WorkspaceParam(r)
agent := httpmw.WorkspaceAgentParam(r)
var workspaceAppPtr *database.WorkspaceApp
if app.AppSlug != "" {
workspaceApp, ok := api.lookupWorkspaceApp(rw, r, agent.ID, app.AppSlug)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceAppPtr = &workspaceApp
}
// Verify application auth. This function will redirect or
// return an error page if the user doesn't have permission.
sharingLevel := database.AppSharingLevelOwner
if workspaceAppPtr != nil && workspaceAppPtr.SharingLevel != "" {
sharingLevel = workspaceAppPtr.SharingLevel
}
if !api.verifyWorkspaceApplicationSubdomainAuth(rw, r, host, workspace, sharingLevel) {
return
}
api.proxyWorkspaceApplication(proxyApplication{
AccessMethod: workspaceAppAccessMethodSubdomain,
Workspace: workspace,
Agent: agent,
App: workspaceAppPtr,
Port: app.Port,
Path: r.URL.Path,
}, rw, r)
})).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
func (api *API) parseWorkspaceApplicationHostname(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next http.Handler, host string) (httpapi.ApplicationURL, bool) {
// Check if the hostname matches the access URL. If it does, the user was
// definitely trying to connect to the dashboard/API.
if httpapi.HostnamesMatch(api.AccessURL.Hostname(), host) {
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
return httpapi.ApplicationURL{}, false
}
// If there are no periods in the hostname, then it can't be a valid
// application URL.
if !strings.Contains(host, ".") {
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
return httpapi.ApplicationURL{}, false
}
// Split the subdomain so we can parse the application details and verify it
// matches the configured app hostname later.
subdomain, ok := httpapi.ExecuteHostnamePattern(api.AppHostnameRegex, host)
if !ok {
// Doesn't match the regex, so it's not a valid application URL.
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
return httpapi.ApplicationURL{}, false
}
// Check if the request is part of a logout flow.
if subdomain == appLogoutHostname {
api.handleWorkspaceAppLogout(rw, r)
return httpapi.ApplicationURL{}, false
}
// Parse the application URL from the subdomain.
app, err := httpapi.ParseSubdomainAppURL(subdomain)
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Title: "Invalid application URL",
Description: fmt.Sprintf("Could not parse subdomain application URL %q: %s", subdomain, err.Error()),
RetryEnabled: false,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return httpapi.ApplicationURL{}, false
}
return app, true
}
func (api *API) handleWorkspaceAppLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Delete the API key and cookie first before attempting to parse/validate
// the redirect URI.
cookie, err := r.Cookie(httpmw.DevURLSessionTokenCookie)
if err == nil && cookie.Value != "" {
id, secret, err := httpmw.SplitAPIToken(cookie.Value)
// If it's not a valid token then we don't need to delete it from the
// database, but we'll still delete the cookie.
if err == nil {
// To avoid a situation where someone overloads the API with
// different auth formats, and tricks this endpoint into deleting an
// unchecked API key, we validate that the secret matches the secret
// we store in the database.
apiKey, err := api.Database.GetAPIKeyByID(ctx, id)
if err != nil && !xerrors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to lookup API key.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// This is wrapped in `err == nil` because if the API key doesn't
// exist, we still want to delete the cookie.
if err == nil {
hashedSecret := sha256.Sum256([]byte(secret))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(apiKey.HashedSecret, hashedSecret[:]) != 1 {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: httpmw.SignedOutErrorMessage,
Detail: "API key secret is invalid.",
})
return
}
err = api.Database.DeleteAPIKeyByID(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to delete API key.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
}
}
}
if !api.setWorkspaceAppCookie(rw, r, "") {
return
}
// Read the redirect URI from the query string.
redirectURI := r.URL.Query().Get(redirectURIQueryParam)
if redirectURI == "" {
redirectURI = api.AccessURL.String()
} else {
// Validate that the redirect URI is a valid URL and exists on the same
// host as the access URL or an app URL.
parsedRedirectURI, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Title: "Invalid redirect URI",
Description: fmt.Sprintf("Could not parse redirect URI %q: %s", redirectURI, err.Error()),
RetryEnabled: false,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return
}
// Check if the redirect URI is on the same host as the access URL or an
// app URL.
ok := httpapi.HostnamesMatch(api.AccessURL.Hostname(), parsedRedirectURI.Hostname())
if !ok && api.AppHostnameRegex != nil {
// We could also check that it's a valid application URL for
// completeness, but this check should be good enough.
_, ok = httpapi.ExecuteHostnamePattern(api.AppHostnameRegex, parsedRedirectURI.Hostname())
}
if !ok {
// The redirect URI they provided is not allowed, but we don't want
// to return an error page because it'll interrupt the logout flow,
// so we just use the default access URL.
parsedRedirectURI = api.AccessURL
}
redirectURI = parsedRedirectURI.String()
}
http.Redirect(rw, r, redirectURI, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}
// lookupWorkspaceApp looks up the workspace application by slug in the given
// agent and returns it. If the application is not found or there was a server
// error while looking it up, an HTML error page is returned and false is
// returned so the caller can return early.
func (api *API) lookupWorkspaceApp(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, agentID uuid.UUID, appSlug string) (database.WorkspaceApp, bool) {
app, err := api.Database.GetWorkspaceAppByAgentIDAndSlug(r.Context(), database.GetWorkspaceAppByAgentIDAndSlugParams{
AgentID: agentID,
Slug: appSlug,
})
if xerrors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
renderApplicationNotFound(rw, r, api.AccessURL)
return database.WorkspaceApp{}, false
}
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusInternalServerError,
Title: "Internal Server Error",
Description: "Could not fetch workspace application: " + err.Error(),
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return database.WorkspaceApp{}, false
}
return app, true
}
//nolint:revive
func (api *API) authorizeWorkspaceApp(r *http.Request, accessMethod workspaceAppAccessMethod, sharingLevel database.AppSharingLevel, workspace database.Workspace) (bool, error) {
ctx := r.Context()
if accessMethod == "" {
accessMethod = workspaceAppAccessMethodPath
}
isPathApp := accessMethod == workspaceAppAccessMethodPath
// If path-based app sharing is disabled (which is the default), we can
// force the sharing level to be "owner" so that the user can only access
// their own apps.
//
// Site owners are blocked from accessing path-based apps unless the
// Dangerous.AllowPathAppSiteOwnerAccess flag is enabled in the check below.
if isPathApp && !api.DeploymentConfig.Dangerous.AllowPathAppSharing.Value {
sharingLevel = database.AppSharingLevelOwner
}
// Short circuit if not authenticated.
roles, ok := httpmw.UserAuthorizationOptional(r)
if !ok {
// The user is not authenticated, so they can only access the app if it
// is public.
return sharingLevel == database.AppSharingLevelPublic, nil
}
// Block anyone from accessing workspaces they don't own in path-based apps
// unless the admin disables this security feature. This blocks site-owners
// from accessing any apps from any user's workspaces.
//
// When the Dangerous.AllowPathAppSharing flag is not enabled, the sharing
// level will be forced to "owner", so this check will always be true for
// workspaces owned by different users.
if isPathApp &&
sharingLevel == database.AppSharingLevelOwner &&
workspace.OwnerID.String() != roles.Actor.ID &&
!api.DeploymentConfig.Dangerous.AllowPathAppSiteOwnerAccess.Value {
return false, nil
}
// Do a standard RBAC check. This accounts for share level "owner" and any
// other RBAC rules that may be in place.
//
// Regardless of share level or whether it's enabled or not, the owner of
// the workspace can always access applications (as long as their API key's
// scope allows it).
err := api.Authorizer.Authorize(ctx, roles.Actor, rbac.ActionCreate, workspace.ApplicationConnectRBAC())
if err == nil {
return true, nil
}
switch sharingLevel {
case database.AppSharingLevelOwner:
// We essentially already did this above with the regular RBAC check.
// Owners can always access their own apps according to RBAC rules, so
// they have already been returned from this function.
case database.AppSharingLevelAuthenticated:
// The user is authenticated at this point, but we need to make sure
// that they have ApplicationConnect permissions to their own
// workspaces. This ensures that the key's scope has permission to
// connect to workspace apps.
object := rbac.ResourceWorkspaceApplicationConnect.WithOwner(roles.Actor.ID)
err := api.Authorizer.Authorize(ctx, roles.Actor, rbac.ActionCreate, object)
if err == nil {
return true, nil
}
case database.AppSharingLevelPublic:
// We don't really care about scopes and stuff if it's public anyways.
// Someone with a restricted-scope API key could just not submit the
// API key cookie in the request and access the page.
return true, nil
}
// No checks were successful.
return false, nil
}
// fetchWorkspaceApplicationAuth authorizes the user using api.AppAuthorizer
// for a given app share level in the given workspace. The user's authorization
// status is returned. If a server error occurs, a HTML error page is rendered
// and false is returned so the caller can return early.
func (api *API) fetchWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, accessMethod workspaceAppAccessMethod, workspace database.Workspace, appSharingLevel database.AppSharingLevel) (authed bool, ok bool) {
ok, err := api.authorizeWorkspaceApp(r, accessMethod, appSharingLevel, workspace)
if err != nil {
api.Logger.Error(r.Context(), "authorize workspace app", slog.Error(err))
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusInternalServerError,
Title: "Internal Server Error",
Description: "Could not verify authorization. Please try again or contact an administrator.",
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return false, false
}
return ok, true
}
// checkWorkspaceApplicationAuth authorizes the user using api.AppAuthorizer
// for a given app share level in the given workspace. If the user is not
// authorized or a server error occurs, a discrete HTML error page is rendered
// and false is returned so the caller can return early.
func (api *API) checkWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, accessMethod workspaceAppAccessMethod, workspace database.Workspace, appSharingLevel database.AppSharingLevel) bool {
authed, ok := api.fetchWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw, r, accessMethod, workspace, appSharingLevel)
if !ok {
return false
}
if !authed {
renderApplicationNotFound(rw, r, api.AccessURL)
return false
}
return true
}
// verifyWorkspaceApplicationSubdomainAuth checks that the request is authorized
// to access the given application. If the user does not have a app session key,
// they will be redirected to the route below. If the user does have a session
// key but insufficient permissions a static error page will be rendered.
func (api *API) verifyWorkspaceApplicationSubdomainAuth(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, host string, workspace database.Workspace, appSharingLevel database.AppSharingLevel) bool {
authed, ok := api.fetchWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw, r, workspaceAppAccessMethodSubdomain, workspace, appSharingLevel)
if !ok {
return false
}
if authed {
return true
}
_, hasAPIKey := httpmw.APIKeyOptional(r)
if hasAPIKey {
// The request has a valid API key but insufficient permissions.
renderApplicationNotFound(rw, r, api.AccessURL)
return false
}
// If the request has the special query param then we need to set a cookie
// and strip that query parameter.
if encryptedAPIKey := r.URL.Query().Get(subdomainProxyAPIKeyParam); encryptedAPIKey != "" {
// Exchange the encoded API key for a real one.
_, token, err := decryptAPIKey(r.Context(), api.Database, encryptedAPIKey)
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Title: "Bad Request",
Description: "Could not decrypt API key. Please remove the query parameter and try again.",
// Retry is disabled because the user needs to remove the query
// parameter before they try again.
RetryEnabled: false,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return false
}
api.setWorkspaceAppCookie(rw, r, token)
// Strip the query parameter.
path := r.URL.Path
if path == "" {
path = "/"
}
q := r.URL.Query()
q.Del(subdomainProxyAPIKeyParam)
rawQuery := q.Encode()
if rawQuery != "" {
path += "?" + q.Encode()
}
http.Redirect(rw, r, path, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return false
}
// If the user doesn't have a session key, redirect them to the API endpoint
// for application auth.
redirectURI := *r.URL
redirectURI.Scheme = api.AccessURL.Scheme
redirectURI.Host = host
u := *api.AccessURL
u.Path = "/api/v2/applications/auth-redirect"
q := u.Query()
q.Add(redirectURIQueryParam, redirectURI.String())
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
http.Redirect(rw, r, u.String(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return false
}
// setWorkspaceAppCookie sets a cookie on the workspace app domain. If the app
// hostname cannot be parsed properly, a static error page is rendered and false
// is returned.
//
// If an empty token is supplied, it will clear the cookie.
func (api *API) setWorkspaceAppCookie(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token string) bool {
hostSplit := strings.SplitN(api.AppHostname, ".", 2)
if len(hostSplit) != 2 {
// This should be impossible as we verify the app hostname on
// startup, but we'll check anyways.
api.Logger.Error(r.Context(), "could not split invalid app hostname", slog.F("hostname", api.AppHostname))
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusInternalServerError,
Title: "Internal Server Error",
Description: "The app is configured with an invalid app wildcard hostname. Please contact an administrator.",
RetryEnabled: false,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return false
}
// Set the app cookie for all subdomains of api.AppHostname. This cookie is
// handled properly by the ExtractAPIKey middleware.
//
// We don't set an expiration because the key in the database already has an
// expiration.
maxAge := 0
if token == "" {
maxAge = -1
}
cookieHost := "." + hostSplit[1]
http.SetCookie(rw, &http.Cookie{
Name: httpmw.DevURLSessionTokenCookie,
Value: token,
Domain: cookieHost,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: maxAge,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: api.SecureAuthCookie,
})
return true
}
// workspaceApplicationAuth is an endpoint on the main router that handles
// redirects from the subdomain handler.
//
// This endpoint is under /api so we don't return the friendly error page here.
// Any errors on this endpoint should be errors that are unlikely to happen
// in production unless the user messes with the URL.
//
// @Summary Redirect to URI with encrypted API key
// @ID redirect-to-uri-with-encrypted-api-key
// @Security CoderSessionToken
// @Tags Applications
// @Param redirect_uri query string false "Redirect destination"
// @Success 307
// @Router /applications/auth-redirect [get]
func (api *API) workspaceApplicationAuth(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
if api.AppHostname == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusNotFound, codersdk.Response{
Message: "The server does not accept subdomain-based application requests.",
})
return
}
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
if !api.Authorize(r, rbac.ActionCreate, apiKey) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
// Get the redirect URI from the query parameters and parse it.
redirectURI := r.URL.Query().Get(redirectURIQueryParam)
if redirectURI == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Missing redirect_uri query parameter.",
})
return
}
u, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid redirect_uri query parameter.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Force the redirect URI to use the same scheme as the access URL for
// security purposes.
u.Scheme = api.AccessURL.Scheme
// Ensure that the redirect URI is a subdomain of api.AppHostname and is a
// valid app subdomain.
subdomain, ok := httpapi.ExecuteHostnamePattern(api.AppHostnameRegex, u.Host)
if !ok {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "The redirect_uri query parameter must be a valid app subdomain.",
})
return
}
_, err = httpapi.ParseSubdomainAppURL(subdomain)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "The redirect_uri query parameter must be a valid app subdomain.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Create the application_connect-scoped API key with the same lifetime as
// the current session (defaulting to 1 day, capped to 1 week).
exp := apiKey.ExpiresAt
if exp.IsZero() {
exp = database.Now().Add(time.Hour * 24)
}
if time.Until(exp) > time.Hour*24*7 {
exp = database.Now().Add(time.Hour * 24 * 7)
}
lifetime := apiKey.LifetimeSeconds
if lifetime > int64((time.Hour * 24 * 7).Seconds()) {
lifetime = int64((time.Hour * 24 * 7).Seconds())
}
cookie, err := api.createAPIKey(ctx, createAPIKeyParams{
UserID: apiKey.UserID,
LoginType: database.LoginTypePassword,
ExpiresAt: exp,
LifetimeSeconds: lifetime,
Scope: database.APIKeyScopeApplicationConnect,
})
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to create API key.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Encrypt the API key.
encryptedAPIKey, err := encryptAPIKey(encryptedAPIKeyPayload{
APIKey: cookie.Value,
})
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to encrypt API key.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Redirect to the redirect URI with the encrypted API key in the query
// parameters.
q := u.Query()
q.Set(subdomainProxyAPIKeyParam, encryptedAPIKey)
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
http.Redirect(rw, r, u.String(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}
// proxyApplication are the required fields to proxy a workspace application.
type proxyApplication struct {
AccessMethod workspaceAppAccessMethod
Workspace database.Workspace
Agent database.WorkspaceAgent
// Either App or Port must be set, but not both.
App *database.WorkspaceApp
Port uint16
// SharingLevel MUST be set to database.AppSharingLevelOwner by default for
// ports.
SharingLevel database.AppSharingLevel
// Path must either be empty or have a leading slash.
Path string
}
func (api *API) proxyWorkspaceApplication(proxyApp proxyApplication, rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
sharingLevel := database.AppSharingLevelOwner
if proxyApp.App != nil && proxyApp.App.SharingLevel != "" {
sharingLevel = proxyApp.App.SharingLevel
}
if !api.checkWorkspaceApplicationAuth(rw, r, proxyApp.AccessMethod, proxyApp.Workspace, sharingLevel) {
return
}
// Filter IP headers from untrusted origins!
httpmw.FilterUntrustedOriginHeaders(api.RealIPConfig, r)
// Ensure proper IP headers get sent to the forwarded application.
err := httpmw.EnsureXForwardedForHeader(r)
if err != nil {
httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
return
}
// If the app does not exist, but the app slug is a port number, then route
// to the port as an "anonymous app". We only support HTTP for port-based
// URLs.
//
// This is only supported for subdomain-based applications.
internalURL := fmt.Sprintf("http://127.0.0.1:%d", proxyApp.Port)
if proxyApp.App != nil {
if !proxyApp.App.Url.Valid {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Title: "Bad Request",
Description: fmt.Sprintf("Application %q does not have a URL set.", proxyApp.App.Slug),
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return
}
internalURL = proxyApp.App.Url.String
}
appURL, err := url.Parse(internalURL)
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
Title: "Bad Request",
Description: fmt.Sprintf("Application has an invalid URL %q: %s", internalURL, err.Error()),
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return
}
// Verify that the port is allowed. See the docs above
// `codersdk.MinimumListeningPort` for more details.
port := appURL.Port()
if port != "" {
portInt, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("App URL %q has an invalid port %q.", internalURL, port),
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if portInt < codersdk.MinimumListeningPort {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Application port %d is not permitted. Coder reserves ports less than %d for internal use.", portInt, codersdk.MinimumListeningPort),
})
return
}
}
// Ensure path and query parameter correctness.
if proxyApp.Path == "" {
// Web applications typically request paths relative to the
// root URL. This allows for routing behind a proxy or subpath.
// See https://github.com/coder/code-server/issues/241 for examples.
http.Redirect(rw, r, r.URL.Path+"/", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return
}
if proxyApp.Path == "/" && r.URL.RawQuery == "" && appURL.RawQuery != "" {
// If the application defines a default set of query parameters,
// we should always respect them. The reverse proxy will merge
// query parameters for server-side requests, but sometimes
// client-side applications require the query parameters to render
// properly. With code-server, this is the "folder" param.
r.URL.RawQuery = appURL.RawQuery
http.Redirect(rw, r, r.URL.String(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return
}
r.URL.Path = proxyApp.Path
appURL.RawQuery = ""
proxy := httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(appURL)
proxy.ErrorHandler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
Title: "Bad Gateway",
Description: "Failed to proxy request to application: " + err.Error(),
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
}
conn, release, err := api.workspaceAgentCache.Acquire(r, proxyApp.Agent.ID)
if err != nil {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
Title: "Bad Gateway",
Description: "Could not connect to workspace agent: " + err.Error(),
RetryEnabled: true,
DashboardURL: api.AccessURL.String(),
})
return
}
defer release()
proxy.Transport = conn.HTTPTransport()
// This strips the session token from a workspace app request.
cookieHeaders := r.Header.Values("Cookie")[:]
r.Header.Del("Cookie")
for _, cookieHeader := range cookieHeaders {
r.Header.Add("Cookie", httpapi.StripCoderCookies(cookieHeader))
}
// Convert canonicalized headers to their non-canonicalized counterparts.
// See the comment on `nonCanonicalHeaders` for more information on why this
// is necessary.
for k, v := range r.Header {
if n, ok := nonCanonicalHeaders[k]; ok {
r.Header.Del(k)
r.Header[n] = v
}
}
// end span so we don't get long lived trace data
tracing.EndHTTPSpan(r, http.StatusOK, trace.SpanFromContext(ctx))
proxy.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
}
type encryptedAPIKeyPayload struct {
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
}
// encryptAPIKey encrypts an API key with it's own hashed secret. This is used
// for smuggling (application_connect scoped) API keys securely to app
// hostnames.
//
// We encrypt API keys when smuggling them in query parameters to avoid them
// getting accidentally logged in access logs or stored in browser history.
func encryptAPIKey(data encryptedAPIKeyPayload) (string, error) {
if data.APIKey == "" {
return "", xerrors.New("API key is empty")
}
if data.ExpiresAt.IsZero() {
// Very short expiry as these keys are only used once as part of an
// automatic redirection flow.
data.ExpiresAt = database.Now().Add(time.Minute)
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(data)
if err != nil {
return "", xerrors.Errorf("marshal payload: %w", err)
}
// We use the hashed key secret as the encryption key. The hashed secret is
// stored in the API keys table. The HashedSecret is NEVER returned from the
// API.
//
// We chose to use the key secret as the private key for encryption instead
// of a shared key for a few reasons:
// 1. A single private key used to encrypt every API key would also be
// stored in the database, which means that the risk factor is similar.
// 2. The secret essentially rotates for each key (for free!), since each
// key has a different secret. This means that if someone acquires an
// old database dump they can't decrypt new API keys.
// 3. These tokens are scoped only for application_connect access.
keyID, keySecret, err := httpmw.SplitAPIToken(data.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return "", xerrors.Errorf("split API key: %w", err)
}
// SHA256 the key secret so it matches the hashed secret in the database.
// The key length doesn't matter to the jose.Encrypter.
privateKey := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keySecret))
// JWEs seem to apply a nonce themselves.
encrypter, err := jose.NewEncrypter(
jose.A256GCM,
jose.Recipient{
Algorithm: jose.A256GCMKW,
KeyID: keyID,
Key: privateKey[:],
},
&jose.EncrypterOptions{
Compression: jose.DEFLATE,
},
)